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
“From the Sea’: Refining an Old Idea”

by
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Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

The Navy white paper ...*From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* focuses on littoral warfare as the main thrust for our future maritime strategy. This direction is applicable to the foreseeable future where freedom of the open seas will be unchallenged and potential conflicts will exist in nearly every region of the world, in every regional CINC's area of responsibility (AOR). Successful conduct of littoral in the Major Regional contingencies (MRCs) and Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs) of the foreseeable future involves joint service employment. This paper examine three cases where United States military forces conducted joint operations in a littoral environment, Operation CHROMITE in Korea (1950), Operation BLUEBAT in Lebanon (1958) and Operation POWER PACK in the Dominican Republic (1965). Each operation was successful in achieving its operational goal and provides lessons concerning joint force employment for use in future operations. Areas examined, in the context of the operational art, include operational planning, command structures and relationships, force employment, and interoperability issues. These historical paradigms point to the following as keys to success in joint littoral operations: 1) a theater level operational commander to interface with strategic and policy level leaders and 2) an on scene joint task force (JTF) commander to provide unity of command for tactical commanders. The Naval service needs to remain focused on the tenets of ...*From the Sea: Preparing the Navy for the 21st Century*, refining an old idea, the use of Naval forces as "enabling forces" for joint task force operations from the sea.

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PREFACE

“...From The Sea’; Refining an Old Idea”

The post-Cold War focus on littoral warfare of the Navy white paper, *...From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, has been effectively tested in 20th century history. Common threads in our historical experience in littoral warfare, which is by nature joint, are flawed interoperability, lack of interservice understanding of doctrine and capabilities (often due to service parochialism), and inadequate logistics support. The most likely use of naval expeditionary forces in future littoral warfare will be as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF). In developing doctrine for JTF employment in the littoral environment it is useful to study our historical experience. This paper will examine three joint operations conducted in a littoral environment in terms of the Operational Art and joint cooperation: Operation CHROMITE, Korea 1950; Operation BLUEBAT, Lebanon 1958; and Operation POWER PACK, Dominican Republic 1965.

Littoral warfare, as presented in *...From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, is a joint concept that involves the Army and Air Force in addition to the naval services. This direction is applicable to the foreseeable future where freedom of the open seas will be unchallenged and potential conflicts will exist in nearly every region of the world, in every regional CINC’s area of responsibility (AOR). Successful conduct of littoral warfare involves joint service employment in all but the smallest of contingencies (i.e. small NEO operation) where perhaps only the Navy and Marine Corps will be employed. Our unified command plan, however, ensures that there will always be a Unified CINC overseeing the operation. This is certainly the case in the Major Regional contingencies (MRCs) and Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs) of the foreseeable future that serve as the basis for our present force structure planning. Consequently, it is valuable to look at historical cases that closely resemble those sorts of contingencies. In the context of the themes of the Navy white paper, the three operational paradigms examined in this paper closely resemble those types of situations that our armed forces are very likely to face in the future.

Each operation examined has flaws with regard to today's view of the operational art but was considered a successful projection of United States power. Given the historian's advantage of having the outcome of events, this paper will examine how each of these operations was conducted at the operational level. I will analyze those factors that made each successful and which lessons may be learned from these paradigms that can be used in joint operations in the littoral in the future.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In September 1992, the Department of the Navy issued a joint Navy-Marine Corps white paper entitled *...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* co-signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The purpose of this paper is to provide a "new direction" for the Naval services to cope with the foreseeable threat(s) of the post-Cold War era stating that "our strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges and opportunities."¹ Given the undisputed control of the seas by the free nations of the world resulting from the fall of the Soviet Union, it calls for concentration on naval warfare "capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the 'littoral' or coastlines of the earth."² The new focus is on Naval Expeditionary Forces participating in joint service operations. This role is defined as follows:

The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and can provide the initial, "enabling" capability for joint operations in conflict -- as well as continued participation in any sustained effort. We will be part of a "sea-air-land" team trained to respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they execute national policy.³

Our maritime strategy during the Cold War, and most of the 20th century, emphasized the principles of "command of the sea" or "sea control" on the open oceans of the world.⁴ However, the use of the Navy and Marine Corps team in joint service operations conducted "from the sea" is not a new concept and has played a significant role in the projection of United States power in a multitude of worldwide contingencies throughout its history.

The advantages of such power projection are many. Among the so called "principles of war" that are embraced by using Naval Expeditionary Forces are the ability: to **take the offensive**; to **mass** combat power; to employ "**economy of force**"; to **surprise** the enemy; and to **maneuver** forces placing the enemy in a disadvantageous position.⁵ As proven by history, operational planners must have a firm grasp on force capabilities and optimum force employment to achieve success using Naval Expeditionary Forces in joint operations.

Essential to the employment of Naval Expeditionary Forces in a littoral environment is amphibious warfare. World War II proved the value of power projection from the sea in the form of amphibious assaults. In the period since then, United States armed forces have not been

involved in a declared war but have been involved in numerous conflicts which fall into the present day parlance of "regional contingencies" (both "major" (MRC) and "lesser" (LRC)). Instrumental to the success (or failure) of these has been the projection of expeditionary forces from the sea.

...*From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* implies the use of Naval Expeditionary Forces in a Joint Task Force (JTF) structure. I will examine three historical cases in the period following World War II in terms of their relevance to littoral operations of the future. They are: a littoral operation in an MRC, Operation CHROMITE in Korea (1950); and two LRC interventions Operation BLUEBAT in Lebanon (1958) and Operation POWER PACK in the Dominican Republic (1965). Each of these operations provides insight into the benefits and hazards of joint operations and appropriate command structures to optimize the advantages of littoral warfare.

CHAPTER 2

OPERATION CHROMITE

“The Navy and Marines have never shone more brightly”

General Douglas MacArthur, 15 September 1950⁶

Historical Background

The US intervention on the Korean peninsula began with the strategic goal of pushing the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel restoring *status quo*, in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution. Operationally, by the beginning of August 1950, UN Command forces had been forced to withdraw within the Pusan perimeter and the US faced the humiliation of being driven off the Korean peninsula. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief Far East Command (CINCFE) and Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC), believed that he could conduct a landing at Inchon, 18 miles from Seoul, recapturing the South Korean capital as well as striking the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) forces facing Pusan from their unguarded rear, thus allowing the Eighth Army to break out from the Pusan perimeter. Despite original JCS reservations due to the risks involved, President Truman approved MacArthur's plan at the end of August. The Inchon operation begun on 15 September was a tremendous success which marked a *decisive point* in the conduct of the war where Naval forces enabled “power projection from the sea” as envisioned in the 1992 Navy white paper.⁷

Planning and Conduct of the Operation

Over the short planning period, MacArthur sought options to maximize the probability of success of the operation at Inchon. He apparently saw the NKPA as North Korea's *center of gravity* and the necessity of striking it with a formidable blow. Through application of the operational art, he effectively took an operation that he thought was *suitable* to achieve his objective and made it both *feasible* and *acceptable*. Because of what seemed excessive risks to higher authorities including the JCS, MacArthur had to tenaciously pursue selling his plan.

Charged with planning the operation was the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) headed by the FECOM G-3, Brigadier General E. K. Wright, USA. The JSPOG had been organized in 1949 “under heavy JCS pressure for ‘jointness’.”⁸ General Wright's group formulated three location options for the landing: Inchon, Kunsan, and Chumunjin. Of the three, Inchon represented the most obstacles for a large scale landing with regard to the Navy's

amphibious doctrine of the time, not the least of which was a 32 foot tidal range which restricted the operation to 15 or 27 September to allow for deep enough water for landing craft to enter and depart the harbor safely.⁹ Nevertheless, MacArthur saw it as the most likely to strike the enemy decisively in that the North Koreans never would conceive of an amphibious assault on Inchon due to the many obstacles.¹⁰ He wanted to maximize *surprise* of the enemy and saw the risks as helpful in achieving surprise. By exploiting the enemy's initiative, MacArthur would ensure that the operation was *offensive* in nature.

As in similar situations today, a joint task force (JTF) was formed to conduct the landing operation.¹¹ Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Commander Seventh Fleet was placed in command of JTF-7. This provided *unity of command*. Struble was allowed direct access to MacArthur for discussion surrounding the operation. JTF 7 was composed of six task forces to support each major functional area of the operation (see Appendix I). The plan for the operation called for use the optimal force for each task providing *unity of effort*.

For the landing operation Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle, an officer with considerable amphibious warfare experience during World War II, was commander of the attack force with Major General O. P. Smith, USMC in command of the 1st Marine Division (CATF and CLF, respectively, in amphibious warfare terms). To capitalize on Marine amphibious assault expertise rather than use Army forces unfamiliar with amphibious doctrine in the assault, the 5th Marines who were in the south with the Eighth Army were brought north to participate in the landing. This decision, made by MacArthur despite protests from General Walker of the Eighth Army shows MacArthur's appreciation of *economy of force* and the unique capabilities of the Marines.¹²

There were clear cases of interservice rivalry and parochialism which hindered planning but were overcome, often with MacArthur's intervention. MacArthur decided that the campaign would be supported by Navy and Marine Corps aviation only, excluding the Air Force assets available to him, due to the close air support expertise of those forces and their poor interoperability with the Air Force. Instead, the Fifth Air Force was assigned to provide all air support for the Eighth Army and to perform deceptive strikes outside the Seoul-Inchon area. This decision based on the recommendations of Generals Almond and Wright resulted in resistance and criticism by the Air Force.¹³ In another instance of parochialism, the use naval gunfire support (NGFS) was originally

discounted by Army planners due to their lack of familiarity with shore bombardment. At the insistence of both General Smith and Admiral Doyle, this vital part of amphibious warfare was injected into the plans. US and combined warships provided NGFS both in the area of the Inchon landing. Both aerial bombardment and NGFS in the days preceding D-Day and close air support would prove instrumental in limiting DPRK armed resistance.¹⁴ The assault was launched according to plan on the morning of 15 September 1950. Enemy resistance was minimal and D-Day ended with the successful landing of 13,000 troops and related equipment. Casualties totaled 21 killed, 1 missing, and 174 wounded. In accordance with amphibious doctrine General Smith took command of the landing force the next morning.¹⁵

Because he thought that Army forces were more capable and appropriate for that task, MacArthur insisted upon the activation of Army's X Corps for the landward phase of the operation, once the beach was secured by the 1st Marine Division. On 21 September, FECOM chief of staff Major General Harry S. Almond, USA took command of X Corps. MGen Smith's 1st Marine Division fell under Almond's command and Admiral Struble disestablished JTF 7.

On 25 September 1950, Seoul was liberated. The Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter on 19 September pursuing DPRK troops north and, on 27 September, linked up with X Corps at Osan completing the envelopment.¹⁶

Lessons learned

Many of the lessons of CHROMITE are positive. Given the limits of two weeks planning time for the operation and resulting lack of a rehearsal, it is amazing that things went as well as they did. The establishment of *unity of command* and *unity of effort* were key to operational success. MacArthur, although not involved in tactical detail, was firmly in place as the operational commander and the allocation of responsibility to his subordinates was clear. He also demonstrated an ability to select the optimum force from those available for each task. This was accomplished with the aid of some advisors who shed service parochialism, particularly VADM Struble whose stated goal was achieved, to form a "...damn good unified command."¹⁷ BG Wright also emerged as one who understood practical application of jointness. From his position behind the scenes, Wright and his JSPOG continually advocated the choice of the most capable

force for each task from those joint forces available as with the decision not to use the Fifth Air Force in the Seoul-Inchon area. Further, Wright's planners were responsible for the retention of ex-USN LSTs for Japan which were critical for augmentation of the amphibious force at Inchon.¹⁸

Surprise was achieved because of MacArthur's insistence in overcoming the obstacles and pursuing an operation that North Korea would deem improbable. He employed deception in the form of air strikes and NGFS on other sites on the Korean coast to force dilution of defending North Korean forces. Ironically, *security* was a problem for CHROMITE and numerous leaks about a landing on the Korean coast led the operation to be dubbed "Operation Common Knowledge" at the Tokyo Press Club.¹⁹ Fortunately, loose security was apparently countered by MacArthur's use of deception.²⁰

One critical flaw existed in MacArthur's planning and execution of CHROMITE, the selection of MG Almond as commander of X Corps for the conduct of the ground campaign. This flaw emerged with the bloody recapture of Seoul. MacArthur, in his apparent haste to announce the recapture of the city precisely three months after it fell to the NKPA, had set a deadline of 25 September.²¹ Almond, despite the reality of a far fiercer resistance by the North Koreans than anticipated argued by MGen Smith, insisted that slow progress by the Marine 1st Division was preventing the swift recapture of Seoul.²² On 25 September FECOM announced the fall of Seoul but it was not until the 27th that the city was entered by the 5th Marines.²³ Given Almond's performance and that of his X Corps staff, it may be concluded that MacArthur made a poor choice in what Heinl terms "military nepotism."²⁴ Perhaps MacArthur was unable to observe Almond's flaws due to his closeness as FECOM chief of staff.

The execution of MacArthur's vision of an Inchon landing saved many lives that would undoubtedly have been lost in a frontal assault on the NKPA forces from the Pusan perimeter by a reinforced Eighth Army. He clearly saw the *ends, ways, and means* of this deep envelopment of the enemy's *center of gravity* and was able to skillfully assemble a joint task force organization that was capable of achieving those ends.

CHAPTER 3

OPERATION BLUEBAT

Historical Background

The intervention of the US forces in Lebanon in 1958, Operation BLUEBAT, was in direct response to the request of President Chamoun of Lebanon to the US government for assistance in stabilizing an effort to unseat the legitimate government of Lebanon. In the wake of the Suez crisis of 1956 and the rise of Nasser's Pan-Arabism as an influential force in the Middle East, President Eisenhower enunciated the "Eisenhower Doctrine" in early 1957 pledging military and economic support to US allies in the Middle East threatened by "communist -sponsored invasion or subversion."²⁵ The unstable situation in the Middle East was leading to a reexamination of the wisdom of the "New Look", a plan for reshaping of conventional forces to maintain capabilities as well as adding nuclear capabilities while simultaneously reducing the overall defense budget.²⁶ The conduct of BLUEBAT certainly gives credence to that reevaluation.

The plan for BLUEBAT evolved from plans developed as early as 1956 in reaction to the Suez Crisis. In late 1957, Admiral James Holloway, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean based in London, was directed by the JCS to establish Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME). If a crisis arose in the Middle East, the command would be activated and Admiral Holloway would assume duties as CINCSPECOMME.²⁷

Planning and Conduct of the Operation

Theater-level planning for an emergency in Lebanon began in November 1957, soon after the SPECOMME staff was formed. What came to be known as BLUEBAT emerged using Naval forces, elements of the 11th Airborne Division, Air Force transport aircraft, and an Air Force Composite Air Strike Force (CASF BRAVO).²⁸

From the outset, it was clear that Naval forces would be the enabling force for a military intervention in Lebanon. The deployed Marine force in the Mediterranean during the late 1950s normally consisted of one battalion landing team (BLT) as Task Force 62. As tensions increased in Lebanon in May 1957 this force was augmented by two additional BLTs and BGen Sidney S.

Wade, Commanding General of the 2d Provisional Marine Force (2d PROVMARFOR) assumed duties as CTF 62. He and one battalion of Marines had been in the Mediterranean for an exercise and were ordered to remain, along with associated ships to augment the existing amphibious forces in the Mediterranean. BGen Wade and the amphibious task force commander (CTF 62) began refining plans for a landing in Lebanon.²⁹

On 14 July, when a coup led by a UAR sympathizer occurred in Iraq coupled with President Chamoun's request for assistance invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine, President Eisenhower directed an immediate US intervention in Lebanon. The stated military mission of BLUEBAT was the "protection of the life and property of Americans and assistance to the legal Lebanese government."³⁰ Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Arleigh Burke, acting as JCS' executive agent activating SPECOMME, relayed to Admiral Holloway the president's order that the first echelons of the force arrive in Beirut by 0900, 15 July. It was Eisenhower's wish that the intervention be launched as he announced it on television. Given the short notice, the amphibious force dispersion at the time in the Mediterranean made it impossible for three BLTs to land simultaneously in accordance with the original BLUEBAT plan. CNO (as JCS' executive agent) also ordered CINCEUR to be prepared to airlift one Army battle group to Beirut within 24 hours. Further confusing the situation, coincident with JCS notification of commands, the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Army and CINCEUR were involved with notification of various commands as well.³¹ This is a prime example of how political considerations can drive operational execution and of the importance of *unity of command* in planning in such situations. Fortunately, today's unified command plan precludes much of the confusion that was inherent in the "stove piped" operational chains of command of the 1950's.

The command structure that evolved before and during the operation placed CINCSPECOMME in command of functional commanders (see Appendix II). Within a day of notification, two battalions had landed in Beirut without the benefit of close fire support from tanks and artillery which were on board a ship elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Fortunately, the landings met no opposition. A third BLT landed on 18 July and the port and airport were under US control. On 19 July, Army ground forces of Army Task Force (ATF) 201 began arriving by air and within five days over 8000 army troops had augmented the Marine forces. BGen Wade stated, "The combined Army and Marine forces there were strong enough to cope with any foreseeable situation

which was likely to develop.”³² The principle of *mass* had been achieved. The political situation stabilized over the next few months and by 15 October all US forces had departed with BLUEBAT considered a success.

Lessons Learned

In view of the confusion that can be attributed to the short notice given the commanders involved coupled with the “stove piped” operational chain of command of the day, the success of BLUEBAT gives great credit to the value of advance contingency planning. The amount of firepower assembled in Beirut within a ten day’s notice was indeed formidable. Because of the general nature of some of the plans, some *ad hoc* planning occurred with regard to force employment. For instance, when the Marine forces under BGen Wade and ATF 201 found themselves both on the ground trying to perform similar missions under the immediate command of Admiral Holloway, the need for an overall land force commander became apparent to provide both *unity of command* and *unity of effort*. Holloway asked the JCS for an “American Land Force Commander” and, after some interservice rivalry for the position between the Army and Marines, MG Paul D. Adams, USA was named as Commander, American Land Force (COMAMLANFOR).³³ Given the guidance of the present day JCS Pub 5-00.2 on formation of Joint Task Forces, the repeat of such a situation is unlikely. Key to MG Adams’ success in his role as COMAMLANFOR was his translation of President Eisenhower’s broad mission statement into an operational mission statement for the ground forces and, further, into specific tasks to accomplish that mission.³⁴ This reduced ambiguity surrounding command relationships ashore, therefore providing *simplicity* that was lacking in previous direction.

As previously mentioned, the H-hour set by the National Command Authority and conveyed by the strategic level commanders prevented the operational commander from assembling all assets available in theater to conduct the landing according to plan. Had there been any opposition to the landing, tragedy may have resulted. For example, the landing was conducted without the benefit of current beach surveys of the Beirut coast and the landing beach selection was based solely on intelligence publications and reconnaissance photos because the deployed UDT team was on board an LSD elsewhere in the Mediterranean (along with tank and artillery support.).³⁵

No Marine fixed wing or helicopter assets were assigned -- a situation that is inconceivable given the concepts of ...*From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*. This could have proven critical in an opposed landing. In his observations concerning the lack of Marine air support, BGen Wade stated:

In active combat operations, Marine air support would have been invaluable not only because of its effectiveness against enemy ground elements, but also because of the superior ability of the air-ground team to pinpoint actual targets, thereby minimizing destruction and loss of life in an essentially friendly area...Lebanon and other Mideast areas capable of supporting a major amphibious landing make vertical envelopment necessary in maintaining speed and mobility and in providing versatility in the choice of tactics by the Landing Force Commander.³⁶

Clearly, the principle of *maneuver* would have been better realized with the benefit of Marine air.

Intelligence support provided was limited in its scope, providing little or no information on the political-military situation in Lebanon. This may have been the result of a misconception that BLUEBAT "was to be a 'purely military operation'" by those involved in theater. Poor awareness of the situation resulted in the requirement for an assessment by US commanders "on the spot and quickly."³⁷ As a result, initial relations with host nation forces were uncertain. Wade recalled the unique "need to negotiate for objectives in lieu of seizing them" from Lebanese Army units in order to provide security for his own troops.³⁸

Logistics support was not centralized with separate support for the Army and the Marines, even after the establishment of AMLANFOR. The Army was well supported by the 201st Logistical Command, an "*ad hoc* organization" established along with ATF 201 which provided support to the Marines which was "overlooked" according to MG Gray, the ATF 201 commander.³⁹ The establishment of a joint logistics commander would have streamlined efforts considerably.

It was indeed fortunate that Operation BLUEBAT was unopposed given the risks presented to the landing force in such a situation. Synergy could not have been achieved. The operation is clearly marred by what one observer terms "the wave of 'provisionalism' which dominated military planning as well as by a certain parochialism in the services."⁴⁰ It is not unlikely that similar power projections from the sea will occur in the future, as they have since 1958. Joint doctrine has evolved considerably since that time but we must continue to remind ourselves of the problems that precipitated that evolution.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATION POWER PACK

Historical background

Civil war erupted in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 as the result of increased tensions between the "Constitutionalists," loyal to popularly elected former president Juan Bosch who was deposed by a coup in September 1963, and the "Loyalists," followers of the Donald Reid Cabral who headed the junta that led the post-coup Dominican Republic. Also contributing to tensions was a split of the military into two factions, both supporting coups against the junta: 1) younger officers generally supporting the left leaning, reform oriented Bosch; and 2) older officers who did not support Bosch but were angry with Reid's reduction of the military budget and campaign against profitable smuggling operations run by those officers.⁴¹

At that time United States foreign policy was focused on the Vietnam conflict. Previous US policy in Latin America had been committed to avoiding military intervention and promotion of democracy. However, with the recent memory of Cuba's fall to communism and related problems experienced by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, President Johnson was committed to preventing a similar occurrence on his watch.⁴² On 27 April, Johnson ordered the evacuation of American citizens and selected foreign nationals using the forces of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Group already standing off the coast of Santo Domingo. With the failure of attempts to solve the situation diplomatically coupled with requests by Dominican authorities for US military intervention, Johnson became more concerned by support for the pro-Bosch faction reported by US Ambassador William Tapley Bennett and the CIA to include some Communists. The president decided on 28 April to proceed with an armed intervention in the Dominican Republic and ordered the landing of Marines to ensure the safety of American citizens. The following day, he ordered elements of the 82nd Airborne Division to land at San Isidro airfield and so began the joint service intervention.

Contrary to Johnson's reasoning, the unilateral US action was not well received internationally, even after linking Communist influence to the Dominican unrest.⁴³ The Organization of American States (OAS) met 29 April, at US urging, to discuss the matter and passed a resolution calling for a cease fire and the establishment of an International Security Zone

(ISZ) around the US Embassy and other diplomatic missions.⁴⁴

Planning and Conduct of the Operation

The operation can be divided into four phases with the command structure of US forces evolved with changing strategic and operational goals (see Appendix III for illustrations):⁴⁵

- 1) NEO by US Naval forces (27-28 April)
- 2) Joint US forces employed in "stability operations" (30 April-3 May)⁴⁶
- 3) Unilateral peacekeeping by US forces (3-23 May)
- 4) Peacekeeping by the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) (23 May-September 1966)

The initially evacuation operation was under the command of Captain James A. Dare, USN, commander of the Caribbean Amphibious Ready Group which included the 6th MEU. Dare and Ambassador Bennett coordinated NEO operations 27 April. 536 Marines had already landed in Santo Domingo via helicopter when Johnson made his decision to land Marines to stabilize the situation. There was much confusion up and down the chain of command regarding this matter, setting the tone for the remainder of the operation.⁴⁷

As the NCA increased the scope of US involvement, VADM Kleber Masterson, COMSECONDFLT, took command of JTF 122 and embarked in Dare's flagship, *USS Boxer*. Initially, 82nd Airborne commander, MG Robert York was appointed as commander of US land forces. The ISZ was established by Marine landing forces in accordance with the OAS resolution.⁴⁸ After activation of the XVIII Airborne Corps, LTG Bruce Palmer, USA was assigned as commander of US land forces which included the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Throughout this phase of "stability operations" the chain of command was frequently violated by direct communications between JCS or President Johnson and Masterson or Palmer bypassing CINCLANT and/or the JTF commander.⁴⁹

The unilateral peacekeeping phase began with the establishment of a "Line of Communication" (LOC), a euphemism for "cordon", across Santo Domingo that linked army and marine units allowing free travel between the ISD and the San Isidro airfield. At that point, the NCA had ruled out a military solution to the crisis, shifting US forces to a peacekeeping role.⁵⁰ Palmer chopped U. S. Land Forces as JTF 120 to CINCLANT and relieved VADM Masterson of command of the operation on May 4 and JTF 122 was dissolved.

The OAS passed a resolution on 6 May calling for the formation of an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to take over peacekeeping duties from the US.⁵¹ LTG Palmer became Deputy Commander of the IAPF on 29 May transferring command to General Alvim of Brazil, while retaining command of US ground forces. By design, through Palmer's position, the US was able to dominate decisions regarding the IAPF's employment.⁵²

Lessons Learned

The initial Marine landing operation via helicopter on 27 April to support evacuation operations was smoothly executed on scene, in sharp contrast to confusion surrounding the remainder of the operation.⁵³ As the NCA increased the scope of involvement, the stove piped chain of command of the time and a lack of specific doctrine for joint force employment contributed to a situation described by one observer as: "Chain of command violations, conflicting priorities, escalating requirements, equipment and personnel shortages, coordination difficulties, outdated OPLANS, and inadequate and inaccurate intelligence: all presented problems with which commanders and their staffs had to contend."⁵⁴ The chain of command was violated by "*de facto*" command by JCS circumventing the operational commander, CINCLANT.⁵⁵ Much of this can be attributed to the President Johnson's insistence on his personal involvement. Poor communications was also a cause of chain of command problems. For instance, CINCLANT was unable to communicate securely with the 82nd Airborne headquarters at Fort Bragg.⁵⁶ This violation of *unity of command* can result in confusion and duplication of effort, thus thwarting *unity of effort*..

The deployment of US-based Army and Air Force units was complicated by the fact that they fell under CINCSTRIKE and were to chop to CINCLANT for the operation. A clear example of problems stemming from this arrangement came when CINCSTRIKE insisted on completing a joint Army-Air Force exercise in progress rather than focusing the efforts to prepare for possible deployment of the 82nd Airborne in response to a 26 April JCS alert. When two Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) of the 82nd Airborne were ordered to achieve DEFCON 2 status on 28 April, a delay in achieving that status occurred as the direct result of the need to unload equipment set up for the exercise. Further, CINCLANT failed to provide CINCSTRIKE with an updated version of the OPLAN covering the deployment.⁵⁷ Confusion continued as York's forces deployed loaded for

air drop only to receive last minute orders to land, in accordance with the president's wishes, in order to appear "less warlike."⁵⁸ This decision made at the policy level, opposed by both CINCSTRIKE and CINCLANT and concurred with reluctantly by the strategic level, resulted in considerable difficulty for the 82nd including overcrowding of the airfield causing the diversion of some aircraft to another field as foreseen by LANTCOM staff officers.⁵⁹

Interference at the strategic level also caused problems in the area of *logistics*, depriving the joint force commander of the ability to synchronize efforts. A JCS decision to assign priority of airlift to troop movement resulted in delayed arrival of USAF fighter and reconnaissance aircraft in the area.⁶⁰ In another instance of miscommunication between operational and strategic levels JCS, ordered the deployment of a lead elements of a field hospital without consulting Palmer.⁶¹

A positive lesson was the importance of interagency relationships in theater. After his arrival, General Palmer established good rapport with Ambassador Bennett. They worked closely with one another to ensure good information flow up their respective chains of command.⁶² The success of the unilateral peacekeeping phase and transition of the mission to IAPF cognizance was aided by this relationship as was the decision regarding phased *termination* of US involvement.

The strength of the force applied reinforced the principle of *mass* and its contribution to achievement of an operational objective. By the end of the stability phase, US forces under Palmer totaled 14,650 personnel and associated equipment, the largest US buildup ever in a Latin American intervention.⁶³ The main forces employed for the task, the amphibious ready group with MEU embarked and the 82nd Airborne, were optimum for such an operation possessing the ability to effectively *maneuver* in response to a crisis. In his reminiscences, General Palmer credits that force allocation with much of the operational success of POWER PACK.⁶⁴

Relationships in combined command structure of IAPF are beyond the scope of this paper. However, the design of the IAPF versus the reality of Palmer's (therefore, US) considerable power may provide a useful paradigm for placing US forces under foreign command in the future.

Overall, the intervention was successful in stabilizing the political situation and the bloodshed of civil war was ended. Swift deployment of formidable forces into the area and the political awareness of longest standing JTF commander, General Palmer, were factors that overcame the command structure flaws of the day.

CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY

Operations CHROMITE, BLUEBAT and POWER PACK were successful littoral joint operations the initiated from the sea that accomplished their operational objectives. Some common strong points shared by all three operations are:

- Naval forces projecting power from the sea were used as enabling forces for the employment of joint forces to accomplish operational goals.
- Each illustrated the flexibility of Naval forces and ability to respond expeditiously to tasking on short notice.
- Each proved the ability of Naval forces to provide "extended and continuous on scene crisis response."⁶⁵
- Amphibious forces demonstrated the advantages of maneuverability of forward deployed Naval forces.

However, none was without flaws that can be used to provide lessons for future operations. The move towards joint doctrine and training in recent years has reduced the probability of reoccurrences but such study reinforces the reasoning behind that doctrine. Similar difficulties experienced in each operation were:

- Phasing difficulties with the introduction of non-Naval forces.
- To greater and lesser degrees, interservice rivalry resulting in interference with optimal employment of forces.
- Interoperability problems limiting planning options and/or hampering the actual conduct of the operation.

In CHROMITE, MacArthur used a JTF structure similar to that spelled out in JCS Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. Though much of the division of labor in that operation was dictated by interoperability considerations, the JTF organization exploited the unique capabilities of Naval Forces and allocated functional responsibilities to the most capable force. Barring Almond's personal peculiarities, the shift of command of joint operations ashore as the operation moved "landward" is precisely what is envisioned by the Navy in future joint littoral operations. Although not planned in advance, such a shift occurred as

command of POWER PACK operations was shifted from VADM Masterson afloat to LTG Palmer ashore. Contrasting those operations with BLUEBAT provides a clear illustration of the benefits of a JTF commander on scene to provide *unity of command* for tactical forces.

CHROMITE also illustrates the importance of having a designated theater level operational commander who is the sole liaison with strategic level military leaders. Today's unified command plan and existing chain of command provides for such an arrangement but BLUEBAT and POWER PACK provide examples where ambiguity resulting from provisional and *ad hoc* operational level command assignments can impair the efficiency of an operation, especially in its initial stages.

The temptation of political/strategic level leaders to bypass operational commanders in contingency operations can exist, as it clearly did in POWER PACK. In that case, General Palmer later reflected that this was perhaps necessary due to the political implications of the operation.⁶⁶ Although not totally unavoidable in this day of real-time communications, direct involvement by political/strategic level leaders in tactical details can be more easily avoided with a theater level operational commander firmly in place as the sole flow point upward in the chain of command. This allows all levels of command to operate most efficiently, as illustrated by DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Astute operational planning contributed to the success of CHROMITE where a wide array of options were examined and planning was truly an iterative process. In BLUEBAT, plans were in place for a Middle East contingency but details were limited below the operational level. The result was *ad hoc* planning such as the establishment of AMLANFOR and the "seat of the pants" deployment of EUCOM Army and Air Force assets. In the case of POWER PACK, OPLANS were out of date and spread between CINCSTRIKE and CINCLANT responsibility resulting in much *ad hoc* planning as well. *Logistics* was a common area of weakness for both BLUEBAT and POWER PACK largely due to a lack of detailed operational planning.

Interoperability problems can be solved by emphasis on creating a force structure with each service's capabilities complementing those of others and the formation of joint doctrine. This is happening today as the result of CHROMITE, BLUEBAT, POWER PACK and myriad other joint operations.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

“The shift in the strategic landscape means that Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea”⁶⁷

Although each of the operations examined has its unique characteristics which are not likely to be repeated in the future, there will be operations from the sea in the future where the strengths and weaknesses of these operations apply. The keys to success in littoral warfare are: 1) a theater level operational commander to interface with strategic and policy level leaders; and 2) an on scene joint task force (JTF) commander to provide unity of command for tactical commanders. Established joint task force formation doctrine and joint amphibious doctrine as well as the existence of a force structure that supports those doctrines are vital. This is especially true in the limited engagements of regional contingencies (MRCs and LRCs) anticipated in the future. In *...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, the Navy makes a commitment to shaping its force to support joint operations as an enabling force for joint operations. The likelihood of LRC operations similar to BLUEBAT and POWER PACK exists as the post-Cold War world evolves and the readiness of Naval forces to operate in the littoral will be the linchpin for the success of those operations.

Interservice rivalry is a common thread that presents itself in each of the operations examined. It is imperative that each of the services continue to focus on jointness and avoid the temptation to renew rivalries as competition for budget allocations increases. In that vain, the Naval services should press on towards realization the tenets of *...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, refining an old idea.

¹ U. S. Dept. of the Navy, ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington: September 1992), p.1.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴ Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 12-13.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D. C.: 9 September 1993) pp. A-1-A-4.

⁶ Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (New York: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1968), p. 87.

⁷ ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, pp. 8-9.

⁸ Heinl, p. 33.

⁹ Michael Langley, Inchon Landing: MacArthur's Last Triumph (New York: Times Books, 1979), p. 46.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 47.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-00.2: Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures (Test Pub) (Washington : September 1991), pp. II-1-II-11.

¹² Heinl, pp. 61-63.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 56-59.

¹⁴ Duane E. Byrd, "Command and Control of U. S. Army Amphibious Operations: An Essential Element of Projecting Combat Power," Unpublished Research Paper, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1985, p. 25.

¹⁵ Heinl, pp. 87-119.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 247-248.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁹ Langley, p. 61.

²⁰ Heinl, p. 79.

²¹ David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1964), p. 91.

²² Heinl, pp. 210-211.

²³ Rees, p. 92.

²⁴ Heinl, p. 261.

²⁵ Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Papers, no. 3 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, January 1981), p. 2.

²⁶ James F. Ponzo, "The New Look, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Lebanon Intervention, 1958," Unpublished Research Paper, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1991, pp. 24-27.

²⁷ Spiller, p. 10.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

²⁹ Jack Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon, 1958 (Washington: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1966), pp. 7-8.

³⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 267.

³¹ Spiller, pp. 18, 23-26.

³² Brigadier General Sydney S. Wade, USMC, "Operation Bluebat," U. S. Marine Corps Gazette, July 1959, pp. 10-23.

³³ Spiller, p. 36.


- ³⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade, USA, Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958, Research Survey No. 3 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), p. 47.
- ³⁵ BGen. Wade, pp. 16-17.
- ³⁶ Ibid., p. 19.
- ³⁷ Spiller, p. 39.
- ³⁸ BGen. Wade, p. 19.
- ³⁹ Major General David W. Gray, USA (Ret.), The U. S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander's Reminiscence (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), p. 49.
- ⁴⁰ Spiller, p. 44.
- ⁴¹ Lawrence M. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention (Washington: Analysis Branch, U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 9-10.
- ⁴² Ibid., pp. 17-26.
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 25.
- ⁴⁴ Herbert G. Schoonmaker, Military Crisis Management: U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 77.
- ⁴⁵ Greenberg, p. 31.
- ⁴⁶ Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, Leavenworth Papers, no. 15 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), p. 73.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 49-53.
- ⁴⁸ Greenberg, p. 40.
- ⁴⁹ General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989), pp.43-44..
- ⁵⁰ Yates, p. 119.
- ⁵¹ Schoonmaker, p. 114.
- ⁵² Greenberg, p. 74.
- ⁵³ Yates, p. 50.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 65.
- ⁵⁵ Palmer, p. 156.
- ⁵⁶ Yates, p. 64.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 59-62.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 69.
- ⁵⁹ Palmer, p. 33.
- ⁶⁰ Schoonmaker, p. 128.
- ⁶¹ Yates pp. 90-91.
- ⁶² Palmer, p. 155.
- ⁶³ Greenberg, p. 44.
- ⁶⁴ Palmer, pp. 158-159.
- ⁶⁵ ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, p. 1.
- ⁶⁶ Palmer, pp. 43-44.
- ⁶⁷ ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, p. 10.

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APPENDIX I
OPERATION CHROMITE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS




MAJOR FORCES AND COMMAND RELATIONS

Operation "Chromite", D-day


Source: Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (New York: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1968), p. 53.

APPENDIX II
OPERATION BLUEBAT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS




Source: Sydney S.Wade, Brigadier General, USMC. "Operation Bluebat," U. S. Marine Corps Gazette, July 1959, p. 19.

APPENDIX III
OPERATION POWER PACK COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS




U. S. Command Relationships, 30 April 1965

Source: Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, Leavenworth Papers, no. 15 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), p. 109.




U. S. Command Relationships, 1 May 1965

Source: Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, Leavenworth Papers, no. 15 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), p. 109.



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INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE ORGANIZATION

Source: Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966. Leavenworth Papers, no. 15 (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), p. 154.