INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND ITS PREVENTION (U)

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"INTELLIGENCE FAILURES" OFTEN RESULT FROM PREVENTABLE CONDITIONS. THESE INCLUDE POOR UNDERSTANDING OF INTELLIGENCE METHODS AND CAPABILITIES, POOR COORDINATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS, AND POOR DISSEMINATION METHODS. THE CONCEPT OF THE OPERATIONS-INTELLIGENCE MARRIAGE UNITES THE TWO STAFF FUNCTIONS TO PROVIDE PERTINENCE TO EACH OTHER'S WORK. A STRONG OPS-INTEL MARRIAGE HELPS ALLEVIATE SOME "INTELLIGENCE FAILURES" DUE TO POOR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT INTELLIGENCE AND POOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO STAFFS. "INTELLIGENCE FAILURES" DUE TO POOR DISSEMINATION DEPEND ON BETTER INTELLIGENCE INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE THREE LEVELS OF WAR: STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL. EACH LEVEL MUST POSSESS ITS OWN COLLECTION, ANALYTICAL AND DISSEMINATION MEANS TO PRECLUDE FAILURE. "C4I FOR THE WARRIOR" IS ONLY AN IMPROVEMENT IN DISSEMINATION MEANS, NOT A RESOLUTION TO SUBJECTIVE PROBLEM OF WHAT TO DISSEMINATE. NEW MIND SET, TRAINING AND COORDINATION CAN ALLEVIATE SOME "INTELLIGENCE FAILURES."
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"INTELLIGENCE FAILURE" AND ITS PREVENTION

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Abstract of
"INTELLIGENCE FAILURE" AND ITS PREVENTION

"Intelligence failures" often result from preventable conditions. These include poor understanding of intelligence methods and capabilities, poor coordination between intelligence and operations, and poor dissemination methods. The concept of the Operations-Intelligence Marriage unites the two staff functions to provide pertinence to each other's work. A strong Ops-Intel Marriage helps alleviate some "intelligence failures" due to poor knowledge about intelligence and poor coordination between the two staffs. "Intelligence failures" due to poor dissemination depend on better intelligence intercourse between the three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. Each level must possess its own collection, analytical and dissemination means to preclude failure. "C'I for the Warrior" is only an improvement in dissemination means, not a resolution to subjective problem of what to disseminate. New mind set, training and coordination can alleviate some "intelligence failures."
In war, intelligence is a force multiplier, the same as fire support or logistics. However, simply having the capabilities and material is not enough. It must be properly utilized to gain benefit on the battlefield. Large quantities of Iraqi artillery in Kuwait did not benefit Iraqi forces because of poor employment. Large quantities of supplies at Port Stanley during the Falkland War were not distributed and therefore did not benefit the Argentinians. Thus, providing intelligence does not guarantee its benefit as a force multiplier unless it is properly utilized. The factor determining usefulness will be subjective human interaction; how will the commander and his staff evaluate, disseminate and use the information? This paper addresses some issues of intelligence utilization and how intelligence is often available but poorly utilized. Historical examples and personal experiences as a tactical and operational level intelligence officer support the premise that many "intelligence failures" result from poor human interaction with available information. This paper will explore the weak points of human interaction in intelligence use and recommend methods to maximize its utility.
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"INTELLIGENCE FAILURE" AND ITS PREVENTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Defining "Intelligence Failure." During the United Nations mission to Somalia, U.N. forces were tasked to locate and capture Mohamed Farah Aideed. Those efforts failed. A common complaint was "why couldn’t the military find Aideed when CNN could." This incident is an example of "intelligence failure."

"Intelligence failure" means poor performance of intelligence capability. Additionally "intelligence failure" has come to mean poor operational performance attributed to perceived poor intelligence; thus the reason "intelligence failure" appears in quotes. This would imply intelligence personnel, systems, or the community as a whole did not do something within their capability. We will see intelligence capability is often assumed by operators, when in fact it does not exist. In the case of Aideed, the assumption was U.N. forces had the capability to find him or use CNN to do so. "Intelligence failure" can also be a matter of intelligence being available but not disseminated and correctly utilized. Perhaps Aideed’s whereabouts was known but never connected with operational planners correctly. Whatever the reason, "intelligence failures" are both a current and a historical theme.

"Intelligence failures" proved to be as much a part of war as "bad calls" are a part of football. Both are inevitable. Despite this the soldier and football player must learn to overcome them in order to win. While football is only a game, war risks lose of life and national interests. Recent history is replete with "intelligence
failures." Beginning with World War II all major conflicts are identified with an "intelligence failure:"

- World War II and Pearl Harbor
- Korean Conflict and the Chinese Intervention
- Vietnam War and the Tet Offensive
- Yom Kippur War and the Egyptian Attack
- Falkland War and the Argentine Invasion
- Persian Gulf War and Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

This list indicates "intelligence failure" is not limited by geography or time. "Failures" occurred around the world throughout the past 50 years.

Strategic intelligence scholars argue that "intelligence failures" are inevitable. The uncertainty of intelligence, enemies' ability to deceive, and policy makers' unwillingness to believe something counter to their own ideas makes failure inevitable.\(^2\) Stalin's refusal to believe the Germans would attack Russia even after they crossed the border is not exceptional. At the operational level these arguments also have merit. Intelligence uncertainty, deception, and operators' mind set will discount the value of intelligence. During the Easter Offensive in 1972, in which the North Vietnamese crossed the DMZ, the commanders in Saigon did not believe it was a serious assault.\(^3\)

Since lives and national interests are at risk, accepting the argument that "intelligence failures" are inevitable is neither helpful nor tolerable. While acknowledging the intelligence system is not perfect, avoidable mistakes must be
reduced. Two fertile areas to begin are the intelligence consumer-producer relation, or Ops-Intel Marriage, and the intercourse between strategic, operational and tactical intelligence.
Defining Ops-Intel Marriage. Operations (J-3) and intelligence (J-2) have a special relationship compared to other primary staff functions. Intelligence drives operations and vice versa. Together they form a union. Each depends on the other to make their efforts pertinent to mission accomplishment.

When intelligence personnel collect information and produce intelligence, it is not done for the J-2's own needs. Pragmatically, intelligence's worth is not intrinsic but it's utility in support of decision making. The J-2 staff should approach intelligence as a consumer product. It must be pertinent, timely, reliable and usable. If intelligence remains behind the "Green Door," it has no worth. Value of intelligence is derived from its successful application in operational planning and execution. This is why intelligence must be coordinated and combined with operations. The Ops-Intel Marriage requires intelligence support oriented towards consumers.

Equally important on the operations side is a consumer who understands intelligence. "Intelligence failures" are not monopolized by the J-2. Often they result from unrealistic consumer expectations of the intelligence product. These expectations generally result from the belief that intelligence is a precise science, or that intelligence systems are more capable than they are. When intelligence proves imperfect or systems cannot perform as expected, then the Ops-Intel Marriage is weakened from mistrust or misunderstanding.
**Intelligence Art.**  The idea that intelligence is a precise science, capable of providing infallible truth is a myth. Intelligence should be viewed as an art, not a science. A good example of intelligence art is the Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) problem during Operation DESERT STORM. Attempts to apply the scientific method of quantifiable observation to BDA, resulted in useless information for the commander. Requirements for photographic evidence of destruction led to damage estimates which said power grids were not destroyed and Iraqi air forces were still intact. However, power was out in most of Iraq and the Iraqi air forces were not flying. Clearly scientific criteria did not adequately measure what the commander really desired the air campaign to do.¹

Like war, intelligence possesses principles but requires subjective interpretation in their application. This interaction involves both intelligence producers and consumers, each of which can contribute to "intelligence failure."

First consider the intelligence producer. The most widely perceived failure is one of incorrect intelligence analysis. During a 1989 WestPac deployment, an amphibious exercise was conducted on Iwo Jima. Overhead imagery of the landing force objective was analyzed by photo interpreters. Their analysis indicated a 12 foot high fence surrounded the objective area. After the assault, I toured the objective area and noted a water pipe one foot off the ground surrounding the area. The limitations of imagery derived intelligence analysis were evident.

Another example of analytic limitation came prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqis assumed a military posture commensurate with attack. However state
department and international diplomatic analysis indicated it was a show-of-force. Intelligence analysis is a "best guess" proposition, which every consumer needs to understand. Evaluation of "gray" situations will not yield "black and white" results. Analysis is limited by the analyst's training and experience. These factors will yield "best guesses" only. The better the analyst's training and experience, the better the guesses - not the more correct.

Another problem on the producer side is not understanding the significance of some intelligence. On the evening of 6 December 1941, the heads of Army and Navy intelligence read intercepted messages from Japan ordering her embassy and consulates in the U.S. to destroy their codes and classified material. Neither intelligence chief considered anything about the messages sinister. However the President recognized the messages meant war. General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, also reacted strongly and issued a warning to Hawaii. So the top U.S. military intelligence producers' analyses of this war warning were not as sensitive as the operators.

Intelligence producers are not the only points of failure. Consumers are responsible for many, if not more failures than producers. They show an inability to deal with the uncertainty of intelligence. This results in planning and decisions based on initial intelligence, and later, when new intelligence dictates changes, they hesitate to change the plan. During World War II, Convoy PQ17 disbanded in the Barents Sea north of Norway resulting in lose of 23 merchant ships out of 34 to U-boats. The reason stemmed from the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty ordering PQ17 to scatter in
order to avoid loses to the German battleship Tirpitz. However the Tirpitz never put
to sea. It remained in a Norwegian fjord throughout this period and the First Sea
Lord possessed both analysis and confirming information of the fact.4

During Operation DESERT STORM uncertainty of intelligence was exemplified
by the number of known Iraqi nuclear sites. The war began with two known sites and
eventually added six more. After the war U.N. inspectors uncovered another 12.5
Were there more than two sites when the war began? Did the Iraqis disperse nuclear
facilities as a result of combat operations? The innate uncertainty of intelligence
makes it hard for operators to solidify plans and actions. Instead they forever seem
destined to change their plans as the J-2 comes up with new information. From the
frustrated operator’s perspective it seems new information is always coming to light to
change the plan. Meanwhile critical information is never provided to clarify the
situation, even though our systems "must" be able to collect it.

"A man has got to know his limitations."

Lt. Harry Calahan
San Francisco Police Department

Limitations. In effort to sell intelligence and systems, the intelligence community
throughout the 1980's briefed on capabilities. Unfortunately these briefs tended to
downplay the limitations of intelligence. They were sales pitches which oversold
intelligence systems and their capabilities. Along with that, the American love affair
for high technology intelligence collection left many operators believing in capabilities far beyond reality. Tom Clancy's *Patriot Games* makes a good pitch for real time, infrared video satellite capability. Media speculation about the follow on to the SR-71, the so called "Aurora," titillates the public. However these speculative systems only fuel false impressions of available capabilities.

These impressions become dangerous when operators assume capabilities which do not exist. When the British broke the German codes in World War II with "Ultra," many assumed they would know everything the Germans were doing. In fact "Ultra" only gave access to some coded message traffic. "Ultra" did not access wire communication. It also suffered delays in decrypting until the regularly changing codes were newly broken. This led to the "intelligence failure" at the Battle of the Bulge. Lack of intercepts about specific offensive plans lulled operators about German intentions. However "Ultra" depended on radio intercept and the Germans used wire communications. Not considering the limitations of "Ultra" supported a wrong conclusion.

During the Persian Gulf War, the J-STAR System prototype deployed to Southwest Asia and received praiseworthy reviews. I remember on several occasions receiving J STARS derived early warning of high speed enemy armored columns closing on our positions in Saudi Arabia. No attacks ever arrived. Later I learned J- STARS had picked up concertina wire blowing across the desert. Understanding the limitations of the intelligence collection system allowed better operational decisions. In this case, ignoring the reports without further confirmation. Do not allow
intelligence to be oversold. If it sounds too good to be true, like everything else someone is selling, it probably is.

Understanding the imperfect nature of intelligence art, and limitations of intelligence systems will reduce Ops-Intel Marriage related failures. When commanders and planners understand that intelligence is a best guess proposition, they plan more flexibly. Insistence on courses of action tied to definite enemy situations lose favor to more adaptable courses.

J-3 understanding of intelligence and J-2 understanding of operations are the "get to know each other" phase of the relationship. Good communication is required in order for the marriage to succeed.

"Their not to make reply,
Their but to do and die."

Lord Tennyson

The Charge of the Light Brigade

I-2/I-3 Communication. Clear communication is important in any human interaction. In the military there is a tendency for 'clipped' and succinct communication. This often leads to ambiguity and confusion. However, the operational level requires more than "theirs not to make reply."

In fact a Theater Commander’s staff must always be "making reply" and
"reasoning why." Plans always change as friendly and enemy situations evolve on the battlefield. In such an environment, the J-2 and J-3 must continually coordinate. Otherwise either may find himself overcome by events, dragging his counterpart down with him.

Ensuring both J-2 and J-3 efforts are pertinent requires them to know each others business. During the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1979, the weather briefers did not know the operators' plan. Thus, pertinent information about dust storms was not stressed. The unplanned for dust storms caused the lose of several helicopters. This contributed to aborting the mission. Another example is the radar operators at Opana Point, Hawaii on 7 December 1941 who detected the incoming Japanese air raid. After reporting aircraft inbound to operations at Fort Shafter, they shut down the radar and were never questioned further about it. By not "reasoning why" the planes were assumed to be B-17's coming from the mainland.

J-2 and J-3 cannot depend on the Commander to be their common point of intercourse. Pertinent operational planning and orders require reasoning why. This means the J-2, J-3, and their staffs must continually check their activities with the pertinence of what the other is doing. In the heat of planning this is often difficult, however there is some relief.

One method is to ensure J-2 and J-3 staff members attend each others meetings. Whenever sections within each staff meet, they should include their appropriate counterpart on the J-2 or J-3 staff. Such coordination, in order to work, requires continual inter staff communications.
The Commander. Another key to a successful Intel-Ops Marriage is the Commander. Wherever he takes his J-3, he should take his J-2. Anytime the Commander and J-3 are involved in something, there are intelligence implications. Since the J-2’s work is up front, the sooner he knows, the faster the Commander and J-3 will get answers to Essential Elements of Information (EEI’s) and Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR’s). If plans are dependent on specific information, the J-2 can indicate the likelihood of getting answers. Knowing the intent of commanders and operators up front increases the timeliness, pertinence and useability of the J-2’s product.

The Commander’s input for operational pertinence to intelligence is EEIs. His understanding of EEI’s places his imprint on the intelligence effort in support of operations. The Commander who really understands what an EEI is, understands the limitations of the intelligence system. An EEI is a piece of information which is critical to know, otherwise mission failure could result. EEIs are prioritized. The listing of too many defeats their purpose by diluting effort. EEIs are the method by which the Commander communicates his intelligence priorities to the intelligence community.

Thus far we discussed what the Theater Commander, J-2 and J-3 can do on their own to reduce “intelligence failures.” Marrying intelligence and operations at the theater and Joint Task Force (JTF) level will validate the work of both. However, as argued during Congressional hearings on Pearl Harbor, the theater may not control its own intelligence destiny. What can the Commander, J-2 and J-3 do then?
"We have a very good organisation for updating the front line with all the intelligence that it needs to know...."

British MOD Intelligence Officer

Sea Harrier Over the F

**Intelligence Intercourse.** A good Ops-Intel Marriage can prevent some "intelligence failures." Another lucrative point of prevention is the intercourse between the three levels of intelligence: strategic, operational and tactical. Failures to collect and exchange information on all levels leads to failure. The British Ministry of Defense (MOD) Officer quoted above is probably correct - they had a good organization. Unfortunately shortly after this statement the Falkland War proved they could not depend on the national level to know what the tactical level needed.

**Dissemination.** The most difficult portion of intelligence is dissemination. Once a higher headquarters knows information it often assumes their subordinates and adjacent organizations know it too. During the Falkland War, H.M.S. Invincible’s Sea Harrier squadron was tasked to provide Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to the task force. However during the entire operation the Invincible received only three intelligence messages.¹ The ground assault commander received none. He attacked
Goose Green with only rudimentary information he could gather. This is particularly damning since the British Ministry of Defense possessed the order of battle for the Argentineans at Goose Green.\(^2\) This is an "intelligence failure" too many operators experience.

On the other hand DESERT STORM demonstrated the reverse, too much information pushed down. During one point in the air campaign, so much information was sent that naval communications in Hawaii had an 8,000 "Immediate" message backlog. On the receiving end of this intelligence windfall I remember receiving nearly 200 messages a day in the middle of the Saudi desert. Of these, only three to five were pertinent. It seemed everyone had a piece of war winning intelligence they had to share with everybody else. The instinct to disseminate was healthy but it clobbered communications.

The "feast or famine" situation is a result of centralized intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. Intelligence efforts must be broad based, that is they must address the three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. Intelligence capabilities must exist at each level to support operations. The strategic level has Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA). At the operational level are Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC) and theater collection assets. At the end of the intelligence food chain are the tactical users. They have few intelligence assets.
"[Intelligence] mistakes are inevitably disastrous, and knowledge learned the hard way - that is, in the field - must be paid for in blood."

**Front-Line Intelligence**

**Tactical Intelligence.** This is "over the next hill" intelligence. It has no high priority to compete with the national and theater level leaders. It is intelligence of specific detail and perishability. It has limited value to other levels of command. Strategic and operational intelligence will not normally meet the detail criteria tactical users require. However, it is the intelligence that saves lives. It prevents a squad of infantry or tank platoon from moving into an ambush. It warns aircraft where the anti-aircraft fire will come from. It is the personal level of intelligence which saves lives.

The Theater Commander, J-2 and J-3 must emphasis getting pertinent information to this level. Before a crisis hits, the Theater Commander must support programs which guarantee tactical units maintain organic intelligence capability. These capabilities include collection, analysis and dissemination. The theater must also emphasis and practice identifying pertinent intelligence for dissemination down. During crisis this includes ensuring pertinent information is available despite "need to know" and caveat restrictions. The point is, the Theater Commander must direct his JIC to support his war fighters fully, in some cases ignoring administrative procedure
which interfere with support to tactical warfighters.

The Theater Commander must weigh the consequences of allowing tactical units to use their own collection assets in a crisis. During Operation DESERT STORM national and theater imagery could not provide information to Marines on breach points through Iraqi obstacle belts in Southern Kuwait. The Theater Commander recognized the importance of the information for reducing casualties and ensuring success. He risked possible compromise of his plans and approved Marine tactical ground reconnaissance to enter Southern Kuwait.

The benefits of supporting low level intelligence not only help tactical units but enhance operational success as well. To win a campaign, the battles must also be won. Ensuring tactical units control their own intelligence assets allows operational intelligence to focus on broader matters pertinent to the whole theater. Theater Commanders have a vested interest in ensuring service components maintain their own tactical intelligence capability. Likewise, the theater must maintain sufficient operational intelligence capabilities independent of national assets.

**Control.** If the Theater Commander or Commander JTF does not directly control intelligence assets of his own, operations suffer delays and denigration. During Pearl Harbor, the commander responsible for defense of Hawaii possessed no long range reconnaissance aircraft. In the Persian Gulf, over dependence on national reconnaissance assets by everyone, left components with limited imagery intelligence. The lesson from World War II through DESERT STORM has not changed - to
control your own destiny, control your own assets.

This simply means do not depend on outside organizations to supply all your intelligence needs. This rule is the same as depending on someone else to take care of fire support or logistics. The other party will justifiably see to their own needs first and then help you out. In instances where demand is high and supply scarce, you may get nothing. During DESERT STORM the Marines possessed no tactical aerial reconnaissance. They previously retired all their RF-4B aircraft in anticipation of the F/A-18D being available. This proved premature. Thus, the Marines were forced to compete for national level sensor support against national agencies, theater commands, and all other CENTCOM components. Not only was getting support a problem, but the systems could not provide the detailed support required. Imagery never proved adequate in coverage, clarity, frequency, or resolution. While imagery was provided, by piggy backing off higher level requirements, the result was an intelligence product lacking pertinence for Marine needs. Without direct control, intelligence support rarely will be satisfying.

An area in which tactical control was achieved in DESERT STORM was Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). Theater guidance directed moving EPW’s to the rear as quickly as possible for interrogation. However theater capability to disseminate interrogation reports failed to provide tactical units useful feedback. Since tactical units controlled the situation at the time of capture, EPW evacuation to the rear slowed because tactical units began utilizing their own interrogator-translators to collect information.
Historically intelligence support in a crisis becomes a "every man for himself" evolution. The lessons from Pearl Harbor, Korea, Vietnam, Falklands and the Persian Gulf bear this out. Controlling your own intelligence destiny at each level of war is the key. Beliefs in centralized intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, even when technologically capable, never will be responsive or sensitive enough to meet requirements of low level commanders. In such a case the theater JIC would be inundated with tactical requirements and unable to support either tactical or operational units sufficiently.

Intelligence Push and Pull. Intercourse between the three levels of intelligence requires communication connectivity. As discussed, some "intelligence failures" come from not receiving available information, as in the Falklands. On the other hand the Persian Gulf War demonstrated intelligence overload mired communications and intelligence analysis. Both problems result from intelligence "push." This simply means intelligence is pushed from the producer to the consumer. The producer decides what the consumer will get.

The Department of Defense program, "C'I for the Warrior" intends to change "push" to "pull." Intelligence "pull" allows consumers to select the intelligence they receive. "Pull" depends on computer driven menus from which consumers pick what they want. This technology requires decisions regarding menu content. Furthermore intelligence consumers will need to know what menus to locate information on and possess the hardware to access it. The bottomline, while national and theater
intelligence organizations sell "pull" technology, it does not place control in the hands of the subordinate consumer. Such control only comes from organic capabilities. "C'I for the Warrior" could resolve problems, like not pushing anything down as in the Falklands case, if that information is put on the menu. Intelligence "pull" though assumes connectivity is assured. What if the future battle environment includes EMP and EW?

Intelligence intercourse requires more than organization or architecture for updating intelligence. We cannot assume the information revolution will solve our fundamental "failure" problems. Information must first be collected. The strategic level does not collect all the intelligence required by the three levels of war. If it did, it is not likely it would appreciate the importance of particular pieces of operational or tactical information. This was amply demonstrated by the service intelligence chiefs prior to Pearl Harbor. All three levels must collect and analyze, as well as disseminate. During the introduction of Chinese forces into North Korea in 1950, operational air reconnaissance flights revealed nothing. The rugged terrain and scheduling of troop movements denied observation of Chinese activities. Only tactical ground reconnaissance could collect the information.

"C'I for the Warrior" will help dissemination failures. It will not improve analysis, collection and utilization related "intelligence failures." Capability to use intelligence must improve, not just the ability to move more intelligence around to more people. The danger of "pull" architecture is in believing it will solve such problems. Further, if it leads to centralizing collection and analysis at the upper
levels because of diminishing resources, the lower level will be robbed of capability
to secure pertinent intelligence.
CHAPTER IV
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The Traditional Intelligence Cycle. The traditional intelligence cycle is presented in Diagram 1. This is a simple model of the intelligence process. While simple, it allows intelligence producers to clearly envision how intelligence works. Significantly it is a closed system. No where is there an outlet for intelligence to be used. This reflects the intelligence process and mind set which resulted in many of the failures discussed.

Diagram 1. The traditional intelligence cycle.

Revised Intelligence Cycle. Reducing "intelligence failures" requires relooking at our basic intelligence doctrine. Intelligence's worth is its usefulness. A common point of failure in the system is at the point of utilization - the Ops-Intel Marriage. If the traditional intelligence cycle diagram represents the mind set of intelligence
producers, than there is no recognition of responsibility for how intelligence is utilized.

Addition of utilization to the intelligence cycle, as in Diagram 2, creates an open mind set for intelligence producers. This simple change renders the intelligence cycle more pragmatic, and better reflects the utilitarian requirement of intelligence. It also assigns responsibility for the area in which many "intelligence failures" occur. The provider is now responsible for the intelligence even after dissemination.

Diagram 2. Revised intelligence cycle.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Toward Fewer Failures. "Intelligence failures" are inevitable, but many are avoidable. They result from both intelligence mistakes and operational errors in intelligence use. Most avoidable failures occur at coordination points either between operations and intelligence or the three levels of intelligence. Efforts to avoid "intelligence failure" should focus on:

- Training operators in capabilities/limitations of intelligence.
- Training intelligence providers to assist operators in maximizing utility of intelligence.
- Stressing continuous coordination between J-2 and J-3 staffs in the Ops-Intel Marriage.
- Ensuring each level of war maintains organic intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination capabilities.
- Exploring opportunities of the "information revolution" to improve intelligence intercourse.
- Changing the intelligence cycle to reflect an open system with responsibility assigned for intelligence utilization.

Ultimately many of the "intelligence failures" we discussed may be prevented. However, the failings of the human component of the intelligence system to always make mistakes, results in failures. As demonstrated by Operation "Urgent Fury", if
no one thinks ahead during planning to tell the Defense Mapping Agency to provide maps of Grenada, then "intelligence failure" is inevitable.
NOTES

CHAPTER I


CHAPTER II


2. Schwarzkopf, p. 293.


**CHAPTER III**


3. Wohlstetter, pp. 5-6.


5. DOD, p. 346.


**CHAPTER V**

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