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## THESIS

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**CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OFFICERS:  
CAN THEY ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE FORCE?**

by

Kelly N. Campbell

December 1993

Thesis Advisor:

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Contingency Contracting Officers:  
Can They Adequately Support The Force?

by

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the training Army Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) receive from their units while they are not deployed, prepares them to accomplish their mission during contingency deployments. This was accomplished by examining previous contingency operations for problem areas and determining whether the current CCO training program is correcting these problem areas. The issues were: garrison duties vs. duties on deployment, the experience level of CCOs, training effectiveness, planning, and assistance available to CCOs during deployments.

The results of this study indicate the Army needs to re-examine the following areas: contracting experience of officers assigned as CCOs, contingency contracting guidance, specific duties of the CCO, training of Unit Ordering Officers, and the feasibility of the overall contingency contracting plan. This study recommends: using Non-Commissioned Officers as CCOs, providing firm guidance for contingency contracting, involving CCOs during early planning, and studying the size of the contracting element.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
A.	BACKGROUND . . . . .	1
B.	OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH . . . . .	4
C.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS . . . . .	4
D.	SCOPE . . . . .	5
E.	LIMITATIONS . . . . .	6
F.	ASSUMPTIONS . . . . .	6
G.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY . . . . .	6
H.	DEFINITIONS . . . . .	7
I.	ORGANIZATION OF THESIS . . . . .	8
II.	BACKGROUND . . . . .	10
A.	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	10
B.	CHANGING ARMY MISSIONS . . . . .	10
C.	PLACEMENT OF CONTRACTING OFFICERS . . . . .	12
D.	INADEQUACIES IN CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING . . . . .	15
E.	SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS . . . . .	18
F.	TRAINING . . . . .	21
G.	SUMMARY . . . . .	24
III.	THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT . . . . .	25
A.	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	25
B.	DESERT SHIELD . . . . .	26
1.	Problems with Regulations . . . . .	26

2.	The Supply System . . . . .	28
3.	Determination of Responsibility . . . . .	29
4.	The Procurement Integrity Statute . . . . .	31
5.	Training of Contingency Contracting Officers . . . . .	32
6.	Unit Ordering Officers . . . . .	34
7.	Management of Contracting Officers . . . . .	36
C.	THE NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPT . . . . .	38
1.	Contingency Contracting Officers . . . . .	38
2.	Unit Ordering Officers . . . . .	41
D.	SUMMARY . . . . .	42
IV.	SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS . . . . .	43
A.	INTRODUCTION . . . . .	43
B.	SURVEY DEVELOPMENT . . . . .	43
C.	SURVEY RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS . . . . .	45
1.	Background Information . . . . .	46
2.	Garrison Duties . . . . .	53
3.	Contingency Contracting Experience . . . . .	57
4.	Training Effectiveness . . . . .	61
5.	Coordination and Assistance . . . . .	63
6.	Future Deployment Scenarios . . . . .	66
7.	Additional Comments . . . . .	68
D.	SUMMARY . . . . .	70
V.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	72
A.	CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	72
1.	Experience . . . . .	72

2. Guidance . . . . .	73
3. Garrison Duties . . . . .	73
4. UOO Training . . . . .	74
5. Feasibility . . . . .	74
B. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	75
1. Internal Resources . . . . .	75
2. Guidance . . . . .	75
3. Planning Process . . . . .	76
4. Size of Contracting Element . . . . .	76
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS . . . . .	77
1. How should the Army train and utilize Contingency Contracting Officers in order to maintain the ability to execute their duties in the event of a deployment? . . . . .	77
2. What is the purpose of the CCO and what are the primary duties of the CCO? . . . . .	77
3. What are the unique requirements of the CCO? . . . . .	78
4. What is the best method to obtain and maintain the CCO's requisite skills? . . . .	78
5. Who are the principal sources of CCO assistance during deployment periods and what training do these personnel receive? . . . .	79
6. What deployment scenarios might a CCO face in the future and how should the CCO be employed during preparation? . . . . .	79

D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH . . . . .	80
1. Officers v. Non-Commissioned Officers as CCOs . . . . .	80
2. Army Contracting Knowledge at Commands outside the Acquisition Corps . . . . .	80
3. The Size of the Contracting Sections . . . . .	80
APPENDIX A . . . . .	81
A. Survey . . . . .	81
APPENDIX B . . . . .	89
A. List of Abbreviations . . . . .	89
LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . .	91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . .	93



## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. BACKGROUND

The Army recently added two Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) positions, Functional Area 97, to Division Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&Es), one Major, O-4, and one Captain, O-3. CCOs are Army Contracting Officers, assigned to operational divisions that might be deployed during contingency situations. They are the only military Contracting Officers assigned to divisions. Lieutenant General William H. Forster, the Army's Director of Acquisition Career Management, spoke to a group of officers during a visit to the Naval Postgraduate School in the fall of 1992 and implied that CCOs were premier positions for Army Contracting Officers. That meeting moved the researcher's thoughts toward contingency contracting and more specifically, toward the training CCOs received during garrison operations, i.e., non-deployed, which increased their ability to become force multipliers by contracting, during contingency deployments.

Prior to the end of the "Cold War", the Army's primary mission focused on the European theater in support of the NATO alliance. The logistical infrastructure was firmly entrenched throughout the European theater with US support units as well as Host Nation Support (HNS). Since the majority of US Army

divisions were dedicated to the European mission, contingency forces consisted of the Rapid Deployment Force and Special Forces.

The Army did not perceive a high priority need for contingency contracting due to the preponderance of US support and HNS units that were available in Europe, the dominant theater of operations. With the current downsizing of the US Armed Forces and the end of the "Cold War" threat from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the Army faces a highly diversified range of missions. During the past three years, the Army has deployed forces to southwest Asia, Somalia, Yugoslavia and now Macedonia. In each case, the logistics support infrastructure was non-existent. When Army forces deploy, they need the basic necessities to survive unduly harsh conditions, especially in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Somalia. In both cases, unlike the European theater, where logistical support is in place, the contingency forces with use of Contracting Officers had to establish logistics bases from ground zero. Due to a lack of time for adequate contingency planning and training for Contracting Officers, the establishment of an adequate support base proved to be a formidable task, especially during the initial stages of deployments. Currently, CCOs must be capable of providing adequate minimal support during early stages of operations, in preparation for the arrival of support units such as Division Support Command/Corps Support Command (DISCOM/COSCOM) into the

theater of operations. The necessity of support for deployed units is paramount to mission accomplishment. The following quote demonstrates the importance of contingency contracting in areas where US logistical support is not in place.

The United States Army has responsibilities that are global, extending to wherever there are national interests, obligations or commitments. The ability to meet these responsibilities demands that the Army be able to sustain itself in situations far from our national shores and perhaps from the shores of our NATO allies. Logistically, Army units will be the most vulnerable when they are deployed outside established logistical areas like Europe or Korea. In these situations, Light Divisions and other highly deployable formations could be expected to perform their missions at the end of a very extended supply line. That supply line will obviously have to give priority to uniquely military supplies (i.e. munitions, spare parts, etc.). Supplies that are not uniquely military may be available in the local economy. If so, the purchase of locally available supplies or services would take some of the "pressure" off what could be a nearly non-responsive supply line, especially in the early phase of a deployment.

[Ref. 1:p. 2]

The Army's answer to improve or meet the non-responsive supply line was the introduction of the Contingency Contracting Officer and the continued use of the Unit/Field Ordering Officer (UOO/FOO). However, even though the CCO concept is a step in the right direction to meet the logistical challenge, there is no specific training in place which addresses contingency contracting. This is especially apparent in the initial stages of a deployment. In order to be responsive to the needs of deployed forces the CCO has to be a positive asset from the start.

## **B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH**

The basic objective of this research is to determine whether the experience and training CCOs receive during non-deployed operations prepares them for contracting during contingency operations. There is ample evidence during recent contingency deployments to determine a CCO's required duties. In order to reach a conclusion about the basic objective, one must understand the primary duties and responsibilities of a deployed CCO as opposed to a non-deployed CCO. By contrasting the duties of the deployed CCO with the non-deployed CCO, the researcher attempts to discern whether the Installation contracting training and experience is beneficial to the CCO once he deploys on a contingency. To determine the training non-deployed CCOs receive, the researcher canvassed contracting professionals using a survey. The comparison of the two will provide answers as to whether the current training program is sufficient or needs to be changed.

## **C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The primary research question is: How should the Army train and utilize Contingency Contracting Officers in order to maintain the ability to execute their duties in the event of a deployment? The subsidiary questions are:

1. What is the purpose of the CCO and what are the primary duties of the CCO?
2. What are the unique contingency requirements of the CCO?

3. What is the best method to obtain and maintain the CCO's requisite skills?
4. Who are the principal sources of CCO assistance during deployment periods and what training do those personnel receive?
5. What deployment scenarios might a CCO face in the future and how should the CCO be employed during preparation?

#### D. SCOPE

The main thrust of the study is to determine how the CCOs should be utilized and trained during non-deployed periods, to prepare them for a contingency situation. The Army assigns two CCOs per active stateside division. If the personnel are not utilized in the area of contracting, then the skills they acquire at Advanced Civil Schooling and the Army Logistics Management College are being under-utilized. The researcher intends to determine whether the CCOs themselves feel there is a need for improved training. The research will concentrate on three main areas. The first area of research will attempt to determine if the CCOs duties are commensurate with the education and training provided by the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) for establishing a professional work force. The research will explore the unique duties of the CCO and evaluate how the Army plans to prepare CCOs in the event of deployments that initially receive little logistical support. Next, the research will investigate assistance available to the CCO for carrying out his duties during a deployment. The

final area of research will discuss possible deployment scenarios for CCOs.

#### **E. LIMITATIONS**

One potential limiting factor for the study is that the concept of the CCO is somewhat new. Another potential limiting factor is the low number of CCO positions that are currently occupied. The personnel system is lagging behind the Army downsizing efforts currently underway. Some divisions still have vacant CCO billets. The total number of Army officers designated as Contracting Officers was reduced by approximately 67% during the 1992 Qualification/Validation board. The Army personnel system directed this reduction in compliance with Department of the Army guidance.

#### **F. ASSUMPTIONS**

The researcher assumed the reader has knowledge of the following information throughout the thesis:

1. The enormity of logistics requirements for deployed forces.
2. The remoteness of the areas CCOs may deploy to.
3. Army communications equipment problems over long ranges.
4. The command structure of the Army.

#### **G. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The research consisted of an extensive literature review. The Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)

provided numerous articles on various areas of contingency contracting. The information was used to develop a current expectation of what CCOs should be able to do during a deployment. A survey was conducted in questionnaire format among current contracting professionals, including CCOs. The purpose of the survey was to determine whether their training prepares them for deployments. With this information, the researcher was able to conduct a comparison of deployed vs. non-deployed CCOs, and whether the training was helping to solve problems discovered during previous contingency deployments.

#### H. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions should aid the reader's understanding of contingency contracting and contracting in general:

- A. Contingency Contracting - Contracting performed in support of a peacetime contingency at an overseas location pursuant to the policies and procedures of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. [Ref. 2:p. 86]
- B. Contingency - An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require planning, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. [Ref. 3:p. 1]
- C. Contracting - Purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources. Contracting includes descriptions (but not determination) of supplies and services required, selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract

administration. It does not include making grants or cooperative agreements. [Ref. 3:p. 1]

- D. Deployment - The relocation of the force to a desired area of operations. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
- E. Deviation - Not to adhere to policy, procedure, solicitation provision, contract clause, method, or practice of acquisition actions conducted for any reason, that is inconsistent with FAR or agency regulations. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
- F. Federal Acquisition Regulation - A regulation designed to prescribe, structure and control the methods and procedures by which business is conducted in a defined segment of our economy--government procurement. [Ref. 5:p. 107]
- G. G4 - Assistant Chief of Staff, (Logistics), the primary staff officer responsible for logistics on a General Staff.
- H. Requisition - The document submitted to a supply source to obtain material. Requisitions may be transmitted by message, telephone, or radio when time is of the essence. [Ref. 6:p. A-20]
- I. Small Purchase - The acquisition of supplies, non-personal services, and construction for \$25,000 or less using small purchase procedures. [Ref. 6:p. A-20]
- J. Waiver - To give up an advantage, privilege, or right; and acknowledgement of the surrender of this advantage, privilege, or right. [Ref. 4:p. 5]

## I. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

The remainder of the thesis is organized in chronological order. Chapter II presents problematic aspects of contingency contracting from deployments within the last ten years prior to Desert Shield. Chapter III will focus on contracting during Desert Shield and the concept the Army has developed for improving contingency contracting. Chapter IV presents



the survey results and the analysis of the results. Finally, Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations generated from the study.

## **II. BACKGROUND**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter consists of information retrieved during a literature review of documents concerning contingency contracting over the past decade. First, the information demonstrates the logistical need for contingency contracting in the face of current mission changes affecting the Army. Second, it looks at the placement of Contracting Officers within organizations prior to the present policy of assigning them to DISCOMs and COSCOMs. Third, it discusses shortcomings in the contingency contracting arena over the last decade. Fourth, the research presents specific CCO requirements that emerged as a result of previous shortcomings. Finally, the discussion examines previous training and education of Contracting Officers prior to today's, and the problems that resulted because the training did not prepare them for contingencies.

### **B. CHANGING ARMY MISSIONS**

During the last four years, the Army's population dwindled from a peak of 781,000 to the present total of approximately 590,000. However, the list of contingency missions continued to grow. Presently, the Army has forces deployed in Somalia, Macedonia, Kuwait, and Egypt. The Administration is also

considering sending a large contingent to Bosnia in the former republic of Yugoslavia.

The downsizing of the Army and the changing of its global mission will demand that the Army move quickly and decisively. Army planners must recognize that operations are hampered when deployed. The exclusion of contracting capability has been a consistent problem with the deployment of forces. The doctrinal changes ongoing and those of the future place the Army in a contingency posture. [Ref. 7:p. 4]

One of the major problems experienced during recent historical deployments was the decision to deploy fighting forces first, at the expense of concurrently establishing logistical bases. The commander's need for logistical support was not met, leading to logistical problems. From Napoleon to Hitler, history has shown the importance of logistical planning and the consequences of failing to adequately plan. It seems the Army has learned lessons about the importance of logistics.

As the scale and complexity of warfare have increased, the importance of logistics to success in battle has likewise increased. An Army's ability to marshal, transport, and distribute large quantities of material and maintain the men and equipment can make the decisive difference between victory and defeat. [Ref. 7:p. 41]

In recent conflicts though, the logistics planning has been on the lean side. Contingency contracting developed from the need to provide immediate support to the deployed force. Even a small force requires basic logistical support, e.g., food and water. With the advent of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), the Army has the ability to deploy a brigade-sized

unit, approximately 3,000 soldiers, on short notice. The idea of contracting for supplies and services during contingency operations is not a new idea.

Logistics contingency plans at corps level and above identify the acquisition of supplies and services as a necessary function in all scenarios. The logistics/contingency contracting interface is vital. [Ref. 8:p. 33]

One aspect created by short notice RDF contingency deployments was a reduction in the amount of time available for pre-planning, especially in the area of logistics. As illustrated above, military history has shown when time was available for contingency planning, the results were usually more favorable.

#### C. PLACEMENT OF CONTRACTING OFFICERS

Prior to the current policy of assigning CCOs to DISCOMs and COSCOMs, Contracting Officers wore dual hats. They were assigned to a procurement office on post and were required to support operational units during deployments. They had no familiarity with the deployed units' needs as the following example alludes:

The procurement branch is responsible both to requiring activities within the 1st COSCOM, and to requiring activities elsewhere within the Corps, such as divisional and non-divisional units. As the procurement branch does not interact with these units in peacetime, it is ill-prepared to do so during contingency operations. [Ref. 8:p. 31]

The establishment of a good working relationship, familiarity with the needs of the unit, and involvement in the planning phases, would have increased the Contracting Officer's

effectiveness in support of the deployed force. The following quote provides an explanation of why a Contingency Contracting Officer needs to be involved in the logistics planning process.

As contingency contracting is a recognized alternative for solving logistics shortfalls, it is illogical to contemplate the contingency contracting function and the G4 staff element being divorced one from the other, especially during contingency operations. With no present peacetime interaction, and with limited staff authority, it is obvious that the procurement branch is not optimally placed. It is interesting to note that the perceptions of those most involved with contingency contracting are, that some senior staff officers know nothing about the mechanics of procurement, except that if funds are expended improperly, grave consequences follow. The observation was made that procurement is held to be a potentially embarrassing and legally hazardous function that is better left to the subordinate logistics operators, rather than to risk one's career. [Ref. 8:p. 32-33]

The lack of CCO support capability knowledge on behalf of senior staff officers, the major players in Army planning processes, was a major impediment in their ability to use CCOs to support deployed forces in an efficient manner.

The following statement, extracted from a paper written in 1984, persisted as policy, in principle, until the Army finally decided to assign CCOs to divisions.

A fragmented grouping of uncoordinated contingency contracting organizations exists in the United States Army today. These organizations perform very esoteric contingency contracting functions for the specific military units to which they are assigned. Often, there is little upward, downward, or lateral flow of information or interaction regarding contingency contracting. [Ref. 8:p. 27]

The lack of communication between the CCO and the unit preparing for deployment resulted in less than optimal support of the deployed forces. If the Army had extended its "Continuation of the present 'Hey, You' method of selection in designating contracting officers/ordering officers," [Ref. 1:p. ii] the lack of familiarity concerning needs of the unit would continue to impede the CCO's efforts to provide effective support to the unit. A previous study gathered the following information from some Contracting Officers' points of view.

The consensus of those interviewed was to have a contracting officer responsible for each division. Not, however, assigned to the division. This contracting officer would handle all the contract actions above \$2,500 and monitor the actions of ordering officers in the division. It was felt that the bulk of purchases could be obtained at the battalion level by organic personnel trained as ordering officers. The reduction of the small purchase requirements would enable the KOs to concentrate on large purchases and focus on the negotiating and administrative aspects of their function. [Ref. 7:p. 38]

The assignment of a CCO to a unit, responsible for supporting contingency missions in which the division deployed, would help to avoid the learning curve gap which results when unfamiliar Contracting Officers are called out to deploy with units they do not ordinarily work with. If they were able to participate in the planning process, they would be able to provide better support to the deployed forces during contingencies.

#### D. INADEQUACIES IN CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

Throughout the last decade, the experiences of CCOs have proven to be less than adequate in support of deployed forces. The failure to assign them to a specific unit, in a position where they were involved in the planning process, led to various problems. The following example demonstrates some of the pitfalls that can occur when Contracting Officers are not normally associated with the unit they deploy with.

A third example of contingency contracting inadequacies occurred during a training deployment to Jordan. Many administrative problems occurred, from late notification of the contracting officer's deployment to his not supporting his own unit. The contracting officer was not aware of the many contractual agreements that existed between the US and Jordan. Also many of the requirements that he was expected to purchase required close coordination with the local military. Many of the required services were only available through the military causing many procedural problems. [Ref. 7:p. 31]

Problems such as the aforementioned are bound to happen when CCOs lack familiarity with specific unit needs upon arrival. Including them in the planning would have alerted them to the circumstances involved in the exercise. Situations such as the Jordan training exercise left commanders with negative impressions of the Contracting Officers. They were not considered combat multipliers at all. In fact, they were perceived by the Commander as a weak link, requiring much attention and continuous corrective action.

The military Logistics Directors, in conjunction with OSD, have determined that a weakness in support during contingency operations has been on-the-scene contracting. [Ref. 9:p. 42]

Another weak area for Contracting Officers during previous deployments was their lack of hands-on experience. The Contracting Officers did not spend enough of their careers in contracting positions. The Army would send them to a school to obtain a basic understanding of contracting, and assign them to a contracting position at various locations throughout the Army. They would work as Contracting Officers for a three year period known as a nominative assignment. Some were on installations with operational units and some were not. When the Army deployed forces to Grenada, the following situation occurred:

When the contracting section from the Material Management Center of the 1st COSCOM did deploy, the contracting officers were ineffective, through no fault of their own. They had recently received formalized training but had no actual contracting experience. Because of their duty position they did have warrants to contract outside of CONUS. [Ref. 10:p. 21]

Government Service employees performed the majority of the contracting functions in the Army during that period of time and continue to do so today. These civilians have the hands-on experience that is desperately needed by CCOs.

The variety of contracting skills needed to make Contingency Contracting work is presently concentrated in a highly civilianized workforce at the Army installation level. This force is not immediately deployable. Those uniform Army personnel that are trained in contracting are almost all officers. Few of these officers have the installation level skills (i.e., small purchases, services, minor construction, etc.) needed. [Ref. 1:p. 3]



In Grenada, the lack of contracting experience, along with inadequate planning, highlighted the problems encountered by Contracting Officers.

The Army doctrine of being prepared was violated because the logisticians were not included in planning prior to the deployment of the Rangers. The original concept was to place as many "fighters" on the ground as possible and that they would need little or no combat service support (CSS). The Corps Support Command (COSCOM) was unable to deploy an entire package of CSS so sustainment items like fresh fruit, water, and fuel were bartered for or confiscated from local sources. Ordering officers, not fully understanding their responsibilities and liabilities, were afraid to spend money to purchase needed items. The two contracting officers who deployed from the 1st COSCOM did not have experience in local purchase procedures and as a result, the Fort Bragg Directorate of Contracting deployed civilian contracting officers to Grenada for a few days at a time in order to let contracts. [Ref. 10:p. 5]

Lessons learned from Grenada operations pointed to flaws in the planning phase prior to Operation Urgent Fury. One flaw was the belief that any UOO could obtain critical supplies or services, with minimal training, without critical logistical support. Another flaw was the belief that Contracting Officers could provide the necessary support with minimal training and hands-on experience in purchasing.

While Army logistical doctrine espouses the acquisition of local supplies to meet the needs of a rapidly deploying unit, logisticians have overlooked the importance of this guidance, and they have done so repeatedly. [Ref. 11:p. 5]

The presence of a CCO during the planning phases of an operation might have enabled the inclusion of contracting issues as a critical piece of the logistics annex of the

operations order. Unfortunately, the Army, until recently, only used the Contracting Officer in a reactive role instead of a proactive one. The following statement was written in 1986, but held true until the Army established a concept for contingency contracting in 1992.

Army CC is fatally flawed but realistically designed. Its systematic flaws are lack of definition, mission, regulation, etc. There is no plan to implement this capability within the existing structure. In this regard, the Army is outclassed by one of its sister services - the US Air Force. The Air Force has published a regulation on this subject - AF Regulation 70-7, Contingency Contracting Support Program - which requires each of its major commands and installations to develop supplemental implementing plans. This regulation, in fact, institutionalized this capability throughout the Air Force. [Ref. 11:p. 33]

The Army has been working on a manual for contingency contracting, but it has not been finalized as of the completion of this writing.

#### **E. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS**

The requirements placed upon CCOs demand they work in an entirely different manner than they are use to. While deployed in support of forces during contingencies, they no longer have an experienced civilian contracting safety net to rescue them in troubled waters. The CCO has to procure items needed for unit mission accomplishment. A previous study produced the following requirements for CCOs:

First, the critical demands of a contingency contracting situation are:

1. That contracting professionals can award contracts in a timely matter under urgent conditions within

the constraints of the "peacetime" laws and regulations.

2. The characteristics of a typical contingency are subject to change without warning.
3. The inexperience of commanders and customers in utilizing contracting can prolong the procurement cycle and causes problems.
4. Courtesies, customs, traditions, and security threats provide barriers when contracting in a foreign country.
5. Repetitious administrative procedures required by a "peacetime" acquisition system are carried out in this type of environment.

Second, contracting professionals can best be prepared for contingency contracting situations by developing their skills in peacetime contracting positions. [Ref. 4:p. 74-75]

During contingency operations this list of requirements poses some interesting situations for relatively inexperienced CCOs to overcome. One problem is the fact that contracting in the US during peacetime is difficult enough to do, let alone in a country with a different language, different customs and different business procedures. In remote foreign areas, merchants know they have a customer in need and can set prices as they please, especially if they are the sole source. Another major problem is the lack of knowledge on behalf of commanders of the particular laws and regulations imposed on the CCOs. The Army's dedication to mission accomplishment at all costs places the CCO in the unenviable position of having to explain situations to commanders that they do not want to hear regarding services and supplies. For example, if a

requirement for an item surfaces, and the contracting or Army regulations prohibit acquisition prior to meeting certain guidelines, e.g., FAR, AFARS, the CCO faces a dilemma. Should he obtain the item and request ratification or follow the prescribed procedures which may be detrimental for the unit? Choosing the second option led to a perceived weakness of CCOs' capabilities from the eyes of the logistical field leaders. That perceived weakness persists due, in part, to the lack of an adequate concept to change the way Army CCOs are trained and utilized.

As previously stated regarding guidance for CCOs, the Army, in comparison to the Air Force, was behind the power curve. The following information appears in the Air Force Contingency Contracting Handbook:

One of the first things CCOs need to do is to make themselves known to the on-scene commander, potential customers... contracting is there to support the unit ... the CCO can avoid ratifications by getting involved early in the process.

The second objective is to develop a simple, straightforward way for customers to submit contracting requirements.... For supply requisitions, what is needed is a good item description from the requiring activity and the requestor's name.

The CCOs responsibilities for supplies buying is more encompassing during deployments than during peacetime. There are several reasons for this. First, lack of reliable communications in many contingency areas makes it necessary to travel to the vendor's location. Secondly, most business will be "cash and carry" which requires the CCO to officially receive and deliver items on behalf of the customer. There are times, of course, when the CCO will not have to make delivery.

Contracting may receive a number of purchase requests for items which are not available in the immediate area but are possibly available at a

location serviced by another contracting office. If the deployment base has routine military flights to and from another installation, the CCO may satisfy requirements by "referring" the purchase requests to another contracting office in the area.

It cannot be overemphasized how important it is to accurately document all purchases. Since normal checks and balances may not exist during contingency situations, CCOs can be assured auditors will be interested in all paperwork when the unit returns home. Proper forms and formats are not nearly as important as having complete and accurate information, even if it is on a plain piece of paper.

While an accurate list of actual requirements at every contingency location is not possible, it is useful to have an idea of what was required during past deployment exercises. This can help in determining the types of catalogs (preferably those with pictures) CCOs need to take in contingency kits. [Ref. 12:p. 5-7]

Although this list was only a sample of what is included in the AF guidebook, the topics stimulate thought in regards to CCO job description. From the AF requirements discussed above, the Army should begin to address a method to train its CCOs to meet the high demands.

#### **F. TRAINING**

The Army has overlooked the issue of proper training for CCOs.

Many deployment after-action reports have highlighted the lack of any training or preparation by those personnel suddenly entrusted with contracting responsibilities. As officers of any branch may be called upon to act as ordering officers or contracting officer representatives during a deployment, a comprehensive short course and reference material package should be made available to combat and combat support officers.... [Ref. 3:p. B-1]

The previous statement was extracted from the Army's Operational Concept for Contingency Contracting (Draft). The importance of specific CCO training is still inadequately addressed. The draft concept failed to address the unique situations CCOs have to contend with. According to the Army's contingency contracting concept,

The "basic" training required for contracting officers is, however, the same for all levels of contracting. Those variations particular to contingency contracting should be provided within existing programs. [Ref. 3:p. B1]

As demonstrated during the problems in Grenada, the "basic" training may be the same, but the variations have not been adequately addressed. The following information helps explain why.

Both officers assigned to the Procurement Branch, AC of S, Materiel, 1st COSCOM, Ft Bragg, NC, had no previous procurement assignments. Both were recent graduates of the Management of Defense Acquisition Contracts Course (Basic). The chief of the branch had only graduated one month prior to being deployed to Grenada. [Ref. 8:p. 47]

After reading the requirements placed on CCOs, it should be fairly obvious to anyone familiar with Army operations, that contingency contracting and installation contracting are not synonymous. Depending on a CCO's experience during garrison operations, some similarities may exist. However, the environment during contingency situations is still very different due to the hands-on nature of the requirements along with the foreign aspect. The assignment of new, inexperienced Contracting Officers to contingency positions is not the

optimal situation. The following quote explains the main responsibility of every office responsible for training CCOs.

Contingency contracting officers should be properly trained. Every contracting office should ensure that each individual tasked as a contingency contracting officer is trained in contingency contracting. [Ref. 9:p. 31]

The preceding statement sounds simple but one problem with developing generic training plans for CCOs is the uncertainty as to where the next contingency will be. Failure to properly train CCOs for region-specific business customs results in situations such as the following example experienced by the Air Force:

One interviewee suggested that training should be improved. Although there are some experienced contingency contracting officers, the majority of the contracting officers in TAC lack experience. The following example illustrates how lack of training and experience may affect performance.

During an exercise a new contingency contracting officer told the using organization that three sources were required on a form 9 to order supplies. The using organization stated that there were not three sources for the supplies within the country. The contracting officer told the organization that if they did not have three sources they could not get the supplies. An experienced contingency contracting officer corrected the problem, procured the supplies, and explained to the new contracting officer that the primary job is to support the deployed unit. [Ref. 9:p. 29]

Although the example was from an Air Force study, the result was similar to experiences by Army CCOs during Operation Urgent Fury. The training methods utilized thus far by the Army result in a less than favorable perception of contingency contracting by the Army's leaders.

## **G. SUMMARY**

This chapter has shown various problematic aspects of contingency contracting from recent operations. First, it discussed changes to the Army's mission and how contingency contracting became more critical to meet the changes. Second, it addressed the placement of Contracting Officers in units and whether the units were utilizing them in the planning process. Third, the research covered previous contracting inadequacies during contingency operations. Following the discussion of inadequacies, the specific requirements for CCOs were addressed. Finally, the study discussed training for CCOs to determine whether the training was sufficient to prepare them for contingency missions or not.



### **III. THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Contingency contracting is in an evolutionary stage. Desert Shield experiences taught the Army that it needed to improve its contingency contracting capability. Only then could the CCO become a force multiplier. They realized the CCO must be able to meet the needs of deployed forces in order for units to accomplish their missions. Therefore, to meet these needs, changes must be made in the training, assignment and utilization of CCOs, and in their regulatory guidance. Contracting can and will play a significant part in the logistical support of future Army and joint force contingencies. Improvement must occur before forces deploy. By training Contracting Officers and by integrating contracting into overall force planning, the CCO should become a force multiplier from the beginning of the deployment. By providing adequate regulatory guidance, CCOs should receive training which will enable them to support deployed forces. In order to show how the Army recognized the need for improved contracting support in its contingency concept, this chapter will discuss various problem areas Contracting Officers encountered during Desert Shield. As one can imagine, complications faced in everyday contracting during normal

conditions are magnified during contingency situations. The situation the XVIII Airborne Corps Acquisition Section (CAS) faced during the early stages of deployment for Desert Shield provides many observations and examples of what can go wrong during contingency operations.

## **B. DESERT SHIELD**

### **1. Problems with Regulations**

The XVIII Airborne CAS experience during Desert Shield included:

The initial, and largest, difficulty encountered was determining the FAR, DFARS, and AFARS applicability under wartime conditions. These regulations do not contain specific guidance concerning contingency operations, nor do the procedures outlined in these regulations lend themselves to contingency operations. There was simply not enough time to follow all the normal contracting procedures. Because of the urgency to obtain goods and services, we often completed the acquisition process of solicitation, negotiations and award in five days. [Ref. 13:p. 2]

The regulations cited above are cumbersome enough in peacetime let alone contingency operations. Dealing with unique requirements in a foreign country under circumstances such as those encountered during Desert Shield added a new dimension to contracting. That new dimension is what makes contingency contracting such a challenge. There has not been enough emphasis placed on contingency contracting as evidenced by the lack of guidance provided on the subject in the FAR, DFARS or AFARS. In retrospect, this disparity occurred in part for reasons related to the inception of the acquisition

regulations to begin with. They were developed in order to consolidate and standardize the voluminous amount of procurement documentation, while simultaneously attempting to enhance the ability of Government agencies to acquire material and services in the US, at reasonable costs to the taxpayers. For DoD in particular, the regulations pertain to all contracts. They were developed with the intention of controlling the acquisition of high dollar systems and services in order to control waste and abuse in the acquisition process, and to improve the overall efficiency of the Contracting community. Contingency contracting is not addressed by regulations.

Some problem areas associated with regulations during Desert Shield include: "cost and pricing data, full and open competition, DLA approval for centrally managed items, and determination of responsibility." [Ref. 13:p. 7-9] Additionally, the Procurement Integrity Act adds unnecessary requirements. "Completion of a contract pricing proposal is much too complicated for many third world businessman...." [Ref. 13:p. 8] The complex nature of completing proposals in accordance with the FAR was incompatible with the urgency required to procure materials or services in support of deployed forces. Support of these forces is the intended purpose of sending CCOs on contingency operations. Ironically, many US contractors are unable to comply with the laborious requirements for providing cost and pricing data.

Consequently, it is ludicrous to expect foreign contractors, with different cultures and business practices, to be able to comply, especially considering the urgency of requirements. The "... increased urgency of acquisitions and the often limited sources of supply in third world countries" [Ref. 13:p. 8] added to the difficulties of obtaining full and open competition in compliance with FAR requirements. In emergency cases, sole source, with justification and approval, is an acceptable exception for the military to use to meet urgent needs. As long as the CCO is able to obtain approval, there is not a problem. However, when a conflict arises, e.g., the item is available through the supply system, and approval is not granted, the commander still wants the item "now". He does not want to hear about contracting requirements. Although some regulatory requirements are waiverable, the problem remains, i.e., the regulations do not provide the basis for the CCO to complete the mission of supporting the force in the most efficient manner.

## **2. The Supply System**

Due to the circumstances surrounding contingency operations, the normal supply system fails to adequately meet the requirements. The supply system procedures are directly responsible for some problems during contingencies.

Commonly needed supplies, which are required on a recurring basis and that the Army supply system has failed to supply in an adequate quantity, normally

does not allow waiting for DLA approval to make the acquisition in a contingency environment. [Ref. 13: p. 8]

Based on the urgency of the situation, waiting for DLA approval on centrally managed items could be the difference between life and death. This was especially true for the earliest forces deployed for Desert Shield. For example, in the case of sandbags, "... the immediate requirement was for hundreds of thousands.... The supply system was only supplying hundreds" [Ref. 13:p. 8] Thus, the regulations or a new contingency policy need to address such specific problem areas which require the CCO to diverge from regulations. Having served in Saudi Arabia, and remembering waiting for parts to arrive, it was readily apparent that the supply system was incapable of fulfilling the urgent needs for equipment to support the soldiers. CCOs and UOOs provide an invaluable service by bridging the gap in existing supply lines for items that can be purchased locally as needed. In the researcher's case, positive results of contracting were: the availability of laundry service, personal hygiene facilities, and a generator to provide electricity for light sets.

### **3. Determination of Responsibility**

The question of responsibility comes up in every contracting decision. During Desert Shield, CCOs' unfamiliarity with the business customs increased the

difficulty of the decision. Unlike US contractors who are required to comply with the provisions of the FAR, the Saudis had a completely different way of conducting business.

First, a preponderance of businessmen in third world countries are general traders. Thus very few of the materials on which a contractor may quote are actually in stock and directly under the contractor's control. [Ref. 13:p. 9]

Without knowledge of a source's prior performance, and an urgent need to acquire an item, the CCO faces additional risk every time he contracts for items the contractor does not have on hand. He must consider whether or not the contractor can actually deliver the requisite item, whether the contractor has the means to deliver the item to an agreed upon rendezvous location, and whether the quality of the product meets the specifications of the purchase request. And then comes the matter of price. Without a base knowledge of the local market, the CCO is at a particular disadvantage. In addition to whether the contractor is responsible, he must make the decision as to whether the price is fair and reasonable.

In addition to the problems with foreign merchants, units often fail to clearly state their needs.

The CAS received DA Form 3953 that contained little or no useful information that would allow purchase of an item. The units wanted something, but could not tell the contracting officer exactly what they wanted. Realizing that the units were sometimes hard pressed for time and in need of the requested item, the contracting officer would try to read the mind of the requesting unit. [Ref. 13:p. 15]

The uncertainty of what the unit actually required compounded the difficulty for determination of responsibility. Though the proactive efforts of the CCOs in trying to decipher the requirement were commendable, those efforts were not the most efficient or effective use of their time. To be more efficient, they should have immediately requested the unit to clarify the requirement in order to acquire the correct item. The purchase request needs to fully specify the requirement. Only then can the CCO determine the requirement and whether a contractor can fulfill the requirement. Providing any less specificity causes confusion and frustration for the commander, who receives the wrong item, consequently requiring the CCO to start the process again. The lack of a peacetime communication system to obtain corrections in a timely manner was also a limiting factor for the CCO. Faced with these types of situations, the CCO was unreasonably challenged with making determinations of responsibility.

#### **4. The Procurement Integrity Statute**

During Desert Shield, the provisions required by the Procurement Integrity Statute placed an unnecessary burden on the CCOs, in that:

Most businessmen dealt with during this operation did not understand the reason or the requirement...and usually would sign anything in order to make a sale.  
[Ref. 13:p. 9]

The Saudi merchants' business customs differed from those of US contractors. There was no reason to impose the provisions

of the statute on Saudi contractors. The Procurement Integrity Statute prohibits the following actions:

...(1) offering future employment or business opportunity to a Government procurement official; (2) giving any money, gratuity, or other thing of value to a procurement official; (3) soliciting or obtaining any proprietary or source selection information concerning a procurement from a procurement official.  
[Ref. 15:p. 2-13]

Saudis were unfamiliar with US law, and who could blame them, they were not required to comply with it in their country. The possibility of the statute applying to contracts in Saudi Arabia was not likely. Desert Shield offered Saudis a chance to make extra money. However, the merchants did not always want to sign contracts. Many preferred to deal in cash.

There is a general distrust in financial institutions. It is not unusual to see a Saudi walk into a bank or money exchange and open a large briefcase filled to the brim with bills of large denominations; many employees may request to be paid in cash each payday.  
[Ref. 14:p. 13]

Since the practice of cash and carry was prevalent, the Saudi businessmen expected to be paid at the time of the transaction. The Saudis wanted the business but did not want to adjust their business customs to comply with US laws. The Procurement Integrity Statute administrative provisions seem non-applicable in foreign countries.

##### **5. Training of Contingency Contracting Officers**

The CCOs' training prior to arrival in Saudi Arabia did not prepare them to conduct contingency contracting. They were not familiar with problems caused by Saudi business



customs, the climate, the hands-on work involved, lack of knowledge regarding sources, or the increased urgency of needs. They were trained to work as Contracting Officers at Installation DOCs, where there are civilian experts to rely on when CCOs can not solve their own problems.

The ALMC preparatory course for Contracting Officers concentrated on preparing students for formalized contracting in a fixed and stable environment. No mention was made of contracting in a contingency environment such as Desert Shield. [Ref. 13:p. 19]

Whatever the level of experience of the Contracting Officers, the culture shock upon arrival in Saudi Arabia complicated matters. The culture, customs, and weather were completely different from Installation contracting. The change in atmosphere between working in an Installation Directorate of Contracting, and working out of a tent in the desert, took quite an adjustment. The CCOs had to locate sources, make their own living and transportation arrangements, and arrange for the arrival of follow-on units. They had to arrange transportation for thousands of troops in just days. They also had to overcome a language barrier. In addition to the problems listed above, the need to deploy quickly prevented prior planning that normally precedes a deployment.

Units deploying on an exercise or an actual emergency deployment such as Desert Shield cannot fully anticipate all requirements before deploying; many immediate requirements can only be identified and filled once the unit arrives at their deployment location. [Ref. 13:p. 1]

Due to the shortage of planning time, the initial workload for the CCOs was enormous. This added burden compounded the CCO's responsibilities until follow-on support units arrived.

#### 6. Unit Ordering Officers

During Desert Shield, UOOs reduced some of the workload for the CCOs. However, the UOOs also contributed to the problems faced by the CCOs.

Unit ordering Officers are limited in the types of items they may purchase such as no personal comfort items or ADPE. There were instances where ordering officers bought these, and other unauthorized items in violation of their appointment letter. Failure by their unit's chain of command to monitor and check these abuses placed a further strain on the CAS. [Ref. 13:p. 10]

The CCOs appointed the UOOs and briefed them on their duties. UOOs could not be fully monitored because they worked for their unit commander. However, the "CCOs were responsible for monitoring the ordering officers funds and purchases." [Ref. 13:p. 10] The task did not seem to be so difficult until the research revealed "740 UOOs procured close to \$13,000,000 worth of supplies and services." [Ref. 13:p. 10] The geographical dispersion of units during Desert Shield compounded the task of monitoring UOO activities. The UOOs also displayed a lack of knowledge as to what their limits were.

Unit ordering officers need to be more familiar with the limits of their appointment. This should be completed, if possible, at the home station prior to deployment. There is insufficient time to ensure a

thorough briefing of officers after arrival within the theater of operations. [Ref. 13:p. 23]

CCOs should have ensured proper training took place prior to deployment. Once CCOs deployed, they did not have the luxury of additional time to train UOOs. Reading a briefing about what a UOO's limitations are should not constitute a UOO training program. It could almost be called negligence on the part of CCOs and commanders, considering some UOOs were untrained, aside from an "initial briefing concerning their duties" [Ref. 16:p. 2], yet they "were appointed to purchase urgently needed items valued at less than \$2,500.00" [Ref. 13:p. 1] without violating any rules. The problem is the definition of an urgent need. An urgent need to one person may not coincide with what someone else thinks. The UOOs were rated by their unit commanders, and based on the commander's perceived needs, it was likely that some UOOs were pressured into purchasing supplies they should not have bought. The commander's perception may not have coincided with the UOO's standard procedures. During contingencies, documentation of purchases is very important in accounting for funds.

Records of purchases made by the unit ordering officers was another area of concern to the CAS. Several unit ordering officers destroyed their records just prior to the beginning of the ground offensive.... [Ref. 13:p. 10]

The UOOs' actions destroyed the audit trail of their purchases. Without the trail, the units lost accountability for funds used and equipment purchased. In addition to this

blunder, a memorandum from 1st COSCOM cited three additional problems concerning UOOs:

(1) Units utilized UOOs to bypass the supply system because little work was involved. This negated the ability to build demand histories within the supply system and to allow the supply system to work as designed.

(2) Unit commanders, on numerous occasions did not become actively involved in their UOOs' actions until threat of CID investigation or fund authority withdrawal occurred.

(3) Because COSCOM received units from different stateside locations, many Ordering Officers were placed on orders from different Contracting Officers. These Contracting Officers had different procedures, which caused confusion throughout COSCOM. [Ref. 17:p. 20-2]

The assistance the UOOs offer the CCO outweighs the negative effects presented in this section. However, proper training prior to deployment can help avoid the occurrence of such problems.

#### **7. Management of Contracting Officers**

During Desert Shield, the XVIII Airborne CAS consolidated all CCOs into one large section. They justified doing so as a precautionary measure against possible conflicts of interest that might arise between CCOs and logisticians within the divisions. Even though units deploy during contingency operations, the CCO is still guided by FAR requirements. Staff personnel could easily apply pressure to the CCO to perform illegal actions. An example would be to

force the splitting of requirements to meet the small purchase threshold. This is clearly a violation of the FAR.

AFARS 1.6 warns that contracting officers should not be assigned to positions where interdepartmental pressure might lead the contracting officer to perform improper acts that expose the individual to personal risk and subject the Army to criticism. When contracting officers provide direct support to division size and smaller units, the potential for inappropriate pressure on the contracting officer to fill local purchase needs, regardless of the methodology, increases significantly. The reason for this is that the logistics staff, which is charged with filling the requirement, also directly supervises and rates the contracting officer. Several contracting officers were attached to a division during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Divisions have no infrastructure to support a contracting officer and therefore little understanding of how to utilize one. This is why the contracting officers worked at the Corps Acquisition Section and not at the division level.... [Ref. 13:p. 13]

The preceding statement summarized a large problem that is inherent throughout the Army. The rating system plays a large part in the career of every officer. A subordinate must obey legal orders from a superior. Mission accomplishment is the ultimate measure of success or failure in the Army. To fail offers the commander grounds to remove the non-performer. Commanders realize the importance of mission accomplishment, and their subordinates realize that their future depends on their successes or failures. Staff members issue orders to their subordinates in an attempt to accomplish their assigned tasks. In the case of Contingency Contracting Officers, a low-density specialty, e.g., two per division, the G4/S4 does not want to hear that "it can not be done." The staff member

may be unfamiliar with the FAR and other legal requirements involved in contracting. The only thing everybody wants, including the CCO, are results. A CCO faces a unique problem. In many cases, the CCO's normal rating chain of command during peacetime does not deploy during contingency operations. When this is the case, the CCO must adapt to a new rater during contingencies. The new rater has different expectations than the garrison rater because of the difference in missions between Installation contracting and contingency contracting. Although the CCOs are actually assigned to DISCOM/COSCOM, during periods of non-deployment, the logistics unit leadership does not rate CCOs.

### **C. THE NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPT**

#### **1. Contingency Contracting Officers**

During the initial stages of Desert Shield, the lack of prior training and planning caused numerous problems for CCOs and UOOs. As a result, the Army realized it needed to develop a concept for contingency contracting situations. In order to accomplish the task, the Army published a draft concept for contingency contracting in July of 1992. First, they defined the purpose, "to provide field commanders an effective force multiplier of combat service support for deployed forces." [Ref. 18:p. 2]

The Army's concept states that it is important to remember that first and foremost,

the mission of CCOs is to act as special staff officers to the CDR, provide organic contracting training and support in preparation for, and during contingency operations. [Ref. 18:p. 3]

Even though the FAR, DFARS and AFARS contain various requirements that CCOs must comply with, they still need to support the commander.

The goals of the concept for CCOs are to:

- (1) Reduce dependence on CONUS-based logistics system.
- (2) Improve response time.
- (3) Free airlift and sealift.
- (4) Augment existing logistics support.
- (5) Consolidate CCOs into central offices when appropriate.
- (6) Ensure contracting solutions are considered in planning. [Ref. 18:p. 4]

Even though the goals are logical, a problem still exists. The concept does not address training for CCOs to prepare them for duties during contingency operations. It does not address the region-specific skills that a CCO needs. The integration of the CCO into the logistics system is critical for successful contingency contracting. Without proper prior planning, the CCO becomes a reactive figure instead of proactive. Of course, unforeseen situations will arise, but proper planning and communication between the members of the logistics system will help to minimize the impact of no-notice

requirements. According to the Army's Operational Concept for Contingency Contracting (Draft),

The concept combines separate contracting elements located in COSCOM Headquarters and the COSCOM Material Management Center (MMC) into a single contracting element within the COSCOM Headquarters. The concept adds a contracting element consisting of two officers and supporting enlisted personnel to the Division Support Command (DISCOM) Headquarters, and retains the newly established contracting elements in ASGs and CSGs. [Ref. 3:p. 4]

Assigning the CCOs to the COSCOM/DISCOM should aid in their contribution to the integration of contracting into the overall logistics support system. The CCOs should be able to familiarize themselves with the normal requirements of the supported units, and begin to plan for contingency situations that already exist, or for future situations that may arise, throughout the world. They will receive basic guidance from the commander and the G4 channels. The G4 should become more familiar with the abilities of, and constraints faced by the CCO, and implement that information into the operational plan. The guidance CCOs receive will enhance their ability to determine the situations they may face in the future. This should enable them to familiarize themselves with possible areas of deployment ahead of time.

A second part of the concept states,

Unit Contracting Officers may work in the Directorate of Contracting (DOC) at their installation to develop skills necessary to maintain qualifications as Contracting Officers, and maintain proficiency in contracting laws and procedures. In order to remain responsive to their units' requirements and procedures, they should participate in field exercises



and training with their parent unit. They also will cooperate with G4 and other staff elements to assure coordinated preparedness for deployment. [Ref. 3:p. 4]

By working in the DOC, the CCO can develop general contracting skills.

Small purchases... are usually the greatest volume of work in an installation contracting office. The same will likely be true in any contingency contracting situation. [Ref. 1:p. 24]

Hands-on contracting experience is critical for CCOs since that is their primary mission during a contingency situation. However, they must remain in tune with the unit they will support during deployments. This entails deploying on field exercises, maintaining liaison with the logistics units, and becoming proactive in the unit's contingency planning process. Unlike peacetime contracting, they need to be able to support the force without assistance.

## 2. Unit Ordering Officers

The important assistance CCOs receive during deployments comes from UOOs.

Unit commanders nominate ordering officers from within their organization. Nominated UOOs are then appointed by persons authorized in AFARS 1.698. They receive instructions and guidance from the Contracting Officer, but are not assigned or attached to the contracting element. [Ref. 3:p. 8]

It is critical that UOOs receive training on a recurring basis so that in the event of a contingency, they can perform their duties and relieve some of the CCO's burden. The UOO is the most responsive source the commander has when needs arise.

However, the UOO's actions/responsibilities must remain within prescribed legal limits regardless of the situation.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

This chapter demonstrated why the Army developed a new concept for contingency contracting. It reviewed various problems the XVIII Airborne CAS encountered during the early stages of Desert Shield. Those problem areas included: regulatory requirements, the lack of responsiveness in the supply system, the CCO's ability to determine a foreign contractor's responsibility, and the training of CCOs and UOOs. This chapter also discussed the new Army concept developed in order to meet the challenges presented by contingencies for CCOs in the future.

#### **IV. SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS**

##### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The necessity for a contingency contracting training program evolved when the Army decided to assign CCOs to DISCOMs and COSCOMs. The purpose of this survey is to determine whether a viable training plan has been developed, and if so, is the training plan successful? In order to accomplish an assessment of current training, surveys were sent to CCOs and their supervisors. The responses present a snapshot of the effectiveness of the training program. The training plan is in its infant stages and is proving to be difficult to develop, since every conceivable contingency has its own peculiarities. Since the Army defines training plans for every type of unit and individual, the lack of attention given to contingency contracting is somewhat of a surprise.

##### **B. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT**

In order to assess the training CCOs receive, the research has to address certain areas that could have an effect on the eventual performance of their duties. The survey requests information to help determine whether CCOs are utilized in an effective manner which might prevent some of the problems discussed earlier from reoccurring. The first area of concern is to determine the CCO's normal duties in a garrison

environment. More specifically, are they expected to conduct duties as Contracting Officers or special projects officers? Sometimes, Army officers in low-density branches receive additional duties not associated with their specialty. Some officers put a standard duty description on their OER Support Form, but then they perform tasks not associated with their position until it is time to deploy. As stated earlier, CCOs need to be familiar with hands-on contracting.

The second area of concern addresses whether CCOs know what field commanders expect from them during deployments, and if their garrison duties prepare them to meet those demands. The critical planning required prior to deployment stood out as a glaring weakness during the literature review. The researcher attempts to find whether assigning CCOs to DISCOMS/COSCOMS helps to resolve the planning problems caused by the CCO working in the Directorate of Contracting. The questions are designed to allow the respondents to provide a self-assessment of their ability to perform duties as a deployed CCO. The goal is to determine if CCOs think the training they receive would enable them to support deployed forces in contingency situations.

The third area of concern addresses the working relationship between CCOs and their assistants, UOOs and enlisted assistants, during periods of non-deployment. As stated previously, the UOOs should play an important role during contingency operations. Since the CCOs are responsible

for training UOOs, there should be frequent interactions between them concerning coordination for the purchase of needed supplies and services. In developing a Contracting Support Plan, these interactions would aid CCOs during their planning process prior to deployment.

To avoid a random selection of answers to the survey questions, the respondents were asked to explain why they chose their response to each question. In hope of obtaining accurate responses, the anonymity was held confident by the researcher. Names are provided only in order to contact individuals where follow-up information is required.

The analysis of information consists of a comparison of responses by current CCOs with problem areas previously experienced by deployed CCOs. The background information offers the opportunity to conduct comparisons by experience, and level of skills attained. Finally, the overall responses by CCO supervisors provide a contrast between the perceptions of senior contracting personnel and those of current CCOs.

#### **C. SURVEY RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS**

Surveys were sent to 23 individuals, with 18 of those being CCOs. Fifteen surveys were returned for a response percentage rate of approximately 65%.

## 1. Background Information

### a. Rank:

The respondents' ranks range from Sergeant First Class through Lieutenant Colonel, and includes one civilian employee. Table 4.1 contains the inclusive totals.

**Table 4.1**  
**Rank**

RANK	#	Relative Frequency (%)
SFC/E-7	1	6.67
CPT/O-3	7	46.67
MAJ/O-4	3	20.00
LTC/O-5	3	20.00
GM-14	1	6.67

### b. Time in Service

The time in service (Table 4.2) gives the impression that the respondents are a seasoned group of military professionals. The majority of respondents, 86.67%, have over 10 years of military experience.

**Table 4.2**  
**Time in Service**

Years	#	Relative Frequency (%)
$5 < x \leq 10$	2	13.33
$10 < x \leq 15$	6	40.00
$x > 15$	7	46.67

**c. Current Position:**

As shown in Table 4.3, the majority of the respondents, 66.67%, are CCOs. The positions held by the respondents offer a variety of viewpoints concerning training.

**Table 4.3  
Current Position**

Position	#	Relative Frequency (%)
Director of Contracting	3	20.00
CCO	10	66.67
Program Manager	1	6.67
Contracting NCO	1	6.67

Although no authorized position for a Contracting NCO exists in the Army, the NCO respondent works in an Acquisition Section and has experience. During garrison operations, the Directors of Contracting assume the role as CCO trainers.

**d. Time in Position:**

Comparing Table 4.2 with Table 4.4 shows a sharp contrast between respondents time in their present positions and their time in service. Over 86% of the respondents have served two years or less in their current positions. The lack of contracting experience proved to be a shortcoming during past contingencies. Some of the respondents are so

inexperienced, they are unable to assess the effectiveness of their unit's training program.

**Table 4.4**  
**Time in Position**

Years	#	Relative Frequency (%)
$0 < x \leq 2$	13	86.67
$2 < x \leq 5$	1	6.67
$x > 5$	1	6.67

Ironically, the only CCO with greater than two years of experience is due for reassignment. The civilian employee is the most experienced person serving in his current position.

**e. Do you have a Contracting Officer's Warrant?**

The CCOs' ability to successfully complete their duties depends on their ability to purchase supplies and services for deployed forces. The CCO must be warranted to obligate Government funds. Without warrants, CCOs are an administrative burden. The percentage of warranted respondents is 46.67%, but the percentage of CCO respondents warranted is 26.67%.



**Table 4.5**  
**Warranted Contracting Officers**

Response	#	Relative Frequency (%)
Yes	7	46.67
No	8	53.33

Inclusion of the three Directors of Contracting inflates the number of warranted respondents. These personnel would not deploy for contingency operations, but ironically, they have the responsibility to train CCOs during non-deployed periods.

*f. How long have you had your warrant?*

Table 4.6 shows the lack of experience among respondents with warrants. The reader should keep in mind that the requirement for a normal warrant is usually two years of contracting experience, in addition to achieving required levels of education. However, some of the respondents receive temporary warrants, up to \$25,000, during periods of deployment.

**Table 4.6**  
**Years with Warrant**

Year(s)	#	Relative Frequency (%)
$0 < x \leq 1$	6	75.00
$1 < x \leq 4$	1	25.00
$x > 4$	1	25.00

**g. Highest level of education completed:**

The educational achievements of the respondents should lead the reader to believe that the Army is attempting to comply with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, which requires Acquisition Corps members to obtain advanced levels of education. The only individual without a Bachelor's degree was the NCO.

**Table 4.7  
Education Level**

Level	#	Relative Frequency (%)
High School, Some College	1	6.67
Bachelor Degree	5	33.33
Master Degree	9	60.00

**h. Government Contracting classes:**

The respondents have attended many of the Government contracting classes. The respondents lack of participation in the Contract Administration class is one discernable weakness. Given that the CCO must handle many "cradle to grave" projects during deployments, the contract administration course should receive additional emphasis.

**Table 4.8**  
**Completed Contracting Classes**

Class	# attended	Class	# attended
Mgmt Def Acq Contracting (Basic)	15	Contract Law	10
Mgmt Def Acq Contracting (Advanced)	9	Cost & Pricing (Basic)	7
Small Purchase	9	Contract Administration	2

***i. Raters' and Senior Raters' Duty Positions:***

Raters and senior raters have the ability to mentor and improve the CCO's duty performance in the garrison environment. However, the Garrison Commander and Director of Contracting do not deploy. Unless the contracting function is centralized under a senior Contracting Officer, the contingency rating scheme consists of senior logistics officers in the deployed force.

**Table 4.9**  
**Rater's Duty Position**

Position	#	Relative Frequency (%)
Director of Contracting (DOC)	7	46.67
Garrison Commander	4	26.67
Chief, Corps Acq	1	6.67
Corps G4	1	6.67
Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting	1	6.67

**Table 4.10**  
**Senior Rater's Duty Position**

Position	#	Relative Frequency (%)
Commanding General	2	13.33
Chief of Staff	2	13.33
Garrison Commander	4	26.67
Group Commander	1	6.67
Dep. Group Commander	1	6.67
G4	3	20.00
Chief, Corps Acq Section	1	6.67

Tables 4.9 and 4.10, illustrate a wide spectrum of personnel in the CCO rating chains. The inconsistency in rating chains demonstrates the lack of an established CCO rating system. Some of the differences are due to the type of unit and the assets available at the post. The CCO's primary rater would not deploy in most instances. The responses show that appropriate personnel rate the CCOs during non-deployed periods. The majority of respondents will have different raters if they deploy on contingency operations.

**j. OER Support Form Duty Description:**

The OER Support Form duty descriptions are used to determine what CCOs perceive their jobs to be. The respondents have similar ideas concerning their duty descriptions. Some of the newer CCOs admit they do not fully understand their jobs yet.

## 2. Garrison Duties

The statements in the remaining sections of the survey utilize the following scale to solicit input from the respondents, in particular, the CCOs:

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	No Strong Opinion	Agree	Strongly Agree

The following sections afford the reader the opportunity to study the respondents' answers to the survey questions. Each box contains the responses on the bottom line and the choices on the top. Additionally, each question offers the respondent the opportunity to explain why they chose their respective response. This section attempts to determine what CCOs do during periods of non-deployment and whether the duties they perform aid them in preparing for contingency operations.

**a. My OER Support Form duty description matches my daily duties.**

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
0	0	4	5	1

There is no major discrepancy between CCOs' duty descriptions and their actual Installation duties. Two of the undecided individuals are very new to their assignments. The NCO did not respond to this question. Based on the responses, the CCOs do not receive special non-contracting projects. If this is the case for CCOs, it should enhance their ability to

train for contingencies. A special project usually takes up inordinate amounts of the officer's time.

- b. My garrison duties prepare me to conduct CCO duties while deployed in support of a contingency operation.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
0	1	3	4	3

Of the CCOs who strongly believe their garrison duties prepare them for contingency operations, one is chief of a contracting section, and two are lone CCOs at their unit. The Contracting NCO disagrees and the newest officers can not determine whether their duties prepare them or not. The written responses indicate CCOs' garrison contracting duties help, but do not totally prepare them for contingencies. A sample of responses are:

1. Yes, because I do contracting work daily.
2. I am prepared but there is no training for actual deployment.
3. My current duties help, but would not completely prepare me for CCO.

Although the respondents feel they can perform CCO duties, they believe the training could improve. Based on results from previous contingencies, CCOs seem to be more aware of the contingency requirements and are conducting hands-on training. This should improve the ability of CCOs to provide support.

**c. I am heavily involved with the Directorate of Contracting.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
0	1	1	1	8

Responses are identical for daily and weekly contact with the DOC. The data indicate CCOs are assigned to positions which improve their contracting skills. This is in keeping with the Army's operational contingency contracting concept and lessons learned from Desert Shield. The data indicate CCOs are gaining valuable hands-on contracting experience, which was rated a major weakness during previous contingency deployments.

**d. I receive training for contingency contracting at my home station.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
0	2	5	2	2

Even though four of the respondents state they receive contracting training at their Installation, the majority of the CCOs feel it lacks contingency training aspects. Some of the comments are:

1. I perform self-training.
2. All preparations for deployment are my own. There is no guidance provided.
3. I have worked on SOPs (Standing Operating Procedures) and put together a contingency contracting text.

4. I have not seen or been exposed to any specific contingency contracting training.

The majority of contingency contracting training for CCOs seems to be self-taught. The Army's contingency concept is also vague concerning specific CCO contingency training. As stated earlier in Chapter III, the concept calls for units to provide specific contingency training. Based on the responses listed above, not all of the units are in compliance. Although the DOC is responsible for training the CCO, the DOC is not deployable. Because of this, the DOC may not have the knowledge, or desire, to perform region-specific training.

- e. *I am sufficiently trained at home station to be able to deploy and conduct contingency contracting.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
0	2	4	4	1

Three of the five respondents who agree, deployed during actual contingency operations. The two respondents who disagree also have actual contingency deployment experience. The literature review revealed that Contracting Officers were unprepared to conduct contingency contracting in the past. The survey responses indicate a better level of preparation by current CCOs even though they believe training needs to improve. The education Contracting Officers receive, combined with the hands-on experience they obtain during non-deployed periods, enables CCOs to possess the basic contracting skills. CCOs believe the contracting skills help prepare them, but the



addition of region-specific training will complete the training package, in accordance with the Army contingency contracting concept.

### **3. Contingency Contracting Experience**

#### **a. I have experience as a CCO.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
0	2	2	2	5

Approximately 64% of the respondents have CCO experience. By virtue of being assigned to a CCO position, some respondents consider themselves experienced. For example, one respondent with less than five months time in his position "considers himself an experienced CCO, but is not warranted". Another, who has been a CCO for nearly two years considers himself to "have no experience due to the lack of a deployment." While their circumstances differ, the answers provide a range of opinions concerning experience. Since the AAC requires Contracting Officers to remain single-tracked within the contracting field, the experience factor variances should fade as experienced Contracting Officers become CCOs.

#### **b. I have experience as a deployed CCO.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
1	1	1	3	5

Almost 73% of the CCOs deployed on either contingency deployments or training exercises. The five who strongly agree, deployed during actual contingencies to

include Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. One of those who deployed to Somalia during Restore Hope stated:

"The amount of contracting they conducted in country was minimal. Most transactions were coordinated through other agencies located in other countries." The situation in Somalia indicates a sample of the problems CCOs must plan for. They can be deployed on short notice to unfamiliar areas. If they have an idea of what to expect upon arrival, they can provide better support.

*c. I agree with the current definition of a CCO.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
0	1	6	3	1

The research provides a concrete definition as stated in Chapter I. Many responses indicate a lack of familiarity with the definition. Some of the comments are:

1. What is the definition?
2. As defined by who/what?
3. I haven't seen the current definition.
4. Not sure which definition you refer to.

DoD's definition is not long and drawn out. In fact, it is fairly succinct and to the point. The researcher assesses the lack of familiarity with the definition as a weakness. As a CCO, the officer should know the definition of his job title.

**d. My garrison duties parallel the duties of a deployed CCO.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
0	4	5	1	1

Only one CCO who deployed previously, agrees with this statement. The responses indicate a disconnect between the contracting requirements in a remote area and the training CCOs receive at an installation. It is difficult to replicate contingency contracting situations at Installations. However, this does not justify lack of contingency training. The lack of contingency training for CCOs represents a basic problem with Army contingency contracting. The Army training philosophy is to train as you will fight. Though contingencies may not involve fighting, the principle holds true, i.e., during garrison operations, CCOs do not train to operate as they would during deployments. The researcher's assessment is that a stronger link between the DISCOM/COSCOM planning cells and CCOs may provide a better training scenario for CCOs.

**e. Based on my level of training, I could provide immediate support to a deployed force.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
0	0	2	4	5

A CCO's primary mission is to provide immediate support to deployed forces. The majority of respondents believe they can provide immediate support to deployed forces.

Except for the newest Contracting Officers assigned to CCO positions, the respondents think they can accomplish their mission. The literature review indicated that during previous contingency deployments, Contracting Officers could not adequately support forces. Based on previous questions, there appears to be little evidence of contingency training besides self-preparation. A majority of the respondents indicate CCO garrison duties do not parallel duties while deployed. Given this information CCOs must rely on their own training and previous experience to explain their confidence level. It appears that the Army needs to re-evaluate and define proficiency levels for CCOs.

*f. My training prepares me for the unique requirements of CCOs, e.g., language barriers, lack of sources, currency, control of Unit/Field Ordering Officers (UOOs/FOOs).*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
1	4	2	3	1

The CCOs who believe their training prepares them, consists of CCOs who participate in field exercises or have actually deployed during contingencies. The majority of those who disagree, respond that "no specific CCO training exists." Units plan for specific contingency areas. The DISCOM/COSCOM should be able to provide the CCO enough information to prepare a training plan for known areas. The failure to incorporate CCOs into planning cells is probably the main reason for the lack of region-specific training, a major

requirement for contingency contracting. One respondent writes, "I'm aware of these training problems, and like any other officer, you develop solutions and drive on." Of course the CCO must develop solutions, but the support will improve dramatically if CCOs receive region-specific training prior to deployments. CCOs will not find themselves in constant reactive modes.

#### 4. Training Effectiveness

*a. I have suggestions that could improve training for CCOs.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
1	0	5	3	2

Most of those who agree with this statement fail to offer input, while those with no strong opinion provide comments. One response sums up what seems to be the key to the contingency contracting training problem.

It's hard to have suggestions when no real guidance has been provided to you. I try to get as much information as possible but am a rarity here.... No one here 'really' understands what I do. There is no urgency until it comes time for deployment.

Overlooking contingency contracting support until time for deployment probably happens because CCOs work in the non-deployable DOC. Although continuous logistics planning occurs, CCOs are not involved. As a result, they perceive a lack of training guidance. Thus, it becomes difficult for the CCO to train or prepare in a realistic manner. Another part of the problem stems from the fact that some newly designated

Contracting Officers are assigned to CCO positions. Another response states, "Suggestions are difficult because it takes at least one year of contracting experience to be familiar with all the rules and regulations." The Army's Contingency Contracting Concept attempts to alleviate the training problem by having the DOC train CCOs at the Installation. The researcher's assessment of DOC training is that CCOs receive basic contracting training, but fail to receive region-specific contracting training.

*b. I think ALMC should develop a course to educate CCOs.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
1	0	1	3	6

The overwhelming majority agree with this statement. The only respondent who disagrees wants "a clear policy on contracting doctrine as the #1 priority." The Army's position that "training for contracting officers remains the primary responsibility of the U.S. Army Logistics Management College (ALMC)" [Ref. 3:p. 4], should support a class for CCOs, or for those responsible for training CCOs. The researcher's assessment is that ALMC assumes the basic contracting education responsibility, but feels the contingency aspects should be handled at the unit level.

**c. My daily duties allow me to obtain and retain the requisite skills of a CCO.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
0	2	4	4	1

The CCOs generally believe that Installation contracting experience does help them obtain and maintain the requisite contracting skills. There is a problem though, as one experienced CCO states,

My daily duties involve Post/Camp/Station contracting which I believe is the closest parallel to CCO available. It still falls very short of providing all of the skills necessary.

Part of the training problem is that some CCOs are relatively inexperienced in contracting. Therefore, they have to learn contracting through a series of classes and OJT. By spending so much time learning how to be Installation Contracting Officers, new CCOs do not prepare themselves for contingency operations. The assignment of more experienced Contracting Officers to CCO positions might prevent some of the contracting problems that have happened in the past.

**5. Coordination and Assistance**

**a. I plan for contingencies with the G4 and DISCOM/COSCOM reps.**

<b>strongly disagree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>no strong opinion</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>strongly agree</b>
1	2	3	3	2

Two of the respondents who agree are not assigned to a division or a corps asset. Another, who strongly agrees

said, "it has gotten better over the last 6-12 months, but needs more planning together to act instead of react." This statement leads the researcher to believe that planning is not as effective as it needs to be. One of the CCOs states,

I have worked with reps from the G4 on several deployments. As the reps change I tend to get left out of the planning process and get remembered as the wheels go up on the plane.

For the CCO to be involved, there must be two-way communication. If CCOs do not attempt to actively participate in the planning process, they will probably be left out. The result might resemble the rocky starts witnessed during Desert Shield or Grenada.

- b. *I conduct training for UOOs/FOOs, maintain a current list of trained UOOs, track UOO turnover and feel they are capable of performing their duties.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
3	2	4	1	1

After the discussion about the importance of UOOs earlier, the response to this statement provides unexpected results. Only one CCO assigned to a division or corps, conducts training for UOOs. The majority of responses indicate the DOC conducts training for UOOs. It appears CCOs have not learned the importance of ensuring UOOs are capable of performing their duties in a satisfactory, coordinated manner. The research revealed high turnover rates among UOOs is not uncommon. Relying on the DOC for UOO training leaves



CCOs unable to place names with faces. Simply communicating at training sections will help avoid unfamiliarity. Familiarity between the CCO and UOOs aids the CCO in monitoring UOOs activities. Failing to have CCOs conduct UOO training could lead to the same UOO problems experienced during Desert Shield.

*c. I feel confident in my current system of accounting for UOO purchases.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
2	1	5	3	0

The research has shown the CCO is responsible for monitoring UOOs' expenditures. The response to this statement indicates a lack of responsibility by some of the CCOs. The three who agree, all have experience during actual contingency operations. The remainder believe the DOC is responsible for UOOs. Relying on the DOC is an easy solution during non-deployment, but the DOC will not deploy with the CCO during a contingency. As prior experiences have shown, the CCO's familiarity with what UOOs were buying enabled them to monitor the overall needs of the unit. The researcher's assessment is that CCO dependency on the DOC to conduct training could reduce the CCO's ability to ensure UOOs remain within their procurement limits during future contingencies.

- d. *I work with the administrative assistants who would deploy with me on a regular basis.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
3	3	3	2	0

The responses indicate a weakness in the Army contingency contracting arena. According to the contingency contracting concept, "There are two enlisted personnel assigned to the division contracting section." [Ref. 18:p. 4] In reality, there are few enlisted administrative personnel in place. One respondent writes, "the Army does not have administrative assistants for contracting -- big problem! The Air Force and Navy have enlisted contracting officer MOSs." Enlisted administrative personnel need to receive training. This will help educate them. Trained administrative assistants will also ease the administrative burden experienced by CCOs during past deployments. The researcher assesses the lack of peacetime communication between CCOs and their enlisted assistants to be a problem area. Without proper communication during periods of non-deployment, it is unrealistic to expect smooth operations during contingencies.

#### 6. Future Deployment Scenarios

- a. *I feel the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm enable CCOs to plan for future contingencies better.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
0	0	7	3	1

Although no one disagrees with the statement, there are some interesting comments about the lessons learned.

Some of those are:

The Army quickly forgets lessons learned as people move from position to position. So we remake the wheel.

Good idea to have CCOs, but the time it takes to train them may make them impractical in the future.

I've learned a lot by reading AARs and talking to CCOs that deployed to the desert.

Especially true for a large scale deployment such as two or more corps.

Based on the number of respondents with no strong opinion, it appears the Army needs to get the information to CCOs. The idea of reinventing the wheel every time a contingency arises shows a lack of standards for CCOs to follow. Someone needs to develop a basic CCO training program. The decision to make Contracting Officers single-track in contracting jobs should afford CCOs the ability to learn from past mistakes. This should help them prevent repeating past mistakes.

*b. I/we conduct planning for contingencies with little or no infrastructure for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, etc.*

strongly disagree	disagree	no strong opinion	agree	strongly agree
4	2	4	1	0

The intent of this question was to determine whether CCOs plan for possible contingency areas where supplies are limited or non-existent. As discussed throughout this thesis, planning is one of the most important facets in

allowing CCOs to become combat multipliers during deployments. Based on the responses to this statement, contingency contracting planning is not taking hold at unit level. These responses directly contradict the responses to the previous question concerning planning. The responses indicate a come as you are attitude. As a result, CCOs who deployed to Somalia had "nothing to buy, reliability was zero, and quality was worthless. The CCO had to go to Kenya to purchase." Without prior market knowledge, the CCO's ability to provide support to the deployed force is undoubtedly impaired. If CCOs fail to support the force's urgent requirements, CCOs fail to accomplish their missions.

#### 7. Additional Comments

Finally, the survey offers participants the opportunity to provide any additional comments concerning areas the survey fails to address. Several of the CCOs offer the following insights:

There are some fundamental problems with the Army's Contingency Contracting Program. First, there is no program. Only after notification of deployment does the Army begin to think about Contracting Officers - too late. A CCO should be one of the most experienced - not a situation to put beginners.

It is important that higher look at the operation, evaluate it as it is, and not try to have an O-5/O-6 try to create a 40+ person DOC with themselves as Director and thus create their own position. Contingency contracting should be used to secure goods/services as quickly as possible until the normal supply situation comes on line....

I have really had to train myself as far as planning for a contingency.... Commanders and their staffs do not really understand what I do or how I do it (or do they really care as long as I get them what they want). So when we deploy I feel like they learn more about what I do and in that light I am training them in our capabilities.

The current "Big Plan" is if another large-scale deployment occurs, FORSCOM (Forces Command) will task all subunits for their CCOs and create a team. This means I'll be yanked from my unit to work for another headquarters.

The Army is shrinking. An AAC Officer does not really want to start his career working contingency contracting. When you are a CCO you are on your own because you have no mentors or peers.... It takes two years to obtain requisite contracting experience to become warranted... by the time you accomplish this hurdle, the time for rotation is approaching.

The comments present interesting information for the research. First, CCOs need contracting experience prior to assignment to CCO billets. Second, non-contracting personnel who become involved with contingencies should become more aware of what CCOs can and can not do for them. Finally, despite having the authorization for CCOs at unit level, the "Hey you" method of selection still exists during contingency deployments.

In contrast to the majority of CCOs' responses, the senior personnel who participated in the survey feel the Army is moving in the right direction. Some of their comments include:

Deployable divisions must have readily deployable Contracting Officers. The contingency contracting concept is an excellent concept but without clear documentation on the MTOE identifying these personnel, they tend to be assigned where most needed - not to contracting positions. Failure to use these personnel in acquisition positions leads to erosion of skills,

lapse of warrants, and ultimately non-preparedness to support deployments.

Overall - we're on the right track, but still have a ways to go.

I worked on a Contingency Contracting Handbook while at DA. Input from all MACOMs, AMC, ARCOM, Air Force and AARs on Panama, Honduras and Saudi was included. In conjunction, the handbook explained training programs by experience and schools the DOC was to establish... All the issues you've addressed and more are in the handbook if DA would release it.

The draft copy of the handbook, is still going through a final review. The handbook, if as stated above, will provide the necessary guidance CCOs and units need to effectively coordinate contracting support for contingency deployments. The senior personnel realize that problems exist, but with the exception of the officer who worked on the book, do not seem to be pushing for solutions.

#### D. SUMMARY

This chapter presented the results of the survey sent to CCOs, and some senior contracting personnel who do not deploy during contingencies. The researcher analyzed current CCOs' responses by comparing them with problems areas faced by previously deployed CCOs. From that comparison, the research shows some questions need to be addressed. The Army is taking steps in the right direction, but needs to answer the following questions:

1. Should they assign new Contracting Officers to CCO positions?

2. Is there enough information and guidance for CCOs to prepare themselves for contingency situations during periods of non-deployment?
3. Although CCOs work in the DOC to improve contracting skills, what is the proper balance between training and working with the DISCOM/COSCOM staff to prepare for contingencies?
4. Who should conduct the training for UOOs and how much interaction should the CCO and UOO have during non-deployed periods?

These questions provide the basis for the researcher's conclusions.

## **V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

The objective of this study is to determine whether the training CCOs receive during garrison operations prepares them for contracting during contingency operations. This section presents the conclusions of the study.

#### **1. Experience**

The Army should not assign new or inexperienced Contracting Officers to CCO positions. Inexperienced Contracting Officers in deployed CCO positions find themselves in an environment quite unlike their contracting jobs at Installation DOCs. Because the AAC brings officers into Functional Area 97 at approximately their eighth year in service, Contracting Officers have to learn a system that is complicated enough, besides requiring unique CCO responsibilities. The skills required of Contracting Officers do not lend themselves to OJT, although learning on the job is certainly better than no training. The Defense Acquisition University offers mandatory courses for Contracting Officers to obtain basic skills necessary for contracting. However, contingency contracting is not among the subjects offered. The AAC should place experienced Contracting Officers in the



CCO positions whenever possible. The CCO positions should not be initial positions for Contracting Officers.

## **2. Guidance**

The Army needs to provide more comprehensive training guidance in the area of contingency contracting. The lack of published training guidance leaves CCOs the unenviable task of training themselves to perform a mission with little or no prior notice. The DOCs train them how to perform Installation contracting and small purchases, but do not prepare them for the unknown contracting circumstances for deployments to remote foreign areas. The training needs to emphasize not only the "how to" for CCOs, but also the region-specific training that will enable CCOs to support field commanders during contingency deployments. Although the DOC is qualified to train the CCO in contracting functions, the CCO needs to also train with the DISCOM/COSCOM to remain familiar with possible contingency operations.

## **3. Garrison Duties**

Although the CCOs work in the DOC, they should not be isolated from the logistical staff and units they support during contingencies. There seems to be a communication gap between the CCOs and the logistical support chain-of-command. The G4/S4 does not use the CCO as a planning asset. The CCOs need to stay abreast of the logistical needs of the units that will deploy during contingencies. They should monitor the

pulse of the unit as part of their everyday duties. The time to address contingency contracting should not be at "wheels up", it should be a recurring process. Units with CCOs need to include them in their contingency planning sessions to allow them to support deployed forces to the maximum extent possible. The new types of missions the Army recently assumed, provide a stronger mandate for strengthening the CCOs' ability to conduct their missions.

#### 4. UOO Training

The CCOs should assume more responsibility for the pre-deployment training of UOOs. They should ensure that a solid line of communication exists between themselves and the UOOs. The CCOs should not let the DOCs assume total responsibility for training the UOOs. Communication with the UOOs would improve the CCO's knowledge of the various unit needs. Although commanders assume the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of their UOO, the CCO can reduce the amount of required oversight by the commander and himself if he prepares the UOO properly. The turnover of UOOs can also be controlled better if the CCOs keep accurate rosters.

#### 5. Feasibility

The plan to support deployed divisions with two CCOs during contingency operations, may not be feasible if whenever possible, the Army plans to consolidate CCOs in a centralized location. During Desert Shield, when the XVIII Airborne CAS

consolidated the Contracting Officers at one location, the commanders complained about the response time. The Army's new concept places the CCOs in divisions to ensure responsiveness to the commanders' needs. The Army needs to decide which way they will operate and develop contingency training.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Internal Resources**

The Army is not utilizing internal personnel who are available to assist in contingency contracting. The supply system is run by Warrant Officers and NCOs at the user level -- use them. The development of a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for contracting specialists would help to educate enlisted personnel. These personnel would provide valuable assistance to CCOs. The technical expertise of NCOs has been a trademark in the Army since its inception. There is no reason besides Army self-imposed personnel limits that would preclude the Army from following the example set by the other Services. Contracting could become a secondary MOS if the personnel limits do not allow for the development of a new primary MOS.

### **2. Guidance**

If the guidance discussed at the end of Chapter IV is available for CCOs to use in the field, ensure the expedient distribution of that guidance to DOCs and CCOs, even in draft format. The concept of CCOs in divisions is relatively new.

There is not an established set of standards for CCOs to determine whether they have reached a proficient contingency training level. The only way for them to find out is by actually deploying and supporting deployed forces during contingencies. The differences between "peacetime" and contingency contracting can reach extremes. The manual under consideration for contingency contracting should be distributed in draft so CCOs, their trainers, and commanders will understand what CCOs can and should do.

### **3. Planning Process**

Ensure CCOs participate in the contingency planning process for deployments and exercises. Units need to ensure CCOs do not become so entrenched in learning basic contracting skills that they fail to actively participate in logistics planning sessions. CCOs need to be proactive to better prepare themselves for deployment. The interaction between CCOs, G4/S4 staff, and DISCOM/COSCOM representatives, should occur routinely. The new evolving Army missions will require more contingency deployments. This should result in additional contingency planning. The CCOs should be included in those planning cells at all levels.

### **4. Size of Contracting Element**

Examine whether the number of contracting personnel assigned to deployable units is adequate to perform the mission required of CCOs. If the plan is to augment

contracting sections during large deployments, it leads one to wonder whether two CCOs per division is a large enough contingent. The Army needs to look closely at whether the augmentation of contracting sections is consistent with the reason for placing them within the divisions to begin with.

### **C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

- 1. How should the Army train and utilize Contingency Contracting Officers in order to maintain the ability to execute their duties in the event of a deployment?**

The personnel responsible for training CCOs need to find the right balance between formal education and OJT for contracting. Additionally, the CCOs need to become active in the unit logistics planning process. The Army needs to provide CCOs and their trainers specific guidance concerning CCO responsibilities. The guidance should enable the CCOs to become combat multipliers.

- 2. What is the purpose of the CCO and what are the primary duties of the CCO?**

The purpose of the CCO is "to provide field commanders an effective force multiplier of combat service support for deployed forces." [Ref. 18:p. 2] The CCO accomplishes this purpose by performing the following duties:

- 1. Training Unit Ordering Officers prior to deployment.**
- 2. Preparing the Contracting Support Plan.**
- 3. Maintaining a contracting support kit and the ability to deploy early in support of contingency forces.**

4. Augmenting the supply system once it is in place to provide support. [Ref. 18:p. 3]

3. What are the unique requirements of the CCO?

The unique requirements of the CCO include the ability to:

1. Conduct business according to the customs of foreign countries while remaining in accordance with FAR requirements.
  2. Locate sources in foreign countries without standard means of communication, e.g., telephones, computer networks, available in domestic contracting.
  3. Work with purchase request originators who are unfamiliar with contracting procedures as well as FAR requirements.
  4. Monitor multiple UOOs who are geographically dispersed and under the control of their commanders.
  5. Meet the urgent needs of the commander when no existing supply system is established.
  6. Function without the civilian expertise available in normal contracting situations.
4. What is the best method to obtain and maintain the CCO's requisite skills?

The best way to obtain the requisite skills is to ensure officers are thoroughly trained in basic contracting procedures, e.g., small purchases, FAR requirements, prior to assigning them to CCO positions. The CCOs should study the business cultures of their units' possible contingency areas.

The CCOs should work in the DOC to maintain their contracting skills, but should divide their time between contracting and contingency preparation. Units should integrate CCOs into the logistics planning cell. The CCOs

need to remain aware of all unit activities so they have a solid knowledge base of unit needs.

5. Who are the principal sources of CCO assistance during deployment periods and what training do these personnel receive?

The main source of assistance is the UOO. DOCs have assumed responsibility for UOO training.

6. What deployment scenarios might a CCO face in the future and how should the CCO be employed during preparation?

The possible future contingency locations include various regions around the world. Effective planning is extremely difficult because the time for deployment is unknown. Planning occurs, but regional differences vary so much that a plan might be outdated depending on when the deployment occurs. Presently, the US is contemplating deployments to Haiti and Bosnia. The deployment to Somalia is ongoing. The range of cultures within those three countries is enormous, but the business cultures can be studied. The peacekeeping missions the US is contemplating will expand the role of CCOs. The possibility of future deployments reinforces the previous assertion that CCOs need to be an integral part of the planning process.

#### **D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

##### **1. Officers v. Non-Commissioned Officers as CCOs**

Is there any reason besides the current legal requirement that Contracting Officers be commissioned officers? Is it feasible for NCOs to be CCOs?

##### **2. Army Contracting Knowledge at Commands outside the Acquisition Corps**

Does the Army leadership have enough knowledge of contracting to use it effectively? If not, what should the Army do to increase the level of understanding among its leaders?

##### **3. The Size of the Contracting Sections**

Are two CCO billets per division adequate contracting support during deployment of a full division? Given lessons learned from Desert Shield, further consideration is warranted.



## APPENDIX A

### A. Survey

#### MEMORANDUM

From: CPT Kelly N. Campbell  
To: Survey Participants

1. Subject: Contingency Contracting Officer(CCO) Training

2. Purpose. The purpose of this survey is to gather data for my thesis. The goal of the research is to determine whether the training CCOs receive at their installations during peacetime prepares them to perform their duties during an actual contingency.

3. General Information. I am a student at the Naval Postgraduate School, pursuing a Masters Degree in Acquisition and Contract Management. The questions posed in this survey are designed to provide necessary data to determine whether the training program for CCOs is sufficient to allow them to conduct their requisite duties during contingencies. The scaled answers provide me an objective rating of how the CCO rates the training he/she receives. The format provides space for respondents to provide narratives of a subjective manner. If additional space is required, feel free to continue on the reverse side of the sheet.

The information acquired during the research is held in complete confidence. Your name and telephone number will provide the opportunity for me to contact you for any follow-up information that might be necessary. This is an educational exercise, but if the research determines patterns that need to be addressed concerning CCO training, the thesis will provide recommendations to appropriate commands. No surveys will be included in any package.

4. Instructions. Fill in the blanks of the background information section. The objective questions utilize scaled responses ranging from 1 to 5. The responses correspond to the following answers:

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	No	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Strong		Agree
		Opinion		

After you answer the objective rating, explain why you chose the respective response in the space provided below each question. If you feel there is additional information to provide that has not been requested, feel free to send any additional comments in the package you mail back in the envelope provided. For locations with more than one respondent, please consolidate surveys and return in the same envelope.

5. Because of the survey population, please expedite the completion of the survey. It is critical to my research that I receive your responses prior to the 15th of September.

6. Finally, I realize that your time is at a premium. The survey is designed to take approximately 30 minutes to an hour to complete. I appreciate your cooperation in completing and returning the survey as soon as possible.

KELLY N. CAMPBELL  
CPT, USA

## Survey

### Section 1: Background Information

1. Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Phone#: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Rank: \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Time in Service: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Current Position: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Time in Position: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Do you have a Contracting Officer's Warrant? \_\_\_\_\_
7. How long have you had your warrant? \_\_\_\_\_
8. Unit of Assignment: \_\_\_\_\_
9. Highest level of education completed: \_\_\_\_\_
10. Govt contracting classes( list all ) \_\_\_\_\_

11. Rater's Duty Position: \_\_\_\_\_
12. Senior Rater's Duty Position: \_\_\_\_\_
13. OER Support Form Duty Description: \_\_\_\_\_

### Section 2: Garrison Duties

a. My OER Support form duty description matches my daily duties.

1                      2                      3                      4                      5

b. My garrison duties prepare me to conduct CCO duties while deployed in support of a contingency operation...

1                      2                      3                      4                      5

c. I am heavily involved with the Directorate of Contracting...

daily

1 2 3 4 5

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---

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weekly

1 2 3 4 5

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---

---

d. I receive training for contingency contracting at my home station.

1 2 3 4 5

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e. I am sufficiently trained at home station to be able to deploy and conduct contingency contracting.

1 2 3 4 5

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### Section 3: Contingency Contracting Experience

a. I have experience as a CCO.

1 2 3 4 5

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b. I have experience as a deployed CCO.

1 2 3 4 5

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c. I agree with the current definition of a CCO.

1 2 3 4 5

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---

d. My garrison duties parallel the duties of a deployed CCO.

1 2 3 4 5

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e. Based on my level of training, I could provide immediate support to a deployed force.

1 2 3 4 5

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f. My training prepares me for the unique requirements of CCOs, e.g., language barriers, lack of sources, currency, control of Field Ordering Officers(FOOs).

1 2 3 4 5

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#### Section 4: Training Effectiveness

a. I have suggestions that could improve training for CCOs.

1 2 3 4 5

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b. I think ALMC should develop a course to educate CCOs.

1 2 3 4 5

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c. My daily duties allow me to obtain and retain the requisite skills of a CCO.

1 2 3 4 5

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---

#### Section 5: Coordination and Assistance

a. I plan for contingencies with the G4 and DISCOM/COSCOM reps.

1 2 3 4 5

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b. I conduct training for Field Ordering Officers, maintain a current list of trained FOOs, track FOO turnover and feel they are capable of performing their duties.

1 2 3 4 5

---

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---

c. I feel confident in my current system of accounting for FOO purchases.

1 2 3 4 5

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---

d. I work with the administrative assistants who would deploy with me on a regular basis.

1 2 3 4 5

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#### Section 6: Future Deployment Scenarios

a. I feel the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm enable CCOs to plan for future contingencies better.

1 2 3 4 5

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b. I/we conduct planning for contingencies with little or no infrastructure for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, etc.

1

2

3

4

5

Additional comments: \_\_\_\_\_



## APPENDIX B

### A. List of Abbreviations

AAC - Army Acquisition Corps  
AAR - After Action Review  
AFARS - Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement  
ALMC - Army Logistics Management College  
AMC - Army Materiel Command  
ASG - Area Support Group  
CAS - Corps Acquisition Section  
CCO - Contingency Contracting Officer  
CID - Criminal Investigative Division  
COSCOM - Corps Support Command  
CSG - Corps Support Group  
CSS - Combat Service Support  
DFARS - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement  
DISCOM - Division Support Command  
DLA - Defense Logistics Agency  
DLSIE - Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange  
DOC - Director of Contracting  
DoD - Department of Defense  
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulation  
FOO - Field Ordering Officer  
FORSCOM - Forces Command

G4 - Assistant Chief of Staff, (Logistics)  
HNS - Host Nation Support  
MACOM - Major Command  
MMC - Material Management Center  
MOS - Military Occupational Specialty  
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
OER - Officer Efficiency Report  
OJT - On-the-Job Training  
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense  
RDF - Rapid Deployment Force  
SOP - Standing Operating Procedure  
TAC - Tactical Air Command  
TO&E - Table of Organization and Equipment  
UOO - Unit Ordering Officer

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