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UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE IN OPERATION DESERT STORM


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Strategic Intelligence Support: Military Intelligence Detachments for the Defense Intelligence Agency

Adding Value to the Total Force and to the Nation

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FOREWORD

This is one in a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in winning the war in the Persian Gulf. Countless reports have been written and numerous books published about the coalition victory. None have appeared, however, that focus on the valuable contributions of Army Reserve soldiers and civilians to the favorable outcome of the conflict. This monograph and others in the series fill that void.

This report highlights the role of Army Reservists who serve in Strategic Military Intelligence Detachments to support the nation's intelligence activities. There are 59 such detachments in the Army Reserve and four of them were activated to support the Defense Intelligence Agency during Operation Desert Storm. The report provides insight into the utilization of these unique Army Reserve assets when needed.

Other monographs will be issued to describe the roles of a variety of Army Reserve units and individual soldiers. They will include military police, civil affairs specialists, engineers, trainers, communicators, medical personnel, transporters and infantrymen. These monographs, and the results of additional research on contributions of the Army Reserve to operations in the Persian Gulf, will be bound eventually in a single volume.

Your comments on this and future issuances are most welcome.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT:

**Military Intelligence Detachments
for the
Defense Intelligence Agency**

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The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other official documentation.

John R. Brinkerhoff, Consultant to the ANDRULIS Research Corporation, has been the principal author of this report. Ted Silva and John Seitz were editors and contributing authors.

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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT:

**Military Intelligence Detachments
for the
Defense Intelligence Agency**

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**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
in
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT:

**Military Intelligence Detachments
for the
Defense Intelligence Agency**

Three Army Reserve Military Intelligence Detachments (Strategic) were activated to augment the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for OPERATION DESERT STORM.¹ The 446th MID(S), Pittsburgh, PA, the 480th MID(S), Bloomington, IN, and the 484th MID(S), Boston, MA, were called to active duty on 27 December 1990. The call up was the first for these kinds of units since 1961 and throws new light on the utility and utilization of these unique detachments.

Military Intelligence Detachments (Strategic)

Strategic intelligence is required "for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels."² The job of the strategic military intelligence detachment is to produce high level intelligence to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified and Specified Commanders, and the Defense Intelligence Agency in understanding the global situation with respect to military capabilities. A strategic military intelligence detachment is authorized nine personnel--normally five officers and four enlisted personnel--each of whom is an intelligence specialist.

There are 59 strategic military intelligence detachments in the United States Army Reserve. Each detachment specializes in a particular region or a particular global function. The regional detachments may specialize further in a particular aspect of the region, such as transportation and logistics, or order of battle, or key targets. The job of the military intelligence detachment in peacetime is to acquire broad understanding and deep knowledge of a particular country, region, or function. The job of the military intelligence detachment in wartime is to apply that understanding and knowledge in developing intelligence information for the commanders to consider in making their operational plans. Twenty-three of the Army Reserve's MID(S)s are designated for DIA under the CAPSTONE plan. The remaining 36 detachments are designated for the Army Intelligence Command, the CINCs, and Army schools.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the primary producer of strategic intelligence within the Department of Defense. DIA is a Defense Agency manned by civilian employees and

military personnel from all of the Armed Forces. DIA recognizes that it needs to be able to expand rapidly in time of crisis, and it relies extensively on Reservists to provide that rapid expansion capability. About 1,300 Reservists are assigned to or designated for DIA. DIA regards these Reservists as an important part of its staff.

DIA Response to the Invasion of Kuwait

When Iraq threatened Kuwait late in July 1990, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) responded by establishing on 1 August 1990, a Task Force to focus on the Persian Gulf area. The Middle-East Africa Division of DIA's Research Directorate, headed by Mr. John Moore, provided the core of the task force, which grew from 115 to over 800 intelligence analysts. The mission of the task force was to provide strategic intelligence to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Central Command, and other members of the Coalition. In addition, the task force provided intelligence to Congress and the White House.

The task force was strengthened by calling to active duty Reservists who had specialized in the area and by shifting analysts from other work within DIA. Eight Naval Reservists reported for duty in September, and ten Air Force IMAs in November. Three detachments from the Army Reserve with thirty-one Reservists were requested by DIA in August 1990 but did not arrive until late December 1990. Additional Reservists of all Services also were brought on board, and by March 1991 the total Reserve Component augmentation to DIA was 233--of whom 193 had been called to active duty and 40 were on special tours of active duty.

The reason for the delay in the arrival of the Army Reserve strategic intelligence detachments is not clear. Certainly, John Moore recognized early that he needed the expertise of the 31 Reservists involved. They had area specific skills and long experience which were needed to back up the other members of the task force, many of whom were specialists in regions other than the Persian Gulf. DIA admits that there was an internal problem of not understanding how to request these units, and that time was lost in finding the proper channels. However, DIA made a request in September for the units which was disapproved by the Army. A second attempt by DIA in October also was disapproved by the Army. The basis for the disapproval was that the Army was giving priority to the requests of the Theater Commander, and since these detachments were neither on the CINC's list nor slated for movement to the Persian Gulf, they were simply too low in priority to be given any attention. The Director of DIA made a third appeal directly to the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, and this time the request was approved. The units were called up on 27 December 1990, and they started to work on 3 January 1991. They were inactivated on 30 April 1991 after serving 125 days on active duty.

The delay in making the three Army Reserve intelligence units available hurt the ability of DIA to provide strategic intelligence for OPERATION DESERT STORM in the early months

of the crisis. These units had worked for many years in close collaboration with DIA and had developed special knowledge which would have been highly useful in the early stages.

Utilization of the Detachments

Once approved, the call up proceeded according to plan. The three detachments were ordered from home stations to their mobilization station, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, where they were processed and provided administrative support. The three detachment commanders agree that the support provided by Fort Belvoir was good. They said the attitudes of senior leadership toward their detachments was positive, They did encounter some "bad attitudes" on the part of some of the civilian employees at Fort Belvoir who had picked up the habit of treating Reservists as second-class citizens. The commanders also had difficulty in obtaining orders assigning them to their duty stations. The Military District of Washington did not want the detachments assigned to them because that would show an increase in MDW strength.

Each detachment was utilized differently. One was broken up into smaller teams. Another was used as a unit. The third was employed as the basis for a larger team. In each case DIA made the decision on how best to utilize the personnel of the detachments.

The 446th MID(S)

The 446th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic) specializes in the military capabilities of the nations in the Middle East region. The mission of the unit is to conduct strategic intelligence research and analysis in support of DIA's Middle East Capabilities Branch and produce finished intelligence to help meet the Branch's needs. This is what the unit does in peacetime, and this is what the unit did in wartime. The personnel of the 446th MID(S) were utilized in their specialties on various teams. Five members worked on ground order of battle; one was involved in the search for SCUD launchers; two were focusing on the confrontation states; and two were involved in compiling biographical data on Iraqi leaders. The commander of the detachment was the deputy to the Task Force leader. The unit personnel worked both at the Pentagon and at the Defense Intelligence Analyses Center (DIAC) as necessary to do their jobs. The unit personnel were completely integrated with the civilians and Active military personnel of DIA. They worked effectively and well! As one co-worker said in a kind of a left-handed compliment: "We even forgot you were Reservists."

The 480th MID(S)

The 480th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic) specializes in the transportation and logistics characteristics of the Middle East Region. The unit had been supporting DIA for

several decades and was thoroughly familiar with the terrain, transportation network, and other features of the Middle East. The unit has the ability to conduct research in five foreign languages: Arabic; French; German; Spanish; and Afrikaans. The unit was used to review and update the intelligence data base on characteristics of the area of operations. In one instance, the DIA Task Force wanted to update a ten-year old assessment of the highway network of one of the nations in the theater. This proved to be relatively easy for the 480th MID(S), since the unit had performed the original study to be updated. The 480th MID(S) operated as a unit during their active duty period and brought their collective experience to bear on their assignment.

The 484th MID(S)

The 484th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic) specializes in counterterrorism. It is the most qualified MID(S) in the force structure with this area of expertise. After reporting for duty on 3 January 1991, the unit performed its CAPSTONE mission in support of the Terrorism Analysis Branch of DIA. Unit members staffed the Threat Analysis Section and the National Military Intelligence Center Terrorism Desk on a 24 hour per day basis seven days a week from January to April. The unit members worked 12 hour rotating shifts during this period. The duties included responding to threats of terrorism in the theater and worldwide, sending warning of possible terrorist attacks, compiling Iraqi EPW data, and compiling evidence of violations by Iraq of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The team members published terrorism preventive action summaries and the Daily Intelligence Terrorism Summary. They also provided terrorism data for the Defense Intelligence Threat Data System and presented briefings on terrorism as required.

The 484th MID(S) was able to do this very specialized work right after reporting for duty because it had done the same work in training status for many years. No additional training of the unit members was necessary. Often they knew more than Active Component co-workers who had not enjoyed the benefit of their long, focused experience. The unit had even developed an artificial intelligence application for the terrorism data base which they brought with them and which was adopted subsequently by DIA.

Utility of the Detachments

DIA civilians and Active Component military personnel who worked with these three detachments during OPERATION DESERT STORM agree that they did a good job. These Reservists provided detailed knowledge and long experience—qualities that DIA prizes highly. One reason they were able to be of such great assistance is because the members of these detachments are so highly qualified both individually and as a group.

Qualifications of Unit Members

One of the most important characteristics of these three detachments is the extraordinary qualifications of the unit members, as shown in the figures below.

Figure 1.

Educational Qualifications of Unit Members

	Strength	Average Years	Highest Degree		
			Bachelors	Masters	Doctors
446th	11	16	5	4	-
480th	10	17.5	4	3	3
484th	10	16.7	2	5	1

Figure 2.

Years of Service in the Detachments

	Average	Median	Shortest	Longest
446th	5.8	3	1	23
480th	9.3	6	1	24
484th	6.4	6	2	12

Figure 3.

Civilian Occupations of Unit Members

Architect	Electronics Maintenance	Personnel Advisor
Attorney (2)	Helicopter Pilot	Police Officer
Business Consultant	High School Teacher (3)	Sales Executive
Carpenter	Housewife (2)	School Counselor (2)
Cement Worker	Investigator	Security Consultant
Computer Sales	Medical Secretary	Student (2)
Corporate Executive	Metallurgist	Univ Professor (2)
Director, State Emergency Medical Services		Univ Administrator (2)

These people are a real bargain for the Army. At the cost of their Reserve training pay, the Army gets a group of highly educated people from a variety of civilian pursuits. These people stay in their units for a long period of time--something that could not happen in the Active Army. They attain long-term experience in their military intelligence duties and can bring that experience to bear quickly when needed. The Army could not afford to create and maintain this kind of unit in the Active Component.

The Outlook for the Detachments

Despite their outstanding performance during OPERATION DESERT STORM, the outlook for continuation of the MID(S) in the Army Reserve is not good. The detachments have little going for them. They are small. They lack high visibility support in the Army Staff. They are manned with expensive senior officers and NCOs. They provide no short-term products in peacetime. They do their work in secrecy, and as a consequence they have little public recognition. There are only about 600 Reservists involved in the entire program, and eliminating these few in a reduction of over a hundred thousand could pass unnoticed.

One specific criticism of the program is that having a colonel as commander of a nine person detachment is unwarranted. A brigade of several thousand soldiers is also commanded by a colonel. However, in this instance the colonel is paid for his experience and skills rather than his managerial ability. He functions as the chief expert among a group of experts. There is also the question of having sufficient rank to work effectively when called to active duty. The

experience of OPERATION DESERT STORM supported having a colonel in command. The detachment commanders said that being colonels allowed them to act as deputies and team leaders on the DIA task force more effectively than if they were of a lesser grade. Grade is relative, and they needed to be able to talk as peers with the GS-15s, Senior Executives, and active component colonels with comparable experience and grade. Both DIA and the detachment commanders believe that it takes the grade of colonel to assure that the detachment commanders would be able to fulfill their missions in peace and war.

Unless DIA and other customers for these strategic intelligence detachments speak clearly and loudly on their behalf, it is possible that the MID(S) will disappear from the Army Reserve.

The Value of the Detachments

Before the program is reduced or eliminated, it is useful to consider the value of having these detachments in the Army Reserve as confirmed by the experience of OPERATION DESERT STORM.

One of the advantages of these detachments is that they are allowed to concentrate on accumulating knowledge--banking it for the day it will be needed. Organizations tend to value knowledge only in crises. During peacetime the mere accumulation of knowledge often is given low priority, and managerial emphasis is on output. Most large organizations, particularly government agencies, are focus on the daily work, and the longer range work is left for later. "Answering the mail" is the governmental equivalent to focusing on short-term profits in the private sector. The full-time personnel are so busy answering the mail that they have little time for long-term projections. Reservists, on the other hand, have time to acquire knowledge and even put it to good use in performing research projects during their training. The cost of operating these detachments is remarkably low compared to the cost of completing their research projects with full-time staff or by using research contracts with academic or consulting organizations.

Another advantage of the detachments is that unit members are required to train frequently and regularly. If the detachments were eliminated and the Reservists assigned directly to DIA as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) they would receive less training. The MID(S) are in Training Category A, which means that they are required to conduct 48 drills (four-hour training sessions) annually and to receive 14 days of annual training as a unit. This establishes a requirement for 38 days of training each year. Army IMAs normally receive only the annual training of 14 days. So under current policies unit members get 24 additional training days each year.³ This is a considerable increase. If the Army funded 48 drills for these personnel as IMAs, they would be able to train as much as they do as unit members--and at the same cost.

There is an advantage of having Reservists in a unit--even a small detachment--as opposed to having them in individual status. The commanders of these detachments and their supervisor in DIA agree that the unit configuration had added value even when training time is equal. IMAs are assigned to an Active Component unit and are supposed to fit in with the full-time personnel of that unit. In peacetime, however, the full-time personnel often consider IMAs to be more of a burden than an asset. Thus, IMAs often do not receive the kind of training they need for mobilization. When Reservists are members of a unit, however, they work together as a team. The unit commander is responsible for coordinating with the host unit to fulfill training requirements and accomplish projects. There are also the intangible advantages gained from close personal relationships among members of a small team and the extra intellectual growth resulting from those relationships. The Reservists believe that the detachment configuration pays off in better training and morale for them.

Another advantage is continuity of commanders. One colonel had been in command for six years, primarily because another qualified colonel could not be found. Such continuity in this kind of job is a big advantage. The commanders believed that it would take a new commander without considerable experience in an MID(S) over a year to be effective. They suggested that commanders should be promoted from within the detachments. There was also the general perception that changing detachment commanders just to comply with personnel management policies might not be the best policy for these kinds of specialized detachments.

The value of these three detachments when they finally were called upon to help DIA was greater than their numbers would indicate. They brought years of experience and expert knowledge to bear on the problem. They contributed from their first day, and they won the acclaim of their fellow workers as full-fledged members of the DIA Task Force. Perhaps this positive experience will help to save the program.

The members of these units appear to be driven by a desire to contribute, which is reinforced by group dynamics. All have full-time jobs, but all are eager to help DIA. They ask for little other than their training pay--mostly to be appreciated and treated as members of the team. This is a bargain for the Army, DIA, and the Nation. It would be a loss if they were to be eliminated or cut back drastically as an economy move.

Note on Sources

The information in this article was obtained from a briefing and discussion for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, presented by Mr John Moore, DIA, and the three detachment commanders on 22 April 1991. Additional information was obtained from Colonel Bernard F. Wilkes, Jr, CO, 484th MID(S); Colonel Gary C. Steinhardt, CO, 480th MID(S), and Colonel David L. Dragics, CO, 446th MID(S). DIA reviewed a draft manuscript and made numerous helpful comments which improved the accuracy of the paper.

End-Notes

1. In this paper the term OPERATION DESERT STORM is used to mean both OPERATION DESERT SHIELD--the buildup phase--and OPERATION DESERT STORM--the combat phase. The abbreviation for the Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic) is MID(S).
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1, 1 June 1987, P. 349.
3. DOD policy is that IMAs, as members of the Selected Reserve, may be required to attend drills in addition to annual training.

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