




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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM



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**Enemy Prisoner of War Operations:
The 800th Military Police Brigade**

Adding Value to the Total Force and to the Nation

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FOREWORD

This is one in a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in winning the war in the Persian Gulf. Countless reports have been written and numerous books published about the coalition victory. None have appeared, however, that focus on the valuable contributions of Army Reserve soldiers and civilians to the favorable outcome of the conflict. This monograph and others in the series fill that void.

This report, *Enemy Prisoner of War Operations: The 800th Military Police Brigade*, tells the story of an Army Reserve organization responsible for all enemy prisoner of war operations in the war against Iraq. It is a unique story in that it put an Army Reserve General Officer in command of units from all the components of the Army - Active, Guard and Reserve - that supported all Coalition Forces in the theater by operating the prisoner of war camps. In addition to the prisoner of war functions, an Army capability unique to the Reserve Components, the 800th MP Brigade performed the full range of military police operations, acted as customs agents during redeployment of forces, and were fully involved in supporting humanitarian relief operations for refugees. This is a success story attributable to the operational realization and reliance of the Army on its Total Force policy.

Other monographs will describe the roles of a variety of Army Reserve units and individual soldiers. They will include transporters, civil affairs specialists, engineers, infantrymen, trainers, communicators, medical personnel and strategic intelligence units. These monographs, and the results of additional research on Army Reserve contributions to operations in the Persian Gulf, will be bound eventually in a single volume.

Your comments on this and future issuances are most welcome.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

RONALD E. SMITH
Colonel, General Staff
Chief, Program Analysis and
Evaluation Division

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM

Enemy Prisoner of War Operations:

The 800th Military Police Brigade

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John R. Brinkerhoff, Consultant to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, has been the principal author of this report. Ted Silva and John Seitz were editors and contributing authors.

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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

**Enemy Prisoner of War Operations:
The 800th Military Police Brigade**

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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM

Enemy Prisoner of War Operations:
The 800th Military Police Brigade

The Fruits of Victory

On Sunday, 3 March 1991, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant General Prince Khalid of Saudi Arabia met with the Iraqi commanders to dictate the terms for a temporary cease fire. Generals Schwarzkopf and Khalid flew to a tent camp at Safwan, an air base in Southern Iraq. Lieutenant General Mohammed Abdez Rahman al-Dagistani, Lieutenant General Sabin Abdel-Aziz al-Douri, and other Iraqi officers arrived by vehicle with a strong U.S. security escort. The two groups met in a tent to settle the arrangements for what was in effect an Iraqi surrender. After the Coalition demands as to the time and rules of the cease fire had been agreed to by the Iraqis, the talk turned to the matter of prisoners. The chief Iraqi delegate announced that Iraq held 41 American and other Coalition prisoners and asked how many Iraqi prisoners were held by the Coalition forces. General Schwarzkopf conferred with an aide and responded: "Fifty-eight thousand prisoners or more, and we don't have a full accounting yet."

The Iraqis were stunned. Never had they imagined the extent of the Coalition triumph, the most visible results of which were the liberation of Kuwait and one of the largest mass capitulations in recent military history.¹

To the winners, the 86,743 Iraqi prisoners taken were both the fruits of victory and a tremendous management and logistical problem.² The prisoners had to be processed, fed, provided medical care, accounted for, and treated properly in accordance with international law and agreements. For the 69,822 prisoners captured by the U.S., U.K. and French forces, and interned in U.S. prisoner of war camps, this massive job was done entirely by units of the U.S. Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve.³

The treatment of prisoners has been a sensitive subject since war started. In the past prisoners were often killed, enslaved, or otherwise treated poorly, except for high-ranking officers who often were held to be exchanged for ransom. As part of twentieth century efforts to mitigate the effects of war by international agreement, rules prescribing proper treatment of prisoners have been established. In 1929, the world community adopted a Geneva Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, to which the U.S. was not a signatory. During World War II, prisoners of the Allies were treated well, but treatment of prisoners by the

Japanese and, in some cases the Germans, was not in accordance with the humane standards of the Geneva Convention. In August 1949, the international community adopted four new Geneva Conventions, to which the United States is signatory. Geneva Convention III addresses the status of prisoners of war and mandates humane treatment and full accountability of all prisoners of war from the point of capture until release, repatriation, or death.⁴

During the Korean and Vietnamese wars, although American prisoners were not well treated by their captors, the U.S. Army policy was to treat prisoners humanely and in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Despite some problems in dealing with hard-core communist North Korean prisoners during the Korean War, U.S. captured prisoners in that conflict were managed well.⁵ In the Vietnam War, prisoners captured by the U.S. forces were turned over to the Government of Vietnam.

The Secretary of the Army is designated as the executive agent for the Department of Defense Program for Prisoners of War and Other Detainees.⁶ In the U.S. Government, the general term "prisoner of war" (POW) is used to describe U.S. or allied troops captured and held by an opponent. The term "enemy prisoner of war" (EPW) is used to describe enemy troops we or our allies capture and hold. Within the Army, the Military Police Corps is responsible for development of doctrine, force structure, and methods to deal with EPW. During the years after World War II and the Korean War, the primary planning case for the U.S. Armed Forces was to be prepared to fight a major conventional war in Europe against the Soviet Union and the other nations of the Warsaw Pact. The primary concern of the Army for that contingency was to win the first battle and hold the Soviet-led invaders of Germany as far to the East as possible. Maintaining a capability to manage EPW was not a high priority, and the specialized MP units to do this job were maintained in the Army Reserve Components because they could be mobilized in time to be available when they would be needed in Europe. An MP prisoner of war unit is ideal for the Reserve Components since it requires a small amount of equipment and a narrow range of specialized skills, and could be trained adequately in the 39 days of training prescribed for Reserve Component units.

Accordingly, at the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War, all of the specialized capability of the United States to process and intern EPW was found in units of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).⁷ These units had trained for years to accomplish a mission considered to be relatively unimportant, and when they were needed to cope with the large numbers of Iraqi prisoners taken from 20 January to 15 April 1991, they were there. How they got there and what they did is another chapter in the story of the Army Reserve in DESERT STORM. The story starts with the Military Police Corps.

The Military Police Corps

The Military Police Corps of the U.S. Army is a combat support branch which is vital to the operations of the army-in-the-field. Military police originated from the need to assure that stragglers on the battlefield were put under military control and returned to the battle and that prisoners were taken into custody. The German term for military police, feldjaeger (literally field hunter), expresses the original role of these troops.

Military Police in the US Army

The United States Army has had military police since it was formed during the Revolutionary War. In that conflict a "Provost" of four officers and 57 enlisted personnel (including four executioners) was authorized by Congress and organized on 1 June 1778 at Valley Forge, PA. This corps provided security for General Washington's headquarters, handled prisoners of war, and apprehended deserters and stragglers. For American wars up to World War I, the military police function was assigned to officers and soldiers detailed on a temporary basis. During the Civil War, Regular Army units were often detailed as provost guards to enforce Army regulations, manage prisoners of war, and provide security for key areas, such as Washington, D.C. General McClellan employed his provost marshals and guards to restore order to a mutinous regiment of volunteers. During the Spanish American War, General Arthur MacArthur was designated the Military Governor and Provost Marshal General of Manila and employed a Provost Guard Brigade to assume the responsibilities of the civil government. During the Spanish American War the term "military police" was used for the first time to refer to troops performing these kinds of duties.⁸

A separate Military Police Corps was established for World War I. The Provost Marshal General of the Army, Major General Enoch H. Crowder, operated the Selective Service System and established the military police as a professional corps. Major General Harry H. Bandholtz, Provost Marshal General of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, organized military police units, established the responsibility of provost marshals for the military police chain of command, and established a military police school in France.⁹ The military police units accomplished circulation control to prevent unauthorized individuals from entering the Zone of Operations, established a criminal investigation division, managed large numbers of German prisoners of war, and assisted the combat operations of the infantry divisions. After the Armistice, efforts by the Army to retain a permanent Military Police Corps were rejected by Congress. However, the National Defense Act of 1920 authorized military police units to be in the Army Reserve.

Facing the imminence of World War II, the Military Police Corps of the U.S. Army was established on a permanent basis on 26 September 1941. During that global conflict, the Military Police Corps grew to a strength of 9,250 officers and over 200,000 enlisted personnel.

Specialized battalions, companies, and detachments were formed for post, camp, and station guards, Zone of Interior Guards, POW Escort Guard, POW Processing, and Criminal Investigation. Each division had an MP company and other tactical support MP units helped control the battlefields of Europe, the Pacific, and the other theaters of war.¹⁰

Following World War II, the Military Police Corps was retained as a combat service support branch and became part of the Army's permanent force structure. Military Police Corps units served with distinction in Korea and Vietnam, where they were responsible for defending the US Embassy in Saigon against Viet Cong forces during the Tet Offensive of January and February 1968. After the Tet Offensive, the Military Police Corps was redesignated a combat support branch. Military Police accompanied the combat forces during the Grenada and Panama operations, and--as we shall see--were a vital factor in Operation Desert Storm.

Military Police Missions

In the U.S. Army the military police are responsible for four major missions: battlefield circulation control; area security; law and order, and enemy prisoner of war operations.¹¹ The U.S. Air Force and Navy also have military and civilian personnel to perform the area security and law and order missions as security police or shore patrols.

Battlefield Circulation Control (BCC) is designed to facilitate the movement of military units and supplies by performing route reconnaissance, controlling stragglers and refugees, and expediting traffic. Complex movements, such as the flanking maneuver of US and Coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM in February 1991, require close coordination of military convoys to assure that units get where they are supposed to be at the right times. Route reconnaissance conducted by MP units to obtain detailed information on routes and nearby terrain plays a significant role in the development and maintenance of movement plans. Three person MP teams operate traffic control points on the main supply routes to direct convoys and individual vehicles to their proper destinations. MP teams patrol the roads and enforce traffic and security regulations. They erect signs marking routes in the theater of operations. Stragglers and military personnel absent without official leave (AWOL) are collected at traffic control posts and transferred to straggler control points, where they are screened and removed to medical facilities or returned to their units. MPs also assist Civil Affairs units to keep civilian refugees from hindering military movements by diverting them to secondary routes and assisting their movement out of the area of operations.

Area Security is a major function of military police in the theater of operations. MP combat support units in the U.S. Army are highly mobile, are heavily armed with numerous automatic weapons, and have excellent communications. They are well suited to provide mobile patrols to protect convoys, act as response forces for counter-incursion (ambush) operations, and

secure designated critical assets, such as bridges, depots, ammunition supply points, ports, airfields, and headquarters. When required, they fight and are equipped and trained to deal effectively with light forces and guerrillas. Military police and civilian security police also provide physical security to military installations and other key facilities in the rear areas and the United States to protect against unlawful trespass and criminal or terrorist attack. This is done by providing guards, mobile patrols, and surveillance of key facilities and gates and other means of egress or entry. Military Police providing area security play a key role in the battle to protect the rear areas.

Law and Order includes law enforcement, criminal investigation, military prison confinement, and counter-terrorism. Law enforcement ranges from writing tickets for traffic violations on military bases to apprehending military personnel whose conduct is illegal. Criminal investigations to identify persons who violate military law or civil law on military installations are accomplished by specialized units in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Defense Inspector General. Military investigators gather evidence for presentation to the Judge Advocate General staff officers of military commands, who decide whether to recommend a pre-trial investigation as a prelude to court-martial. MP units also secure military prisoners convicted of felonies or held in custody while waiting court-martial. MP units also act to defeat terrorists attacking military installations or activities, to include providing protection for key individuals and negotiating the release of hostages.

Enemy Prisoner of War Operations are a major responsibility of the Military Police Corps of the U.S. Army. All MPs are trained to handle EPW and Civilian Internees (CI), and some units are trained specifically for this function, as described further in this paper.

Military Police Force Structure

Military police units exist at every level in the U.S. Army from the division to major commands. Each division has an MP company, and each corps an MP brigade with several battalions. One or more MP brigades support the theater army, and a separate criminal investigation unit usually operates directly under the theater or theater army commander. Commanders of divisions and larger organizations have a staff provost marshal to advise on military police matters and to exercise staff supervision of MP units assigned to or in support of the organization.

Division MP Company. Each division has an organic MP company, which performs the four MP missions in support of division operations. A divisional MP company is commanded by a captain and may range in size from 81 personnel (six officers and 75 enlisted personnel) for a light division to 153 personnel (nine officers and 144 enlisted personnel) for a heavy division. In addition, there is a division provost marshal, an MP lieutenant colonel, who is a special staff officer responsible for the conduct of all military police activities performed in

support of the division and the principal advisor to the division commander on MP related matters. The division MP company operates under the operational control of the division provost marshal.

Combat Support MP Company. The four MP missions are performed at the corps and echelons above corps by the combat support MP company. This unit is commanded by a captain and is authorized 176 personnel (five officers and 171 enlisted personnel). Combat support companies have 100% tactical mobility and are heavily armed with 91 automatic weapons and 88 anti-tank weapons. The basic operational component of the combat support company is the three person team, which is capable of operating independently over extended periods of time.

Combat Support MP Battalion. This unit is a headquarters and headquarters detachment designed to provide command and control for up to seven combat support companies. The battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and is authorized 67 personnel (13 officers, two warrant officers, and 52 enlisted personnel).

Corps MP Brigade. A corps consists of several divisions, one or more separate combat brigades, an armored cavalry regiment, an engineer brigade, artillery brigade, signal brigade, and a corps support command. The military police function for the corps is carried out by a military police brigade commanded by a colonel. The brigade is a headquarters to which MP battalions and companies are assigned as appropriate for the mission. A typical MP Brigade for the corps includes two to four combat support MP battalions, each of which has several combat support companies. The corps MP brigade provides law and order, BCC, and EPW capabilities within the corps rear area and also has a substantial role in rear area security.

Theater Army Area Command MP Brigade. The military police function at echelons above corps (field army or theater army) is provided by one or more Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) MP brigade headquarters, each of which is assigned two to four combat support MP battalions and an appropriate number of combat support companies. These brigades are normally allocated on the basis of one per TAACOM.

The EPW function at echelons above corps is carried out by a specialized force structure that will be described later.

The Military Police force structure in July 1990 was divided among the components as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Army Military Police Force Structure in July 1990
(Numbers of Units)


	Active	USAR	ARNG	Total
MP Command (EPW)	0	1	0	1
MP Brigade HHC	5	3	4	12
MP Camp (EPW)	0	5	0	5
MP Battalion HHD	14	13	13	40
MP Companies	94	44	101	239
MP Detachments	3	8	0	11
Total Units	116	74	118	308

The two Army Reserve Components provided 47% of the pre-Gulf War strength authorization of the MP Corps. The authorized strength of the USAR units was 8,708 personnel; ARNG units had 13,322 personnel; and the active MP units, 24,813 personnel.

The Military Police Force Structure in Southwest Asia

For Operation DESERT STORM a maximum of 17,618 military police personnel were deployed to the Southwest Asia theater, including personnel from the Criminal Investigation Command and non-MPs assigned to MP units. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve contributed 76% of this strength. The overall MP organization for DESERT STORM was as shown in Figure 2.¹²

Figure 2.
ARCENT Military Police Organization for DESERT STORM



Each of the three combat support MP brigades had an authorized strength of over 3,000 military personnel, and the CID Group had a strength of 175 personnel. The 800th MP Brigade had an authorized strength of 8,461 personnel (actual strength was about 7,300) and was assigned to the 22nd Support Command (SUPCOM). The breakout of the authorized strengths of the MP commands in the theater by component is shown in Figure 3. Assigned and actual strengths tended to be somewhat lower than these, but this gives an idea of the allocation of MPs among the various organizations and components.

Figure 3.

Authorized Strength of MP Commands in the SWA Theater

	USAR	ARNG	Active	Total
Divisional MP Cos	0	0	1175	1175
14th MP Bde	176	1,544	1,287	3,007
16th MP Bde	772	528	1,707	3,007
89th MP Bde	528	1,896	1,206	3,630
3rd CID Group	0	0	175	175
800th MP Bde (EPW)	3,027	5,434	0	8,461
Total	4,503	9,402	5,550	19,455

A total of 128 MP units were deployed to Southwest Asia for DESERT STORM. In addition, a number of USAR and ARNG MP units were mobilized and employed in CONUS and Europe as backfill for deploying Active Component units. Figure 4 shows the extent of the call up and deployment of units.

Figure 4.

Employment of MP Units in DESERT STORM
(Number of Units)

	USAR	ARNG	Active	Total
Deployed to Theater	33	66	29	128
Backfill to USAREUR	5	5	0	10
Employed in CONUS	1	3	n/a	4
Total Committed	39	74	29	142

The EPW System

The EPW system operates from the combat area to Washington, D.C., to assure that the United States accomplishes this mission properly and efficiently. Operations of the EPW system start on the battlefield.

EPW Operations

EPW operations start with the combat units, who actually capture almost all of the prisoners. All combat units receive some training in handling of EPW, and this subject is covered in the Soldiers Manual that prescribes the common tasks all Army military personnel must master. The capturing troops are responsible to safeguard, silence, tag, and evacuate their prisoners to the nearest EPW collecting point, where they are turned over to MP personnel. So that they may concentrate on their operational missions, the combat units are instructed to turn over their prisoners to MP units as soon as possible. The first MPs to receive prisoners are usually from the division MP company. They take charge of the prisoners and move them to division collection points--simple enclosures where the EPW are assembled and secured while waiting transportation to the rear. The EPW are collected and moved further back to corps holding areas, operated by soldiers of the MP brigades providing combat support for the corps. The corps MPs secure the EPW until they are turned over to the specialized MP EPW units assigned to the theater army area command.

The basic rule for moving EPW is that the losing organization provides the transportation while the receiving organization provides the security. Thus, for movement of EPW from the corps holding areas to the camps, the EPW brigade would provide the escorts while the corps would provide the transportation, primarily using vehicles returning empty after supply runs to the forward areas. Theater army and corps transportation assets (trucks and helicopters) also may go forward to the brigade support areas to evacuate EPW. The goal of the initial management of the EPW is to get them out of the combat area as rapidly as possible.

Once the EPW are in the camps, the main thrust is to care for the prisoners humanely in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, shield them from unwarranted intrusion, provide food, shelter, and medical care, and--most important--account for them. One of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions is that each prisoner of war will be accounted for until released, repatriated, or dead. This is an important aspect of the EPW system, and great care is taken to do this.

In the theater of war, the Army is responsible for all EPW processing and assumes responsibility for EPW captured by Marine Corps, Air Force, Navy, and when covered by international agreements (as in this case)--Allied units. In his capacity as executive agent for the Department of Defense EPW/Detainee Program, the Secretary of the Army coordinates on

these matters with the Department of State and the International Committee of the Red Cross.¹³

The EPW Force Structure

The MP EPW unit force structure is designed to process, account for, intern, and sustain the EPWs in accordance with the requirements of the Geneva Conventions, law, and regulations. Eight kinds of EPW units were used during Operation DESERT STORM:¹⁴

MP Camp (EPW). This unit provides both a headquarters and an operational element for processing and internment of EPW. As a headquarters, a camp supervises an MP battalion and several MP companies that provide security for the camp. As an operating entity, a camp provides the personnel who work directly with the EPWs to operate and administer the camp itself. An MP EPW Camp is commanded by a colonel and has a required strength of 296 personnel (25 officers, two warrant officers, and 269 enlisted personnel).

MP Command and Control Team (Battalion). This is an intermediate command and control headquarters that administers and oversees the operations of several MP companies. One MP battalion headquarters is normally assigned to each MP Camp. An MP battalion headquarters is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and has a required strength of 33 personnel (seven officers and 26 enlisted personnel). This unit is a detachment lacking its own messing, maintenance, and administrative capability and must be supported by one of its MP companies in these areas.

MP Guard Company. This unit provides security for a camp by manning guard posts, guard towers, and mobile patrols to control both entrance and egress from the camp. This unit is commanded by a captain and has a required strength of 124 personnel (four officers and 120 enlisted personnel).

MP Escort Guard Company. This unit provides security and accountability for EPW being moved from the corps holding areas to the EPW camps and between EPW camps. An MP escort guard company is commanded by a captain and has a required strength of 141 personnel (four officers and 137 enlisted personnel).

MP Processing Company. This unit records the identity and status of each EPW and keeps track of each EPW during processing and movement. These units in effect operate a personnel system for the EPW, maintaining rosters of EPW and accounting for each while in U.S. custody. One of these units normally is assigned to each Camp. An MP processing company is commanded by a captain and has a required strength of 78 personnel (four officers and 74 enlisted personnel).

MP Processing Advisory Team. This detachment insures that EPW are processed properly and their records are correct to facilitate a smooth transfer between EPW camps or among nations. A processing advisory team has a required strength of four personnel (one officer and three enlisted personnel).¹⁵

MP Camp Advisory Team. This detachment provides advice and liaison to host nation EPW camps to which U.S. captured EPW have been transferred to assure continued accountability and humane treatment. They provide a link to the EPW brigade headquarters from all EPW elements in the theater. A camp advisory team is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and has a required strength of 12 personnel (three officers and nine enlisted personnel).

MP Prisoner of War Information Center (PWIC). This theater level unit is responsible for compiling, managing, and transmitting information on EPW accountability to the National PWIC. It operates directly under the theater EPW brigade and is the single repository for authoritative EPW information for the brigade and the original source of EPW statistical information for the theater released by Department of the Army to outside agencies and the public. A prisoner of war information center is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and has a required strength of 60 personnel (six officers and 54 enlisted personnel).

EPW Operational Concepts

The basic element of the theater EPW system used in DESERT STORM was an EPW Camp, consisting typically of an MP Camp Headquarters, a battalion headquarters for intermediate command and control, a processing company, four to seven guard companies, and one to two escort guard companies. A camp is designed to handle 12,000 EPW and process them in at a rate of 500 per day.

The apex of the EPW system in a theater of war is an MP brigade headquarters that has the responsibility for all EPW operations above corps, including operation of camps, processing of EPW, liaison with other senior headquarters, cooperation with allies and host nations, and working with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In a small theater of operations, a corps or TAACOM MP brigade headquarters might be responsible for EPW operations in addition to its other missions. However, because of the specialized nature of large scale, extended EPW operations, the Army created and maintained in its force structure a specialized MP brigade headquarters--the 800th--to perform the theater EPW mission as its sole mission.

The U.S. Army also has maintained, since 1959, the 300th MP Prisoner of War Command, USAR, Inkster, Michigan, to serve as a centralized command for all EPW matters in CONUS and a focal point for EPW matters throughout the Army. Should EPW be transferred from the theater to CONUS, the 300th MP Prisoner of War Command and

subordinate units would establish and operate the necessary camps.¹⁶

Prisoners are a good source of intelligence, and it is desirable to interrogate them soon after capture to elicit timely information of use to the capturing forces. Military intelligence units are responsible for interrogation of prisoners, usually at corps level. Interrogation is also required at the camps to obtain intelligence useful for camp operations and identification of war criminals. Military intelligence detachments with specially trained linguists may be located at the MP EPW Camps.

At the national level, the highest element of the EPW operational system is the National Prisoner of War Information Center (NPWIC) which serves as the central manager for information pertaining both to EPW in U.S. custody and U.S. personnel held as POW by others—in this case, the Iraqis. The NPWIC is operated by Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The NPWIC receives EPW information from the theater and serves as the central information source for the Secretary of Defense and his staff, other Federal Agencies, the White House, Congress, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The NPWIC was established at the Pentagon in October 1990 on a standby basis. On 17 January 1991, right after the start of the Air War, the NPWIC was activated partially in order to be able to report U.S. POWs and MIAs to the ICRC. On 21 January 1991, in order to deal with the anticipated heavy EPW workload from Operation DESERT STORM, the National PWIC became fully operational and was manned by five U.S. Army Reserve IMAs, two volunteer Reservists, and a recalled retired NCO, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Pidgeon, USAR, and the general supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Judy-Ann Carroll, Chief of the EPW Branch of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The operations of the NPWIC during Operation DESERT STORM were highly successful and provided at the national level the guidance and support needed for the EPW operation carried on by the 800th MP Brigade in the theater.¹⁷

Preparations for EPW Operations

Upon the outbreak of war on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent build up of U.S. and Coalition forces during Operation DESERT SHIELD, it was not immediately apparent that there would be a requirement for specialized EPW units in the Southwest Asia Theater of Operations (SWA). The U.S. mission was defensive. Taking care of large numbers of prisoners was not a high priority item for commanders and staff concerned with protecting Saudi Arabia against what they considered to be a strong and aggressive Iraqi enemy. It was believed that the few prisoners that were expected could be handled by the MPs of the divisions and corps and the combat support MP units of the 16th MP Brigade of the XVIII Airborne Corps. However, when the decision was made to have a capability for offensive action, and the war plans for DESERT STORM were written, the prospect of taking large numbers of EPW became evident, and it was

decided to create a dedicated EPW capability in the theater. The 800th MP Brigade (EPW) was selected to be responsible for planning and conducting EPW operations in SWA.¹⁸

The 800th MP Brigade (EPW)

The 800th MP Brigade (EPW), USAR, is the only EPW brigade in the Army. Since 1985, it had trained and prepared to command EPW operations in Europe in the event of a major war there. The 800th MP Brigade Headquarters is stationed at Uniondale, NY, and is authorized 32 officers and 56 enlisted personnel.

The Commander of the 800th MP Brigade at the outbreak of the War with Iraq was Brigadier General Joseph F. Conlon, III. General Conlon is a Detective Captain in the Suffolk County District Attorney's office with a Masters Degree in Criminal Justice. He has the reputation of being tough but fair in bringing to justice those who violate the law. He is also a dedicated Army Reservist who served two years on active duty with the 82nd Airborne Division and then 27 years as a drilling Reservist with USAR military police units. He has held command and staff positions at platoon, company, and battalion levels, culminating in his assignment as commander of the 800th MP Brigade from 1985 until 1991. As commander, General Conlon stressed realistic training and field exercises on the basis of his oft stated view that "If you are trained to do your mission, you can do it anywhere."

The 800th MP Brigade was well prepared for the mission it was about to undertake. It had written EPW plans and participated in numerous field exercises with its CAPSTONE headquarters, the 1st Personnel Command of United States Army, Europe. In July 1990 the 800th MP Brigade conducted Exercise TOREADOR SWORD, a rear area battle exercise at Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia, that included the full spectrum of rear area battle operations, including the construction and operation of two EPW camps.¹⁹ More than half of the EPW units that deployed to SWA for Operation DESERT STORM participated in TOREADOR SWORD or its 1987 predecessor, GOLD SWORD. This preparation paid off in SWA.

The 800th MP Brigade took notice of the conflict from the start. It contacted the 89th MP Brigade and provided advice and assistance on EPW matters to that unit which, prior to the arrival of the 800th, had responsibility for the function. The 800th MP Brigade worked with FORSCOM Headquarters to plan the time table for introduction of EPW units into the theater. Personnel from the Brigade staff and some subordinate units helped train and process the early deploying EPW units--a newly formed EPW battalion and a prisoner of war information center. In addition, an advanced party of the 800th MP Brigade was deployed to provide a planning capability in the theater.

Build Up of EPW Units in the Theater

The first EPW units to deploy to the Southwest Asia Theater were the 400th MP Battalion (EPW/CI), the 313th Prisoner of War Information Center, three guard companies and two escort guard companies. These units arrived in SWA Theater from 4 November to 8 December 1990. The advance party of the 800th MP Brigade Hqs, under the Deputy Commander, Colonel Evo Riguzzi, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 9 December 1990. Department of the Army had disapproved the original plan to have the Commander, Brigadier General Joseph Conlon III, lead the advance party. The advance party consisted of 12 personnel from the Brigade and two personnel each from the 401st and 403rd MP Camps. Upon arrival, the 800th MP Brigade advance party took command of the EPW units in the theater, established liaison with the Saudi Arabian EPW cadre, and provided training and assistance to the Saudis as they developed their own EPW capability.

As of 11 December 1990, the EPW structure in the theater was as shown in Figure 5. This structure had the rated capability of interning 6,000 EPW, but this was clearly inadequate to the need, and the first task of the advanced party was to start work on a plan to cope with an estimate of 100,000 Iraqi prisoners for the forthcoming combat phase.

Figure 5.

EPW Forces in SWA Theater on 11 Dec 1990

**800th MP Brigade
Advance Party**

<u>313th PWIC</u>	<u>400th MP Bn</u>
	200th MP Guard Co 290th MP Guard Co 1138th MP Guard Co 342nd MP Escort Guard Co 344th MP Escort Guard Co

The 800th MP Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company was called to active duty on 6 December 1990 and reported to its mobilization station, Fort Meade, MD, on 10 December. On 20 December the unit was certified ready for deployment, and it arrived in Saudi Arabia on 25 December 1990, to take up its assigned mission as senior EPW headquarters in

the theater. On 26 December 1990, General Conlon and the Brigade G1 and G3 staff officers participated in the ARCENT map exercise which was the battle briefing for DESERT STORM. During the map exercise, the Brigade brought up six issues for ARCENT consideration: support for selection of sites for EPW camps outside the combat zone based on water availability; the need for Engineer support; arrangements for transferring EPW to the Saudi Government; emphasis on use of retrograde transportation for EPW movement; shortages of communications and transportation equipment in EPW units; and the balance between camp capacity and projected EPW capture rates. This exercise provided the basis for subsequent EPW planning.

The original mission of the Brigade was to establish five EPW camps and one EPW/CI battalion internment facility; process and intern EPW/CIs from all Services and Allied Forces as agreed to; and be prepared to establish and operate a confinement facility for all U.S. prisoners.²⁰ Subsequent discussion with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) revised the number of camps to four. The Saudis wanted to limit the time which the EPW spent in U.S. hands to about 30 days maximum and thought that a fifth U.S. EPW camp would be excess capacity and might detract from the construction and operation of their own three camps.

General Conlon's concept of the operation was to establish two camp areas, each with two EPW camps. The two camps in the East (BRONX) Area would be in support of the Marine Corps, who were expected to capture large numbers of Iraqis--and did. The two camps in the West (BROOKLYN) would support VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps and accept EPW from the U.K. and French forces operating with the XVIII Airborne Corps. A fifth EPW camp would be held in reserve for contingency missions. Each of the four camps was to be constructed initially for 12,000 EPW (48,000 total) with a capability to expand to 24,000 each (96,000 total) with no additional MP personnel.²¹ Despite the assignment to the 800th MP Brigade of numerous collateral missions, this concept remained valid throughout the operation.

The 800th MP Brigade staff prepared Theater EPW OPLAN 1-91, which was published on 14 January 1991 and delineated EPW support for XVIII Airborne Corps, VII Corps, and the 1st U.K. Division in the ARCENT area of operations; and the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and the Navy in the MARCENT area of operations.²² The plan provided for all contingencies and was designed to work even if communications failed. The theater confinement facility mission was included in the plan even though the 800th MP Brigade had received assurances that it would not be tasked for this mission. General Conlon's principle throughout the operation was "Follow the Plan." This worked well, and the detailed plan gave the entire organization a blueprint for success.

U.S. EPW forces were also assigned to support the U.K. and French Forces in the theater. The First U.K. Division was supported directly by their own prisoner of war forces consisting of one collection battalion, one guard battalion, and one escort guard battalion. EPW captured by the U.K. forces were taken to a U.K. holding area by the U.K. escort guards. U.S. MPs picked up the EPW from the U.K. holding area and escorted them to the BROOKLYN

Area EPW camps. EPW captured by the French Forces were sent to the XVIII Airborne Corps holding area from which they were escorted to the EPW camps by 800th MP Brigade units.²³

By 20 January 1991, shortly after the start of the air war, the 800th MP Brigade had the force structure shown in Figure 6. The 301st MP Camp was en route to the theater and was designated to assume command of the 361st and 705th MP Guard Companies upon its arrival. Although these units had enough personnel to intern 28,000 EPW, the camps were not constructed and supplies were not available to handle that workload.

Figure 6.

EPW Forces in SWA Theater on 20 Jan 1991

800th MP Brigade

313th PWIC	400th Bn	401st Camp	403rd Camp
	200th Guard 290th Guard 1138th Guard 344th Escort	358th Proc 157th Guard 191st Guard 206th Guard 361st Guard 625th Guard 705th Guard 342nd Escort	420th Proc 72nd Guard 213nd Guard 257th Guard 745th Guard 970th Guard 346th Escort

Ultimately the 800th MP Brigade achieved a strength of over 7,300 troops and was the largest brigade in Saudi Arabia. In addition to the specialized MP units, a field hospital, a psychological operations (PSYOP) battalion, an adjutant general company, and two military intelligence detachments were assigned to the brigade. Of the total 69 units assigned to the 800th MP Brigade, 29 were from the US Army Reserve (USAR) and 40 were from the Army National Guard (ARNG). Except for a few fillers and replacements, there were no Active Component personnel in the 800th MP Brigade. The final task organization of the 800th MP Brigade is shown in Figure 7 and its final unit composition in Figure 8.

Figure 7.
Major Elements of the 800th MP Brigade on 4 Mar 1991

EPW Camps	152nd PWIC	Advisory Teams	Confinement Facility	Supporting Units
301st Camp 400th Camp 401st Camp 402nd Camp 403rd Camp		346th Camp 418th Camp 424th Camp 439th Camp 440th Proc 446th Proc 498th Proc	200th Guard	300th Field Hosp 13th PSYOP Bn (-) 6th PSYOP Bn (-) 513th MI Det (-)

Figure 8.
Unit Composition of the 800th MP Brigade

	USAR	ARNG	Total
MP Brigade Hqs & Hqs Co	1	-	1
MP Camp Hqs & Hqs Co	5	-	5
MP Battalion EPW/CI	1	-	1
MP Battalion Hqs & Hqs Det	-	5	5
MP Escort Guard Co	4	4	8
MP Guard Co	4	28	32
MP Processing Co	2	1	3
MP Processing Advisory Team	3	-	3
MP Camp Advisory Team	4	-	4
MP PW Info Center	1	1	2
AG Personnel Services Co	1	-	1
PSYOP Battalion	1	-	1
Field Hospital	-	1	1
MI Detachment	2	-	2
Total:	29	40	69

Advisory Team Utilization

Seven EPW advisory teams were mobilized and deployed to Saudi Arabia to assist in accounting for EPW and provide EPW expertise to the Saudi Arabian Forces. While they did not arrive in the theater until early February, the teams were invaluable in carrying out the theater EPW mission by training Saudi Arabian forces in the treatment of the Iraqi prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Although the attitude of the Saudis was positive toward their co-religionists from Iraq, it was useful to help the Saudis avoid any criticism which might have been made by Iraq or other Moslem nations in the world about bad treatment of the EPW. The advisory teams operated under Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. See, and were allocated to various headquarters as shown in Figure 9.²⁴

Figure 9.

Allocation of EPW Advisory Teams

TEAM	HEADQUARTERS
346th Camp	ARCENT FORWARD & Dhahran Area
439th Camp	BRONX Area
418th Camp	BROOKLYN Area
424th Camp	CENTCOM & Artawiyah Area
440th Proc	BRONX Area
446th Proc	BROOKLYN Area
498th Proc	ARCENT FORWARD & Dhahran Area

The EPW advisory teams were used to provide essential coordination and accounting services for EPW who were transferred from one U.S. EPW camp to another, were under treatment in medical channels, or--particularly--were transferred from U.S. custody to the custody of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) at one of their four EPW camps.

The 346th MP EPW Camp Advisory Team, USAR, Nashville, Tennessee, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Boyd, arrived in the theater on 25 January 1991 during

a SCUD attack that required the unit members to don their protective gear while still in the aircraft. After this introduction to the theater, the team provided training for Saudi Arabian personnel on operating EPW camps, and monitored and reported on EPW transferred from U.S. to Saudi Arabian EPW camps. The team also contributed to organizing and implementing the movement of Iraqi refugees and displaced civilians to refugee camps in Iraq.

The 439th MP EPW Camp Advisory Team, USAR, Omaha, Nebraska, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Worrell, provided assistance in transferring and maintaining accountability for EPW moved from U.S. to KSA custody in the BRONX Area. This team also provided technical assistance to the KSA EPW camp at As Nu Ayriyah in the BRONX Area.

The 418th EPW Camp Advisory Team, USAR, Tallahassee, Florida, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Bernard, provided assistance in transferring and maintaining accountability for EPW moved from the two U.S. camps in the BROOKLYN Area to KSA custody. The team also provided technical assistance to the KSA EPW camp at Hafar Al Batin in the BROOKLYN Area. This team also maintained accountability for EPW in medical channels.

The 424th EPW Camp Advisory Team, USAR, Ashley, Pennsylvania, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Czyzyk, provided assistance in transferring and maintaining accountability for EPW moved from U.S. to KSA custody near Artawiyah. The team also provided technical assistance to the KSA EPW camp at Artawiyah. This team maintained accountability for EPW in medical channels in the Riyadh Area.

The 498th EPW Processing Advisory Team, USAR, Nashville, Tennessee, commanded by Major Billy Cunningham, processed EPW in medical facilities in the Dhahran Area and the 300th Field Hospital in the BRONX Area. The team assisted the 401st MP Camp in processing and preparing records of EPW being transferred to KSA custody.

The 440th EPW Processing Advisory Team, USAR, California, commanded by First Lieutenant John. F. Bazan, reviewed and provided quality control of records for EPW being transferred from U.S. camps in the BRONX Area to KSA camps.

The 446th MP EPW Processing Advisory Team, USAR, Inkster, Michigan, commanded by Second Lieutenant Steven S. Chung, reviewed and provided quality control of records for EPW being transferred from US camps in the BROOKLYN Area to KSA camps.

EPW Workload

The Air War started on 16 January 1991. The first 22 prisoners were received by the 401st Camp at 0930 on 21 January 1991, just one day after the first enclosure was completed. These were Iraqis captured on 19 January 1991 by the USS Nicholas from oil platforms in the Persian Gulf.²⁵ The initial inspection of the EPW camps by the ICRC took place on the same day.

The total number of EPW processed and interned by the 800th MP Brigade was 69,822. Of these, 63,948 were captured by the US Forces, 5,005 by UK Forces, and 869 by French Forces.²⁶ In addition, 16,921 Iraqis were captured, processed, and interned by Saudi Arabia and other members of the Coalition. The breakout by EPW camp of the 69,822 EPW in US custody is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10.

US Processed EPW by Camp

	Number	Percent
301st Camp	21,473	31%
401st Camp	21,861	31%
402nd Camp	16,277	23%
403rd Camp	10,159	15%
Unknown	52	-

Of the EPW in U.S. custody, 2,940 were officers, 2,688 were warrant officers, 61,620 were enlisted personnel, and 1,492 were civilian internees. Another 1,082 were of indeterminate status. Thirteen general officers were captured, including three full generals. The EPW workload spread over time can be obtained from Figure 11.²⁷ These figures are somewhat misleading because they indicate EPW processed into camps rather than EPW captured and still being evacuated to the camps. However, it is clear that the bulk of the EPW workload for the camps came after hostilities had ceased.

Figure 11.
Phased Intake of EPW in U.S. Camps

Air War 17 Jan-23 Feb	Ground War 24 Feb-28 Feb	Post-War 1 Mar-2 May	Total
1,081	22,560	46,181	69,822

Collateral Missions of the 800th MP Brigade

Collateral (non-EPW) missions for the 800th MP Brigade started as soon as the first units arrived in theater. These included area security, law and order, evacuation of non-combatants, port security, VIP security, customs inspection, and operation of a confinement facility for U.S. prisoners. These collateral missions tended to degrade the ability of the Brigade to accomplish its primary EPW mission, but General Conlon's policy was never to refuse a requirement to support the combat effort--unless it was impossible to accomplish.²⁸ The Commander, 800th MP Brigade was also designated as the Deputy Commanding General for Rear Battle Operations of the 22nd Support Command, and he was responsible to plan and coordinate the security for 140 military facilities in the ARCENT rear area, including responses to terrorism or other attacks.

Despite shortages of equipment, the EPW soldiers performed military police combat support missions when required. Each of the collateral missions listed above and described in the following sections on camp operations required retraining programs that were facilitated by making extensive use of the civilian skills of the members of the Brigade, many of whom were police officers in civilian life.

Theater Confinement Facility

In early January 1991, the 800th MP Brigade was tasked to construct and operate a theater confinement facility for U.S. military personnel accused or convicted of offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Prior to this, the 89th MP Brigade had been evacuating US military prisoners directly to Germany using pre-planned procedures.²⁹ Because of the large build up in troop strength it was decided by ARCENT that a confinement facility was needed in the theater. The 800th MP Brigade tasked the 200th MP Guard Company, an Army National Guard unit from Salisbury, Maryland, commanded by Captain Ronald G. Chew, to perform this mission directly under the Brigade Headquarters.³⁰

This was a new mission for the 200th, and although all MP guard companies have the mission of providing security for military prisoners as well as EPW, some refresher training in confinement facility operations was conducted for the unit.³¹ This training was facilitated by the fact that several members of the 800th MP Brigade (including the Commander and the Deputy Commander) had training and experience in confinement operations and some members of the company had civilian jobs in correctional facilities. The senior corrections NCO of the 89th MP Brigade also provided valuable assistance. A search for a suitable existing facility was conducted with the assistance of the Saudi Military Police, and located a vacant Royal Saudi Air Force installation, which was converted into the confinement facility. Although the confinement facility was intended to serve the entire theater, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps chose not to use it. In addition to the theater facility, a forward pre-trial confinement facility was established to support VII and XVIII Airborne Corps, and coordination was effected with the Staff Judge Advocates of the corps to facilitate transfer and escort of prisoners to these facilities.

A total of 55 Army prisoners (two officers, six NCOs, and 47 enlisted personnel) were confined, 18 while awaiting trial, and 37 after conviction. These prisoners were evacuated in an orderly manner from the theater to the U.S. Army Confinement Facility in Mannheim, Germany, for further incarceration. This essential mission, was carried out in good order by the EPW MPs in a typical demonstration of Reserve Component flexibility.

The 200th MP Company also provided area security for the Dhahran Helicopter Repair Facility from 8 January 1991 until it was relieved by the 822nd MP Company on 21 February.

EPW Camp Operations

The heart of the EPW operations were the four camps which processed and held the EPW pending their release or repatriation. The camps had to be constructed, operated, and secured.

Camp Construction and Operation

Because of differences in circumstances, time of arrival in the theater, and commanders, each of the four EPW camps was organized, constructed, and operated somewhat differently. The locations of these camps, shown generally on Map 1, were chosen to be close to main supply routes (MSRs) in the rear areas of the units being supported, and were deemed to have sufficient water. The order of construction of the camps was the 401st Camp, 403rd Camp, 301st Camp, 402nd, and finally the 400th Camp, which did not construct a camp of its own but supported those in the BRONX area.³²

Map 1.

Southwest Asia Theater of Operations





Figure 12 is the plan of the camp constructed by the 301st MP Camp in the BROOKLYN Area, which shows the basic features common to all of the camps. An EPW camp is built in self-contained areas to provide adequate security for 12,000 EPW. The basic element of an EPW camp is the prisoner compound, which holds 500 prisoners in an area of 120,000 square feet and includes houses or tents for the EPW plus 21 latrines, 12 shower heads, and 32 wash basins. The next element of an EPW camp is the enclosure, which includes eight prisoner compounds, an administrative compound, and a recreation compound. Each enclosure is designed to accommodate 4,000 EPW. The administrative compound houses the MP and EPW staff of the enclosure and provides space for meetings and processing. The recreational compound gives the EPW a place to congregate and read books and magazines or listen to music and movies. A camp consists of three enclosures, a supply area, a processing area, and one or more holding areas. A camp may also contain a Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) used by a military intelligence unit to interrogate selected EPW. The supply area holds the rations, bedding, clothing, and other supplies for the EPW. The holding areas are used to segregate incoming or outgoing EPW while they are waiting processing, and the processing area is used

to perform the steps required to identify and assure the health of the EPW. A typical camp is a rough square two-thirds of a mile on a side, with a perimeter of 2.8 miles and an area of 317 acres.

Figure 12.
Plan of the 301st MP Camp



Some of the features of the camps were unique to Saudi Arabia. Because of the nature of the terrain, the camps there were surrounded by an 8-10 foot sand barrier or berm to provide extra protection and deny the EPWs the ability to observe outside the camp. Guard companies assigned to the camp provided all around perimeter security between the berm and the outer concertina wire. The gates and other access points were secured at all times. The Camp Headquarters was located in a central place to react to an EPW disturbance or an external attack with a reaction force kept ready for that purpose. Each compound and each enclosure was usually completely surrounded by triple concertina wire, and 14 foot guard towers were located at appropriate sites around the perimeter of each enclosure. The 403rd Camp, in the BRONX Area, however, had a concertina wire fence around all three of the prisoner enclosures with the processing and holding areas outside that area.

The camps built in Saudi Arabia were designed to hold 12,000 EPW, but were to be prepared to hold twice that number--but with no additional personnel or resources. This meant that each compound designed to hold 500 EPW would have to be capable of holding instead 1,000 EPW by the addition of more facilities. In the opinion of at least one camp commander, it proved feasible to place 700 to 800 EPW in a compound, but placing 1,000 EPW in a compound would have been "an open invitation to disaster."³³ Using the recreation compound in each enclosure for EPWs reduced the flexibility of the enclosure and made it more difficult to manage the EPW. While it was possible to exceed the design capability of the camps for limited periods of time, this would not have been a good long-term solution.³⁴

The operations of all of the camps were similar with respect to the basic tasks of processing, securing, housing, and feeding the EPW.

Processing is accomplished immediately when each EPW is brought to the camp under escort. While waiting to be processed, the EPW are kept in holding areas within the camp but isolated from the main compounds. Prisoners waiting to be processed are kept in holding areas within the camp but isolated from the main compounds. Each incoming EPW is searched, given a shower and a physical exam, deloused (using Lendane powder), interviewed to obtain a name and other personal data, photographed, fingerprinted, given an identity card or wrist band, issued an internee serial number (ISN), and provided a change of clothes and a blanket.³⁵

During the Ground War, EPW came in so fast that large backlogs of unprocessed prisoners developed. The 403rd Camp received 4,000 in one day and 1,900 in a single group. In these cases, the designated holding areas were filled and new EPW were placed in a regular compound or enclosure for up to a week while waiting to be processed. If possible they were searched upon arrival, but sometimes this was not possible, and so before processing each EPW had to be searched again--as well as the compounds in which they had been held temporarily. In order to speed up the processing, some short-cuts were devised, such as taking only a thumbprint instead of a full set of fingerprints or not issuing identity cards, or using trucks to shuttle the EPW between the processing stations.³⁶ Some of the streamlining was accomplished by eliminating gathering of information required by the Army but not by the ICRC. The processing routine was carried out for each EPW thoroughly and in accordance with international guidelines.³⁷

Security was a major task for the Camps, and there was a significant difference between the BROOKLYN and BRONX areas in their approach to this problem. In the BROOKLYN Area, basic security was provided by locating the billeting areas for the MP guard companies around the perimeter outside the inner berm and inside the outer concertina fence. This meant that there would be U.S. personnel available to react either to a raid from the outside or a mass escape from within. In the BRONX Area, the 403rd Camp housed all U.S. units and all interpreters in a common site that was situated and designed for all around defense. The primary threat in the BRONX Area was thought to be terrorists and--in the event of a large-scale

disturbance--the EPW themselves, and it was believed that dispersion of the MP units around the perimeters of the camps would have made them vulnerable. The assumption of the 403rd Camp commander was that EPW seeking to escape would try to seize vehicles, weapons, and supplies from U.S. units to make a dash back to the Iraqi lines. In this event, a single well organized defensive perimeter for the U.S. units provided the best security with the limited number of MPs available.³⁸

The number of guards available to secure the EPW was barely sufficient. Within each compound holding from 500 to 1,000 EPW, there were only three to four MPs per 12 hour shift, with additional MPs in the guard towers around the enclosures. This was a potentially dangerous situation, and any serious outbreaks or prisoner unrest would have been difficult to contain initially. It would have been necessary to increase the ratio of guards to prisoners if the prisoners had been hostile.

The Iraqi prisoners, however, proved generally to be docile and cooperative. Many expressed an unwillingness to fight for Saddam Hussein. Most had surrendered or were captured after a mere show of resistance, even though they had been told that the Americans would torture and kill them if they were captured. The Iraqis generally were glad to be out of the war and did not display any serious organized covert activity within the camps.³⁹ The cooperative attitude of the prisoners was fortunate, for it allowed the 800th MP Brigade to support important collateral missions that otherwise would not have been possible to undertake.⁴⁰

Feeding the EPW was a delicate matter in Desert Storm because of the dietary rules of Islam, and a monumental job because of the large numbers of people to be fed. It took 150,000 meals per day and 1,500,000 gallons of water per day to meet the basic needs of the 50,000 to 60,000 EPW held during the peak of camp operations in March 1991 plus the 6,000 U.S. MPs and hundreds of interpreters operating the camps. The Army supplied food for the MPs but not for the prisoners. The Saudi Arabian Government paid for the food and other supplies for all EPW.

The 800th MP Brigade, with the agreement of the Saudi Arabian Government, contracted with a private company, Astra Catering, to provide 4,500,000 German rations which were acceptable to both the U.S. and Saudi Forces for EPW consumption. While waiting for the German rations to arrive, the caterer provided frozen chicken and lamb, rice, and vegetables along with burners, cooking pots, and cooking utensils. In the initial period, some camps were using U.S. or Saudi ready-to-eat rations, while others were serving fresh food, and this caused problems with the EPW who were transferred from one camp to another. As the EPW population increased, meal preparation and the related sanitation problems became a difficult problem--solved by the use of pre-packaged meals. A typical daily menu served the EPW is shown in Figure 13.⁴¹

Figure 13.

Typical Daily Menu for Iraqi Prisoners

<u>Breakfast</u> 4 slices of bread w/jam Cheese or peanut butter 1/4 liter milk 1/4 liter juice	<u>Dinner</u> Lamb, chicken, hamburger, hot dog 1 pound of rice tomatoes beans Hot Tea	<u>Lunch</u> 1 US Meal Ready to Eat (Fish substituted for pork) or Saudi Rations
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Providing housing, clothing, and other supplies for the EPW was also a major challenge. As with food, no EPW support was available from the Army logistical system, and these items had to be obtained from contractors paid by the Saudis. When the first EPW came into the camps, their MP guards gave up their own tents and clothing to provide for the EPW. Urgent efforts by the 800th MP Brigade G4 Section convinced the authorities of the need for these items, and the Saudi Arabian Government contracted for 50,000 sets of clothing, blankets, bedding, shoes, and prayer rugs. These plus additional smaller local purchases were sufficient to support the camps through the operation.⁴²

Field Sanitation at the camps was a continuous challenge. With populations at each of the four camps over 10,000, the job of providing latrines and showers and keeping the camps clean was a major task. The 800th MP Brigade surgeon, his staff, and preventive medicine personnel from the camps worked out arrangements for each site. The problem was compounded by the differences between U.S. practices (which stresses burning solid waste) and Arab practices for operation of latrines (which involves large amounts of water). It was necessary to provide greater than expected amounts of water to permit the EPW to perform their ablutions in accordance with their customs.

400th MP Battalion (EPW/CI)

The 400th MP Battalion (EPW/CI), USAR, Fort Meade, Maryland, commanded by LTC Cotton W. S. Bowen, is a new type of EPW unit, organized under TOE 19-646, that has replaced the MP camp structure used for DESERT STORM.⁴³ This battalion consists of a headquarters and headquarters company with an organic capability for camp operations and EPW processing. The new EPW/CI battalion is designed to have the capability to process and secure 2,000 EPW, and has been adopted by the Army to provide greater flexibility and overall capability than the camp structure. The 400th MP Battalion was the only new type EPW unit employed in DESERT STORM.

The 400th MP Battalion was the only EPW camp unit in the theater from its arrival on 10 & 11 December 1990, until the arrival of the 401st MP Camp on 16 January 1991. The battalion set up initially at a temporary location at Umm Al Sahik and then moved to King Khalid Military City (KKMC), where it was located when DESERT STORM started on 16 January 1991. While at its initial location and at KKMC, the battalion conducted mission training and accomplished security missions, including security for the Northern Logistical Operations Center from 15 January 1991 until 21 January 1991. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bowen, served as the provost marshal for KKMC during this period. All during this period, however, the battalion staff was engaged in reconnaissance and evaluation of potential EPW camp sites.⁴⁴


Starting on 20 January 1991, the 400th MP Battalion moved in stages to the BROOKLYN Area about an hour from KKMC where it was to open an EPW camp at Hafar al Batin. Construction of the camp started on 21 January, and the main body of the battalion closed in on the 23rd. The first compound was completed on 24 January 1991, just 15 minutes before the first seven Iraqi prisoners arrived.⁴⁵ On 27 January 1991, the 301st MP Camp assumed command of the Hafar al Batin Camp, and the 400th MP Battalion became the subordinate command and control headquarters for that camp. Figure 14 shows the organization of the 400th MP Battalion on 24 January 1991, when it had four subordinate companies, not including the 361st MP Company still engaged in a security mission at Dhahran.

The ability of the 400th to move and open a camp upon short notice demonstrated the flexibility of the new EPW/CI battalion, but the battalion's organic capability soon became overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of EPW to be handled. The compound operations personnel and the processing team of the battalion headquarters augmented the personnel of the 301st Camp to take care of the large numbers of EPW coming to the camp. Personnel of the 400th MP Battalion also laid out in advance the 402nd MP Camp prisoner compounds and saved time for construction of that camp. At its peak strength the 400th MP Battalion had 1,277 personnel.⁴⁶ Since the 400th MP Battalion was used by the 301st MP Camp in the same role as that of the old style battalion command and control element--controlling the guard and escort guard companies for external security and movement of EPW--there was no opportunity to

evaluate the new battalion configuration in its intended role of operating a complete camp on a smaller scale, but with the same scope as the MP EPW camps.

Figure 14.

Organization of the 400th MP Battalion on 24 January 1991



401st MP Camp

The 401st MP Camp, USAR, Nashville, Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Larry J. Stovall, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 16 January 1991. A 13 person forward element of the 401st had arrived earlier on 3 January and was tasked immediately by the 800th MP Brigade to assume command of 14 EPW units already in the theater. The 401st had been activated and moved to its mobilization station, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, on 9 December 1990. The unit constructed and operated a 12,000 prisoner EPW camp in the Eastern Area (BRONX) with a capability to expand to 24,000 EPW. The commander of the 401st Camp was designated by the 800th MP Brigade as the Eastern Area Commander responsible for coordinating the security of the BRONX area.⁴⁷


On 17 January 1991 the unit started moving from Khobar Towers in Dhahran, where it had been trying to collect its equipment, into the desert to As Sarrar, where it would construct its EPW camp--known to the soldiers of the 401st as "Al Opryland." The location was barren desert about 120 miles south of the Kuwait border and 150 miles Northwest of Dhahran. The site was selected because of the availability of three water wells and its proximity to MSRs Lincoln and Mercedes. The mission was to support MARCENT, and these two MSRs connected to the MARCENT holding area as well as to nearby KSA EPW camps. An advanced element of the 401st Camp moved into the desert and started construction of the camp on 17 January 1991, and the rest of the unit closed on the camp site on 25 January 1991.

The organizational model adopted by the 401st Camp was to use the battalion headquarters to command and control the guard companies whose mission was to provide external security for the EPW enclosures. The processing and escort guard companies would report directly to the camp headquarters, which also would operate the camp. A detachment of the 13th PSYOP Battalion was also attached, as was the 755th Postal Detachment, an Army National Guard unit from Texarkana, Texas, under the command of Sergeant First Class Timothy Fletcher. Other units providing support to the 401st Camp were the 202nd Military Intelligence Company, which interrogated the EPW in the Joint Intelligence Center EAST, and an advisory team from the 12th Preventive Medicine Group, led by Captain Donald Gongaware, which provided field hygiene and sanitation support. The 300th Field Hospital was in direct support of both EPW camps in the BRONX Area. The organization of the 401st Camp is shown in Figure 15.

The 342nd Escort Guard Company of the 401st MP Camp provided security for the Port of Dammam and Griffin Base from 8 January 1991 to 29 January, 1991.

Figure 15.

Organization of the 401st MP Camp



Construction of the Al Opryland Camp was supported by all available personnel of the 401st and supporting units. Initially one platoon, then two, from the 864th Engineer Battalion constructed the physical security barriers and installed lighting and a sanitation system. The engineers used dozers and graders to level the area and build a ten foot high sand berm around the perimeter of the camp, erected triple strand concertina wire barriers around each compound and enclosure, emplaced waste disposal systems designed to pump human waste to an outside lagoon, dug gravel sumps to drain the shower areas, and improved the road from the MSR to the camp. The engineers also constructed light poles and placed wiring and generators to provide a perimeter security lighting system. The 360th Quartermaster Detachment helped install water lines throughout the camp. While the engineers and quartermaster troops worked, the MPs also were engaged in setting up the compounds and enclosures and preparing the camp for arrival of EPW.

The first enclosure at Al Opryland Camp was completed on 20 January 1991, and the first 22 EPW arrived the next day. With the start and rapid end of the ground war, the EPW load increased rapidly in March and again in April. Figure 16. shows the time-phased workload for the 401st Camp.

Figure 16.

EPW Interned at the 401st EPW Camp

Jan 21	22	Feb 25	0	Mar 27	1,631
Jan 28	199	Feb 27	4,848	Apr 3	5,991
Feb 4	32	Mar 6	9,063	Apr 7	11,352
Feb 11	51	Mar 13	8,663	Apr 14	4,118
Feb 18	20	Mar 20	4,292	Apr 21	0

Considering the large numbers of EPW interned, there were very few incidents of disorder or EPW misconduct. The primary fear of the Iraqi prisoners was that there would not be enough food, water, or cigarettes. Once they realized that the MPs would fulfill the basic needs and would not torture them physically or mentally, they began to relax and cooperate, and respond positively.

The 401st MP Camp was also responsible for the security of the entire BRONX Area. A defensive perimeter enclosing the 401st Camp, the 403rd Camp, and other supporting units was established, with 12 outposts established and manned 24 hours daily. Each outpost was equipped with day and night vision devices, machine guns, NBC alarms, and telephones. The circumference of the defensive perimeter was almost nine miles. Two motorized patrols augmented the outpost line and responded to suspicious activity. Reaction and damage control teams were also held on stand-by. All area security operations were coordinated from the 401st Camp Tactical Operations Center (TOC).

Communications within the camp were provided by a complete wire system using TA-312 telephones. All headquarters and each enclosure were tied into the camp telephone system, with switchboards at the camp, battalion, and field hospital TOCs. The guard companies also used their FM radios as an alternative communications system. Communications outside the camp were not very good, although it was possible to get through to Khobar or Riyadh if the caller was persistent.

By early April large numbers of Iraqi refugees entered Saudi Arabia trying to get away from Saddam Hussein's brutal suppression of his own people. Among other relief efforts, the Saudi Arabian Army established a large refugee camp near Rafha Air Base, and VII Corps was tasked to provide support for this camp. Task Force Rafha commenced operations on 18 April. The 401st MP Camp was part of the Task Force and oversaw the work of the 358th and 420th MP Processing Companies, who provided photographic, fingerprint, and identity card services for the processing of 20,987 displaced civilians in the camp.⁴⁸

On 21 April 1991, the 401st MP Camp was relieved of its EPW mission after turning over all of its EPW and CI to the Saudis. The unit left Al Opryland, redeployed to the United States on 21 May, and was relieved from active duty on 3 June 1991. The leadership of the 401st attributes their success in this mission to the excellent quality of the soldiers and leaders, and the participation by the unit in a realistic field exercise in July 1990, where they got a taste of what it meant to fight a "come as you are war."

403rd MP Camp


The 403rd MP Camp, USAR, Omaha, Nebraska, commanded by Colonel Carl D. Novak, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 15 January 1991.⁴⁹ The unit was activated on 6 December 1990 and reported to its mobilization station, Fort Riley, Kansas, on 11 December 1990. The 403rd constructed and operated a 12,000 capacity EPW camp in the Eastern Area (BRONX) to support MARCENT. Although the 403rd was the first of the camps to arrive in theater on 15 January 1991, it arrived without its mission essential equipment, which was held up at the Port of Houston, and did not arrive until 20 February 1991, well after the camp was in business and taking care of EPW.⁵⁰

One of the most difficult yet rewarding experiences of the 403rd Camp was the initial move into the desert. Four days after arriving at Dhahran, the unit began its move to the camp site despite its lack of the vehicles, tentage, generators, field mess, and other gear for the camp headquarters. Leaving behind a detachment to obtain as much equipment as possible when it arrived, the unit moved in relays using the few vehicles in the assigned guard companies. Despite the obvious problems the move was a good idea because it got the people to the job site rapidly and set the tone for later achievements with austere support. The organization of the 403rd MP Camp was as shown in Figure 17.

Construction of the camp was started on 20 January 1991 by a handful of MPs. Because of the urgency of having at least one camp operational in the Eastern Area after the start of the Air War, priority for Engineer support and construction materials had been given to the 401st Camp. The 403rd assumed responsibility for the collateral missions which had been assigned to the 401st Camp and contributed work details to the 401st Camp, while also continuing work on its own camp. The work on the 403rd Camp continued around the clock, sometimes using engineer equipment when it was not needed for the 401st Camp. Despite these difficulties, the 403rd was able to receive its first EPW on 17 February 1991 and had all three of its enclosures completed by the start of the Ground War on 23 February 1991.

Figure 17.

Organization of the 403rd MP Camp.



Because the 403rd Camp was without its equipment, the unit performed several collateral missions while the camp was being finished. One of these was the development of a training course on EPW operations for Saudi personnel. Colonel Novak negotiated the content, time, and location of the course with Saudi officials, and Major Donald Korte, Camp S-3, headed the team which developed the course and made the initial presentation on 19 and 20 January 1991 at KKMC. After the initial presentation, the course materials were turned over to the 800th MP Brigade advisory detachments, who taught additional classes.⁵¹

The 403rd MP Camp also carried out an important noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). From 19 January through 6 Feb 1991, as the danger from SCUD attacks became apparent, 1,147 U.S. and 68 Canadian noncombatant citizens were evacuated from Saudi Arabia. A squad of the 257th MP Guard Company, led by Staff Sergeant Maryjo Quickstad, was tasked to provide support to the operation. Working directly for the Consul General in Dhahran, the MPs provided escort security for movement of the evacuees from the assembly area at the U.S. Consulate to Dhahran Air Base. The 800th MP Brigade staff coordinated with the Saudi Civil Police, who were very helpful to the mission. The noncombatants were evacuated without incident on 25 special flights. During the operation there were SCUD attack alerts, and although

the MPs were equipped with chemical protective masks and suits, Sergeant Quickstad ordered her troops not to don them in order to avoid panicking the evacuees, who had no chemical protection.

The 403rd MP Camp also provided area security. The 346th Escort Guard Company secured Dhahran Air Base from 9 to 22 January 1991, and the 213th Guard Company provided VIP security and other services to 22nd SUPCOM Headquarters.

The 403rd Camp received its first prisoner on 17 February 1991, and all three enclosures were ready by the start of the Ground War on 24 February 1991. The operations of the 403rd Camp were distinctive in several areas. The 403rd MP Camp operated kitchens in the compounds right from the start to feed two hot meals each day to the EPW. Packaged rations were used primarily for EPW work details as long as Class A rations were available. This emphasis on hot meals helped with security and sanitation, which was a major problem. The sewer system at the camp consisted of PVC pipes laid on top of the ground and pumps. The pipes leaked severely, causing a health hazard and requiring constant effort to repair. The EPW were putting foreign material (plastic water bottles, rags) into the system either out of ignorance or to sabotage it, and increased measures to stop that practice helped. When an enclosure was rebuilt in April, an improved gravity flow sewer system with larger pipes and holding boxes was used with greater satisfaction. Finding that it was impossible to connect the wholesale tactical water distribution system (TWDS) to the camp's own PVC water system, the 403rd used water trucks to move water from the TWDS to the camp system. Although water was available, water distribution was a constant problem, and water for the EPW had to be rationed at times. Camp medical personnel screened EPW with health problems, and those with serious problems were sent to the 300th Field Hospital for care. A battalion aid station staffed by Iraqi doctors was established within the camp to care for EPW with minor ailments.⁵²

The 403rd Camp did an outstanding job processing prisoners for transfer to Saudi custody. To comply with guidance from the 800th MP Brigade to be prepared to turn over EPW to the Saudi Arabians in 72 hours, the camp established separate inprocessing and outprocessing lines to perform both functions simultaneously. Outprocessing packets were prepared as soon as records were received from the inprocessing center. The accuracy of the 403rd Camp processing system was the best of all the camps: an initial error rate of 0.1% compared to 1.1% for the other camps, and a final audited error rate (October 1991) of only 0.08% compared to 0.45% for the other camps.⁵³

By late March 1991, most of the EPW in the BRONX Area camps had been transferred to KSA camps. On 27 March 1991, only about 1,600 EPW remained under U.S. custody in the 403rd Camp and a similar number in the 401st Camp. No more prisoners were being taken by US forces, and the remaining EPW were scheduled to be transferred to Saudi custody in a few days. Colonel Novak obtained approval from General Conlon to tear down the 403rd Camp using the remaining EPW as labor, and this was nearly completed on 31 March 1991. On 1

April 1991, however, U.S. forces began capturing EPW again after Iraq crushed a revolt near Basra, and there was a need for a U.S. camp. The 403rd rebuilt one enclosure within a week without engineer support and was back in business, except for a processing facility. Incoming EPW were processed at the 401st processing facility by a combined team from both units and included in the EPW count for the 401st Camp. The rebuilt enclosure was even better than the original camp, for much had been learned the first time. The 403rd Camp was operational until 17 April 1991, when it was finally torn down for good.

During its operational period, the 403rd had one disturbance which could have been serious. About 1,900 EPW who had not been fed for more than a day were received in one group, and since the unit's food distribution system had not been organized to handle this load, there were some delays in getting the EPW fed. The EPW were unconvinced that they would be fed, and they all wanted to be fed first. Prompt, professional response quieted the EPW disturbance and no one was hurt in the affair. This was an exception to the general rule, which found the EPW generally quite cooperative.

301st MP Camp

The 301st MP Camp, Inkster, Michigan, commanded by Colonel Charles S. Johnson, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 21 January 1991. The unit was activated on 3 January 1991 and reported to its mobilization station, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, on 7 January 1991. It was the third camp to arrive in theater.⁵⁴ The 301st constructed and operated an EPW camp at Hafar Al Batin in the Western Area (BROOKLYN) in support primarily of the XVIII Airborne Corps, including its French units. After arrival in theater, the unit moved in stages to the camp site which had already been constructed partially under the direction of the 400th MP Battalion, and on 27 January 1991, the 301st MP Camp assumed command of the Hafar Al Batin EPW Camp.

The 301st MP Camp was organized as shown in Figure 18. These assigned and attached units had an average strength of 1,615 personnel. In addition to the units shown, the 301st was supported by several other Army units shown in Figure 19. Average support strength was 118 for direct support and 110 for general support. Altogether, it took 1,843 military personnel to operate the camp.

Figure 18.
Organization of the 301st MP Camp




Figure 19.

Units in Support of the 301st MP Camp

Direct Support	General Support
Team, 13th PSYOP Battalion 17th Finance Company (-) 947th Medical Clearing Company (-) 75th Medical Dispensary (-) 714th Preventive Medicine Detachment (-) 123d Dental Detachment (-) 446th MP Detachment	Platoon, 43d Engineer Battalion 202d MI Company (-) Team, 79th Signal Detachment

The 361st Guard Company of the 301st Camp provided security for the Quarry Ammunition Supply Point from 11 January 1991 until 23 February 1991. This operation released the mechanics and technicians of the unit operating the supply point to concentrate on their maintenance and supply tasks during a critical period in preparation for the war. After moving to the Hafar Al Batin Camp in mid-February, the 361st was used to augment 301st Camp processing operations.⁵⁵

Processing was given great emphasis by the 301st MP Camp. Incoming EPW were met at the gate by an MP Quick Reaction Force and unloaded in groups of 50 EPW at a time into the holding areas. They were assessed medically and segregated by rank (officer, NCO, enlisted). Additional segregation was accomplished by religion and whether they were pro- or anti-government. They were briefed immediately on the camp rules and the expectations of their behavior. All captured documents and equipment were turned over to intelligence personnel.

The processing line at the 301st Camp employed 135 military personnel from seven different units. The operation continued 24-hours each day except for interruptions from sand storms. Ten laptop computers were used to record data on each EPW. Because of the high workload, which peaked at 75 EPW per hour, some short cuts were implemented. Depending on the workload, EPW were allowed to keep their personal property, take their showers after processing, give a thumbprint only, and postpone finance processing until later. The EPW workload reported by 301st Camp is shown in Figure 20. After auditing the records for dual and erroneous entries, the final accounting credits the 301st Camp with processing a total of 21,473 EPW.⁵⁶ In addition to the EPW shown in the figure, 268 innocent civilians were released.

Figure 20.

EPW Workload of the 301st MP Camp

Processed In		Processed Out	
Officer	1,445	Trans to KSA	22,726
Warrant	780	Repatriated	294
Enlisted	20,394		
CIs	401		
Total	23,020		23,020

The 301st stressed using the EPW as much as possible to help operate the camp. The EPW were used for trash pickup, unloading rations, camp maintenance, and sanitation. The

daily police of the camp was essential to minimize the number of rats and reduce the incidence of disease. Several flat bed trucks arrived each day carrying rations, and these were off-loaded by the prisoners and distributed by them to the compounds. Minor repairs to the utilities and daily cleaning of the latrines was a prisoner chore. Almost every Iraqi smokes, and issues of cigarettes were used to provide an incentive for good behavior and work. Utilization of the EPW for this work is in accordance with international standards and entails some risk, but it was necessary. The daily routine established for the EPW is shown in Figure 21.⁵⁷

Figure 21.

Daily Routine for EPW at 301st Camp

0530: Wake Up
0600: Formation; Strength Report; Sick Call
0700: Assignment to Work Details
0800: Breakfast (prepared by EPW)
0900: Morning Work Details
1200: Lunch; Informal Count of EPW
1300: Rations drawn from Central Facility
1500: Preparation for Dinner Begins
1700: Formal Head Count
1830: Dinner (prepared by EPW)
1900: Recreation Period
2100: Evening Work Details
2200: Lights Out; EPW Restricted to Tents
0300: Tent Check

Another major activity of the 301st MP Camp--and the other camps as well--was the transfer of EPW to KSA camps or another U.S. camp. These transfer movements often occurred at night, and great care had to be taken to maintain control of the EPW. The transfer process started with identification of those EPW to be moved and assembly of transportation and food for the trip. Prior to the movement, the EPW to be transferred would be identified according to the manifest (list of names) and moved into the recreation or administrative area of an enclosure. There they would be organized into ISN order and searched. They would be provided with their personal property. Transportation would be placed at the enclosure entrance and the EPW would load directly from the enclosure gate, with each verified with the manifest while loading. The escort guard company receiving the EPW would sign for them and the trucks would depart. This procedure worked well without the loss of any of the 12,137 EPW transferred during the operation.

The 301st MP Camp turned its camp over to the Saudi Arabian authorities. When the Saudis took control of the camp, the 301st established a transfer point and held 12,000 EPW for 1-2 week periods until transportation to take them to the 401st Camp for processing and internment could be arranged. An additional 5,000 EPW were processed and turned over to the Saudis immediately. The EPW were signed over to the Saudis but remained at the camp. The 301st established an advisory staff to assist the Saudis and continued to support the operation with a minimum of one MP per compound inside the wire at all times. The total number of prisoners passing through the camp was about 35,000.

The last EPW left the 301st Camp on 4 May 1991. The camp was then torn down by 301st personnel, and the equipment was loaded on trucks to support the refugee camp at Rafha. The 301st departed the Hafar Al Batin site on 11 May 1991 and moved to Khobar Towers where it remained until redeploying to CONUS on 18 and 19 May 1991. During its operation of the camp, the 301st had displayed prominently a sign saying, "We'll leave the light on for ya!" As they turned over the camp, a new sign was posted on top of that: "Under New Management!"


402nd MP Camp

The 402nd MP Camp, USAR, Ashley, Pennsylvania, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 31 January 1991, under the command of Colonel Wendell Rich.⁵⁸ The 402nd had been activated on 3 January 1991 and processed at Fort Pickett, Virginia. The initial task of the 402nd after arrival in the theater was to construct an EPW camp in the Western Area (BROOKLYN) in support of VII Corps. A four person advance party had preceded the main body by a week and had reconnoitered the camp site, obtained operational guidance, and made logistical support arrangements. The unit was operational at its location on 9 February, received its first prisoners on 3 March 1991, and received over 10,400 EPW during the four days after that.

The organization of the 402nd Camp was as shown in Figure 22. The camp had an average strength of 1,432 troops. In addition, to the units shown, a five person detachment of the 13th PSYOP Battalion was assigned to the camp. The organizational concept of the 402nd Camp was to utilize the battalion headquarters to command and control all of the guard and escort guard companies concerning the day-to-day functioning of the camp, leaving the camp headquarters free to concentrate on larger issues. However, the 143rd Battalion headquarters arrived in theater after all of the guard and escort guard companies, and this stretched the camp staff thinly during the critical period of camp construction. Although this temporary situation was alleviated by the arrival of the 143rd Battalion headquarters, it illustrates the importance of having an intermediate command and control element as part of the camp organization. During the move to the camp, a rear detachment remained at the initial unit assembly area in Dhahran to direct the arriving units to the camp location. Security for the camp was achieved by establishing a full perimeter defense with all eight guard companies positioned to defend against either an external or internal threat.

Figure 22.

Organization of the 402nd MP Camp



One major accomplishment of the 402nd was retraining MP combat support units to perform the specialized EPW mission. Altogether, a total of 12 MP combat support companies (TOE 19-77L) were reorganized and retrained at their mobilization stations to perform EPW missions--ten to become guard companies and two to become escort guard companies. (One guard company--the 304th--was retrained to become an escort guard company.) Nine of these companies were in the Army National Guard and three in the Army Reserve. All of the seven guard and escort guard companies of the 401st Camp were retrained, and three of the retrained combat support companies were assigned to the 301st Camp, one to the 400th Camp, and one to the 402nd Camp. The retraining was difficult because of a lack of manuals and expertise. Emphasis was on assuring humane treatment of the EPW and respecting their culture. These units believed they would be performing combat support missions, and there was some initial frustration on the part of the unit members, but they quickly realized the importance of the EPW mission and did it enthusiastically. Retraining would have been easier if the personnel of these combat support MP companies had received adequate EPW training during peacetime before they were called up for the war.⁵⁹

As the combat support MP units were reconfigured at their mobilization stations, many vehicles, radios, weapons, and other items of equipment were taken from them. This was done in part simply because the TOEs for the EPW units authorized less equipment than the TOEs for the combat support units, but it was also done to make it easier to deploy the stripped down units given a shortage of airlift and sealift assets.⁶⁰ This made it possible to deploy MP EPW personnel into the theater rapidly, but it also made it harder for them to operate once they arrived because they found they could have made good use of the missing equipment.

The 402nd Camp was constructed entirely by the MP troops. There was no engineer support. A 12,000 person EPW camp was constructed in three weeks and a week after completion it housed more than that number of EPW. The MPs built the towers, installed the lights, placed the concertina wire, and established the sanitation system. Priority was given to camp construction, and the MPs worked extra hours to finish the camp before they were able to improve their own billets.

Several significant problems with logistical support were reported. About one-third of the equipment of the 402nd Camp was turned around at the port in Saudi Arabia without being unloaded. This action, taken without consultation with the unit, caused great difficulty and was overcome only by using more local purchase and host nation support. The camp had inadequate communications, and there were insufficient radios to provide even one for each EPW compound, which was the minimum requirement to assure a quick response to a prisoner disturbance.

EPW Processing--a difficult task under the best of conditions--was further complicated by having outdated delousing equipment and too few interpreters. Nevertheless, the 402nd Camp processed 1,925 EPW in one 24 hour period, which was the highest rate recorded in the theater. The 731st Processing Company with 60 personnel was too small to handle this workload, and the processing lines were augmented by an additional 30 MPs per shift to achieve these high processing rates. Some of the EPWs were pressed into service as interpreters, and this helped the processing personnel to communicate with the EPW. In addition, several members of the 731st Processing Company learned key Iraqi phrases to allow them to conduct certain aspects of the processing without interpreters. The 402nd Camp reports that the total number of EPW processed was 18,263, including 2,355 processed for the 301st Camp. The final accounting credits the 402nd Camp with processing 16,277 EPW.⁶¹

The 402nd Camp had some problems initially with the personal property of EPW because many of them arrived in the camp without having passed through a corps holding area and without capture tags or capture property records. The missing property was forwarded along with groups of EPW, but it was difficult to determine the owners of the property. This problem was solved by stressing to the corps and MARCENT commanders the proper procedures for caring for EPW personal property and by aggressive measures to return property to the EPWs. A joint U.S.-Saudi program to return all personal property to the Iraqi prisoners continued until

December 1991. Overall for all of the camps of the 800th MP Brigade, there were only 300 claims for missing personal property.⁶²

The 402nd Camp found several innocent civilians in the camp but had difficulty transferring them to Army Civil Affairs units responsible for them. Attempts to obtain Civil Affairs support failed, and the innocent civilians were taken by the MPs to the Refugee Camp at Rafha. The 418th Camp Advisory Team, USAR, Daytona Beach, Florida, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Bernard, was highly effective in resolving these problems, which were experienced by all of the EPW camps.

The 402nd also had the mission to process, guard, and transfer all EPW and civilian internees who were receiving treatment at three U.S. Army evacuation hospitals in Northwestern Saudi Arabia. A detachment of the 731st Processing Company was sent to the hospitals to account for the EPW in medical channels, and a platoon of MPs was sent to provide security. Accounting for EPW in medical channels was very difficult because some had been admitted without being processed as EPW and because the sick or wounded EPW were moved around in medical channels as required for proper care. This problem eased as the necessity and procedures for accounting for EPW became familiar to the medical facilities.

As its final mission in the theater, the 402nd MP Camp trained the members of a Saudi National Guard battalion in EPW operations and turned over the operation of the camp to them on 4 April 1991. Previously, 3,329 EPW were transferred to Saudi camps, and another 15,286 were transferred to the Saudis with the camp itself. The 402nd Camp remained at the camp until 6 May 1991 advising and assisting the Saudi personnel operating the camp. The camp was closed by the KSA on 10 May 1991 after all of its EPW had been moved or repatriated.

The 402nd redeployed to the United States on 21 May, 1991, and was relieved from active duty on 5 June, 1991.⁶³ It had done the job for which it had trained. Its operations were highlighted by improvisation and sensitivity to the culture of the EPW--so much so that the MPs of the 402nd Camp refrained from eating during daylight hours during Ramadan, as is the Moslem custom.

400th MP Camp

The 400th MP Camp, USAR, Tallahassee, Florida, commanded by Colonel Timothy Kerns, arrived in Saudi Arabia on 13 February 1991. It was the last of the camp headquarters to arrive. The unit was activated on 3 January 1991, and reported to its mobilization station at Fort Stewart, Georgia, on 6 January 1991. By 16 January, the unit was ready to deploy, but the start of the air war that same day caused a change in movement priorities that delayed the unit. Even more significant was the reconfiguration of the unit's equipment from air to sea shipment. This meant that even with the delay, the unit arrived in theater well before its

equipment. An advance party of the 400th MP Camp arrived in theater on 21 January 1991 to prepare for the unit's arrival and make contact with the 800th MP Brigade.

Upon arrival in the theater, the 400th MP Camp found that its original mission to construct and operate an EPW camp in support of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions in the Eastern (BROOKLYN) area had been canceled because an agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia obviated the need for a fifth U.S. camp. Performance of new missions by the 400th MP Camp was complicated by the fact that neither the camp headquarters nor any of its ten subordinate units (except the 34th Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment) had any equipment other than that which was carried in the rucksacks or duffel bags of its individual soldiers.


The 400th Camp worked with the 800th MP Brigade staff to identify missions which could be carried out under these circumstances. The result was the organization of the 400th MP Camp into three task forces, as shown in Figure 23 effective 24 February 1991.

On 23 February 1991, the MARCENT Task Force headed by the 34th MP Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company moved to the MARCENT EPW holding area at Al Cabrit, near Al Jubail, to assume operation of that area when the Marines moved north into Kuwait. The MARCENT task force consisted initially of two guard companies and enough of the 400th MP Camp staff to operate one EPW enclosure. The Marine Corps Field Service Support Group at Al Jubail did not have enough people to perform the holding area mission. The timely arrival of the MPs just before the influx of prisoners helped control the situation when MARCENT forces took large numbers of Iraqi prisoners--12,000 in one 24-hour period--during the ground war. The EPW in the holding area were unruly, hungry and thirsty, and threatening to breach the wire until an additional EPW enclosure was added on 26 February 1991. The MARCENT support mission was completed on 5 March 1991 after all EPW had been moved to the BRONX Area camps for processing and internment.

The East Site Task Force provided support to the 401st and 403rd Camps in the BRONX Area with one guard company, one escort guard company, a processing company, and one enclosure from camp headquarters. Over 10,000 EPW were processed for the 401st MP Camp. The 240th MP Guard Company provided two platoons to the 300th Field Hospital, securing EPW receiving medical treatment, and one platoon to the Joint Interrogation Facility at the East Site. The 324th MP Escort Guard Company provided security for movement of EPW from the MARCENT holding area to the East Site, from the East Site to the West Site, and to KSA camps.

Figure 23.

Initial Task Organization of the 400th MP Camp



The 183rd Personnel Services Company, an Adjutant General unit of the Army National Guard, Richmond, Virginia, commanded by Major Linwood Taylor, found itself part of the 400th MP Camp. This unit was used for processing EPW and found that its skills normally devoted to managing US soldiers worked well for Iraqi prisoners. The 183rd supported both the 401st and 403rd Camps at the East site and sent a platoon to assist the 301st Camp at the West site.

The remaining units of the 400th Camp--three guard and one escort guard companies--remained at Khobar Towers, Dhahran, under the main body of the 400th MP Camp, and assumed responsibility for security and law and order at the Khobar Towers housing area.

Liaison was established with the Saudi military and civil police and the United Kingdom police. Security was provided to support General Conlon in his role as the Mayor of Khobar Towers, which during the redeployment phase housed as many as 40,000 military and civilian personnel. The 273rd and 274th MP Companies also provided security elements for Khobar towers until they moved to the East Site.

The 273rd and 274th MP Companies were placed under the operational control of the 185th MP Battalion, VII Corps, on 28 February 1991, to close down the VII Corps EPW holding area. Following completion of this mission, the two companies were placed in support of the 402nd MP Camp.

The 400th MP Camp was relieved of EPW missions in mid-March and thereafter undertook a variety of other MP missions, including customs inspection, area security, and law and order. There were numerous area security missions. The 276th MP Guard Company provided security at the ASP Quarry, a 50 acre site near Dhahran Airfield, relieving the 361st MP Company, 301st MP Camp, of this mission on 20 February 1991. The company obtained vehicles and radios to do this job on hand receipt from the 800th MP Brigade. This mission continued until the unit left the theater in April 1991. The 822nd MP Guard Company undertook two security missions throughout its stay in the theater. It provided a platoon for security of the TAMP Helicopter Refit Facility on 21 February 1991, and another platoon for Khobar Towers on 28 February 1991.

The ability of the 400th MP Camp--and the other EPW units--to accomplish area security missions was severely degraded by their lack of organic FM radios and transportation. Perhaps believing that the EPW mission did not require the units to be mobile or have tactical communications, some of the guard companies were instructed at their mobilization stations to leave their HMMWVs and FM radios behind. They would "receive what they needed" after arrival in Saudi Arabia. As it turned out, however, they were unable to draw this equipment in the theater, and they needed it to accomplish not only the collateral missions but the basic EPW mission as well. This lack of even their original equipment was a severe handicap which had to be overcome by hard work and innovation.

The largest collateral mission accomplished by the 400th MP Camp was to perform customs inspections for the entire theater during the redeployment phase. The unanticipated rapid conclusion of the war occurred before redeployment planning had been completed, and it was necessary to establish a customs inspection program to permit the U.S. troops to return home rapidly. A major effort was required to establish a program in coordination with the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and to train over 1,500 soldiers to perform this exacting duty. The 89th MP Brigade had the responsibility for this mission initially but needed additional resources as U.S. troops started leaving the theater in large numbers after the cease fire.⁶⁴

On 5 March 1991, the 34th MP Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment and two MP companies were assigned to the customs mission and placed under the operational control of the 89th MP Brigade. They received training in customs inspection from the 42nd MP Group (Customs) and took over responsibility for the Port of Dammam (750th MP Company) and the West Heliport (480th MP Company).

On 15 April 1991, the 400th MP Camp assumed responsibility for the military customs inspection program in the Southwest Asia Theater, relieving the 89th MP Brigade of that mission. The 400th MP Camp worked with the 42nd MP Group, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture to assure effective inspections for the largest redeployment operation since World War II. The operation was both important and interesting, as the returning soldiers proved to be ingenious in their efforts to bring home souvenirs of the war, such as firearms, ammunition, explosives, and even snakes. The 400th MP Camp prepared a detailed plan for customs inspection and briefed every redeploying unit on what to expect, assigned liaison officers to each redeploying unit, and conducted daily conferences with redeploying units to track progress and work out problems. A major factor in the success of the program was the desire of the units to leave Saudi Arabia without further delay.⁶⁵ Task Force Horton was established under Lieutenant Colonel Norman H. Horton, Jr., Executive Officer of the 400th MP Camp, to perform inspections in the Riyadh area. The 34th and 146th MP Battalions were placed in charge of customs inspection operations at Dammam and Dhahran respectively. Nine MP companies of the 800th MP Brigade were assigned to customs inspection missions organized as shown in Figure 24.

Figure 24.
Assignment of MP Units to Customs Inspection Duties
(15 April 1991)

UNIT	LOCATION
Task Force Horton 240th MP Company 822nd MP Company	Riyadh Airport King Khalid Military City
34th MP Bn HHD 225th MP Company 274th MP Company 480th MP Company 755th MP Company	West Heliport Dammam Wash Rack West Heliport Al Dammam Port
146th MP Bn HHD 269th MP Company 273rd MP Company 324th MP Company	Dhahran Airport Al Jubail Port (USMC) King Fahd Airport

Customs inspections began to phase out as units redeployed, and on 26 May 1991, the 146th MP Battalion HHD and Task Force Horton relinquished control of their units to the 34th MP Battalion HHD, which assumed responsibility for the program on 1 June 1991, with 6 MP companies still engaged in inspections. On 1 July 1991, the 34th MP Battalion turned over responsibility for the customs inspection program to the 210th MP Battalion, of the 89th Brigade. The last 400th MP Camp unit, the 822nd MP Company, finally completed its customs inspection mission and redeployed to the United States on 31 July 1991.

The final mission of the 400th MP Camp was to assist the 69 units of the 800th MP Brigade to redeploy to the United States. The camp headquarters performed administrative tasks to ease the transition back into civilian life, including preparing personnel actions, updating unit property books, and cleaning and transporting soldiers and equipment to their demobilization stations. Having done this, the 400th itself redeployed back to the United States on 7 June 1991, and was released from active duty on 16 June 1991. Although the 400th MP Camp did not do what it was sent to do, it accomplished an important mission.

Support of EPW Camps

The needs of the EPW were met almost entirely by host nation support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, either directly or through contractors, or from the resources and ingenuity of the 800th MP Brigade. Food, water, tents, blankets, clothing, medical supplies, trucks, mechanics, and other essentials required for EPW operations were not available from the Army's logistics system.

Logistical Support for the Camps. It appears that the Army underestimated the workload involved in supporting any prisoners it might take during the fighting. Few prisoners were expected during the defensive phase, but even after the EPW planning figure had been set at 100,000, the Army ignored the pleas of the 800th MP Brigade to plan to provide the essentials. Most 800th MP Brigade requisitions for supplies for the EPWs in their charge were canceled as "not authorized" because the supply system recognized only the authorizations for the MP units themselves.⁶⁶ When requisitions for EPW clothing did arrive at the National Inventory Control Point of the Army Materiel Command, there were no stocks of EPW clothing available, and new contracts would have been necessary with delivery to the camps taking two to three months. This would not meet the urgent need, and clothing and other supplies had to be purchased locally.⁶⁷ The Army decision was--by default--let the Saudis do it. Fortunately, the Saudis had the wherewithal to provide for the EPWs. However, in the early days, before host nation support was available, the MPs relinquished their own food, blankets, and tents to provide for their prisoners.

Logistical support for the camps was improvised. Not only did the Army not provide the supplies, but it did not provide supply and service or transportation units to manage the locally procured EPW supplies. Generally, the Army logistical system in the theater simply ignored the existence of the 70,000 EPW in U.S. Army custody. One logistical unit that was helpful to the 800th MP Brigade was the 321st Materiel Management Center, an Army Reserve unit from Baton Rouge, Louisiana. On several occasions, the 321st MMC provided emergency assistance to the overloaded emergency logisticians of the 800th MP Brigade. Mostly, the MPs of the 800th MP Brigade had to do it themselves. They arranged to purchase the supplies, pick them up, transport them to the camps, and tried to keep track of them. The MP units had minimal training to perform this logistical management mission, and they had to rely on their civilian skills to perform this unexpected work.

The 800th MP Brigade established provisional Logistical Control Centers in each of the two camp geographical areas to provide a central point to receive, issue, and store supplies and equipment for the camps. They appointed contracting officers to make local purchases. They coordinated transportation and delivery of the supplies and equipment, as well as the EPWs. Because of the makeshift, reactive nature of these logistical operations, it is likely that some inefficiencies resulted, but the work got done, and the EPWs did not suffer.

Construction Support and Materials. The MPs expected to receive more construction support from the Engineers than was provided. Engineer support for EPW camp construction was limited because most of the engineer combat heavy battalions had been allocated to the combat corps for the ground war and the two battalions available for rear area work were engaged heavily in MSR maintenance, pipeline construction, and airfield construction and maintenance. A memorandum of agreement between General Conlon and Major General Terrence D. Mulcahy, Commander of the 416th Engineer Command, January 1991, established the amount and kind of engineer support to be provided the 800th MP Brigade. The engineers would prepare plans for the camps and submit construction requests for latrines, showers, washstands, guard towers, and lighting systems to be built or installed by local contractors. The 411th Engineer Brigade would task engineer companies to provide construction support and technical assistance. The 800th MP Brigade would provide soldiers to construct the camps and procure all materials and equipment for their construction.⁶⁸ Except for some 360 miles of triple concertina barbed wire supplied from theater stocks, and some lighting sets, the materials for construction of the camps were purchased locally by the Saudi Arabians.

Most of the work in constructing the camps was performed by the MPs. Two engineer platoons from the 864th Engineer Battalion supported construction of the camps in the BRONX Area, and two engineer platoons from the 43rd Engineer Battalion in the BROOKLYN Area. The engineers prepared the sites, constructed the earth berms, installed the sanitation systems, and trained the MPs to do the actual construction. The 535th Engineer Detachment (Prime Power) helped the MPs install two 300 kw generators at each camp and inspected the lighting systems constructed by the MPs. Because of the urgency to get the camps ready to receive EPW, the MPs sometimes borrowed construction equipment from other units for a few hours in the evening to work on their camps. The civilian skills of some of the MPs were helpful in performing this unexpected work.

Communications. This was a problem for the MPs as it was with many other combat support and combat service support elements. The camps had enough telephone equipment to establish effective communications inside the camps to assure proper security of the EPW. However, the camp headquarters and the guard and escort guard companies generally had insufficient FM radios to establish satisfactory communications to operate the camp. All of the camps had to overcome problems communicating externally with each other and with the 800th MP Brigade Headquarters. The EPW units were authorized insufficient communications capability to operate under the conditions of Operation DESERT STORM, and some communications equipment that would have been very useful was taken from the units at the mobilization stations. Local procurement of communications assets by the 800th MP Brigade alleviated the communications problem to an extent, but communications remained a major problem.

Transportation. Moving EPW to and among the camps and moving supplies to the camps was also a major problem. MP escort guard companies charged with securing prisoners

being moved from corps holding areas to the camps did not have organic vehicles to transport EPW. Army doctrine is that EPW will be moved back from the combat area using empty trucks which have brought supplies to the forward areas. However, this back hauling process did not work in DESERT STORM. During the ground war, the movement of the combat forces was so fast that there simply was little back haul capability available to move prisoners. Many of the trucks that moved forward with supplies and ammunition were never unloaded because of the short duration of the ground war. Even after the end of the ground war, when the U.S. units were not moving, the back haul transportation did not materialize. Despite the efforts of Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, commander of the 22nd SUPCOM, to use his transportation assets to back haul the EPW, this was not done during DESERT STORM.

In this area, also, the Saudi Arabians again came to the rescue. A variety of locally procured trucks and busses were obtained to move the EPW from the corps holding areas to the camps and from the U.S. camps to the Saudi camps. This required the 800th MP Brigade to create and operate two massive motor pools for which it had to train some MPs to be truck drivers and convert others to be automotive mechanics. Two hundred buses were acquired from the Saudis and 200 MPs were trained to drive them. In addition, the 800th MP Brigade had to organize convoys to move all of its own supplies to support the camps. The EPW camps were visited daily by large numbers of trucks bearing rations, clothing, other essential supplies, and EPW arriving from corps holding areas or other camps. The supply trucks would travel right into the camps to be unloaded by the prisoners, and stored under direction of the MPs inside the camps. It was a scene of mass confusion and purposeful activity that would not have been possible if the prisoners had not been so cooperative.

Maintenance of vehicles was difficult because the MP units had very limited organic maintenance capability. When a vehicle broke down, the MP units themselves had almost no capability to repair the vehicle or tow it to a maintenance facility. The Army maintenance system provided good support for military vehicles, but was not designed to maintain the contractor supplied vehicles that were supposed to be maintained by the contractors furnishing them. Maintenance of military vehicles organic to the Brigade's units was good, with an availability rate of 85% to 95% throughout the operation.⁶⁹ It was a different story, however, with the numerous contract vehicles--particularly buses--that the MPs used to augment their modest organic transportation capability. With some exceptions, contractor furnished maintenance was generally poor, and the availability of the contract vehicles ranged from 50% to 65%.⁷⁰ Maintenance of these vehicles was often performed by the MPs who were mechanics in civilian life, but lacking parts and tools, they were limited in what they could do. Despite the problems, there were some successes. The 403d MP Camp turned to the civilian skills of its personnel and adopted an aggressive procurement program to keep its fleet of 29 U.S. trucks, three German water trucks, a bulldozer, two HMTs, two forklifts, a scoop loader, five locally acquired ten-ton trucks of uncertain make, and a wide variety of U.S. and foreign generators operational. The 403d was able to keep 100% of this equipment running during a period of 47 days--an exceptional record.

Medical Care for EPW. Medical support at the EPW camps was austere and was a major concern throughout the operation. An EPW camp headquarters is authorized one doctor and nine medical technicians to provide emergency treatment and supervise EPW medical personnel used to treat the EPW. The camp medical section is not intended to provide primary medical care for the 12,000 EPW which the camp is designed to intern. Additional medical personnel were required to care for the EPW. At the 402nd Camp, for example, a team of volunteer U.S. Army and Saudi doctors arrived to help take care of the EPW after the fighting was over. Extensive use was made in the camps of captured Iraqi doctors and medical personnel. U.S. Army medical facilities in the theater were also used to provide medical treatment for EPW. The 300th Field Hospital, USAR, Ashley, Pennsylvania, commanded by Colonel Jonathan Sussman, was assigned the primary mission of providing medical support for EPW camps by its higher headquarters, the 173rd Medical Group, USAR.⁷¹ The 300th Field Hospital was located within the BRONX Area with 126 officers (including 25 physicians and 75 nurses) and 301 enlisted personnel. Once the war was over the theater medical system was able to accommodate EPW patients without difficulty because of the fewer than expected US and Coalition casualties.

Logistics Management. The task of constructing, operating, and supplying the four EPW camps was a massive job--equivalent almost to supporting a third army corps in the theater. Out of necessity, the MPs of the 800th MP Brigade had to do a good job of managing the logistics of the EPW operation. Failure to feed or clothe the EPW properly would have brought massive criticism on the Army and the Nation and might have hurt our cause. EPW support was a low priority for the Theater and was not provided by the Army's logistical system, and it was just good fortune that it turned out well. The major element of that good fortune was the willingness and the ability of the Saudis to pay the bill and provide most of the supplies and equipment for EPW support. The Saudis, for example, saved the U.S. a lot of money and problems by accepting financial responsibility to pay all of the U.S. captured EPW in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

Administration of the Prisoners

Many of the duties of the 800th MP Brigade were involved with the rights of EPWs to be accounted for properly, treated fairly, and their claims and protests heard and adjudicated. It also was necessary to keep the EPW calm, communicate with and interrogate them, assist in the search for war criminals, and determine the status of some EPWs claiming to be innocent civilians. Finally, it was necessary to release, repatriate, or retain the EPW in accordance with the Geneva Convention, the desires of the Saudi Government, and the preference of each individual EPW. Much work had to be done to administer the EPWs fairly and in accordance with the rules.

Psychological Operations

Much of the credit for the smooth operations of the camps rests with the personnel of the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion, a USAR unit from St Paul, Minnesota, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James P. Noll. The 13th PSYOP Battalion was part of the CAPSTONE trace of the 800th MP Brigade and had specialized in working on EPW operations. Although the unit had the mission of providing psychological operations support for four camps with almost 70,000 EPW, only 32 members of the unit were activated (out of 102 available), and this left the PSYOP part of the EPW mission severely undermanned. Very little of the unit's organic equipment arrived in the theater, and the lack of secure communications gear, computers, printing presses, and loudspeakers also hampered the ability of the unit to perform its mission properly. The 800th MP Brigade alleviated the manpower somewhat by augmenting the 13th PSYOP Battalion with 15 personnel of the 338th MI Detachment, USAR, from Waterbury, Connecticut, commanded by Sergeant First Class Raul Jiminez-Cintron. In addition, 15 Arabic interpreters were assigned to the PSYOP teams. Failure to activate the entire 13th PSYOP Battalion is another indication of the lack of appreciation on the part of some planners for the magnitude and importance of EPW operations and their willingness to accept more risk in this area than is practical.⁷²

Despite the lack of resources, the 13th PSYOP Battalion provided excellent support to the camps. The PSYOP teams at each camp were valuable in judging the mind-set and state of morale of the EPW population and helped to maintain order by accompanying the MP Reaction Forces responding to occasional disturbances. They helped the camp commanders explain to the EPW almost immediately upon arrival at the camp the rules and procedures of the camp and the rationale for them. Audio tapes in Arabic were developed to tell the prisoners what would happen during processing and how they were to respond. Signs in Arabic were produced for each processing station and for displaying the camp rules and locations. One sign, for example, warned the prisoners not to drink from an unsafe water source. The PSYOP teams established at each camp a mobile shelter which provided Arabic magazines and newspapers and played Arabic movies and music. PSYOP personnel prepared special news programs in Arabic for the prisoners. Access to these shelters was prized by the prisoners, and the threat of losing this privilege through misconduct was an effective way to control the prisoners. The PSYOP teams were essential to the operation of the camps.

The PSYOP teams at the camps were also helpful in the overall theater PSYOP campaign. The EPW were used to test the effectiveness of leaflets and broadcasts being developed to induce other Iraqis to surrender. They were asked to comment on the understandability and effectiveness of leaflets under development. Some prisoners were carefully selected to make oral surrender appeals which were taped and broadcast later to Iraqis still in their bunkers.⁷³

Interpreter Support

One of the critical resources for the 800th MP Brigade were interpreters who could communicate in Arabic with the Iraqi prisoners. There was no central agency for obtaining interpreters, and requests for them through intelligence and personnel channels were fruitless. The 800th MP Brigade obtained interpreters from a variety of sources, including the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, the Saudi Commander of the Eastern Province, and through other Host Nation Support channels. Most of the interpreters were civilian volunteers, and some were reluctant to live in the austere environment of the EPW camps and work the long hours required to run the camps. The arrival on 27 February 1991 of 60 Kuwaiti civilian volunteer translators added to the problem, for these people thought they would be assigned to work in Kuwait and were unhappy with camp life and work. Some of the interpreters simply left the camps. As a result, the supply and availability of interpreters was uncertain, and the camps were unable to use them with greatest effectiveness.

By mid-March 1991, 124 Saudi and 137 Kuwaiti interpreters were supporting the operations of the Brigade. They worked closely with the MPs inside the camps under a variety of arrangements determined by the camp commanders. In the 403rd Camp, the interpreters were themselves organized into a separate unit under a supervisor, and this worked well for orienting new interpreters and seeing that they did their jobs. Although there were never enough Arabic interpreters, most of those that were available did an outstanding job.⁷⁴

Interrogation of EPW

An important aspect of EPW operations was interrogating them to obtain information of use to the Coalition. Doctrine calls for interrogation of prisoners as soon as possible after capture in order to obtain timely information while the prisoners are still confused and before they have had time to regain their composure. The first formal interrogation of EPW in the theater was accomplished at Joint Interrogation Facilities (JIF) located near the EPW camps. A JIF is comprised of interrogators, counterintelligence agents, and analysts from the Army and other Services or intelligence agencies as required. JIF East was located between the 401st and 403rd Camps, while JIF West was located within the perimeter of the 301st Camp and also supported the 402nd Camp. Security for the JIFs themselves was provided by MP personnel, and this was a minor problem for JIF West located inside a camp perimeter but more difficult for JIF East located outside the camps. All EPW remained in 800th MP Brigade custody while being interviewed in the JIFs.⁷⁵

JIF East was operated by the 202nd MI Company with Army and Air Force personnel. All EPW were screened by the intelligence sections of the 401st and 403rd Camps while being processed in order to ascertain how they had been treated while en route to the camp and to identify potential trouble makers. EPW believed to have information of value were also

identified during the initial screening and escorted to the JIF for interrogation.

A Joint Debriefing Center (JDC) was established in Riyadh by CENTCOM Headquarters to interrogate selected EPW thought to possess high value information. The JDC was operated as an extension of the 800th MP Brigade Camps, and all EPW transported to the JDC were in 800th MP Brigade custody during the process. A security element from the 400th MP Camp provided security for EPW during movement to the JDC, while undergoing interrogation, and during movement back to the camps. About 25 EPW were processed at the JDC during the operation.

Legal Operations

Two important legal operations carried out by the 800th MP Brigade during the war were to adjudicate the status of EPW claiming to be civilians and identify war criminals.

The mission of the 800th MP Brigade called for innocent civilians (IC) to be identified, removed from the EPW camps, and turned over to Civil Affairs personnel. A significant number of civilians and alleged civilians were placed in the custody of the Brigade erroneously, and some of the persons captured as EPW claimed they were civilians. The status of these people had to be determined in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Another reason is that EPWs have more rights to support from the capturing nation than ICs. The mechanism to determine the status of individuals is a tribunal.

In order to start this process, the 800th MP Brigade submitted to the Judge Advocate General at ARCENT a request for legal authority to conduct tribunals. Although the request for tribunal authority was supported by the JAG at 22nd SUPCOM, the initial response of the ARCENT JAG was uncertainty, based according to the 800th MP Brigade on lack of understanding by the ARCENT JAG of the need for such tribunals. The request by the 800th MP Brigade for tribunal authority was neither denied nor approved during the entire operation, and the 800th MP Brigade went ahead and conducted "administrative tribunals" to get the job done.⁷⁶

The task of holding administrative tribunals was the responsibility of the Judge Advocate of the 800th MP Brigade.⁷⁷ Since the JAG section of the 800th MP Brigade consisted of only two JAG officers and a legal clerk, two more JAG officers were detailed from 22nd Support Command for short periods of time to help conduct the administrative tribunals. Each tribunal was composed of a JAG officer and a camp officer to hear evidence and make a determination. The fact that the camps were clustered in pairs made doing the job possible with the limited number of legal personnel available. A total of 1,198 administrative tribunals were conducted to determine the status of persons claiming to be civilians, and 886 persons were determined to be innocent civilians, 310 persons were determined to be EPW, and two were determined to be

retained personnel.⁷⁸

The 800th MP Brigade Staff also cooperated with the Theater War Crimes Information Team, CENTCOM Headquarters, and other EPW headquarters to identify EPW alleged to have committed war crimes. The names of 540 persons suspected of being war criminals were provided the Brigade. The Brigade G2 used PWIS II to match the names to EPW. Because of the similarity of Arabic names the matching process was difficult, even with the computer data base. Eventually, using a manual screening process, about 30 suspects were identified and their names were referred to CENTCOM for action. Most of these EPW, however, had already been transferred to the KSA authorities prior to their identification as war criminals. The 800th MP Brigade staff believed that the system for identifying war criminals was instituted too late to be useful.⁷⁹

Accounting for EPW

The most important element of EPW operations is accounting to the ICRC for each prisoner captured by the U.S. forces. The rules of the Geneva Convention and the policy of the United States require an exact accounting for each EPW. Accounting properly for prisoners has important international implications. One has only to consider the problems caused by improper accounting by Vietnam of U.S. personnel missing in the Vietnam War to appreciate the problems that careless or misleading accounting can bring. The 152nd Prisoner of War Information Center, Army National Guard, Moundsville, West Virginia, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Patton, was responsible for the accounting of EPW during DESERT STORM. This was no easy feat. Despite great care during processing to identify each EPW, there were several problems. One was the similarity of Iraqi names and their unfamiliarity to the U.S. troops; another was the tendency of some EPW to give false names during processing and switch identification wrist bands later. Yet, despite the problems, the 800th MP Brigade set a new standard for EPW accounting.

The 800th MP Brigade had given much thought to accounting for prisoners and was using a computer-based system--the Prisoner of War Information System Version II (PWIS II)--for this task. In previous wars, EPW accounting was performed manually, and DESERT STORM was the first operational use of PWIS II. The internee serial number (ISN) required by the Department of the Army to be assigned each EPW during processing was used to report to the ICRC and the National PWIC the status of prisoners and to keep track of those that were transferred to KSA custody, repatriated, or sent to medical facilities. PWIS II was used to maintain a computer data base of all ISNs and generally worked well, although some problems were encountered.

PWIS II was a brand new system that was not operational in August 1990 at the start of the war. The initial computer system--PWIS I--was originally developed by the Army for

CONUS internees and U.S. installations, and PWIS II was developed for use in the theater of operations.⁸⁰ A prototype version of PWIS II was exercised for the first time by the 800th MP Brigade and the 152nd PWIC in 1987. Subsequent field testing was accomplished in 1988, and the system was to be modified as a result.⁸¹ However, the new development effort had not started when war broke out. Recognizing the importance of being able to use computers for this task, the U.S. Army undertook a crash effort to field a workable PWIS II system for DESERT STORM.

There was a difference of opinion between the 800th MP Brigade and Department of the Army on accounting for wounded Iraqis who died after being captured, but before being entered into the EPW accounting system. The 800th Brigade had established in OPLAN 4102 for support of U.S. Army Europe, and had rehearsed in many exercises, the policy that accounting for EPW started when the captured person was interviewed and processed at the EPW camps. EPW were not to be processed at division collection points or corps holding areas because that would slow down their rapid evacuation from the combat area as called for by the Geneva Conventions. The 800th MP Brigade policy called for EPW who died of wounds after capture but before arriving at an EPW camp to be processed in graves registration channels as killed in action (KIA), in the same way that wounded U.S. soldiers who die en route to a hospital are treated as KIA in graves registration channels rather than as patients in medical channels. One reason for this procedure was that a dead prisoner could not be interviewed--an essential part of the EPW processing routine. The 800th MP Brigade believes that listing Iraqis wounded in combat as prisoners who died in U.S. custody could have had considerable adverse impact on the US record for treatment of prisoners.⁸²

Department of the Army takes the position that an enemy soldier becomes a prisoner when he has "fallen into the power of the enemy" at the moment of capture rather than the time of entry into the EPW accounting system and that the U.S. Government could have been criticized for claiming that an Iraqi was KIA, when his fellow EPW saw him alive in U.S. hands, up to the point when he died upon arrival at the EPW camp.⁸³ After one attempt to process a dead Iraqi as an EPW caused many problems, Department of the Army allowed the 800th MP Brigade to continue its original policy. The issue remains unresolved.

Working with the NPWIC, the 800th MP Brigade Headquarters, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 152nd PWIC stayed on the job even after the unit returned to the US in June 1991 and was released from active duty. Three members of the unit remained on active duty to complete the accounting for the EPW. The first task was to verify the EPW data base with a file by file check of each record. This audit increased the number of EPW by 893 records from the original raw number of 68,929 to the final total of 69,822. The second task was to document the repatriation process by reviewing repatriation orders prepared by the ICRC, 800th MP Brigade, and KSA. This resulted in orders for 46,558 EPW repatriated and left an additional 23,764 EPW waiting for orders as of 15 October 1991. The third task was to reconcile data with the ICRC, which had provided a list of 1,801 EPW thought to be

unaccounted for. By comparing records and tracing duplications, the number of unaccounted EPW was reduced to 63 when accountability operations ceased on 4 January 1992. The final reconciliation yielded an accountability rate of 99.1%--by far the best record in modern warfare. The 152nd MP PWIC and the 800th MP Brigade deserve much credit for this outstanding achievement.⁸⁴

EPW Information

The number and status of EPW held by the U.S. and the Saudis were high interest topics for the media covering the war. With over 1,200 media representatives accredited to the theater, the 800th MP Brigade had a formidable job dealing with the media. The Brigade had two somewhat conflicting information tasks. It had to protect the rights of the Iraqi prisoners to privacy under the Geneva Convention, while at the same time providing the media enough information to keep the U.S. public informed on the accomplishments of the members of the Brigade. The public affairs section of the Brigade took care to inform the media on the rights of the EPW, particularly to avoid identifying or photographing individual EPW who might face reprisals when repatriated to Iraq. The 800th MP Brigade requested and received exceptional cooperation from the media on this point.⁸⁵

There was some difficulty encountered about the release of official data on EPW captured, repatriated, and interned in the camps. During Operation DESERT STORM there were numerous instances in which EPW numbers released by CENTCOM and ARCENT were at variance with those available from the 800th MP Brigade. This was because the estimates from the higher headquarters were based on figures received from the combat commanders on the numbers captured, while the information from the 800th MP Brigade counted only those prisoners who were entered into the EPW system. An Iraqi became an "official" prisoner at the moment he fell into the hands of U.S. or Coalition forces but became an accountable EPW only when he arrived at an EPW camp and was entered into the accounting system.⁸⁶ Informal estimates from combat commanders were useful to plan for logistical and transportation support for the EPWs, but their release outside of the Army could have invited media inquiries into discrepancies and charges of confusion or cover-up. The 800th MP Brigade suggested that in future EPW operations it would be sound policy to release information on EPWs only from the Theater and National PWICs.⁸⁷

Transfer and Repatriation of EPW

The agreements with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) provided that the Iraqi prisoners would be transferred to KSA control. The KSA established four EPW camps--one just north of BRONX, one north of BROOKLYN, a third south of King Khalid Military City, and the fourth at Tobuk for officers only. Although these camps as constructed were smaller than

originally intended, they sufficed to receive the EPW from the U.S. camps during the war and as the EPW mission phased out later. The transfer operations were facilitated by close coordination between the 800th MP Brigade and the KSA Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA). Major General Hatem Al Okasi was responsible for KSA EPW operations in the theater and the operation of the four KSA camps.⁸⁸ General Okasi and his military police units acted professionally and in accordance with the highest standards of international law. The KSA camps served well prepared food, provided excellent medical care, and had adequate water and sanitation.⁸⁹

Neither U.S. doctrine nor the EPW camp organization was designed for in-processing of EPW, and the simultaneous transfer of some to the camps of an ally. That operation was done, but required extra effort and considerable improvisation. This needs to be considered when future EPW operations in a theater are planned and support systems are designed.⁹⁰

Although the 800th MP Brigade and its advisory teams were intimately involved in the transfer and accounting for U.S. held EPW and maintained close contact with the MODA EPW officials, the 800th MP Brigade was not consulted by CENTCOM in the planning or coordination phases of the EPW transfer and repatriation program. Neither General Conlon nor Lieutenant Colonel See, the chief EPW liaison officer to MODA, were invited to participate in the planning or attend meetings to coordinate with KSA officials. This caused problems because those who did the initial planning had little knowledge of the Geneva Conventions, requirements for processing, transfer, and support of EPW, or KSA camp capacities. When it came time to execute the repatriation program, this oversight at first caused problems from lack of movement schedules, no MP liaison officers appointed, lack of proper repatriation rosters from KSA, poor accounting of EPW refusing repatriation, and generally poor accountability. Ultimately the KSA EPW authorities elected to deal directly with the 800th MP Brigade who, according to the Saudis "knew what they were doing."⁹¹

Many of the Iraqi prisoners did not want to go back to Iraq. Some had previously been prisoners of the Iranians in the earlier Iran-Iraq war--some as long as eight years. Many had no idea whom they were fighting, except that they were infidels. Since Saddam Hussein had decreed that all family members of soldiers who surrendered would be killed, there was little incentive to go back.

The repatriation process moved forward. The plan was that all U.S. held EPW would be transferred to KSA control, and KSA would release them to return to Iraq. EPW had been transferred to KSA control from the outset, and this flow continued as the KSA released the prisoners back to Iraq. A total of 73,325 prisoners were repatriated by the KSA to Iraq at their request and in accordance with the terms of the cease fire. There were still 13,418 Iraqi prisoners in Saudi hands who refused repatriation to Iraq.

Upon its redeployment in June 1991, the 800th MP Brigade left behind a detachment of three personnel to work this issue with the ICRC and KSA. The final member of this detachment returned to the U.S. in December 1991--the last of the Brigade to return from its successful mission.

Issues Relating to EPW Operations

Three issues derive from the manner in which EPW operations were carried out in Operation DESERT STORM. They have to do with the support by the Army for the EPW mission, command and control of EPW operations within a theater, and staff oversight of EPW operations.

Support by the Army for the EPW Mission

The Army did not have to provide full support for EPW operations in the Southwest Asia Theater because the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was willing and able to support the mission. This was fortunate because the Army would have been hard pressed to provide adequate logistical support for its own forces as well as for large numbers of prisoners. Initially, the emphasis by CINCENT was on defending Saudi Arabia and then on liberating Kuwait. Few prisoners were expected during the defensive phase, and even after a planning estimate of 100,000 EPW was adopted, priority for logistical support was to the U.S. and Coalition forces to accomplish the offensive mission. By that time an agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had specified, among other things, that the entire cost of EPW operations would be borne by Saudi Arabia.⁹² This allowed the Army to concentrate on its principal mission of defeating Saddam Hussein.

The Army failed to appreciate the full consequences of the EPW mission, particularly the magnitude of the logistical support required for 70,000 EPW. Even though the Saudis were paying the bill and most of the supplies were obtained by local purchase, the Army still had the responsibility to support the EPW mission, including both the EPWs in the camps and the MPs operating the camps. The Army logistical system in the Southwest Asia Theater should have been prepared better than it was to procure the EPW supplies, transport them to the EPW camps, and manage the process of supporting EPW operations. Much of this work had to be done by the 800th MP Brigade in an improvised manner.

The United States cannot count on fighting future wars in nations whose governments are both willing and able to assume responsibility for EPW captured by U.S. forces. While combat operations must continue to have the highest priority, some assets need to be made available for EPW operations, and support of EPW operations needs to be considered routinely in campaign planning.⁹³

Command and Control of EPW Operations in a Theater

Doctrine calls for the theater EPW brigade to be assigned to the theater personnel command because this facilitates support, accountability, and coordination within the personnel system. Collocating the Theater PWIC with the personnel data center might have been advantageous, but the Provisional Personnel Command for ARCENT was located in Riyadh--perhaps too far from the EPW camps to be helpful. The 800th MP Brigade was assigned instead to the 22nd Support Command, the headquarters in charge of logistical support for the Theater Army.⁹⁴ While this command arrangement might not have been the solution most agreeable to all concerned, it was the best solution at the time, and it worked.⁹⁵

General Conlon says that the command arrangement worked because Major General Pagonis, Commander of the 22nd Support Command, demonstrated great confidence in the 800th MP Brigade and became personally involved in providing support to EPW operations. He was willing to utilize the expertise and heed the advice of the 800th MP Brigade. The support of General Pagonis contributed significantly to the success of EPW operations in the theater.⁹⁶

The proper subordination for the EPW brigade in a theater army needs to be reconsidered in light of DESERT STORM experience, and there is no obvious solution. Accounting for EPW is a personnel related function. Operating the camps is a logistical function. The provost marshals exercising special staff oversight of EPW operations fall within the operations staff. It is likely that the organizational subordination of the EPW brigade (or other EPW headquarters) in a theater is less important than proper command and staff emphasis on EPW operations.

Staff Oversight of EPW Operations

Staffs are provided in military organizations to take care of a multitude of details so that commanders can focus on coordinating the fires and maneuver of subordinate organizations to accomplish the military mission. In ARCENT during Operation DESERT STORM, there were many collateral functions, such as EPW operations, that were managed primarily through staff oversight rather than the personal involvement of the commanders. For EPW operations, the staffs at CENTCOM, ARCENT, and 22nd Support Command Headquarters exercised oversight over one operational organization--the 800th MP Brigade.

The organization of staff oversight of EPW operations was diverse and characterized by a general lack of staff officers with extensive EPW training and experience. At CENTCOM Headquarters, responsibility for EPW policy was vested with the Political-Military Division of the J5 Plans and Policy Directorate. The EPW staff officer at ARCENT worked directly for the Chief of Staff instead of the Provost Marshal and had only six months of EPW experience before being assigned by Department of the Army to this position.⁹⁷ ARCENT Headquarters

as a whole, moreover, was not very involved in EPW operations, perhaps because they thought the 22nd Support Command was supervising the operation. The 22nd Support Command staff was oriented toward logistics and had no staff officer with experience in EPW operations.

The commander and staff of the 800th MP Brigade believe that staff officers at higher headquarters did not rely sufficiently on their EPW expertise when planning and overseeing EPW operations in Operation DESERT STORM. Although the 800th MP Brigade was the only general officer command in the United States Army devoted to EPW operations in a theater of operations and had trained extensively on the EPW mission, there were several instances in which higher staffs revealed a lack of knowledge of EPW operations but failed to consult with or give credence to the views of the Brigade. These instances were:

- The Brigade's long standing policy on accounting for prisoners who died in U.S. custody, before being processed at an EPW camp, was overturned, but later reinstated.
- The ARCENT JAG failed to act on the Brigade's request for authority to conduct tribunals to identify innocent civilians.
- The process of transferring EPW from one camp to another was complicated in numerous instances by staff officers at various higher headquarters calling up the 800th MP Brigade Headquarters directly and issuing fragmentary orders orally to "Pick up 65 buses in Riyadh," or "Transfer 5,000 EPW tomorrow." These uncoordinated fragmentary orders raised havoc with the orderly administration of the camps and failed, above all, to appreciate the necessity for strict positive control of EPW whenever they are moved. Many times the orders were not achievable with the time and resources available to the Brigade.⁹⁸
- Planning for repatriation of EPW was accomplished by CENTCOM without consulting the 800th MP Brigade staff, and this led to problems in implementing the program.

The 800th MP Brigade believes that many of the difficulties they experienced could have been avoided if the staffs of the higher headquarters had consulted them before establishing policy and issuing directives on EPW operations.

The ARCENT Provost Marshal, Colonel Douglas H. Cobb, was highly supportive of the 800th MP Brigade and was the only higher headquarters staff officer to visit the 800th MP Brigade and receive an EPW briefing.⁹⁹ Colonel Cobb notes that ARCENT was the Executive Agent for EPW operations, and that it was his job to formulate policy and prepare orders on EPW operations for the approval of the ARCENT Commander. He and his staff worked closely with the 800th MP Brigade Staff and always gave them a "heads up" on forthcoming orders and

issued mission type orders leaving the execution to the EPW experts. Colonel Cobb also notes that it is not realistic to expect that a higher headquarters will negotiate missions or abdicate its responsibility to supervise the operations of a subordinate command. "The Army simply doesn't work that way."¹⁰⁰

The nature of the staff oversight problem is ambiguous--and may be nothing more than the traditional problem in any army between headquarters at different levels--but one essential element of a solution appears to be more emphasis on EPW operations during peacetime at all levels of command. EPW operations are highly specialized and involve training and procedures not common to the rest of the Army. They differ substantially from most activities of the army-in-the-field and are part of a vertical functional system that goes up the chain of command to the Department of the Army, the national level, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Staff oversight of the EPW system by the provost marshal at each level would be improved by assigning qualified EPW officers to inform and influence decisions affecting EPW operations. This could be done by establishing Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions for EPW experts or by forming liaison teams within the 800th MP Brigade Headquarters to join higher level staffs upon deployment to a theater. The 800th MP Brigade and the other specialized EPW units of the Army can help by educating other commanders and staffs on the fundamental principles of EPW operations.

Lessons for the Army

The Flexibility of Army Reservists

Without doubt the most important lesson for the United States Army to draw from the operations of the 800th MP Brigade in DESERT STORM is the extraordinary flexibility of the Reserve Component MP units and their members. The 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate camps were highly specialized units designed and trained to perform one mission only--enemy prisoners of war. Yet, the Brigade units performed numerous other missions in the course of the war--some ordered by higher headquarters out of need and others because they had to be done to accomplish the EPW mission. These Reservists and Guardsmen guarded facilities, ran jails, built camps, drove trucks, ran a huge logistics system, bought and maintained their own equipment and supplies, and operated a customs inspection system. None of this was in their MOSs. They trained and were retrained to do these other jobs. Whatever it took, they did it.

These citizen-soldiers were able to do all of this flexibly because they had civilian skills in addition to their military skills. They were not only EPW experts, but they were mechanics, police officers, carpenters, electricians, dozer operators, managers, and truck drivers in civilian life. Whenever a new task came up, there were some in these units who knew how to do it. The units were constantly being reorganized into new teams and constantly being trained for new missions. This capability to respond flexibly is a highly valued attribute that does not now exist to such a high degree in the Active Component, which cannot afford to train its members in several skills. Army Reserve flexibility could be a useful asset for the Total Army to have in the uncertain future.

The Value of Army Reserve Leadership

A word needs to be said about the great performance of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 800th MP Brigade. From the commanding general down to the team leaders, they did a great job. This was necessary because the EPW mission requires particularly good leadership and initiative at the small unit level.

Good leadership flows from the top, and General Conlon did a great job. In fact, no small share of the credit goes to this remarkable New York Cop, who led, prepared, and trained the Brigade for this job and then led it as it did the job. Truly a charismatic leader, General Conlon admits that the job was the "hardest thing I ever did," and "the most responsibility I ever had." He also says that these were the "best troops and leaders I ever worked with."¹⁰¹

The Commander of the 403rd MP Camp, Colonel Carl D. Novak, credits the success of the 800th MP Brigade, in part, to luck. His version of luck, however, is as much a matter of hard work as of chance. He says:¹⁰²

"By luck, I don't mean good things happening to us without effort on our part. I think we caused the good things that happened."

Colonel Novak goes on to cite a list of bad things that, by virtue of "good luck," did not happen: No severe health problems; adequate food and supplies despite the system; and no NBC or terrorist attacks. Had these or other bad things happened, the EPW system would have been stressed but, based on what was done, would have reacted, adjusted, and coped.

The Future of the EPW Mission in the Army

The EPW mission reached perhaps its zenith with the great success of DESERT STORM. Predictions of future warfare contemplate low-intensity conflict, which is unlikely to result in large numbers of prisoners. The probability of mass capitulations in future regional wars is not high. The need to intern large numbers of Soviet prisoners appears remote. So there is no easy way to justify retaining a large number of EPW units in the Army Base Force for the 1990s. Already the reductions have started, and many of the units that did such a good job in the desert have already been eliminated. Without a definite threat to use to estimate future EPW workloads, the Army is simply setting a level of effort of 60,000 EPW to size the structure. Most of the EPW units will be in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, but the Army is considering a small capability consisting of an EPW/CI battalion and a PWIC in the Active Component as well.

The Army has converted to a new organizational structure for the EPW mission. The conversion had started before the war, but only the 400th MP Battalion was activated with the new TO&E at that time. The new organization eliminates the five EPW Camp headquarters in favor of 13 EPW battalions like the 400th MP Battalion (EPW/CI). There was some disagreement about the new structure. General Conlon, his successor General Evo Riguzzi, the staff at the 800th MP Brigade, and some other commanders favored the previous organization because they say it provided great flexibility and a efficient operation. These are the same arguments used by the MP School and other Reserve EPW officers to justify the new structure. At any rate, the decision has been made, the camps were all inactivated by 15 December 1991, and the new structure is in effect.

EPW operations may receive greater attention by the MP Corps and the Army in the future than they have in the past. Hopefully, the experience of DESERT STORM will point up the need to have an assured capability to handle the EPW mission and other important collateral missions.

The Importance of EPW Operations

Finally, there is the question of the importance of EPW operations to the US Army. Certainly they were important in the War with Iraq. From a National viewpoint the operations to process, intern, account for, and repatriate or release the Iraqi prisoners had profound implications. The United States had to demonstrate to the World--and to Iraq--that it played by the rules and treated its prisoners with respect and humanity. This was essential to influence global public opinion positively toward US policy and US-led actions against Iraq. In order to do that, the EPW operations had to meet with the tough standards of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The ICRC is the focal point for international attention to prisoner of war affairs. One of the most important functions of the EPW system is to work closely with the ICRC on matters pertaining to the treatment and repatriation of prisoners. The ICRC can influence world public opinion on prisoner treatment and provides a neutral channel for exchange and repatriation of prisoners. Approval by the ICRC is an important asset for US foreign policy. The 800th MP Brigade in its role as the senior US Army planning agency for EPW matters made it a rule to maintain a close working relationship with the ICRC.¹⁰³ In August 1990 the ICRC visited the United States to observe the 800th MP Brigade train in Exercise TOREADOR SWORD 90. This close contact paid off in Operation DESERT STORM.

The initial visit of ICRC representatives was made to the camps in the BROOKLYN Area on 21 January 1991. The approval of the ICRC for US EPW measures provided the basis for Under Secretary of State Kimmitt to declare that the US was in full compliance with the Geneva Conventions. This in turn made it possible for the ICRC to demand to be allowed to visit Iraqi prison camps and obtain a status report on US and Allied airmen held captive in Iraq. The parading on Iraqi television of obviously abused airmen helped sustain world opinion in support of the Coalition, while our own good treatment of Iraqi EPW gave us a moral and psychological edge. Throughout DESERT STORM the relationship between the 800th MP Brigade and the ICRC was effective and helpful. Weekly meetings with ICRC representatives helped assure mutual understanding and cooperation and underscored the importance of providing good treatment of EPW. Such close cooperation between the 800th MP Brigade and the ICRC should continue in peacetime.

The Commander and personnel of the 800th MP Brigade believe that the work they did was instrumental in making possible the release of all US and Allied prisoners of war by the Iraqis immediately after the cessation of hostilities. There was a distinct linkage between our treatment of the Iraqis and the release by Iraq of the Coalition prisoners.

Even more important is that humane treatment of enemy prisoners of war is consistent with our beliefs and our principles. The key to doing this is to have well trained military police personnel who understand how to "take care of another nation's patriots." The combat soldiers

who actually capture the prisoners are oriented toward fighting and cannot be expected to feel sympathetically or even objectively about their prisoners. The few incidents of rough treatment of Iraqi prisoners occurred in the combat units, although mostly the treatment was correct. Once the EPW were in military police channels, they were handled professionally in accordance with the Geneva Convention. General Conlon believes that military police are the proper troops to perform this EPW mission because they are NOT combat troops and can be more objective about it than the combat troops.

Good treatment of the Iraqi prisoners will also have beneficial long-term effects. The United States Army took good care of almost 70,000 Iraqis and put to rest the propaganda of their own Government. Surely this good--even kind--treatment has some positive effect and left some positive feelings toward the United States which just might be helpful in the future. Many Iraqi prisoners respected the U.S. military for its treatment of them, and showed it. One Iraqi prisoner even travelled to the United States after his release and visited the 403rd MP Camp at its home station in Nebraska to convey his appreciation. Others wrote to their captors thanking them for the treatment, as in the following letter:

6 March 1991

To: Commander
401st MP Camp (PW)

In the name of GOD, most gracious and merciful.

Verse from the Kuran:

"I have created you male and female and I have made you nations and tribes to meet and know each other. The best amongst you are those who believe."

Shapes and colors, however different we are part, meet in the frame of honest and human cooperation and the true and objective joint relations for those people that love peace and well being, and that is how we see the treatment given to us by the forces that have captured us. The treatment has surpassed the imagination about this type of work and regardless of religion and beliefs, we look upon this work and the marvelous human treatment has had an impact on us, and we have felt as if we were not prisoners but brothers here. We are grateful for those who are responsible for running these camps from the highest rank to the lowest and we thank them from the bottom of our hearts and our peace loving souls. May GOD lead them to the service of mankind and peace. Thank you a thousand times. May peace and blessings be upon you all.

(Name Withheld)

Finally, the ultimate effect of humane treatment of prisoners may have surprising and happy results as it did for Lieutenant Colonel Theodore D. Szakmary, G-1 of the 800th MP Brigade. During World War II Colonel Szakmary's own father was a prisoner of war--of the Americans. The good treatment he received at the hands of the Americans persuaded Szakmary Senior to move to the United States following the war. Today, the son of the former prisoner of war appreciates more than most people how important it is that the United States set an example for the rest of the World by humane treatment of prisoners of war, and he has devoted his Army Reserve service to this end.

End Notes

1. This account is based on Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1991, photo caption opposite p. 217. An account is given in Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, submitted by the Department of Defense to Congress in April 1992, page 215, and details are from an eyewitness account by a member of the CENTCOM planning staff, 13 October 1991. There were larger mass surrenders in World War II, such as French to Germans in 1940, Russians to Germans in 1941, and Italians to British in 1942, but this was the largest since World War II.
2. Letter, Colonel Peter D. Hoffman, Chief, Security, Force Protection, and Law Enforcement Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 1 June 1992. The listed number of Iraqi prisoners was agreed upon and reported to Congress at a final reconciliation by the NPWIC and the 152nd PWIC on 4 January 1992.
3. All of the units of the 800th MP Brigade were from the US Army Reserve or Army National Guard. Active combat and MP units were involved in the capture of EPW and their movement to corps holding areas, and there were some Active Army personnel in 800th MP Brigade units. Once the EPW were taken over by MPs from the 800th MP Brigade, they were managed by Reserve Components.
4. Letters, Colonel Hoffman, 1 November 1991 and 1 June 1992.
5. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953, Anchor Books, New York, 1989, pp 966-967.
6. DOD Directive 5100, "DoD Program for Prisoners of War and Other Detainees," 27 December 1972.
7. Colonel Hoffman, letter, 1 June 1992, points out that all MP units have a capability to handle EPW, including Active Component units that dealt with prisoners captured in the Grenada and Panama operations.
8. U.S. Army Military Police School, Military Police Corps Regimental History, Fort McClellan, AL, undated, is the source of the historical data on military police.
9. General Bandholtz had been Commander of the Provost Guard Brigade in the Philippines during the Spanish American War.
10. Ibid, passim.

11. Hqs, Department of the Army, FM 19-1, Military Police Support for the Airland Battle, May 1988, pp 3-1 to 3-11, is the source for the description of MP missions. This section was reviewed by the U.S. Army Military Police School, and helpful comments were provided by letter dated 20 December 1991.
12. Colonel Hoffman, 31 October 1991 and note, 1 November 1991.
13. DOD Directive 5100.69, "DoD Program for Prisoners of War and Other Detainees," 27 December 1972, p 3.
14. Required strength data and unit descriptions were obtained from the U.S. Army MP School, 20 December 1991. The MP School does not list the MP Processing Advisory Team, but these detachments were activated and employed during the operation according to after-action reports of the 800th MP Brigade. The EPW unit structure used during Operation DESERT STORM has been replaced by a new unit structure that used an EPW battalion as the basic element instead of the EPW camp. See the discussion of the 400th MP Battalion.
15. Letter, LTC Frederick W. See, 26 December 1991. Colonel See was in charge of EPW advisory team operations in Desert Storm.
16. Information supplied by 300th MP Command, 6 February 1992.
17. Information on the NPWIC provided by Colonel Peter D. Hoffman, Hqs, DA, 1 November 1991.
18. The 220th MP Brigade, USAR, Gaithersburg, MD, was the CAPSTONE unit designated to provide EAC MP support for CENTCOM, including necessary EPW operations. However, this unit was not called up for DESERT STORM, and the 89th MP Brigade, an AC unit affiliated with III Corps, was used in the EAC combat support role.
19. Long Island Newsday, 6 Mar 1991.
20. LTC Kevin F. Harrington, G3, 800th MP Brigade, briefing at the EPW Conference held at the 800th MP Brigade on 19 Oct 91 (hereafter EPW Conference).
21. LTC Harrington, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
22. 800th MP Brigade, After Action Report, 800th MP Bde (PW), 1 June 1991 (hereinafter 800th After Action Report).
23. 800th After Action Report, p B-2.
24. LTC See, Summary of EPW advisory team operations, letter of 26 December 1991.

25. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992, p. 262, describes the action in which these prisoners were captured. The attack on the oil platforms started on 18 January and took place mostly at night, so the Iraqis could have been captured late on the 18th or early on the 19th. Department of the Army says that 19 January 1991 is the correct date, per letter, Colonel Hoffman, 29 May 1992.
26. The source for these and other data on EPW is the after-action report of the 152nd Prisoner of War Information Center presented at the 800th MP Brigade EPW Conference, 19 October 1991, and modified by Letter, Colonel Cobb, 13 April 1992, to accord with the final accounting on 4 January 1992.
27. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 1 June 1992.
28. General Conlon, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
29. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 1 June 1992.
30. A request by the 800th MP Brigade that a USAR MP battalion specializing in confinement operations be called up and deployed to perform this mission was not approved.
31. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 29 May 1992.
32. The 403rd Camp arrived in theater on 15 January 1991, a day ahead of the 401st Camp, but the equipment of the 403rd was delayed in arrival, so the 401st Camp was built first. Memorandum, Colonel Carl D. Novak, 28 January 1992.
33. Memorandum, Colonel Carl D. Novak, 28 January 1992.
34. Some reviewers also pointed out that doubling a camp's capacity means exceeding the "minimum international standards" for EPW internment. Colonel Hoffman, letter 29 May 1992, points out that strictly speaking there are no prescribed "standards" and conformance with the Geneva Conventions is judged by the actual state of health of the prisoners.
35. The exact order and location of the processing varied from camp to camp. For example, the 301st Camp required showers after the EPW were in their assigned compounds. In some camps, the EPW were not issued ID cards at all, while in others they were issued ID cards after the initial processing.
36. In one instance at least the 403rd Camp had to stop photographing new EPW for several hours because they ran out of film. Memorandum, Colonel Carl D. Novak, 28 January 1992.
37. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.

38. Memorandum, Colonel Carl D. Novak, 28 January 1992.
39. G2 Briefing, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
40. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
41. 301st MP Camp Briefing, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
42. Major Alan A. Ecke, G4, 800th MP Brigade, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
43. Letter, U.S. Army MP School, 20 December 1991, indicates that all five of the EPW camps were inactivated by 15 December 1991 as well as all battalion command and control detachments and processing companies. They are to be replaced by 13 of the new EPW/CI battalion headquarters.
44. 400th MP Battalion, Command Report: 400th Military Police Battalion, 17 Jan 1991 - 27 March 1991, 27 March 1991.
45. Telephone interview, Colonel Bowen, 6 February 1992.
46. Comments by Colonel Bowen on the draft manuscript, 11 December 1991.
47. Briefing by Major Karen Linnenkohl, S3, of the 401st MP Camp, EPW Conference, 19 Oct 91. The section on the 401st MP Camp benefitted also from a review and comments on the draft manuscript forwarded by Sergeant Major Ronald K. Mason, on 11 December 1991.
48. The MPs call these refugees "displaced civilians" while the civil affairs community calls them "dislocated civilians." They are the same folks!
49. Colonel Novak indicates his unit arrived in Saudi Arabia on 15 January 1991, and the Third Army PM Section reports the arrival date was 17 January. The difference probably is between the arrival of the initial increment with the commander versus closure of the entire unit.
50. The source for this section is a briefing by Colonel Novak, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991, and Memorandum, Colonel Novak, 28 January 1992, commenting on the draft manuscript.
51. Memorandum, Colonel Carl D. Novak, 28 January 1992.
52. Memorandum, Colonel Carl D. Novak, 28 January 1992.
53. Memorandum, Colonel Carl D. Novak, 28 January 1992.

54. Based on briefing by LTC Robert G. Harvey, Deputy Commander, 301st MP Camp, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991, and comments on the draft manuscript provided by Colonel Charles S. Johnson, Commander, 31 December 1991. The Third Army PM Section reports the arrival date of the 301st Camp as 27 January 1991, but this is the date the unit took over the camp.

55. 400th MP Battalion, Command Report, 27 March 1991.

56. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 1 June 1992.

57. 301st MP Camp Briefing, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.

58. Colonel Rich gives the date of the arrival of his unit as 31 January 1991, but the FORSCOM PM Section lists it as 2 February 1991.

59. The following combat support companies were retrained: 342nd and 344th to escort guards; 157th, 191st, 206th, 223rd, 269th, 290th, 363rd, 622nd, 625th, and 1138th to guard companies. Source, 800th MP Brigade, 20 Nov 91.

60. Department of the Army (Colonel Hoffman letter, 1 June 1992) stresses that the equipment was taken from the units intentionally because of the shortage of air and sea lift assets. ARCENT (Colonel Cobb letter 13 April 1992) says that this action was the byproduct of converting these units from the heavier combat support TOE to the EPW TOE. Both of these reasons probably applied.

61. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 1 June 1992.

62. Headquarters 800th MP Brigade, "Operation Desert Storm Draft," 14 May 1992.

63. This account is based on the briefing by Colonel Rich at the EPW Conference, 19 October 1991. The 402nd MP Camp was inactivated in September 1991 and replaced by the 367th Command and Control Detachment (EPW). Colonel Rich was transferred to the IRR, and the commander of the 367th Detachment is Colonel Red Kelley. Dates were confirmed by Sgt Hardesty, 367th C&C Detachment, 28 May 1992.

64. 400th MP Camp Presentation for the 800th MP Brigade EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.

65. Ibid.

66. 800th After-Action Report, p N-1, recommends a separate UIC for the EPWs to provide a basis for the supply system to act.

67. 800th After Action Report, p N-10.

68. Engineer Support at Echelons Above Corps: The 416th Engineer Command, Andrulis Research Corporation, 18 May 1992, p 40.
69. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
70. G4 Briefing, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991, amplified by BG Conlon, 4 June 1992.
71. The 300th Field Hospital is claimed by the 800th Brigade, but the unit itself insists that it reported to the 173rd Medical Group. Telephone interview, Mr Vershinski, 300th Field Hospital, 21 February 1991.
72. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
73. G2 Briefing, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
74. G1 and G2 Briefings, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
75. LTC Vincent F. O'Connell, G2, 800th MP Brigade, EPW Conference, 19 October 91.
76. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigad Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992, amplified by General Conlon, 4 Jun 1992.
77. In addition to EPW operations, the JAG Section also provided legal assistance and military justice. Fortunately, the Brigade's disciplinary record was exemplary, and there were only seven Summary Courts Martial and 47 cases of non-judicial punishment for the entire Brigade, 80% of which occurred before deployment and while waiting redeployment after the end of the war. This is an excellent record for an organization of 7,300 troops.
78. After-action report by Major Anthony Moncayo, Judge Advocate, 800th MP Brigade, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
79. LTC C'Connell, G2, 800th MP Brigade, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991. The single war crimes identification unit assigned to the theater consisted of only seven people, and none of these was assigned to the PWIC or Joint Interrogation Facility.
80. LTC Hurburt, U.S. Army MP School, April 1992.
81. 800th After-Action Report, Annex G.
82. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992, amplified by General Conlon, 4 Jun 1992.
83. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 1 June 1992.

84. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 1 June 1992.
85. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
86. Letter, Colonel Hoffman, 1 June 1992.
87. Major Mary E. Pawloski, Public Affairs Officer, 800th MP Brigade, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
88. Letter, LTC See, 26 December 1991.
89. 800th After Action Report, p B-1.
90. Comments by Col Charles S. Johnson on draft manuscript, 31 December 1991.
91. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
92. Letter, Colonel Douglas H. Cobb, Provost Marshal, Third US Army, 13 April 1992.
93. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
94. 800th After Action Report, p N-15.
95. Letter, Colonel Cobb, 13 April 1992.
96. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
97. Headquarters, 800th MP Brigade, Operation Desert Storm Draft, 14 May 1992.
98. General Conlon, Desert Storm Lessons Learned, undated.
99. Colonel Cobb subsequently directed other officers of his section to receive the 800th Brigade briefing.
100. Letter, Colonel Cobb, 13 April 1992.
101. General Conlon, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
102. Colonel Novak, EPW Conference, 19 October 1991.
103. 800th After Action Report, Annex L.

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