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Human Rights and Nationbuilding: Future Imperatives of U.S. Foreign Policy

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**HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONBUILDING:
FUTURE IMPERATIVES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**

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ABSTRACT

The 1992 deployment of U.S. military forces to Somalia presented a series of new challenges to the United States and the world community. Foremost among these are the questions of what criteria will be used for embarking on future humanitarian operations and for terminating such interventions.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the principle threat to this nation and the rest of the developed world is regional instability stemming from deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. The United States and the enlightened world community are faced with both realist and idealist foreign policy imperatives to intervene in selected "human emergencies."

A formal international framework under United Nations auspices is needed to evaluate human emergencies and provide a wide range of responsive actions. Among U.N. options must exist a nationbuilding capability -- non-military forces specifically trained to address the root causes of national instability and provide the administrative and security functions needed to restore civil order and economic stability.

The United States is obligated to provide global leadership to the enlightened world community in this effort.

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FROM THE HALLS OF MOGADISHU ...

In December of 1992 U.S. military forces entered sovereign Somalia with the mission of alleviating widespread suffering and death caused by ongoing famine and civil chaos. This was a watershed event:

--The U. S. military action was based on strictly humanitarian motives -- promotion of basic human rights -- not superpower exigency.

--The world community supported or acquiesced in the imposition of a limit on the concept of exclusive national sovereignty.

The action in Somalia indicated clearly that there is a tacit line past which the United States and the international community will act to promote humanitarian needs. This new policy of intervention presents a series of challenges:

1. What "human rights" require international protection?
2. To what extent is humanitarian intervention a policy imperative for the United States?

3. What will be the guidelines for future humanitarian intervention operations?

4. What will be the criteria for terminating humanitarian interventions? What is our ultimate goal, our measure of success?

I. TOWARD INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

Since World War II, a significant philosophical basis has been established for international agreement on basic human rights. Under U.N. auspices alone, more than a dozen documents have been adopted by the vast majority of the world's states dealing with various aspects of human rights, crimes against humanity, and elimination of discrimination. In addition to U.N. efforts, regional conventions on human rights have been adopted in Europe, the Americas, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. The common thread through all of these is the inherent right to life of all individuals.

It is clear, at least among the enlightened leaders of the world, that there is a universal conception of basic human rights centered on human life and human dignity, with broad aspiration for achievement of many tenets of the liberal democratic ideology.

Based upon the Somalian experience, domestic and world

opinion is coalescing around the concept that humanitarian intervention is justified, if not required, in cases of egregious rights violations and where action can be undertaken with acceptable cost and risk.

In a world where relatively harsh living conditions and early death are the norm for the bulk of mankind, there is certainly some subjectivity in defining an "egregious" level of suffering. The Washington-based Population Crisis Committee concluded in 1992 that 3.5 billion of the world's 5.5 billion people endure "high suffering" and of these, 430 million live in "extreme suffering." The Committee's "misery scale" of 141 countries found that **"an appalling three-quarters of the world's people live in countries where human suffering is the rule rather than the exception."** Both in numbers and proportion of people, this was found to be a significant increase since 1987.

This constant volume of human suffering worldwide has throughout history been punctuated with what can be termed "accelerated" levels of death. In the past decade, these "human emergencies" have totalled as many as two million dead in eastern Africa alone.¹

What distinguishes these cases from "normal" levels of Third World suffering is the accelerated death rate from causes of human design or neglect -- causes that were immediately preventable. Experience has shown that modern famine, even in Africa, is the result not of lack of food, but rather counterproductive agricultural policies or social chaos --

disasters of human rather than natural causes.²

Until recently, these massive human tragedies had been largely absent from the public eye of the developed world.³ But with the end of Cold War and the arrival of instant, 24 hour telecommunications these events are now appearing realtime in the world's living rooms. World policymakers will be increasingly faced with the requirement to justify action or inaction in the face of such massive human death tolls.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The dissolution of the Soviet Union can be considered a major triumph for the liberal democratic ideals of the United States and the enlightened nations of the world -- the "self-evident truths" of human equality, dignity, and natural rights. Although not well articulated into long term foreign policy guidance, these ideals are nevertheless embodied in our "national vision." To quote the 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States, we seek a world of "freedom, respect for human rights, free markets, and the rule of law."

Our ultimate goal is the universalization of those values which form the basis of the societies and governments of the democratic developed world. What we seek is not necessarily a world state, but rather a world of states dedicated to basic human rights and social development values.

This ideological development is a process of national enlightenment, characterized by the progressive achievement of a succession of human rights. The following is a general hierarchy of those rights that liberal democratic regimes pursue in spirit if not law (from most basic to most ideal):

HUMAN RIGHTS

- o Life
- o Subsistence
- o Shelter
- o Freedom from slavery
- o Individual security
- o Justice
- o Health
- o Work
- o Reasonable wages
- o Education
- o A home
- o Property
- o Expression
- o Free association
- o Travel
- o Equal voice in government
- o Equal access to resources

There is a very close correlation between achievement of economic freedom and political freedom, and between economic development and political development. In the past, the United States formally avoided the characterization of economic and social needs as "rights" entitled to legal protection. The official preference was to view these needs as goals for national achievement. But our present acknowledgement that human rights is more than simply free speech should not lead us down the old communist path of playing these rights off against one another. Simply because a nation is economically underdeveloped provides

- no excuse for the denial of the individual freedoms associated with the more ideal human rights. The right to equal voice in government is intrinsically no less important than the right to life.

Most of the world's developed countries have progressed to an ideological level where they routinely guarantee the higher hierarchical rights -- both political freedom and prosperity -- to the vast majority of their citizens. However an increasing majority of the world's peoples are mired in conditions where even the most basic rights -- including life itself -- are not taken for granted. Given the scope of this situation, and our relatively limited resources, we must ask ourselves whether the United States can actively afford to promote human rights as a central focus of its foreign policy. We must also ask ourselves whether the United States can afford not to.

JUSTIFYING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Although such tragedies as the 1980s Ethiopian famine received widespread world publicity, it was not until after the 1991 Gulf War that the international community began to acknowledge some limit to the concept of exclusive state sovereignty in order to ameliorate egregious cases of human suffering. There are three traditional arguments against an active foreign policy for the promotion of human rights:⁴

1. The **realist view** that a nation's foreign policy is concerned solely with power.⁵ The demise of the Soviet Union along with its need for containment as a primary policy imperative removed the principal support to this argument. There is no inherent contradiction which requires the exclusion of human rights from a nation's foreign policy.

2. The **statist view** that considers the export of human rights concepts to be inconsistent with the principle of state sovereignty. President John Quincy Adams, although firmly believing that American democracy was the best form of government, nevertheless argued that the United States should not impose its own moral principles upon the rest of the world, but should serve as an example that others might emulate.⁶ Of course Adams was referring to liberal democratic ideals, not genocide. The failure of "good example" to impact world behavior is what has led to the recent changing view of state sovereignty. Without question, the inviolability of state sovereignty under all circumstances is no longer considered sacrosanct. In addition, the human suffering in Somalia can be attributed not to government oppression, but to anarchy -- the lack of government control. In such situations, one might logically ask whose sovereignty is being violated? For the world community, the issue is no longer whether it is legal to intervene, but under what circumstances intervention can be justified.

3. The **relativist view** that a human rights foreign policy is a form of cultural imperialism that fails to respect cultural diversity. There is certainly a cultural relativism to many aspects of human rights -- especially such concepts as the nature of self-determination and the equality of men and women. But as world consensus about events in Somalia and Bosnia has shown, mass starvation and genocide are no longer ignored as respect for "cultural diversity." There is now a tacit limit at which enlightened world opinion will coalesce -- whether action is taken or not.

HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED POLICY -- A REALIST IMPERATIVE

Despite growing enlightenment among the world's cultural elite, evidence indicates that the bulk of the world's population is evolving backward politically, socially, and economically. Most humans are moving down rather than up the human rights hierarchy. Today, the developed countries are assessed to encompass only 20 percent of the world's population, with that proportion projected to decrease to 14 percent by the year 2025.⁷ The continued relative growth of the world's "unenlightened" and undeveloped mass will force us to deal with them as their sheer numbers eventually challenge our vital national interests economically and socially. This rising threat is not limited to the Third World. International shock over the civil war in Yugoslavia centered not so much on the rising death toll (modest

by Third World standards), but rather on how far this "civilized" and developed nation regressed toward barbarism in less than a year.

Human rights problems are the root cause of the estimated 18 million refugees worldwide, all searching for individual security.⁸ Geographic isolation puts the U.S. in the unique position of having to deal now only with relatively small numbers of Mexican and Haitian economic refugees. But massive population movements in Europe, the Middle East, and Western Asia feed instability and unrest, raising the probability of ultimate U.S. involvement in regional problems of much larger scope. Only by bringing most nations, and the bulk of the world's population, to a higher plane of common interest centered on economic development and ideological enlightenment can we hope to minimize the level of debilitating conflict.

HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED POLICY -- AN IDEALIST IMPERATIVE

It may be difficult to argue that ongoing massive human rights tragedies in Africa impact the vital interests of the United States and the developed world. But the ideology upon which this country was founded has always been considered in a universal context. Our Declaration of Independence proclaims that "all men are created equal" and are endowed with the unalienable rights of "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." The Founding Fathers did not consider these rights

limited to residents of the this country alone.

Considering the factors of individual security, economic consumption, and political freedom, the gulf between the world's "haves" and "have-nots" is enormous, and growing.⁹ Ignoring the world's "have-nots" while we aggressively pursue the most esoteric of domestic individual rights injects a degree of relativism to the concept of basic human rights, suggesting -- as many of the world's warring factions already believe -- that some humans are more worthy than others. This is an attitude that we cannot afford to promote, either internationally or domestically. Evidence strongly indicates that popular U.S. support for an objective, consistent human rights agenda can be generated.¹⁰

Political realists and other critics have never said that idealistic goals were not worthwhile, only that their pursuit as a primary foreign policy goal was counterproductive to the nation's long term interests. With the necessity of countering the Soviet threat now gone, we are faced with a new imperative. The primary threat to our national interest is increasingly socioeconomic rather than military. In both a realist and an idealist sense, we cannot ignore the pursuit of a national vision, indeed an international vision, based upon basic human rights and individual prosperity.

III. IN PURSUIT OF OUR VISION

Our ultimate goal is clear -- we both want and need to change the present course of humanity. But the collective resources of the developed world are limited, and the problems immense. We cannot squander our wealth on a quixotic quest for utopia. Our idealist goals must be pursued prudently and consistently, with an objective prioritization of effort. To this end, we face two levels of action:

1. **Alleviation of human emergencies:** Intervening in regions where necessary to halt an "unacceptable" death rate; and

2. **Nationbuilding:** Constructive measures to address the root causes of the civil instability which create such emergencies.

DEFINING 'HUMAN EMERGENCIES'

At what level of suffering should the international community act? It is clearly the accelerated level of preventable death that caught public attention in Somalia and Bosnia. U.S. Center for Disease Control measurements in southern Somalia prior to humanitarian intervention in late 1992 showed an estimated daily death rate among some population segments more than 100 times higher than the non-famine death rate in the Horn

of Africa.¹¹ It also exceeded the death rate of the 1984-85 Ethiopian famine.¹²

The death rate in Bosnia is less clear. By official count, nine months of civil war left 17,000 dead by the end of 1992.¹³ In raw numbers, this was a lower death rate among Bosnian Muslims than that seen in Somalia during non-famine conditions. In numbers alone, the "emergency" in Bosnia was nowhere near as bad as that in Africa.

But such figures are misleading at best. First, the death rate is dependent upon accurate estimates of the number of fatalities -- often only a rough guess.¹⁴ Second, the death rate is highly variable depending upon the geographic area of comparison. The death rate in Bosnia was comparatively low when matched against the population of that country as a whole, but would be much higher, possibly approaching that of portions of Somalia, if considered only against refugee populations in the areas of intense fighting.

Without question, the world community needs both a structure and agreed criteria to accurately measure, comprehend, and publicize egregious suffering and death. When considering the violation of state sovereignty, there is a significant gulf between a potential crisis and an actual human emergency. The imperative for intervention in Somalia was driven more by the selective attention of the world press rather than objective considerations of vital interests. In the end, each case will have to be evaluated on individual merits -- as a realist or

idealist imperative -- rather than the level of international publicity. Given the enormity of the problem, we must adopt a policy of triage, with the need for action balanced against resources available. **The ultimate objective should be to place rising international emergencies in perspective such that the most truly pressing issues are dealt with.**¹⁵

o A human emergency which impacts our vital national interests is, by definition, a realist imperative and action must be taken -- multilaterally if possible, unilaterally if necessary.

o For a human emergency which presents an idealist imperative, the criteria for action is twofold:

1. Will more people die through action or inaction?

The Hippocratic injunction to do no harm should be the guiding principle. In a case such as Somalia, where warlords fight for local power rather than ideology, intervention is relatively low-cost. In Bosnia or Sudan, where ethnic security and ideology are central to the struggle, the overall benefit of military intervention is highly questionable.

2. Is the action "doable"?¹⁶ Is there some prospect for success without being dragged into a Vietnam-type quagmire? This is perhaps the most difficult decision since avoidance of

failure continues to be a prevalent excuse for inaction. We must learn to set achievable goals, no matter how modest, and we must also learn to see the wisdom rather than the failure in a decision to withdraw from intractable problems.

IV. NATIONBUILDING

There is a major step between halting mass death today and ensuring that it won't recur tomorrow. Saving Somalian or Haitian lives is easy; creating conditions in those societies which alleviate the root causes of the emergencies is difficult and expensive. Our primary dilemma in a situation like Somalia is not whether to go in, but how to get out.

Any permanent path toward resolution of social instability needs to follow three simultaneous nationbuilding tracks:

1. Establishment of a ruling system to provide guarantees of basic human rights, fair political representation, and justice in unstable countries such that non-ruling groups will retain confidence in their security under the national regime. The international track record in this area has not been good. Traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations have tended to intensify rather than relieve the causes of social disintegration by promoting separation rather than compromise among warring factions. We cannot afford an increasing series of apparently

endless U.N. missions such as that ongoing in Cyprus since 1964. Traditional "peacekeeping" is no long term solution to the Somalian and Bosnian problems.

2. **Indoctrination of a significant enlightened minority of each country into the cultural values of human rights and social development.** Cultural values would climb the human rights hierarchy, ultimately converging on the liberal democratic ideology of the "developed" nations. Social development values would encompass those individual and community responsibilities necessary for a stable and prosperous society. Such values would include national identity, obedience to rule of law, honesty, work ethic, and recognition of equal rights. Given the stark cultural differences between the developed world and so much of the Third World, "social development" is undoubtedly the major challenge we will face.¹⁷

3. **Continued economic development in order to create opportunities for popular expectations to be fulfilled.** A critical factor is promoting the transition from international food aid -- which discourages native farming -- to the stimulation of viable market economies in Third World countries. As an initial step, this will likely require such unpopular measures as eliminating protectionist agricultural policies by the world's developed countries.¹⁸

AN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

Without question, the United States must take unilateral action to intervene when its vital national interests are at stake. But it is equally evident that the U.S. should not embark on future non-vital humanitarian missions and interventions without agreement on international norms and the establishment of an international framework. Such a framework should provide for timely action, multinational funding and support, and an acceptable means of mission termination. As initial steps in this direction, the following measures are proposed:

1. The United States must assume world leadership in emphasizing the attainment of worldwide human development and human rights as an imperative for the entire world community.

o We must work for international consensus on a hierarchy of basic human rights, and on the need for the transfer of social development values -- along with economic opportunity -- as the basis for attaining those rights.¹⁹ This value transference might be deemed "cultural imperialism," but the enlightened world community established the relative merit of the Somali "culture" by judging that civil situation against an acceptable social image and finding it untenable.

o We must promote civil stability by discouraging

autonomous movements in favor of national consolidation, full participation in existing governments, and establishment of guarantees of security and basic human rights for all individuals. Respect for human rights and human equality stem from order and justice, not unrestrained "democracy."²⁰

o The American people -- and the world community -- must understand the imperatives for action, and support some realistic level of sacrifice to attain human rights goals and human development.²¹

2. The U.N. must establish a permanent international human rights tribunal separate from the U.N. Security Council to identify potential and existing human emergencies which may require outside intervention. This would include issues ranging from genocide to pending famine in a country where the government has taken no steps to prevent it.

o The tribunal should be a separate body from the Security Council so that it can focus on human suffering and nationbuilding rather than simply peacekeeping.

o Tribunal membership should include all major economic powers (including Germany and Japan) since they will be the primary source of funding and support. But major representation should be from the Third World, giving those nations a moral onus

for recommending action or inaction, and separating tribunal recommendations from the taint of neocolonialism and imperialism.

- o The tribunal should have the power and resources to conduct full investigations of internal conditions threatening massive loss of life -- with or without the subject nation's permission.

- o Strict criteria for judgement and action need to be developed in order to avoid politicization of the intervention process (e.g. a focus on apartheid or "Zionism" rather than mass killing) and to avoid policy imperatives being driven solely by selective public opinion. The world community must learn to use the world press, not be used by it.

- o The tribunal would recommend action along a scale of options. The recommendation would include the ultimate objective, as well as a mechanism for frequent policy review to determine that the policy is not doing more harm than good (i.e. expending more lives than are being saved).

- o The tribunal would have the power to investigate and try individuals for international crimes against humanity.

3. Tribunal recommendations and actions (for both U.N. and regional organizations) could include:

a. **Objective analysis of the situation.** Estimates of the toll of human death and suffering are inaccurate at best. Using sophisticated intelligence resources and data collection techniques, the world community could develop a much clearer perspective of the existing and potential problems.²²

b. **Technical and administrative assistance** to help stave off pending political or economic catastrophe. Such assistance could range from international Peace Corps-type units to political and infrastructure administration.

c. **Public appeals to humanitarianism.** The public eye has often forced warring factions to each seek the "moral high road" (such as it is). Moral suasion was a notable factor in improving Serbian treatment of Bosnian prisoners, and in achieving humanitarian ceasefires for famine relief in the Sudan.²³

d. **Measures short of intervention.** These would include varying levels of sanctions, backed by force if necessary, to bring pressure to bear on offending parties.

e. **U.N. civil law authorities.** In many instances of Third World political instability there is only a need for civil order in certain key areas; the type of order that is provided by police forces in other countries. Many crises could perhaps be

contained at a lower level if civil authorities of the U.N., acting as honest brokers between factions, were to intervene earlier and at lower cost than full combat troops. Civil capabilities should include local police functions, support, and training.

f. **Military intervention.** Multinational military force should be available as a last, rather than a first option. The most critical criteria are that any military action should minimize the ultimate loss of life and serve some ultimate political goal. Any military intervention should be guided by the following principles:

- o **Military intervention for humanitarian purposes is different from a peacekeeping operation.** In the first case military force is injected to eliminate the cause of human suffering. A specific military objective must be delineated and pursued with overwhelming force and vigor (e.g. creation of a large demilitarized zone as a safe haven for distribution of food). This implies liberal, but narrowly defined rules of engagement, and offensive as well as defensive action -- factors normally absent from traditional peacekeeping operations.

- o **Military force is a means to a political end,** not an end in itself. Strict goals and timelines must be delineated and adhered to, with the earliest possible transition

to civil authority, or withdrawal if costs become prohibitive. It must be accepted that resource limits may force acceptance of authoritarian regimes which recognize the most basic human rights as the most palatable alternative to social chaos and mass death.

4. **Nationbuilding.** What is ultimately needed if future crises in Somalia and elsewhere are to be averted are concrete measures promoting permanent solutions to basic societal problems. This requires a major reconstruction effort to establish civil authority and transfer social development values in countries incapable of responsible self-rule.

o **Nationbuilding Forces.** For lack of any alternative, military forces have been traditionally considered and employed for this role. There has been a growing international sentiment to expand U.N. access to quick-reaction, military intervention forces. But that capability does not address the core issue -- reconstructing stable societies.

Although military units can establish order and perform some civil affairs functions, they are neither trained nor equipped to provide the full range of social services necessary to construct and maintain lasting governments. Combat troops do not maintain order in the streets of the world's developed countries, and we should not lead people in countries like Somalia to believe that maintaining social order through military force is the norm, or that they are devoid of responsibility for their own security.

U.N. peacekeeping forces provide a near-permanent separation of warring factions, thus prolonging the prospect and ultimate intensity of civil strife. Nationbuilding forces would focus on the opposite function of bringing these factions together and teaching them to cooperate under mutual guarantees of security and human rights.

The U.N. needs large units of rapidly-deployable paramilitary "government construction" forces to inject into selective situations in lieu of, or following military intervention. A full range of services, from police, to medical care, to public sanitation, to education, to agricultural and industrial development is required to help nations help themselves -- no small order.

The creation of nationbuilding forces separate from the military sidesteps the continuing impediments to German and Japanese participation in such international efforts. The non-offensive military capability of such forces would also make a U.N. command structure more palatable to the United States.

A nationbuilding effort would offer much more than the "neutral political environment" goal of the U.N. effort in Cambodia. But unlike the Cambodian civil situation, nationbuilding efforts would be feasible only in reasonably benign threat environments.

o Trusteeship. Reestablishment of the UN trusteeship system may be the only hope for those nations adjudged unable to

provide for the health and welfare of their citizens. An impediment is Article 78 of the UN Charter which prohibits application of the trusteeship system to the territories which are members of the UN, guaranteeing them the principle of sovereign equality. However, the framers of the Charter assumed the continued progress of society and did not anticipate that some member countries like Somalia would move backward along the social, political, and economic evolutionary scale after achieving independence.

Trusteeship, with the promise of neutral, competent, uncorrupted administrators might be an attractive alternative for a threatened government authority to request, especially in lieu of military coup or anarchy. The administering authority would ideally be a non-national group of government and educational experts under U.N. auspices. Trusteeship could be applied to all or part of a state (such as southern Somalia). **Developing a social culture accustomed to civil order, human rights, and economic development would dictate a Trusteeship duration of at least a generation** (Somalia was under UN trusteeship from 1950-60 with no permanent benefit.) The emphasis would be to mold the minds of an enlightened class of national administrators from birth -- the only possible way to break into the cycle of counterproductive social values.

5. As UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has pointed out, timely international action requires three basic elements:

finance, personnel, and equipment.²⁴

o **Finance.** During the first half of 1992, the cost of UN peacekeeping efforts alone jumped from \$700 million to \$2.8 billion. Future operations such as those in Cambodia and Somalia will likely double or triple this figure (Cambodia itself could consume nearly \$3 billion).²⁵ But the U.N. has spent only \$7 billion on peacekeeping since 1948, compared with an estimated \$20 trillion in world military expenditure.²⁶ Given the imperative of reversing the trend of social disintegration, it is difficult to think of a better use for an international "peace dividend" than U.N. nationbuilding operations. The U.S. should take the lead in pursuing international conventional arms reduction initiatives to help make more money available worldwide for humanitarian purposes.

o **Personnel/Equipment.** The United States can take the lead in developing, training, and equipping specialized nationbuilding forces, separate from the military, to serve as an international core and model. Ideally, these forces would come under the control not of the Department of Defense, but rather the State Department, within an umbrella organization that encompasses and coordinates the full scope of international development and aid efforts. Nevertheless, it is evident that a formal U.N. mechanism with objective criteria for employing, and withdrawing multinational forces must be in place before the

actual utilization of such a force can be considered.

CONCLUSION -- THE REALITY OF IDEALISM

The history of mass human suffering offers up no simple solutions. A lack of timely warning and inability to predict outcomes makes any cost/benefit analysis of intervention an educated guess at best. The character of situations such as those in Somalia and possibly Haiti show some prospect for mass relief through humanitarian intervention and nationbuilding efforts. The deep ideological nature of the civil wars in Bosnia and Sudan may defy international solution until one side surrenders or is destroyed; for these situations, our best policy continues to be realpolitik containment.

Until the demise of international communism there was a clear distinction between the realist policy of survival and the idealist policy of world development. The primary threat to the national interests of the U.S. -- and the developed world -- is no longer a military challenge, but the drain on our collective national resources caused by the continued disintegration of the economic and social order among most of the world's peoples. The social chaos in Somalia, Bosnia, and other areas is symptomatic of issues that will eventually pose threats to our vital national interests and will have to be dealt with. We face a large problem now, or possibly an insurmountable problem later.

There is no short term, low cost solution to this challenge.

It will take a concerted effort of future generations to bring the underdeveloped and unenlightened peoples around to the path of liberal democratic ideals and free market prosperity. This will incur expense in dollars and lives, and will require policy compromises to prevent permanent entrapment in a philosophic maze of inaction.

The following basic principles must guide U.S. policy in addressing this effort:

- o This is not an "American crusade" to impose our system of government upon the world. We are pursuing the ideology that serves as the basis for the free and prosperous governments of most of the developed world; the ideology that has provided the greatest good for the greatest number.

- o Our focus must be on nationbuilding and social stability, not peacekeeping and autonomy. The ultimate goal is to bring peoples together in mutual cooperation, not to permanently separate factions.

- o The United States must be committed to global leadership and engagement. In our own national interest we are obliged to lead, but we must do so as part of a multinational effort led by the world's liberal democratic regimes. A cornerstone of our policy must be raising the focus of our ideological allies above regional power considerations and economic competition, to the

goal of true world development.

o Due to limited resources, our national and multinational efforts must be carefully coordinated to ensure maximum return on our investment. This will be a triage process focusing on those crises which are of prime importance to our interests. We may have to accept temporary alternatives to democracy in other countries if that is the only way to stave off civil chaos and mass death.

o Finally, and most importantly, the U.S. must lead this effort from a position of strength. Domestic social cohesion and prosperity are vital to both our national survival and our ability to build other nations.

We should have no illusions about the difficulty of the task. If history is any guide, one can be only pessimistic about an effort to change the course of humanity. But while to try may be to fail, not to try is almost certainly to fail.

END NOTES

1. Major human tragedies of the past decade are provided below. Death toll figures should be considered rough estimates only; estimates vary widely according to source.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Death Toll</u>
Somalia	1991-92	300,000
Yugoslavia	1991-present	17,000
Liberia	1991-present	60,000
Sudan	1983-present	500,000
Ethiopia	1983-85	100,000's
Mozambique	1981-present	500,000 to 1 million

2. See Alex DeWaal, "Preventing Famine at Its Source," *Technology Review*, Nov/Dec 1992, pp. 70-71; W. K. Jaeger, "The Causes of Africa's Food Crisis," *World Development*, Vol. 20 No. 11 (Nov 1992), pp. 1631-1643; and Dennis T. Avery, *Global Food Progress 1991*, (Indianapolis: The Hudson Institute, 1991), p. 28.

3. One study concluded that the "autogenocide" in Cambodia that left at least 1 million dead by 1978 merited only 58 minutes of coverage on the three U.S. television networks during the three years of the tragedy. Additionally, the 1976-77 Indonesian military action to incorporate East Timor which left up to 100,000 dead received only one half column of coverage in the New York Times in 1976 and only five lines in 1977. (Robert H. Taylor, ed. *Asia and the Pacific*, Vol. 2 (New York: Facts on File, 1991), pp. 1678-1679).

4. See Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 229.

5. To quote Hans Morgenthau, "...the defense of human rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and must come in conflict with other interests that may be more important in a particular instance." (Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 277.

6. Cited in Morgenthau, p. 276.

7. U.N. figures cited in *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World*, Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World, Washington, D.C. 1991, p. 41.

8. *World Refugee Survey 1990*, U.S. Committee for Refugees.

9. For example: The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of Mozambique is only \$120 compared to more than \$22,000 for the United States. More than half of the world's peoples have a per capita GDP of less than \$500; 84% less than \$6000. For more than two dozen countries, the per capita GDP has shown an average annual decline for the past 30 years. The infant mortality rate in Afghanistan (162 per 1000 live births) is 16 times that of the U.S. and 40 times that of Japan. Male life expectancy in Chad (39 years) is only slightly better than half that of the U.S. (Source: *The World Factbook 1992*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office).

10. In public opinion polls taken after the Gulf War, 86 percent of Americans said that the U.N. and the U.S. should stop dictators who violate human rights. (*The Emerging World Order*, Americans Talk Issues Foundation, Americans Talk Issues Survey, No. 16. Field Dates: Jun 23-Jul 1, 1991).

11. The estimated daily death rate in Baidoa in southern Somalia was 23.4 per 10,000 of the refugee population. For refugees under age five, the daily rate was as high as 69.4 per 10,000. By comparison, the non-famine death rate in the Horn of Africa was put at 0.65 per 10,000 per day. (David Brown, "Data Indicates Somali Famine Among Worst," *Washington Post*, 9 January 1993, p. A17).

12. The Ethiopian daily famine death rate was estimated to be 20 per 10,000 (Brown, p. A17).

13. John Pomfret, "Bosnian President Accuses Serbs of Playing Games With Talks," *Washington Post*, 8 January 1993, p. A9.

14. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic claimed a death toll of 200,000 for his country by the end of 1992. (Pomfret, p. A9).

15. Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear ("Do International Ethics Matter?: Humanitarian Politics in the Sudan," *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 5 (1991), p. 213) have suggested the nominal figure of 100,000 displaced persons to trigger a humanitarian operation regardless of state permission. However, at least 24 areas in the world today have estimated refugee populations exceeding 100,000 (out of more than 18 million refugees total). Most of these people have moved spontaneously to avoid suffering and death, thus achieving the primary goal that would be sought by humanitarian intervention in the first place. Establishing a trigger figure on "preventable" deaths is also problematic for the United States, where we have 20,000 annual murders and 45,000 annual highway deaths.

16. Charles Krauthammer, ("Drawing the Line at Genocide," *Washington Post*, 11 December 1992, p. A27) offered the rule of thumb for "doability" that our opponent be isolated from outside

support or sanctuary. This is a helpful, but not very definitive guideline for all situations.

17. The U.S. experience in Somalia was a valuable education into this cultural gulf. Ritual sexual mutilation practices, subjugation of women, and racist attitudes toward "low class" Africans -- including black American Marines -- were reportedly prevalent. See Mary Ann French, "The Open Wound," *Washington Post*, 22 November 1993, p. F1; French, "Hunger Pangs," *Washington Post*, 3 January 1993, p. F6; and Keith B. Richburg, "After Month in Somalia, What Next?," *Washington Post*, 10 January 1993, p. A24.

18. It has been estimated that Third World nations lose up to \$26 billion each year due to the agricultural and trade policies of the developed countries. See Clayton Yeutter, "Trade Reform: The Key to the Future of U.S. Farming," in Avery, p. 202; and "Grotesque," *The Economist*, Vol. 325 No. 7789 (12 December 1992), p. 6.

19. This value transference might be deemed "cultural imperialism," but the enlightened world community established the relative merit of the Somali "culture" by judging that civil situation against an acceptable social image and finding it untenable.

20. The potential for world instability from unrestrained democracy should not be underestimated. As Joseph Nye ("What New World Order?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71 No. 2 (April 1992), p. 91) points out:

Less than ten percent of the [then] 170 states in today's world are ethnically homogenous. Only half have one ethnic group that accounts for as much as 75 percent of their population. Africa is a continent of a thousand ethnic and linguistic peoples squeezed within and across some forty-odd states.

Somalia is relatively homogenous compared to Zaire which has over 200 ethnic groups. Additionally, democracy in an unenlightened society can give the populace the opportunity to make the "wrong" choices. This situation emerged in Algeria in January of 1992 when the voting public freely chose an orthodox Islamic regime representing limitations on individual freedoms and human rights. We want people to be free to choose their destiny, but we need them to make the right choices based on enlightened values.

21. A post-Gulf War public opinion poll showed that while Americans support U.S. military action to punish violators of human rights, they put a very low number on the U.S. deaths that make the sacrifice worthwhile. While 79 percent approved eventual use of military force, 59 percent put the upper limit of

sacrifice at less than 100 American lives; 75 percent put the limit at 1000. (Source: *The Emerging World Order*).

22. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has recommended broadening the functions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council to provide an "early-warning function" of threats to well-being. (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72 No. 5 (Winter 1992/93), p. 98).

23. See Weiss and Minear, p. 208.

24. Boutros-Ghali, p. 92.

25. "A Cambodian Peace Settlement: George Bush's Litmus Test in Asia," *Backgrounder*, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation, 24 Jul 1992, p. 6.

26. Michael G. Renner, "A Force for Peace," *World Watch*, Vol. 5 No. 4 (Jul/Aug 92) p. 28.