

AD-A276 903




①



INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL
STRATEGIC STUDIES

IN SEARCH OF A POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

GREGORY D. FOSTER

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

94-08247



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

McNair Paper 27

***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.***

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY

August 4, 1822

IN SEARCH OF A POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

GREGORY D. FOSTER

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

McNair Paper 27
February 1994

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Washington, DC

94 3 11 199

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

- ☐ *President:* Lieutenant General Paul G. Cerjan
☐ *Vice President:* Ambassador Howard K. Walker

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

- ☐ *Acting Director:* Stuart E. Johnson

Publications Directorate ☐ Fort Lesley J. McNair

- ☐ Washington, D.C. 20319-6000 ☐ Phone: (202) 475-1913 ☐ Fax: (202) 475-1012
☐ *Director:* Frederick T. Kiley ☐ *Deputy Director:* Lieutenant Colonel Barry McQueen
☐ *Chief, Publications Branch:* George C. Maerz ☐ *Editor:* Mary A. Sommerville
☐ *Secretary:* Laura Hall ☐ *Circulation Manager:* Myrna Morgan

-
- ☐ *Editing:* Mary Sommerville ☐ *Cover Design:* Barry McQueen
-

Gregory D. Foster is J. Carlton Ward Distinguished Professor and Director of Research at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C. A graduate of West Point, he holds a doctorate from the George Washington University. His activities as Ward Chairholder are underwritten by the Association of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

From time to time, INSS publishes short papers to provoke thought and inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era. These monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Readers are invited to submit (nonreturnable) manuscripts for consideration for publication. Please submit them in WordPerfect on 3.5 inch diskettes with one printout.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. A courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISSN 1071-7552

Contents

Doing Hard Time in Psychic Prison	1
Stumbling Blind into the Future	2
Bowing to the Organizational Imperative	5
Old War Thinking—Cold War Organization	9
Changed Strategic Environment— Unchanged Security Structure	14
A General Failure of Performance	18
The Imperatives for Reform	24
The Elements of a Revamped Structure	29
Afterword: Bowing to Futility	34

Notes

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Mail and/or	
Special	
Dist	
A-1	

35

In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure

GREGORY D. FOSTER

Doing Hard Time in Psychic Prison

In his immensely insightful book, *Images of Organization*, Gareth Morgan characterizes organizations as "psychic prisons" that may trap their members in favored—frequently illusionary—ways of thinking. The metaphor of the psychic prison is rooted in Plato's famous allegory of the cave, where Socrates addresses the relations among appearance, reality, and knowledge. Organizations, suggests Morgan, are psychic phenomena that ultimately are created and sustained by conscious and unconscious processes. People within the organization and those who simply must deal with it actually can become imprisoned or confined by the images, ideas, thoughts, and actions to which these thought processes give rise.¹

The United States is trapped in the psychic prison of the Cold War. Change, bewildering in its scope, intensity, and rapidity, is going on all about us. Yet we are stuck in neutral, seemingly mired in a past that is no more, waiting for the "invisible hand" of evolutionary drift to guide us to some sort of social, political, and economic equilibrium

2 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

whose contours will be defined *for* us naturally rather than *by* us intentionally. A major culprit for such rearview-mirror thinking is the organizational framework—generally known as the "national security establishment"—set in place in 1947 and maintained essentially unchanged since.

Harvard historian Ernest May has made the telling observation that policymakers often are influenced by erroneous beliefs about what history teaches or portends. The key members of the Truman administration (who brought us the notion of the Cold War, as well as the policies and organizational arrangements that went with it) appear to have thought about the issues before them, suggests May, in a frame of reference made up in large part of narrowly selected and poorly analyzed historical analogies, parallels, and presumed trends.²

We can learn two important lessons from our Truman administration forebears. First, we tend invariably to "face" the future by looking backward. Looking back, of course, is not bad in and of itself; it is a seemingly sound way to impose understanding on the unknown. But it can become a self-deluding crutch for not thinking anew as circumstances change. Thus, a second lesson: thinking and organizing go hand in hand. At some point in time, we organize the way we think; thereafter, however, we tend to think the way we are organized. As inheritors of the Cold War mantle, we are thinking the way we have been conditioned to think by 45-year-old organizational structures. If we want to think differently—and we must if we are to cope with a world that is reconfiguring itself almost daily—then we must organize differently.

Stumbling Blind Into the Future

There are those among us who argue with great certitude that the United States, having emerged victorious from the

Cold War, is the world's lone remaining superpower. It seems a fatuous boast, not only because our claim to victory seems to be based primarily on our having outlasted an exhausted foe, but even more so because there is no reason to believe that we can command the automatic deference from the rest of the world that one would expect of a true superpower. If we aspire to superpower status, we must lead; to lead, we must demonstrate vision. In the words of Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus:

The absence or ineffectiveness of leadership implies the absence of vision, a dreamless society, and this will result, at best, in the maintenance of the status quo, or, at worst, in the disintegration of our society because of lack of purpose and cohesion.³

Vision requires three things: *foresight*, an ability to look into the future and see possibilities and relationships that others cannot or will not see; *courage*, the strength to stand by that vision in the face of censure and resistance; and above all, *initiative*—boldness even—the willingness to move forward when others shrink from the prospect, to position oneself ahead of events, to create a new reality.

The United States has demonstrated no such traits in the aftermath of the Cold War. We have instead assumed an inertial attitude toward the future that some would characterize as inactivism or reactivism. Inactivists are satisfied with the way things are and the way they are going. They assume a do-nothing posture. Reactivists prefer a previous state to the one they are in. They believe things are going from bad to worse. Hence they not only resist change; they try to unmake previous changes and return to where they once were.⁴

It is interesting to note, for example, that the future of which the Commission on the Year 2000 of the American

4 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

Academy of Arts and Sciences spoke, a quarter of a century ago, is now almost upon us. Among the many findings and speculations emanating from that body, one was especially noteworthy: that by the year 2000, if not long before, the foreign affairs organization of the federal executive branch would be substantially reconstructed. To date, of course, no such thing has come close to happening.⁵

And in 1975, the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (The Murphy Commission) submitted its thorough and perceptive final report to the President. The Commission's recommendations for reorganization (very few of which ever were implemented) were based on a view of the future that offers a strong taste of déjà vu today:

The most pervasive characteristic of international affairs in the next decades will be the growing interaction and tightening interdependence among the nations of the world. Almost certainly, economic issues will loom larger on the foreign policy agendas of the future Technological and environmental issues will continue to grow in importance The frequency and intimacy of contact between societies will also increase Military power alone cannot provide security. A growing number of conflicts of national interest will take economic form Important questions will more often be debated or resolved in multilateral as well as bilateral forums. Foreign policy and domestic policy merge The organizational implications of this mingling are numerous and important. They include changes in the number of executive departments involved in foreign policy; the necessity for clearer Presidential oversight and direction; a substantial expansion in the role of Congress in foreign policy; the need for better coordination between the executive and congressional branches; and a new role for public opinion.⁶

One of the things on which leading futurists most agree is that, although almost all human endeavors, institutions,

and systems are becoming more complex, current institutional structures, such as government, are not up to the task of managing this complexity. Most such structures are out of date, bureaucratic, and sluggish, possess short timeframes and attention spans, and lack a coherent worldview.⁷

Sounding this same theme in their popular book, *Reinventing Government*, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler contend that traditional bureaucracies increasingly are failing to cope with the dizzying change that surrounds us. Bureaucratic governments focus on supplying services to combat problems rather than anticipating and preventing problems. They develop tunnel vision. They wait until a problem becomes a crisis and then offer new services to those affected. Our fundamental problem today, therefore, is not too much or too little government. It is that we have the wrong kind of government. We need better government—or, more precisely, better governance. We need an American *perestroika*—a restructuring.⁸

Bowing to the Organizational Imperative

Organization matters because government matters. Government is what enables humans to operate as a group, to make communal decisions. It is, said R. M. MacIver, the administrative organ of the state, the "organization of men under authority."⁹

Government is a collective enterprise operating through organizations. As some perceptive observers have noted, we live in an organizational society in which organizations are pervasive social and cultural forces that dominate our lives and have critical normative consequences for society.¹⁰

In the narrowest sense, organization is important for three reasons: it creates capabilities; it vests and weights

6 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

certain interests and perspectives; and it helps assure the legitimacy of decisions.¹¹ In a broader sense, though, the way we organize does three other things that are especially important in the context of the national security establishment:

- Organization influences thought processes by determining who deals how with what issues. Assigning responsibility for a particular issue is a way of prescribing who is and is not permitted to even address it. Further dividing the issue into component parts for managerial purposes is equivalent to defining its nature and specifying how it is expected to be handled.
- A formal organizational structure institutionalizes and gives permanence to a pattern of relationships and a mix of actors that is intended to be more or less immune to whims of personality or changes in participants.
- The composition and placement of an organization project an image to outsiders of one's worldview. Organizational schemes, in other words, have symbolic content that, intentionally or not, may influence how others see us.

The national security establishment is not simply an organization—although organizational principles clearly apply to its structure and functioning. It is, rather, a *system*—a network of interrelated organizations that presumably share a common purpose. And it is a vital *institution* that both reflects and shapes the dominant values of American society.

The systems perspective is useful in several respects. First, the national security establishment does not exist in isolation. It contains constituent organizations and activities and is itself part of a hierarchy of higher-order enterprises

(figure 1). As defined here, the *national security establishment* consists of all the organizations of the federal government—in both the Executive Branch and Congress—charged with formulating, executing, and overseeing national security policies and programs. The *national security community* includes the national security establishment and those other elements of society (the media, industry, interest groups, think tanks and universities, state governments, and the informed public) that affect, are affected by, and are interested in the establishment's workings. The *international security community* encompasses the world's individual national security communities, as well as the entire contingent of supranational or transnational security organizations and activities (including, most notably, the United Nations and its supporting arms).¹²

Second, ideally the cooperative interaction of the national security establishment's constituent elements will have a synergistic effect that exceeds and is qualitatively superior to the mere accumulation of their individual contributions operating in parallel.

Third, the holistic notion that everything is related to everything else provides a robust conceptual underpinning for broadening the notion of national security to encompass a fuller range of concerns than defense, foreign policy, and intelligence—the major organizational elements embodied in the 1947 National Security Act.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, open social systems interact with their governing environments. This suggests that the structure of the national security

8 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE




FIGURE 1: THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

establishment must be capable of reconfiguring itself, not simply to adapt to its internal and external surroundings but, no less, to influence the direction and shape of those surroundings.

There is a crucial distinction to be made between the rational, means-oriented, efficiency-guided process of the *organization* and the value-laden, adaptive, responsive process of the *institution*. As Robert Bellah and associates have noted, institutions mediate the relations between self and world. Institutions are patterns of normative, or moral, expectations enforced by both positive and negative social

sanctions. We create institutions, but they also create us: they educate us and form us, especially through the socially enacted metaphors that provide us our normative interpretations of situations and actions. Institutions today, say Bellah et al., have become corrupt because means have been wrongly turned into ends. The institutions set up to fight the Cold War, for example, have partially destroyed the freedom they supposedly were set up to defend. The vast military and intelligence apparatus created to preserve freedom and dignity instead may have smothered the rest of society and sown the seeds of paranoia among its citizens. The connection between government and an enlightened public has been broken, thereby engendering the need to renew a serious public conversation and to strengthen the institutions that nurture and extend it.¹³ The national security establishment is the institutional embodiment of the Cold War ethos. If that ethos is to change, in an era to which it no longer is relevant, the institution must change.

Old War Thinking—Cold War Organization

The thinking that spawned America's response to the Cold War and produced the 1947 National Security Act was grounded firmly in World War II, the events that precipitated that experience, and the desire to prevent its recurrence in the form of World War III.

President Truman's advisors, instinctively anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, viewed the Soviet Union as a powerful, ambitious, ruthless, deceitful foe. Relying on the experience of the 1930s interwar years as their frame of reference, they were convinced that appeasement of totalitarian states during that period had encouraged Axis aggression. They therefore adopted the position that Communist Russia represented an ominous threat the

10 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

United States had to resist—by resort to (total) war if necessary.¹⁴

French social philosopher Raymond Aron, a devoted Cold Warrior, reflected the tenor of the times in describing the Cold War as a "pretended peace" waged by limited-war means: propaganda, espionage and sabotage, agitation and mass movements, and civil war. An outgrowth of the Soviet design for world conquest, the Cold War represented more a preparation than a substitute for total war—the threat of which by the West seemed the only convincing way to prevent Communist military expansion.¹⁵

Such ideas pervaded post-World War II Washington policy circles and magnified the seriousness of the lessons we drew from the war. The 1947 Senate Armed Services Committee report on the proposed National Security Act observed that World War II, however successful in the main, had disclosed a number of fundamental weaknesses in the country's security apparatus that needed to be remedied: a slow and costly mobilization, limited intelligence on the designs and capacities of our enemies, an incomplete integration of political purpose and military objective, and the prodigal use of resources. The counterpart report of the House of Representatives, citing the anticipated totality and rapidity of modern war, called for the creation of a new security structure that would (a) help ensure the coordination of our domestic, foreign, and military policies on an informed basis; (b) facilitate the integration of our military services and their unified strategic direction and command; (c) assist in taking full advantage of our resources of personnel, materials, scientific research, and development; (d) preserve the integrity and more fully exploit the capabilities of all components of ground, sea, and air forces; and (e) provide for continued civilian direction and control.¹⁶

The resultant National Security Act sought

to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.¹⁷

The Act established eight organizational entities of enduring importance: the National Security Council (NSC); the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National Security Resources Board (NSRB); the National Military Establishment (Department of Defense), headed by a Secretary of Defense; the Department of the Air Force, headed by a Secretary of the Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); the Joint Staff; and the unified (multi-service) and specified (single-service) combatant commands (or at least the authority to create them).

The NSC originally was composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the three military services, the Chairman of the NSRB, and other specified officers designated by the President with Senate consent. Its function was "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."

12 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

The CIA was created "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security." Its duties included advising and making recommendations to the NSC on intelligence activities; correlating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence; and performing "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The Act gave special authority for statutory secrecy to the Director of Central Intelligence by making him responsible "for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."¹⁸

The NSRB was responsible for advising the President "concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization." This basically meant peacetime planning for wartime production, procurement, distribution, and transportation of all national resources (including stockpiling of strategic and critical materials, economic stabilization, emergency facilities relocation, and the like).

The Secretary of Defense, as the "principal assistant to the President in all matters related to the national security," was given authority over the military departments, the Joint Chiefs, and all military forces. The JCS, consisting of the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and "the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one," were coequal principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense. They were charged with, among other things, preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the military forces. The Joint Staff, limited in size to 100 officers (more or less equally apportioned among the three services), supported the corporate JCS.

What the National Security Act produced was an organizational engine to keep the country running in a permanent state of limited mobilization. Several features of this original architecture would have enduring significance. First, in giving new currency to the term "national security," the Act thereby implied a more comprehensive orientation—a more internationalist posture even—toward the outside world than the traditional notion of "national defense" seemed to suggest. Most policy practitioners of the time, though, crudely conflated the two concepts. The result was a security posture dominated by military concerns and priorities.¹⁹

Second, the Act called for the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies. The implied emphasis, though, at least with regard to the domestic component of this policy triumvirate, clearly was on ensuring that domestic resources and initiatives were capable of giving way to and supporting emergency military needs. What the relationship was to be between military policy and foreign policy was left unsaid (tacit obeisance perhaps to the eternal verities of Clausewitzian thought).

Third, without conscious acknowledgement, the Act laid the foundation for (or perhaps merely reaffirmed and codified) what, in the years since, has been our seeming preference for crisis management over crisis prevention. The Act assigned responsibility for all strategic planning to the JCS and related the notion of strategic direction purely to military forces.²⁰

Fourth, the Act institutionalized and legitimized secrecy and covert activities as central features of our national security posture. Among other things, this would have the ultimate effect of fostering a new order of technocratic elitism that removed many facets of our national security

14 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

posture from the realm of public accountability and discourse.

Fifth, despite numerous positive references to unification and integration, the Act actually sought to avoid the oneness most of us would associate with these terms. Instead, drawing a distinction with the more ambiguous concept of "merger," the Act legitimized and perpetuated bureaucratic separateness and autonomy, especially of the individual armed services.

Finally, the Act was, as much as anything, a paean to the principle of civilian control of the military. By placing civilian authorities in the chain of command, ensuring that the services were independent counterweights to one another, providing originally for no (and later for a weak) military chairman, and limiting the size of the Joint (general) Staff, the authors of the Act evinced the obsessive fear of concentrated military power they had inherited from their Constitutional forebears. Unity of action, though ostensibly an important underpinning of the Act, really became little more than window dressing.

Changed Strategic Environment—Unchanged Security Structure

The world has changed materially since 1947. Most of that change, despite having been underway for many years, has become widely credible (to both ideologues and the general public) only since 1989 and the beginning of the end of the Cold War.²¹ James Rosenau has portrayed the turbulent period of profound change we are now in as an era of "postinternational politics"—characterized by sweeping technological breakthroughs, authority crises, consensus breakdowns, revolutionary upheavals, generational conflicts,

and other forces that restructure the human landscape in which they erupt.²²

The obvious changes going on around us require little explication. What was, throughout the Cold War, a seemingly eternal bipolar struggle for survival—U.S.-USSR, West-East, democracy-totalitarianism, capitalism-communism—has become a multipolar competition involving many actors, employing sundry instruments of power, under widely varying conditions, for any of a variety of reasons. Gone are the regularity, simplicity, and discipline of the old order. The discrete, unambiguous, principally military and ideological threats we grew comfortably accustomed to have transmogrified into multiple, ambiguous, largely non-military and non-ideological "challenges" that are difficult to discern and even more difficult to "sell" to the American public.

Notwithstanding the claims concerning America's lone-superpower status and the murkiness of the supporting evidence, it is quite logical to conclude that the United States today is in a state of relative decline—economically, if not in other important respects as well. Military power has shown itself to be increasingly less important—perhaps less useful—as an instrument of statecraft than non-military (especially economic) power. Similarly, unilateralism has shown itself to be increasingly less feasible—perhaps less desirable—than multilateralism. The United Nations has experienced a rebirth of expectations, if not necessarily of confidence and support, from the nations and states of the world long accustomed to answering to (and looking out for) only themselves. Globalization and interdependence in the economic and technological spheres have forged nascent forms of transnational integration that are struggling against contagious disintegrative tendencies to define the new order.²³

16 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

More important perhaps than these obvious changes are the cosmic changes that have taken shape in recent years. The first of these is the progressive fragmentation, or balkanization, of American society and the associated breakdown of the broad-based national consensus that originally galvanized the public in common cause during the first two and a half decades of the Cold War.²⁴

A second cosmic change is the seeming obsolescence of major war in the developed world. As John Mueller suggests: "The institution of war has gradually been rejected because of its perceived repulsiveness and futility. In the developed world few, if any, are able to discern either appeal or advantage in war any more; and they have come to value a goal—prosperity—that has long been regarded as incompatible with war."²⁵ One might even go so far as to suggest that we are witnessing a sort of grand evolution, in which we have passed from an extended historical period of *hot war*, where the actual use of military force was the central element of statecraft; to a highly compressed period of *cold war*, where the threat of force for coercive purposes assumed overriding importance; to the current period of *new war* (or perhaps even *no war*), where non-military instruments of power predominate.

Yet a third cosmic change is the possibility that, just as we have seen the end of the Cold War, of containment, and even of communism as a prospective universal ideology, so too may we have seen the end of realism. What this suggests, among other things, is a complete transformation in the prevailing worldview that has guided our thought and actions for most of the past half century: from the primacy of national interests as a guide to international behavior to the recognition of global (humanitarian, transnational) interests; from military prowess as the primary measure of national power to non-military measures of strength

(culture, knowledge, economic well-being); from the irrelevance or inappropriateness of morality as a guide to action, to the centrality of moral desiderata; and, most importantly, from the belief that there is an objective reality (the darkness of human nature, the inevitability of war, the necessity of meeting pervasive evil on its own terms) that exists independent of human perception, to the belief that we socially construct the reality we and others see, and that it is within our power as humans to redefine reality.²⁶

In contrast to the sweeping changes that have taken place in the governing international environment, the structure of the U.S. national security apparatus has changed relatively little over time. The composition of the NSC—which, for most of the period, has consisted of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, with the Director of the CIA and the Chairman of the JCS as statutory advisors—has remained more or less constant. It has been left to presidential prerogative (or whim) to alter that composition, and to determine whether and how to use the NSC.²⁷

The President's national security advisor, though never actually provided for in law, has risen to independent prominence and grown in power and stature, even where individual Presidents have chosen to suppress the profile of the position.²⁸ The Secretary of Defense, by retaining Cabinet status and a seat on the NSC and by acquiring a greatly enlarged staff, has been strengthened (presumably to ensure dominance over both the JCS and the individual armed services). The Chairman of the JCS, established in 1949, long considered technically first among the legally equal joint chiefs, and now principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense, as well as sole owner and operator of the Joint Staff, has also acquired added strength. The Joint Staff has increased in

18 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

size from its original 100 to (officially) 1,627. The unified and specified commanders in chief ostensibly have gained strength at the expense of the services, though in reality the services continue to exert dominant influence, largely through their control of budgets, resources, force planning, and personnel management.²⁹

Perhaps the biggest change is the one least acknowledged (or even recognized): the removal of the NSRB (or its successor agencies) from the NSC. The closest approximation of the NSRB today—that is, an activity with a concentrated, centralized focus on national resource management, civil emergency management, and mobilization—is the Federal Emergency Management Agency, a demonstrably minor-league organization which lacks presidential imprimatur, prestige, and command of resources.³⁰

A General Failure of Performance

Ideally, the adequacy or appropriateness of organizational structure should be determined by organizational or system performance. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to draw a conclusive link between the effectiveness of the established national security structure and overall national performance. Was our failure to foresee the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism, for example, due to faulty organizational arrangements? Conversely, did our Cold War victory have much, if anything, to do with organization?³¹

To the extent that we can draw a link between organization and performance at the national level, it was the Iran-Contra fiasco that provided probably the most visible, telling, and disturbing measure of that linkage. Ironically, the Tower Commission that President Reagan

appointed to "investigate" the affair, though citing "a flawed [decisionmaking] process," exonerated the institution itself—thereby ignoring the insidious effect the system had had on the thinking and behavior of its operators. A more pointed assessment came from the Joint Congressional committee that investigated Iran-Contra:

The common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law. A small group of senior officials believed that they alone knew what was right. They viewed knowledge of their actions by others in the Government as a threat to their objectives The Administration's departure from democratic processes created the conditions for policy failure, and led to contradictions which undermined the credibility of the United States.³²

In the final analysis, process measures provide the best, if not the only, basis for judging overall system performance. The many process-related symptoms we see and hear so much about give strong evidence that the national security system has been and is in ill health.³³

There is, first, the endemic, perpetual conflict between the Executive Branch and Congress. In part this reflects the design (some would say the wisdom) of the Constitutional framers, who sought to enshrine separated or shared powers and associated checks and balances in our governmental structure—especially in matters of war and peace. In part, though, it also reflects other factors—not least of which is the growth and diffusion of the imperial presidency and Congress's related efforts to keep pace, to maintain sufficient parity to perform its oversight functions.³⁴

Then there are the many sources and forms of enduring conflict within the Executive Branch itself: between the Departments of State and Defense, between either or both of them and the President's national security advisor,

20 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, between the civilian and military staffs in each service, and, of course, between the military services. Although the framers of the Constitution sought to divide and balance power between the branches, they also saw the need for a strong executive. In Hamilton's famous words from *Federalist* 70, "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government." The first ingredient of such energy, he argued, was *unity*. What we have today, rather than the unity of an energetic executive, is a vast plurality of individuals, organizations, and activities.³⁵

Hedrick Smith has perceptively characterized the conduct of U.S. foreign policy (or national security affairs) as "bureaucratic tribal warfare—institutional conflict fired by the pride, interests, loyalties, and jealousies of large bureaucratic clans, protecting their policy turf and using guile as well as argument to prevail in the battle over policy." He describes the recurring clashes that take place between Secretaries of State and Defense as collisions at the tips of bureaucratic icebergs that echo long, bitter feuds within previous administrations and serve as reminders of the institutional competition built into the structure of the Executive Branch.³⁶

The fact that open conflict between the President's national security advisor and the Secretaries of State and Defense was generally muted during the Bush and Reagan administrations (albeit for different reasons) did not hide the underlying tension that is embedded in this relationship. Security advisors owe sole allegiance to, meet daily with, occupy the same vantage point as, and speak for the President. Cabinet secretaries are line managers in the chain of command who outrank presidential staff advisors. But they rarely enjoy unlimited access to the President, and

they cannot help but represent the frequently self-serving bureaucracies they head. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, has observed: "Over time the secretary of state or the secretary of defense in every recent administration has become a propagator of his own department's parochial perspective, even to the detriment of the broader presidential vision."³⁷ The attendant tension that is bound to result, when it does break into open conflict, can be both strategically and politically debilitating.

Perhaps the most commonly recognized and frequently reported source of conflict within the Executive Branch is the historical rivalry that has always characterized the relationship of the individual armed services to one another. *New York Times* columnist Richard Halloran has noted that the defense establishment, far from being a unified, cohesive institution dedicated to the national security, is a structure in fundamental disarray:

It is a confederation of feudal domains, each struggling to preserve and to enlarge itself. The fiefs within the confederation do not work together for the common good but struggle to advance their own causes. They battle each other over concepts, responsibilities, weaponry, and, most of all, money. Those intense conflicts are not debates over how best to defend the nation but deadly feuds that sap military strength.³⁸

No less insidious than the fighting that regularly goes on among the services is their increasing tendency to collude when convenient to protect their collective interests from outside attack. Huntington has labeled the dual evils of such competition-cum-collusion "servicism," to describe the prevailing condition in which power resides with the services rather than with a stronger military institution. It is servicism, he contends, and not the more commonly

22 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

feared militarism, that today constitutes "the central malady of the American military establishment."³⁹

Beyond these deep-seated organizational conflicts, though, there are several other notable features built into the national security structure that are of enduring problematical import. It is a structure that has focused on international affairs to the virtual exclusion of domestic considerations—this, despite the fact that the NSC, at least, was designed specifically to provide for the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies. It is a structure dominated by military interests—and, to only a slightly lesser extent, by diplomatic and intelligence interests—while largely ignoring other important dimensions of security, such as economics, the environment, criminal justice, and the like. And it is a structure that has magnified and perpetuated our natural penchant for unfettered unilateral action abroad in lieu of cooperative multilateral enterprises.

Such features, problematical in their own right, nonetheless are merely symptomatic of deeper ills that must be treated if the system is to be brought back to health. In the simplest sense, much of what we see in the functioning of the system is attributable to plain old bureaucratic politics: factionalism and partisanship, parochialism and inertia, self-interested bargaining and compromise, suboptimization and incrementalism. It is no accident that the burgeoning literature on bureaucratic politics is based in large part on observations of the national security establishment.⁴⁰

At a deeper level, the field of national security affairs has long been the arcane preserve of a self-selected, self-protecting group of technocratic elitists who themselves have been the source of many of the system's most fundamental problems. For one thing, they have inbred and

produced the sort of lock-step thinking, fear and loathing of outsiders, and Messianic tendencies we now know as "groupthink." For another thing, their elitism has grown out of and further fed a thirst for power, a disdain for the ignorant mass public, and a belief in the efficacy of the Mushroom Principle ("Keep 'em in the dark, and feed 'em manure").⁴¹

Most importantly, though, this elitist pretense has thrived on and legitimized the secrecy that is the most lasting, visible, and destructive feature of the Cold War ethos. Justified on grounds (a) that national security is more important than the democratic principle of popular consent and (b) that our survival could be endangered by exposing privileged information to a public that has neither the need nor the right to know, obsessive secrecy has had the unintended effects of disguising government abuse, obscuring accountability, and engendering public distrust, fear, alienation, and apathy. Garry Wills has characterized the modern presidency as *nyctitropic*, a reflection of its tendency to turn toward the darkness, to prefer covert action, to replace accountability with deniability:

In the *nyctitropic* presidency, secrecy is a source of power as well as its symbol. The wartime justification of secrecy used to run this way: The citizens must be kept in the dark, as a necessary evil, in order to keep the enemy from knowing what one's country is doing and taking action on the basis of that knowledge. The modern presidency takes the old means and makes it the end: The citizens are kept in the dark about what the enemy already knows, lest the citizens take action to stop their own government from doing things they disapprove of.⁴²

Ultimately, organizational cultures—the persistent, patterned ways of thinking that distinguish organizations from one another—represent the most fundamental source

24 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

of problems within the national security establishment. The foreign service has its own distinctive identity—ranging from its elitist tendencies and preference for negotiation and diplomacy, to its extreme caution and resistance to change—as do the individual armed services and the member organizations of the intelligence community. Moreover, each culture has its own identifiable subcultures, each subscribing to values and preferences that, while providing the social glue that gives members their sense of solidarity, also can—and usually do—distort their views of reality and impair their ability to accept and work cooperatively with others.⁴³

The Imperatives for Reform

Experience has shown that personalities and procedures ultimately determine whether and to what extent formal organizational structures have an enduring relevance or utility.⁴⁴ This realization tends, more often than not, to serve as a barrier to fundamental organizational reform (especially where legislation is required). But if we are to effect a fundamental transformation in how we deal with a rapidly changing world, if we are to eliminate the serious organizational shortcomings that have been built into our national security structure, we have little choice but to reorganize. Seven imperatives must guide any such reform effort.

IMPERATIVE NO. 1: RECONCEPTUALIZE SECURITY. It is inconceivable that we could establish a security apparatus appropriately geared to the modern age unless we first are willing to rethink our entire approach to security. "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged," said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. "It is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and

content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."⁴⁵ National security is a regrettably vague concept that has never been adequately defined nor formally codified (not even in the National Security Act).⁴⁶ We have equated it with defense and foreign policy and chosen to focus our security concerns almost exclusively on international affairs. Security is not, of course, just defense. Nor is it the special preserve of international relations. It is, rather, the cardinal measure of the seamlessness of domestic and foreign affairs. To be hungry or homeless, to be illiterate or impoverished, to be chronically ill or addicted to drugs, to be constantly afraid of being robbed or attacked, to be unable to afford basic medical care, to be exposed to environmental hazards, is to be no less insecure than from the fear, however remote, of external military attack. To counter such conditions—that is, to provide for health care or welfare or housing or education or crime prevention or drug treatment or economic development or environmental protection—is not to diminish or endanger security, but to enhance it. To address such needs is to acknowledge the importance of, and to contribute to, the national will or cohesion that is so critical to the effective exercise of power abroad.⁴⁷

IMPERATIVE NO. 2: SEEK FULL-SCALE INTEGRATION. Organizational structure is fundamentally about balancing the competing aims of dividing the labor or activities of the organization or system (differentiation) and achieving effective coordination of those activities (integration) in order to achieve unity of effort.⁴⁸ Differentiation (specialization) increases as the organization seeks to cope effectively with the heightened complexity and demands of the governing environment. The inevitable result—conflict—is what effective integration is designed to resolve. In the case of our extraordinarily differentiated

national security establishment, we must seek a fuller integration of civil-military, domestic-international, national-supranational, government-industry, air-land-sea, and routine-emergency structures and processes than now exists.

IMPERATIVE NO. 3: INSTITUTIONALIZE COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY. Strategically, it is absolutely essential that the United States speak with one voice at any given time and that it demonstrate a credible degree of consistency across changing presidential administrations. What we must seek, therefore, is a fully institutionalized framework with the following characteristics: (1) regular, formal consultation between central decisionmakers and the organizations responsible for conducting or developing policy; (2) standardized processes for the conduct of such consultations; (3) severely constrained opportunities for any of the players to set policy in the absence of regularized consultative procedures (à la Iran-Contra).⁴⁹

IMPERATIVE NO. 4: SEEK COOPERATIVE CHECKS AND BALANCES. While it is logical to expect that the system of shared powers and checks and balances the Founding Fathers created would produce natural tensions between the branches of government, it does not follow that what they envisioned was a bare-knuckled adversarialism that produces only zero-sum stalemate. We might rather think that what they intended was a dialectical process whose outcomes would be higher order syntheses of opposing points of view. In the words of Justice Robert H. Jackson: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that the practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."⁵⁰ If our overall goal is more effective governance, if our more

specific goal is enduring security, and if we subscribe to the wisdom of balancing sober deliberation against speed and efficiency, especially in matters of war and peace, then we would do well to seek mechanisms that will facilitate the cooperative pursuit of common interests.

IMPERATIVE NO. 5: REASSERT CIVILIAN SUPREMACY. Although we have made much of the principle of civilian control in our approach to organizing for national security, there is less "there" there (repetition intended) than meets the eye. We maintain a heavy layer of civilian bureaucracy in each of the armed services—in the form of the service secretary and his staff—but these politicians are rarely independent authorities, tending all too often to be "captured" by their service.⁵¹ In a similar vein, with minor exceptions (such as our representation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), most of our regional "authorities" around the world are the military heads of our combatant commands. Our civilian representatives of the President are predominantly individual country ambassadors with no regional orientation and no authority over U.S. military forces. Such anomalies must be redressed, especially if we are to present a convincing picture that we actually are a peace-loving country that values civilian supremacy.⁵²

IMPERATIVE NO. 6: PURSUE AN INFORMED PUBLIC CONSENSUS. Benjamin Barber has distinguished strong, participatory democracy from the thin, representative democracy we have. It is such thin democracy—made even thinner by those in power who would deny the public visibility of their actions—which destroys participation and produces the malaise elitists are so fond of decrying.⁵³ America's true strength rests with the vitality of our political system. What we must have at a minimum, if we are to avoid elite abuse and stupidity, is popular consent for

our government's actions, especially in the international sphere. What we must seek at a maximum, if we are to thrive and prosper, is not merely minimalist consent but active consensus—knowledgeable agreement from an involved citizenry exercising public judgment rather than public opinion.⁵⁴

IMPERATIVE NO. 7: PROJECT A NEW POST-COLD WAR IMAGE. As important as anything substantive reorganization might accomplish are the symbolic purposes it must serve. As Kenneth Boulding has observed, the symbolic image of one's own nation is tinged with ideas of security or insecurity depending on one's image of other nations. Country A perceives itself as insecure and hence increases its armaments or maintains an aggressive posture. It thereby seeks to improve its image of its own security; instead it makes B feel insecure, and so B increases its armaments. This makes A feel more insecure, so A again increases its armaments, thereby further making B feel insecure and increasing its armaments in a never-ending spiral.⁵⁵ Throughout the Cold War the United States has preached peace but prepared for war. We have preached multilateralism but practiced unilateralism. We have preached morality but practiced amorality (or even immorality). We have preached openness and democracy but practiced secrecy and authoritarianism. We have preached joint military operations but practiced the evils of servicism. Through organizational reform we can create a new reality about who we are, what we consider important, and how we view the world. We should seek to demonstrate that we truly subscribe to peace and democracy; that our strength and leadership are based on our ability to generate new ideas; that our process for formulating and executing strategy and policy is one of inclusion, cooperation, and comprehensiveness; and that we

have moved beyond the Cold War to shape a new world order.

The Elements of a Revamped Structure

The elements of a revamped security structure that supports the foregoing imperatives and provides the foundation for a new American Security Act of 1994 are shown in figure 2.

U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL. This body, replacing the NSC and having a broadened focus, would consist of six members: the President and Vice President; our ambassador to the United Nations, to reflect our heightened commitment to that body; and three new supra-Cabinet officials, all subject to Senate confirmation to demonstrate presidential commitment to bipartisanship and accountability—a Minister of International Affairs, a Minister of Domestic Affairs, and a Minister of National Resources. The Secretaries of State and Defense and a new Director of National Intelligence would report to the Minister of International Affairs. The Minister of Domestic Affairs would oversee the major domestic departments and agencies—Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice (including the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Coast Guard), and Veterans Affairs—as well as a Director of National Service and a Director of Public Outreach (who would oversee a nationwide network of Citizen Action Councils). The Minister of National Resources would oversee the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, and Treasury, a newly merged Department of Energy and Environmental Affairs, FEMA, the Office of Management and Budget, and a new Office of Science,




FIGURE 2: REVAMPED NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

Technology, and Industry (OSTI). OSTI would absorb the current Office of Science and Technology Policy and the (Defense) Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). ARPA would be responsible for guiding national efforts to integrate defense and commercial technologies and for managing a streamlined, consolidated federal laboratory system.⁵⁶

COUNCIL OF STRATEGIC ADVISORS. Consisting of 10-12 distinguished Americans from all walks of life, this permanent body would provide continuing advice and counsel to the President on matters of global strategy. It would absorb the Council of Economic Advisors and the National Economic Council, and it would receive analytical support from the George C. Marshall University.

PRESIDENTIAL OMBUDSMAN. Reporting to the White House Chief of Staff, this senior presidential aide would head a new Office of Policy Grievance, which would provide a formal mechanism outside the normal chain of command for identifying and mediating major policy disputes and bringing alternative policy views to the President's attention.

OFFICE OF PUBLIC ETHICS. An outgrowth and expansion of the current, narrowly focused Office of Government Ethics, this office would be responsible for ensuring consideration of ethical concerns and priorities in major policy issues (both international and domestic) and for government-wide ethics education.

ELIMINATION OF CIA. This would involve the abolition of the most visible, negative, unaccountable vestige of the Cold War, and the attendant consolidation and streamlining of national intelligence collection and analysis capabilities in the Departments of State and Defense. The Director of National Intelligence would assume authority for determining requirements and priorities

32 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

and for exercising community-wide product quality control.⁵⁷

ELEVATION OF SECOND-TIER AGENCIES.

Heretofore second-tier agencies whose functions are likely to assume added importance in the emerging world order—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, the Peace Corps, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation—would be accorded greater status and visibility.

REGIONAL SUPER-AMBASSADORS.

These regionally oriented diplomats would exercise civilian authority over both individual country ambassadors and military commanders in chief in each major region of the world (thereby demonstrating a more expansive regional orientation and asserting true civilian supremacy). Located either in the dominant country of the region or with the regional CINC (depending on circumstances), these super-ambassadors would lead U.S. efforts to establish standing security regimes, arms conferences, and peace conferences in each of the world's regions.⁵⁸

GEORGE C. MARSHALL UNIVERSITY. Currently the National Defense University (headed by a three-star military officer who reports to the JCS Chairman), this institution would be headed by a distinguished civilian chancellor who would report to the Minister of International Affairs. It would become the focal point for a dramatically expanded government-wide education and research program in strategic thinking, executive decisionmaking, and global security affairs. Its research arm would be merged with the defense and foreign affairs arm of the Congressional Research Service to provide common (presumably nonpartisan) analytical support to senior decisionmakers in both branches of government.⁵⁹

CITIZEN ACTION COUNCILS. Headquartered regionally throughout the United States, these permanent bodies would be headed by highly qualified presidential appointees who report to the White House Director of Public Outreach. The councils would seek to facilitate broad-based strategic consensus through ongoing public education and dialogue on major security issues.

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AFFAIRS. To ensure that Executive Branch integration is matched by commensurate measures in Congress, this committee would be designed to elevate, focus, and streamline congressional oversight and involvement in security affairs.

A JOINT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. In the interest of breaking the stranglehold of the armed services and achieving true integration of the Defense Department, four measures are in order: (1) completely abolishing the civilian service secretariats, thereby concentrating civilian control in the Secretary of Defense; (2) replacing the JCS with a Council of Military Commanders, headed by a Chief of Military Staff (now the JCS Chairman), and consisting of the commanders in chief of the unified combatant commands; (3) replacing the service chiefs of staff with land, naval, and air deputies to the Chief of Military Staff; and (4) consolidating all common administrative and support functions in joint commands or DoD agencies.

Afterword: Bowing to Futility

In a massive study of institutions in the United States and abroad, two scholars recently observed: "There is widespread agreement that major deficiencies in American governing capacities exist In particular need of strengthening are the capabilities of the American system to

34 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

tackle large problems in a coherent and coordinated fashion and to set priorities." They then go on to conclude, though, what to many of us is all too regrettably obvious: "The prospects for major institutional reforms in the United States are not promising."⁶⁰

Although a reasonably compelling case can be made that the Cold War security structure we have inherited is in need of fundamental overhaul, political feasibility will be the final determinant of whether, how much, and how soon reform takes place. Unfortunately, if we let political feasibility dictate the value of proposed change, then it is senseless to even entertain the proposals I have offered here with any seriousness. Each is sufficiently different from our current way of doing business as to invite only heated debate and intense resistance.

Thus, only strong, assertive presidential leadership, possessed of a coherent strategic vision for the future, can hope to have any chance of overcoming the deep-seated greed, inertia, and parochialism that inevitably will conspire to obstruct sweeping change. But it is only sweeping change that will carry us safely into the next century. Otherwise, the United States could end up being not a superpower, but a superpower emeritus.

NOTES

1. Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1986), 199-231.
2. Ernest May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 51.
3. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 228. Also see Edwin A. Locke et al., *The Essence of Leadership* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), esp. 49-61; and Burt Nanus, *Visionary Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992).
4. Management theorist Russell L. Ackoff, in his book *Redesigning the Future: A Systems Approach to Societal Problems* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 22-28, identifies four general attitudes toward planning: inactivism and reactivism (as defined here), preactivism, and interactivism. These latter two orientations would seem most conducive to truly visionary leadership. Preactivists are not willing to settle for things as they are or once were. They believe the future will be better than the present or the past, in direct proportion to how well they predict and prepare for that future. Interactivists similarly are unwilling to settle for the way things were, are, or are going. They try to prevent—not merely prepare for—threats, and to create—not merely exploit—opportunities.
5. William M. Capron, "The Executive Branch in the Year 2000," in *The Future of the United States Government: Toward the Year 2000*, ed. Harvey S. Perloff (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 305. The Commission, formed in 1965, first published many of its findings in the Summer 1967 issue of the journal *Daedalus*.
6. *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1975), 2.
7. See Joseph F. Coates and Jennifer Jarratt, *What Futurists Believe* (Bethesda, MD: World Future Society, 1989), esp. 19-20.

36 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

8. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992), 23-24.

9. See David Fromkin, *The Question of Government: An Inquiry Into the Breakdown of Modern Political Systems* (New York: Scribner's, 1975), 91; Osborne and Gaebler, xviii; and R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 6, 24. "When we speak of government without a qualifying adjective," says MacIver (17), we mean political government, the centralized organization that maintains a system of order over a community large or small."

10. The best known statement of this theme, of course, is Robert Presthus, *The Organizational Society* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962). Also see William G. Scott and David K. Hart, *Organizational America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979).

11. Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 20.

12. The terms "national security establishment" and "national security community" tend to be used interchangeably and imprecisely. When it is singled out, the national security establishment is commonly defined in terms only of the Executive Branch organs specified in the 1947 National Security Act. For example, see Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989), esp. 14-19, 61-64, 72-84; and John Allen Williams, "The National Security Establishment: Institutional Framework for Policymaking," in *National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (New York: Praeger, 1984), 323-343. However, because Congress and the President (or, as it has become, the presidency) share virtually all of the Constitutional powers involved in national security affairs, it seems incongruous that both branches would not be considered part of "the establishment." Moreover, the more robustly or comprehensively one defines national security, the more important it becomes to include other Executive Branch actors (e.g., the Departments of Treasury and Energy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency) in our considerations. The national security community, in turn, must include those numerous other

actors outside the federal government that play important roles in the conduct of national security affairs.

13. Robert N. Bellah et al., *The Good Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 10-16, 220-229, 287-293. Also see Charles Perrow, *Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay*, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1979), 186-188, for further discussion of the organization-institution distinction.

14. May, 19-51 (a chapter perceptively entitled "The Cold War: Preventing World War II").

15. Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), 171-173, 226-233.

16. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *National Security Act of 1947*, Report No. 239 to accompany S. 758 (Washington: GPO, June 5, 1947), 2; and Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *National Security Act of 1947*, Report No. 961 to accompany H.R. 4214 (Washington: GPO, July 16, 1947), 5-6.

17. Public Law 253, National Security Act of 1947, July 26, 1947.

18. The CIA's so-called fifth function—"to perform such other functions and duties"—has provided authority for the continuing conduct of covert operations ("dirty tricks"). NSC policy paper 10/2 (NSC 10/2), "National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects," dated June 18, 1948, assigned the CIA responsibility for covert operations abroad. Portions of NSC 10/2 are contained in Sam C. Sarkesian with Robert A. Vitas, *U.S. National Security Policy and Strategy: Documents and Policy Proposals* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 32-33. For a fuller discussion of the origins and growth of "the U.S. secrecy system," see Arthur Macy Cox, *The Myths of National Security: The Peril of Secret Government* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), esp. 32-60.

19. One obvious example of this, of course, was the military-dominated composition of the NSC. Another example was the designation of the Secretary of Defense as the President's principal assistant for national

38 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

security matters. Yet a third example was the Senate version of the bill (S.758) leading to the Act, which labeled what would become the National Military Establishment the "National Security Organization" and the proposed Secretary of Defense the "Secretary of National Security." As Samuel Huntington points out, for the bulk of U.S. history a sharp distinction was thought to exist between war and peace, and the role of regular military forces in both was limited. After World War II, though, this orientation changed drastically: "National security suddenly became the overriding goal of policy rather than its starting point. Military force came to be viewed as a prime instrument of policy to prevent large-scale war and to deal with small-scale conflicts." See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in *Civil-Military Relations*, Andrew J. Goodpastor and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 5-27.

20. It would not, in fact, be until the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 that there would be a mandated requirement for the President to formulate any sort of strategic guidance at the national level. The resultant annual *National Security Strategy of the United States* has generally not been approached very seriously, however. The latest such report, dated January 1993, is a tribute to superficiality and innocuousness. See The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1993).

21. See William G. Hyland, *The Cold War Is Over* (New York: Random House, 1990).

22. James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 6-8.

23. The most popular, visible, and provocative statement on U.S. decline and the importance of economic power is, of course, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987). Perhaps the strongest of the anti-declinst rebuttals is Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1988/89, 76-96. For a balanced account of America's relative economic decline and an important treatment of the growing

utility of non-military forms of "soft power," see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

24. On the subject of societal fragmentation, see Kevin P. Phillips, *Post-Conservative America* (New York: Random House, 1982), esp. Chapter 6, "The Balkanization of America," 73-87; and, more recently, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992). On the breakdown of the bipartisan consensus spawned by the Vietnam War and other causes, see Richard A. Melanson, *Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 1-32; and Daniel Yankelovich and Sidney Harman, *Starting With the People* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), esp. 3. Melanson (2) points to the views of some contemporary and retrospective critics who have argued that Cold War presidents, by baldly and simplistically inflating the communist "threat," manufactured an artificial consensus that stifled domestic dissent, rigidified U.S. foreign policy, and ultimately trapped them in their own rhetoric. Also see Jay Winik, "Restoring Bipartisanship," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1989): 109-122; and David L. Boren, "Speaking With a Single Voice: Bipartisanship in Foreign Policy," *SALS Review* (Spring 1989): 51-64.

25. John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 264. Also see Evan Luard, *The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics* (New York: New Amsterdam, 1988). Luard argues (esp. 14-15) that modern conflicts are principally civil wars that take place within third world states, are determined primarily by political rather than military factors, and generally defy the imposition of superpower will. "Power in modern international relations is no longer primarily a military factor. Increasingly we live in a world of political, not military, conflicts. And it is *political* power—political skills and political influence—not brute military power which is ultimately decisive in these contests" (24).

26. On this last point, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967); and the discussion of the action frame of reference in David

40 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

Silverman, *The Theory of Organizations: A Sociological Framework* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 126-146. For views that run counter to my proposition about the end of realism, see the series of articles by Fareed Zakaria ("Is Realism Finished?" 21-32), Robert W. Tucker ("Realism and the New Consensus," 33-36), and Owen Harries ("Fourteen Points for Realists," 109-112) in the Winter 1992/93 issue of *The National Interest*.

27. The service secretaries lost their seats on the NSC, as well as their Cabinet status, in the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act.

28. The National Security Act called only for a civilian executive secretary to head the NSC staff. Today, the executive secretary plays the role of staff administrator or chief of staff. For a useful discussion of the different roles—administrator, coordinator, counselor, agent—various national security advisors have played, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Kevin V. Mulcahy, "The National Security Council and the Shaping of U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 3, no. 2 (1989): 153-168. Also see I.M. Destler, "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," *World Politics* 29, no. 2 (January 1977).

29. For contrasting views on the relative strength and influence of the armed services and the CINCs, see James A. Blackwell, Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, "The Essence of Reform," in *Making Defense Reform Work*, ed. Blackwell and Blechman (Washington: Brassey's, 1990), 1-24; and Admiral Robert P. Hilton, "The Role of Joint Military Institutions in Defense Resource Planning," in the same volume, 151-172. Blackwell and Blechman argue that "the services continue to undercut the real authority of the unified and specified commanders," and "the services continue to exert the predominant influence over military operations." Hilton argues (more, it appears, on the basis of what was meant to be than what actually is) that "a major cultural change is under way. The predominance of the services in planning, programming, and budgeting is gradually being modified to give a significant role to the joint military structure, particularly to the chairman, the CINCs and the Joint Staff."

30. The NSRB also became part of the Executive Office of the President in 1949. In 1973, known then as the Office of Emergency Preparedness, it was disestablished, thereby signaling the first time since 1947 that there would be no such representation on the NSC. FEMA was established as a separate agency in 1979. It is headed by an Executive Level II political appointee who does not have a seat on the NSC or in the EOP. For a discussion of the origins and early performance of the NSRB, see Harry B. Yoshpe, *A Case Study in Peacetime Mobilization Planning: The National Security Resources Board 1947-1953* (Washington: Executive Office of the President, April 30, 1953).

31. There are those who would argue that our military success in Operation Desert Shield/Storm was due in large measure to the strengthened roles of the JCS Chairman and the CINCs, provided for in the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act. Even if largely true, such appraisals speak only to the military dimension of our response to the situation in the Persian Gulf, not to our overall national (military and non-military) response, nor to the quality of decisionmaking, advice, and counsel that led up to—and may even have encouraged—Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. For a telling portrayal of the flawed thinking that produced Desert Shield/Storm, see Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush* (New York: William Morrow, 1993).

32. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, H. Rept. No. 100-433/S. Rept. No. 100-216 (Washington: GPO, 1987), 11. The Tower Commission Report, *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (Washington: The White House, February 26, 1987), refers to "a flawed process" (IV-1), but then states (V-4, 5):

The flaws of procedure and failures of responsibility revealed by our study do not suggest any inadequacies in the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 that deal with the structure and operation of the NSC system. Forty years of experience under the Act demonstrate to the Board that it remains a fundamentally sound framework for national security decision-making. It strikes a balance between formal structure and flexibility adequate to permit each President to tailor the system to fit his needs. . . . We recommend that no substantive change be made in the provisions

42 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

of the National Security Act dealing with the structure and operation of the NSC system.

It is worth noting that the individuals comprising the Tower Commission—former Senator John Tower, former Senator and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former national security advisor General Brent Scowcroft—were traditionalists, non-provocateurs who were unlikely to challenge the status quo. Their only recourse, if they were to avoid pointing the finger of blame at President Reagan, was to endorse the flawlessness of the system and blame its misuse on the personalities of subalterns.

33. The general failures that Edgar Schein's "adaptive-coping cycle" (the sequence of organizational activities or processes that begin with some change in the internal or external environment and end with a more adaptive dynamic equilibrium for dealing with the change) is designed to uncover in any system tend to be the specific failures of the current national security establishment: (1) a failure to sense changes in the environment or incorrectly sensing what is happening; (2) a failure to get relevant information to those parts of the system that can act on or use it; (3) a failure to influence the internal system to make necessary changes; (4) a failure to consider the impact of changes on other systems and to achieve stable change; (5) a failure to export the new product, service, or information; (6) a failure to obtain feedback on the success of the change. See Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 98-103.

34. See Louis Henkin, "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1987/88, 284-310; Edwin B. Firmage, "To Chain the Dog of War," *World & I*, August 1987, 561-568; Richard Haass, "Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy," in *U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis*, ed. Daniel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKittrick, and Thomas J. Leney (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 263-306; and the entire collection of papers in Howard E. Shuman and Walter R. Thomas, eds., *The Constitution and National Security* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990).

35. Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., *The Ring of Power: The White House Staff and Its Expanding Role in Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 16-20. For an excellent discussion of executive energy, see Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., *Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), esp. 266-268.
36. Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Random House, 1988), esp. Chapter 15, "The Foreign Policy Game: Bureaucratic Tribal Warfare," 566-575.
37. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1987-88, pp. 80-99. Similarly, Constantine Menges, a former NSC staffer, makes the critical observation that "in foreign policy it is elements within the State Department that most often have decided to ignore, undermine, challenge, and countermand the president." See Constantine C. Menges, *Inside the National Security Council* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 392.
38. Richard Halloran, *To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America's Endangered Defenses* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 144-145. Also see Arthur T. Hadley, *The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure, America's Armed Forces* (New York: Random House, 1986), esp. 23-24, for a detailed discussion of interservice and intraservice rivalry.
39. Samuel P. Huntington, "Defense Organization and Military Strategy," *The Public Interest*, Spring 1984, pp. 20-46. Servicism, says Huntington, is the doctrine or system that exalts the individual military service and accords it primacy in the military establishment. Militarism, on the other hand, is that doctrine or system that, among other things, exalts an institutional structure—the military establishment—and accords primacy in state and society to the armed forces. Of course, if one's concern is civilian control—a concern that recognizably has dominated this country's historical approach to defense organization and civil-military relations—then the fragmentation that accompanies servicism actually could be considered a good thing. Richard K. Betts, for example, in his *Soldiers, Statesman, and Cold War Crises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), takes the position that military

44 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

disunity actually increases the choices available to decisionmakers (115-138):

Although civilian analysts frequently criticize interservice rivalries for the divisiveness, inefficiency, and confusion they cause in defense policy, these disagreements can often help civilians keep the maximum number of choices in their own hands. In the first fifteen years of the cold war, interservice controversy enhanced civilian control by deflecting conflict away from civilian-military lines.

40. For a comprehensive recent treatment of the subject, see David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, eds., *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988).

41. On the subject of groupthink, see, most notably, Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). Walter Lippmann, from the second decade of this century to the 1950s, gave authoritative voice to much of the elitist and realist thinking that survives today. For an excellent compilation of his writings on elitism, leadership, statesmanship, mass public opinion, and the failings of liberal democracy, see Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., *The Essential Lippmann* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). A perceptive contemporary observation is that of Rodney B. McDaniel, former executive secretary of the NSC, in Thomas P. Coakley, ed., *C³I: Issues of Command and Control* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991), 77:

The sociology of the practitioners of foreign policy, and military policy, in my experience, can only be accurately described as elitists who are most comfortable doing business in a back room, talking to nobody, and then after they've done it their notion of the domestic angle is you call in the public affairs guy and flack it up. The notion that you bring a bunch of politicians, Congressmen, and you seriously take what they have to say into account is anathema both to the agency professionals, and the "civilian" policy people—many of whom are cranked out of [Harvard].

42. Garry Wills, "Power Unchecked," *The Washington Post Magazine*, June 28, 1987, 31-39. Also see Bill Moyers, *The Secret Government: The Constitution in Crisis* (Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1988), 113-115:

It is in secrecy that the bacilli of self-deception thrive unexamined, producing that peculiar Washington disease known as Potomac Fever, which causes one's head to swell and one's mind to shrink. Unless inoculated by facts and informed opinions—rare in the protected coterie of the like-minded—it can rage like an epidemic in the highest realms of government, with devastating costs to the democratic ideal What is secret is often squalid as well. In the dark, men were able to act contrary to the values they proclaimed in public. Paying lip service to democratic ends, they made league with scoundrels whose interest is anything but the survival of democracy In secret the road descends from fantasy to fanaticism, from moral relativism to moral hypocrisy. And the United States government becomes the ethical twin of the enemy. *His* rules become the rules of the game.

43. For an excellent discussion of organizational culture, with specific treatment of the State Department, the armed services, and the CIA, see Chapter 6, "Culture," in James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 90-110. Wilson notes: "A strong sense of mission may blind the organization to changed environmental circumstances so that new opportunities and challenges are met with routinized rather than adaptive behavior The perceptions supplied by an organizational culture sometimes can lead an official to behave not as the situation requires but as the culture expects." For a thorough treatment of the subcultures of the foreign service, the military, and the intelligence community, see Jerel A. Rosati, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), 121-131, 147-169, and 191-223. For one of the best early treatments of the organizational "essences" of these same three groups, see Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1974), 26-62.

44. Probably the most comprehensive treatment of the role of personality in presidential decisionmaking is Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980).

45. *Towne v. Eisner*, 245 U.S. 425 (1918).

46. See Arnold Wolfers, "National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (December 1952): 481-502.

46 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

47. In an October 1960 interview, shortly before he left office, President Eisenhower observed:

I think you know that I believe we must be strong militarily, but beyond a certain point military strength can become a national weakness. The trouble with collecting military strength beyond our needs is that it tends to become a substitute for all the other things involved in true national security. It fosters the notion that national security is automatically tied to the amount of money spent on arms.

Quoted in Norman Cousins, *The Pathology of Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 80.

48. Henry Mintzberg, *The Structuring of Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 2. The classic statement on the nature and importance of differentiation and integration is Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, *Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1969), 8-13. The importance of fuller integration to the effective functioning of the national security establishment cannot be overstated. Such integration will require not simply new organizational arrangements, but also other mechanisms for achieving commonality in ways of thinking and doing business (e.g., reeducation, regular and frequent interagency personnel exchanges, and even a coherent grand strategy to guide the nation).

49. These features of effective institutionalization are from Bert A. Rockman, "Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and Leadership," in *The Constitution and National Security*, eds. Howard E. Shuman and Walter R. Thomas (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990), 211-230. Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, ed. Oliver E. Williamson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 116-153, notes that political opponents want governing structures that work against effective performance. They fear strong, coherent, centralized organization. They like fragmented authority, decentralization, federalism, checks and balances, and other structural means of promoting weakness, confusion, and delay. The task of designing political organization, therefore, is not simply a technical problem of

finding an efficient governance structure linking current power-holders to their creations. The more fundamental task is to find and institute a governance structure that can protect public organizations from control by opponents.

50. *Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). Quoted in Louis Fisher, *The Constitution Between Friends: Congress, the President, and the Law* (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), 9.

51. See Arthur T. Hadley's discussion (*The Straw Giant*, 126) of what is commonly known as "Operation Pocket": the practice of military professionals trying to put new high-level political appointees at the Pentagon (especially those with little previous military experience) into their pocket.

52. See Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, "Civil Supremacy Over the Military: Its Nature and Limits," *Armed Forces & Society*, Fall 1992, 7-26.

53. Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).

54. See Daniel Yankelovich, *Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991). Public judgment is the state of highly developed public opinion that exists once people have engaged an issue, considered it from all sides, understood the choices it leads to, and accepted the full consequences of the choices they make. This contrasts with "mass opinion," the volatile, confused, ill-formed, emotionally clouded public responses to an issue when underlying value conflicts remain unresolved.

55. Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 112-113. Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1985), notes (6): "Every symbol stands for something other than itself, and it also evokes an attitude, or set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated through time, through space, through logic, or through imagination with the symbol." Also see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Word*

48 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). The authors argue (118) that verbal weapons are as "real" in their strategic potential as missiles and submarines, and that (128) verbal strategy can be employed to effect fundamental system transformation.

56. Proposals for the creation of supra- or super-Cabinet officials or staffs are anything but new, dating back at least to the 1955 Hoover Commission. The seminal deliberations of the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, more than thirty years ago, assessed Nelson Rockefeller's proposal to create a "First Secretary" of the Government who would be "above the Cabinet" and exercise delegated presidential authority in all areas "of national security and international affairs." Though finding the proposal to have serious shortcomings, the subcommittee made observations that are achingly familiar today:

New dimensions of national security make the proper exercise of the President's responsibility more difficult than even before in our history. The line between foreign and domestic policy, never clear to begin with, has now almost been erased. Foreign policy and military policy have become more inseparable than ever. The tools of foreign policy have multiplied to include economic aid, information, technical assistance, scientific help, educational and cultural exchange, and foreign military assistance. . . . Indeed, today, almost every department of our Government, and some 18 independent agencies also, are involved with national security policy. . . . The net result is this: The planning and execution of national security policy cut across the jurisdiction of many departments and agencies.

See U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security* 3, Staff Reports and Recommendations (Washington: GPO, 1961), 15-16. For recent supra-Cabinet proposals, see Richard Brown, "Toward Coherence in Foreign Policy: Greater Presidential Control of the Foreign Policymaking Machinery," in *The Presidency and National Security Policy*, ed. R. Gordon Hoxie et al. (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1984), 324-340; and R. D. McLaurin, "National Security Policy: New Problems and Proposals," 341-354 in the same volume. The question of whether such officials should be subject to Senate confirmation is a contentious one for which there is no simple solution. Brzezinski, "The NSC's Midlife

Crisis," has argued that confirmation of the national security advisor would make sense only if the President, and perhaps Congress as well, were determined to elevate that person into the key player, designated by law to be the coordinating supervisor of the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Clark Clifford, "The Workings of the National Security System: Past, Present, and Future," *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1988, pp. 19-28, contends that Senate confirmation simply wouldn't work: "If these people have to be approved by the Senate then they will just be left out of everything at the White House." Also potentially controversial is the suggestion that these supra-Cabinet officials be called ministers. On the one hand, perhaps there is some lingering philosophical baggage from our colonial heritage that would make us want still to distance ourselves from our European forebears. Lawyers also might make an argument to the effect that it is important not to muddy the semantic waters between executive functions (those requiring judgment and discretion) and ministerial functions (those not allowing discretion). See Fisher, *The Constitution Between Friends*, pp. 39-46. On the other hand, to the extent that we see value in more post-Cold War openness, and since "secret" and "secretary" share the same etymological roots, maybe "minister" isn't such a bad label after all.

57. See Marcus Raskin, "Let's Terminate the C.I.A.," *The Nation*, June 8, 1992, 776-784. For just one of what undoubtedly are an infinitude of contrasting views on the subject, see Loch K. Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 10-11: "To abolish or emasculate the CIA would be an act of folly, for while the Agency can pose a threat to democracy from within [a not-insignificant concession], it provides a vital protection for democracy against serious threats from abroad."

58. There does not appear to be any provision in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that would preclude the establishment of regional super-ambassadors. In fact, Article 5 of that protocol states: "The sending State may, after it has given due notification to the receiving States concerned, accredit a head of mission or assign any member of the diplomatic staff, as the case may be, to more than one State, unless there is express objection by any of the receiving States."

50 POST-COLD WAR SECURITY STRUCTURE

59. Although the Constitution prohibits individuals from holding office in both the Executive Branch and Congress at the same time, there is no obvious reason why both branches of the government could not—or should not—be served by the same analytical arm. The intent of such a proposal is to strive for objective analysis over advocacy research, and thereby to expose obvious partisanship.

60. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, "Institutional Reform and Constitutional Design," in *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, eds. Weaver and Rockman (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993), 462-481.

McNair Papers

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 25 July 1944.

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, *Egypt and the New Arab Coalition*, February 1989.
2. John E. Endicott, *Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region*, May 1989.
3. Eugene V. Rostow, *President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional Monarch?*, October 1989.
4. Howard G. DeWolf, *SDI and Arms Control*, November 1989.
5. Martin C. Libicki, *What Makes Industries Strategic*, November 1989.
6. Melvin A. Goodman, *Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third World*, February 1990.
7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in *Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy*, April 1990.
8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, *A Strategic View of Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador*, May 1990.
9. Steven R. Linke, *Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The PEPCON and Avtex Cases*, June 1990.
10. Christine M. Helms, *Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and Nationless States*, September 1990.
11. Ralph A. Cossa, *Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns*, July 1990.
12. Ewan Jamieson, *Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand*, May 1991.

13. Richard J. Dunn III, *From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare*, March 1992.
14. Ted Greenwood, *U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military Operations in the Mediterranean*, June 1993.
15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., *Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the Cold War*, February 1993.
16. William C. Bodie, *Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe*, June 1993.
17. William H. Lewis (ed.), *Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, June 1993.
18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, *Interoperability: A Desert Storm Case Study*, July 1993.
19. Eugene V. Rostow, *Should Article 43 of the United Nations Charter Be Raised From the Dead?* July 1993
20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, *European Security Toward the Year 2000*, August 1993.
21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., *Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 1990s*, August 1993.
22. Patrick Clawson, *How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions, 1990-93*, August 1993.
23. Jeffrey Simon, *Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines*, October 1993.
24. Eugene V. Rostow, *The Future of Palestine*, November 1993.
25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian Urquhart, *Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead?* November 1993.
26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, *Triage for Failing States*, January 1994.
27. Gregory D. Foster, *In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure*, February 1994.

JFQ

JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly is a new professional military journal published under the auspices of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. ***JFQ*** focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development.

The journal is a forum for examining joint and combined warfare and exchanging ideas of importance to all services. ***JFQ*** will appeal to a wide audience across the defense community with an interest in the nature and history of joint warfighting.

TO ORDER A SUBSCRIPTION, cite ***Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)*** and send your check for \$22.00 (\$27.50 foreign), or provide your VISA or MasterCard number and expiration date, to Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15220-7954. You may also place orders by FAX: (202) 512-2233.