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# Development of Strategic-Level Leaders

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


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## ABSTRACT

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Strategic leadership is an elusive and complex, multi-dimensional process that involves establishing a vision, making decisions and establishing policies that have long-term impacts, recognizing frames of reference and time horizons, and effectively employing human resources. Military leadership provides the overarching framework for articulating how military leaders lead subordinates at each successive level of the organization and developing joint military strategic leaders is essential to future success on the battlefield. This paper discusses joint military strategic leadership development. I initially analyze the historical background of military leadership doctrine and training to provide a basis for examining strategic military leadership. I review existing definitions of strategic leadership to place the construct in perspective and provide a definition that serves as a baseline to address the crucial facets of strategic military leadership. I compare current research and writings to determine applicability to joint strategic military leadership and identify key elements and vital competencies. Finally, I provide conclusions, issues for further consideration, and recommendations to enhance the development of future joint military strategic leaders.

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Originality, not conventionality, is one of the main pillars of generalship. To do something that the enemy does not expect, is not prepared for, something which will surprise him and disarm him morally. To be always thinking ahead and to be always peeping around corners. To spy out the soul of one's adversary, and to act in a manner which will astonish and bewilder him, this is generalship. ... This is the foundation of success.

Major-General J.F.C. Fuller

## CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Appropriate talent is needed at all levels if distinguished service is to be performed. But history and posterity reserve the name of "genius" for those who have excelled in the highest positions . . . since here the demands for intellectual and moral powers are vastly greater.  
Karl von Clausewitz<sup>1</sup>

Over 150 years ago Clausewitz described his concept of "military genius." Perhaps the most important insight of his idea was that "To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce."<sup>2</sup> The mission of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) supports the enduring significance of his idea: "To focus on the integration of the resource components of national power into national security strategy for peace and war."<sup>3</sup> While Clausewitz' idea of genius has served as a basis for discussion over the years, it has lacked impact without a clear definition and a model for strategic leader development.

The military has begun to come to grips with what Clausewitz termed "military genius" and within the past decade "strategic leadership" has come into vogue to describe leadership requirements at the highest echelons of organizations. The subject of much research, discussion, and writing in the academic, corporate, and military communities, one doesn't have to look far for examples of strategic leaders -- most would agree that Sylvanus Thayer (West Point) in academia, Henry Ford (Ford Motor Company) and Lee Iacocca (Chrysler Corporation) in business, and military leaders such as George C. Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Hap Arnold, Chester W. Nimitz, and Colin Powell were strategic leaders.

The fundamental question is what is strategic leadership? Is it an innate attribute, or a derivative of the organizational



culture, or the result of a combination of innate attributes and culture, or some other process? One can argue that certain aspects of strategic leadership result intuitively, but one also must recognize that it consists of the interaction of external and internal factors. To do otherwise posits that the senior leaders mentioned above occurred by sheer happenstance -- ascribing their successes to the "Great Man" theory of leadership. If leaders are born and not made, intervention to develop strategic leaders will do little or no harm; the effort will be worthwhile if leaders can be developed.

**Purpose.** The purpose of this paper is to address joint military strategic leadership development. In general, military leadership development is a career-long interactive process that involves professional experience, formal professional training and education, and self-study, assessment, and reflection. Since an objective of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is to "produce broadly educated strategic thinkers"<sup>4</sup> and ICAF, like its sister senior service colleges (ssc), includes strategic decision making as a central part of the core curriculum, a specific purpose of this paper is to address how institutions can facilitate joint strategic military leader development.

**Thesis.** The thesis of this paper is that military leadership, in a generic sense, can be developed and, specifically, that competencies exist essential for being an effective strategic leader. The United States military excels at producing strategic leaders. The vital issue is to isolate factors that can enhance the development of future joint strategic military leaders.

**Topics.** Several issues must be addressed. What is the definition of strategic leadership? Are there differing levels of leadership? And can an institution facilitate development of strategic leaders? I will also discuss the history of senior leadership doctrine and training in the military and define strategic-level military leadership by reviewing essential strategic leader competencies. I will provide conclusions, identify issues for further consideration, and propose recommendations that address institutional, organizational, and individual requirements. My effort will attempt to limit the issue and focus on factors that can be used to facilitate the development of joint strategic military leaders, while avoiding oversimplification.

**Summary.** Reviewing the background of military leadership doctrine, defining strategic leadership, and discussing competencies necessary for effective strategic leadership will identify constructs necessary and sufficient to address the concept of the 'strategic' modifier and will suggest what can be done to facilitate strategic military leader development.

## CHAPTER 2 - HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

George Santayana<sup>1</sup>

Particularly throughout the latter half of this century, the United States' military has devoted much attention to leadership and individual leader development. As we proceed toward the 21st Century, the military must consider future leadership needs to ensure the development of combat leaders who will assure success on the future battlefield. As the above quotation implies, to predict

the future we first must be able to know and understand the past. The next section will place into historical context the development of military leadership philosophy, concepts, and doctrine.

**History of United States Army Leadership.** "Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth."<sup>2</sup> While each of the services (with the possible exception of the United States Marine Corps) has developed its own leadership doctrine to address specific needs, my review relies on the United States Army to provide the historical context.

The history of leadership can trace its lineage to the writings of German and French psychologists and sociologists from the latter part of the last century. Leadership, as an entity of its own, achieved prominence at the turn-of-the century with Frederick Taylor's concept of "Management Science." Taylor's concepts, and Secretary of War Elihu Root's reform of the United States Army command and staff system by infusing models of the German and British general staff systems, assisted the reorganization of the War Department prior to the hostilities of the First World War. Thus, "the management of war" originated some 50 years before the infamous McNamara era.

The Army became acutely aware of leadership as it attempted to move quickly from the small, professional inter-war army to meet the leadership needs of the greatly expanded land force of the Second World War. It enlisted the efforts of the civilian academic community to provide a framework for identifying and developing junior leaders. During the Great Depression a shift from the school of scientific management to the school of human relations influenced the academic community. Accompanying this were military

history chroniclers of the Second World War, such as S.L.A. Marshall and Martin Blumenson, commenting on leadership issues within the context of relevant military history.

Additionally, the conclusion of the Second World War brought about significant changes in the philosophy of "leading soldiers" -- as exemplified by changes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, concern for individual rights, and President Truman's decision to integrate racially the armed services. In essence, these changes signaled a shift from leadership of domination to leadership of manipulation.

As a result of the Army's leadership experiences during the Second World War, there was intense interest on leadership and leader development within the Army. Outside the Army, academic and business interest in leadership grew. This interest led to several important developments. For example: Samuel A. Stouffer and Ralph M. Stogdill emphasized cohesion and group dynamics, while Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz emphasized the unique aspects of the military profession.

Within the Army this period signaled an attempt to identify and codify the process of military developing leaders. For example:

- o General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower directed the establishment of the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership at the United States Military Academy in 1946.

- o S.L.A. Marshall published Men Against Fire. This work highlighted the importance of leadership at the small unit level and although some of Marshall's conclusions were controversial, it provided the basis for further leadership efforts in the Army.

o S.L.A. Marshall also published the first broad description of the military profession and the inherent leadership requirements of the profession in The Armed Forces Officer.

But perhaps most significant was the effort to establish and articulate leadership concepts.

**Military Leadership Doctrine.** The first official United States military document devoted to address common basic leadership concepts was the 19 July 1948 Training Circular Number 6, titled simply LEADERSHIP. This document identified 11 "Principles of Leadership" (see Appendix A, FM 22-103). There does not exist a record of identification, establishment, correlation, or verification of these principles -- one account has it that several combat experienced senior leaders discussed the subject of leadership in a smoke-filled room at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and agreed from their extensive experience these 11 precepts were essential to good leadership. The principles were fundamental, and as the Training Circular noted, universal in their application -- ". . . the same for all levels of command."<sup>3</sup> The Army's first doctrinal publication on leadership, Field Manual 22-10, Leadership, dated March 1951, incorporated these principles. Although challenged periodically, these principles have continued to stand the test of time and scrutiny.

Less revered has been the use of leadership traits (see pages 330-333, Fitton). The intent was that traits enhance effective leadership by providing a basis for implementing the principles of leadership. Traits were not all inclusive, but rather served as a guide for self-assessment and self-improvement. A specific problem with the use of traits was a lack of consensus -- the number varied

from ten in a December 1948 publication to nineteen in the first doctrinal manual.

The Army was not content to rely solely on the principles of leadership and attempted to identify a leadership construct or model. Some have maintained the Army's search for a descriptive model was nothing more than a search for a "Holy Grail." I believe that viewpoint suggests a lack of understanding about the benefit of a model. A model serves the useful purpose of providing a basis for articulating leadership doctrine and developing leadership instruction.

The first graphic depiction of the Army's concept of leadership can be found doctrinally in the 2 December 1958 version of Field Manual 22-100, Leadership (see Figure 1). Subsequent versions of leadership doctrinal manuals presented various other models and the 1983 version of Field Manual 22-100 presented the "Be, Know, Do" model (see page 49, FM 22-100, October 1983).

Interestingly, the process of identifying a leadership concept has been dynamic and evolving, essentially paralleling the same discussions of leadership occurring in the academic and business communities. The Army began with the individual-centered trait approach, then it incorporated academic theory that considered the potential impact of the situation (such as the Hersey and Blanchard situational leadership theory), followed by leadership within an organizational context. Within the past couple of decades, study has evolved to address how systems theory applies to military leadership.

While I am not positing a distinct correlation, it is also interesting to note that shifts within the Army's concept of

leadership not only paralleled what academia was advocating, but it also occurred within the context of other major issues.

**Examples:**

- o the first documents on leadership occurred as the Army was integrating blacks (note that the Army's first doctrinal publication on leadership had specific sections on "Leadership of minority groups" and "Leadership of female groups"4).

- o As national security began to rely on nuclear deterrence in the late 1950's, the Army began to lose its perspective on the operational level of warfare.

- o As the Army entered the Vietnam era, shortened and repeated tours of duty presented new leadership challenges. During this period there was an influx of managerial techniques and quantitative analysis for decision making. Academic behavioral sciences ideas, such as the Hersey and Blanchard situational leadership theory mentioned above or Fred Fiedler's contingency model, gained a measure of credibility. All this resulted in a revision of the basic leadership manual.

- o The armed forces moved to an all volunteer force in 1973 requiring changes in our thoughts on leadership. An in-depth review of how the Army trained and educated its officers eventually resulted in the establishment of a single agency for leadership. This was also during the period of time females were being fully integrated into the armed services.

- o After several "stutter" starts, the October 1983 leadership manual emphasized the linkage of leadership with the various levels of warfare, using historical examples to highlight and reaffirm the important concepts of military leadership.

**Senior-level Leadership.** The preceding is not to imply the Army only discussed leadership in terms of leading small units -- personal (or direct) leadership. For example:

- o The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College published a document entitled Leadership for Commanders of Divisions and Higher Units on 1 January 1949. As mentioned previously, this document included the principles of leadership since they apply to leaders at all levels.

- o Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-15, Leadership at Senior Levels of Command, appeared in October 1968. Written by renowned academicians working for the Army, this document represented the best concepts of leadership at upper echelons of organizations available at the time. Although well-written, the document contained academic verbiage and was never widely received -- it lacked "greening" (i.e., written with an Army flavor).

- o The Army began to focus on the leadership requirements at the senior levels as a direct result of the emphasis provided by the revision of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, in 1976.

- o The first doctrinal publication on senior-level leadership appeared in June 1987. A lack of consensus within the senior leadership of the Army about the concepts presented hampered Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels -- specifically the document only addressed two levels of leadership (direct and indirect). The benefit was that it initiated discussion on leadership requirements for the senior-most echelons of the Army.

- o Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership, addressed most of the concerns pertaining to Field



Manual 22-103. This document achieved better reception than its 1968 predecessor because of conscientious efforts to ensure that it was "green." Unfortunately, the "greening" process was not as complete as I would have liked. For example, it uses the term "executive leader" as found in academic language as opposed to the more common military term of "strategic leader."

**Summary.** Military leadership doctrine provides an overarching framework for articulating how the military leads soldiers at each level and for developing military leaders. The United States Army has gone through a series of doctrinal manuals that vary in length (see Table 1). This is not necessarily an indication of more knowledge or precision in discussing leadership, but perhaps is a reflection of a lack of consensus and understanding of the leader development process. The principles of leadership are imperatives for leaders at all levels; they are timeless and fundamental to success. Academic theories have served as a basis, at least in part, for developing military leadership doctrine. Military leadership doctrine has generally paralleled the "three basic schools of organizational theory and their effect on communication . . . : classical (1910-29), human relations (1939-59), and systems (1960-present)."<sup>5</sup>

### **CHAPTER 3 - DEFINING STRATEGIC-LEVEL LEADERSHIP**

Any true science must have a language of univocally defined concepts.

Elliott Jaques<sup>1</sup>

Leadership, at whatever level, is a complex phenomenon. Concepts and models developed over the years appear at times to be contradictory; however, consensus exists that there are some not so

subtle differences between leadership at the lower levels of an organization and that required for leaders at upper echelons.

Within the historical context of military leadership doctrine, strategic military leadership has only recently arrived on the scene. As a result, consensus is lacking and the first prefatory issue must address providing a practicable definition for strategic military leadership.

**Civilian Definitions.** Academics have devoted much scholarly work in an attempt to ascertain a theoretical basis for the qualitative differences between leaders at the various levels of an organization. They use the term "executive leadership" to describe the leadership process at the senior-most levels of an organization. A review of many of the works devoted to leadership at senior levels suggests that while there appears to be many common themes in articulating senior leader skills, attributes, competencies, and requirements, a common definition of leadership at the strategic level is lacking.

**Existing Military Definitions.** The military, in general, and the Army specifically, recognize leadership differs substantially at different levels. Perhaps because of its need for structure and uniformity, the military has attempted to define leadership at the upper echelons of the organization. One can trace the evolution of the military thoughts on senior-level leadership by reviewing the various definitions that have appeared over the years:

o 1949. "Leadership is the art of influencing and directing others to an assigned goal in such a way as to obtain their obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation. Military leadership is this same art demonstrated and applied within the profession of arms."<sup>2</sup>

o 1968. "Leadership is defined as the process of influencing the actions of individuals and organizations in order to obtain desired results."<sup>3</sup>

o 1987.

oo "Leadership and command at senior levels is the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired results."<sup>4</sup>

oo Leadership "Achieve[s] understanding and commitment of subordinates for the accomplishment of purposes, goals, and objectives envisioned by the leader, beyond that which is possible through the use of authority alone."<sup>5</sup>

These definitions highlight that leadership is a process and not an activity. Description of that process has varied over the years. In fact, it is interesting to note the variations in the length of leadership documents devoted to the discussion of senior-level leadership (see Table 2).

**Levels of Military Leadership.** Until the past five years the military has differentiated between two levels of leadership -- direct and senior-level. Direct leadership occurs when the leader has personal contact with essentially all members of his unit -- termed "personal" leadership and having relatively low task complexity. Because of the size and scope of large organizations, it is generally impossible for senior-level leaders to interact with all members of the organization. The leader must rely upon indirect means and other subordinate leaders to achieve the mission.

The military now accepts that these two levels fail to cover adequately the spectrum of military leadership. The term "strategic leadership" refers to leadership at the highest echelons of large, complex organizations. In these situations, the leader is more remotely removed from contact with subordinates and more concerned with critical, long-term issues (which are often broad

and ill-defined) -- such as establishing or reenforcing the organizational culture and values, long-term decisionmaking, or prioritizing the allocation of scarce resources.

Use of the three delineations of leadership -- direct, senior, and strategic -- facilitates determining leadership requirements. They also correspond to the three levels of warfare -- tactical, operational, and strategic.

I want to avoid possible confusion over the various rubrics used by the academic, corporate, and military communities. For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to the various levels of leadership as direct (personal), senior (indirect organizational), and strategic (executive).

**A Working Definition.** Each of the existing definitions of strategic leadership is not comprehensive and fails to account for the common themes inherent in leadership requirements at the uppermost echelons of organizations. Recognizing this problem, the United States Army War College conducted a seminar on strategic leadership in February 1991. One of the outcomes of that conference was a definition of strategic leadership.

"Strategic leadership is the process used to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by:

- o influencing organizational culture
- o allocating resources
- o generating activities
- o building consensus

within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment, marked by possibilities and opportunities."<sup>6</sup>

It is always difficult to achieve a definition that is precise and all inclusive for a subject as complex as strategic leadership. This definition addresses the crucial facets of strategic military leadership and notes that strategic leaders exist in an

uncertain environment. One could always argue for the inclusion of other issues, but that would only dilute the definition and make it more cumbersome. A key inference is that many decisions will have an impact long after the strategic military leader has departed the organization. This definition provides an adequate baseline.

**Summary.** Strategic leadership does not have the long and colorful history accorded direct leadership, but has achieved increasing prominence over the past 40 plus years. A lack of definitional precision has contributed to a distinct lack of consensus about what strategic leadership is and what it isn't. The Army's efforts to revise its discussion of the operational level of warfare have served to focus the Army's need of ensuring that there is a linkage with leadership doctrine. The recent conference on strategic leadership hosted by the United States Army War College has served the purpose of proposing a practicable working definition of the sometimes elusive concept of strategic military leadership.

#### **CHAPTER 4 - STRATEGIC LEADER DEVELOPMENT**

The higher a monkey climbs a pole, the more you see of his behind.

Attributed to General Joseph W. Stilwell<sup>1</sup>

The Army War College definition of strategic military leadership provides a start-point, but it doesn't do justice to a complex and multi-dimensional process. Along with the aspect of more visibility as the above quotation implies, maturity and blending of leadership skills occur as a leader goes higher in rank and responsibility. If strategic leadership differs from direct leadership, then it should follow that developing strategic leaders

also differs. A corresponding prefatory issue needs to be pondered -- Can we develop strategic leaders and what is the process?

This chapter addresses the process of developing strategic leaders. It summarizes various works on strategic leadership, identifies elements of strategic leadership, and addresses how an institution can enhance strategic leader development.

**Assumptions.** Before proceeding with reviewing the development of strategic leaders, we need some basic assumptions. First, I assume that leaders arriving at the threshold of strategic leadership have successfully mastered the knowledge, skills, attributes, and competencies required for success at the direct and senior levels of leadership. Additional assumptions are:

- o There are distinct differences in strategic leadership requirements for the corporate community as opposed to the military -- there are qualities unique to military leadership.

- o Burns' comment that "The crisis of leadership today is the mediocrity or irresponsibility of so many of the men and women in power, but leadership rarely rises to the full need for it"<sup>2</sup> is not applicable to today's military leaders.

- o It is essentially impossible to categorize a generic strategic military. [Note the variance of results for the current ICAF class Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) (see Table 3) and Strategic Leader Development Inventory (SLDI) (see Table 4).]

- o Strategic leaders already have an experience base with:
  - oo issues and concerns of organizations at the strategic level.
  - oo other more senior strategic-level leaders.

- o Strategic leadership doesn't occur without intervention. It involves professional experience, formal training and education,

and self-study. The United States Army refers to these as the "Three Pillars of Leader Development,"<sup>3</sup> where development is a continuous process that includes institutional, organizational, and individual requirements.

**Developing Strategic Leaders.** Supported by equivocal research, most leadership theoreticians agree that leadership can be developed. The academic community has devoted much scholarly work to establishing processes at the respective levels for developing leaders. At the strategic level there is an interesting mix of viewpoints about the development of leaders. For example:

- o Elliott Jaques has studied and written extensively on strategic leadership for about 40 years. In his seminal work, Requisite Organization: The CEO's Guide to Creative Structure & Leadership, he posits that the potential for strategic leadership is primarily an innate capability and can be identified early in one's development. He argues strategic leaders are able to conceptualize within a "time horizon" that corresponds to discernable levels in their strategic leadership capacity (see Figure 2). Jaques does not discount intervention, but maintains that early identification will ensure proper training and location within the organization for strategic leaders. That is not to say that some of his concepts are not appropriate or applicable to the military. He advocates that strategic leaders must mentor subordinates and be able to assist with the development of "subordinates once removed."<sup>4</sup> Additionally, he emphasizes strategic leaders must accomplish work at the appropriate level and need effective interpersonal relations to influence, persuade, and gain consensus.

o Peter Senge, in The Fifth Discipline, states "we can build "learning organizations," organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire."<sup>5</sup> He discounts the concept of leaders learning from individual experiences, but rather maintains that they use an ensemble of five "component technologies" to create learning organizations. These dimensions are: systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared vision, and team learning.<sup>6</sup>

o Donald Wick emphasizes that there is a difference between leaders who naturally develop and those who have had intentional development. He advocates that most learning occurs as the result of on-the-job experience.<sup>7</sup>

o James Kouzes and Barry Posner state that successful leaders assess their strengths and weaknesses, learn how to inspire and motivate others toward a common purpose, acquire skills in building a cohesive and spirited team, and frequently put these lessons to work.<sup>8</sup> Similar to Senge, they identify five leadership practices: challenging the process, inspiring a shared vision, enabling others to act, modeling the way, and encouraging the heart.<sup>9</sup>

o Jaques teamed with T. Owen Jacobs to write the Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership. They view the "executive leader" as an integrator. They identify executive leader skills falling into the technical, interpersonal, and conceptual/decision arenas. Critical strategic military leadership requirements include establishing the organizational culture and values, developing a sound organizational structure, assuring information flow and decisionmaking, providing human resource development, and structuring leader development. They discuss the



necessity for recognizing appropriate "frames of reference," e.g. the ability to understand cause and effect in complex situations, and "time horizons" for decision-making.

o The military and the nation's economy are moving from the Taylor concept of the assembly line approach with little value added effort to a more pronounced focus on human resources. The military's emphasis on "Total Quality Management" (TQM) or "Total Quality Leadership" (TQL) agrees with the current administration's emphasis on the value of human resources -- "to increase the potential value of what its citizens can add to the global economy, by enhancing their skills and capacities and by improving their means of linking those skills and capacities to the world market."<sup>10</sup>

**Elements of Strategic Leadership.** Various descriptions of strategic leadership requirements abound and it would be helpful if there was a way to conceptualize elements of strategic leadership.

**Environment.** Military strategic leaders, like their corporate counterparts, exist in a world filled with complexity, ambiguity, and competing priorities. Situations involve competing resources and priorities. In order for strategic leaders to be effective, they must understand and be aware of the external environment over which they have little or no control.

**Competencies.** Competencies frame strategic leader requirements and form the basis for any discussion of a developmental model. It is necessary to identify the requisite competencies for strategic leaders. As previously discussed, Senge, Kouzes & Posner, Jaques, and Jacobs & Jaques provide corresponding lists of required competencies. Critical competencies include: professional competency, understanding and establishing the culture and values

of the organization, a broad understanding of the world and how their organizations relate to it (Jacobs refers to this as "frames of reference"), developing long-term policy and decisionmaking, conceptual skills such as establishing and articulating a vision, and interpersonal skills such as team building and consensus, and providing for effective communication and networking. I must raise a caution -- avoid the inclusion of "executive skills" (such as executive writing, speed reading, computer literacy, dealing with the media, public speaking, etc.) as part of strategic leader competencies. While they are important, emphasizing them dilutes the critical importance of the subject area of strategic leadership and has a tendency to divert attention away from long-term critical competencies.

**Future.** The domain of strategic leaders is the future. Strategic leaders make decisions that frequently will not come to fruition during their watch. Strategic leaders must provide a vision for the future that can be interpreted and understood at the lowest levels of the organization. They must be able to anticipate and envision situations never before experienced and enact decisions that either preclude problems or take advantage of potential opportunities.

**Learning Versus Development.** Defining strategic leadership and discussing required skills and competencies are only partial solutions to the problem. The next issue is how to develop strategic leaders. Forsythe follows Wick's contention that there is a difference between learning and development.<sup>11</sup> In his work, Forsythe specifies that the learning approach to leadership is the

"acquisition of knowledge, skills and values"<sup>12</sup> and is insufficient to provide for the development of strategic leaders.

The developmental approach focuses on the aspect of encouraging innovation and enhancing change. Strategic leaders must be able to discern, differentiate, and discriminate in order to accept a new approach to doing things. On the one hand leaders like to say "if it ain't broken, don't fix it." Yet, on the other hand, "if we always do what we have done, we will always get what we have got." We must provide the opportunity for challenging how strategic leaders look at situations and how they make decisions. Training differs from development in that training evolves around testing to ensure the acquiring of concepts, whereas development relies more on self-assessment and awareness. Assessment can be a long-term activity with results not achieved in a course lasting less than a year. The institution must keep this in perspective, realizing that it might mean foregoing academic certification (which relies heavily on the academic rigor of testing).

Formal development institutions such as ssc must provide intervention, as opposed to mere training, to challenge the strategic military leader to push his individual "envelope of acceptance." If necessary, we must take leaders outside their comfort zones. By its very nature, development necessitates a hands-on approach and involves few truly 'right' answers.

Focusing on personal reading, writing, and reflection, vice the old order of routinization, can broaden one's knowledge base and facilitate change. A vital aspect of the developmental philosophy is realizing that "students" want to learn and develop. Establishing stringent academic requirements to ensure compliance

is generally not necessary. Case studies can be used to stimulate thought and discussion, thereby assisting strategic leaders to gain from the insight and experiences of their peers. Open and candid discussion of viewpoints is crucial and challenges leaders to move beyond their comfort zone. Most successful leaders refer to challenges and changes as producing their best accomplishments.

Correspondingly, formal development institutions, i.e., the ssc, must ensure that the curriculum addresses the requirements for adult learning and professional development. Because of the experience level involved, potential strategic leaders exhibit unique concerns and are generally more questioning. Malcolm Knowles has long advocated adult learning differs from traditional undergraduate learning and coined the phrase "androgogy" to describe the process. The process is dynamic and continuous and must address assessment and feedback on that assessment, reinforcement, education, training, and experience. The process incorporates student involvement to ensure their issues are addressed. It is essential to recognize that development for adults entails a different approach for the "student" than it does for the "teacher." Since teachers generally concentrate on only subject area, they teach sequentially. Traditional adult teaching techniques expose students to several subject areas simultaneously, students thus tend to develop intellectually in parallel.

Since developing strategic leaders is a career-long, continuous, and dynamic process, development must be interactive between the individual, professional study (the institution), and the organization. It must rely on the "Three Pillars" described earlier.

**Early Selection of Joint Strategic Military Leaders.** Jaques is committed to the belief that identification of strategic leaders can occur early. He maintains that once identified, leaders can undergo a tailored developmental and training program to enhance their strategic leadership capabilities. While this is an interesting concept, I do not feel that it is appropriate for the military to change its current selection timing or criteria. Jaques' approach is accomplished in part by the various selection promotion and school "gates" that military leaders undergo as a matter of course in their careers. For example, Army officers generally undergo at least five major selection boards (major, staff college, lieutenant colonel, battalion command, ssc) prior to attending a ssc. Also, providing a tailored development program might actually inhibit the development of strategic military leaders by limiting their exposure to a breadth of experiences.

**An Assessment of ICAF.** ICAF provides a learning and developmental process that prepares strategic military leaders to deal with significantly broader issues than previously encountered. Specifically, the "Strategic Decisionmaking" course promotes self-assessment and awareness through its use of tools such as the KAI, MBTI, and SLDI, both semester curricula promote parallel learning, and ICAF provides an Industry Study program which exposes military and government students to concerns of industry.

That is not to state that shortfalls do not exist. One shortfall is that each seminar has a teaching team and employ separate instructors to teach a specific subject area. This reinforces the aspect of sequential vice parallel teaching and tends to diminish cross-feed between subject areas. Another

shortfall is that while ICAF is the only ssc that addresses the resource component of national security strategy and policy, one constituency is glaringly missing from student rolls -- representatives from industry. Their perspective is vital as the nation and the military continues to address reconstitution issues.

**In Search of a Strategic Leadership Model.** As discussed previously, the Army has always sought to develop and depict a model of leadership. One shortfall is that while various models exist for leadership at junior levels, consensus lacks for a corresponding model for strategic level leadership -- "It is strange that although our Army has devoted enormous efforts toward leadership development, it remains unable or unwilling to articulate and adopt a meaningful leadership model that applies to senior leaders."<sup>13</sup>

This problem continues. While the current draft Army field manual addressing strategic leadership discusses various strategic leadership competencies and tasks, it does not provide a succinct definition of strategic military leadership nor provide a descriptive model.<sup>14</sup>

Doctrine is the basis for ensuring understanding, structure, and a common focus -- "Fundamental principles by which the military forces . . . guide their actions in support of national objectives."<sup>15</sup> The doctrinal development model (see Figure 3) depicts this process and should be used to develop a practicable joint strategic military leadership model.

**Principles of Leadership.** The principles of leadership exist as timeless imperatives and joint strategic military leadership doctrine must include them. Even with the rhetoric about the

unique qualities of strategic leadership, most writers continue to refer to the basic leadership principles. We cannot overlook the roots of leadership -- discussion of leadership at any level must address and reaffirm these principles.

**Summary.** Strategic leadership development is an art and a science. It is multi-dimensional and dynamic. Strategic leaders can be developed. Although many discussions and descriptions of strategic leadership exist, they highlight several critical common skills -- establishing a vision, developing an organizational culture, synthesizing complexity, anticipating and making long-term decisions and policies, recognizing frames of reference, exhibiting global thinking, demonstrating awareness of one's "time horizon," and emphasizing the human resource aspect of leadership. As Kouzes and Posner state, "effective leaders we know are involved and in touch with those they lead. They care deeply about others."<sup>16</sup> One aspect of Jaques' work is that strategic leaders must essentially be the architect of their respective organizational structure. This is generally not possible within the military context due to the need for common structure and consistency. Finally, strategic military leaders must develop their organization by recognizing its strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities.

#### CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION

The more elastic a man's mind is, that is the more it is able to receive and digest new impressions and experiences, the more commonsense will be the actions resulting.

Major-General J.F.C. Fuller<sup>1</sup>

This paper investigated the concept of strategic leadership. The effort provides sufficient material to arrive at some major

conclusions, to present some issues needing further research and study, and to provide some recommendations.

### **Conclusions.**

1. The United States military is proceeding in the proper direction for developing strategic leaders. Strategic leaders can be developed and developing strategic leaders results from employing an effective process. The ICAF "Strategic Decisionmaking" curriculum uses the proper approach to assist with the development of strategic leaders; however, strategic decision making is only one facet of strategic leadership.

2. Developing strategic leaders is not a short-term activity. It relies on integrating the "Three Pillars" of individual study, institutional development, and personal experiences.

3. The necessity for developing effective strategic military leaders focused on human resources will become more pronounced as the military proceeds toward the 21st Century.

4. In the formal developmental setting (such as ssc), 'reading, 'riting, and reflection' (essentially the intellectual ferment) is the best means to assist with developing strategic leaders, vice mere routinization.

5. Individual self-assessment and self-awareness (MBTI, SLDI, KAI, etc.) tools are vital to the strategic leadership learning and development process and should be continued.

6. Because of the age and experience level of potential strategic leaders, the adult learning model serves as a valuable tool. Its benefit is placing the onus on the student.

7. The domain of strategic leaders focuses on the future. "Leaders must have a vision, a sense of direction, but the vision



need not show any psychic foresight."<sup>2</sup> It results from awareness and knowledge of the external environment based on a combination of innate ability, experiences, and strategic leader development.

8. The armed services already do a good job of identifying and selecting strategic leaders and do not need to change their current selection processes.

**Issues.** Extensive discussion of the following issues are beyond the scope of this paper but must be considered if enhancing the development of joint strategic military leaders is to occur.

1. Development of a definitive strategic leader model.
2. Provide for the continued development of strategic military leaders after completion of the ssc.
3. Ensure leaders at the highest echelons of the military assist with the long-term mentoring of strategic leaders.
4. Encourage creativity and risk taking, particularly in light of resource constraints and job security concerns. Basic inhibitors to creative thinking include over-regulation, bureaucracy gone awry, unnecessary oversight, and a focus on efficiency versus effectiveness. Without this emphasis the military will not have its Kelly Johnson, Billy Mitchell, Hyman Rickover, or Creighton Abrams of the future.
5. Over the past decade there has been an emphasis to "power down" and empowering the workforce. The focus on TQL makes this more pronounced. While I believe that this is necessary, we must recognize that some issues must be worked at the strategic level due to their complexity and time horizon.
6. Commission additional research to differentiate between the wartime and peacetime requirements and competencies for

strategic leaders.<sup>3</sup> Most academic research focuses on the managerial and administrative aspects of strategic leadership. How does that correspond to strategic leadership in combat? And, does it differ between combat and service support organizations?

**Recommendations.** The following represent selected recommendations to enhance strategic leader development. They correspond to the previously discussed three interdependent pillars -- professional experience, professional training, and self-development.

**Institutional (joint/service specific).**

1. Avoid too much reliance upon academic research to determine strategic leadership requirements for the military. This includes ensuring that military strategic leadership doctrine uses its own lexicon where possible and not something borrowed from the academic community. Commanding, leading, and managing differ; the academia/corporate rubric may not fit. After all, the United States military appears to have done exceedingly well in developing strategic leaders, as exemplified by the results of OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD, and the previous examples of corporate success (such as IBM, General Motors, or Apple Computers) have demonstrated possible flaws in their long-term strategy.

2. As stated in the first recommendation, use terminology that is familiar to the military mind. Arrive at a joint consensus on definition of terms. If necessary, provide a "cross-walk" with academic verbiage to assist understanding and application.

3. Development of a joint leadership doctrine.<sup>4</sup>

**Organizational (primarily for ICAf, but applicable to all ssc).**

1. While all the various branches of service have virtually the same or similar values, the socialization and culturization

process differs across each of them. As the United State military moves toward a greater reliance on joint operations, we need to promote a mutual basis for understanding joint strategic military leadership. Specifically, provide extensive exposure to professional journals for all services, such as Parameters, Naval Proceedings, and the proposed National Defense University's Joint Force Quarterly. This can be accomplished by making available copies of these documents in each ssc seminar room. There must also be a concerted effort to acquaint joint strategic military leaders with writing service specific efficiency reports.

2. The MBTI, KAI Inventory, and SLDI are good materials, but a post-test experience should be provided in the spring.

3. Don't forget the roots of leadership; continue to address and emphasize the principles of leadership. Continue to emphasize and use military history to enhance the understanding of strategic military leadership concepts.

4. Make maximum use of case studies. While most of the case studies currently used are good, they were not necessarily developed for use in discussing strategic military leadership. These case studies can be developed and refined in-house.

5. Provide a more delineated break-out of the strategic decisionmaking curriculum to highlight the definition of strategic leadership and its corresponding elements.

6. Provide more personal and individual exposure to strategic leaders. This will be difficult due to the hectic schedules of strategic military leaders, but can be accomplished by providing more seminar room discussions with strategic leaders and fewer Baruch Auditorium lectures.

7. Provide the opportunity for more team efforts, e.g., require students to accomplish a low-risk, practical project that necessitates achieving consensus and coordination with sister service representatives, vice accomplishing an individual research paper. Strategic military leaders accomplish little on their own; the proposed approach is more realistic and relevant.

8. Make the ssc experience truly interactive and require the core curriculum to be team taught; have all instructors participate in most classes -- not just the ones they are responsible for.

9. Avoid the pitfall of confusing executive skills (such as computer literacy, dealing with the media, public speaking, executive writing, etc.) with strategic military leadership.

10. Establish a program to solicit active participation of corporate representatives as ICAF students.

#### **Individual.**

1.- Provide a process to formalize strategic leader mentoring. Washington, D.C. provides a relatively large number of strategic military leaders, both active duty and retired, who can be identified as strategic mentors for ICAF students. The mentor can be "contracted" to be involved with a student throughout the year. The mentor would be expected to review key papers, provide periodic discussion sessions, and involve the student in policy/decisionmaking sessions. The expectation would be that the relationship will continue after graduation.

2. Ensure that ICAF students broaden their experiences. Research has shown that one aspect of enhancing creative thinking is broad exposure to experiences and thoughts. Students should not focus efforts on areas/issues in which they are already acquainted.

3. Provide the opportunity for future voluntary self-assessment/awareness through access to the MBTI, KAI, SLDI, etc.

**Summary.** This paper has investigated the concept of strategic military leadership, surveyed existing works on the subject, identified strengths and weaknesses in current efforts to develop strategic military leaders, and proposed recommendations for enhancing the development of strategic military leaders. Specifically, Chapter 2 provided a historical context of military leadership doctrine. It noted that military leadership doctrine is dynamic and ever-evolving and generally parallels the subject in the academic community. Chapter 3 discussed the lack of definitional precision for strategic leadership and advocated the use of the U.S. Army War College definition. Chapter 4 posited that development of strategic military leaders can be enhanced and differentiated between leadership training and development.

Developing strategic leaders is essential to ensuring the future success of the military -- be it on the battlefield or in the political realm. We must remember that the requirements for wartime strategic leadership differ from those required in peacetime, but a diligent approach can ensure success.

We must sort through all the rhetoric regarding development of strategic military leaders. Our current approach is sound, but can be refined and enhanced. Understanding the complex, multidimensional phenomenon will allow the military to develop a corps of capable strategic military leaders. Yet, in the final analysis, strategic military leader development is a dynamic, continuous, and career-long process with the ultimate responsibility resting with the individual leader.

## ENDNOTES

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3. Department of the Army. Pamphlet 600-15, Leadership at Senior Levels of Command, October 1968, p. 7.
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15. JCS Publication 1.

16. Kouzes and Posner, p. xvii.

## Chapter 5 - Conclusion

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2. Kouzes and Posner, p. xvi.

3. Kenneth R. Knight, Lieutenant Colonel (USA). "Similarities/Differences in Combat/Peacetime Leadership," United States Army War College study project, 1992. Also addressed in Lieutenant Colonel John N. Paolucci's 1990 United States Army War College study report entitled "Successful Wartime Senior Leadership." These individual study projects note that there are similarities and differences in the way a leader must lead in peacetime vice combat.

4. Alan A. Fox, Lieutenant Colonel (USA). "Joint Leadership Doctrine for the Strategic Leader," United States Army War College study project, 1990. In his individual study project for the U.S. Army College, LTC Fox describes the lack of joint military leadership doctrine and provides a proposal for a joint strategic leadership doctrine.



# SIZE OF JUNIOR LEADERSHIP MANUALS

<u>PUBLICATION/DATE</u>	<u>PAGES</u>
TC 6            19 JUL 48	10
PAM 22-1        DEC 49	44
FM 22-10        MAR 51	66
FM 22-100      FEB 53	93
FM 22-100      DEC 58	119
FM 22-100      NOV 65	59
FM 22-100      JUN 73	130
FM 22-100      OCT 83	314
FM 22-100      JUL 90	84

Table 1

# SIZE OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP MANUALS

<u>PUBLICATION/DATE</u>	<u>PAGES</u>
USACGSC PAM JAN 49	20
PAM 600-15 OCT 68	234
FM 22-103 JUN 87	100
PAM 600-80 JUN 87	58

Table 2

# MBTI ICAF Classes '83 - 98

<b>ISTJ</b> 29% 93 29 ■■■■■ 92 28 ■■■■■ 91 30 ■■■■■ 90 30 ■■■■■ 89 28 ■■■■■ 88 26 ■■■■■ 83/84 33 ■■■■■	<b>ISFJ</b> 3% 2 3 ■■ 3 1 ■ 1 1 ■ 0 0 ■ 2 2 ■ 3 3 ■	<b>INFJ</b> 1% 3 ■	<b>INTJ</b> 10% 7 9 ■■■■■ 12 11 ■■■■■ 11 11 ■■■■■ 8 8 ■■■■■ 11 11 ■■■■■
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<b>ESTP</b> 4% 93 4 ■■■ 92 4 ■■■ 91 3 ■■■ 90 4 ■■■ 89 4 ■■■ 88 3 ■■■ 83/84 4 ■■■	<b>ESFP</b> 1% 1 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ 0 ■ 0 ■ 0 ■	<b>ENFP</b> 1% 1 ■ 2 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■	<b>ENTP</b> 4% 6 5 ■■■ 4 4 ■■■ 4 4 ■■■ 2 2 ■■■ 6 6 ■■■ 3 3 ■■■
<b>ESTJ</b> 18% 93 18 ■■■■■ 92 20 ■■■■■ 91 19 ■■■■■ 90 19 ■■■■■ 89 18 ■■■■■ 88 22 ■■■■■ 83/84 11 ■■■■■	<b>ESFJ</b> 3% 2 1 ■■ 2 1 ■■ 4 4 ■■ 4 4 ■■ 1 1 ■ 3 3 ■■	<b>ENFJ</b> 1% 1 ■ 2 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ 2 ■ 1 ■ 1 ■	<b>ENTJ</b> 12% 11 14 ■■■■■ 12 12 ■■■■■ 12 12 ■■■■■ 13 13 ■■■■■ 12 12 ■■■■■ 9 9 ■■■■■

■ = 1% of sample

Table 3

STRATEGIC LEADER DEVELOPMENT INVENTORY

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
Failure Factors

Scored: 08/24/92


DIMENSIONS:

Raw Scores: 1 ← Never Occasionally Always → 5


LIMITED PERSPECTIVE



EGOCENTRIC



CAREERIST



UNPROFESSIONAL



◆ = Score | = 25% || = 50% | = 75% and ▨ = Range

Table

STRATEGIC LEADER DEVELOPMENT INVENTORY

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
Success Factors

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
DIMENSIONS:

Raw Scores: 1 . . . . . 2 . . . . . 3 . . . . . 4 . . . . . 5  
 ← Below Average      Better Than Most      The Best →


CONCEPTUAL EFFECTIVENESS




TEAM BUILDING



STRATEGIC POTENTIAL



PERFORMANCE UNDER STRESS



◆ = Score    | = 25%    || = 50%    | = 75%    and    ■ = Range

# EARLIEST CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP




Figure 1

Source: U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, December 1958.

**CIVIL SERVICE AND ARMY STRATUM EQUIVALENCE**

	Corporate Organization	Federal Civil Service	British Civil Service	Army Organization	
VII	CEO	POLITICAL APPOINTEES	PERMANENT SECRETARY	★★★★ GEN JOINT EAC	20 Y
VI	EVP		DEPUTY SECRETARY	★★★ LTG CORPS	10 Y
V				★★	5 Y
IV				*	2 Y
III	Unit Mgr	GS 13 GS 12 GS 11 10	PRINCIPAL CEO SEO	LTC MAJ	1 Y
II	First Line Mgr.	GS 9 GS 8 GS 7 GS 6 5	ASS'T PRINCIPAL HEO PRINCIPAL HEO EO	CPT LT "Platoon-pany" 2LT	3 M
I	Shop & Office Floor	GS 4 GS 3 GS 2 GS 1	HCO CO CA	1SGT S/SGT SGT CPL PTE } SQUADS & TEAMS	1 D
	<b>NOTES</b>	US career service goes up to Str-V with political appointees above. British career structure goes up to Str-VII	EO, SEO, SCEO are transition roles in which it is possible to move across the Str-II, III & IV boundaries without changing grade	Combat echelons correspond to strata (including peace time time-spans). Ranks are pay grades.	


HEO, SEO, CEO, SCEO, & PEO = Higher, Senior, Chief, Senior Chief, & Principle Executive Officer; HCO - Higher Clerical Officer, CA - Clerical Asst.

Figure 2

Source: Elliott Jaques, Requisite Organizations, page pair 134.

# LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

TRAINING



LEADERSHIP  
DOCTRINE



WAR

LEADERSHIP  
CONCEPTS



LEADERSHIP  
PRINCIPLES



THEORY

Figure 3



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People cannot be managed. Inventories can  
be managed, but people must be led.

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