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**Bosnia and Collective Security  
UN, EC, NATO, CSCE, WEU  
--Which Task for Whom--**

**Lieutenant Colonel  
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**ABSTRACT**

The resurgence of regional instability is an apparent manifestation of the post Cold-War era. Regional instability manifests itself in a wide range of behaviors: from small border disputes to ethnic conflict and in some cases wars of independence. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a gruesome example of how devastating post-Cold War regional instability can become.

Because of this rapid rise in regional instability, a mechanism is needed which helps prevent and resolve these crises. Our global and regional security organizations possess such mechanisms, but are they capable of responding adequately to such instability? The Bosnian situation may provide some insight.

This paper examines the ability of the UN and the European regional security organizations--European Community (EC), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Western European Union (WEU)--to deal with the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Specifically, the paper reviews pertinent aspects of the region's history. It analyzes the national security interests of the major western states capable of influencing the conflict (Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) and their preferred multilateral approach in Bosnia and the surrounding European region.

It examines the roles of the EC, CSCE, UN, NATO, and WEU, and the effectiveness of each in dealing with Bosnia. Finally, the paper addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the EC, UN, CSCE, NATO, and WEU as revealed in Bosnia.

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## INTRODUCTION

The resurgence of regional instability is an apparent manifestation of the post Cold-War era. Regional instability manifests itself in a wide range of behaviors: from small border disputes to ethnic conflict and in some cases wars of independence. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a gruesome example of how devastating post-Cold War regional instability can become.

Because of this rapid rise in regional instability, a mechanism is needed which helps prevent and resolve these crises. Our global and regional security organizations possess such mechanisms, but are they capable of responding adequately to such instability? The Bosnian situation may provide some insight.

This paper examines the ability of the UN and the European regional security organizations--European Community (EC), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Western European Union (WEU)--to deal with the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the Bosnia war is ongoing, I will focus on these organizations from the period just before the start of the Bosnian crisis in March 1992 up through December 1992.

This paper is divided into four major sections.

1. *Examining the Situation*--reviews the pertinent aspects of the region's history up through March 1992.
2. *The Nation-State Actors*--discusses the national security interests of the major western states capable of influencing the conflict (Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) and their preferred multilateral approach in Bosnia and the surrounding European region.
3. *The Organizations*--examines the roles of the EC, CSCE, UN, NATO, and WEU, and the effectiveness of each in dealing with Bosnia.
4. *Observations*--looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the EC, UN, CSCE, NATO, and WEU as revealed in Bosnia.

# EXAMINING THE SITUATION

## An Historical Perspective

Strife between ethnic factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina began before the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires. Not until 1908, when it was annexed by the Austro Hungary Empire did Bosnia-Herzegovina become recognized as a single nation-state. Yet with 33 percent Orthodox Christian Serbs, 44 percent Slavic Muslims, and 20 percent Roman Catholic Croats, Bosnia was, and remains today far from homogeneous.

After the First World War, Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, an entity that was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929.<sup>1</sup> During WWII, a puppet Croat government, put in place by the Nazis, massacred hundreds of thousands of Serbs. This genocidal act was surpassed only by the slaughter of the Jews in Poland and remains an open wound with ethnic Serbs.

Hoping to enjoy the same quick success as they did in Poland, the Germans sent two divisions into Yugoslavia. However, the results were dramatically different. The Yugoslav regular forces and militia repeatedly defended against the Germans' efforts. The Slavs were extremely effective in combating the Germans primarily due to their willingness to fight and their knowledge of geographical advantage. Slav forces were tenacious, rugged individuals who fought fiercely, much more so than the Germans anticipated. During two years of battling, the Germans were unable to quell the Slavs.

Geography was another major factor working against the Germans. The areas of Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia, consist of rough terrain that severely restricts air and ground mobility.<sup>2</sup> Mountains and steep hills comprise an ideal arena for rival factions that specialize in hit-and-run raids, ambushes, sabotage, and terrorism. The slavs capitalized on this advantage.



After the war, the Communist Party under Josip Broz Tito, took control in Yugoslavia. Recognizing the danger of Serbian domination of the new Federation, Tito, a Croat national, dissected the Serbian Republic, portioning one-third of its land to Bosnia and Croatia. Despite Tito's efforts to reduce Serbian influence, the breakup only served to further galvanize Serbian nationalism. Tito's death and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe created pressures for independence within Yugoslavia. Serbia attempted to redraw its borders to regain control of Serbian-populated areas, but Croatia resisted.<sup>3</sup>

The Federation crumbled in June 25, 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. Serbian-led Yugoslavian troops first attacked Slovenia but encountered stiff resistance. The army withdrew and Slovenia emerged as an independent nation. The Yugoslav army then attacked Croatia. Fighting lasted approximately six months, during which time Serbs captured the western third of Croatia. Serbia felt justified in its actions, since this land had been part of Serbia before Tito's regime. Serbia acceded to an EC designed cease-fire that allowed the Serbs to retain the captured Croat territory. The negotiated cease-fire in essence rewarded Serbia's aggressive actions.

Watching Slovenia's and Croatia's successful fights for independence, Bosnian Muslim and Croat factions sought their own independence from Yugoslavia. However, all did not share their desires. The Bosnian Serbs--33 percent of the nation--wanted to remain within the Federation.

The EC supported Bosnia's quest for independence. An EC negotiation team headed by Lord Carrington attempted to reconcile ethnic concerns within Bosnia before a declaration of independence. The team developed a plan that divided Bosnia into three national regions.<sup>4</sup> Bosnian Muslims and Croats unwilling to accept a divided country, forced a vote for independence on February 29, 1992. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum.

Skirmishes between Bosnian ethnic factions broke out immediately following the vote. Serbia's

Communist leader, Slobodan Milosevic fanned the skirmishes into civil war. Milosevic faced economic and political collapse within Yugoslavia. He saw an opportunity, through Bosnia's independence, to regain his stature by calling for Bosnian Serbs to return with their land to the Federation. Milosevic's efforts went well beyond a call for nationalism. He sent weapons, supplies and troops to support Bosnian Serb efforts. Figure 1 depicts the various warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**Figure 1**  
**Warring Factions in Bosnia<sup>\*</sup>**

◆ **BOSNIAN SERB ARMY**

- Created from Yugoslav Army
- 35,000 troops-well armed
- Several hundred armored vehicles and artillery

◆ **BOSNIAN MUSLIM DEFENSE FORCES**

- 50,000 troops
- Mainly small arms  
limited number of armored  
and artillery

◆ **BOSNIAN SERB IRREGULARS**

- 35,000 men
- Small arms, mortars
- Poor command and control

◆ **BOSNIAN CROAT FORCES**

- 35,000 troops
- Mainly small arms,  
some tanks and artillery

◆ **SERBIAN REGULAR FORCES<sup>\*</sup>**

- Initially remained in B-H
- Estimated up to 70,000 troops  
pulled out by summer 1992

◆ **CROATIAN DEFENSE FORCES**

- Up to 15,000 troops in B-H
- Less than 50 tanks
- Focus is north-central B-H

<sup>\*</sup> Yugoslav Army

## THE NATION-STATE ACTORS

In complex and dangerous conflicts such as Bosnia, most nations prefer multilateral rather than independent unilateral approaches to help resolve such situations. International institutions serve as frameworks for the implementation of their members' national wills. To a large degree, it is the membership that determines the power of the organization and its effectiveness. According to Stanley Sloan, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy for the Congressional Research Service,

Recent debates over the relative merits of different international institutions for US-European cooperation have tended to obscure the fact that it is still nation states, not international organizations or alliances, which make decisions and act to implement those decisions, whether individually or collectively.<sup>6</sup>

Before we can fully understand the effectiveness of the EC, CSCE, UN, NATO and WEU, we must first examine the security interests of their key members: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. I will focus the discussion on two issues, The nation's interests which directly pertain to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the nation's broader interests in European regional security.

### BRITAIN

**Bosnia-Herzegovina.** The British desire to see the conflict resolved through diplomatic negotiation rather than the use of military force. The government wants to avoid a protracted peace-enforcement operation in Bosnia. However, the British government does support the limited use of military force for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.<sup>7</sup>

Public pressure on the British military to restore peace in Bosnia is high. This is not surprising, given the televised pictures of war, the human suffering and atrocities that appear in British homes each evening. Despite public pressure the government does not see a clear military solution in Bosnia. In

reality, Britain fears the use of military force in Bosnia. The government's concern is that military force will threaten the lives of those involved in humanitarian assistance in Bosnia. In addition, hidden deep within the British government is the fear that the use of military force would result in another protracted, costly, conflict similar to that in Northern Ireland.<sup>8</sup>

Despite public concern, the British government is unwilling to undertake unilateral action. They can't afford it--economically or politically-- especially since the ruling Conservative party is extremely weak. In this regard British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said, "the luxury and danger of the West European powers pursuing national policy on their own in Eastern Europe belong in the first and not in the last decade of this century."<sup>9</sup>

Because of these concerns, the British government strongly favors a diplomatic solution in Bosnia and supports both EC and UN peace initiatives. Britain is supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation's (UNPROFOR) humanitarian assistance efforts. The British provide 2,500 troops for UNPROFOR and a couple of warships in the Adriatic. The warships are under rotational command and control between NATO and WEU.

**European Regional Security.** Britain views the Bosnian conflict as having an important impact on European collective security, specifically US-European relations, and NATO's survival. Though Britain perceives itself as honest brokers in collective security affairs, the rest of Western Europe perceives her as too strong a friend of Americans.<sup>10</sup> As the strongest ally of the US, Britain has ardently defended the US lack of action in Bosnia. Mr. Hurd stated, "that the problems in Eastern Europe are above all the responsibility of the European Community and not the United States."<sup>11</sup> The prime reason for Britain's strong support of the US originates from a fear that, if provoked, America would leave the continent, thus weakening NATO.

Besides being America's closest ally, Britain is NATO's strongest supporter.<sup>12</sup> Britain argues that only NATO, with a strong US presence, can protect European Security interests. Therefore, the British believe that America must stay in Europe to keep NATO strong. The British also believe that NATO is more capable and vital to European security than the EC. Former British Prime Minister Thatcher, talking about the paralysis of the EC in resolving Bosnia's civil war, stated,

only NATO can act to assure Bosnia's survival, which would prevent the irredentist wars that the partition of the country between Serbia and Croatia would inevitable provoke . . .<sup>13</sup>

Further, because of their position on not wanting to use NATO as a vehicle for intervention, the French have irritated Britain. Through their membership in the North Atlantic Council, the French have blocked NATO's efforts to become involved in Bosnia's humanitarian assistance efforts. This has forced Britain to act through the UN framework.

The British support the WEU as a framework for developing enhanced European role in the alliances, but reiterate that NATO remains the supreme decision making body on key alliance decisions.<sup>14</sup> The British believe that the WEU should be a bridge which links the European Community needs and NATO capabilities.

In summary, Britain has taken an active role in supporting UN peacekeeping resolutions in Bosnia. They are firmly committed to supporting diplomatic negotiated solutions aimed at settling the conflict. However, their greater concern remains supporting NATO's leadership role in European security matters.

## FRANCE

**Bosnia-Herzegovina.** The Bosnian conflict deeply troubles the French. They are concerned that this conflict could quickly expand through Eastern Europe.

The strongest sentiment to resolve the crisis in Europe comes from the French populace, emanating from the longstanding French belief in basic national sovereignty.<sup>15</sup> Public outcry prompted the first French action in March 1992, when following the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia, France became the first country to provide humanitarian aid. Despite public support, the French government lacks the resources and the political will (especially with the recent national elections) to take unilateral action in Bosnia. As a result, they have reluctantly been forced into supporting collective security measures of the EC and the UN.<sup>16</sup> The French have been frustrated by the EC's ineffectiveness. Therefore, they pushed the UN--through their security council membership--to take a more aggressive role in Bosnia.

The French support UNPROFOR's humanitarian assistance efforts with some 4,500 troops. In addition they provide several ships to support the UN naval blockade in the Adriatic. The ships are under WEU command and control.

**European Regional Security.** France's political leaders are concerned over the impact the Bosnian war may have on the future strength of French influence within Europe. Since 1958, France has sought acknowledgment of their role as a major power and has strained against the preeminent US role in Western Europe. Thus France has highly valued its position as a permanent member of the UN security council, alongside Britain, US, Russia, and China. This "equal" status appears to facilitate French cooperation with the US in UN-sponsored activities, but that cooperation breaks down in European regional security issues.<sup>17</sup>

To strengthen their influence in Europe, the French believe they must reduce European reliance on US support within the Atlantic Alliance. In 1991 when the Yugoslavian conflict erupted, US policy favored a regional solution to the crisis. This US policy fueled the French position that Europe needs its own collective security organization as a matter of long-term insurance. According to French news reports, Bosnia illustrates that the US cannot be counted on to supported all European security needs.<sup>18</sup>

The French argue that in light of a lack of US resolve, NATO should step aside and allow the WEU to assume a stronger leadership role in the Bosnian crisis. The French clearly see NATO on the decline and have attempted to impede US attempts to redefine NATO post-Cold War mission.<sup>19</sup> From a French perspective, NATO's creation of the Rapid Reaction Corps was a surreptitious attempt to appropriate new roles and missions by first creating the forces then, after-the-fact, defining the specific mission for the forces.<sup>20</sup> France's Defense Minister Joxe argued:

It must be noted that these recommendations [to create the Rapid Reaction Corps] have been adopted even though the discussions about NATO's new strategy . . . have not reached a conclusion.<sup>21</sup>

Concerning their European neighbors, the French will take all measures necessary to bolster the WEU over NATO. The French believe that the British don't truly support the WEU. France has criticized the British as being a disloyal member of the EC. In addition, the French are angered that the British have assumed leadership of NATO's new Rapid Reaction Corps.<sup>22</sup>

In summary, the French have been the WEU's strongest supporters. France remains consistently non-cooperative in supporting NATO initiatives. In addition, They are frustrated over the EC's ineffectiveness in Bosnia. They have provided troops for UNPROFOR and naval forces for enforcement of the naval blockade.

## GERMANY

**Bosnia-Herzegovina.** Germany is perhaps in the most difficult position of all the European countries involved in reconciling the Bosnian conflict. The German government is fearful that the Bosnian crisis will explode beyond its borders. Germany's fears arise from internal concerns emanating from the 2 million Yugoslavian guestworkers and refugees who have settled in Germany. German history, combined with the current internal debate on the use of military force, has all but curtailed their involvement in Bosnia. As a result, they have been supporting collective security efforts primarily from the sidelines.

German debate centers on ambiguous interpretations of the constitutional provisions governing the use of German troops outside a defensive role. Though the constitution is vague on the use of the military, public sentiment is not supportive of a broader role for the military. In addition there is virtually no consensus between the governing coalition and the opposition on this issue.<sup>23</sup> However, public consensus does exist for military support of humanitarian assistance throughout the world under UN auspices.

This issue hit the front pages, when Germany sent ships to the Adriatic to monitor UN economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. When the UN authorized a naval blockade, the German government prohibited their ships from complying with the UN resolution. Government leaders viewed the naval blockade as an offensive act, precluded by law. In fact Germany must remove their airmen from NATO AWACS aircraft if they are used to enforce a UN no-fly zone resolution.

As a result, Germany has assumed only non-military roles in Bosnia. Germany has avoided sending in ground forces to support Bosnia's humanitarian assistance efforts. Yet, they were the first country to recognize Slovenian and Croatian independence and they served as the driving force in pushing



EC recognition for both countries and some would argue, therefore, bear a certain responsibility for the current situation. In addition, Germany has opened its doors to more Bosnian refugees (some 50,000) than any other country.

Because of the strong internal conflict, Germans feel that they must have UN approval to legitimize the use of military force for humanitarian assistance. Germany is the least likely European country to take unilateral action.<sup>24</sup>

**European Regional Security.** Beyond this internal debate, Germany is pivotal in all European alliances and is faced with external pressure from the US and France regarding support for NATO and WEU. Germans want to develop European defense in a way that enhances ties with France but also protects Germany's relationship to the US.<sup>25</sup> The creation of the Franco-German Corps illustrates this desire.

In 1987 Germany presented the idea of a joint Franco-German Corps as a method of keeping French soldiers in Germany after the Cold War and creating a joint defensive capability. In 1987, the French were not supportive of expanding beyond the existing joint brigade with the Germans. The French changed their minds when they realized that the Germany was going to reunify.

Simultaneously, the United States was quite upset at the idea of a Franco-German Corps that appeared to be duplicative of NATO's mission. The Germans quickly reoriented the Corps' mission to avoid straining US-German relationships. Germany said that first and foremost the Corps would come under the command of NATO whenever the need arose.

The US and France continue to pressure Germany to favor one country over the other. The Germans are doing their best to avoid alienating either country, contending that they are unable to focus on these external situations until they resolve their constitutionality issues.

In summary, Germany is severely restricted--by history and internal debates on constitutional law--from taking a more active role in Bosnia. Germany is under pressure from both the US and France with regard to supporting NATO versus the WEU.

## UNITED STATES

**Bosnia-Herzegovina.** According to Ambassador Thomas Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, the main interests of the United States in Bosnia are:

- That the conflict does not spill beyond the Yugoslavian borders.
- That the fighting end and an outcome be negotiated that reflects democratic principles, human and minority rights.
- That the acts taken by Serbia against its neighbors are rebutted.<sup>26</sup>

Despite these interests, the United States policy translated to inaction, partly a result of concessions made to Russia. In the summer of 1991, Soviet President Gorbachev asked that the US refrain from intervention in the Balkan crisis, which he claimed would further erode his right-wing support.<sup>27</sup> The US wanted, moreover, to ensure continued Soviet support in the UN Security Council.

Due in part to these factors, President Bush declared in the fall of 1991 that the US would no longer serve as the world's policeman and called for regional solutions for regional conflicts. Consequently, the US developed a wait-and-see attitude concerning Bosnia. Also the President felt that the Balkans' were primarily a problem for the Europeans to handle, ergo EC first.

It wasn't until the failure of the EC unilateral negotiations in the summer of 1992 that the US finally engaged, calling for stiffer enforcement of UN sanctions. However, the President made it clear that the US would only take action through collective security mandates. Under UN mandates, the US supported the naval blockade and provided a field hospital for UNPROFOR forces; however, the US

elected not to support UN humanitarian assistance efforts with ground forces. Let me present three reasons:

- When the EC attempts failed, the President was in the middle of the Presidential campaign and could not afford to commit troops for political reasons.
- It was too dangerous. There was no one person or organization in control in Bosnia. As a result, the risks to our soldiers outweighed the benefits of supporting the humanitarian assistance efforts.
- By December 1992, the US had already committed to sending 28,000 troops to support humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

**European Regional Security.** The US also views Bosnia in terms of its impact on European regional security issues. The US worked feverishly to redefine NATO's role with the intent to maintain relevancy in the post-Cold War era. The US wants to keep NATO as the supreme decision making body in the European/Atlantic alliance. The US publicly supports other security organizations--such as the WEU--as long as they do not duplicate the work of NATO.<sup>28</sup> However, since the US is a member of NATO, but not the WEU, what the United States desires most is to keep NATO vibrant so that they can preserve their influence on the European continent.


In summary, the US supported an EC leadership role in the Bosnian conflict. When the EC efforts fell short of expectations, the US stepped up pressure on the UN to take stronger measures. In addition, the US is actively seeking to continue NATO's position as Europe's the preeminent regional collective security organization.

## THE ORGANIZATIONS

### EC, UN, CSCE, NATO, and WEU

In discussing each of these individual organizations it is important to understand which countries comprise the membership of each collective security organization. Figure 2 depicts the membership in the CSCE, NATO, EC, and WEU.

Figure 2  
**EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES**



This section details each organization's mission, and its response to the Bosnian crisis. I will assess the effectiveness of each organization's response. For quick reference, Figure 3 highlights key events during the period.

Figure 3

### Bosnian Conflict Chronology

**March 1992**

Bosnia's first request for UN peacekeeping mission  
EC-initiated peace talks with Bosnia resume in Brussels

**April 1992**

EC recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina  
US recognizes Bosnia based on pre-crisis Republic borders  
Ethnic fighting explodes into civil war<sup>29</sup>  
UN Special Envoy travels to Bosnia--stresses EC peace talks  
CSCE recognizes Bosnia, blames conflict on Serbia  
Through EC, Bosnian Serbs offer peace--Muslims decline  
EC observer killed in Bosnia  
French and Austria start aid program

**May 1992**

UN Under Secretary travels to Bosnia--recommends EC handle peace talks  
UN RES 752 Call to end the fighting in Bosnia  
UN RES 757 calls for broad economic sanctions against Yugoslavia

**Jun 1992**

UN RES 758 expands UNPROFOR  
EC's Lord Carrington negotiates a major cease fire-- lasts three days  
US disgusted with lack of European action in Bosnia

**Jul 1992**

UN RES 761 expands UNPROFOR into Bosnia  
EC peace talks admit failure--UN steps in with EC for negotiations

**Aug 1992**

UN RES 770 authorizes all means necessary to deliver humanitarian aid  
CSCE backs UN sanctions and sends observers to neighboring countries  
Bosnia factions agrees to new peace talks with UN and EC

**Sept 1992**

UN RES 776 strengthens UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia  
NATO and WEU offer 6,000 more troops for Bosnia  
NATO and WEU ships arrive to monitor embargo activity in Adriatic

**Oct 1992**

UN RES 779 calls for a committee to examine war crimes  
UN RES 781 Bans all military flights--but provides no enforcement  
US wants to enforce no-fly zone  
Public pressure to take action grows in France, Britain, and the US

**NOV 1992**

UN avoids discussion on no-fly zone enforcement  
UN wants a peaceful solution to the Bosnian crisis--avoid peace-enforcement  
UN RES 786 further expands UNPROFOR in Bosnia  
UN RES 787 halts all inward and outward maritime shipping  
Germany cannot participate in blockade because of their constitution  
WEU and NATO search all ships as they enforce the blockade  
UN and EC peace talks recommend 7-10 provinces  
Bosnian Muslim and Serbs still won't agree to provisions for peace

**DEC 1992**

NATO fails to reach accord on no-fly zone  
UN continues to avoid discussions of no-fly zone  
Britain, France, and the US do not support the use of ground forces in Bosnia

## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

**Mission.** The European Community is the vehicle for West European economic and political integration. The EC developed the European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a formal process of consultation and cooperation, which has become the framework for European political union, including common foreign security matters.

**Role in Bosnia.** The EC was actually the first organization to become involved in the Croatia/Slovenia problem back in early 1991. The EC's intent was to prevent a destabilizing situation from developing and provoking a chain reaction in Eastern Europe. Aware that it did not have justification to interfere in Eastern Europe, the EC went before the CSCE to seek approval for its actions.<sup>30</sup> The CSCE was very supportive of the EC diplomatic initiatives.

Referring specifically to the Bosnian situation, the EC initiated talks with the three ethnic Bosnian leaders in January 1992. The aim of the talks was to help the Bosnians in finding a way to become independent from Yugoslavia while resolving the ethnic tensions. The EC under Lord Carrington recommended the creation of a loose federation consisting of three ethnic regions as a way of averting a bloody conflict.

The main problem with this recommendation is that the three ethnic groups had become extremely intermingled over the years and there was no easy way to divide the country. The Muslims and Croats walked away from the EC negotiations and voted for independence in late February 1992.

The EC recognized Bosnian independence despite the ethnic Serb's desire to remain part of the Federation. EC recognition served as the spark which ignited the conflict. Civil war, fueled by Milosevic, broke out immediately following EC recognition. The EC attempted to mediate a peaceful solution between the warring ethnic factions in Bosnia without success. The EC negotiated numerous

cease-fire agreements only to see them fail days later.

The EC also tried a dispute settlement mechanism based on a binding arbitration board consisting of EC member nations.<sup>31</sup> This effort also failed. By midsummer, the EC under Lord Carrington had successfully negotiated a cease-fire that involved the use of additional UN peacekeeping forces. But Lord Carrington had not consulted with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to gain UN support. In a speech to the UN, the Secretary General said that a regional security organization does not have the authority to commit UN forces without permission:

The UN did not participate in the negotiation of the London Agreement. Only on the eve of its signature were my staff informed of the request . . . It is most unusual for the UN to be asked to help carry out a political-military agreement in whose negotiation it has played no part<sup>32</sup>

The London Agreement cease-fire was short-lived and the EC negotiations were discontinued. The EC had no mechanism to coerce the combatants to comply with the terms of the cease-fire. Lord Owen replaced Lord Carrington. The UN, under special envoy Cyrus Vance, joined hands with the EC, and in reality, took control of the peace negotiations.

**EC Effectiveness.** The EC, acting on its own, remained virtually ineffective in preventing the Bosnian crisis from developing and negotiating a peaceful settlement once the crisis broke out. Yugoslavia represents the EC's first attempt to conduct peacemaking outside its membership. The EC had no real capability to respond to the Bosnian conflict. The EC's political and diplomatic capabilities in solving regional crises remain relatively undeveloped. However, the EC is getting lots of on-the-job experience.

The fact that the EC had no "military might" could partially explain the ease with which the Bosnian leaders ignored the EC's efforts. The EC had hoped that the Maastricht Treaty which links the EC political machine to the WEU's military component would provide increased credibility. It did not,

partially because this linkage is nothing more than a paper agreement. The two organizations have not worked out any detailed agreements and procedures.

## UNITED NATIONS

**Mission.** According to the charter, the UN mission is to maintain international peace and security . . . take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace...<sup>33</sup> Between the years 1948 and 1988 the UN conducted 13 peacekeeping operations. With the end of the cold war, the UN has conducted 13 peacekeeping operations since 1988.

**Role In Bosnia.** As stated earlier, the crisis in Bosnia broke out early in March 1992. Though the UN was already involved in peacekeeping efforts in Croatia, the first official visit to Bosnia by a UN envoy did not occur until April 16, 1992.<sup>34</sup> Yet Bosnian Muslim leaders began calling for UN peacekeeping efforts as early as March 6, 1992. In reporting back to the UN Security Council, the UN envoy said that the situation in Bosnia was not yet able to support peace-keeping<sup>1</sup> efforts because all the belligerents had not agreed to a cease-fire. The envoy did not discuss the possibility of establishing a UN peacemaking<sup>2</sup> operation in Bosnia. He further recommended that the EC continue to handle the peace negotiations in the Balkans.

It wasn't until May 15, 1992, that the UN passed its first resolution which expanded the Croatian

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<sup>1</sup> The UN defines peacekeeping as a presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned . . . Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace . . . Peacekeeping works to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.

<sup>2</sup> The UN defines peacemaking as the action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. If necessary peacemaking operations can utilize peace-enforcement units that would be sent into respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual.



UNPROFOR humanitarian effort into Bosnia. The next series of resolutions, passed during the early summer, focused on expanding UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo and imposing sanctions against the former Yugoslavia.

The UN remained primarily involved with humanitarian efforts up through midsummer 1992. The UN requested support from member nations and regional security organizations to support the UNPROFOR effort. After the failure of the London Conference, the UN assumed the lead role in negotiating a peace settlement in Bosnia.

As the situation worsened, the UN continued to expand its UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, while invoking an "all measures necessary" clause to aid in the delivery of humanitarian aid. This clause allows the UN troops to use force. Although when confronted by aggressors, UN forces have thus far elected to retreat rather than exercise force. In fall 1992, the UN passed a resolution banning all military flights over Bosnia; however, this ban lacked an enforcement clause. With the situation still deteriorating, the UN authorized a naval blockade around Yugoslavia. The UN called upon all member nations and regional organizations to support the blockade.

Through fall, the UN continued to push for a peaceful settlement to the Bosnian situation. This was despite pressure from the US, France, and Britain to take stronger measures (e.g., enforcing the no-fly zone). However, the UN continued its support of the peace diplomacy process and avoided talk of peace enforcement measures.

In late December, UN and EC negotiators presented a plan to the three Bosnian ethnic leaders calling for partitioning Bosnia into a loose federation composed of 7-10 sectors with limited autonomy. Negotiations on this plan are ongoing.

**UN Effectiveness.** The outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia came at an unfortunate time for the UN. With its ongoing peacekeeping operations, it was operating beyond its means. The UN Secretary General stated

the demand (for peacekeeping) has now become such that I believe that the UN must share the work with others . . . it is for this reason that I have insisted on a clear division of labour between the EC . . . and the UN.<sup>35</sup>

As a result, the UN chose not to take the leadership role in Yugoslavia. They instead solicited the support of regional security organizations, the CSCE, and EC to assume leadership roles to resolve the situation. In addition, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was fearful that Russia might use its veto in the security council to block an aggressive UN effort in Bosnia.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1992, US, France, and Britain all agreed that the Bosnian situation could not be resolved with the use of military force for several reasons. Within Bosnia, rival armed forces are mingled with each other and with civilians. Consequently, there are no front lines or rear areas. As in World War II, the Bosnian geography severely restricts air power employment and ground mobility.<sup>36</sup> Therefore the primary hope for a settlement was through diplomatic means. When it became apparent the EC was unable to resolve the conflict, the UN was pressured to assume control by France and the United States.

In November, the US, followed by France, then Britain, began pushing the UN toward enforcement of the no-fly zone. There have been some 300 recorded violations of the no-fly zone since it was imposed on October 9, 1992. But, the UN Secretary General remained firm in his belief that the enforcement of a no-fly zone would not result in a quicker solution to the problem.

A major reason for avoiding a discussion on the use of force is that the UN has not secured Russia's support for the enforcement of a no-fly zone. In fact the Russian's have threatened to veto the measure.<sup>37</sup> Until the Russian's support stiffer measures the UN will be limited to continuing with its

peace diplomacy efforts.

The Bosnian crisis can best be resolved through the capabilities of the UN. The UN can respond with a greater variety of options--from preventive diplomacy to armed intervention--than any other collective security organization. However, since the UN is overtaxed and concerned that Russia could be forced to veto Security Council actions, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was willing to shed some of the UN's burden to regional organizations.

## CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

**Mission.** The CSCE was an ongoing set of meetings--a "conference"--that formed into an organizational entity in 1975 under the its "Final Act." The organization provides a set of guiding principles for peaceful relations and cooperation among its members.<sup>38</sup> The CSCE's primary focus was on human rights issues and treaty verification between the West and the East. In 1990, the CSCE completed the Paris Charter that called for the creation of institutions within the CSCE focused on military and security issues (e.g., a permanent Secretariat, a Committee of Senior Officials, and Conflict Prevention Centre).

**Role In Bosnia.** The CSCE played little if any role in the Bosnian situation, other than endorsing the actions of the EC and the UN. The CSCE formally recognized Bosnia on April 29, 1992. However, it wasn't until August when Boutros-Ghali asked the CSCE to support UN efforts that the organization did act.<sup>39</sup> The CSCE said it would send a mission to Bosnia to investigate the detention camps. It also agreed to send observers to Kosovo to try to prevent conflict spillover.<sup>40</sup>

**CSCE Effectiveness.** Why was the CSCE so limited in its ability to influence the outcome in Bosnia? One reason lies in the foundation of the organization. Any member nation within the CSCE can

veto any action or recommendation of the body as a whole. As a result the CSCE has little power to deter conflict, to impose sanctions, or to authorize the use of force in peacekeeping operations. When the Yugoslavian crisis first erupted, the Soviet Union vetoed any involvement of the CSCE in the Balkans. Once the Soviet block was removed, the CSCE ran into another stumbling block--France.

France wanted the EC, not the CSCE to take the leadership position in resolving the Yugoslavian problem in hopes that the EC would involve the WEU. France worked vigorously to have the CSCE members endorse the EC efforts in Yugoslavia.<sup>41</sup>

The Bosnian crisis forced the CSCE to deal with the fact that they lacked any type of enforcement or compliance arm. The CSCE set out to find an appropriate enforcement mechanism. France lobbied the CSCE to use the WEU to the exclusion of NATO. Britain and the US lobbied on behalf of NATO. Germany remained uncommitted.

The CSCE agreed to use both the WEU and NATO. The agreement was signed in midsummer; however, detailed agreements and procedures have not been worked out. For the time being, the CSCE has access to two military organizations--at least on paper. However the CSCE will continue to be of limited utility in resolving regional crises if it maintains the consensus rule.

## **NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**Mission.** NATO is a collective defense organization, based on the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949. It was established to deter potential Soviet aggression in Europe and to provide for the collective self-defense of the alliance.<sup>40</sup> With the collapse of the Soviet empire, NATO had to reshape its fundamental mission. As a result of the Rome summit, NATO's new strategy focuses on cutting the alliance's troop strength, creating the Rapid Reaction Corps, and reducing the reliance on nuclear

weapons.<sup>41</sup>

**Role in Bosnia.** Initially, there was little involvement by NATO other than developing contingency plans. In July 1992, during the expansion of UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo, the UN requested that NATO forces provide a command and control structure for the UNPROFOR. France blocked the action in the North Atlantic Council. However, the command and control structure was provided in its entirety by the NATO member nations acting on their own, not under NATO auspices.<sup>42</sup>

NATO provided AWACS aircraft to monitor the ban on military flights over Bosnia. NATO provided ships from the standing naval Force Mediterranean in September to monitor the UN embargo on Yugoslavia. When the UN passed the resolution calling for a naval blockade, NATO ships expanded their role to boarding vessels in the Adriatic.

**NATO Effectiveness.** NATO has had minimal effectiveness in the Bosnian crisis for several reasons. First, NATO's fundamental mission revolves around the use of military power. NATO was not designed, and therefore lacks the resources, to respond to a crisis diplomatically. Up to this point, the UN, along with its key member states has not agreed to the use of military force to solve this crisis. Thus, NATO's capabilities have not been called upon.

Second, article six of the NATO charter geographically limits the organization. Therefore, NATO can't act alone in Bosnia unless it is presented with a compelling request from a legitimate organization--such as the UN, CSCE, or EC. That is why it was so important for NATO, in light of its new mission, to become a military component supporting the CSCE.<sup>43</sup> Third, as a member of the North Atlantic Council, France has blocked several NATO initiatives that were designed to provide assistance to the UNPROFOR.<sup>44</sup>

NATO by itself is best able to respond with a military answer. NATO would not be justified in

intervening unilaterally in Bosnia unless the situation becomes a direct threat to its Western European members. NATO is willing to act if asked by the UN.

## **WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**

**Mission.** The WEU is based upon the Brussels Treaty in 1948. The present organization was created in 1955, following an abortive effort to create a European military force. The WEU has been in hibernation for some thirty odd years, having been awakened by France in the mid 1980s. WEU maintains that it is the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The WEU says that it would act only in situations in which NATO chose not to intervene or in situations outside the NATO Treaty area.<sup>45</sup>

**Role in Bosnia.** The WEU firmly supported all actions called for by the UN Security Council. Many WEU member nations are supporting the UNPROFOR with ground troops. WEU naval forces and maritime patrol aircraft began operating in the Adriatic in support of the UN naval blockade of Yugoslavia. The WEU created a naval command and control structure on the southern coast of Italy to oversee WEU naval operations. This unit also communicates with NATO command and control units.

**WEU Effectiveness.** The WEU was unable to support UNPROFOR as an organizational entity because it lacked a comprehensive command and control structure. In addition, none of the member countries have trained together under WEU auspices. The WEU is still very much of a "paper" organization. The naval component is the only segment of the WEU that has developed any kind of joint contingency plans and tactics. The WEU is just beginning to create council and planning boards as the organization moves its headquarters to Brussels.

As envisioned the WEU will be similar to its NATO cousin in that its response to a crisis will be limited to military action of some sort. The WEU is still in its infancy and will be unable to operate as

an organizational entity for many years to come. Therefore, the WEU will be of marginal utility in any future Bosnian operations.<sup>46</sup> In addition, even if Bosnia becomes a direct threat to the Western European countries, the WEU will be incapable of intervening unilaterally.

## OBSERVATIONS

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is based on a resurgence of nationalism and ethnic strife. The crisis highlights the inability of regional security organizations to resolve such conflicts. This war points out specific limitations of the various collective organizations involved in Bosnia. It also illustrates that the true power of the various collective security organizations emanates from the member nations.

A wide range of actions can be undertaken in attempting to prevent or resolve a crisis. The choice of action can range from preventive diplomacy--averting the crisis--all the way to armed intervention--separating the combatants or eliminating the aggressors. These choices fall within a response continuum or spectrum.

In developing a capability to respond to regional instability, a security organization can structure its resources in several ways. If limited on resources, it can concentrate on developing a robust capability in one specific area (e.g., NATO's armed intervention capability, or the CSCE's diplomatic capability). The other alternative, if resources are available, is to develop the capability of responding across the entire continuum (e.g., the UN's ability to support, from peace-diplomacy to peace-making). However, few organizations have the resources to maintain a robust response capability across the entire spectrum. Therefore, organizations may need to band together to effectively deal with a specific crisis. The Bosnia case highlights this reality. Table 1 depicts the response of the collective security organizations discussed.



Table 1

# ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE BOSNIAN CRISIS

## RANGE OF RESPONSE

ORGANIZATION	DIPLOMATIC	MILITARY
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Chief Negotiator—Lord Owen</li> <li>2. Sanctions</li> </ol>	
CSCE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mission to Detention Camps</li> <li>2. Observers in Kosovo in a preventive-diplomacy role</li> </ol>	
UNITED NATIONS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Chief Negotiator—Cyrus Vance</li> <li>2. Sanctions and blockade</li> <li>3. No-fly zone</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. UNPROFOR—Humanitarian efforts</li> </ol> <p>*With authority to use "all measures necessary."</p>
NATO		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. C<sup>3</sup>—from individual member-nations</li> <li>2. AWACS</li> <li>3. Naval Forces for blockade</li> </ol>
WEU		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Naval Forces for Blockade</li> </ol>

The EC entered the arena in an attempt to first mediate, then arbitrate a solution. Prior to the Balkan crisis, the EC had no experience in preventive diplomacy outside its membership. The EC lacks the ability to deter conflict or to impose sanctions. The EC has agreed that the WEU should become its enforcement arm in handling collective security issues. This is a healthy and mutually beneficial

relationship. The WEU realized that its only ability to answer a crisis is through military might. Therefore, the EC and the WEU will complement each other once specific agreements and procedures are worked out. However, both the EC and the WEU must initiate training programs to develop their respective skills: preventive-diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-making. The Bosnian crisis also points out that, to be taken seriously, the WEU must develop the infrastructure needed of an allied military force.

Concerning the CSCE, both the EC and the UN turned to the CSCE for assistance. It was unable to respond primarily due to its need for unanimous consent. To make the CSCE more effective, its unanimous consent requirement should be restructured. It is almost impossible to achieve unanimity among 52 members. In addition, the CSCE should develop an operational capability to enforce its sanctions and to deter aggressors. The CSCE needs to move beyond paper agreements with the WEU and NATO.

NATO is struggling to remain relevant in a post-Cold War era. The organization is a preeminent military collective security organization. We must remember that NATO's military might is only an extension of political power and that it is not an end unto itself. Therefore, NATO should begin by working more closely with the CSCE and the EC. By becoming an enforcement component for the CSCE and EC, NATO can legitimize the need to redefine its basic mission.

Of the collective security organizations, the UN remains most capable. Through its established relationships, the UN can respond to a crisis with appropriate action. But, the UN is moving at an extremely slow pace, haunted by fears of Russian vetoes in the Security Council. The UN must continue to improve, and more important, it must impart its corporate knowledge to further the abilities of regional organizations.

Bosnia's conflict re-enforces the concept that the collective security organizations are not

supranational organizations but rather serve as frameworks for the conveyance of their members' national wills. Britain has a choice of acting through the EC, CSCE, NATO, WEU, UN, or unilaterally. Yet Britain chose to act through the EC and the UN. Why? British officials say it's because the EC and UN position most closely align with their national desires. The British feel that the CSCE has been ineffective and that the WEU and NATO represent military answers--something that Britain would like to avoid if possible. Member nations will continue to act through the organization that best serves its purpose.

The conflict also illustrates that the power for a collective security organization to act--or not to act (e.g., NATO)--still rests with each member state. France's ability to block NATO's involvement in supporting UNPROFOR emphasizes this point. This condition will remain until collective security organizations prove themselves.

Unfortunately, the Bosnian crisis highlights many more limitations than it does capabilities. Bosnia reaffirms the need for effective regional security organizational mechanisms to deal with regional crises.

Little time has passed since the revolution of 1989. Bosnia comes in the revolution's wake. In looking for a silver lining, Bosnia may serve as the catalyst that rouses nation states to form more effective mechanisms for dealing with regional instability.

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