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TAKING THE "ISLAM" OUT OF "ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM":
SOME THOUGHTS FOR SENIOR LEADERS

by

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The intricacies of the Middle East challenge senior leaders and policy makers. Religious issues can complicate America's already tenuous relationships with certain Arab nations. With the best intentions, leaders can inadvertently offend the religious sensitivities of those whose cooperation they seek. The expression "Islamic Fundamentalism" often misrepresents the movements it seeks to describe. More seriously, it confuses the religion of Islam with radicals and fanatics who do not represent the majority of Muslims. This paper urges senior leaders to abandon the term "Islamic Fundamentalism," and it offers recommendations for dealing with the delicate matter of religion in Arab world. Senior leaders are encouraged to make a sharp distinction between the religious fanatics and the Islamic faith.

TAKING THE 'ISLAM' OUT OF "ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM":
SOME THOUGHTS FOR SENIOR LEADERS

With the best of intentions, the young American embarrassed himself and offended his hosts. He was speaking through an interpreter to a Korean church. In trying to endear himself to the congregation he used one of the few Korean words he knew. He referred to the pastor as "moksa." It was the correct word, but he made a grievous error. He forgot to place the polite "nim" at the end of the word. To refer to the pastor as "moksanim" would have been proper, but without the "nim" it was an insult. Some in the congregation gasped; others murmured. The pastor attempted to save the day by explaining to the gathering that their guest simply did not understand the language.

With the best of intentions, it is possible for policy makers and senior leaders to alienate those whose cooperation they seek. Positive relations with the Arab world are important to America's national interests. Yet because of ideological differences, they are often tenuous. Religion is one area ripe for misunderstanding. Unfortunately the Islamic faith is frequently confused with what is mistakenly called "Islamic Fundamentalism." Many moderate Muslims find the connection offensive. This essay offers some suggestions to assist senior leaders in understanding and handling the delicate matter of religion in the Arab world.

A Mistaken Term: "Islamic Fundamentalism"

The term "religious fundamentalism" conjures up a variety of images. For some it implies "hell, fire and brimstone" preaching; for others unusual religious practices such as snake handling. To some the term suggests a literal interpretation of the Bible; to others radical groups committed to destroying their opponents through holy war and terrorism.

The term "fundamentalism" was coined in 1920. A group of conservative Protestant scholars sought to rally believers around the fundamentals of faith. "Fundamentalism" was a response to a perceived threat from religious liberalism and its non-traditional methods of interpreting the Bible. Central to "fundamentalism" was the belief that the Bible was divinely inspired and fully authoritative for Christians.

Over time the term took on a negative connotation. For some it came to imply an anti-intellectual approach to Christianity. In recent years political observers have erroneously applied "fundamentalism" to radical Islamic groups. This new use of the word fosters misunderstanding. There are vast differences between Christian Fundamentalism and religious radicalism in the Arab World. For example, Christian Fundamentalism frequently disparages any relationship between the church and the state. But there is no distinction between religion and politics in what is

commonly called Islamic Fundamentalism.¹

The term "Islamic Fundamentalism" is inaccurate and nearly meaningless. It confuses radical, violent political movements with a great world religion. It promotes a negative stereotype of a faith that claims nearly one-fifth of the world's population. Finally, it offends the religious sensitivities of many moderate Arabs who disavow the tactics employed by the religious fanatics.

I urge senior leaders to abandon the term. "Islamic Fundamentalism" misrepresents the spirit of Islam. Islam is not a blood thirsty religion intent on imposing its will on others by force, as the term sometimes implies. Neither is it a religion of hate and violence. On the contrary, Muslims consistently refer to Allah as "the Merciful, the Compassionate." The Koran states, "Let there be no compulsion in religion."²

Experts in Middle Eastern affairs understand the problem with the term. Iranian opposition leader Mohammed Mohaddessin reluctantly uses it for convention's sake. He notes that when speaking of the situation in Iran, "Khomeinism" would better describe that "fanatical, superficial interpretation of Islam."³ Fuller⁴, Dunn⁵, and Fandy⁶ prefer the term "Islamist" as more accurate and less depreciating of Islam as a religion. Miller⁷ prefers "militant Islam" noting that "Islamic Fundamentalism" is an inappropriate term borrowed from

American Protestantism.

The expression wrongly suggests Islam is a monolithic danger to the West, particularly the United States. The Gulf war clearly showed the error in this thinking. Ideologically diverse Muslim nations were brought together into a coalition with America against another Muslim nation. Leon T. Hadar of the American University School of International Service summarizes: "Islam is neither unified nor a threat to the United States."⁸

I have observed senior military personnel speak of "Islamic Fundamentalism" in the presence of allied Arab officers. Frequently these officers politely attempt to correct the term. They do not want their religion confused with violent or radical movements. It is a sensitive point with them. We use the term much, I think, to the detriment of our national interests. We do not make friends by associating their religion with terrorists and fanatics. At best the term muddies the waters; at worst it may damage delicate relationships.

Movement in the Right Direction

Enlightened leaders understand the problem. A senior military official and expert in the Middle East recently delivered an address at the U.S. Army War College. He discussed regional issues of interest to the United States.

During his presentation he never mentioned "Islamic Fundamentalism," instead he spoke of "religious fanaticism." He frankly confronted the threat the religious fanatics present to the area, but he intentionally avoided identifying them as "Islamic."

Some may contend this is simply a matter of semantics. I would argue that when it comes to emotionally charged issues it is never simply a matter of semantics, it is absolutely a matter of semantics. Words are powerful. How people are likely to understand them is as important as how the speaker intends them. Wise senior leaders will consider how audiences will hear what is said. The impact on the listener may be different from what the speaker meant to say. In delicate matters, it is not always so much a matter of what is said as what is heard.

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Edward P. Djerejian, reflects an approach senior leaders would do well to emulate. Before leaving office he cautioned against misplaced fears concerning radical religious movements in the Middle East:

. . . the United States government does not view Islam as the next "ism" confronting the West or threatening world peace. That is an overly-simplistic response to a complex reality.

The Cold War is not being replaced with a new competition between Islam and the West. . . . Americans recognize Islam as one of the world's great faiths. . . . As Westerners, we acknowledge Islam as an historic civilizing force among the many that have influenced and enriched our culture.'

Secretary of State Warren Christopher has succinctly stated what needs to be reflected at every level: "Islam is not our enemy. What we do oppose is extremism or fanaticism, whether of a religious or secular nature. We part company with those who preach intolerance, abuse human rights or resort to violence in pursuit of their political goals."¹⁰

Recommendations for Senior Leaders

In seeking to maximize the good will of Arab allies, senior leaders can take a cue from the examples just cited. They can take the "Islam" out of "Islamic Fundamentalism." They can abandon the term and replace it with more accurate ones: "extremist", "radical" or "religious fanatic."

However, being successful in such delicate matters involves more than simply modifying the words one uses. It requires sensitivity to what others consider important. Tact and discretion are invaluable assets in dealing with the things another person holds sacred.

A balanced view of religion and extremism is required. It is an error to imply that religious extremism in the Middle East is harmless to American interests. As will be demonstrated below, religious fanatics are capable of disrupting the often tenuous political balance in friendly Arab nations. Many radical groups actively campaign against the West and America specifically. Terrorism is an ever constant danger to American's

abroad and, as recent events have proven, at home.

This must be countered with the fact that religion itself poses no threat to the United States. America is a religiously diverse country. However, religious extremism -- be it Islamic, Jewish, or Christian -- bears watching.

I offer the following suggestions to assist senior leaders as they seek to deal with the issues surrounding Islam and religious extremism in the Middle East.

1. DISTINGUISH BETWEEN RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM.

Leaders must not confuse Islam with the small percent of radical believers who bring discredit to the faith. The views of extremists do not speak for the religion. Islam does not equal fanaticism.¹¹

Confusing Islam with fanaticism discredits the entire faith. It conjures up fears that the religion is dangerous and that Muslims are a threat to the American way of life. Because the actions of a few religious fanatics are identified as "Islamic," the entire religion gets a black eye. One expert summarizes: "Fear of fundamentalism creates a climate in which Muslims and Islamic organizations are guilty until proven innocent. Actions, however heinous, are attributed to Islam rather than to a twisted or distorted interpretation of Islam"¹²

The religious extremists are fragmented, anti-establishment groups each championing its own agenda. Their followings grow

wherever there is perceived injustice in the existing state. Poor social and economic conditions strengthen the appeal of their promises of a better life. They cloak their political messages in religious rhetoric, thus adding the weight of God to their causes.

Perhaps an analogy will help. Many members of the Ku Klux Klan are also members of Christian churches. Klansmen frequently quote the Bible to support their racist ideas. They employ religious symbols (e.g. a burning cross). Yet few thoughtful observers would call the KKK Christian. If the KKK came into power in Alabama (or Montana, for that matter), one would hardly consider it a Christian state. As it is a mistake to identify the KKK with Christianity, so one should not confuse religious fanaticism with Islam.

In seeking to separate the Islamic faith from the religious fanatics, it is helpful to note points common to Islam and the Judeo-Christian roots of American society. The Jewish faith traces its roots Abraham, the patriarch; so does Islam.¹³ Where Judaism follows Abraham's lineage through his son Isaac, Islam looks to Ishmael (Abraham's son through his wife's handmaiden, Hagar). Both Judaism and Islam hold Moses in high esteem. Both see him as a deliverer and law giver.¹⁴ Islam also honors him with the exalted title prophet.¹⁵ Other Old Testament characters recognized in the Koran include (but are not limited to) Aaron, David, Jacob, and Solomon.

Islam recognizes New Testament personages as well. Jesus is given the title Messiah.¹⁶ Mary is not only recognized as his mother, but allusion is made to the virgin birth.¹⁷ The Twelve Apostles are considered inspired¹⁸ and John the Baptist is listed among the righteous.¹⁹

The Koran has much to say about Jews and Christians. They are referred to as "People of the Book" (also called "People of the Scripture"). Though the Koranic references express a variety of feelings about the "People of the Book," one theme is common. They have some kinship to Muslims in that the same God revealed scripture to Jews and Christians as well as Muslims. The common heritage is viewed favorably, though it is clear that Jews and Christians must return to the ways of God as revealed by Mohammed if they are to receive the full blessings of God.

Though many modern Muslims view the "People of the Book" in a more favorable light than they do those of other faiths, religious radicals rarely make such a distinction. From the radical's perspective, "Christians and Jews are generally regarded as unbelievers rather than 'People of the Book' because of their connections with Western (Christian) colonialism and Zionism. They are seen as partners in a Judeo-Christian conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world."²⁰

2. EXAMINE ATTITUDES TOWARD ISLAM. Attitudes and stereotypes tend to betray themselves. Thus it behooves senior leaders to

examine what they believe about Islam, Muslims and Arabs. Leaders must be ever vigilant about their attitudes for they will eventually convey those attitudes to others.

Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias can be found easily in our society. Hollywood, television, and literature have portrayed Arabs in a negative light. The news media are quick to identify many terrorist activities as Islamic (note the World Trade Center bombing) when such acts do not represent the main line teachings of the faith.

One popular misconception is of an Islamic conspiracy.²¹ Isolated extremist activities are viewed as part of an international Islamic plot. Such misunderstanding is fueled by an erroneous interpretation of the term *jihad* (often simplistically mistranslated "holy war"). For most Muslims the term implies a struggle "to realize God's will, to lead virtuous lives, and to extend the Islamic community through preaching, education, and so on."²² At one level *jihad* is an individual quest for personal faithfulness; at another it represents an evangelistic zeal to spread the faith to others.

It is true some radical groups call for a holy war against the West. However these groups depart from the traditional Islamic interpretation of *jihad*. They exploit the term to propagate violence. It is interesting to note Saadam Hussein's feeble attempt to rally Arab sentiment by calling for a *jihad* against the United States and the coalition during the Gulf War.

Not only did his call fail, it caused some Muslim leaders within the coalition to affirm their cause was a *jihad* against Saadam for his treachery which disgraced Islam.

The religious extremists are not united. They are a "mosaic of many national, ethnic and religious groups competing for power and influence . . ." and a "kaleidoscope producing shifting balances of power and overlapping ideological configurations which neither Tehran -- nor Washington -- can control."²³

3. **VALIDATE ISLAM.** By this I mean publicly recognize its value and importance. One need not embrace Islam to validate it. Validation does not say, "I believe what you believe." Rather it says, "I understand your religion is significant to you, and I respect the prominent part it plays in your life. Because your faith is meaningful to you, I will regard it as important in the way I deal with you."

Validation does not mean we concur with another on all points, but it does mean we treat kindly what that person holds dear. It is an attitude of positive regard, even when we differ or disagree.

Validating Islam includes affirming its positive characteristics while remaining faithful to one's own beliefs. Islam has much to commend it. It has been a great civilizing influence in the world. It currently fosters many benevolent and humanitarian efforts.²⁴ One need only casual contact with a

devout Muslim to observe how faith influences personal conduct (for example daily prayer, diet, and observance of holy days such as Ramadan) .

Islam's code of morality has much to commend it. "Belief and action are to be joined; Muslims are not only to know and believe, but to act and implement. Worship and devotion to God embrace both private and public life, affecting not only prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, but social behaviors as well."²⁵

For example the Koran teaches the solemn responsibility to care justly for orphans: "Give unto orphans their wealth. Exchange not the good for the bad (in your management thereof) nor absorb their wealth into your own. Lo! that would be a great sin. . . .Lo! Those who devour the wealth of orphans wrongfully, they do but swallow fire into their bellies, and they will be exposed to burning flame."²⁶ Social responsibility is also set forth as a norm for personal conduct: "(It is) to free a slave, and to feed in the day of hunger an orphan near of kin, or some poor wretch in misery, and to be of those who believe and exhort one another to perseverance and exhort one another to pity. Their place will be on the right hand."²⁷

The Koran strictly forbids incest.²⁸ Additionally there are laws concerning modesty, marriage, divorce, diet, adultery, bribes, the abuse of women, and a host of other matters which parallel many of the mores of the Judeo-Christian ethic.²⁹ One need not look hard to find material that makes it easy to

validate Islam.

4. RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Religious belief is only one element of a national ethos. Yet strategic thinkers must consider its significance as it is often part of the fiber and soul of a society. To ignore a people's faith is to lose valuable insight into how they think, how they feel, and how they can be expected to act.

The Balkan situation is instructive in this regard. Religious differences not only exacerbate the problem but are part of the origin of the conflict. Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, and several branches of the Orthodox Church fortify the ethnic and national identities of the region. Historically the religious issues have served to intensify ethnic animosities.³⁰ "Just as enormous pressures created the chaotic physical geography of the Balkans, so, too, have language, religion, ethnic origin, and culture extended great forces on the region. These forces have no less impact today and undoubtedly will continue to vex policy makers. . . ."³¹

Religion in the Arab world is probably a more important influence than it is in much of the West. This is not to minimize its importance in the West. It is to say Islam plays a significant role in almost every aspect of daily life in the Middle East. Religious influence runs much deeper in the affairs of state in many Arab nations than it does in the United States.

For example, businesses in the United States do not close regularly each day for prayer time as they do in Saudi Arabia.

Important as religion is, it is only one part of the regional dynamic. Other factors are also significant: economics, national security needs, and interdependence with the West. Political and social concerns often carry as much weight as theological dogma. Even in a radical state such as Iran, some pragmatists seek to temper strict religious sentiment with the realities of needing to improve relations with the West.

One of the goals of Islamic Revivalism³² is to minimize Western influence in Muslim nations. At the same time it takes a pragmatic approach about retaining what it considers to be the valuable aspects of Western technology. It seeks to replace the perceived failure of secular states with governments based on the Koran and the *Shaira*, the Islamic legal code. It envisions a struggle against corruption and social injustice. These ideas alone pose no threat to the West. However religious extremists have taken revivalism further. For them it means an active crusade against the West, particularly the United States.

Religious feeling will continue to play a significant role in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. Senior leaders must continue to take the religious element into consideration. Any arrogant approach that minimizes the role of religion runs the risk of harming America's interests in the region. Senior leaders must consider the complex and delicate religious issues

Middle Eastern leaders face, especially in the more volatile, less stable states. American leaders cannot expect Arab leaders to behave in an "American" way.

5. RECOGNIZE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN EXTREMIST GROUPS. Just as Islamic states differ (e.g. Iran is vastly different from Saudi Arabia), so do the religious radicals. Islamic movements exist not as a single entity, but along a broad continuum. Some walk a fine line between theory and practice when dealing with the West. Thus each group "must be judged within the political context of its own country, its own agenda, and its own ideological orientation."³³

A good case in point is Al-Tilimsani. Though generally considered a "fundamentalist" leader, he attempted to assist President Carter in gaining the release of the hostages during the Iranian crisis. Though he did not succeed, he did make a telling statement. He noted that in any conflict between the United States and a power that was not a "People of the Book" (i.e., Jewish or Christian) "We would be with you unconditionally."³⁴

Given the differences between the radicals it seems prudent to do two things. First, refrain from viewing all religious radicals as unreachable, thus negating the possibility of any future dialogue with more moderate groups. Second, avoid policy decisions and statements that are certain to offend general

Islamic sensitivities in the region thus provoking radical responses.

6. **KEEP THE THREAT IN PERSPECTIVE.** The rapidly changing nature of the Middle East makes it difficult to portray an accurate picture of the future. One can be certain, however, that religious fanatics will continue to play a part in the stability of the region. Even in realms now deemed stable, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, radical religious sentiments exist that could complicate the picture and threaten stability.³⁵ A religiously inspired overthrow of the government in Egypt is unlikely. But if economic and social conditions deteriorate, religious radicals could make dangerous progress.³⁶ In Saudi Arabia a new wave of religious extremism "dangerously peppered with Western-oriented demands for democratic reforms is beginning to threaten the authoritarian rule of the monarchy. . . ." ³⁷

American interest in the stability of the region is clear.³⁸ The Gulf War was a strong statement of America's resolve to retain uninhibited access to the Gulf and its natural resources. Any threat to the Middle East is a threat to American security. Policy makers must seriously consider the potential of religious fanatics to agitate and possibly destabilize vital states.

On the surface, a policy of funding anti-terrorist activities in friendly nations might seem appropriate. Some policy makers have championed this approach. But Pelletiere posits correctly

that such a course alone is misguided.³⁹ No current radical group has sufficient resources to topple an existing regime. Religious fanatics themselves are not a direct threat to American interests.⁴⁰

Yet this must be tempered with the fact that religious fanaticism does pose a threat to some of the established governments in Arab countries.⁴¹ The threat of extremists generating regional class revolts is a possibility fraught with danger. "The tremendous energy released by something of this order . . . could easily disorient [a legitimate government] and make it incapable of governing."⁴²

It is unlikely a revolutionary movement similar to what occurred in Iran will occur again in the region in the near future. A more probable scenario would be radical attempts to rally alienated sub-cultures. They are apt to seek support through bold acts such as an assassination (e.g., Sadat) or seizing some symbolic site (e.g., the Grand Mosque in Mecca).⁴³ Such previous attempts to destabilize failed because both Egypt and Saudi Arabia retained the loyalty of their militaries.

The seeds of a revolution would be most likely to find root in countries with precarious economies -- Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt.⁴⁴ The "simplest" solution, providing U.S. aid, becomes increasingly difficult as America's economy has its own problems. One suggestion is for the United States to solicit the wealthier Gulf States (e.g., the Saudis and Kuwaitis) to support

the potentially endangered regimes.⁴⁵ Such aid would minimize the impact of religious fanaticism in the entire region and consequently would benefit the aid providers as well.

7. UNDERSTAND AMERICA'S LIMITATIONS. The United States has relatively few options in dealing with the religious factor in the Middle East. America certainly cannot manage or manipulate Islamic religious feelings. Since there is great disparity between Muslim subgroups, Arab leaders themselves have limited control over religious forces.

American leaders do, however, have the power to do things which the Arab world will perceive favorably. One recent study concluded two things could improve the United States' image in the Muslim world: (1) assisting in the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and (2) increasing emphasis of the United States as a country where Islam is an important religion, practiced by a growing American Muslim population.⁴⁶ On the other hand, American leaders "should not be embarrassed to call attention to America's accomplishments, or afraid to discuss candidly the failing of an Islamic theocracy."⁴⁷

America cannot, and probably should not, attempt to democratize all nations. Foreign aid can go only so far to assist governments experiencing threats from religious radicals. Military aid is of dubious value in these cases. Perhaps the most effective thing the United States can do is to encourage

governments to tend to the economic and social conditions which strengthen the religious radicals' appeal.

America must carefully guard how she is perceived in the Arab world. Striving to be an honest broker in the region will greatly enhance the chances for successes in foreign policy. However, intense religious feelings greatly complicate the task of maintaining the honest broker image. America has and will continue to have close ties with Israel. Even some moderate Arabs are quick to point to perceived inequities in the way America deals with Israel and her Arab neighbors. Radicals go even further. They employ Israel's favored status with the United States to fuel anti-American sentiment. Without a doubt, religious sentiment poses a hearty challenge to senior leaders and policy makers as they strive to chart America's course in the region.

"God Is One" But Religion Isn't

The complex picture in the Middle East is made more difficult by a plethora of religious ideas and sentiments. Like Christianity or Judaism, Islam is radically monotheistic. The Bible declares, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is One."⁴⁸ The Koran likewise proclaims, "Your God is One God; there is no God save Him, the Beneficent, the Merciful."⁴⁹

Yet, like its Western counterparts Islam is divided into denominations, branches, and sects. Senior leaders would do well

to recognize that Islam, like Christianity or Judaism, is fragmented and complicated. To think of Islam as a monolithic faith is to fall prey to the error of oversimplification. To confuse Islam, even subtly, with the radical dogma of some of its extremists is to do injustice to a major world religion and to run the risk of alienating our Arab allies.

Senior leaders must be sensitive to the religious fervor and diversity in the Arab world. In doing so they can avoid the error of confusing radical dogma with what the majority of Muslims believe. Respecting religious feeling is vital to success in promoting America's interests in the Middle East. Common courtesy is perhaps the key operative. The ancient truth no doubt applies in this endeavor: do unto others as you would have done unto you.

ENDNOTES

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2. Sura II, Verse 256.
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4. Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in the Northern Tier Countries: An Integrative View (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, 1991), p. v.
5. Michael Collins Dunn, "Central Asian Islam: Fundamentalist Threat or Communist Bogeyman?" Middle East Policy, II (1) 1993, p. 35.
6. Mamoun Fandy, "The Tensions behind the Violence in Egypt," Middle East Policy, II (1) 1993, p. 26.
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9. Edward P. Djerejian, "The United States and the Middle East in a Changing World: Diversity, Interaction, and Common Aspirations," Middle East Journal, I (4) 1992, pp. 159-160.
10. Warren Christopher, "Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher Before the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), Marriot Crystal Gateway Hotel, Arlington, VA, April 23, 1993," Middle East Policy, II (1) p. 152.
11. Djerejian clarifies the U.S. position: "Simply stated, religion is not a determinant -- positive or negative -- in the nature or quality of our relations with other countries. Our quarrel is with extremism, and the violence, denial, intolerance, intimidation, coercion and terror which too often accompanies it." Djerejian, loc. cit., p. 161.
12. John L. Esposito, "Secular Bias and Islamic Revivalism", The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 26, 1993, p. 44.
13. The Koran, Sura II, verses 124 ff.

14. The Koran, Sura II Verses 49 ff.
15. The Koran, Sura XIX verse 54.
16. Ibid.
17. The Koran, Sura III Verses 45 ff.
18. The Koran, Sura V Verses 111 ff.
19. The Koran, Sura VI, Verse 86.
20. John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 164.
21. Hadar, op. cit., pp. 29 ff.
22. Esposito, op. cit., p. 93.
23. Hadar, op. cit., p. 31.
24. See Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990, p. 48.
25. Esposito, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
26. The Koran, Sura IV, Verses 2 & 10.
27. The Koran, Sura XC, Verses 13-18.
28. The Koran, Sura IV, Verses 23 ff.
29. For a more detailed discussion of this matter, see Esposito, op. cit., pp. 30 ff.
30. William T. Johnsen, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993), pp. 24-27.
31. Ibid., p. 23.
32. For a detailed discussion of the differences between Islamic revivalism, reformism and radicalism see Youseff M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990). A key element in the extremist position is an "ever-recurring conspiracy" against Islam, "by the same enemy masquerading under various disguises" (p. 94).

33. Michael Collins Dunn, "Islamist Parties in Democratizing States: A Look at Jordan and Yemen," Middle East Policy, II (2) 1993 p. 16.
34. Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 105.
35. Examples of extremist activities are abundant. As an example the reader is referred to the Middle East International, December 3, 1993 p. 11.
36. Fauzi M. Najjar "The Application of Sharia Laws in Egypt," Middle East Policy, 1 (3) 1992, p 73.
37. Isaak Yusuf, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Western-Style Democracy in Saudi Arabia," Asian Defense Journal (March, 1993), p. 25.
38. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 8.
39. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992) p. 14.
40. George McGovern, "The Future Role of the United States in the Middle East," Middle East Policy I (3) 1992, p. 2.
41. See Michel Jubran and Laura Drake, "The Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," Middle East Policy, Vol. II, No. 2, 1993, p. 3. They note the extremists call "for the overthrow of present Arab and Islamic regimes (with the exception of Sudan and Iran) by popular revolution because of their alleged reversion to a state of jahiliyya (ignorance-barbarism, prior to Islam)." The term jahiliyya is a heavily loaded one and indicates a serious offense when used against a brother Muslim.
42. Pelletiere, op. cit., p. 14.
43. Hiro, op. cit., p. 275.
44. Some Arab leaders recognize the necessity of begin dialogue with certain extremist groups. Algeria, for example, has recently indicated a willingness to initiate talks with the Islamic Salvation Front. See Alfred Hermida, "Time to Talk?", Middle East International, December 3, 1993, p. 11.
45. Pelletiere, op. cit., p. 16.

- 46. Fuller, op.cit., p. 42.
- 47. Miller, op.cit., p. 55.
- 48. Deuteronomy 6:4.
- 49. Sura II, Verse 163.

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