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The New Germany in a New Europe-- The Global Dimension

Colonel
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
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THE NEW GERMANY IN A NEW EUROPE

THE GLOBAL DIMENSION

by

Col Dave Sonnenberg

PROLOGUE

Since German reunification on October 3, 1990, one fact has emerged: Germany is Europe's local superpower. Despite the economic and social problems brought on by the meshing of the two very different societies of east and west, Germany has not faltered. The demise of the Soviet Union and the chaos encompassing the Commonwealth of Independent States has left a political vacuum on the European continent. Germany, under the leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has shown itself both capable of and determined to step in and assume a position of leadership.

Germany displayed its new political confidence most clearly in the decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992, against the objections of the United States and a number of fellow European Community (EC) members. The Germans, however, refused to be dissuaded from what they saw as the only way to end the bloodshed in what was formally Yugoslavia. The U.S. and the other EC nations reluctantly followed suit and recognized both Croatia and Slovenia.

Germany has also been the driving force toward a united Europe. The economic and political treaties concluded at Maastricht in December 1991 were pushed through by German

determination. In late January 1992, Chancellor Kohl showed again that Germany is intent on playing a leading role in the future EC, demanding that the German language be given equal weight to English and French in Community affairs.

There is no doubt that Germany will be in position to influence events across the Continent for years to come, more so than either France or Britain. Many of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, and almost all of the Commonwealth of Independent States present great potential for instability, and they all need economic assistance. These nations, which share centuries of history both good and bad with Germany, might well have preferred to do business with the United States, but it is from Germany that loans and investments have been flowing. The post-World War II order in Europe is now being replaced by a different set of power relationships, and Germany is committed melding those relationships into European unity.

Over the next several pages, I will attempt to define Germany's role in the New World Order. In order to know where Germany is headed, it is important to know from whence it came. Therefore, I will provide a quick historical overview to set the stage -- an overview that will suggest that the German's are well aware of their history and determined to help build Europe based on responsibility and not the power politics of the past. I will then examine Germany's political, economic, and defense agendas. Finally, I will attempt to forecast Germany's influence and power in the year 2000.

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HISTORY

I. TWO GERMANIES

For more than 40 years, Germans would awaken each morning and be reminded that their divided nation was the cornerstone around which world politics revolved. East vs. West, Communism vs. Democracy, Expansionism vs. Containment were all strategies, shaped by politicians, to sway the global balance of power. As the United States and the Soviet Union were establishing their might as global superpowers, a divided Germany was becoming the primary battleground for the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, few people outside of Germany remember what the German political figures of those days said or did. What the world remembers is the rhetoric and imagery of the Americans and the Soviets, of Kennedy and Khrushchev.¹ Kennedy boldly stated the United States would be willing to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, and oppose any foe." Standing on the steps of the West Berlin city hall, he denounced those who built the Wall and declared, "all free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin." Thus he galvanized West Berlin, West Germany, Western Europe, and the entire Western world behind his leadership in what he depicted as a global struggle for freedom. Khrushchev, at the same time, was taunting Kennedy with predictions that West Berlin would fall, 'like an apple from a tree', leaving it vague whether that meant military

intervention or Kremlin engineered political events that would encircle West Berlin in the surrounding East German landscape.² "Twenty eight years later, however, one of the most salient aspects of the fall of the Berlin Wall was how little control over the process either Washington or Moscow had."³

"One Germany. Tear down the Berlin wall. Build a common European house. For 40 years leaders in East and West have intoned such words at varying times and varying motives. West Germans, in their national anthem, sing about a united German fatherland; so did East Germans, until the state told them to forget the words and hum the tune. A common thread ran through every wish: the wishers did not mean it. Or rather, they did not need to wonder whether they meant it; for it could not happen. This comfortable hypocrisy is no longer available."⁴

II. EIN DEUTSCHLAND

Few could have predicted the speed of German unification when the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989. Outlining a ten point program for German unification just three weeks later, Chancellor Helmut Kohl envisioned a transition period of perhaps five to ten years that would involve cooperation between the two German states. But by early 1990 it was evident that the momentum behind unification could not be stopped. Politics in both Germanies were denied the luxury of a gradual transition. In October 1990, less than a year after the Wall fell, Germany once again became one nation. But with unification came the question whether the world is comfortable with an united German nation. History still casts a long shadow. It is vital the

world not draw the wrong conclusions from the ill-fated chapters of Germany's past. German leaders are quick to point out that the Germany of today is a much different Germany than that of the 1940's. As one observer put it: "For the first time in German history, unity was the result of democracy -- a peaceful revolution, not iron and steel."⁵ Although East and West Germany are now formally united, it will take years, if not decades, to fully integrate eastern Germany into western Germany's social and economic system.

III. A UNITED EUROPE

Can Germany be integrated into a united Europe, a Europe described so well, so long ago by Victor Hugo?

A day will come when you, France; you, Russia; you, Italy; you Britain; and you, Germany -- all of you, all nations of the Continent will merge tightly, without losing your identities and your remarkable originality, into some higher society and form a European fraternity. A day will come when markets, open to trade, and minds, open to ideas, will become the sole battlefields.⁶

Addressing the United Nations in September 1991, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared that Germany is willing to step up to the task of building such a unified Europe. Genscher said, "We regard the greater weight of our people united in one state as a mandate to assume greater responsibility for freedom, democracy and human rights in a European Germany which has put behind it the nation-state thinking of the past. While the division of Germany manifested

the division of Europe, German unity today contributes to the unification of Europe."⁷ Europe today is standing at a crossroad in its history. Genscher went on to say, Germany wants "the European Community to develop into a European Union and ultimately into the United States of Europe."⁸

Germany is back! And it is not just the great economic machine. Germany is now beginning to manifest all the signs of a multifaceted, advanced, creative, and progressive society.

GERMANY'S POLITICAL AGENDA

The demise of the bipolar world and the birth of a unipolar one upset the delicate East-West balancing system in international power politics that existed for more than 40 years. The revolutions of 1989 and the unification of Germany strengthened the inclination of German leaders to see themselves as Europe's unifiers. Just as the Germans identified the division of Germany with the division of Europe, so do they identify the unification of Germany with the unification of Europe.⁹ Upon his return from Moscow in November of 1990, where he signed the treaty re-establishing a united Germany, German Foreign Minister Genscher articulated how his country intends to use its freedom to define its own fate. A united Germany will have "a greater political and economic weight due to its additional 17 million people," Genscher said. "We want to use that enhanced weight not to seek more power but to exercise more responsibility."¹⁰

However, as Germany defines its new role and identity as Europe's central power, it must tread carefully. While Germans argue that Germany must assume the economic, political and military responsibility commensurate with its relative weight, neighboring nations express concern about renewed German domination. Once again, it was Genscher who tried to allay concerns about a dominant Deutschland: "Our aim, as Thomas Mann wrote as early as 1952, is to create not a German Europe but a European Germany."¹¹ According to one scholar, however, "The reality is likely to be a little of both: a more European Germany in a more German Europe."¹² Whether the world wants to admit it or not, Germany, das Land in der Mitte, has been transformed from a divided front line nation into a unified central power capable of shaping the future of the European continent as well as influencing world events.

Genscher carefully laid out his long range goals and objectives to fellow United Nations members in his September 1991 United Nations General Assembly speech. Germany wants the European Community to develop into a European Union and ultimately into the United States of Europe.¹³ Critical to his plan is giving the new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe the opportunity to accede to this new Community. To be completely successful, these new democracies must be permitted an avenue to enter the market economy, and the way must be opened, though association, to full membership.

I. RESHAPING EUROPEAN SECURITY

The Warsaw Pact is dead, and the once mighty Soviet Union has self-destructed. Europe is less vulnerable to an armed attack than at any other time since 1945. The role of NATO, as a military organization, is going to diminish, however stubborn the efforts of defense ministers and generals to maintain both military forces and armament expenditures at high levels. But the requirement for European security is still valid, for "Western Europe is an island of stability in a sea of uncertainty."¹⁴

If NATO's days are numbered, which institution is likely to replace it? There are two existing organizations within Europe that may be used as a baseline for defining Europe's security concerns: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU).

The CSCE is an organization consisting of 48 nations at last count (all European countries plus the United States and Canada). Originally convened in 1973 as part of the effort to promote detente between the former USSR and the West. In 1975 the Conference became a permanent institution. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980's, European and American leaders planned an expanding role for the CSCE as a new community including the nations of both Eastern and Western Europe. The Paris Charter, adopted by the CSCE in November 1990, articulated the several elements of this goal. The United States, Britain, France and the former Soviet Union, the four states with special

responsibilities in Berlin and Germany, would join with Germany in concerting major elements of their European politics. The Soviets were offered a nine-point plan which promised NATO would revamp its strategy and force structure. No NATO forces would be stationed in East Germany, Soviet troops would remain in East Germany for a transition period, and the CSCE would be endowed with permanent organizations to allow it to play a larger role in the affairs of Europe.¹⁵

The 1990 Charter of Paris for a new Europe is a major step forward in establishing an all-European institution because security is now tied to co-operation. Based on the principles of the Final Act of Helsinki, The Paris Charter marks a breakthrough on military and security issues. For the first time in the history of the CSCE, the members have approached the issue of the new structures and institutions in a concrete manner, providing guidelines for their implementation.

1. The central forum for political consultation is a Council made up of ministers of foreign affairs.
2. A permanent Secretariat was set up to set up the agenda for the Council and other agencies.
3. A committee of senior officials will assist the Council and carry out its decisions. It will also review current issues and may make low level decisions.

4. Finally, a series of agencies were also set up: The Conflict Prevention Center, the Office for Free Elections, and the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

Foreign Minister Genscher told the members of the United Nations, "the CSCE must be capable of action. The crisis management capability of the CSCE must be enhanced. The less necessary it becomes to protect oneself from the outside, the more we need a system in which all cooperate in guaranteeing the common security. If we together learn to guarantee our security from one another, we in Europe will be on the way to a collective system of security."¹⁶ It has been argued that, to be effective, this all-European institution must be entrusted with power of its own and that, therefore, a transfer of power would have to take place from the nation states to the new institution.¹⁷ But no illusions should be harbored about its near-term effectiveness. To expect 48 nations to agree on a common security program, when many of them have mutual grudges to settle, is pure fantasy.

Less unwieldy, the WEU is a nine member organization designed in 1954 to coordinate European defense and ease the exchange of information on social, economic, and cultural affairs.¹⁸ After a ten-year period of dormancy, a revitalization of the WEU was initiated by the French in early 1984 to enhance Europe's ability to coordinate security policy. The French motivation for the WEU was two fold. First, the

French saw the 1981-1983 Euromissile crisis over the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the U.S. SDI program as posing challenges to Europe's independence. Second, the French saw the WEU as part of a "grand design" in which France would play a leading role in a new European security structure.¹⁹

While the WEU is the only European institution whose members have pledged to defend one another, "Clear conflict has existed over the vision of European security cooperation, and not surprisingly, such conflict has been reflected in controversy over how to use the WEU as a Europeanization instrument."²⁰ For the British, the WEU might provide an avenue to create a European pillar in the Alliance. For the French, it might provide an opportunity to build an independent European defense backed by the United States. For their part, the Germans have been pulled in conflicting ways by these two visions. For the German Defense Ministry, the British vision is valid. For Foreign Minister Genscher, the French vision provides an attractive option to reduce the American role in European defense in the years ahead.²¹

A new impetus for the WEU was provided by the Gulf War. The deployment of forces by Western Europeans, notably by the British and the French, was done primarily on a national basis. Nonetheless, the WEU took a collective decision in the fall of 1990 to condemn Iraqi actions and to support a European response, and the deployment of Italian, Spanish and Dutch

forces was done largely under the WEU umbrella. In the long term, the WEU, or whatever it may then be called, may very well be the steward of a united Europe's security. Until Europe is ready and capable to provide its own collective security, however, NATO will remain as an insurance policy during the time of transition.

II. UNITED NATIONS

Germany is committed to making the United Nations the main forum for action in the new world order. For this to happen, it is absolutely essential that Security Council resolutions be carried out, completely and unconditionally. German leaders, who have stated openly that aggressors like Saddam Hussein must no longer be permitted to keep people in constant fear of aggression and mass destruction, are all for strengthening the UN so that it will be able to meet the challenges of the future. Among these, conflict prevention, demographic policy, environmental protection, and channeling the tremendous energies released by the end of the superpower arms race to the benefit of the Third World.

In his September 1991 speech to the UN, German Foreign Minister Genscher, outlined how Germany is prepared to play its part and step up to the challenges of a new era. "The united Germany will assume all rights and meet all obligations of the United Nations Charter, including measures of collective security, also with our armed forces. For this purpose we

intend to amend our constitution."²²

The nature of Germany's history has obligated it in a special way to freedom, especially in the realm of human rights. Genscher made a passionate plea to pursue a policy which focuses on the individual and makes human rights and human dignity the measure of all human action. "The violence of human rights must no longer be a domestic concern of individual states but a domestic concern of the community of nations as a whole. Today sovereignty must meet its limits in the responsibility of states for mankind as a whole and for the survival of Creation. When human rights are trampled under foot the family of nations is not confined to the role of spectator. It can, it must, intervene."²³

In late 1991, Germany proposed one of the most significant resolutions in United Nations history. It proposed an International Court of Justice of the United Nations where crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, genocide, war crimes and environmental criminality can be prosecuted and punished. This proposal called for court of justice to which anyone who feels his human rights have been violated may appeal. It called for a proscription of torture and capital punishment. It pointed out the need for an effective international environmental law regime with appropriate international controls. This court, the German proposal said, must be empowered to impose sanctions on countries who deliberately destroy the environment.

As Germany's political and economic power continues to expand in the global environment, so does its reputation and influence. As mentioned earlier, Germany wholeheartedly supports the United Nations as the main forum for action for world affairs. They are the third largest economic contributor to the UN, just behind the United States and the former Soviet Union.²⁴ In spite of the enormous domestic strain on its resources and the disproportionately high level of support for its eastern neighbors, Germany donated more than one billion deutschmarks for humanitarian purposes in Third World countries in 1991.²⁵ With all its economic strength and political clout, why isn't Germany a member of the prestigious Security Council? There really is no a good answer, except for the explosive politics that surrounds the issue. Germany's economic base is stronger than either France or Britain's, and its political foundation is much more stable than that of the former Soviet Union, so why not let it assume more power and responsibility in defining the new world order. Germany has certainly showed it is capable and justly deserves a seat on the Council.

III. ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

The restriction of arms exports requires, as first step, greater transparency. Since the early 1980's, Germany has been urging that the United Nations establish a register in which the transfer of weapons be recorded. In 1991, military spending for Third World countries was almost 200 billion dollars. This

wholesale exportation of armament and weapon systems is irresponsible and must be stopped. The responsibility lies with the buyers and the sellers alike. Germany, through the consolidated power of the EC, wants the United Nations to advocate placing even greater restrictions on the export of arms, with severe penalties for those who refuse to comply.

Both as a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and under its unification pledges, Germany showed its concern about nuclear weapons and technology. It has gone on record many times supporting global prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher expressed their concern about the danger of passing on nuclear know-how to third world countries. The danger is that carrier technology and nuclear technology will be spread via the many tens of thousands of scientists and engineers that worked on the former Soviet Union's nuclear and military programs. To make matters worse, the threshold countries in the Middle East are attempting to recruit these scientists.²⁶ Germany has promised to develop an initiative regarding the control of transfer of the know-how on the production of weapons of mass destruction. They have enacted laws making such a transfer a punishable offense and firmly believe it should be punishable under international law as well.

Yet, in the past, Germany has not been totally responsible when it comes to safeguarding nuclear technology. German officials claimed their policy of transferring nuclear

technology has always been on the basis of full-scope safeguards. When the German-Brazilian nuclear cooperation agreement was signed in 1975, German officials said, all nuclear material in Brazil was deemed safeguarded. In 1987, Germany told Argentina it would agree to supply a nuclear plant only if all the nuclear material in Argentina would be properly safeguarded. Proliferation experts in the United States charged, however, that once Germany established initial transfer of reactor technology and that the nuclear material in Brazil and Argentina was accounted for, there was no follow-up to prevent these countries from embarking on unsafeguarded programs.²⁷ In response to the U.S. allegations, Germany and Brazil formed a bilateral commission to investigate evidence that German technology and know-how were diverted from Brazil's safeguarded to its unsafeguarded program. The investigation uncovered that about 20% of German-trained personnel in the safeguarded nuclear program had quit and three were actually diverted to Brazil's unsafeguarded program.²⁸ As a result of this investigation, Germany pledged to reorganize the technology transfer reporting mechanism.

German leaders also believe there is danger in the area of nuclear reactors, and that the world-wide standard is disastrous. Many existing nuclear reactors are substandard and are not even checked for safety. Germany thinks this is a problem that concerns the entire international community and the need for a common, coordinated action is mandatory.²⁹

IV. THE NEW ROLE FOR INTELLIGENCE

The new tasks of the Federal Intelligence Service, BND, include not only the control of the non-proliferation of sensitive weapons or technology, but also international drug trafficking, technology transfers and international terrorism. The special problems following the end of the Cold War will have a significant impact on the BND's importance. A new cooperation between the BND and the intelligence services of the republics of the former Soviet Union are a must if the free world wants to safeguard nuclear weapon technology. The BND is especially concerned with the Soviet scientists who have offered their services on the free market.³⁰

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC AGENDA

Germany is one of the world's major economic powers, and in 1990, it was the largest trading nation, surpassing even the United States and Japan. Its economy, Europe's strongest, accounts for about 35 percent of the economic output of the 12-nation European Community, but Germany is relatively poor in natural resources. Its economic success is based on the production of sophisticated manufactured goods, notably vehicle, chemicals, and complex machine tools. Almost a third of its national income is derived from exports, mainly to its EC partners.

With its own unification and the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Germany is playing an even more

important economic role in that region. After unification, the economy of the former East Germany has declined rapidly, since most of its manufactured products are not competitive on the open international market. Its previous trading partners, the former USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, now lack hard currency to purchase its exports.

The infrastructure in those countries (roads, highways, telephone system, railroads, utilities, sewage and disposal) are also in deplorable condition. The modernization of these facilities will require a large infusion of investment capital, most of which will come from west Germany. At a minimum, \$100 billion will be needed annually over a period of ten years to complete the process. These economic problems are compounded by a badly damaged environment and the lack of administrative structures such as local and state governments and courts.

I. ECONOMIC UNIFICATION

The most immediate issue facing a unified Germany is the economic reconstruction of the East. Chancellor Kohl set economic prosperity and equal living standards as the benchmark of unification success. However, salvaging the former East Germany will continue to be a drain on the Germany economy, its cost still largely incalculable. Each day brings higher estimates. The government committed \$83 billion in 1991, a quarter of its budget, to revive its eastern states.³¹ Yet Germany's economy is strong -- strong enough to be confident

that the cost of unification can be borne until the economy in eastern Germany begins to grow significantly. At unification, Germany's GNP was \$1.7 trillion after eight years of economic growth. Its trade surplus was \$80 billion and private savings amounted to \$140 billion.³² But the powerful boost to the economy from unification is fading, and Germany must now tighten its belt.

II. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

The cost of unity has been high. Germany's trade surplus has evaporated and the West GNP growth slowed from a 3.5 percent annual rate in 1991 to an estimated 2 percent this year. Economic policy touches the fundamental internal fears, frustrations, and hostilities about unification.

East Germans fear unemployment, the loss of occupational identity, and an inability not only to advance but even to hold on to what they have so painfully achieved in the post-war years. Unemployment in what was East Germany has now passed the one million mark with an additional two million more workers minimally employed. Some estimates are that employment will be as high as 4.9 million by the end of 1992.

West Germans, on the other hand, resent the burden of the cost: a 7.5 percent surcharge on their income taxes, an increase of 60 cents a gallon on gas and a budget deficit that has jumped to 5 percent of Germany's GNP.³³ West Germans, though worried about how long it will be necessary to continue to support the

east, will tolerate their burden in the short run. Their assumption is that the growth in East Germany will pick up and the real GNP will grow an average of 10 percent in the East and 3 percent in the West between now and 1995.³⁴ But in the meantime, Germany is going to have to live with a sudden doubling of the public-sector debt -- 5.5 percent of the GNP and an inflation rate of 5 percent, also about double its rate before unification. At the same time, investments the west is making in the east and the incentives of the marketplace are beginning to bring progress.

III. NEW HEIGHTS

As EC 92 becomes a reality, the borders that still exist within the EC for people, goods, services, and capital will be abolished once and for all. When that happens, the European Community will be the largest and most effective trading region in the world.³⁵ Germany has a lot to gain both politically and economically from EC-92. "It's clear that the new Europe will largely be forged in the workshops of Stuttgart, the laboratories of Munich, and the banks of Frankfurt - and not the back rooms of Brussels - as Kohl tries to turn economic clout into political power."³⁶ Germany's economic clout is only growing as Europe moves to a single currency built on the German model. At some point, a European currency based on the mark will stand as the trading unit for 400 million Europeans.³⁷ But EC-92 is more than an international free market, it may be

the economic skeleton of the United States of Europe.

Everyone believes (or disbelieves) in his own 1992. The French think '92 will happen when they can take their dogs to England for the weekend. The English think it will happen when they can find cheap Commonwealth lamb on the supermarket shelves in Tours. The Italians think '92 means having their face-lifts covered by health insurance, the way face-lifts are in Holland. The Irish think it means abortions, and the Germans think it means sharing 'the East German recovery' - which is another way of saying the East German payroll.³⁸

GATT

The EC already has achieved a level of substantial and sophisticated sovereignty. Perhaps it already is a superstate. Its GNP exceeds \$4 trillion. It is the largest market for exports from the United States. But, like every other trading block, it suffers from protectionism. One of the reasons the Europeans came together and now stay together is the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Italy and France would not have joined without this subsidy program. CAP subsidizes EC agricultural production and exports. It eats up sixty percent of the EC budget and is the Community's single most difficult international problem. It may bring down the most recent in a series of decades of concerted attempts to reduce tariffs and eliminate trade barriers. The latest attempt is known as the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).³⁹

The fate of the GATT is somewhat uncertain, after Chancellor Helmut Kohl failed to persuade France to cut its farm

subsidies. So Germany is marshalling the Group of Seven leading industrial nations to step up the pressure on Paris and thereby getting the worldwide trade liberalization talks back on track.⁴⁰

GERMANY'S DEFENSE AGENDA

Germany is in the process of re-examining its role in international politics. The changes of the last two years have had a tremendous impact on the security situation of Germany. Almost over night, Germany went from a divided nation around which the battles of the next world war were to be fought, to a united country at the heart of a continent about which democracy now flourishes. The Bundeswehr's challenge is to restructure itself to remain a solid pillar for Germany, Europe and NATO in a turbulent world.⁴¹

The Gulf War revealed the fact that Germany must redefine its responsibility in Europe and in the world. It underscored the fact, as well as demonstrated the differences between Germany and its European partners, especially Britain and France. Saddam Hussein was driven out of Kuwait by UN forces, but those forces were void of any German units. The vast majority of the German people were highly supportive of the allies even though Germany did not participate in the conflict in military terms. Opinion polls made it clear that more than 75 percent of the German population agreed with the allied military action.⁴² Germany's participation in this conflict

was mostly financial -- to the tune of \$6.5 billion.

Germany desperately wants to make it possible for Bundeswehr units to participate in peacekeeping missions and missions aimed at the restoration of peace within the framework of UN measures. As it stand now, direct military involvement on the part of Germany requires a change to the constitution. Under allied prodding, Germany placed particularly tight restrictions on itself after World War II with regard to use of German soldiers outside NATO territory. In the case of Kuwait, these laws proved to be restrictive. The German legislature is working on an amendment to the constitution that will allow German participation in international sanctions against aggressors.⁴³

I. SECURITY POLICY

In early 1991, Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg outlined German security policy interests with the following three basic objectives:⁴⁴

1. Contribute to the stability and security of the international system based on the rule of law and respect for human rights.
2. Develop and strengthen the North Atlantic security system and promote the integration of Europe.
3. Establish positive relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and develop a more stable and open community of states within all of Europe.

II. FORCE STRUCTURE

As with most of the other countries in the world, Germany is re-examining the strength and role of the Bundeswehr of the future. Defense Minister Stoltenberg is obligated to reduce the strength of Germany's armed forces to 370,000 men by the end of 1994. The maximum personnel strength of 370,000 was initially agreed upon during the 2 + 4 negotiations and then mandated in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Prior to unification, the Bundeswehr strength was approximately 470,000. Added to this, there were 380,000 Soviet soldiers and 150,000 East German soldiers all stationed within the boundaries of the former East Germany. The 1994 goal represents a significant decrease when one considers that the actual number of soldiers stationed within the united Germany will be reduced by about two-thirds of what existed prior to unification; i.e. 370,000 vs. 1.1 million.

German leaders have unveiled a carefully constructed and somewhat ambitious plan reshape and modernize its military forces over the next ten years. The process of adapting and transforming the German defense posture to the new world security environment is closely connected to the adaptation process as the Alliance as a whole. NATO will have smaller but highly mobile and flexible forces for crisis response. The size and composition of the German armed forces will reflect both the need to contribute to the strategic new balance of power in Europe, and the increased ability to respond to a variety of

more multi-directional risks.⁴⁵ Germany is particularly supportive of the principle of multinational forces which serve as a visible expression of the Alliance's cohesion and determination to share risks.

As part of its restructuring effort, the Bundeswehr realigned its forces into three main categories and defined the mission of each, namely:

- Main Defense Forces as the major portion of the force structure with graduated readiness and availability status.
- Reaction Forces available at short notice for crisis management and crisis response.
- Augmentation Forces to reinforce any region and contribution to deterrence, crisis management and defense.⁴⁶

The armament and equipment of the future German Army and Air Force are essentially determined by the CFE ceilings. In concrete terms, Germany is allowed to possess a maximum of 4,166 tanks, 3,446 armored vehicles, 2,707 artillery pieces, 900 combat aircraft, and 306 combat helicopters.

The Bundeswehr's 370,000 troops will be distributed to the three services as follows:

Army - 255,400

Air Force - 82,400

Navy - 32,200.

Bundeswehr restructuring will undoubtedly be a continuing process, driven primarily by CFE and the perceived threat. Political leaders will debate and might argue for changes in Germany's grand security strategy. As the force draws down and the budget get smaller, the Ministry of Defense planners will be forced to make difficult choices from stretching out new equipment procurement, upgrading existing weapons systems, and abandoning some mission areas.

II. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY

Since technology developments play a decisive role in determining the outcome of a war, as proven in the Persian Gulf, Germany has to update many of its existing weapons systems. This problem can not be solved completely, however, by just purchasing new weapon systems whenever the older ones become obsolete. In the future, Germany is committed in developing weapons systems having a deliberate pre-planned and wide-range growth potential. The chief advantage of this acquisition strategy is that the production of a new system can commence with a base model at relatively low cost and low risk and does not have an immediate qualitative escalating effect on the enemy's armament. However, if the threat were to increase, the performance potential of the system can, in keeping with the political situation, be achieved by means of previously conceived retrofitting.⁴⁷ Armaments cooperation will continue to grow in importance since it can contribute essentially to

cost reduction, standardization and rationalization within the Alliance. Germany has actively supported the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) and has developed and procured about 70 percent of its systems through some sort of cooperative basis.⁴⁸

III. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Will Germany have its own nuclear weapons? Today, in time of optimism about nuclear disarmament, this question is dismissed as irrelevant. But with American troop and weapon reductions in Europe and the crisis over the future of NATO, the possibility of Germany having nuclear capability by the end of the century is very high.

GERMANY IN THE YEAR 2000

Shortly after the fall of the Wall, a wise British writer remarked that Germany is not "going to 'become' the dominant economic power of Europe; it already is."⁴⁹ Germany is back. It is a superpower once again. "In the space of a year, the German world's thinking on the German question evolved as follows: In July 1989, the idea of Germany reunification still seemed too improbable to merit serious discussion. By October, it has become possible, but those who advocated a quick timetable were accused of provocation and adventurism. In

November, it began to seem likely -- and therefore became a cause for panic, as the world considered the many problems that might ensue."⁵⁰ By December 1989, fears about Germany that remained in the world's collective memory had bubbled to the surface. Especially worrisome was Chancellor Kohl's apparent willingness to reopen the Polish border question. By March 1990, however, Kohl had made amends on the Polish issue and had cemented his deal with his allies in Paris, Brussels, and London. By April, the world had resigned itself to accepting German unification as inevitable. By July 1990, the first economic stage of unification had actually begun, and on October 3, 1990, Germany was once again united.⁵¹

PREDICTIONS

German unification will prove to be one of the greatest success stories of modern times. Germany will get all the economic benefits it anticipates out of the efforts to rebuild the East. East German living standards will rise to meet today's West German level by the end of this century. However, the costs of reunification will be much higher than German economists now predict.

Germany's influence will continue to grow in Europe. German political leadership will become much more powerful than it already is in the EC, and Germany's investment in Eastern Europe will provide substantial benefits to its manufacturing industry.

Berlin may very well emerge as the most important city in Europe. It will be functioning as the formal capital of Germany before the end of the century. The Bundesbank will return its headquarters to Berlin, as called for by its charter, in the early 1990's and will become one of the world's strongest financial organizations.

NATO will be formally disbanded by the year 2000. The CSCE will become the main vehicle through which the East-West relationship will evolve and Hans-Dietrich Genscher will become the first "President of Europe."

Germany will become a member of the United Nations Security Council before the turn of the century, Japan will also become a member because of its economic strength and regional political power.

Germany will be completely integrated into the European defense union and will seek its own nuclear deterrent to counter constant pressure from Russia. The EC defense union, especially Britain and France will initially object, but eventually relent and allow Germany its own nuclear force by the year 2000.

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