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
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**TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION
AT THE CROSSROADS OF WORLD AFFAIRS**


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**TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION
AT THE CROSSROADS
OF WORLD AFFAIRS**

**Stephen J. Blank
Stephen C. Pelletiere
William T. Johnsen**

December 3, 1993

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
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FOREWORD

By virtue of its strategic location at the intersection of Europe and Asia, Turkey plays a pivotal role in the post-cold war system of states. It lies, one could say, at the epicenter of a series of conflicts, real and potential, in both continents. It also has enjoyed noticeable growth in both economic prosperity and democracy since 1980. And because Turkey has been, and remains, a faithful U.S. ally, Washington has called upon it to play a role in the Balkans, Near East, and former Soviet empire commensurate with its new-found political and economic development.

This report analyzes the implications of Turkey's policies and the reactions of Turkey's neighbors in three discrete chapters. The authors focus their conclusions and options for U.S. policymakers on the effect of Turkish policies in Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet republics. The final chapter summarizes their conclusions with respect to the three regions and provides policy options for continuing U.S.-Turkish relations that are so important in the search for peace and stability in these regions. The authors and the Strategic Studies Institute welcome readers' comments and will continue to assess developments in this vital area of Western and U.S. concern.



JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
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Director, Strategic Studies Institute

SUMMARY

Turkey sits astride Europe, particularly the Balkans, the Middle East, and the former Soviet empire now known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In addition, since 1980 Turkey has compiled an enviable record of economic growth and democratization in politics. For these reasons U.S. policymakers have assumed that Turkey, a steadfast U.S. ally, is especially well-poised to play a role as an anchor in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a positive pole of attraction for the Middle East and southern republics of the ex-USSR in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and as a block against a resurgence of Russian power and/or Iranian fundamentalism.

This analysis of Turkey's policies and current geostrategic or geopolitical role in these regions is contained in three independent chapters that consider the extent to which Turkey can play those roles expected by its leaders and elites and by U.S. policymakers, as well. In his analysis, Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen observes that Turkey's role in Europe has both magnified and declined since the fall of the Soviet empire. On the one hand, its importance for the Middle East, which could become an out-of-area threat to Europe, has visibly grown. On the other, Turkey's application to the European Union (EU) (formerly European Community [EC]) and, by implication, the Western European Union (WEU), has been deflected and delayed, causing a great deal of concern in Turkey as to European suspicion of Turkey. In addition, NATO as a whole and Turkey's role in particular have come under question in the absence of a definable threat and Western Europe's visible disinclination to shoulder security burdens in the Balkans.

Nowhere is that disinclination and Turkish suspicion of European objectives more clear than in the Bosnian war where Turkey continues to see a Muslim state wiped out in Europe while nobody takes action against Serbia. There are fears that entry into Europe through integration with European security

organizations, the fundamental priority of Turkish foreign policy, is in danger, and that Turkey runs a risk of being somehow marginalized in European calculations. Accordingly, Turkey will and has come closer to the United States to seek support for and understanding of its ultimate objectives. Turkey's integration into Europe is, Johnsen argues, in our interests, and should be supported by a series of U.S. initiatives in and out of NATO to strengthen its standing in Europe, win support for this integration, and bolster Turkey's self-confidence about its future prospects.

But, on the other hand, it is clear that, because of this disconnection between Europe and Turkey, it would be fallacious to expect that Turkey undertake a leading or even unilateral role in assuring Balkan security or the lead in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greco-Turkish rivalry has grown in the recent past, and while one cannot forecast what the new Papandreou government in Greece will do, the Bosnian war, Cyprus, and other issues have brought this rivalry into the center of regional security agendas and further complicated Turkey's efforts to win support for its European objectives. Much depends on U.S. support for Turkey, but it cannot be said that even then Turkey's problems will be sufficiently reduced for it to satisfy its objectives. But otherwise, there is hardly any prospect for successful Turkish integration into Europe in the near-to-medium term.

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere focuses on the complexities that Turkey's own unresolved domestic issues, in particular the Kurdish insurgency in its southeast, pose for Turkey's overall security relationship with its Near Eastern neighbors: Syria, Iran, and Iraq. From Dr. Pelletiere's analysis it is clear Iran and Syria are using the Kurdish issue to coerce Turkey. They fear Ankara's close ties with the United States which, they believe, is a vehicle for spreading the influence of the West into the region. Thus, support for Kurdish rebels has become an instrument of these states' policies, to be turned on and off in order to achieve their aims or to pressure Turkey.

Today, as Turkey assumes a clearer rivalry in the area with Iran, he argues that Iran has stepped up its support for the Kurdish insurgents and is using them to unhinge Turkey at

home. At the same time Turkey appears to be playing a dangerously uncertain hand in its own policies towards the insurgents because it is relying almost exclusively on military repression of the movements involved and neglecting the socio-economic and political alternatives many Western observers believe must be employed to resolve the Kurdish issue. Indeed, the army has evidently threatened to impose martial law in the spring of 1994 if the insurgency is not crushed. But as long as this issue remains an increasingly vital and first-order military priority, Turkey will face an enormous task of domestic reconstruction, be at odds with its neighbors over their support for the insurgents, and find itself castigated in the United States and Europe for human rights violations. At the same time, if it continues to resort exclusively to military tactics of counterinsurgency, Turkey may risk the progress in democratization that it has achieved and undermine not only its domestic stability but also its ability to play a leading role in any international venue.

This prospect is particularly troubling because the Kurdish areas of Turkey are the only ones in which U.S. forces are directly engaged through our participation in OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. U.S. forces, using this area for that relief operation and for overflights and monitoring of Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions, could be drawn into future hostilities over the Kurdish issue. Since there are grounds for believing that Iran and Iraq, as well as possibly Syria, see that U.S. engagement as a potential base for a long-term U.S. military presence that is directly aimed at them, there are real possibilities for an anti-American coalition, either political or even military, employing terrorism, low-intensity conflict operations, and the like that could involve the United States as well as offer serious problems for Turkey.

As numerous analysts have noted, Turkey cannot play a role of a model and commercial entrepot for the new former Soviet republics if it cannot solve its own extensive domestic problems. In his chapter, detailing Turkey's relations with the new states in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and Russia, Dr. Stephen J. Blank assesses the prospect for Turkey to play this role and finds it substantially overdrawn. Both the United

States and Turkey in 1991-92 believed that Turkey ought to take a leading role in the stabilization of the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, against revived Russian imperialism and, in particular, Iranian-type fundamentalism. Regardless of the fact that these new societies of largely Muslim persuasion are very unlike Iran, it appears that Turkey's domestic problems and the economic crisis of enormous magnitude afflicting those areas precludes Turkey from successfully playing the role hoped for by the United States.

Turkey's main concrete objectives have been to dominate these new states' energy economy and thus enrich itself and tie them into a Turkish-led economic system, and to prevent the return of Russian military pressure to and on its borders. In both objectives it is failing or has demonstratively failed. In the Black Sea, efforts at security collaboration with Ukraine and larger regional coordination through the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ) have failed to give Turkey what it wants. In Ukraine, failure to reform has led Ukraine to sell its Black Sea Fleet and nuclear arms to Russia, although it denies doing so, in return for debt relief. In the BSECZ, Greece and Russia are combining to block any Turkish leadership role.

In the Transcaucasus, during 1993 it became clear that Turkey was deterred effectively from acting against Armenian expansion and threats to dismember Azerbaijan that have developed in the course of the long war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkish helplessness to aid even a pro-Ankara government and Russia's ability to unseat that government, and replace it with a pro-Moscow one that now has rejoined the CIS and is accepting long-term Russian bases there denotes the breakdown of Turkey's defense strategy. As a result of Russian overt and covert operations throughout this region, Russian troops will be stationed in all three states, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and Russia alone will probably play the role of "peacemaker" in the region's numerous ethnic conflicts. Turkey has also failed to monopolize or gain a commanding role in the energy economy of Transcaucasia. Instead it is locked in a bruising economic rivalry with Russia over transshipment routes and pipelines.

The outcome remains undecided, but it cannot end better than in a compromise where Russia gains the most.

Although Turkey has invested heavily in Central Asia, it is still unable to provide what the pro-Moscow rulers of the region most need, military security and control over energy and transportation, and food trade. Central Asian rulers, whatever their private inclinations, have been obliged to rejoin the Russian economic sphere by quite brutal Muscovite policies and have also evinced growing suspicion of Turkey's activities. Moreover, other states, not just Iran, Russia, and Pakistan, are competing for influence in the region, allowing local leaders to pick and choose among them. Turkey's own limitations emerge in this context as the most serious factor inhibiting it from playing the leadership role in Central Asia that was previously expected.

Finally, there are strains growing in the relationship with Washington. U.S. aid is being cut and converted into loans. Turkey's efforts to reverse that trend and get stable guarantees has led to growing resort to mutual blackmail over aid and bases, and a threat to condition aid on solution of the Kurdish problem. That would mean making Turkey's entire international position hostage to its ability to satisfy Washington and/or Europe on this problem at a time when neither one of them appears fully committed to helping Turkey achieve its and their interests. Thus the report concludes with suggestions for improving the relationship and calls for a clear U.S. strategy and concept of U.S. and Turkish interests in the regions of mutual engagement so that the United States can help Ankara overcome its problems.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The revolutionary upheavals taking place in Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union have fundamentally transformed the strategic position of Turkey, which sits astride all three areas. The collapse of Soviet power, the continuing uncertainties of European integration, the agony of the former Yugoslavia, the Gulf War of 1990-91, and the first fruits of the Arab-Israeli peace process (i.e., the accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] signed in Washington in September 1993) pose both challenges and opportunities to Turkey. This report, therefore, examines Turkey's strategic conditions, analyzes its options in a fast moving international system, assesses the implications of its policies and positions for the United States, and offers policy recommendations, both for Turkey and the United States.

Today the emergence of largely Turkic republics in Central Asia onto the world political stage offers Turkey the chance to be a model for their westernization and integration into the world economy and culture. Alternatively, the unsettled and even desperate conditions, including several wars, in these republics could drag Turkey into their maelstroms and deflect it from full integration with Europe, its chosen goal since the reforms of the Tanzimat period, 150 years ago.

Europe, however, might rebuff Turkey's efforts to play a larger role in the European Union (EU) (formerly European Community [EC]), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and any future European security systems. Such a turn of events could force Ankara to look East even as European rejection undercuts Turkey's claims to be a fully western state; thus, making Turkey less attractive to eastern societies. Alternatively, unresolved economic and ethnic issues afflicting Turkey (that is, continuing high inflation, an excessively bureaucratized economy, and the

Kurdish issue) could make Turkey unattractive to either the East or the West. And, although progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process has now dramatically transformed prospects for the region, the Middle East is by no means free of all its multiple conflicts that could involve Turkey and its vital interests.

In other words, Turkey's role in Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia will likely remain in considerable flux for the foreseeable future. Turkey's transition to a new system of interstate relations cannot be fixed at this time, but the results will have tremendous effects on Turkey, the critical regions it sits astride, and the United States. Turkey could rise to the occasion and pioneer a vast expansion of the economic potential of former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia as it extends its sphere of influence by virtue of its connection to these regions and Europe. Or, Turkey could be drawn into conflicts that work against European, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern integration and peace. The U.S. connection is crucial because the United States has consistently promoted Turkish integration into the Western security system since the Truman Doctrine (1947) and Turkish membership in NATO (1952). And, today Turkish participation in NATO remains important, not only for Europe and the Middle East, but for the strategic interests of the United States. Operations DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT manifestly displayed the strategic importance, not only of Turkey's NATO membership, but also of its partnership with the United States.

Similarly, as our analysis will show, the United States actively supported Turkey's self-chosen efforts to play the role of vanguard and model for the new republics of the former USSR in order to stave off the threat of Islamic radicalism or of Iranian influence. Moreover, Turkey continues to justify its importance to Washington and Europe, e.g. the EU and WEU, in terms of its 'immense influence' over the region that it can deploy against religious radicalism or related dangers.

If those claims are true, then Turkey's strenuous efforts to play a leading role in the new world order will redound to Ankara's and Washington's benefits. But, if Turkish claims are overdrawn and Turkey cannot effectively shape the outlines of

the new order, then Washington, to the extent that it promoted Turkish involvement abroad, will be implicated in Turkey's subsequent failure to sustain its position. For this reason, and due to its central geographical location, Turkey remains a key strategic partner of the United States and its success or failure will directly affect the national interests of the United States.

The authors, therefore, frame their analyses in terms of Turkish policies and their implications for U.S. policy. Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, USA analyzes Turkey's position and policies vis-a-vis European organizations, i.e., EU, WEU, and NATO, and assesses Turkey's place in the current Balkan crisis. Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere analyzes Turkey's engagement in a key area where U.S. troops are actually engaged, i.e. our position helping the Kurds and the impact that the Kurdish issue has for Turco-Iranian, Turco-Iraqi, and U.S.-Turkish relations. Finally, Dr. Stephen J. Blank analyzes Turkish policy toward the areas opened up by the fall of Communist power and the USSR: the Black Sea, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. This analysis also takes account of the dilemmas facing Turkey as a result of the Armeno-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh that is taking place just over the border from Turkey. The authors conclude the analysis with recommendations for action in U.S. policy towards Turkey.

CHAPTER 2

TURKEY AND EUROPE: EXPECTATIONS AND COMPLICATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of communism in Europe and the peaceful implosion of the Soviet Union have dramatically altered Turkey's security environment, and, hence, Ankara's relations with Europe. As seven-time prime minister and now President of Turkey Suleyman Demirel concluded:

Turkey's position today in this part of the world is much more important [than] it was two years ago.... Reconsidered defense, security, diplomatic, and economic ties with Turkey are 'needed more than ever.'¹

Such sentiments echo throughout Turkey. As Steve Coll of *The Washington Post* pointed out, "While others may debate Turkey's importance...its own political and business elite is convinced that the Cold War's demise offers them a new place in the sun."² Paradoxically, Turkish political scientist Duygu Sezer has noted that "the network of relations that Turkey built with Western Europe at the height of the Cold War seems to have entered a state of paralysis, if not dissolution...,"³ and concluded that Turkish leaders will have to adapt to the new circumstances.

Given the scope and suddenness of the changes that Turkey must face, Turkish leaders find themselves at a critical crossroads. They must reexamine Turkey's relationship with Europe in light of the significant opportunities—and challenges—offered by the end of the bipolar world. This reevaluation will demand not only that Turks reconsider their

role in Europe, but that Turkey's European allies and the United States review their relations with Turkey.

This reassessment will occur as the United States finds itself facing a conundrum. On the one hand, the United States has interests that argue for strong U.S. support of Turkish goals of increased integration in European political, economic, and security organizations. On the other, strong U.S. support of Turkish initiatives to facilitate increased integration with Europe could alienate other U.S. European allies who may hesitate to grant Turkey increased access to European institutions. Similarly, while U.S.-Turkish interests along NATO's southern tier, in Transcaucasia, and in Central Asia are frequently complementary, they are not coincidental and are sometimes in conflict. The key question for U.S. policymakers, therefore, becomes: How does the United States balance these frequently conflicting interests?

The first purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to identify future Turkish goals in Europe, deduce the likelihood of those objectives being attained, and assess the implications of Turkish policies regarding Europe. More importantly, from a U.S. perspective, the essay also examines potential consequences for U.S. interests in Turkey and Europe that may emerge as a result of Turkey redefining its relationships vis-a-vis Europe.

TURKISH GOALS IN EUROPE

Turkey's immediate objectives in Europe will likely be little changed: ensure the territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Turkey and increase integration with European institutions to promote Turkey's continued economic and societal modernization. But, it is important to realize that even though the Turks will pursue parallel political, economic, and security policies for their own rewards, the primary drive is not simply improved political, economic, and security conditions. Put simply, the overriding Turkish goal will be increased integration with Europe; to be seen and to be perceived as being European. The question remains, however, whether Ankara will be able to achieve its goals or will be willing to pay

the economic and political price that may be required. The consequences of the success or failure of these initiatives, particularly their implications for Turkish and U.S. policies, will be the subject of the discussion that follows.

Turkish Membership in the European Union.

One of the best ways to ensure increased integration with Europe is full Turkish membership in the European Union (EU) (formerly European Community [EC]). This is not a new idea, as the Turks entered into an associate status with the EC in 1963 that was designed to provide Turkey with the time to prepare for the rigors of full membership, for which Turkey formally applied in 1987.⁴ But, the recent Maastricht Treaty for European Union has added increased impetus for Turkey to join before, in the words of Duygu Sezer, it is "...reduced to a non-European country on the fringes of Europe...."⁵

Whether Turkey will be able to fulfill its goal of full EU membership remains to be seen. Among Turkish elites, many understand that Turkey's journey to full membership in the EU may be longer than some expect.⁶ A critical question for Turks, however, is not if Turkey can meet its obligations, but whether Europe will live up to its part of the bargain. When Turkey formally applied for EC membership in December 1987, the EC Commission informed Ankara that the matter could not be considered before 1993.⁷ As many in Turkey have noted, 1993 has come "but the signals from Western Europe do not seem promising."⁸ Thus, only one third of participants in the sweeping study, "Turkey in 2020," believe that Turkey will actually be a member of the EU by 2020.⁹

The primary reason behind this gloomy forecast is that many of those surveyed agreed with politician Haluk Ozdalga's conclusion that "the EC in essence is a community of common culture and political principles rather than an organization of economic cooperation."¹⁰ Or, more pointedly, as Turkish political sociologist Nur Vergin commented: "The EC's principal concern in not admitting Turkey is that 'Turks will overwhelm them.'"¹¹ Thus, many leading Turkish intellectual and political leaders are skeptical that the EU will treat Turkey fairly, and

are convinced that once Turkey overcomes existing hurdles to EU membership, new ones will emerge.¹²

These continued obstacles to full Turkish membership are particularly galling to the Turks, given their efforts to attain EU standards, the acceptance of Greece into the EC in 1981, and Turkish support of the allied coalition—with its many EC members—during the Gulf War with Iraq (1991).¹³ Especially frustrating is the likelihood that several former neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland), and, perhaps, even former members of the Warsaw Pact (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, or the Czech Republic) might "jump the queue" and gain membership ahead of Turkey.¹⁴

Facing these obstacles, some prominent Turks have begun to question the long cherished dream of Turkish entry into the EU. Cem Boyner noted in 1991 that the cost of joining the EU may be too high. This is particularly true, he noted, because "there is no place affectionately reserved for us in that organization." He also noted that Turks have placed too much emphasis on joining the EU: "Had we not posed our entry into the EC as a matter of life or death, perhaps we would not have these problems today."¹⁵ Intellectuals' Hearth President Nevzat Yalcintas echoed these conclusions noting, "I have always seen integration with the EC as a romantic and unrealistic policy that wastes Turkey's time."¹⁶

Nonetheless, political leaders in Ankara and many moderates in Turkish society have invested a good deal of political and personal capital in Turkey's membership in the EU. If the EU fails to grant Turkey full membership, then moderates may lose out in Turkey. This is especially true if Turkey meets existing requirements and perceives it is being denied membership because of racial, religious, or cultural differences or because Western Europeans fear being swamped by a wave of Turkish immigrant workers.¹⁷ Nor are Turkish fears overworked, for as Bruce Kuniholm has pointed out, "many Europeans privately express enormous doubts about Turkey's achieving membership in the near future."¹⁸ Should the EU reject Turkey, a considerable backlash against Europe is likely to occur and could lead Turkey to turn toward

Central Asia and the Middle East—an outcome in neither Turkish nor U.S. interests.¹⁹

Two sets of bilateral relations are critical for Turkish entry into the EU and deserve brief comment. The first concerns Germany, which exerts tremendous influence within the EU. Historically, Germany and Turkey have enjoyed close affiliation; however, four issues recently have clouded German-Turkish relations. First, hesitant German support of Turkey during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM angered many Turks and set relations on edge.²⁰ Second, the temporary suspension of German military aid to Turkey because previously supplied equipment had been used to suppress the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK)-led insurgency in southeastern Turkey incensed many Turks who see the PKK threatening Turkish territorial integrity.²¹

Third, the German government's permissive attitude toward PKK activities in Germany has allowed the PKK a relatively safe base for operations against Turkish government and business interests in Europe and is further taxing Bonn's relations with Ankara.²² A recent example of such operations was the wave of violent PKK demonstrations, occupations of buildings, and hostage-taking across Europe on June 24, 1993.²³ These assaults will certainly aggravate Turks who have lobbied Germany for increased protection of Turkish embassies and business interests, as well as for stronger actions against the PKK. A 5-month delay in the decision of the German government to ban the PKK has not helped matters.²⁴

Fourth, the rise of xenophobic groups in Germany that have focused their sometimes deadly attacks on the 1.8 million ethnic Turks living in Germany has also strained relations. German government responses to right-wing violence and efforts to reform its citizenship laws have been half-hearted, at best. Tensions have run high as ethnic Turks in Germany have responded with violence. Turkish government calls for protection of its citizens or ethnic brethren and liberalization of Germany's restrictive citizenship requirements have strained Turkish- German relations.²⁵ These tensions could increase if the German government cannot end the violence.

The second key bilateral relationship concerns Greece. That Greece and Turkey have suffered poor relations for centuries is an understatement and requires little amplification. The catalog of their ongoing disputes is extensive: Cyprus; control of air and sea space in the Aegean Sea; alleged mistreatment of each other's minorities; mutual claims of religious oppression; and Turkish claims of Greek militarization of islands in the Aegean in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), countered by Greek claims that the islands are threatened by Turkish invasion.²⁶

The prognosis of future improvement is unclear, as leading Turkish intellectuals have diametrically opposed forecasts of future Greek-Turkish relations. While optimists formed the majority in the study "Turkey in 2020," strong reservations about Greece still remain. Some of the pessimism is based on long-standing cultural and historical differences, but many believe differences over Aegean Sea issues and the Balkans will block improvement in relations between the two states for the foreseeable future.²⁷ Perhaps most serious has been the resentment generated by Athens' continued opposition to Turkish entry into the EU.²⁸ Equally important, these frustrations could be transferred to Europe, as a whole, if Turkey does not perceive that other EU members are exerting sufficient pressure on Greece to allow Turkey full membership in the EU.

Despite existing and potential problems with Europe and EU membership, many Turkish policymakers still believe they have little option but to press ahead.²⁹ As Ismail Kara, a noted Muslim intellectual stated:

It would be to Turkey's disadvantage if closer relationships with Islamic nations and Turkic republics of the Soviet Union reduce Turkey's chances of having a say in Europe. That would condemn Turkey to being part of the Middle East and the Far East. The reality is that Turkey has to work hard to have a say in Europe despite its religious, cultural, and historic ties to the Middle East and Far East.³⁰

Conversely, other, more nationalistic voices can be heard. For example, in the study "Turkey in 2020," film director Halit

Refig commented, "I think that those who believe that we have to make our plans in accordance with the West's blueprint are wrong."³¹ Political sociologist Nur Vergin takes a similar tack:

Turkey is on its way to becoming an important player in the world stage....[and] Turks have an imperial mission that they derive from their history and the attributes of the land they live on....[As a result,] Europe has stopped being a guiding beacon for Turks.³²

Turkish Membership in European Security Organizations.

Turkish Security Concerns. Turks have good cause to be apprehensive about their security. Turkey has a long history of competition and military confrontation with Russia (not simply the Soviet Union). While the current situation looks promising, long historical concerns have not been overcome. The devolution of the Soviet Union has also created considerable instability along Turkey's northeastern frontier: civil war in Georgia and a historically hostile Armenia engaged in a war with ethnically Turkic Azerbaijan over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

To the east and south lie Iran, Iraq, and Syria, highly armed authoritarian regimes. Turkey supported the allied coalition in the Gulf War against Iraq; continues to provide bases for enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq; and enforces economic sanctions against Baghdad. Iran and Syria have supported anti-Turkey Kurdish groups; indeed, both nations have aided the PKK-led insurgency and terror campaign waged since 1983.³³ Finally, Iran and Turkey are engaged in intense competition for influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.³⁴

Turks also perceive risks to European Turkey. Historic Greek-Turkish rivalries over Thrace, perceived repression of Greek and Turkish ethnic minorities, the festering wound of Cyprus, and conflicts over control of Aegean air and sea space remain, even if subdued.³⁵ While the present regime in Bulgaria has moderated considerably from its predecessor, significant ill-treatment of Turkish minorities occurred as recently as

1989.³⁶ Events in the Balkans could also draw Turkey into the ongoing conflict, with severe implications for NATO.³⁷

Turkey, thus, faces an active insurgency intent on dismantling the Turkish state from within and is surrounded by a host of potential adversaries from without. Given these security concerns, one should not be surprised, then, that the Turks have sought closer ties with the Western European Union (WEU). What remains to be seen, however, is whether Turkey can gain full membership in the WEU and achieve the degree of security it desires.

Turkish Relations with the WEU. Under terms of the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU will act as the defense and security arm of the European Union.³⁸ Recognizing the rising importance of the WEU as the security arm of a united Europe, as well as the basis for a European defense pillar within NATO, and that membership in the WEU offers Turkey the opportunity to shape the evolving European Defense Identity, Turkish leaders have devoted considerable effort to gaining entry into that organization. And, because WEU assistance guarantees are stronger than those of NATO and because the Brussels Treaty is not tied to a specific geographic area, many Turkish leaders hope that WEU membership would bolster European support of Turkish security interests.³⁹ Finally, and perhaps as importantly, membership in the WEU would assist Turkey in achieving its overarching political goal of increased integration with Europe.

Turkey has been able to achieve only associate membership in the WEU, a result that in some ways parallels the frustrations it has met as it seeks full membership in the EU. For example, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin has noted Ankara's dissatisfaction and remarked that Turkey accepts its current status only as a temporary measure until it achieves full membership.⁴⁰ Underscoring the importance of full membership, Ian Lesser of RAND has noted:

Turkish exclusion from these [European defense] arrangements, regardless of their precise form, would be understood in Ankara as a demonstration of Europe's unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security role on the Continent.⁴¹

Continued exclusion from the full benefits of membership within the EC and WEU could, therefore, lead to a reduction in Turkish interest in joining Europe and in Europe's interest in such integration.

The path to full membership in the WEU may, however, contain potential pitfalls for Turkey. Because of Turkey's associate status (which may prevail for some time), the defense provisions of the Brussels Treaty *do not* apply to Turkey;⁴² that is, members of the WEU are not required to come to Turkey's aid in the event of aggression against Turkish territory. At the same time, according to the membership agreement, Turkey "...will be asked to make a financial contribution to the Organization's budgets."⁴³ Thus, Turkey 'enjoys' the responsibilities of the WEU without the benefit of either the right to vote on how that money will be spent or solid security guarantees.

Additionally, as an internal WEU report pointed out, associate membership may actually be inimical to long-term Turkish interests: Turkey could become enmeshed in European issues without being able to participate fully in discussions and, undoubtedly, not in the voting process. Certainly, under the terms of the association agreement, Turkey has the freedom to choose when and where to become involved, but the pressure upon Turkey to be seen as "European" could coerce the Turks to take actions that they might not pursue were Ankara a full member.⁴⁴

For Turkey to integrate more fully in the WEU could also require the Turks to take a more "European" view of defense and security matters. Turkey could get caught between its desires to satisfy the United States and its goal of fuller integration with Europe that would require moving closer to "European" ideas and, perhaps, away from the United States. Thus, aligning more with European policies could create tensions within the Turkish-U.S. bilateral relationship that might hinder attainment of U.S. policy objectives.⁴⁵

Turkish Relations Within NATO. As Bruce Kuniholm, an authority on Turkish security issues, has pointed out, "underpinning Turkey's early role in the NATO alliance was the

principle of reciprocity."⁴⁶ When Turkey joined NATO, the parties tacitly agreed that Turkey would help contain the Soviet Union. Should deterrence have failed, Turkey would have made its facilities available to NATO and would have distracted as many Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in Central Europe. In return, Turkey fell under the Alliance's deterrent and defense umbrella and the Alliance provided economic and military assistance to modernize the Turkish armed forces.⁴⁷

The demise of the Soviet Union has called into question the need to sustain this reciprocal relationship. Some Turkish commentators question whether Europeans still consider Turkey to be a key ingredient in the European defensive scheme.⁴⁸ Other analysts have argued that although the Soviet threat has faded, substantial risks remain along NATO's Southern Tier, and Turkey, in particular, has quickly become the Alliance's new front line.⁴⁹

European reluctance to comprehend the risks facing Turkey and Turkey's rising relative importance as "point man" on NATO's southern flank stems from several conditions. First, many NATO members remain preoccupied with the aftermath of the unification of Germany, the continuing economic recession in Europe, implementation of post-Maastricht issues within the EU, and the assimilation of the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Second, after the long cold war, nations are intent on realizing the "peace dividend." As a result, analysis of security issues within many states has focused inward as nations concentrate on forecasting minimum possible defense expenditures, reducing their forces to conform to new spending guidelines, redefining their security policies, and adapting strategies to new fiscal constraints.⁵⁰

Third, in the wake of the Gulf War, some European allies have expressed concerns over involvement in "out-of-NATO area" operations. While this debate is not new,⁵¹ its focus has sharpened because of the volatile security conditions along Turkey's eastern and southern borders. The Turks strongly believe that, as Secretary of State Warren Christopher has remarked, "Turkey lives in a rough neighborhood,"⁵² and that this neighborhood falls within the NATO area. Not all of

Turkey's NATO partners are enthusiastic about helping police this area, however.⁵³ Some NATO members fear that a conflict between Turkey and one of its neighbors could result in Turkey invoking the defense clause of the Washington Treaty and drawing NATO into a confrontation that would be peripheral to overall European interests.⁵⁴

Ironically, the Turks have their own reservations about "out-of-NATO area" operations and do not want to get caught up in disputes between their neighbors and their NATO allies. Turkish leaders, for example, are concerned that NATO allies will demand use of Turkish bases and NATO infrastructure (communications, logistics, etc.) within Turkey to conduct operations that may not be in accord with Turkey's national interests as a regional power or that operations might be carried out against another Islamic state.⁵⁵

Turkey, therefore, is in a dilemma. Turkey hesitates to support its NATO allies in controversies along its borders that it would rather avoid (such as Operations POISED HAMMER and PROVIDE COMFORT),⁵⁶ but strongly wants NATO to safeguard Turkish security against the instability that boils along its borders. Given these circumstances, it would appear logical for Turkey to resolve this dilemma through deeper bilateral relations with the United States.

TURKISH-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS

Turkish-U.S. security relations are also undergoing reexamination, due as much to Turkish as American motivations. In the wake of the Gulf War, for example, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Dogan Gures noted that cooperation with the United States "has slowed down." Specifically, Gures stated:

The United States suggested storing military material and equipment at the bases in Turkey for emergency operations. The project has not been taken up seriously. The matter is very sensitive, and, because of this, it is also being taken up at the political level. Work here has also slowed, and the matter has not been placed on the agenda. We know that U.S. aid could be

reduced, so we have drawn up measures to deal with that eventuality.⁵⁷

Continued U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on Iraq and support of the Kurds in northern Iraq have increased the distance that some Turks feel toward the United States. As *The Wall Street Journal* noted,

Spend time in Turkey today, and what you'll hear is increasing criticism of the U.S. military presence at Incirlik air base, which is central to U.S. efforts to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf, which still supplies most of the West's energy needs.⁵⁸

The Wall Street Journal questioned whether such comments marked a critical decline in Turkish-U.S. relations, but did note that "... serious people wouldn't ignore the possibility."⁵⁹

Such criticisms also preceded recent congressional reductions in U.S. military assistance to Turkey that will undoubtedly exacerbate tensions. First, Congress reduced the Bush administration's last proposed budget allocation for military aid to Turkey from \$543 million to \$450 million. Second, and more importantly, Congress converted the money from outright grants to loan credits.⁶⁰ These actions invoked considerable adverse commentary from Turkey, which is in the midst of a multi-year, multi-billion dollar modernization program of its armed forces. Moreover, Turkey currently has roughly a \$7.5 billion debt in foreign military sales to the United States, as well as a total foreign debt of approximately \$40 billion,⁶¹ and another \$450 million in loans will not help matters. As a result, the Turks perceive that their nation's long contributions to NATO, support of the U.S.-led coalition during the Gulf War, and, especially, their difficult economic sacrifices in support of the embargo of Iraq have not been adequately recognized by the United States. Consequently, Turkish leaders have called for the revision of the U.S.-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980 (DECA).⁶²

Originally intended to last 5 years, the DECA has been repeatedly extended and is due to expire at the end of 1993. The DECA stipulated that "... *The United States will exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed upon financial and*

technical assistance to Turkey's development efforts," and that "... *the United States shall use its best efforts* to provide the Republic of Turkey with defense equipment, services, and training, in accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon [emphasis added]."⁶³ Apparently, Turkish political leaders no longer perceive that the United States is offering "its best efforts." As one unnamed Turkish official noted,

Washington made a number of promises when it extended DECA in the past. However, it failed to realize them. That is a point that should be considered in the talks.⁶⁴

In an attempt to ensure future "U.S. best efforts," Turkish officials have demanded that yearly military aid guarantees be included in the next version of the DECA. The reported U.S. response to this demand has unsettled the Turkish diplomatic community. According to unnamed officials of the Turkish General Staff participating in the negotiations, their U.S. counterpart replied that "the United States will be forced to close down its bases in Turkey if Ankara insists that the military aid it receives from the United States should be guaranteed."⁶⁵ Such blunt diplomatic language caused consternation within Turkish policy-making bodies, particularly military circles, which undoubtedly will have an effect on Turkish perceptions of the extent of the U.S. commitment to Turkish security concerns.

Perceived U.S. treatment of Turkey may not be the sole motivating factor behind Turkey's decision to review its bilateral relations with the United States. Indeed, over-reliance on the United States may not be in Turkey's long-term interests. As Duygu Sezer remarked in 1989: "a bilateral military relationship with the U.S. would turn Turkey ... into a lonely military outpost of Europe, while Western Europe closed itself into a United Europe." Sezer also concluded that such close bilateral relationship with the United States would play into the hands of religious fundamentalists in Turkey, "... for it would be seen as a defeat for the pro-Western modernists."⁶⁶ Thus, for Turkey, a two-pronged approach that includes the United States, but continues to focus on European security

arrangements will be essential for future Turkish security and political vitality.

THE BALKANS: IMPEDIMENT TO TURKISH INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE

The ongoing crisis in the Balkans could derail Turkish objectives of increased integration with Europe. Turks have strong ties to their Muslim co-religionists throughout the Balkans that pull them toward intervention in the war in Yugoslavia. As a result of the Ottomans' long and oppressive occupation, however, few states in the region are willing to permit a physical Turkish presence in the Balkans outside of Turkey.⁶⁷ Consequently, Ankara is constrained from assisting ethnic Turks or Muslims in the Balkans to the degree it feels necessary, and a certain amount of frustration—to be added to those already addressed—has resulted.

Turkish intervention in the ongoing crisis could generate a severe backlash within Europe. At the least, full Turkish membership in the EU or WEU could be delayed because of Greek objections to Turkish activities. At the worst, Greece and Turkey could be drawn into opposing sides of the conflict. Such a situation could irreparably set back further Turkish integration with Europe, result in the unravelling of NATO, or prevent the further integration of Central and Eastern Europe with West European organizations. Such intervention, while not likely in the foreseeable future, cannot be dismissed out of hand and could occur in a number of ways.

The first instance could be Turkish involvement in the current conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Muslims make up approximately 44 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population⁶⁸ and have been the primary object of Croatian and Serbian aggression. For nearly 2 years, the Turks have reiterated their historic and legal responsibilities for safeguarding Muslim populations in the Balkans, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Albania.⁶⁹ For example, the Turkish General National Assembly noted in August 1992 that it would not accept any forcible changes to the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that:

The TGNA will consider it a humanitarian duty to take every kind of step to stop the Serbian attacks for the protection of the people and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina in case the international use of force is delayed.⁷⁰

As late as February 1993, then Turkish President Turgut Ozal restated his position that Turkey "is responsible for looking after the well-being of the Muslims in the Balkans."⁷¹

Turkish frustrations over the lack of European or U.N. action to protect the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been building, and Turkish leaders have become increasingly critical of perceived Western equivocation.⁷² These tensions have been eased somewhat by Turkish participation in the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the naval forces in the Adriatic Sea enforcing U.N. sanctions,⁷³ but it remains to be seen how long these relatively limited actions will assuage Turkish public opinion. Indeed, even with these actions, some Turkish leaders have endorsed a more strident approach. For example, Necmet Erbakan, leader of the Turkish Prosperity Party, has declared that "If we come to power, we will do in Bosnia what we did in Cyprus,"⁷⁴ alluding to the 1974 Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus.

While an outright Turkish invasion in support of their co-religionists in Bosnia-Herzegovina is highly unlikely, accounts of clandestine Turkish military aid have surfaced repeatedly. For example, an anonymous source associated with the Turkish General Staff has confirmed reports that upwards of 1,000 soldiers have been prepared for covert deployment to Bosnia to aid Muslim forces.⁷⁵ Thus, even if the Turks do not officially intervene, their actions may be sufficient to cause a reaction from other parties within the region that affects overall Turkish relations in Europe. Moreover, even unfounded rumors of such preparations are sufficient to raise suspicions among Turkey's Balkan neighbors.

Despite the volatile situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the level of some Turkish rhetoric, the chance of substantial overt Turkish intervention is relatively small because reactions would imperil overall Turkish political goals in Europe. Should the conflict spread to Macedonia (where, it should be recalled,

the United States has deployed 500 troops as U.N. observers), Kosovo, or Albania, however, Turkey could be drawn into a war that has the potential to quickly escalate and engulf the entire Balkan Peninsula.

Roughly one third of Macedonia's population is Muslim and it has close ties with Turkey. To underscore the importance of Turkish support of Macedonia, the late President Ozal discussed Turkish military assistance to Macedonia during his February 1993 visit to Skopje.⁷⁶ Thus, Serbian attacks against the Muslim population of Macedonia, especially following the depredations against Bosnian Muslims, would undoubtedly bring a strong Turkish reaction.⁷⁷

Bulgaria could also be drawn into the conflict should it spread to Macedonia. Bulgaria has historically coveted Macedonia; indeed, Bulgaria participated in four wars in the last century in failed attempts to incorporate Macedonia into a "Greater Bulgaria."⁷⁸ Sofia also considers itself to be Macedonia's guardian from Serbia, Greece, and Turkey. Although Sofia has followed a cautious policy to date, any intervention by one of those parties would bring about a Bulgarian reaction that would almost certainly result in Turkish entry into the conflict.⁷⁹

Bulgarian actions in Macedonia also would likely precipitate Greek counteraction. Greece has long-standing historical claims to portions of Macedonia, and is intent on preventing the Bulgarians or Turks from expanding their territory or position there.⁸⁰ Greece is particularly concerned about Turkish penetration into the Balkans. As *The Wall Street Journal* pointed out, "any Turkish return to the Balkan nations it once ruled would enflame Greece, its ancient rival, which is preparing to deploy 35,000 troops on its border with Macedonia."⁸¹

Turkish or Bulgarian actions or intervention in Macedonia may not be required to cause Greek intervention in Macedonian affairs. Athens has become almost paranoid about Macedonia—as Greek histrionics over the name, Macedonia, clearly indicate.⁸² Indeed, the "Macedonia Issue" contributed significantly to the defeat of the government led by

Constantine Mitsotakis in the October 1993 elections.⁸³ Although unlikely, the potential exists that Greece could take unilateral action against Macedonia to preclude such an outcome, which could bring Turkey and, possibly, Bulgaria into the conflict.

The situation is more explosive in the Kosovo region of Serbia. Although 90 percent of the population is ethnic Albanian and Muslim, Kosovo is part of Serbia and Serbian nationalism has raised Kosovo to the status of a holy place. The region is virtually occupied by the Serbian Army which is exercising oppressive martial law, as well as conducting a vicious campaign designed to drive out ethnic Albanians.⁸⁴ As a result, many observers have concluded that it is only a matter of time until the Serbs extend their "ethnic cleansing" campaign to Kosovo.⁸⁵ Even should the Serbs not initiate action, the situation has grown so tense and Albanian minorities have become so oppressed that it is possible that Albanian Kosovar nationalists might take steps to provoke or precipitate a Serbian action to bring about a response from the other regional powers.⁸⁶

A worst case scenario for an expansion of the ongoing Balkan conflict could unfold as follows. Regardless of cause, the Serbs begin ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Albania, despite a desire to avoid war at all costs, might feel compelled to take action to assist its brethren in Kosovo.⁸⁷ In turn, the Serbs retaliate against Albania. Given that Turkey and Albania have existing—but publicly unspecified—defense arrangements,⁸⁸ Turkey could then likely become involved in the conflict. This would undoubtedly bring Greece, and probably Bulgaria, into the conflict, as well.⁸⁹

Even if Turkey did not initially become involved, Macedonia—with its own sizeable Albanian minority, large Muslim population (roughly one third), and fear that it might be the next target of Serbian aggression—could be drawn into the conflict.⁹⁰ The combination of Macedonian and Albanian participation would undoubtedly elicit Turkey's participation also. Should either Macedonia or Turkey become involved, Greece and Bulgaria would feel compelled to enter the fray to protect their nationalist interests. Thus, Kosovo holds the high

potential of striking the spark that sets the Balkans ablaze once again.⁹¹

Continuation of the war in the former Yugoslavia will complicate the achievement of Turkish goals in Europe. To date, Ankara has displayed tremendous patience with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How long the Turks will be able to retain that patience remains to be seen. But, given the stakes involved, particularly their keen desires for increased integration with Europe, it is likely that Turkish initiatives will remain restricted to rhetoric. That said, should the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina dramatically worsen, the Turks may feel compelled to action, even at the risk of jeopardizing their overall position in Europe. At the very least, Turkish frustrations with Europe and the United States may increase and exert effects in other areas (e.g., Iraq, Transcaucasia, or Central Asia).

Should the war expand beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina into Macedonia or Kosovo, Turkish national interests will be more fully engaged in Balkan, as opposed to pan-European, issues. The Turks will be faced with extremely difficult choices concerning the price they are willing to pay for fuller integration with Europe. Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo or aggression against Macedonia, without what the Turks perceive to be adequate U.N., European, or U.S. responses, may force Turkey to intervene, despite the costs in European integration that might be involved. Certainly, those costs could be extremely high, and Turkey will carefully weigh its options.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Turkey has discovered itself in a new, unfamiliar world, "and facing it, Turkey finds itself alone—philosophically, politically, and militarily."⁹² Turkish leaders have been uncomfortable in such an isolated position and have sought ways to extricate Turkey from its predicament. The path they have chosen relies predominantly on increased integration with Europe. While this conforms with Turkey's traditional approach to ensuring Turkish security and modernization goals, it presumes that Europe will accommodate Turkish aspirations.

Whether Europe will fully satisfy Turkish expectations is an open question. Turkey faces considerable hurdles in achieving its goal of full integration in the European community and European Union. The Ottoman past remains a sticking point in Turkish-European relations and significant religious, racial, and cultural differences compound historical difficulties. European concerns over the pace of human rights reform in Turkey, and the gap between European and Turkish economic capabilities may present difficult barriers to overcome in the short term.

Turkish security concerns are real, but Ankara should not look to the WEU for increased support. That said, and despite its drawbacks, associate membership in the WEU is probably the best Turkey can achieve in the short term and Turkish leaders will have to live with the frustrations of not achieving full membership. The Turks can take solace that associate membership at least gets their foot in the door, so to speak, and offers an increased opportunity to participate in the debates that will shape the future European security environment. Moreover, as the WEU expands its role as the security arm of the EU, Turkey may also be able to make its influence felt in that body. Nonetheless, these conditions likely will not satisfy Turkish leaders and future seeds of discontent will be sown unless Turkey achieves full membership.

Closer security relations with the United States, although not desirable to the Turks in many ways, may have to compensate for the lack of support from NATO or the WEU. If European security organizations fail to meet Turkish expectations, the United States may have to assume a larger part of the burden of providing security assistance to Turkey. If the United States is unwilling to accept this charge, Turkey could turn its back on Europe and focus its energies on the Middle East or Central Asia. This would be a tremendous setback for the West, and the United States should exert all possible leverage to persuade Europeans to accommodate Turkish concerns.

These issues will also be complicated by Turkey's new approach to the world. Turks have a great deal of energy and potential that they want to use. Already, signs indicate a

growing Turkish awareness of its regional, as well as world, importance and a desire to pursue a more independent policy line in accordance with its newly perceived status. Ankara, therefore, may take stronger, more independent positions than its U.S. and European allies have been accustomed.

U.S. interests may dictate that the United States strongly supports Turkish initiatives. The United States and Turkey have complementary interests in Europe, and Turkish membership in the EU, WEU, and other European organizations offers the possibility of the United States being able to exert indirect influence in the crucial institutions of Europe. At the least, having a close ally such as Turkey "sitting at the European table" will offer the United States a measure of influence that it might not be able to exert independently. Additionally, the United States and Turkey also have parallel interests in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, areas where Turkey could exert significant influence on the behalf of the United States in return for U.S. support of Turkish goals in Europe.

If levels of future European integration fall short of Turkey's goals but are sufficient to meet Turkey's perceived minimum requirements (i.e., increased access to European markets and further evolution of Turkey's associate membership in the WEU), Turkey could remain content with its level of participation in Europe. But, if the extent of European integration does not meet Turkish expectations, particularly in terms of security arrangements, then Turkey will undoubtedly seek assistance from the United States.

The type of assistance requested from the United States may vary. Ankara might press Washington to support Turkey's position in Europe. While not exactly coincidental, U.S. and Turkish interests within Europe are largely compatible and, on the surface, should not present significant difficulties. The one key exception to this general rule could be the Balkans where, because of its Islamic heritage and strong national interests, Turkey may feel compelled to take actions contrary to U.S. interests. To date, Turkey has displayed considerable patience with the ongoing crisis in the Balkans, but that patience may be wearing thin.

The problem more likely to surface is that many of Turkey's goals in Europe conflict with desires of U.S. allies in Europe. This places the United States in a dilemma. For example, Turkey could ask the United States to bring pressure on their common allies to achieve Turkish goals of full membership in the EU or WEU as *quid pro quo* for Turkish support of U.S. policies outside of Europe (e.g., U.S. access to Incirlik, support of an operation similar to Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, or counterweight to Syrian or Iranian hegemonic designs in the Middle East.)⁹³ Or, Turkey could request U.S. support of critical Turkish bilateral interests, such as pressure on the German government to ensure the safety of its ethnic Turk minority, as well as ease Turkish assimilation in German society through less stringent citizenship requirements. Alternatively, the Turks could seek U.S. initiatives to help resolve the Cyprus question, broker an agreement for ending Aegean air and sea territorial disputes, or improve treatment of Turkish minorities in Greece.

All of these issues will be difficult to resolve. Given the hardened stand of many nations over these complex matters, the degree of pressure required to provide effective assistance to Ankara is likely to require a level of effort that would alienate other U.S. European allies. Thus, the United States could face a difficult choice: support Turkey and risk alienating its European allies or not support Turkish initiatives in Europe and jeopardize bilateral relations with Ankara at a critical time when Turkey supports U.S. interests not only in Europe, but also the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

If Turkey fails to achieve full membership in the EC and WEU, Turkish leaders would likely seek improved or expanded bilateral relations with the United States. Undoubtedly, Ankara will desire continued economic aid, particularly military aid that contributes to the timely completion of Turkey's 10 year modernization program of its armed forces. Turkey may also look to the United States to open wider its markets to Turkish goods and services that will support the general modernization of Turkish industry and society.

Nor may the United States be able to deny Turkey such assistance. As the United States shifts to a regional strategy,

Turkey may possess considerable leverage in future relations with the United States. Turkish support of U.S. interests, or at least pursuit of complementary objectives (such as in Central Asia or the Middle East), could benefit the United States. In the economic arena, greater and faster Turkish economic success could bolster Russian and Ukrainian economies, which could translate into greater overall stability in Europe.

Thus, the United States may face difficult choices in the midst of redefining its world role and the strategy to effect that role. This review also comes at a time when U.S. leaders are focusing more sharply on domestic issues and are spending less time on foreign affairs. The United States also finds its resources stretched, which in this context translates into increasingly constrained military and foreign aid funds. The United States, therefore, may be forced to reevaluate its priorities—continue its past policies emphasizing Central Europe or concentrate more on Turkey?

Should Turkish expectations of fuller integration with European political, economic, and security institutions go unfulfilled, Turkey could turn its back on Europe and focus on developing relations in the Middle East and Central Asia. Should this occur, the United States may be called upon to bolster Turkey's economic and security interests. This may require the United States to support new Turkish initiatives in Central Asia, an area that, heretofore, has been marginal to U.S. interests. Alternatively, the United States could become more embroiled in the Kurdish issue or entangled in local disputes in the Middle East. These new burdens could arrive at a time when the United States appears uncertain of its role in Europe,⁹⁴ and the Clinton administration may find it difficult to generate the public or congressional support that may be necessary to satisfy Turkish expectations.

European, U.S., and Turkish interests will be best served if Turkey remains engaged in Europe. Unfortunately, Europeans may not take the steps necessary to ensure continued Turkish integration. If these issues are not resolved and Turkey disengages from Europe, European and, more importantly, U.S. interests in Europe, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and

the Middle East will suffer. Thus, it is incumbent upon the United States to take steps to preclude such an eventuality.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

The United States must continue to encourage its European allies to acknowledge Turkey's importance in the post-cold war security environment, to include greater participation in European political and security organizations. More than rhetoric will be required; concrete actions will have to be taken to raise European consciousness of Turkey's strategic importance and to assuage Turkish anxieties. The following initiatives represent potential actions that the United States should undertake.

Economic Initiatives.

- Assist Turkey in ways that will contribute toward Turkey's eventual membership in the EU. For example,
 - Further open U.S. markets to Turkish merchandise.
 - Restructure Turkey's foreign military sales debt to optimize Turkey's ability to repay. Forgive existing foreign military sales debts.
 - Provide economic advice and assistance, particularly concerning privatization of industry, that will help Turkey overcome the hurdles to its membership in the EU.
 - Encourage greater private American investment in Turkey.

Diplomatic Initiatives.

- Bring influence to bear on European allies to overcome obstacles to full Turkish membership in pan-European institutions such as the WEU and EU.

- Encourage European nations, especially Germany, to maintain safety of ethnic Turks and to liberalize immigration and citizenship requirements.
- Increase diplomatic efforts to broker resolution of the outstanding Greek-Turkish issues over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.

Security Initiatives.

- Continue to support Turkey's military modernization program.
 - As the U.S. Armed Forces proceed with their draw down, continue to provide surplus equipment that enhances Turkish military capabilities.
 - Provide military assistance grants as opposed to credits.
 - Persuade Congress to reexamine the de facto 7/10 military aid distribution between Greece and Turkey. This does not imply that Greece should be placed in a subservient position vis-a-vis Turkey, but a more stringent strategic cost benefit analysis may be in order.
- The United States must exert influence in NATO that ensures Turkish security anxieties are addressed. For example,
 - Ensure continued funding of existing and planned NATO infrastructure projects in Turkey. This will require Congress to appropriate more money to support the NATO infrastructure fund than it has shown itself willing to do in the post-cold war era.
 - Promote additional infrastructure projects in Turkey that enhance the modernization and effectiveness of Turkish forces. This may require reducing funds available within the Central Region.
 - Increase Turkish command and staff officer representation in appropriate NATO commands

(e.g., NATO headquarters, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps).

- While recognizing the political difficulties involved, the United States may wish to support Ankara's bid to have the headquarters of the Multinational Division, South located in Turkey.
- NATO, and if necessary the United States, could increase the levels of exchanges and exercises with Turkey.
- Given Turkish sensitivities about bilateral relationships, the United States should pursue security initiatives in a multilateral format. This approach offers two benefits:
 - Ankara will not be forced into the role of junior partner.
 - Multilateral negotiations ensure that Europeans are continually involved with important Turkish issues and can be used as a means of educating European allies about the strategic importance of Turkey.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE KURDISH CONNECTION

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

INTRODUCTION

As the previous chapter has shown, Turkey has for many years been focused on Europe. It has been attempting to integrate itself into the European community. As part of that intention, it has virtually turned its back on the Middle East, even though for centuries Turkey was predominantly a Middle East power.¹

It is ironic in this respect that today the principal threat to Turkey's security originates in the Middle East. Radical groups, which are carrying out subversive operations against the Turkish state, are based there. The author is referring, of course, to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Hizbollah. These groups have within recent years mounted a formidable threat to Turkey's internal security. The activity of the PKK in particular has been such that, in the eyes of many, unless checked, the PKK will push Turkey into a civil war.²

This chapter will describe the origin of the PKK-directed threat to Turkey. It will show that the PKK, and the other radical organizations working with it, are the agents of Syria and Iran, and that the radical states promoted these groups to block what they perceived to be NATO advances in the region.

The chapter will further show that Syria and Iran look on Turkey as a Trojan Horse whereby NATO is penetrating areas the radicals claim as their sphere of influence. Weak as they

are, Damascus and Tehran are incapable of mounting a conventional military threat to Ankara, and therefore they rely on indirect power. They use terror as a means of harassing Turkey and to discourage it from taking actions which the radicals deplore.

For example, in June of this year, 29 Turkish embassies and missions in Europe were attacked by the PKK.³ This wave of violence that swept across Europe was promoted by Iran and, to a lesser degree, Syria, this chapter will argue. The aim of the attacks was to get Turkey to withdraw its support from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

PROVIDE COMFORT, as is well known, represents an effort by the United States to protect the Kurds from the wrath of Saddam Husayn.⁴ To Syria and Iran, however, it is something more sinister. They see it as a thinly contrived effort on the part of Turkey and the United States to establish a permanent NATO military presence in the region, targeted on the Gulf.

Fear of NATO intervention on the part of the radicals goes back many years. This chapter begins with an examination of how Syria and Iran first developed their fears about NATO, and of Turkey's alleged role as a NATO agent in the Middle East.

THE TERROR WAR AGAINST TURKEY

In December 1982 forces from nations belonging to NATO entered Lebanon to separate warring Israelis and Arabs. They did not come as NATO representatives. Indeed, no connection between them and the Alliance was claimed; the units were officially described as the Multi-National Force (MNF). Syria and Iran, however, did not believe this distinction. To them, these were NATO troops and they were coming to help Israel take over the Levant. As a consequence of this perception, the radicals mobilized against the intervention.⁵

The story of the terror war in Lebanon is so well known it need not be recounted here. However, what is not known, generally, is that Syria and Iran waged a similar campaign against Turkey. Starting in 1983, Damascus and Tehran used

Kurdish and Armenian (and some Arab) assets to combat Ankara, and they did it because, in their eyes, Turkey was subverting the northern Gulf by helping NATO establish a military presence there.

Fears in Damascus and Tehran had been aroused by NATO maneuvers in southeastern Anatolia,⁶ which took place in June 1983. During these exercises, Turkish units crossed into Iraq on a mission that has never been adequately explained. Turkey claimed at the time that it was going after "bandits."⁷ However this may be, the action was seen to benefit Iraq. Baghdad could barely police its northern provinces at this time, and having Turkey, in effect, do the job for it, was an enormous help.⁸

The fact that Turkey would seemingly abandon its professed neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War deeply disturbed Syria's President Hafez Assad.⁹ He viewed Iraq's President Saddam Hussein as his arch rival, and had done everything in his power to topple the Iraqi leader.

Now, not only was Turkey coming to Iraq's aid militarily, there were other equally disturbing developments. Starting in 1982, it became obvious that Washington and Baghdad were moving toward a rapprochement. The two had severed diplomatic relations in 1967, and for years Iraq was considered among the inveterate foes of both Tel Aviv and Washington.

In 1982, however, Congressman Stephen Solarz, a foremost champion of Israel, visited Baghdad, after which Saddam publicly expressed his belief that Israel was entitled to secure borders in the Middle East. Right after that Saddam ejected several terrorist groups from Baghdad, including the notorious Abu Nidal organization. This opened the way for the U.S. State Department to remove Iraq from its list of nations supporting terrorism, and a relatively short time later Washington and Baghdad exchanged ambassadors.¹⁰

Obviously these moves threatened Syria's position. In effect, this was a throwback to the days of the Baghdad Pact, when the United States had what appeared to be an unassailable position in the Gulf.¹¹ Hence, Assad (and the

Khomeini regime as well) devised a counter-strategy to offset these developments.

This was the start of the terror war mounted by Syria and Iran against Turkey (and to a lesser degree Baghdad.)¹² The principal agents in this war were the Kurdish *pesh merga* (guerrilla fighters who inhabit geographical Kurdistan), and specifically the PKK, which at this time was a virtually unknown organization. We will now look at how the PKK progressed, under the tutelage of Syria and Iran, from a nonentity to become one of the most feared terrorist organizations in the Middle East, and the principal threat to Turkey's stability today.

THE RISE OF THE PKK

Turkey's history of democratic practice is in many respects exemplary among Middle Eastern nations. In 1950 Turkey's ruling Republican Peoples Party (RPP) held elections in which, unexpectedly, it was defeated. It stepped down.¹³

In the Middle East, where ruling parties almost never give up power voluntarily, this was an extraordinary performance. Nonetheless, the parties that succeeded the RPP proved corrupt,¹⁴ and by the late 1970s Turkey was in the grip of a virtual civil war, with self-proclaimed leftists and rightists battling each other in the streets of Istanbul and Ankara. Finally, Turkey's army intervened, drove the civilian government from power, and purged Turkey of the many radical groups.¹⁵

One of the groups thus forced into exile was the PKK, which professed to be the vanguard of the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. This was a grand boast; in fact the PKK at this time had little following. Turkey has a large Kurdish population (of over 10 million),¹⁶ but, in the late 1960s, this population was not active politically.¹⁷ Hence, the PKK claimed the title of leader of the Turkish-Kurdish resistance by default—there was no other significant Turkish-Kurdish opposition, or none, at any rate, that espoused separatism.¹⁸

The PKK comprised mainly lower class ghetto youths, self-styled Marxists. This was the time of the Maoist

Revolution, and youths throughout the world were embracing China's conception of Marxist ideology. Like a lot of other youth groups at the time, the PKK's understanding of Marxism was dim—as evidenced by its program, which called for little else than "emancipating" southeastern Anatolia (the home of Turkey's Kurdish community). As to what would occur once liberation was secured—the PKK cadres seemed unsure.¹⁹

The PKK, after being purged by Turkey's army, fled to Syria where Assad took it under his protection.²⁰ In 1983, he selected this group to participate in, and ultimately to lead, the terror war against Turkey.²¹

Assad first, however, had to move the PKK into a position where it could act, and for this he turned to Masoud Barzani, head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).²² This was an Iraqi-Kurdish group that participated in Iran's 1983 invasion of northern Iraq. Afterward, the KDP guerrillas had infiltrated Iraq along the Turkish border, and established bases there.

Assad wanted Barzani to take the PKK under his wing so that the group could use his bases to infiltrate southeastern Turkey and stir up a popular revolt. Barzani initially declined, for fear of antagonizing the Turks.²³ His father, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, had led the Kurdish revolt against Baghdad from 1961 until 1975, and during that time had made it a rule always to cooperate with Ankara. Indeed, the elder Mulla Mustafa had gone so far as to assist the Turkish army in its repression of rebel Turkish-Kurds. Ultimately, however, Assad prevailed, and the PKK cadres joined Barzani in the north.

For awhile nothing was heard of the PKK, and then in July 1984 it exploded into the headlines with a spectacular operation that targeted two Turkish-Kurdish towns—Semdinli and Eruh. (See Figure 1.) PKK cadres, divided into two sections, smuggled themselves into Turkey and attacked the towns, located at widely dispersed points in the southeast.²⁴ This operation greatly embarrassed the Turkish army, inasmuch as, prior to it, there had been only minimal anti-government activity in the area.

Turkey responded by entering into an accord with Baghdad whereby Saddam Hussein gave permission to Turkish units to




Figure 1. Area of Kurdish Unrest.

enter Iraq in order to comb the northern territory for PKK guerrillas.²⁵ Damascus and Tehran were outraged at this agreement, and protested against it, but being weak neither could hope to block it. Nonetheless, they took what action they could—which basically consisted of stepping up their assistance to the various anti-Turkish groups; in effect, they increased their pressure on Turkey. For example, Iran offered to provide the PKK a base along the Iranian-Turkish border at Urmia (See Figure 1). At the same time, it invited the ASALA to open an office in Tehran. (Shortly after this two Turkish diplomats were slain in the Iranian capital, an event that nearly caused a break in diplomatic relations between Iran and Turkey.²⁶)

From late 1984 until 1987 a tug of war went on in Iraqi Kurdistan and southeastern Turkey, with Syria and Iran on one side supporting the Kurdish rebels, and Iraq and Turkey seeking to repress them. Then, in 1988, Iraq unexpectedly turned the tables on Iran, forcing it to capitulate in its 8 year war against Baghdad. As might be imagined, the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq died as soon as the Iranians surrendered. The PKK forces, however, did not go out of action. They hung on in the rugged mountains of southeastern Turkey. They were constrained, however, from doing much; the whole security picture in the region had changed after Iran lost the war.

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE

The end of the Iran-Iraq War ushered in a brief period of stability in the northern region of Iraq and southeastern Anatolia. The Iranians stopped meddling with the Kurds, as they had to fear Iraqi retribution. As for the Syrians, they were severely compromised—Assad had backed a loser, which in the Middle East is a bad thing to do. To save face, he had to disassociate himself from the Kurdish resistance publicly.

The big winner—along with Iraq—was Turkey. Between roughly August 1988 and the eruption of the crisis in Kuwait, Turkey's internal situation was relatively secure. Rebel activity in the southeast continued at a low ebb. However, as long as

there was no support forthcoming from the Iraqi Kurds, it was manageable.

In Iraq, Saddam expanded his pacification campaign. During the war he had cleared the Iraq-Iran border of Kurds, now he extended his *cordon sanitaire* to include the Turkish-Iraqi border as well. The Iraqis built model cities to house the displaced Kurdish villagers. The Kurds were upset at being forced from their homes. The Ba'thists, however, felt that their action was justified—to bring the north into his orbit, Saddam had to control the Kurds' smuggling operations. The quarantine now in effect did that. For years all of the states in the area had been plagued by Kurdish smugglers. Now, the base of their operations was shut down, a most salutary development from the standpoint of regional governments. For the first time since the late 1950s geographical Kurdistan was relatively peaceful. And then Iraq invaded Kuwait.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

At the direction of the late President Turgut Ozal, Turkey played a major role in DESERT STORM. Indeed, Ozal violated cardinal principles laid down by Turkey's founder Kemal Ataturk to help out the coalition.

In the mid-1920s, Ataturk enjoined the Turks to cultivate good relations with their immediate neighbors—Iraq, Iran and Syria. This policy was meant to offset distrust among the neighbors caused by policies of previous Turkish governments. However, with the development of the Kuwait crisis, Ozal changed course, virtually offering to go to war with neighbor Iraq, at the behest of the Bush administration. To be sure, Turkey did not take this step, but had it not been for Turkey's support the coalition would not have defeated Iraq as easily as it did.

For example, the interdiction of Iraq's oil pipelines through Turkey practically ensured the success of the West's economic embargo. The stationing of U.S. fighter aircraft at Turkey's Incirlik air base put enormous pressure on Iraq to withstand a potential thrust from the north. Also (and this is a factor easy to overlook) the post-conflict Kurdish rebellion succeeded

largely because Turkey had discontinued its border-monitoring operations.

There has been speculation as to why Ozal was so forthcoming to the United States. There really should be no mystery about this—for Turkey it was a shrewd and effective move. Washington needed of allies, and were Turkey to help out, there would be rewards to come. This was undoubtedly true. Even so, Ozal encountered stiff opposition at home to his policies. The principles of Kemalism are meaningful to Turks. No matter how many material benefits they might reap, Turks would not renounce the legacy of the man who had founded their country. This particularly was the case with the army officers.²⁷

Turkey's Army Chief of Staff resigned shortly after Ozal took his stand in support of the coalition.²⁸ Indeed, due to the opposition of the army, Ozal was kept from doing more for the anti-Iraq forces. For example, the coalition originally considered the idea of developing a second front against Iraq in Turkey—this never happened.²⁹ We do not know what role the Turkish military played in preventing this, but we do know that it opposed the plan. There was also a controversy over the use of Incirlik by the coalition.³⁰

In the face of such opposition, it is remarkable that Ozal prevailed. Several commentators have maintained that he did so by force of his personality.³¹ The author of this chapter believes that he had more going for him than that—he had a most compelling argument that he could use.

Since the end of World War I, Turkey has had a special interest in Mosul, which was stripped from its control by the League of Nations. Many Turks continue to believe that the northern Iraqi province, originally part of the Ottoman Empire, should once more be returned to them (See Figure 1).³²

Thus, Ozal could argue that, if Turkey did not participate *actively* in Operation DESERT STORM, it could not influence the outcome of the war, which could cost it dearly. Iraq certainly was going to lose. The question was how big, and what precisely it would forfeit. If the Iraqi state dissolved, what would

be the fate of Mosul? The possibility existed that some sort of independent Kurdish entity would emerge.

The idea that Mosul might become Kurdish was anathema to Turkey's politicians (not to mention the army). Hence, Ozal could argue that he had to back the coalition, or else Turkey could be cheated of Mosul *for the second time*; and Mosul—as all Turks were aware—included the rich oil fields of Kirkuk.³³ Whether Ozal used this argument is not known. We do know, however, that considerable sentiment exists in Turkey against turning Mosul over to the Kurds. Were this to occur, the author believes, the Turkish army would intervene to prevent it. In any event, Turkey did stand by Washington throughout DESERT STORM, and afterward was set to receive its reward. However here Ozal's plans went awry. With the abrupt and unexpected stampede of thousands of Kurds into Turkey, the character of the war changed. The conflict came home to the Turks; they now found themselves in the international spotlight, portrayed, initially, at least, in a none too flattering way.³⁴

THE COSTS TO TURKEY

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT tested Ozal's pro-coalition policy in two main areas. First, it strained Turkey's economy in ways that it could not absorb. Initially, Ankara had to care for the Kurdish refugees. Turks complained that they were being asked single-handedly to rectify the plight of these people.

Further, the instrument for aiding the Kurds was the army, which was unfortunate. The army, whose primary mission to date had been policing Kurds (i.e., repressing them) was being asked to dispense charity. This, the army found galling, because mixed among the Kurdish civilians were the *pesh merga*, against whom it had been warring for almost a decade.

With the world watching (via CNN), Turkey could hardly turn its back on this problem. It did help out, but Ozal never survived the blow to his prestige. In parliamentary elections Ozal's party lost heavily, to the point where his government was removed from office. To a large extent, the elections became a referendum on the President's handling of the Kurdish issue,

in which he personally was repudiated. Ozal could maintain that he would go on directing Turkish foreign policy.³⁵ In fact, he got no such opportunity, because now events really began to turn against him. Powerful interests in the West had begun to call for the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. This, of course, was something that no Turk—not even Ozal—could countenance.³⁶ As stated earlier, Turks generally were concerned about the fate of Mosul, should Iraq be dismembered. Now, the very outcome that Turks feared apparently was going to transpire.

As the United States came more and more to back the Kurds, their stock soared. Barzani, (along with Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK]), had become the leader of the Iraqi Kurds, and now the U.S. State Department invited him to Washington, an unprecedented show of regard.³⁷ However, just as things appeared to be going well for the Kurds, the PKK returned to the scene. As noted earlier the PKK had maintained a presence in southeastern Turkey, even after the Iran-Iraq War ended. Now, it took advantage of the chaos resulting from DESERT STORM to smuggle more of its cadres into the region. Thus, while world public opinion embraced the Kurds, the Turkish army was attacked by the most violent wing of the Kurdish movement.³⁸ The appearance of the PKK was announced spectacularly with a firebombing of an Istanbul department store. A mob shouting "long live Kurdistan" set the seven-story building ablaze, killing 11 people.³⁹

Turkey's response was to intensify military repression throughout the southeast, and, when violence continued in the region, to reinstate the policy of cross-border raiding into Iraq (essentially it undertook to cleanse the border region). When the world community protested this, the Turkish army turned a deaf ear. The initial cross-border operation was followed by more.⁴⁰

Ozal, his power sharply curtailed, could not deflect the army from its course. Indeed, the officers could claim to be defending Turkey's vital interests, because all Turks—or at least all non-Kurdish Turks—agreed that Kurdish separatism was a menace; anything that promoted it must be expunged.

Unexpectedly the Iraqi Kurds became involved in the crisis. In October 1992, Barzani and Talabani held a parley with Turkey's army commanders, in which they pleaded for an end to the army's operations. It appeared that, in conducting the raids, the Turkish army made no distinction between innocent Iraqi Kurds and PKK cadres—any Kurds that it encountered were attacked.

The Turkish commanders rebuffed the Iraqi Kurds' entreaties, until Talabani publicly denounced the PKK as "tools" of the Iranians. His colleague Barzani echoed this sentiment, saying, "It's no secret, Iran and Syria are aiding the Turkish rebels. Each has his own purpose and aim but the ultimate aim they all agree on is to undermine the Kurdish movement, and destroy what we have here (in Iraq)."⁴¹ After that, the Turkish army, and the Barzani and Talabani Kurds, joined forces to purge the northern region of the PKK.⁴²

DE JA VU ALL OVER AGAIN

Effectively, the Kurds are now back where they were in the 1970s.⁴³ Barzani and Talabani—by agreeing to cooperate with the Turkish army—have reinstated the policy of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, Masoud's father, i.e., assisting Turkey to repress the Turkish-Kurdish resistance. Further, by throwing in their lot with the Turkish army, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have ended whatever hope they might have had of gaining independence. They are now hostages of the Turks.

Ankara will not allow them to form a state; the most that it will do is sanction some sort of de facto independent status for them.⁴⁴ Thus, the Iraqi Kurds are left hanging, in a kind of limbo, as it were—neither part of Iraq, nor independent, and they suffer the worst of both worlds.

Baghdad has adopted the stance that, since it does not rule the north, it will not look out for the area. Supply of electricity and potable water, maintenance of highways—all this has been discontinued. The Kurds must provide such services themselves, something they cannot do. For help, the Kurds have turned to the international relief agencies. But the agencies are badly overworked, and are cutting back on their

operations. Thus the Kurds are not receiving nearly the help that they need.⁴⁵

One would expect the United States to come to the Kurds' aid. However, this has not happened, apparently because Washington does not view the situation as permanent. U.S. policymakers seem to believe that Saddam's days are numbered, and therefore things will turn out right once he is gone. (In the author's view this is a miscalculation.)

The Turkish army, however has reason to be pleased with the setup—as it should be. Its situation is salutary. Whenever it perceives that the Kurds are getting out of line, it pounces on them, after which it returns to Turkey to take up its stance of vigilance once again. And for this, it is well supplied with weapons and resources.⁴⁶ The army has something that all armies crave—a well-defined, concrete mission.

The only question is, what is the effect of all this likely to be on Turkey? Turkey has a Kurdish problem. It is not attempting to deal with it, except through repression.⁴⁷ Is it likely that in the long term this approach will pay off? For the answer to that we need to look at the economics of the situation.⁴⁸

ECONOMICS

The Turks, like their neighbors the Iranians and Iraqis, are fiercely nationalistic.⁴⁹ In line with this, Turkey tried in the 1960s and throughout most of the 1970s to become self-reliant by practicing import substitution. The attempt failed, but not for lack of commitment on the part of Turkey's rulers.

Turkish governments regularly subsidized the public sector. By 1977, however, the policy had to be abandoned; Turkey could no longer borrow the funds it needed to continue public funding (international lenders, having decided that Turkey was not a good risk, withdrew their support).

With that Turkey had but one effective option—to put itself in the hands of the International Monetary Fund, which, in return for painful concessions on Turkey's part, agreed to restructure its debts. The IMF wanted Turkey to shift its focus to exports, and, to make Turkish products competitive

internationally, Ankara was asked to pursue a policy of domestic austerity. This meant cutting wages, eliminating unnecessary jobs, and devaluating the currency.

As we will show, the IMF-imposed regimen was not a total success. In the short run, however—and in specific areas—it worked amazingly well. Turkey's balance of payments became more stable, exports increased dramatically and inflation dropped dramatically, as well.⁵⁰

These results probably could not have been achieved, however, had there not been a military coup. As noted above, there had been a military takeover in Turkey in the late 1970s. In power, the army imposed measures that Turkey's weak civilian leaders would not attempt.⁵¹ In effect, Turkey's economic rejuvenation was carried out under martial law.

Even at this, Turkey's economy would probably not have turned around were it not for another factor. Turkey was able to develop regional markets to supplement those of Europe and the United States. This was essential because after 1985, when the price of oil plummeted, some of its western markets dried up. Turkey faced a similar falling off in the Middle East—however in this area it had something else going for it.

The Iran-Iraq War benefited Turkey by making the belligerents depend on it for survival. For example, early in the war Iraq's seaborne oil line was cut by Iran's takeover of the Gulf. Baghdad had to move oil to market through Turkey.⁵² For that it paid Ankara stiff transit fees. In addition it agreed to provide Turkey with oil at below market prices.

Iran similarly depended on Turkey for the transit of vitally needed supplies. Machine parts, food, and basic consumer products were trucked to Iran through Turkey. Whenever this traffic was interdicted, Iran faced crisis.⁵³ Thus, the period of the Iran-Iraq War had a stimulating effect on Turkey's regional trade. It also created a foundation on which all the regional states could build when the Iran-Iraq War ended.

For a brief period after the war Turkey and its neighbors undertook to cooperate economically, and then came Kuwait. With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and President Bush's pressure

on Turkey to support the coalition, Ankara's regional market collapsed. Its trade with Iraq was interdicted by the U.N.-imposed embargo. Transit fees for oil and oil at bargain prices were discontinued.⁵⁴

To be sure, the coalition made up part of the shortfall. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait together contributed \$12 billion dollars in aid to the frontline states, including Turkey.⁵⁵ In addition, Washington increased Turkey's textile quota.⁵⁶ Germany moved a battalion to Turkey to support DESERT STORM, and afterward left all of the unit's equipment for Turkey's use.⁵⁷

This largesse, however, did not change the reality of Turkey's altered economic position. Just when it appeared that Turkey's economy was about to take off, it foundered. Iran was still a trading partner, but after the end of the Iran-Iraq War Tehran found itself constrained in many of the same ways as Iraq. (Attempts by Rafsanjani to turn Iran's economy around after the disastrous defeat in the Iran-Iraq War have, so far, not proved successful.)

Turkey thus emerged from Operation DESERT STORM in a compromised position. It had definitely benefited in terms of gaining the good will of the United States. Not only did President Bush channel many direct and indirect perquisites its way, but he also held out hope of more rewards to come. For example, Bush strongly supported the idea of an American opening to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, in which Turkey would become the agent of America's cultural and economic advance. Bush also backed Turkey's bid to become a full member of the European Economic Community, and even went so far as to endorse Turkey's position on Cyprus.⁵⁸

All these prospects of aid are now up in the air—immediately after DESERT STORM, President Bush was voted out of office. Faced with severe economic constraints, the U.S. Congress began looking for economies, and in the process cut Turkey's regular allotment of foreign aid. Whereas Bush's last aid request to Congress for Turkey was \$543 million, Congress has now cut that to \$450 million and is converting it to loans.⁵⁹ As for the other schemes promoted by Bush, they may not be realized.

Turkey will presumably continue to receive aid from the IMF. However, as noted above there is a downside to the Fund's assistance. IMF-mandated reforms have imposed hardships on Turkey's population. Job losses have never really been recouped. Wages, cut to make Turkey competitive on the world market, remain low. Inflation, after dropping dramatically, has now shot up again to over 70 percent.⁶⁰

Thus, the Turkish people have borne the brunt of the IMF-imposed measures. Hardest hit has been the rural sector, and this, by and large, comprises the Kurds. This is troubling because the formerly passive Kurdish population is docile no longer—not since the advent of the PKK.

TURKEY AND THE PKK TODAY

As suggested earlier, the PKK became the vanguard of the Turkish-Kurdish struggle practically by default. There were no active Kurdish opposition groups, and hence the field of opposition was pretty much left to it. At the same time (also noted) the PKK cadres were not really far removed from ghetto toughs. As long as this was the perception (that is, that the PKK cadres were thugs), Turkish authorities could hope to make headway against them, counting on the support of peace-loving Kurds who were offended by violence.

For awhile it seemed that the PKK would be extinguished. Had it not been for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the author feels, it probably would have been. The operation did two things for the PKK. It enabled the party to expand its operations in the southeast, after Baghdad's cleansing operations had rendered it virtually defunct.

Along with this, the PKK benefited from international media coverage of the Kurds. Kurds who had given up on their Kurdish identity are now insisting upon it. Since the PKK is *the* group inside Turkey that is avowedly Kurdish, more and more Kurds are identifying with it.

Thus, Turkey's heretofore suppressed Kurdish minority has grown assertive, and this in turn has transformed conditions in

the southern region. From being a sleepy backwater of modern Turkish society, it has turned into a hotbed of revolt.

A BASE FOR REVOLT

Although Kurds are in the forefront of the opposition in Turkey, it would be wrong to assume that domestic unrest is a specifically Kurdish phenomenon. Inside Turkey today a number of subversive groups operate. Some of the most lethal are not Kurdish at all.⁶¹ At the same time, all profit from the poor economic conditions with which Turkey is currently afflicted.

The rise of the PKK has transformed the political climate by, in effect, establishing a safe haven for the disaffected groups, and this, in turn, has enhanced their survival chances. No longer are they restricted to operating underground in Ankara and Istanbul; they can now hide out in the provinces, alongside the PKK.

To be sure, Turkish security forces are present throughout this region; but Turkish police are no different from police anywhere—to operate efficiently they depend on information. If the local Kurds will not cooperate, the police are handicapped. This seems to be the *present situation*—otherwise why has the army been unable to make good its threat to eliminate the radicals?

One could argue that in the long term there is no cause for concern. After all, the Iraqi-Turkish border is closed; the Iraqi Kurds have teamed up with the Turkish army against the PKK. Is it not just a matter of time before the rebellion is crushed? To be sure, there would be grounds for optimism, were it not that Iran has become a factor in the equation. The author will now attempt to show that, as Talabani has charged, Iran and Syria have resumed their intrigues against Turkey.

HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?

Iran is a rival of Turkey in a number of areas. However, neither Ankara nor Tehran wish to go to war with each other. Moreover, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as Iran's president, has reasons of his own for wanting to avoid a break with the Turks.

His opposition in the Tehran government comprises radicals who oppose Turkey as an impious, anti-Islamic regime.⁶² Hence Rafsanjani is drawn to support Ankara on the principle of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

Nonetheless, Rafsanjani is Khomeini's heir, and it was a basic precept of the late Ayatollah's teaching that the United States is *the* number one enemy of Iran. No reason exists to believe that Rafsanjani—or any of the men around him—have given up on this opinion.

And this is where the difficulty comes in. Earlier we described how Syria and Iran both came to view Turkey as a Trojan Horse. It, in their eyes, is a vehicle whereby NATO spreads its influence throughout the region.

The mullahs who presently rule Iran have imbibed that view. This feeling (of mistrust for Ankara) flared anew during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Having a NATO force next door in Iraqi Kurdistan was not something the mullahs relished. They waited anxiously for the operation to end; after which they expected that the Western forces would depart. When this did not happen—when instead the operation dragged out, the mullahs became greatly upset. They blasted Turkey, claiming that Ankara's accommodation of the United States damaged Turkish-Iranian relations.⁶³

Some Iranian commentators have pointed to the situation that obtained with the Kurds in the 1970s, when Mulla Mustafa led the Iraqi-Kurdish resistance movement. We have already alluded to this in our study. At that time, northern Iraq was turned into a base—not only for the Turkish army, but for the CIA, the Shah's security force SAVAK, and the Israelis.

The Iranian leaders remember all this, and thus they regard the present setup in Kurdistan with suspicion. PROVIDE COMFORT is *not* perceived by them to be a humanitarian operation. It is yet another stage in the NATO's attempt to takeover in the region.⁶⁴ In addition, the Iranians' suspicions have been reinforced by Washington's recent espousal of the so-called policy of "Dual Containment." Under it, the Iranians would be subjected to controls, the aim of which would be to deny them access to certain weapons and technology they

could use to modernize their military.⁶⁵ In effect, Iran's treatment by the West would not differ greatly from what Iraq is undergoing.

For Rafsanjani, Washington's policy change confirms his deepest suspicions, and this has put the Iranian leader on the spot. What should he do? It appears that he has made up his mind to revive the terror war.

IRAN'S RESPONSE

At the end of June 1993 expatriate Kurdish workers all over Europe erupted in a rampage of attacks on Turkish embassies and missions. Twenty-nine cities were involved and thousands of demonstrators took part. Nothing like this has been seen since the 1960s.⁶⁶

Western intelligence and the media, in speculating about the rampages, blamed the PKK. No one, however, questioned whether the group had received outside aid, which ought to have been a consideration.

It is not possible that the PKK could have performed an operation like this on its own; it was far too ambitious an undertaking. There would have had to have been an infrastructure on which the protestors could have relied, and the PKK does not have such a network. Moreover, the operation would have required considerable funding (there aren't that many committed PKK members in Europe).

There are really only three states that could have masterminded the embassy attacks. Iraq obviously comes to mind. However, Iraq dismantled its terrorist apparatus in 1983, and there is no evidence that it subsequently geared back up (rebuilding a network of this sort is no easy thing to do). Further, it is unlikely that Iraq would have links to the PKK, an organization based in Damascus, the capital of its arch rival.

Syria is the next likely candidate. Turkey has consistently accused Assad of supporting the PKK, and has been pressing him to close down PKK offices in Damascus.⁶⁷ The Syrians have refused to do this. However, at the same time, Assad has kept a low profile lately. He does not wish to be perceived as

a sponsor of terrorism, while the peace talks with Israel are in process. It is the author's belief that Assad is following essentially the same strategy with the PKK he pursued earlier—he is keeping open his lines to the group, while being careful not to be seen to be openly backing it.

That leaves Tehran as the real culprit. Here the evidence would appear to be compelling. Iran has the infrastructure in place throughout Europe to assist in attacks of this nature.⁶⁸ Further, it has recently been targeting Ankara on another front. In July of this year, members of the pro-Iranian Hizbollah burned down a hotel in Ankara at which a professed supporter of author Salman Rushdie was staying.⁶⁹ The Turkish media publicly branded Tehran as the instigator of this attack. In addition, several prominent Turkish journalists (outspoken secularists) have been assassinated by groups the Turkish media has tied to Tehran.⁷⁰

Finally we know that Iran has a history of perpetrating this type of action. As we have just detailed, it did this throughout the 1980s. All of the tactics that Iran employed then are being used now—attacks against Turkish embassies and diplomats, the staging of cross-border raids into Turkey from Iranian bases. Even the assets that are being employed are identical—the PKK, ASALA, and Hizbollah. In crude terms, Tehran has the *modus operandi* for a job like this, and this—when it comes to dealing with terrorists—is crucial.

The final clinching factor, however, is the timing of the embassy attacks—they came on June 24, one day before the Turkish parliament by a voice vote agreed to extend permission of the United States to use Incirlik for overflights of Iraq in connection with PROVIDE COMFORT. In the meantime, the Turkish government has formally accused Iran of supporting the terrorists; it claims to have conclusive evidence to prove this.⁷¹

WHAT TO DO?

At the heart of this problem, in the author's view, is the Turkish army-Barzani-Talabani deal, and Washington's response to it. By seeming to have accepted the deal, U.S.

policymakers have fostered the belief that the Kurds are an instrument of U.S. policy.

To an American this may seem farfetched, but one must try to view the matter through the eyes of a Middle Easterner. The situation in Kurdistan today too much resembles the setup in the 1970s, when Mulla Mustafa made *his* deal with the Shah of Iran, the CIA and Israel. Then, the north of Iraq was perceived by many as a base of imperialism and Zionism—and that is the way it is being seen (at least in Iran) today.

To counter this impression Washington might want to rethink its policy toward the Kurds. It needs to show that it is primarily interested in their welfare and is not merely wielding them as a weapon against Saddam Hussein. In the author's view there is a way of doing this.

Earlier this year the Iraqi Kurds declared their support for a federated Iraq.⁷² This would be a state combining a Kurdish area in the north with another in the south comprising the Arabs—two regions under the rule of Baghdad.

Washington should push the Kurds to start negotiations with Baghdad on this proposal. The Ba'thists would like to end the economic embargo, and would probably go along with a federation—provided that they retained key portfolios in the government, with the Kurds left to manage their local affairs.

The deal would have to be made with Saddam since no other Iraqi leader could make it stick, and this would mean that Washington would have to abandon its aim of deposing the Iraqi President. But, in the author's view, it is not Washington's job to depose foreign heads of state. This is something for the Iraqi people to do.

The process of setting up the federation would take time, but, as long as there was movement, events should be allowed to work themselves out. The important thing is that matters not be permitted to drift, as they are doing now. It is this *drift* that is exciting suspicions among the regional actors that the United States is striving for hegemonic control. (The idea being that as long as the situation is not resolved, the United States is enabled to keep a military presence in the area.)

What about the regional actors—how would they react to this proposal? If Tehran and Damascus truly are worried about the extension of NATO power into the region, then federation should be reassuring to them. Under the arrangement, the Kurds would not require a NATO shield, and the allied forces could speedily depart.

Also, as part of the deal the border to Turkey would be closed, thus shutting off the PKK. This would benefit all the states that have large Kurdish populations because none is anxious to see the emergence of a separate Kurdish nation. The Turkish Kurds would suffer, to be sure, but then, the United States has influence with Ankara, which it can use to protect the Turkish Kurds.

Moreover, under a federated setup, northern Iraq would be a much more orderly place. Whatever else, the Iraqi Ba'th Party is disposed to maintain order. It would never tolerate smuggling, and all of the other lawless pursuits that currently are going on in the area.⁷³

TURKEY AND THE FUTURE

Many have argued that Turkey is on the threshold of a golden era, and indeed it does appear that opportunities are available to it in a number of areas. For example, Turkey could be enriched by selling water from the newly built Ataturk Dam. Numerous Middle Eastern states, including Israel and Kuwait, would leap at the opportunity to tap into this resource.⁷⁴ There is also talk of establishing a region-wide electric grid.⁷⁵

None of this, however, is going to happen if the area is torn apart with strife, and this brings us to consider the alternative to the solution that we are proposing. Barring some constructive move, we are certain to see more anti-Turkish activity in the days ahead, both in Europe and the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq. This means that Ankara is going to have to devote more and more of its limited economic resources to quelling disturbances in the Kurdish community.

Further, military action against the Kurds is bound to have an adverse influence on Turkey's relations with countries in

Europe and with the United States. Already there have been calls both here and abroad for Turkey to correct what are viewed as human rights abuses.⁷⁶

Turkey does not need this sort of grief. It would be far better, if it could put the Kurdish problem behind it, and devote itself to building up its economy. Moreover, this might also improve its chances of gaining entry to the European Economic Community. As was pointed out in the last chapter, much of the Europeans' concern about granting Turkey membership derives from their unhappiness at having so many expatriate Turks living in their midst. If Turkey's economy improves, many of these Turks would leave Europe to take jobs at home.

THE EFFECTS ON AMERICA

There is a postscript to this whole affair; That is, it obviously also affects the United States. Sooner or later, in the author's view, the PKK is going to start targeting American interests. The group is extremely radical, and, in its public statements, has frequently denounced the United States.

Moreover, U.S. forces at Incirlik are exposed to attack by the PKK. The American public is obviously unhappy about military operations in areas where the vital interests of the United States are not at risk.

In the author's view, America does not need a military presence in northern Iraq.⁷⁷ It does not add to our security position in the Middle East. Also, when one considers the terrain that American troops would have to fight in (were this to be necessary), the situation becomes nightmarish.

At the same time, any disengagement from Kurdistan is sure to outrage the Kurds' numerous supporters in the United States and Europe. Given this fact, the Clinton administration may not see its way clear to act. This is understandable.

However, the Administration should then begin to calculate the costs of going on with things as they are—both in terms of money and lives. The U.S. military should inform the President what would be required to maintain our current presence in the

area—under the worst case scenario, where U.S. troops were actually coming under assault.

Finally, American policymakers should begin consultations with the Turks about how they view events. We need to be certain of where they stand in this. If the author is correct, they are being drawn into a situation that is fraught with danger. At the least they face a prolonged bout of instability. At worst there is the prospect of civil war looming ahead.

There are indications that the Turkish government would like to disassociate itself from PROVIDE COMFORT, and then it would be prepared to strive for some equitable solution to the Kurdish problem.⁷⁸ U.S. policymakers should proceed on the basis that this is the case, and then try to work with Ankara on this matter.

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE FORMER USSR AND U.S. INTERESTS

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the USSR has transformed Turkey's geostrategic engagement with the post-Soviet successor states, and presents Turkey with both unprecedented opportunities and risks. Turkey engages all the post-Soviet successor states in relationships of trade and arms transfers, conducts economic and defense discussions with Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, and is Russia's rival for influence in the Black Sea, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia. Turkey's Transcaucasian and Central Asian policies have also fostered a regional rivalry with Iran. This complex network of Turkish policies and regional relations also has potential repercussions for U.S. interests.

The most serious of these exist in Transcaucasia. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh could embroil Turkey with Armenia and Russia in a war it cannot win. This war and its consequences have also displayed Turkey's inability to aid Azerbaijan. If Turkey cannot stop Azerbaijan from reverting to a Russian sphere, that calls into question Turkey's prospects throughout the former USSR. In that case Central Asia and Transcaucasia's future would once again be an open question, signifying the unsettled quality of the local state systems.¹

Menaced in modern times by the spread of Russian/Soviet power, Turkey has used either of two strategies. One strategy relied upon forging coalitions with other European or Western powers—the United States—to resist Russian ambitions and defend Turkey. NATO exemplifies that strategy. The second

strategy accepted a wide spectrum of cooperative ties with Russia running from partnership through friendship all the way to temporary Russian tutelage.

Currently facing a democratic but unstable Russia that shows continuing interest in its former imperial peripheries, Turkey has borrowed a leaf from both strategies. Turkey seeks to preserve its friendship and large economic ties with Russia. At the same time it pursues a robust, but controlled policy to spread Turkish influence in Transcaucasia, the Black Sea, and Central Asia to form a zone of influence and keep Russia away from Turkey's borders.

TURKEY'S REGIONAL POLICY GOALS

Apart from the open war between Armenians and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, there is a hidden regional conflict between Turkey's drive to build a zone of influence in Transcaucasia and Russia's determination not to be excluded from its traditional spheres of influence. Turkey's strategy to achieve influence reflected its calculus of Ankara's regional interests and of U.S. support for Turkish policy. The Bush administration, and apparently now the Clinton administration as well, openly encouraged Turkey to proclaim itself a Westernizing model for the former Soviet republics to block Iran's (and perhaps covertly Russia's) influence in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.²

But because Turkey also acts in the Balkans and the Middle East and faces a long-standing Kurdish insurgency at home, it cannot refrain from strategic engagement in those areas to concentrate exclusively in Transcaucasia. Turkey's position at the junction of these regions prevents undue concentration on any one area lest it lose influence in the others. Turkey must claim a presence in all four areas. As the late President Ozal said,

Whatever the shape of things to come, we will be the real elements and most important pieces of the status quo and new order to be established in the region from the Balkans to Central Asia. In this region, there cannot be a status quo or political order that will exclude us.³

Although Ozal's vision was probably far more expansive than all the states in these regions would like, many of them need to have a Turkish presence in order to block other contenders for regional preeminence, e.g. Russia. Yevhen Marchuk, the head of Ukraine's Security Service, listed Turkish participation in assuring Ukraine's security as a high priority for Kiev. Turkey's experiment in capitalism and democracy, and its military prominence in the Black Sea as Russo-Ukrainian forces have diminished make it an important factor in Ukraine's security and a model for Ukraine. Creating a multilateral security system in the Black Sea and Mediterranean to protect Ukraine and Turkey from economic or military threats and their mutual military cooperation thus became part of both states' agendas.⁴

Domestic economic factors also affect Turkey's policies and ability to play the role of a model. In July 1993, Turkey had a 73 percent annual inflation rate and its state budget is operating at the limits of its capacity. Its capital resources are also heavily engaged in the mammoth Ataturk Dam and hydroelectric project and a substantial military modernization program. In addition, 30 percent of its expanding military budget goes to contain the Kurds who appear to be a growing burden.⁵ Finally, Turkey's annual per capita income is only \$2000, a figure that needs to grow if Turkey is to overcome internal and international economic challenges.

Another factor affecting Turkey's strategy is Turkish defense policy. Turkey is undergoing large-scale long-term defense modernization. The military's high status in policy making and society, the impact of DESERT STORM, and the violence in Kurdistan and the Transcaucasus are invoked to justify this program.⁶ The program aims to build modern forces needed to ensure Turkish security and gain self-sufficiency in production.⁷ Turkish officials also say they need to develop a capability to produce and sell arms to Central Asian states, thus linking economic and military factors to foreign policy.⁸ Turkey also is restructuring its forces to make missile defense a high priority against proliferation threats from its neighbors. The program evidently will cost \$12 billion, a 20 percent increase over original estimates.⁹ Turkey's inflation rate, military

modernization, and the socio-economic costs of the Kurdish insurgency all suggest a broad unfinished domestic agenda that constrains Turkey fiscally and economically from playing a leading or dominating role in the ex-Soviet republics. Those constraints also suggest the high importance of economic goals in Turkey's overall foreign strategic engagement including the CIS. Equally important is the fact that Chief of Staff, General Mattei Dogan Gures, frankly stated that the Kurdish threat to Turkey's territorial integrity is the military's first priority.¹⁰ This line of policy all but rules out serious consideration of military action on behalf of Azerbaijan in its current crisis. Gures' dictum not only reflects an inward looking military policy that rejects foreign activity, it also reflects the limits that Turkey's economy and military modernization program place on Turkey's war-fighting capabilities.

That consideration takes us to the heart of Turkey's strategic dilemma. Turkey wants to and feels called upon by others, e.g. Ukraine, to extend its influence, in President Demirel's words, "From the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China." Yet domestic economic factors mean Turkey cannot afford to play this primarily economic role. Nor can Ankara escape the fact that efforts to play this role will inevitably increase tensions with Russia and Iran and could lead to military challenges that it cannot or will not accept, e.g. intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. As Demirel recently observed, Turkey does not govern Azerbaijan and thus cannot intervene in a sovereign state's domestic affairs.¹¹

Indeed, to reach a level where it can play this prominent economic role abroad based on a flourishing domestic economy, Turkey's key goal throughout the former USSR apparently is access to economic markets, particularly in energy. To protect its energy sources from interruptions by Iran, Iraq, or Russia, Turkey seeks a continuous pipeline linking it, through Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. A prime strategic objective is a leading position in the transport, if not exploration, extraction, and refining, of Azeri and Central Asian oil and gas to the West. Attaining these objectives would make Turkey the middleman in an extremely lucrative East-West energy business and offer

it an enormous windfall.¹² Those are Turkey's real stakes in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

This war, fought by local Armenians for freedom from Azeri and Soviet oppression so that they can unite with Armenia could dismember Azerbaijan, and bring all the outside powers: Turkey, Iran, and Russia into the conflict. Turkey has backed the former Azeri government of Abulfaz Elchibey, an outspoken Pan-Turk, and provided it with much assistance. The payoff to Ankara was to be a postwar Azerbaijan that showcased the Turkish model and provided Turkey with this uninterrupted supply of Central Asian and Azeri gas and oil. In 1992 Foreign Minister Cetin proposed a territorial realignment as part of a peace settlement that would attain those very goals.

Cetin proposed, with U.S. support, that should a cease-fire occur and negotiations begin, the postwar settlement should create a pure Armenian state out of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and a continuous, purely Muslim, Turkic, state of Azerbaijan incorporating the formerly detached area of Nakhichevan. (See Figure 2.) This territorial exchange would allow construction of a pipeline whose path conformed to Turkey's objectives.¹³

Under this plan, Azerbaijan would remain intact but it and Armenia would be dependent on Turkey while Turkey obtained its cherished pipeline. The plan cuts off Iran and Russia from those energy routes and Russia from Transcaucasia as Central Asian oil and gas go directly to Turkey and Europe, making Turkey a major player in the energy game.¹⁴ This plan also would effectively reorient much of Central Asia's economy from Russia to Turkey and the West since energy is that region's main source of foreign exchange. Turkey could then lead Central Asia and Transcaucasia into overall economic integration and even alliance.¹⁵

But Turkey's support for that solution and its potential future ramifications, in turn, have led Iran and Russia to counter Turkish efforts for leverage over the region's energy sources and its overall economy. At present, for example, Iran has blocked Turkey's TIR (Transit Highway International) trucks from its highways, effectively obstructing overland trade with




Figure 2. Transcaucasia.

Azerbaijan and Central Asia. This has forced Turkey to retaliate in kind for what it believes are politically dictated actions.¹⁶ Such actions indicate the value that rival regional actors place upon economic relationships in the former Soviet republics.

On Turkey's part, President Demirel told a recent gathering of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) of Muslim states, which now includes the ex-Soviet republics, that Turkey strongly believes in those ex-republics' immense development potential. The condition for that development is that they follow Turkey's example by freeing the private sector and coalescing in a common trading bloc.¹⁷ His speech showed that he sees Turkey's role as analogous to Germany's in the EC. He also stressed the centrality of energy cooperation as a precondition for unity.

Utilization of the rich energy potential of the region in a manner whereby the needs of all the countries of the region are satisfied and extension to international markets becomes possible is an issue of special importance which leads to the establishment of lasting ties.¹⁸

Demirel's remarks show the close linkage between Turkey's energy objectives and Turkey and the ECO's ability to weld the new republics into an economic 'common market.' Turkey's economic limitations already cast doubt upon this endeavor's success; but its failure in Azerbaijan throws Turkey's entire strategic profile as a model and leader into question.

TURKISH SECURITY AND THE WAR IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

The Nagorno-Karabakh war starkly illustrates how vulnerable Turkey's grand design is to continued local warfare. This war also has unappealing implications for Turkey's overall security interests. Those vital interests include a friendly and stable Azerbaijan, Armenia's recognition that it depends on Turkey, and ultimately a regional regime that precludes direct Russian military pressure on Turkey.¹⁹

More importantly, the continuing Nagorno-Karabakh war may prevent Turkey from realizing its ambitions, bring back the Russians, possibly introduce Iran into the region, and intensify the risks of a much wider and more dangerous war. This is particularly true since the Armenian forces exploited the coup against Elchibey to break a cease-fire based on U.N. Resolution 882 and seize more Azeri territory during July-August 1993. If the extreme nationalist Dashnak Party members (who appear to control the Nagorno-Karabakh army) have their way, they will apparently use their victories to engineer the secession of the Lach and/or Lezgin peoples from Azerbaijan. This action would effectively dismember Azerbaijan, forcing Turkey to act,²⁰ as well as Iran. Already Iran has strongly protested Armenian forces' advance all the way to the its border.²¹ If Turkey intervenes, it could then also face the Russian division stationed on the border under the Tashkent Treaty on collective security of the CIS that Armenia and Russia signed. Russian analysts state that because that force has no air defense, Russia can only support it by threats of nuclear retaliation, a factor that has deterred Turkey.²²

Because Turkey is deterred from active intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, it cannot unilaterally reshape the future Transcaucasia's regional order and terminate Russian military pressure on its border. Turkish analysts note that the military cannot be expected to act as Azerbaijan's "subcontractor" for security. And, with good reason, they place little credence in a U.N. peacekeeping mission. Nor does Turkey wish to support the new Aliev regime in Baku until and unless a referendum is held by Azeris on their government. All these factors combine to deter Turkey from intervention despite its threats to the Armenian forces.²³ Still, Turkey's condition of being deterred does not mean Turkey cannot reach any of its goals. Rather Turkey must accept a large degree of Russian participation and perhaps even predominance in any regional settlement. So Turkey has had to accept a trilateral political solution and probably a secondary role. Turkey, Russia, and the United States recently coauthored U.N. Resolution 882 authorizing a cease-fire in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, a sign that the other coauthors recognize that Turkey has regional interests.

But continued war in Nagorno-Karabakh threatens even that more modest objective. And, the chaos in Azerbaijan compounds that threat because it has led to the breakdown of the cease-fire accords and renewed fighting. Indeed, Turkey's alarm at new trends is palpable. On July 26, 1993, it proposed that U.N. peacemakers, *including Turkish forces*, be sent to Azerbaijan.²⁴ This would not be seen in Erevan or Moscow as peacekeeping, but as Turkey's intervention in the region to save Baku and Elchibey. This proposal would almost certainly be unacceptable to Erevan, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Iran, and to Russia, which is determined to monopolize peacekeeping operations in the former USSR. Turkish papers also talk of attacking the new government in Baku before the CSCE for violating human rights and even suggest sanctions.²⁵ However, it is unlikely that either proposal will be adopted. Those proposals signify Turkey's failed policies, not strength, and reflect Ankara's inability to save its client and sustain a pro-Turkish regime in Baku. The government there, led by Geidar Aliyev and the rebel commander, now Defense Minister, Guseinov, intend to restore Azerbaijan's integrity and reverse Elchibey's insufficient attention to Russia.²⁶

Thus, this war exposes the weakness of Turkish strategy and policy. Although Turkey became progressively more ready in 1993 to display coercive diplomacy by military forces to make its point it still could not or would not do anything for Elchibey.²⁷ It was in keeping with Turkish policy to speak more resolutely than it acts. But the failure of coercive diplomacy to seriously deter the Armenians could, in time, further stimulate an already aroused Turkish public opinion unhappy with Azeri defeats to demand real pressure on Armenia in support of Azerbaijan which is racially, culturally, and politically very close to Turkey. Turkey's ability to stay out of this war, its clear desire, is, therefore, potentially limited by the fact that public agitation for a tough line has become the daily stuff of domestic politics.²⁸ Should public opinion grasp the full measure of Turkey's failure it may well turn against the government and demand tougher policies at home or abroad. Whatever the outcome, Turkey must now reappraise its strategy and policy. Furthermore, if Armenian forces stay at the Iranian-Azeri border and do indeed

bifurcate Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkey will have to join hands to compel an Armenian retreat and a territorial solution. In September 1993, Armenian advances to the Azeri border with Iran compelled Iran to mass troops on its side of the border and led Turkey to take its own precautionary military actions on its border with Armenia. Both of these military measures remain in effect at the time of this writing. Joint intervention would restore Russia's position in the Transcaucasus, offer Iran a legitimate role there as well as respectability by virtue of its moderation and association with Moscow and Ankara, and leave Turkey with marginal gains at best.

Thus today Turkey loses either way. If the cease-fire negotiated under the terms of U.N. Resolution 882 before the coup against Elchibey is restored and negotiations begin, Russian, not Turkish, influence will predominate in Baku and Erevan because Russia is Erevan's protector against Turkey and the new regime in Baku looks towards Moscow, not Ankara, as a regional patron. On the other hand, continued war and breakdown of the cease-fire could also threaten Turkish interests for several reasons.

First, continued fighting makes it almost impossible for Turkey to realize its vital economic and energy goals and investments in Azerbaijan. Baku now spends 2/3 of its national income on the war. It cannot invest at home and thereby attract foreign investments, nor can it assist Turkey's energy or investment policies. Baku has already suspended previous pipeline negotiations and inclines towards Russian participation, a serious blow to Turkey's interests.²⁹

Second, as of the cease-fire Armenian forces had opened up two direct corridors to Nagorno-Karabakh, one through Kelbadzhar and the other to the south through territory inhabited by Lach and Lezgin peoples. Continued fighting could stimulate Dashnak-influenced Armenian commanders to dismember Azerbaijan and give these peoples autonomous or even independent status. That would break up Azerbaijan and sever its connections to the Azeri-inhabited province of Nakhichevan, giving Armenia a much greater land border with Iran. Or it could lead to Iran's intervention in the war and the peace process.³⁰ Both alternatives are a disaster for Ankara.

Azerbaijan's amputation could also trigger Kurdish pressure to create a state partly out of Turkey or irredentist pressure by Armenian radicals for territorial compensation for the massacres of 1915-22.³¹ And dismemberment of Azerbaijan is an outcome that Turkey's highest officials have stated they would not tolerate.³²

Third, Armenia historically has depended on its Russian connection to block Turkey and prevent an Azeri-Russian rapprochement. If Armenia prevails and Erevan or Baku turns to Russia for help, Turkey could fail to achieve its regional policy's main goals, cooperation with Baku and Armenian subservience, while Russian influence would return to Turkey's borders. That outcome accords with Russia's policy. Russia announced in 1992-93 that its troops in the North Caucasus and Moldova will remain until a political solution amenable to Russia is worked out and that a Transcaucasus Military District will be formed to control strategically important axes there.³³ As Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray said,

Russia has an interest in preserving the integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and in maintaining their political independence and sovereignty. For their part, these states should understand that their political independence, integrity, and development depend on the fact of whether they have normal relations with Russia. The disruption of the balance between various forces and interests leads to redistribution of power, property, and spheres of influence, and all this results in armed conflicts.³⁴

Fourth, Turkey views a possible Dashnak government as a threat since that party carries a bitter tradition of anti-Turkish struggle for the genocide of 1915-22, itself the fruit of years of violent struggles. The Dashnak party in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh demands Turkish territorial compensations, is a breeding ground for anti-Turkish Armenian terrorism, and appears to be linking up with the Kurdish PKK.³⁵ An Armenia freed from dependence on Turkey or that is unstable and even conducts various forms of low-level conflicts against Turkey or its interests greatly adds to Turkish security problems. For example, the PKK has targeted the pipelines from Azerbaijan and talks openly of support from and

links to Armenia.³⁶ If such an alliance does come to pass, it would join together two of Turkey's security dilemmas and greatly complicate Turkish policy. Fifth, a continued war might draw Turkey in, which would be against its best interests. Turkish leaders believe any intervention against Armenia would be interpreted abroad as a Muslim-Christian war, divert U.S. and European support from Turkey to Armenia, enhance Iran's position as a supporter of Armenia, and seriously complicate ties with Europe, Moscow, Tehran, and Washington.³⁷ Such intervention also belies Demirel's basic goals of a peaceful circle around Turkey. Thus any war against the Dashnaks for Azerbaijan could rupture Turkish alliances and threatens incalculable and probably protracted outcomes.³⁸

Although Presidents Ozal and Demirel warned Armenia in increasingly strident terms about the integrity of Azerbaijan and Turkey's limited patience during its offensives in early 1993, the offensives have continued. Thus, in April-May 1993, despite strong signs of the military's reluctance to enter the war, Turkey heightened its forces' readiness on the border, and intensified aerial reconnaissance in an unmistakable signal and act of coercive diplomacy to Armenia and Armenian forces.³⁹ Yet, the Azeri army kept losing, a coup unseated Elchibey, Armenian offensives continue unabated, and Turkey had to climb down from the escalation ladder. All this indicates that Turkey cannot deploy military power for Azerbaijan or elsewhere in the CIS. And this failure to deploy usable force to serve policy is even more marked because the April alert on the border was apparently the second time that Turkey resorted to high-level military threats and signals against Armenia, the first being in May 1992.⁴⁰

Sixth, Turkish intervention also would undo the domestic military modernization program and reverse the military priorities laid down by General Gures. Precisely because intervention raises those prospects, a protracted war in Transcaucasia would set back progress on other key sectors of Turkey's overall security policy.

The seventh reason why intervention is against Turkey's interests is because its armed forces may not be suited to such

a low-intensity conflict type of war. Turkey's General Staff warily viewed participation in Operation DESERT STORM. Its attitude stemmed from fidelity to Ataturk's strictures against foreign adventurism, fears of compromising Turkish sovereignty by acting in a coalition, and concerns about Iraqi retaliation. However, above and beyond those political concerns,

The military leadership apparently had serious doubts about Turkey's ability to deploy and sustain forces beyond their own territory, or even to conduct large-scale mobile operations on the border with Iraq. In short, close observation of the campaign in the Gulf confirmed the unpreparedness of the Turkish armed forces to wage modern conventional warfare. It has even cast doubt on the value of the relatively modern equipment to be acquired from the allies as a result of the CFE agreement.⁴¹

An open-ended low intensity conflict or worse in Transcaucasia would certainly be beyond an army of this caliber.

Finally, prolongation of the war also carries the threat of Iranian political, and perhaps subsequent military, intervention. Iran, too, cannot allow Armenian forces to dismember Azerbaijan. Iran's intervention could inflame the Islamic issue at home or abroad against Turkey and link up with the Kurds.⁴² For those reasons Anakara can only be part of the trilateral initiative that at least accepted that Turkey has regional interests. But that is a poor surrogate for the grand design born when the USSR collapsed.

TURKISH POLICY IMPASSE: TURKEY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Turkey's policy impasse highlights the fact that its strategic economic, political, and military ways and means do not suffice to realize its 1991-93 objective of a zone of Turkish influence. In Nagorno-Karabakh all of those policy instruments proved to be unavailing. Since Demirel's accession to the presidency in May 1993 the future direction of policy is unclear. The new government of Tansu Ciller may well concentrate on domestic economic issues. In that case, Ciller would necessarily have to redefine Turkey's strategic objectives abroad and could

narrow them considerably. The outcome of any strategic review also depends on regional conditions in the former Soviet republics and in the other areas of Turkish engagement which may be beyond Turkish control. For now, Turkey must also redouble its efforts to avert direct military participation in Nagorno-Karabakh and rethink its local objectives because its former strategic goals there clearly can no longer be sustained.

This conclusion also applies to the fact that Turkey's overall strategic engagement abroad reflects the internal and external political dimension of Turkey's self-identification, i.e., its sense of mission and how others see it. Traditionally Turkish elites identified with Europe and sought integration with it. However the Soviet collapse has affected Western perceptions of Turkey's importance for Europe. Its application to the EU has been deflected. Absent a Soviet threat, Turkey's importance to the Pentagon, in Europe, and NATO has declined. There is a trend to see Turkey almost exclusively in its Asiatic and Middle Eastern context.⁴³ Should Europe rebuff it, Turkey may look eastward for areas to enlarge its influence and obtain a new post-Ataturk and anti-Western mission and identity.⁴⁴ That new identity and mission could weaken Turkish involvement in Europe or lead it into very complex regional crises in the Muslim world.

Indeed, Turkish officials argue that if Turkey cannot fully enter the EU and WEU any time soon, its value to Central Asia as a Western state greatly declines. Then Turkey will find it difficult to play a stabilizing role in an area supposedly menaced by resurgent Islamic fundamentalism. Former Acting Prime Minister Erdal Inonu told EC leaders that if Turkey is to use its 'immense influence' on those regions to move them to democracy and markets, it must be a full member of the EC, an unlikely prospect, but one showing Turkey's true priorities.⁴⁵ But should Turkey be rejected by Europe and then turn east it could likely be bogged down in Central Asia or Transcaucasia, and be unable to influence Europe, the Black Sea, and the Balkans.

While Turkey's interest in Central Asia probably does not mean a revived Ottomanism or Pan-Turkism, interest in the Turkic peoples of the former USSR and the recovery of

communications and cultural-economic ties with them is clearly growing.⁴⁶ Turkey, with strong U.S. backing, has presented itself as a model of an economically well-developed, technically advanced, secular state that respects but limits Islam in politics, and has a stable democratic political system. Yet this approach has until now also implied Turkey's leadership, an approach that severely overestimates Turkish power and could lead to serious crises.⁴⁷

Closer bilateral ties and parallel interests with the United States in the ex-Soviet areas seemed, in 1991-92, to offer Turkey an alternative rationale for its strategic importance and a renewed sense of mission. The turn towards the former Soviet republics confirmed Turkey's strategic importance and even its leadership role to itself and Washington and allowed it to escape the deeper implications of the Kurdish problem, i.e., the need to revise Ataturk's heritage of an exclusively Turkish state for solving today's geopolitical problems. Dugyu Sezer argues,

In a very important sense, the scope of the Kurdish confrontation with the Turkish state attests to the failure of Turkish nationalism and the ethos of modernization to create a unitary state and a participatory society within which Kurdish ethnic and cultural identity might have flourished without challenging the state.⁴⁸

While Gures and Ciller reject anything that smacks of separatism and an end to the unitary state, successful export of Turkey's model to Central Asia seemed to demonstrate the continuing validity of Turkey's model to Turks.⁴⁹ Turkey could then have its Ataturkian cake and eat it, too, preserving the domestic structure of Ataturk's model, while venturing upon a much bolder foreign policy.

Unfortunately, the outcome in Transcaucasia and the dawning rivalry with Russia in the Black Sea and with other states, as well in Central Asia, has failed to accord with the dream. This observation, in turn, leads to a profoundly important point that belies the comfortable assumptions involved in looking abroad to escape domestic pressures. U.S. support for Turkey will depend much more on a democratic Turkish resolution of its human rights, i.e., Kurdish problem, a

problem that can only be solved by massive domestic economic growth, as Prime Minister Ciller quite visibly knows.⁵⁰ Ciller apparently will face a tough intramural struggle with the army that wants to continue the tough policy towards the Kurds that focuses on military repression of Kurdish terrorism and downplays a more integrative and balanced economic and political approach.⁵¹ Continuing harsh repression will make it harder for the United States to claim that human rights are obeyed. Any Turkish policy along those lines thereby risks U.S. economic and political support. Since U.S. support for Turkey as a model was and is crucial to the success of Turkey's entry into Europe and penetration of Central Asia, a harsh anti-Kurd policy would limit U.S. support and could limit Turkish activism abroad.

Secretary of State Christopher's recent talks with Turkey indicated a mutual desire to expand U.S.-Turkish relationships even though aid has recently been cut. But Secretary Christopher also explicitly linked aid and support to human rights.⁵² While economic factors may play a larger role than before, Turkey clearly wants increased economic and technological assistance as defense aid falls. Indeed, despite the severe budget cuts in overall U.S. foreign aid and to Turkey in particular, Turkey continues to demand guarantees on the amount of future military aid.⁵³ However, since progress on human rights is a major condition for upgrading the relationship, Turkey must make progress on the Kurds, i.e., demilitarize its policy, to continue being a Western 'interlocutor' and model for Central Asia. If Turkey cannot resolve the Kurdish issue to U.S. satisfaction, U.S. economic constraints will make aid to Turkey much harder to justify. Then Turkey's strategic posture, that the United States openly supported, will be still more exposed.

At the same time, U.S. negotiators have apparently told Turkey that if it continues to seek guarantees to reverse the last few years' downward trend in aid, "the United States will be forced to close down its bases in Turkey."⁵⁴ Although this may be a bluff, some Turkish officials believe that the recent U.S.-Bulgarian rapprochement signifies a long-term process to relocate those bases.⁵⁵

The conditionality of U.S. aid and support for Turkey's effort to lead a grouping of Central Asian states also points up the precariousness of Turkey's domestic structures. Flight from unresolved domestic and economic issues posed by the Kurds to expansive foreign policies is not a satisfactory resolution of domestic issues. Sezer's 1981 admonition remains valid.

Unfortunately, despite the absence of obvious military threats, the very precariousness of Turkey's domestic situation exposes her to precisely the kind of internal and external pressures which may dangerously undermine her ability to stand on her own feet and formulate a coherent security policy. This internal instability is currently the major source of Turkey's insecurity.⁵⁶

In other words, unless Turkey makes progress on its Kurdish problem it cannot play the major role in the Turkic world that it dreams of. By the same token if it cannot adjust outcomes in Azerbaijan, it cannot do so anywhere else.⁵⁷ Thus to achieve its foreign policy objectives, Turkey must first settle its domestic agenda. But these linkages of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy also apply to its relationship with the United States. Even as U.S. policy has promoted an expansive Turkish thrust abroad, Washington is now retrenching and neither can nor will support Turkish objectives in the future as in the past, thereby exposing Turkey to more risks that Ankara can argue it took at U.S. behest. That is not a satisfactory basis for the future of the bilateral relationship.

TURKEY AND RUSSIA IN EUROPE, THE BLACK SEA, AND TRANSCAUCASIA

Wherever Turkey's policy engages the post-Soviet republics, it also meets an increasingly clear Russian resistance. This resistance takes the form of Russia's overt and covert efforts to obtain military bases in the Transcaucasus; to become the sole mediator in the Abkhaz-Georgian and Nagorno-Karabakh wars; to unhinge the Elchibey government in Azerbaijan in mid-1993; to compel all three Transcaucasian states to join the CIS and allow for the stationing of Russian bases in their territory, 'strategic partnership' and a treaty with

Iran; to control the flow of energy products through Russian territory and not Turkey; and to collaborate with Greece against Turkey in Europe and the Black Sea Straits. In the Black Sea region, Marchuk's observations that Ukrainian-Turkish collaboration is a priority for Kiev's security policy and both states' subsequent agreement on military cooperation are exactly what alarms Russia about Turkish policies and causes it to resist them.⁵⁸ Russian observers fear that dividing the Black Sea Fleet among the littoral states gives Turkey an operational-strategic advantage that would allow it to blockade the Bosphorus and the littoral states. Then Turkey (or NATO) could strangle those states' seaborne trade, or allow NATO into the Black Sea with impunity.⁵⁹ They also fear that, under the pretext of U.N. peacekeeping to monitor the Georgian-Abkhazian or Nagorno-Karabakh war, NATO can threaten the littoral states in these or other ways.⁶⁰

Recent Russian political and military commentary also evinces growing suspicion of Turkish aims in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Those reports postulate a 'Turkic belt' of local states and efforts to freeze Russia out of energy pipelines there.⁶¹ Russia's ambassador to Ankara warned that any effort to stir up Pan-Turkism in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus would trigger Russian Pan-Slavism, a force he did not define.⁶²

Military writers in particular charge that Turkey is allowing NATO into the Black Sea, fomenting Pan-Turkism, seeking local unilateral domination, or pursuing a leading role in an anti-Russian 'Baltic-Black Sea' security system.⁶³ The proximity of the Danube to the war in Yugoslavia and Turkish staging areas in the Black Sea heightens their concerns. On February 24, 1993 *Krasnaia Zvezda* stated that "Any WEU actions on the Danube must be approved by Russia."⁶⁴ The Black Sea Fleet's Commander in Chief, Admiral Baltin, has expressed concern lest France, Spain, and Italy participate in a Black Sea blockade of Yugoslavia and over the November 1992 Bulgarian-NATO joint exercises there.⁶⁵ For these reasons, the September 1993 Russo-Ukrainian accord allowing Russia to buy out Ukraine's share of the Black Sea Fleet in return for Kiev's debts to Moscow leaves Turkey face-to-face with Russia and substantially degrades the role

Ukraine could have played in maintaining Black Sea security. Russian opposition to Turkey's aims in the vicinity of the Black Sea will likely grow from now on.

Russia has also recently asked for changes in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to allow it to deploy more conventional forces in what is now the North Caucasian Military district. Russian officials cite their concerns over the wars between Georgia and Abkhazia, among the North Caucasian republics, and the Nagorno-Karabakh War.⁶⁶ More candidly, however, they admit to a great and deep-seated fear of Turkish influence and/or Muslim fundamentalism, which they often, wrongly, lump together.⁶⁷ Ambassador Richard Armitage, the Bush administration's coordinator for aid to Russia, noted that the military dislikes the terms and limits in the CFE treaty and may also wish to use these troops to add pressure on Ukraine.⁶⁸ That too is against Turkish interests since any such move would restore Russian military pressure to the Black Sea and would entail an imperial Russian state structure that would necessarily be authoritarian and a great destabilizer in Eurasia.

Russia's request to revise the CFE accords "angered" Ankara who dismissed "the threat from the south" as "very meaningless." Ankara is reportedly anxious about "whether Russia is trying to extend its sovereignty to the Caucasus region by avoiding the responsibilities it has undertaken within the framework of the agreement on conventional arms reduction."⁶⁹ Ankara views any reopening of the CFE Treaty as touching off "a significant arms race in Europe," and has formally opposed it.⁷⁰ Official sources also reject Russian fears about the wars to its south,

Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan are in the southern part of Russia. In view of the agreement on arms reductions, they have a total of 1,800 tanks. However, Russia has 6,000 tanks. That the three republics, which have internal problems and disputes with each other, would pose a threat to Russia is impossible. Meanwhile Russia does not have a border with Turkey anymore.⁷¹

These Russian political moves, continued fighting in the Black Sea littoral, Georgia versus Abkhazia and the war over

Nagorno-Karabakh, and tensions with Ukraine indicate that for Turkey, the Russian threat is by no means dead, even if it is frozen for the moment. The strains over the CFE Treaty, plus the other issues aggravating relations with Moscow illustrate that the ancient Turco-Russian rivalry in Eurasia continues, albeit under the conditions of the new international order.

Russia continues to view Turkey as an adjacent power and therefore will resist any deployment of forces in Turkey from which it believes it could be attacked. Russia's proximity to Turkey creates in Russian thinking the notion that Turkey is part of its natural defense perimeter. Accordingly, Moscow tends to view Turkey's military preparedness as illegitimate while Russian policies are conceived, not bilaterally, but in a global or Pan-European strategic context that legitimates their activities.⁷²

In addition, although a consensus that Turkey not be the base for a NATO or other attack on the USSR and now Russia has existed for several years in Turkey, Russia still expresses alarm at any Muslim unity. It prefers a disunited Middle East on its borders to one united by any common interest or ideology. Therefore Turkey's efforts to organize the Black Sea region, Central Asia, and the Caucasus stimulate an equally strong Russian counter-effort. Russia's response takes the shape of proposals to send Russian peacekeeping forces into Azerbaijan and to station troops in Armenia and around the former Soviet bases, and warnings against intervention to deter Turkey and Iran. Both Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defense Minister Grachev have also made it clear that Russia supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and Kozyrev observed that Russia's political aim is a peace settlement that will enhance its position in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁷³

Part of Russia's reply to Turkey is Yeltsin's call for military bases in Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, crucial areas for Turkey.⁷⁴ Russia has also fashioned an anti-Turkish entente with Greece. In Greece, President Yeltsin conceded that he and then Prime Minister Mitsotakis had discussed the Muslim threat in the Balkans and the southern borders of the former USSR. Both men reiterated the total coincidence of their views

on Bosnia and the necessity of vetoing any effort to intervene there.⁷⁵

Russia and Greece also proposed to locate the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Salonika, not Istanbul. Russia also tried to prevent formation of an economic, cultural, and political-legal commission within the BSECZ since that would enable that organization to discuss political issues like Russia's intervention in Moldova, as Moldova's Head of Parliament, Petre Lucinschi proposed.⁷⁶

Russian resistance to the BSECZ's falling under Turkish influence or leadership is another crucial aspect of its resistance to Ankara's policies. This is because Turkey's initiative in creating the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone was a linchpin in both its "Eastern" and "Western" policies. Through its association with the EC it hoped to lead its partners in the BSECZ towards integration with the EC and thus play a unifying and vanguard role in the Black Sea region and beyond. Turkey would be the leading integrator of the Black Sea states and Central Asia with Europe. Its influence would have grown to the extent that these states achieved economic and political stabilization and that could lead even to the amelioration of rivalry with Greece. Thus *Izvestiya's* correspondent writes,

Something more undoubtedly lies behind these arguments. Moscow is gradually assuming the role of chief arbiter in Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Dniester region and does not wish for competition from anyone. In addition, people in the Kremlin and on Smolenskaya Square [Foreign Ministry building] do not want the BSECZ, which was created on Turkey's initiative, to be turned into a tool for the expansion of Ankara's political influence in the region.⁷⁷

As noted above, Russia and Iran also signed a treaty of strategic partnership that aims to coordinate politics with Iran in the ex-Soviet republics and which has paid handsome arms transfer dividends for Iran. Finally another dispute is beginning over Russian oil shipments through the Straits. Turkey has warned that Russian efforts to ship its own oil and that of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan through the Straits will force closure of the Bosphorus to allow the daily passage of two

130,000 ton vessels. Therefore the Bosphorous will be closed to Russian maritime traffic 300 days a year to allow those tankers to pass through. That will lead to obstruction of 55.8 percent of Russian trade, or according to Prime Minister Ciller's letter to President Yeltsin, 68 percent of that trade.

Although Russian officials claim they have no other ports available to them through the Baltic or through Odessa, this does not deter Turkish officials. They argue that Russia must cooperate with Turkey on the proposed pipeline project or face obstruction of its foreign trade. They contend that the risk of accidents, and of environmental damage to the Straits is what drives them. Turkey has duly suggested that Russia use existing pipelines to channel exports to a proposed pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey that links up to Georgia and Russia. Alternatively Turkey offers to lay a pipeline from Samsun or Zonguldak on the Black Sea to Kirikkale. Then oil could be pumped through the refinery linking Central Anatolia and Ceyhan to the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁸ Thus oil from Central Asia and Azerbaijan would be diverted from the pipeline to Novorossisk on the Black Sea from whence it would go through the Bosphorous, to an overland pipeline that goes through Georgia, Armenia or Iran to Southeastern Turkey (where the Kurdish issue is at its most intense). Of course, the threat of closure of the Straits, however justified, is the long-standing strategic threat to Russia that it has always regarded as intolerable. And the issue joined here reflects the centrality of energy issues in regional geopolitics and security agendas.

Turkey's policy also reflects a tough-minded effort to revise the Montreux Treaty of 1936 allowing unhampered peacetime transit of tankers and merchant ships through the Straits. Until now the Foreign Ministry had vetoed reopening that treaty as a taboo. But now it is determined to revise the treaty, allegedly to protect the Straits and Istanbul from ecological or other economic damages.⁷⁹ Whether those threats to the littoral of the Straits are real or not, the threat to close down Russia's trade and the determination to secure a pipeline linking Turkey with the energy rich regions of the former USSR are quite tangible, as this episode shows. As the *Financial Times* reports, this Turkish pipeline project is the economic lifeline and

centerpiece of an ambitious foreign policy to overcome the obstacles to Turkish economic linkages with Central Asia. Meanwhile, for Russia the prospect of losing control over its former satellites' natural resource base and access to ports and refineries when it is brandishing its economic power is also intolerable, a fact that Turkey probably underestimated.⁸⁰ Moreover the *Financial Times* also observes that revision of the Montreux Treaty would likely prejudice relations with all the littoral states in the Black Sea and undermine the BSECZ set-up to cement regional trade ties.⁸¹

Four conclusions emerge from these conditions of Russo-Turkish relations. First, Russia and Turkey are engaged in an ever clearer regional rivalry from the Black Sea through Transcaucasia to Central Asia. Second, Russian policies, in the Black Sea, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia outline a growing effort against Turkey and towards common cause with its enemies and rivals, Greece and Iran. Third, because of this regional rivalry, NATO still has enormous relevance to Turkey's security and interests abroad. It is not by accident that Georgian President Shevardnadze, who accused the Russian army of intervening against Georgia in Abkhazia and highly values the relationship with Turkey, has asked NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and Presidents Kohl and Clinton to intervene diplomatically and politically in the region's conflicts and undertake peacekeeping efforts there to restrain Russian influence.⁸²

Fourth, just as domestic economic constraints restrict Turkey's regional influence, so too is Russian resistance a key external factor that will prevent realization of the dream of greater Turkish influence. Turkish officials apparently are coming to grasp this. The new ambassador to Moscow, Ayhan Kamel, told the Russian weekly, *New Times*, that the needs of the Central Asian and Caucasian republics exceeds Turkey's resources and potentials. Hence Turkey wants to get others, including Russia, to help in reconstructing the republics. Pointedly, he added,

We maintain that Russia must necessarily aid the Central Asian and Caucasian countries. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, you lived in common with them for one or two centuries. Secondly,

these countries have a considerable Russian minority. Hence we believe Turkey and Russia could cooperate in aiding them. We regard Russia there not as a rival, but rather as a valuable partner with whom we should cooperate in that respect.⁸³

Turkey has had to recognize that Russia's regional influence cannot be dislodged. Either it acts with Russia and accepts partnership with it or it faces Moscow's superior power to resist and obstruct Turkish initiatives. Even as it blocks Turkish ambitions in Eurasia, Russia pursues a peaceful relationship with Turkey and even sells it arms because both sides are wary of any "Islamic" threat and have a substantial bilateral trade. In addition Russia must be able to use the Black Sea and the Straits for its seaborne trade. Those two factors give Turkey some leverage. Nonetheless they do not erase the constant dynamics of the bilateral relationship, i.e. Russian suspicion of Turkish objectives and ability to resist them.

As in the past, Russia's proximity to Turkey and belief that Turkey is inside its maritime and overall defense perimeter still create a constant pressure on Turkey to defend her sovereignty rather than undertake grandiose anti-Russian objectives, even now when Russia is weak.⁸⁴ Thus in Central Asia, the Black Sea, and Transcaucasia, Russian resistance to Turkish ambitions, combined with Turkey's inability to fully secure its objectives will likely force Turkey to retract its dream of regional leadership.

TURKISH OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Turkish goals in Central Asia are easy to see. At the macro-strategic level the overriding goal is to win many points of economic, cultural, and political leverage in Central Asia to preclude reversion to Russian control or movement towards Iranian-style fundamentalism. Russia has historically oppressed its Muslims and threatened Turkey's integrity. Iran-backed fundamentalism could threaten Turkey's integrity if it is coupled with support for the Kurds.⁸⁵ But it more likely threatens the profound political and institutional secularization at the heart of Ataturk's legacy. In addition, Turkey wants to reinforce Western perceptions of its ability to contain potential

threats from unstable Muslim areas. Turkey believes that the stronger its position as a westernizing model for Central Asia, the stronger its claim on the West for support.⁸⁶ And by acting accordingly Turkey makes that claim on the West.

For those reasons, the leverage Turkey seeks abroad need not be interpreted as revived Pan-Turkism (though its rhetoric often fans such fears). But that quest for strong points could also seduce Turkey into really believing it is some sort of elder brother, spokesman for, or more than a model for former Soviet republics. Turkey's approach has already alarmed Central Asia and Turkey's regional rivals: China, Iran, and Russia.⁸⁷ Nonetheless Turkey apparently remains committed to a strong regional presence as a guarantor of stability and progress. As Premier, Demirel proclaimed Turkey's readiness to assume political responsibility from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China, and that it has never been as important for the United States or Europe as it is today. More recently he expressed his hope that Turkey will become one of the world's 10 major powers "some time in the future."⁸⁸ Ozal was even more outspoken as shown by his statement quoted above at the "Turkic World Fraternity Friendship and Cooperation Convention" in Antalya in March 1993.⁸⁹

Rhetorically such statements go far beyond Demirel's very cautious diplomacy to create merely a 'peaceful circle' around Turkey and eschew Ozal's more grandiose vistas.⁹⁰ But the rhetoric reveals Turkey's choice of a demanding agenda in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Turkey must now be a factor for regional stability and progress in regions dotted by conflicts real or potential, a reversal of Ataturk's rejection of Pan-Turkic policies. If we assess Turkish policies as preventive diplomacy against ethnic conflicts, revived Russian domination, or Islamic fundamentalism, we get a good sense of Turkey's macro-strategic objectives in Central Asia that its other aims serve.

For example, Turkey's extensive economic activity here aims at achieving market access and connections to future business so that its expanding economy has strong ties to these areas and leverage over their future economic policies. Turkish investments in telecommunications and in promoting

the regional Latinization of languages and alphabets also serve to deflect Central Asia and the Transcaucasus away from Russia and Iran and lead Turkey into clashes with Russia and Iran, which also are trying to regain or obtain strong positions here. Russia has even been willing to create crises in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to retain its position.⁹¹ Russia also wholly dominates Central Asian states' security and makes clear its intentions not to let them out of its economic grasp.⁹² Iran and Russia, as we have seen, also compete vigorously with Turkey for pipeline routes and investments.

This leads to the third objective of Turkish activity: i.e., initiatives like the ECO. Those programs show that Turkey's interests cannot be ignored and it can undertake key initiatives to enhance regional security. But this goal involves a yet to be reconciled contradiction. Turkey competes regionally both on its own behalf and on behalf of Washington and the West. But to establish its *bona fides* regionally it must convince local actors that it pursues an independent regional policy and is not a U.S. agent.⁹³ Until Turkey resolves this contradiction it will find it hard to attain its regional objectives in the new republics. But, to be able to compete regionally it must collaborate with Washington to secure vital economic assistance and entree into Europe. Therefore it cannot break free of the contradiction that is the inherent price of Turkey's post-1991 security posture.

INSTRUMENTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

In Central Asia, Turkey has undertaken broadly linked political, cultural, communications, and economic initiatives. Turkey moved fast to recognize and open embassies in all the new states and to sponsor their membership in international agencies like the CSCE and international or regional economic organizations.⁹⁴ Ankara has accepted some 10,000 students from the new republics for higher education in Turkey and has begun educating their officers in its institutions (apart from military assistance provided to Azerbaijan in its war). It has set up television links in Turkish with Central Asia through Intelsat, funded Latinization and supplied materials, e.g., textbooks, to create a common linguistic and educational base with Central

Asia, and invested substantially to integrate telecommunications with these states.⁹⁵

But the most visible and large-scale activity centers around economic investments and assistance. Economic ties by direct bilateral deals and creation of multilateral fora for economic consultation and growth represent the deepest thrust of Turkey's Central Asian policy. This is most visible in Turkish efforts to gain access or direct control over energy sources and pipelines. So too, the investments in telecommunications, education, and linguistic rapprochement with Central Asia have a large economic component and expectation of sizable future returns.⁹⁶ Characteristically, Ozal embraced a still more grandiose vision, namely, that within 15 years economic borders would have disappeared even if political ones remain.⁹⁷ The most optimistic forecast was Turkish dominance in Central Asian markets, a kind of common Turkic market. Turkey may have hoped for that after November 1992, when these states met in Ankara. But closer examination suggests that a Turkic common market is not in the cards.⁹⁸

Large-scale economic activity also takes place in the TACD (Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development), an autonomous organization within the Foreign Ministry. It is developing a volunteers project to work with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The TACD, since its birth in 1992, has a \$406 million budget to oversee, help, and develop projects for Central Asia, the Caspian, Balkans, Black Sea, Eastern Europe, Near and Middle East, Mediterranean, etc. It is supposed to supervise assistance to those countries in education, culture, and economics. It is involved in the Intelsat exchange but also is developing projected satellite launches with and to Central Asia and a fiber optic network linked to the ex-Soviet republics. The TACD is building a highway to Central Asia through Iran, is considering a regional university like the Middle East Technical University, and is planning for the Trans-Eurasia Investment and Development Bank headquartered in Ankara.⁹⁹ This bank would also be attached to the ECO.

Turkish airlines are also trying to corner Central Asia's commercial airline routes.¹⁰⁰ Official media also report around

1000 joint ventures with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan alone: gold mining and refining, textile mills and factories, pipelines, hotel refurbishing, and telecommunications networks. Turkey has allocated between \$1.1 and \$1.2 billion in credits to Central Asia and authorized \$975 million in loans to the Turkic republics that are backed by \$200 million from Turkey's banks. Finally many businesses are active locally.¹⁰¹ Taken at face value, these economic and cultural ties suggest Turkey's strong posture as a regional model, elder brother, and stabilizer.

ASSESSING TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT

However, a deeper analysis of Turkey's Central Asian policy suggests that while Turkey will undoubtedly achieve points of influence or leverage upon regional developments, a leadership role there is beyond its present capabilities. Several factors are at work: Central Asian republics' aspirations for an independent and diversified foreign policy, other states' political-economic rivalry with Turkey, and Turkey's own economic limitations due to its own extensive strategic agenda. Taken together these factors' interaction argues against Turkish dominance over Central Asia, as was feared in 1991-92 by many Russian observers. Rather, it appears that a new version of the old 'Great Game' has already begun to draw the United States and many other regional and extra-regional actors into the area. For example, Turkey's drive for preeminence in Central Asia undoubtedly led Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to proclaim a 'strategic partnership' and sign what amounts to a nonaggression pact with Iran in Tehran.¹⁰²

Similarly Russia has recently quite openly and brutally deployed its economic and military power in Central Asia to install or maintain pro-Moscow policies and ex-Communist dictators. Since these dictators depend on Moscow for their security and economic means of survival, pro-Turkish policies are ruled out. Even in democratic Kyrgyzstan Vice-President Feliks Kulov told NATO that Kyrgyzstan pays "great attention to strengthening of the military alliance with Russia taking into

account the single system of the armed forces and economic dependence in the sphere of the army's logistic support."¹⁰³

The July 1993 decision by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to work towards economic integration excluded Central Asia, evidently deliberately. Russian Vice-Premier Shokhin made it clear that Central Asians cannot flirt with or join economic unions of Islamic states including Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, and still be included in this union.¹⁰⁴ In other words, if they do not opt for Russia, they will be out of the ruble zone and also unable to function economically. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also made clear Russia's ultimate goal that, "the governments proceed from the fact that economic integration cannot be effective in isolation without a wider, multilateral mutual action in the political, defence, and legislative areas." Kozyrev further developed this goal with his notion of a 'shield' against fundamentalism and a "club of friends of regional stability" in Central Asia.¹⁰⁵

Yet despite Russian pressure, Central Asian states do not intend to be Turkey's 'younger brothers.' Although grateful for economic assistance, they are diversifying their sources of foreign investment and interest to escape dependence on any one state and they are also wary of Turkish ambitions.¹⁰⁶ Central Asian states resisted Turkish pressure for a true common market at the ECO's 1992 Ankara conference.¹⁰⁷ Finally, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, and the United States now compete for Central Asian energy resources or investments. Turkey cannot overcome this rivalry and local interest in diversifying foreign investment and influence.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, despite Turkish public and state interest in Central Asian investments, through November 1992 Turkish exports to Central Asia were only 2 percent of total exports. Only \$150 million has been allocated from the \$1.2 billion credits to these states. And only \$175 million of the available loans have been utilized by the Turkic republics.¹⁰⁹ Turkey's debt and high inflation have also inhibited direct investment in Central Asian energy. Istanbul may become a center of the oil business; but Turkey cannot compete with Western oil companies in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. It will more likely be

an intermediary, not an independent force in regional energy politics.¹¹⁰

Additionally, the Central Asian states obviously still depend on Russian forces for security and to keep their internal opposition from coming to power. In the final analysis they have no choice. Turkey cannot protect them and never had any political connection with the area. All these states repeatedly cite close ties with Russia as their priority.¹¹¹

Therefore while Turkey will undoubtedly obtain important markets and some local influence, it is unlikely to realize its larger dreams there. These republics may be Turkey's "dreamland" but the reality will likely be very different. This conclusion suggests that Turkey can promote its own and U.S. interests in an anti-fundamentalist Central Asia based on 'the Turkish model' only up to a point. Turkey may be a model for Central Asia. But even so it cannot offer what Central Asian leaders and their publics most crave on the scale that they need it. Any effort to provide that economic-political role of main benefactor will saddle Turkey, and thus the United States with commitments beyond their means. Such Turkish exertions would also further arouse the suspicions of every state in the area. Turkey's actual powers are consequently more limited than its ambitions might lead others to think.

CONCLUSIONS

Central Asia is a vital area neither for Turkey nor the United States, although it is important to Turkey for reasons of consanguinity, ambition, and desire to block Russia and Iran. Turkey cannot defend or subsidize it nor can the United States. Ultimately, U.S. and Turkish interests comprise largely economic and political goals and instruments to realize them. Turkey will play a role in the regional balance of power. But only Russia, as is the case in Tadzhikistan, can overcome the immense logistical and strategic difficulties of military involvement in Central Asia that is the acid test of real influence there. A Turkish effort to play this role also contradicts a successful resolution of Turkey's domestic security problems.

This same condition holds true for the Transcaucasus as long as Turkey's border with Armenia is stabilized. If that border is unstable, either a war with incalculable conclusions or a political settlement in which Turkey is the loser is quite likely. Indeed, by September 1993 it was apparent that Turkey's policy in Transcaucasia had reached a dead end. Azerbaijan, facing the threat of Armenian military partition, is opting to join the CIS to obtain formal guarantees of Russian military protection. Those guarantees, which also extend to Armenia, would give Russia the formal basis to regain its regional preeminence.¹¹² And, if Russia extends its collective security treaty to cover Azerbaijan as well as Armenia, it would be logical to expect both Russian 'peacekeeping' forces in the former and permanent installations, i.e., bases there and perhaps in or near the Caspian Sea to defend against Armenia, and by extension, Iran and Turkey. Moreover, Turkey and Azerbaijan both had to urge Russia to mediate the war as the only way to prevent a wider war should Armenian forces go towards Nakhichevan, where Turkey has treaty rights going back to 1921, or Iran.¹¹³ Here, too, Turkey will be an important, but not decisive factor in the new version of the great game. As Ambassador Kamel indicated, partnership with Russia, and mainly on Russia's terms or sufferance, is the best it can hope for. Apparently neither Ankara nor Washington will take on Russia here. As a senior Turkish Foreign Ministry official observed, Turkey's mistake was that it had excessive expectations and ignored the Russian factor.¹¹⁴ This turn of events graphically demonstrates both the U.S.' and Turkey's regional weakness. Recently both Turkey and the United States accepted Aliev's regime as a *fait accompli*.¹¹⁵ A U.S. Government that will not commit to defend Bosnia will not do so for Abkhazia, Georgia, Armenia, or Tadzhikistan.

Turkish objectives in those areas, although superficially congruent with U.S. aims, do, in fact, go beyond what are, after all, marginal U.S. interests. As part of the evolving U.S. policy of 'dual isolation' of Iran and Iraq, the United States will probably have to rely more on Turkey in Central Asia and Transcaucasia.¹¹⁶ However, continued pressure on Iraq exacts a high price for Turkey, the depression of its southeastern region, the locus of Kurdish unrest, and the closure of the Iraqi

pipeline which was a vital source of revenue. Thus Turkey now wants to open the Iraqi pipeline, against U.S. interests.¹¹⁷ Thus our pressure on Iraq affects vital Turkish interests and undermines its domestic security, even as that pressure logically suggests a greater Turkish role in the Muslim world. Turco-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, Near and Middle East is also reviving. That revival, in turn, will force Washington to choose between Russian and Turkish influence in the former USSR. Russia is now well-placed to win this contest, especially given traditional U.S. disinterest in these regions. That victory will undo Turkey's role in our anti-Iraq and anti-Iran policy, a role that is already onerous to Turkey.

Thus, U.S. policy has yet to resolve the contradictions based on support for Ankara and Moscow against Baghdad and Tehran when Russia and Iran are allying against Turkey in Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Since Washington cannot defend Turkey's regional objectives without intensifying strains with Russia, Iran, and local 'insurgents,' a negotiated solution offering the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh real national and personal autonomy within an Azerbaijan constrained by treaty and international guarantees, and mutual guarantees against economic warfare and other belligerent acts seems a sounder basis for the Transcaucasus. But no such plan is remotely visible. Instead, as of September 1993 Armenian forces are driving to the Iranian border and threaten to bifurcate Azerbaijan.¹¹⁸ Clearly neither Ankara nor Washington has a viable program of action for the Transcaucasus. And this has stimulated domestic opposition to Ciller's government at home. Professor Mumtaz Soysal of Turkey's Social Democratic Party said that since Turkey "did not know the world in which it wished to play a role," it had created expectations far beyond what its financial means could fulfill. Other critics of the regime speak in even more apocalyptic terms, i.e., that Turkey has lost its chance to become a regional leader.¹¹⁹ Therefore any effort to push Turkey forward as the U.S. regional 'point man' runs aground at a time when the United States is already cutting its aid to Turkey, is changing aid to loans, introducing human rights conditions for it, and threatening to close U.S. bases if Turkey does not like these terms.¹²⁰

Turkish official calls for foreign investment in Central Asia underscore the fact that it is beyond Turkey's dreams to dominate the area as it had hoped.¹²¹ These requests display the limits on Turkish policy, not its strength. Meanwhile U.S. policy supports Turkish efforts to block Russia, Iran, and Iraq and deny them energy markets and influence in these regions. Yet the aid to which Turkey feels entitled is already beyond the will of the United States. This makes Washington an object of suspicion among Turks.¹²² While Turkey will be a major player, preeminence in the former Soviet Muslim republics is beyond its means, risks its alliance with the United States, its political integrity and stability, and neglects the Middle East and Europe, its true priority.

Turkish officials now boast that the United States must consult it before embarking on any policy in all four regions.¹²³ Yet, that cannot imply a U.S. blank check that may have to be paid in full plus interest. Turkey's strategic dilemma is serious. But pursuit of a pro-Turkish zone in the former USSR for its own and for Washington's benefit is not the answer.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As of autumn 1993, there is no doubt that Turkey stands at a crossroads as it attempts to formulate a strategy appropriate to its position. Turkey's international position today is not what its elites or the United States confidently expected in 1991. Therefore Turkey needs to rethink its strategy. Several of the objectives and policies it eagerly embraced in the wake of the Soviet collapse and Operation DESERT STORM have been revealed to be incompatible with Turkish interests or beyond Turkish capacities. The effort to propel Turkey into a leading regional position has stimulated an assertive Russian response that Turkey cannot and will not resist. We also, like the Turkish government, believe that Iran is using Turkey's internal unrest due to the Kurdish problem to destabilize it in Iran's rivalry with Turkey for position and influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

The problem of the Kurds complicates both Turkey's domestic sources of strength abroad and Turkey's international position vis-a-vis Iraq, Iran, and potentially, Armenia. Perhaps for those reasons Prime Minister Ciller was evidently pondering emphasizing economics over military instruments to deal with the domestic Kurdish problem.¹ This emphasis on enhancing Turkey's economic strength and position and on recovering Turkey's position in the international energy market has also led Ankara to support lifting the ban on Iraqi export of oil, in particular, opening the pipeline from Iraq through Turkey. Those specific policies towards Iraq directly clash with the U.S. policy of treating Iraq as an enemy and imposing punitive restraints upon it.²

In Transcaucasia, however, we find the most pressing and urgent need for a rethinking of Turkish security strategy. Turkey

has apparently lost or is losing out to Russian policy in the Armeno-Azeri war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Continuing Armenian offensives, if unchecked, could lead to war involving Turkey and even Russia and Iran against Erevan, which would be a disaster for Turkey as its leaders recognize. On the other hand, it appears that Russia is successfully employing the full range of both overt and covert political and military operations against the fighters in this war and in the Georgian-Abkhazian one to reassert its position as the sole arbiter and protector of the Caucasus and Transcaucasus.³ The attainment of that goal would deprive Turkey of the chance to achieve that coveted objective which had influenced policy after 1991. Russia's actions take on a decidedly sinister light when the general climate of military insubordination and independence of the Russian armed forces is factored into the equation, because it is unclear whether or not the Yeltsin government knows and is controlling these covert as well as overt operations. As we have seen, the overt policy is to restore Russian regional primacy. But if local or central military actors are undertaking their own actions with a view towards restoring a "Pax Russica" in the area, the consequences of their actions could lead to intensification or spread of the fighting in and around Azerbaijan. Neither answer is comforting to those who count either on stability in the CIS or on the permanent end of the Russian empire.⁴

At the same time, the United States is apparently willing to back the Turkish demand, constraining maritime oil shipments through the Straits, thus ranging the United States against an important Russian interest in that part of the world.⁵ Because the Clinton administration has not announced a public posture on the war in Transcaucasia, it cannot be known whether this support on oil transport signifies a U.S. move towards an overall policy position on the Transcaucasus and the entire region. However, because the Bush and Clinton administrations have supported Turkey's efforts to upgrade its influence in the old Soviet empire until now, the U.S. Government evidently will have to articulate its position and interests in this region. By the same token, a reformulation of U.S. policy towards Iraq may become necessary if the combined weight of the Kurdish problem in Turkey and

Turkey's need for oil and trade revenues from Iraq leads it out of the embargo and support for Iraq's international isolation. The concatenation of events in Central Asia, the Kurdish problem, and Transcaucasia all point, therefore, to the urgent necessity of rethinking the entire range of U.S and Turkish interests, both singly and in tandem, with regard to those regions.

Turkey's European policies will also have to be reassessed. Turkey's priority still remains its European connection.⁶ The sons of Ataturk still look to the West. And their turn to Central Asia has the object of appearing as Europeans to Central Asia and of using the promise of stabilizing that region as a lever with which to enter the EU, WEU, and the new Europe. But here, too, Turkey has found Greco-Russian resistance to its efforts in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and those states' resistance to its policies or potential policies in Yugoslavia's wars. Similarly Turkey is dismayed at the West's refusal, through its various security organizations, to take an active role in terminating the aggression it perceives directed against the Bosnian Muslims and potentially threatening Muslims in Kosovo.

The various wars from Yugoslavia to Tadzhikistan that have broken out since 1991 have all acted to reduce Turkey's regional prospects in both Europe and Asia. The crisis in the Balkans aggravates Greco-Turkish rivalries, and triggers European alarm about Muslim influence in Europe. The wars in Georgia and Transcaucasia preclude the very stabilization needed there by Turkey to make its economic-political presence felt. Similarly the economic collapse of Ukraine that forced it into a deal with Russia over its nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet precludes both stabilization of Ukraine and too overt a connection with Turkey. And the ongoing war in Tadzhikistan that has led to the further introduction of Russian troops along with Russia's blunt efforts at regional economic coercion of that area have also deflected Central Asian states from Turkey.

Thus, in all the areas of concern that we have analyzed, Turkish objectives are receding further from attainment and are increasingly seen as beyond Turkey's foreseeable capabilities.

To attain its priority goals in Europe and Asia, Turkey probably will have to obtain increasing support from the United States. However, Turkish interests could, as in the Iraqi case, introduce frictions with the United States. Turkish official opinion apparently was also disturbed by President Clinton's U.N. speech because it apparently implied to Ankara that the U.N. and the United States could not or would not address the Transcaucasian and/or Bosnian wars, an approach that called U.N. credibility into question and effectively left Turkey as a lone 'front-line' state confronting a resurgent Russia, and defiant Serbia and Armenia.⁷ And, on Iraq, Turkey is apparently reversing the threat made by the Clinton administration that it might further cut back aid to Turkey if it continues to demand guaranteed security subsidies irrespective of its Kurdish policy. Prime Minister Ciller hinted that if the United States does not arrange to recompense Turkey for its losses due to the Iraqi embargo, it might not extend its agreement to allow its airfield and roads to be used to supply Iraqi Kurds in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.⁸ Thus a tone of mutual blackmail is creeping into U.S.-Turkish relations even as we proclaim Turkey a model against Iranian backed fundamentalism and a bulwark against Russia.

The problem here is that at the same time as the United States has encouraged Turkey to expand its objectives, its means for doing so are shrinking. In Russia, the government fully believes that the West and the U.N. have implicitly recognized Moscow's mandate, under the guise of peacekeeping, to restore its hegemony in Transcaucasia. Both that hegemony and Western support for it are fundamental objectives of the Yeltsin government.⁹ And Russia's demand for revising the CFE Treaty in Transcaucasia is widely, and rightly we would argue, seen in Ankara an intending "to obstruct the possibility of any direct or indirect intervention in the region by other countries, as was the case when the former Soviet Union existed."¹⁰ Yet apart from inviting Prime Minister Shevardnadze of Georgia to Washington, supporting Georgia's independence, covertly attempting as we did to strengthen its security services, and offering small amounts of aid to it, the United States has yet to outline a policy for the Transcaucasus or a strategy to stop Russian imperial

restoration there. Although our special ambassador to the area, John Maresca, has stated U.S. opposition to exclusive Russian peacekeeping and favored a role for Turkey, more than this is needed.¹¹

Thus Turkey is essentially forced to confront the Russians with only intangible means of support from the United States. Turkish friction with key states like Russia, or with the Kurds, or other Muslim or European states may contribute to the decline of U.S. support which apparently is ebbing due to international retrenchment. Or alternatively, such frictions might force Washington into a position of having to choose between Turkish and other states' or actors' key interests which are more important to it, e.g. Russia. Presumably that is the reason why Prime Minister Ciller told the press before her trip to Washington that she hoped to persuade the United States to view the Middle East and Transcaucasia "through Turkish lenses."¹²

At the same time Turkey clearly needs the United States to smooth her way into Europe. But the Kurdish insurgency has become a threat to all of Turkey's vital international objectives. Turkey believes that Iran and Armenia are behind PKK attacks and that some of these attacks by the Kurds in Turkey and the Armenians in Azerbaijan are directed against Turkish oil pipelines to dissuade Western investment and disrupt its vital energy programs. Moreover Armenia and Iran each are evidently assisting the PKK in its attacks.¹³ By the fall of 1993 it had also become clear that there was no end in sight to the Kurdish insurgency and it was reaching a new level of ferocity, to the extent that the Turkish military, which was running the counter-insurgency program, has promised to crush the insurgency by spring 1994 or institute martial law.¹⁴

American and Western observers in Turkey concur that this primarily military approach is doomed to fail with incalculable consequences, and our analysis agrees with that conclusion. But evidently, mindful of Turkey's role in NATO, and agreeing with Ankara's depiction of the insurgents as terrorists, they have held back from speaking out.¹⁵ Yet, at the same time, this spreading insurgency makes it impossible for Turkey to play its expected role elsewhere and leads to friction over aid with

the United States. Most importantly, it has become apparent to Ciller and her government that the Kurdish problem is the greatest present obstacle to membership in the EU, inasmuch as the European Parliament is now demanding fundamental changes in Turkish policy towards the Kurds.¹⁶ So, in Europe as well, Turkey's domestic and security problems, as Sezer noted above, are inextricably enmeshed.

Thus there is a need for a rethinking of American policy vis-a-vis Turkey's European objectives, the Kurds, Iraq, and for clear U.S. and Turkish objectives in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Although both sides are in constant communication, they need to rethink and harmonize their perspectives to achieve more meaningful cooperation and to integrate Turkey more fully with Europe so that it can play the larger role to which it aspires. The most fundamental task for the United States is to clarify its own objectives with regard to the areas and issues in question: Balkans, Central Asia, Transcaucasus, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Russian imperial longings, and Turkish integration in Europe. It must undertake that clarification with Turkey which must likewise clarify its interests and capabilities. Then together the two states must devise a program to strengthen their mutual capability to achieve those interests that are vital to both and which can be attainable over time, even in a worst case scenario.

Turkey cannot be made to do for the United States what Ankara cannot do for itself or what Washington will not or cannot do either. If the Russian empire is to be stopped in the South then the United States and Ankara must provide the resources necessary to achieve that overriding geopolitical goal. If neither side is willing, and Turkey will not act unilaterally, then we should forget about pushing Turkey into the breach against both Teheran and Moscow as we undercut it because of displeasure with its domestic politics. Therefore, the authors have outlined specific suggestions as to how U.S.-Turkish relations may be further consolidated and how a coherent Turkish policy that positively contributes to regional security may be jointly devised. We recommend the following specific U.S. actions apart from the need to outline general regional objectives in cooperation with Ankara.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The United States must continue to encourage its European allies to acknowledge Turkey's importance in the post-cold war security environment, to include greater participation in European political and security organizations. More than rhetoric will be required; concrete actions will have to be taken to raise European consciousness of Turkey's strategic importance and to assuage Turkish anxieties.

The following initiatives represent potential actions that the United States should undertake.

Economic Initiatives.

- Assist Turkey in ways that will contribute toward Turkey's eventual membership in the EU. For example,
 - Further open U.S. markets to Turkish merchandise.
 - Restructure Turkey's foreign military sales debt to optimize Turkey's ability to repay. Forgive foreign military sales debts, whenever possible.
 - Provide economic advice and assistance, particularly concerning privatization of industry, that will help Turkey overcome the hurdles to its membership in the EU.
 - Encourage greater private American investment in Turkey.

Diplomatic Initiatives.

- Influence European allies to overcome obstacles to full Turkish membership in pan-European institutions such as the WEU and EU.
- Encourage European nations, especially Germany, to maintain safety of ethnic Turks and to liberalize immigration and citizenship requirements.

- Increase diplomatic efforts to broker resolution of the outstanding Greek-Turkish issues over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea.

Security Initiatives.

- Continue to support to Turkey's military modernization program.
 - As the U.S. Armed Forces proceed with their draw down, continue to provide surplus equipment that enhances Turkish military capabilities.
 - Provide military assistance grants as opposed to credits.
 - Persuade Congress to reexamine the de facto 7/10 military aid distribution between Greece and Turkey. This does not imply that Greece should be placed in a subservient position vis-a-vis Turkey, but a more stringent strategic cost benefit analysis may be in order.
- The United States must exert influence in NATO that ensures Turkish security anxieties are addressed. For example,
 - Ensure continued funding of existing and planned NATO infrastructure projects in Turkey.
 - Promote additional infrastructure projects in Turkey that enhance the modernization and effectiveness of Turkish forces. This may require reducing funds available within the Central Region.
 - Increase Turkish command and staff officer representation in appropriate NATO commands (e.g., NATO headquarters, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps).
 - While recognizing the political difficulties involved, the United States may wish to support Ankara's bid to have the headquarters of the Multinational Division, South located in Turkey.

- NATO, and if necessary the United States, could increase the levels of exchanges and exercises with Turkey.
- Given Turkish sensitivities about bilateral relationships, the United States should pursue security initiatives in a multilateral format. This approach offers two benefits:
 - Ankara will not be forced into the role of junior partner.
 - Multilateral negotiations ensure that Europeans are continually involved with important Turkish issues and can be used as a means of educating European allies about the strategic importance of Turkey.

Initiatives Regarding Kurdistan and the Former Soviet Union.

- With regard to the Kurdish insurgency, the United States should privately try to get Ankara to seek a solution incorporating more economic and political means that do not entail exclusive military repression but do safeguard the integrity of the country.
 - This also entails pressure, both public and private, against Iran, Syria, and Armenia to the extent that they are aiding the PKK. The shift to economic-political steps combined with military ones should be the carrot and this pressure the stick.
 - Particularly with respect to Armenia, which is conniving at the dismemberment of Azerbaijan, this pressure should be made public and contingent upon an end to aid for the PKK and a cease-fire and move to negotiations. More than most places, Armenia is vulnerable to sanctions and economic pressure. Although this means taking on the Armenian lobby here, the stakes are worth it because this war is no longer in defense of a threatened minority, but a war to destroy Azerbaijan.

- To overcome the regional economic distress in Southeast Turkey due to the repercussions stemming from the embargo of Iraq's oil, the United States ought to allow Turkey concessionary aid for economic development there. This would also alleviate the economic sources of local unrest.
- The United States must decide what its objectives in Central Asia are apart from human rights and decide to what degree it will support the region's independence from Russia, especially in energy. It might well consider assistance in the energy, transportation, and agricultural areas to those states, either alone or with Turkey, to overcome problems in the most crucial sectors and promote their further growth and economic integration.
- Similarly it is necessary to outline a coherent policy with regard to the wars in Transcaucasia and the shape of an international settlement for Nagorno-Karabakh that secures the interests of both the local belligerents, as well as Turkey, Russia, and Iran. Threatened sanctions against Armenia, as suggested above should be considered as well as the use of a multilateral peacemaking (*not peacekeeping*) force, or perhaps U.S., Turkish, and Russian forces in the area until a settlement is reached.
 - By the same token a clearer line is needed with regard to Georgia which is the obvious victim of Russian efforts to dismember it, not unlike what Serbia has done in Bosnia. Once again the authors reiterate that a strategy, not just declarative policies, is essential to prevent a return of the Russian empire and of the conviction that such a trend is supported abroad.

ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES — CHAPTER 2

1. Steve Coll, "The Turkish Question: How Important Is It?," *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1993, p. A13.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma," *International Spectator*, Vol. 27, No. 1, January-March 1992, p. 22.

4. Harry B. Ellis, *The Common Market*, Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1965, p. 88; Ian Lesser, *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992, p. 88, note 5, and Ian Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992, p. 8.

5. Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy: Challenges of Adaptation to the Post-INF Era," *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, Vol. 134, No. 4, Winter 1989, p. 53.

6. See, for example, comments contained in Sahin Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-91-122-S*, June 25, 1991 (hereafter Alpay, "Turkey in 2020"), pp. 16-18. "Turkey in 2020" is the result of interviews with 32 of Turkey's leading intellectuals from all walks of life: politicians, academics, scientists, artists, writers, film makers, journalists, businessmen, etc.

7. Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 41.

8. Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy," p. 53.

9. Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," p. 19.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 24. Ozdalga is former deputy leader of the Democratic Left Party.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

12. "Geopolitical Overload," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 1992, p. A14.

13. For an example of the extent to which the Turks are willing to go in order to satisfy the EU, see John Murray Brown, "Turkey's EC courtship lowers the trade barriers," *Financial Times* (London), August 4, 1993, p. 4.

14. Morris Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal," *Foreign Policy*, No. 91, Summer 1993, p. 167. For example, the Turks were angered when Austria apparently moved ahead of Turkey in EU membership discussions. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," p. 41. This anger will be exacerbated, no doubt, by the recent EU invitation to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria to join the EU. Alan Riding, "European Community Sets Terms for 6 Former Soviet Allies to Join," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1993, p. A8.

15. All of the above taken from, Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," p. 26. Boyner is the past president of the Turkish Industrialists' Businessmen's Association.

16. *Ibid.*

17. This is particularly true of Greece, Belgium, and Germany (the first because of proximity to Turkey and the latter two because they already have large Turkish populations). Nicholas Gianaris, *Greece and Turkey: Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives*, New York: Praeger, pp. 165, 166, and 168. Much of Western Europe suffers from a rising tide of anti-immigrant bias. Attacks against ethnic Turks in Germany have been most prominent, of late. See, for example, Marc Fisher, "Germany's Turks Erupt With Pent-up Anger," *The Washington Post*, June 2, 1993, p. A21, and Andrew Nagorski and Theresa Waldrop, "The Laws of Blood," *Newsweek*, June 14, 1993, p. 38-39.

18. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," p. 42.

19. *Ibid.*

20. For examples of Turkish sensitivities, see TRT Television Network, January 28, 1992 in "Leaders Hold Panel Discussion on Foreign Policy," *FBIS-WEU-92-020*, January 28, 1992, p. 27.

21. Note, for example, Prime Minister Demirel's comments in Bonn in February 1993 that the Germans needed to reconsider their attitudes toward the PKK. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, February 22, 1993, p. 3 in *FBIS-WEU-93-041*, March 4, 1993, p. 42. For a brief synopsis of the suspension of German military aid because former German equipment was used against Kurds, see Marc Fisher, "Bonn Extends Ban on Arms to Turkey," *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1992, p. A17, or John Murray Brown, "Review follows as US cancels grants," *London Financial Times*, November 18, 1992, p. 6. Even though the Germans later lifted the ban, the move still rankled the Turks, who resented what they perceived as Germans

meddling in their internal affairs. This imbroglio followed close on the heels of German hesitation to reinforce Turkey during the Gulf War in December 1990. Even though aid has been restored, Bonn announced that supposedly due to fiscal constraints associated with unification, Germany will end its long-standing military aid to Turkey by 1995. Hamburg, DPA, November 2, 1992, in *FBIS-WEU-92-213*, November 3, 1992, p. 39.

22. *Die Welt*, June 26, 1993, in "Kurdish Problem Seen Hurting Ties with Ankara," *FBIS-WEU-93-122*, June 26, 1993, p. 13.

23. A brief account is contained in "The Kurds Are Suffering," *Newsweek*, July 5, 1993, p. 37. See also, "Press Views Kurdish Attacks," in *FBIS-WEU-93-121*, June 25, 1993, p. 6, and "Article Gives Background on PKK Activities," in *FBIS-WEU-93-124*, June 30, 1993, p. 7. Nor was this wave of violence the first such case. Less violent instances also occurred in March 1992. See "Arson Attack Aimed at Turkish Bank in Wiesbaden," "Turkish 'Separatists' Attack Hannover Bank," "Turkish Embassy, Airline Office Attacked" [Belgium], and "Group of 'Separatists' Attack Turkish Interests" [Netherlands], all in *FBIS-WEU-92-057*, March 24, 1992, pp. 7 and 9.

24. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, June 30, 1993, in *FBIS-WEU-93-125*, July 1, 1993, p. 28. The Federal Interior Minister Manfred Kanther announced on November 26, 1993, that the PKK was henceforth banned in Germany. DPA, November 26, 1993, in "Kanther Bans Kurdistan Workers Party," *FBIS-WEU-93-226*, November 26, 1993, p. 27.

25. See, for example, Nagorski and Waldrop, "The Laws of Blood," pp. 38-39. Between 1977-1990 only 13,000 of 1.8 million Turks residing in Germany gained German citizenship, due largely to long residency requirements, stiff fees, and language and cultural tests. Fisher, "Germany's Turks Erupt with Pent-Up Anger," p. A21.

26. All above from, WEU Document 1341, "Turkey," November 6, 1992, pp. 8-9. Examples of differences are manifold. Greece and Turkey nearly went to war over the Aegean in 1988, and Turkey would consider Greek expansion of sea territorial limits from 6 to 12 miles as an act of war. (Derya Sazak, "The Changing World and Turkey," *Milliyet*, December 12, 1991, in *FBIS-WEU-92-014*, January 28, 1992, p. 58. In February 1993, the Turks protested the Greek expulsion of four Muslim religious leaders from Western Thrace. (*Anatolia*, February 25, 1993, in *FBIS-WEU-93-039*, March 2, 1993, p. 59.) Turkish authorities demanded in March 1993 that Greece investigate a fire that demolished a historic mosque in Alexandroupolis and provide a suitable place of worship in the interim. (Ankara TRT Television Network, March 17, 1993, in *FBIS-WEU-93-054*, March 23, 1993, p. 49. The Greek government did, indeed, build a new mosque.) An excellent account of Greek-Turkish Aegean issues may be found in Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990,

Chapter 5, pp. 129-167. See also, Andrew Wilson, *The Aegean Struggle*, Adelphi Paper No. 155, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979.

27. Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," pp. 30-31.

28. See Gianaris, *Greece and Turkey: Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives*, p. 165. Also Sabri Sayari, "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, Winter 1992, p. 12.

29. Kuniholm, for example, concludes that the Turks will continue low key efforts to full membership and take up the offer of a customs union with the EU by 1995. "Turkey and the West," p. 41.

30. Alpay, "Turkey in 2020," p. 25.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

32. *Ibid.*

33. For reports on Syrian support of PKK groups see, for example, *Cumhuriyet*, January 8, 1992, in "Syria Urged To Focus On Border Security Issues," *FBIS-WEU-92-014*, January 22, 1992, pp. 52-53. Reports of Iranian support of PKK, see Paris, AFP, July 20, 1993, in "Iranian Envoy Summoned Over Backing of Rebels," *FBIS-WEU-93-137*, July 20, 1993, p. 68, and *Hurriyet*, July 16, 1993, in "Six PKK Camps Reportedly Established in Iran," *FBIS-WEU-93-137*, July 20, 1993, p. 70. A detailed discussion of the PKK insurgency can be found in Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990.

34. For Turkish-Iranian competition, see "Iran and Turkey Vie for Soviet Carcass," *Helsingen Sonomat* (Helsinki), November 29, 1991, in *FBIS-WEU-91-251*, December 31, 1991, pp. 57-58. See also "The Great Game, Chapter Two," *Newsweek*, February 3, 1992, pp. 28-29.

35. A brief overview of Greek-Turkish problems in this century alone can be found in George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th ed., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980, pp. 98-110, 146-147, and 161-166. The seriousness of issues in the Aegean is underscored by the fact that as late as 1988, the two nations nearly went to war over territorial claims in the Aegean Sea, and in Derya Sazak's conclusion in "The Changing World of Turkey," *Milliyet*, December 12, 1991, in *FBIS-WEU-92-014*, January 22, 1992, p. 58, that Turkey would view a Greek extension of its territorial sea limits from 6 miles to 12 miles as an act of war.

36. See, for instance, Thomas Goltz, "Thousands of Ethnic Turks Deported in Bulgarian Assimilation Campaign," *The Washington Post*, June 15, 1989, p. A34, and Marc Fisher, "Refugees Describe Bulgaria's Campaign Against Turks," *The Washington Post*, June 21, 1989, p. A16.

37. For example, the long-standing Greek-Turkish-Bulgarian competition over Macedonia could blossom once again. See, for instance, George Kenney, "From Bosnian Crisis to All-Out War," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1993, p. E17; Martin Sieff, "Active U.S. Support of Macedonia Urged," *The Washington Times*, December 2, 1992, p. 9; and Robert Greenberger, "Macedonian Lesson for Clinton," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 13, 1992, p. A14.

38. Elements of the Maastricht Treaty can be found in Article D, Draft Treaty on Political Union, December 10, 1991. Turkish attitudes about the importance of shaping the European Defense Identity may be found in Lesser, *Mediterranean Security*, pp. 100-101.

39. Terms of the Brussels Treaty may be found in Sir Ian Beckett, *The North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty, and the Charter of the United Nations*, London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1950, Appendix 4, pp. 65ff. Because of its security concerns, Ankara places greater importance on membership in the WEU than in the EU. See Lesser, *Mediterranean Security*, p. 100.

40. *Tercuman*, November 7, 1992, in *FBIS-WEU-92-235*, December 7, 1992, p. 54.

41. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier?*, p. 12.

42. The Petersberg Declaration that stipulated the various levels of membership within the WEU very specifically noted, "...associate members of WEU, *although not being parties to the modified Brussels Treaty* [emphasis added]..." Paragraph III. B., Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, June 19, 1992 in *Letter from the Assembly*, No. 12, July 1992, p. 15.

43. Paragraph 3, Document of Associate Membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, in *Letter from the Assembly*, No. 14, February 1993.

44. WEU Document 1341, "Turkey," p. 23. Alternatively, because of its associate membership, a state involved with a full WEU member might attack Turkey out of a belief that Turkey would come to the assistance of a fellow WEU member. As a purely hypothetical example, Bulgaria might attack Turkey because of a dispute with Greece.

45. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier?*, pp. 25-26.

46. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," p. 34.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Sezer, "Turkish Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma," p. 22.

49. See, for example, the case argued in William T. Johnsen, *NATO's New Front Line: The Growing Importance of the Southern Tier*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

50. For example, many NATO members continue to redefine their post-cold war security policies and force structures. The United States has gone past the "Base Force" and announced the results of the "Bottom Up Review" in September 1993; the Germans appear to be in a continuous state of flux; and United Kingdom forces are undergoing an upward revision after initial cuts proved too severe. All other nations are undergoing similar trials and tribulations.

51. The debate goes back to the original drafting of the Washington Treaty. See Douglas T. Stuart, *Can NATO Transcend Its European Borders?*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991, pp. 1-2. In the past, the debate focused on the actions of major powers outside the confines of the geographic area defined in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty and the reluctance of members to be drawn into bilateral conflicts that did not directly affect NATO interests or where NATO members had differing policies (e.g., the Middle East). For a brief discussion of NATO "out-of-area" operations and their ramifications for NATO, see *ibid.* A fuller discussion may be found in Douglas T. Stuart and William Tow, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.

52. Elaine Sciolino, "Christopher Gives Turks Plan to End Rights Abuse," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1993, p. 11.

53. The most prominent example was the German hesitation to support Turkey during the Gulf War. See, for example, Marc Fisher, "NATO to Send Warplanes to Defend Turkey," *The Washington Post*, January 3, 1991, p. A17, and Marc Fisher, "Germany Reluctant to Defend Turkey If Iraq Retaliates," *The Washington Post*, January 22, 1991, p. A20. Turkish views are outlined in Lesser, *Mediterranean Security*, p. 101.

54. Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992, pp. 34-36, 45-46. For example, Turkey could become embroiled with Iran because of competition over Azerbaijan or Central Asia or continued Iranian support of the PKK insurgency. Other, equally plausible, scenarios might include confrontation with Syria or Iraq over Turkish control of the Tigris and

Euphrates Rivers; or confrontation with Armenia because of its war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

55. Lesser, *Mediterranean Security*, p. 101. The current situation in Iraq is a pertinent example of this conundrum.

56. Thus, one sees the debates within Turkey over whether Operation POISED HAMMER (coalition forces enforcing the no-fly zones over northern Iraq) should be allowed to continue. For examples of the debates, see Norman Kempster, "Angered Turks May Halt Use of Air Base," *Los Angeles Times* (Washington ed.), January 28, 1993, p. 3, and *Sabah* (Istanbul), May 12, 1993, in *FBIS-WEU-93-097*, May 21, 1993, p. 70. Despite the debates, Turkey continues to support PROVIDE COMFORT and POISED HAMMER. "NSC Decides to Extend State of Emergency, Poised Hammer," *FBIS-WEU-93-118*, June 22, 1993, p. 76.

57. *Milliyet*, January 22, 1992, p. 10, in "General Staff Chief Views Terrorism, U.S. Aid," *FBIS-WEU-92-020*, January 30, 1992, p. 28.

58. "Geopolitical Overload," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 1992, p. A14.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Milliyet*, May 2, 1993, p. 16, in "Commentary Criticizes U.S. Aid," *FBIS-WEU-93-086*, May 6, 1993, p. 54.

61. Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey seeks review of US defence agreement," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 30, 1993, p. 9, and Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara," p. 178.

62. Roy Rowden, "Turkey seeks revised pact on bases, report says," *Stars and Stripes* (Europe), March 12, 1993, p. 8, and Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey seeks review of US defence agreement."

63. Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, March 29, 1980, in *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Vol. 32, Part 3, 1979-1980, p. 3326.

64. Sami Kohen, *Milliyet*, May 2, 1993, p. 6 in "Commentary Criticizes U.S. Aid," *FBIS-WEU-93-086*, May 6, 1993, p. 54. Additionally, Washington announced in December 1992 that 8 of 12 U.S. installations in Turkey will be closed by the end of 1993. Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey seeks review of US defence agreement," p. 9.

65. *Milliyet*, July 29, 1993, p. 13 in "U.S. Military Aid, Washington's Approach Viewed," *FBIS-WEU-93-149*, August 5, 1993, p. 44.

66. Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy," p. 53.
67. "The Year's Impending Tragedy," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1993, p. A10.
68. "The Former Yugoslavia: A Map Portfolio," Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, Map 7.
69. Early statements of Turkish responsibilities and concerns can be found in *Gunaydin* (Istanbul), September 10, 1991, p. 8 in *FBIS-WEU-91-178*, September 13, 1991, p. 29.
70. Ankara Turkiye Radilari Network, August 25, 1992, in "Joint Memorandum on Bosnia," *FBIS-WEU-92-166*, August 26, 1992, p. 43.
71. That is, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Greek Thrace. Chuck Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek Pacts," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1993, p. 8.
72. For the increasing tone of Turkish rhetoric see, for example, Robert Mauther, "Turkey criticises allies on Bosnia," *London Financial Times*, September 29, 1992, p. 3; Ankara TRT Television Network, December 17, 1992, in "Turkey Supports Use of Force," *FBIS-WEU-92-244*, December 18, 1992, p. 1; James Yuenger, "Turkey Urges Desert Storm for Bosnia," *Chicago Tribune*, February 28, 1993, p. 1; and Ankara TRT Television Network, April 28, 1993, in "Turkish Chief of Staff Urges NATO Action in Bosnia," *FBIS-WEU-93-081*, April 29, 1993, p. 2.
73. Ankara TRT Television Network, April 28, 1993, in "Turkish Chief of Staff Urges NATO Action in Bosnia," *FBIS-WEU-93-081*, April 29, 1993, p. 2, and Yuenger, "Turkey Urges Desert Storm for Bosnia," February 28, 1993, p. 1, respectively. These actions have set Greek-Turkish relations on edge. For example, Greece refused to allow Turkish aircraft to use Greek air space to fly from Turkey to Italy to participate in the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia. (Athens Elliniki Radiofonia Radio Network, April 17, 1993, in "Regime Rejects Turkish Request," *FBIS-WEU-93-073*, April 19, 1993.) When Turkish F-16 and C-130 aircraft then used international air space within the Athens Flight Information Region, Greek aircraft intercepted and, according to Turkish sources, "harassed" the Turkish aircraft. See, for example, Ankara TRT Television Network, May 3, 1993, in "Ankara Rejects Greek Protest Over Planes' Flight Path," *FBIS-WEU-93-086*, May 6, 1993, p. 55.
74. Sassan Tabatabai, "Muslim World and Bosnia," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 11, 1993, p. 18.
75. *Ibid.*, "Turkish Volunteers Fighting for Bosnia," *FBIS-WEU-92-234*, December 4, 1992, p. 71, and *Ozgur Gundem*, January 14, 1993, pp. 1, 11

in "Paper Reports Troops To Be Sent To Bosnia," *FBIS-WEU-93-012*, January 21, 1993, p. 81.

76. Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek Pacts," p. 8.

77. Martin Sieff, "Active U.S. Support of Macedonia Urged," *The Washington Times*, December 2, 1992, p. 9.

78. The Balkan War of 1912, the Balkan War of 1913, World War I, and World War II.

79. Sieff, "Active U.S. Support of Macedonia Urged," p. 9, and Carol J. Williams, "Neighbors Fear Being Pulled In to [sic] Yugoslav War," *Los Angeles Times* (Washington ed.), November 2, 1992, p. 2, and Misha Glenny, "Is Macedonia Next?" *The New York Times*, July 30, 1993, p. A27.

80. Information contained in this paragraph has been taken from Roger Thurow, "Balkan Tinderbox," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 17, 1992, p. A1; Sieff, "Active U.S. Support of Macedonia Urged," p. 9; and Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek Pacts," p. 8.

81. "The Year's Impending Tragedy," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1993, p. A10.

82. Greek complaints about the name Macedonia go back to the breakup of Yugoslavia and continue through the present. For early concerns see, for example, "Mitsotakis Warns Skopje on Territorial Claims" and "Elaborates Further on Macedonia," both in *FBIS-WEU-91-222*, November 18, 1991, pp. 33-35; "Athens Breaks Off Talks with Skopje Delegation," in *FBIS-WEU-92-003*, January 6, 1992, p. 56; and Blaine Harden, "Greece Blocks Recognition of Macedonia," *The Washington Post*, June 10, 1992, p. A25. More recent statements of Greek concern may be found in, for example, "Mitsotakis Lists Conditions for Skopje," *FBIS-WEU-93-035*, February 24, 1993, p. 55. A concise account of successful Greek lobbying efforts in the United States over the "Macedonia Question" can be found in Robert S. Greenberger, "Macedonian Lesson for Clinton," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 13, 1992, p. A14.

83. *I Kathimerini* (Athens), January 17, 1993, p. 1 in "Columnist Warns of Humiliation over Skopje," *FBIS-WEU-93-013*, January 22, 1993, p. 54. In fact, it could be argued that the Macedonia issue is the prime factor that precipitated the October 1993 elections in Greece. In April 1992, then Prime Minister Mitsotakis fired his Foreign Minister, Andonios Samaras, over the latter's hard line stand on the recognition of Macedonia. Samaras subsequently led a revolt within the ruling party that slowly chipped away at Mitsotakis' majority until the Prime Minister felt compelled to call for a general election—which his party soundly lost.

84. See, for example, Thurow, "Balkan Tinderbox," and Robert L. Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 29, 1992, p. A14.

85. See, for example, Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14; George Kenney, "Blueprint for a Wider War," *The New York Times*, September 30, 1992, p. A25; and Thurow, "Balkan Tinderbox," p. A1.

86. Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14, and "The Year's Impending Tragedy," p. A10.

87. Of the many reports that raise this possibility, see, for example, "The Year's Impending Tragedy," p. A10, and Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14.

88. "The Year's Impending Tragedy," p. A10.

89. Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14.

90. Sieff, "Active U.S. support of Macedonia urged," p. 9, and Greenberger, "Macedonian Lesson for Clinton," p. A14.

91. Nor is this a fanciful scenario. Numerous regional experts and correspondents have offered a similar explanation for possible escalation of the conflict. See, for example, Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14; Kenney, "Blueprint for a Wider War," p. A25; Thurow, "Balkan Tinderbox," p. A1; Anatolia (Ankara), November 21, 1992, in *FBIS-WEU-92-226*, "Chief of Staff: War 'May Break Out' in Balkans," pp. 45-46; Sudetic, "Bosnia Neighbors Nervously Seek Pacts," p. 8; and George Kenney, "From Balkan Crisis to All-Out War," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1993, p. E17.

92. Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma," p. 31.

93. In early 1993, for example, then President Ozal intimated that if the United Nations and Europe did not take stronger action to end the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey would deny access to Incirlik air base which is being used to enforce the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq and to protect Iraqi Kurds. See Kempster, "Angered Turks May Halt Use of Air Base," p. 3. Misha Glenny posits, for example, that "President Clinton's attempt to lift the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian Government was informed partly by the perception that Turkey has become crucial to American strategic interests in the Near East, surrounded as it is by oil-rich Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq." "Carnage in Bosnia, for Starters," *The New York Times*, July 29, 1993, p. A23.

94. Statements by Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff and the subsequent flurry of public discussion on the future use of U.S. power are

the most prominent examples. See, for instance, Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Reduced U.S. World Role Outlined but Soon Altered," *The Washington Post*, May 26, 1993, p. A1.

ENDNOTES — CHAPTER 3

1. For a concise, but authoritative, review of Turkey's experience as a major Middle Eastern power, see George Lenczowski *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.

2. See "Turkish Leader to Press U.S. on Iraqi Embargo," *The New York Times*, October 14, 1993; "Turkey's War With Kurds Reaches New Ferocity," *The New York Times*, October 18, 1993; "Turkey Pushes for an End To U.N.'s Embargo of Iraq," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 14, 1992; "Attacks Focus the Spotlight on Kurds' Tangled Affairs," *The New York Times*, June 25, 1993, and "Turkey's War Against Kurds Embarrasses Ankara," *The New York Times*, September 5, 1992. Turkey's problem with the Kurds goes back to the peace settlement after World War I. At the time, certain Kurdish tribes, in effect, sabotaged Turkey's claim to the province of Mosul (see below). As a result the League of Nations assigned Mosul to Iraq, then under British mandate. When the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, drove the British from Anatolia, he turned against the Kurds, whom, he felt, had betrayed him. He denied them minority status in the newly formed Turkish state, a denial that has persisted to this day. To ultra-nationalist Turks no such thing as a Kurd exists—there are only "mountain Turks." The best source on the origins of the Kurdish problem in Turkey is C.J. Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*, London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

3. During this rampage, Turkish diplomats were taken hostage by the Kurds, and in subsequent clashes between demonstrators and the police one Kurd and one Swiss policeman were killed. See "Kurdish Militants Raid Turkish Sites In European Cities," *The New York Times*, June 25, 1993.

4. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT began April 6, 1991 as a combined task force deployed with the mission of facilitating the return of Kurdish refugees to Iraq. Subsequently, the mission was expanded to include the stationing of U.S. fighter aircraft at Turkey's Incirlik air base. From this base, the United States flies covering missions over northern Iraq. Under the conditions of its establishment, Turkey's Grand National Assembly (GNA) must approve the operation's continuance. The GNA has voted to extend it four times—December 1991, June 1992, December 1992 and June 1993.

5. The attitude of radicals in the Middle East toward the MNF intervention is expressed by Hussein Moussavi, leader of the Hizbollah, in the following extract from Robert Fisk's *Pity the Poor Nation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 521- 522. Fisk quotes Moussavi as saying:

'God is capable of giving Muslims victory, whether the aggression comes from France, America or Italy (these were the three countries that intervened, ed.).... The Imam Ali says that we may throw the stone back from where it has been thrown and that evil cannot be repelled except by evil. Our Prophet Mohammed—praised be his name—has invoked us to carry the sword to defend our honor.'

But Moussavi has some decidedly political views with which he tries to justify his belief in violence. The Americans, he says, have come to Lebanon 'to achieve the results that America wants.' The MNF is a NATO force and America is dealing with 'some traditional leaders' in Lebanon and ignoring what Moussavi calls 'popular Islamic elements.'

Fisk, former Middle East correspondent for *The London Times* has written probably the best account of the long, bloody Lebanese War. For the official Syrian line on NATO in the Middle East see the articles cited in endnote 6.

6. The maneuvers were called "Adventure Express." See *FBIS-WEU* 83-120, June 21, 1983, "NATO Exercises Concluded: Unity Shown." For Syrian and Iranian reaction to them see, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Middle East (Henceforth FBIS-MEA)*-83-128, July 1, 1983, "AL-BATH Comments on NATO Exercises in Turkey;" *FBIS-MEA*-83-140, July 20, 1983, "Damascus TV Comments on Al-Jumayyil U.S. Visit," and *FBIS-MEA*-138, July 18, 1983, "AL-BATH Discusses U.S. Middle East Plan." Also see *FBIS-MEA*-140, July 20, 1983, "Syria, Iran, Libya and PDRY Protest U.S. Maneuvers." For Iran's position see *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-South Asia (Henceforth FBIS-SAS)*-84-133, July 10, 1984, "Khamene'i: U.S. to Rally Gulf Countries."

7. Michael Gunter (*The Kurds in Turkey*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 72) claims the incursion was provoked by PKK units, which attacked a Turkish patrol along the border. There apparently was such an attack in May 1983. But official Turkish statements on the incursion never mention the PKK, referring instead to "Armenian terrorists as well as people being sought by security forces." The author has conducted interviews with sources he regards as reliable, and, as a result, has reached the conclusion that the PKK was not operational in the area at this time. There may have been individual PKK members hiding out in northern Iraq when the incursion occurred (see endnote 8), but the group was not carrying on an active guerrilla war there. See *FBIS-WEU*-83-184, May 27 1983, "Troops Cross Iraqi Border in 'Mop-up Operation'"; *FBIS-WEU*-83-106, June 1, 1983, "Official Spokesman on Contacts With Iraq"; *FBIS-WEU*-83-106, June 6, 1983, "Commandos Purge Separatist Kurds, Silence Radio." For official statements by the Iraqi and Turkish foreign ministries on the action see *FBIS-MEA*-83-105, May 31, 1983, "Foreign Ministry Statement on Border

Issues," and *op. cit.*, "Turkish Foreign Minister Gives Note to President." Also *FBIS-MEA-83-175*, September 8, 1983, "Further on Turkish Interior Minister's Visit," and *FBIS-MEA-176*, September 9, 1983, "Turkish Interior Minister Signs Cooperation Pact."

8. Iraq was outnumbered in the war against Iran three to one. Tehran attempted to exploit this advantage by keeping relentless pressure on Iraqi positions in the south around Basrah. Under this pressure, Iraq found it impossible to spare troops from the southern front to police the north, and therefore tried to make do by using Popular Army units (Ba'thist militiamen) for this job. These proved woefully inadequate, and consequently it was not long before almost the entire north slipped from Baghdad's control. The area became a haven for desperate individuals of every description (draft dodgers, smugglers, and some political dissidents). At the same time, however, as of the spring of 1983 there was little organized anti-government activity in the north—that does not come until after Iran's invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in July of that year. This enabled groups like the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) to infiltrate the region and set up bases there. For Syria's involvement with the Kurds at this juncture see Stephen C. Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas: An Assessment of the Situation in Northern Iraq*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991; also for the Turkish attitude toward Syria and the Kurds see *FBIS-WEU-83-121*, June 22 1983, "Syria Will Not Protect Kurdish Militants," and *FBIS-WEU-83-124*, June 27, 1983, "Ankara Protests Terrorists 'Escape to Syria'."

9. Assad's perception that Turkey was abandoning its neutrality was influenced by another event at the time, namely Ankara's reaction to the invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan by Tehran. Tehran had been preparing its invasion for some time, massing troops along the Iraq-Iran border at Haj Umran. It was common knowledge the Iranians intended to raise the Iraqi Kurdish tribes against Baghdad. This scheme was effectively squelched by Turkey's border-crossing, which demonstrated that Ankara would not respect international frontiers. If the Kurdish tribes joined forces with the invading Iranians, Turkey was prepared to come into the war on the side of Iraq. Perhaps as a result of this (obviously, the author does not know), the Kurdish tribes did not revolt, and Iran's invasion failed. Subsequently, Saddam was able to bring practically the entire Kurdish community in the north over to his side by offering to enroll them as *fursan* (knights) in a paramilitary force called "The Knights of Salhadin." The Kurds served for pay (which was quite lucrative) and were not required to leave their tribal area. Throughout the war the *fursan* was effective in preventing Iran, Syria, and their Kurdish allies from developing a second front in the Kurdish region. For background on this episode see Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas*.

10. For background on this rapprochement see Stephen C. Pelletiere, *The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos In a Vacuum*, Westport, CT. Praeger, 1992. Also *FBIS-MEA-83-007*, January 11, 1983, "25 August Solarz Interview with

Saddam Husayn," also *The New York Times*, "Iraq makes public conversation between President Saddam Hussein and U.S. Representative Stephen J. Solarz," January 3, 1983, also *FBIS-MEA-83-106*, January 10, 1983, "Aziz on Willingness for Talks With Israel," and *FBIS-MEA-84-161*, August 17, 1984, "Tariq Aziz Receives Congressman Solarz." For information on U.S. assistance to Baghdad see *FBIS-MEA-83-092*, May 11, 1983, "Aziz Confers With Schultz," and an accompanying article, "Aziz Confers With Delors"; also *FBIS-MEA-83-186*, September 23, 1983, "Aziz Departs for UN." On the expulsion of the terrorist groups see *FBIS-MEA-228*, November, 25, 1983, "Sabri Al Bannā Followers Reportedly Expelled."

11. The Baghdad Pact allied Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, with the United States as an associate member. Even though Washington had only associate membership status, it nonetheless was the Pact's mainstay. The Pact meant that Western influence ringed the Gulf, with Washington able to count as allies, not only Saudi Arabia, but Iran (under the Shah) and Iraq, which was then ruled by the Hashemites. The revolt of Arab nationalist forces in Iraq in 1958 caused the Pact to fall apart. For the best account of the Pact see Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*.

12. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into the Iraqi aspect of the terror war. Briefly, this was directed by the so-called Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) based in Tehran. SCIRI was led by the members of the al Hakim family. Prominent in the family were a number of Shia clerics several of whom had fled Iraq for Iran before the outbreak of the war. These clerics directed operations against Iraq, including setting off bombs in downtown Baghdad. Saddam responded by rounding up members of the family still resident in Iraq and threatening to kill one for every terrorist act that occurred. After Saddam executed several of the al Hakims, the SCIRI-directed phase of the terror war ceased.

13. For background on this see Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*.

14. In 1960, the Turkish military took power and imprisoned President Bayar, Premier Mendares, and other cabinet members. Mendares was subsequently hung. See Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*.

15. After purging the various radical groups, the army returned to the barracks, surrendering power to the civilians. This was cited at the time as another triumph of democracy. See "Turgut Ozal, 66, Dies in Ankara; Pugnacious President of Turkey," *The New York Times*, April 18, 1993, also "Reformer who built on Ataturk's legacy," *The Financial Times*, April 19, 1993.

16. There are over 16 million Kurds in the Middle East and southern Russia. The breakdown is 10 million in Turkey, four million in Iran, 2 1/2 million in Iraq, and 500,000 in Syria, with perhaps 50,000 in the Russia.

17. The whole of Turkey was in turmoil in the late 1960s, but the Kurdish community, centered in the rural areas, was relatively quiescent. Almost all of the protests were going on in the cities, on the university campuses. There certainly was nothing resembling an active guerrilla movement in the Turkish-Kurdish area at this time.

18. Turkey was rife with opposition groups during the late 1960s, but all paid lip service to the principle of Turkish national integrity. Only the PKK espoused the separation of the Kurdish lands from the rest of the country—hence the appellation separatists.

19. See "Turkey—The Challenge of the Kurdistan Workers Party," Hazine Teimourian, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1993.

20. The best source for investigating the PKK's career during this period is Michael Gunter's *The Kurds in Turkey*, specifically pp. 71-73. The author disputes several of Gunter's conclusions, particularly concerning the PKK's size and strength at this time. But, for a sense of the group's importance to Syria, his book is useful.

21. For background on this episode see Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas*.

22. Barzani had joined a Syrian-sponsored National Patriotic and Democratic Front, which was violently anti-American. The following are excerpts from a report in Syria's official press in November 1984: "Masoud Barzani, leader of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, praised President Hafez al Asad; his basic role and wise leadership in confronting the imperialist Zionist forces in the region.... Regarding the Iran-Iraq war...Barzani said that this war is a war of imperialism and that imperialism entrusted Saddam Husayn to wage it, especially since it provides great gains in the region to imperialist Israel.... The leaders of the National Patriotic and Democratic Front denounced the current new steps (by the United States) to form the Amman-Cairo-Baghdad Alliance." See *FBIS-MEA-84-216*, November 6, 1984.

23. Barzani is the son of the famous guerrilla leader, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who from roughly 1961 until 1975 ruled over the Kurdish area of Iraq as a virtual warlord. Mulla Mustafa is one of the more fascinating figures in modern Middle East history, and also one of the most controversial. In the 1970s he accepted aid from the Shah of Iran, the CIA and Israel and mounted a rebellion against Baghdad. Abruptly, in 1975, the Shah withdrew his support and the rebellion collapsed. Barzani and his forces fled to Iran, and Barzani's sons—who took over the movement after he died—became

embittered against the United States for its role in abandoning their father. Masoud Barzani allied himself with Khomeini against the United States, and later (as we have described here) with Syria. For details on Mulla Mustafa's career see Stephen C. Pelletiere, *The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf*, Westview: Boulder, CO, 1984. Also see Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas*; also Gunter, *The Kurds In Turkey*. For specific details on Mulla Mustafa's work for the CIA, the Shah and Israel see the House Select Committee on Intelligence Report (the Pike Report).

24. A look at Figure 1 will show that the attackers of Semdinli almost certainly entered Turkey from Iran, evidence that Syria and Iran were cooperating to support the terrorists.

25. For details of these raids see *The Kurds and Their Agas*. Also see *FBIS-WEU-84-161*, August 17, 1984, "Kurdish Separatists Attack Military Garrison," *FBIS-WEU-84-172*, September 4, 1984, "Foreign Ministry Denies Troops Crossing Borders," *FBIS-WEU-84-164*, August 22, 1984, "Nine Deaths Reported in 15 August Kurdish Attack," *FBIS-WEU-84-174* September 6, 1984, "Security Forces Continue Operations in Southeast," and *FBIS-WEU-84-207*, October 17, 1984, "Unrest Continues in Southeast Anatolia."

26. For background on ASALA see Gerard Chaliand and Yves Temon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance*, London: Zed Press, 1983, pp. 1-11. For background on ASALA attacks on Turkish diplomats see *FBIS-WEU-071*, April 11, 1984, "Armenian Organization Threatens Ankara, Ozal;" *FBIS-WEU-84-074*, April 16, 1984, "ASALA Threatens Ozal Against Visiting Iran," *FBIS-WEU-084*, April 30, 1984, "Armenians Attack Two Turkish Citizens in Tehran," *FBIS-WEU-84-121*, June 21, 1984, "Armenian Group Responsible for Vienna Bombing," *FBIS-WEU-84-127*, June 29, 1984, "ASALA Threatens Olympic Team." And finally, see *FBIS-WEU-84-205*, October 22, 1984, "Iran Implicated in Southeast Attacks, Talks Held; Reaction to Iran Allegations; Ozal: Terrorists From Iran." Also *FBIS-MEA-83-058* March, 24, 1983, "Turkey warns Syria Over Aid to Armenians," *FBIS-MEA-83-151*, August 4, 1983, "Syrian Agents Helped Iran." Also *FBIS-WEU-84-086*, May 2, 1984, "Ozal Returns From Iran Visit; Makes Statement on Armenian Terror," and *FBIS-WEU-84-088*, May 4, 1984, "Ozal Blames Armenians for Paris Bombing." For the PKK Base at Urmia see *FBIS-WEU-93-140*, "PKK Member Reveals Iranian Links With Terrorist Activity," July 23, 1993.

27. See "Turkey Urged to Bolster Military Role," *The Washington Post*, December 10, 1990.

28. See "Turks Rethinking Regional Roles," *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1993. ("But those Turks who argued for the country to take a prominent role internationally were cutting against the deeply ingrained legacy of Kemal Ataturk"...[who] directed that the country keep focus firmly

at home.") See also "Allied Strike Force Forms in Turkey," *The New York Times*, July 25, 1991 ("On both the political left and right, and within the military, critics complain that Turkey has given up sovereignty over its own land to foreign troops. If there is a point of agreement it is that virtually no one wants the strike force to linger long.")

29. "Turks Rethinking Regional Roles," *The Washington Post*. ("It [opposition to the United States] is part of the political ethic that led a coalition of Turkish military and civilians to sharply limit Turkey's role in the Persian Gulf War, thwarting Ozal's desire to send Turkish troops to help evict Iraq from Kuwait.")

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31. This was the purport of many of the obituaries on Ozal produced at his death. See "Turgut Ozal, 66, Dies in Ankara, Pugnacious President of Turkey," *The New York Times*, April 18, 1993, and "Reformer who built on Ataturk's legacy," *The Financial Times*, April 19, 1993.

32. When Turkey and Britain ceased fighting each other at the end of World I, the Turkish army held Mosul. However, British forces, ignoring the armistice, continued to push north and seized the area, including its oil deposits. Ataturk subsequently renounced Turkey's rights to Mosul in the Lausanne Treaty, but its loss has always rankled. For details see *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*.

33. Iraq's richest oil fields are around Kirkuk, and, although the Kurds maintain that Kirkuk is Kurdish, in fact it is no longer so. The Iraqi government has settled many Arabs there over the years to work the oil fields. The city also has a large Turkomen population, which has resided there for centuries.

34. Television coverage of the Kurds' stampede over the border into Turkey emphasized the victims' distress as they huddled on bare mountainsides in the bitter cold. Many TV commentators sought to blame the Turks for not doing more for the refugees. See "Bush, In Turkey Mutes War Talk," *The New York Times*, July 21, 1991 ("Turkish officials felt the rest of the world unfairly focused on Kurds huddling in filthy camps, rather than on Turkish aid brought to the refugees' remote mountain haven and on the burden imposed by the influx of Iraqi refugees into the country's poorest region.")

35. Ozal's role in Turkey at this time was unique. He held the post of President, which was supposed to be largely ceremonial. However, he personally transformed the office into a real power position. After the elections, when Ozal's party lost seats, he remained as President, and tried to go on dominating Turkish politics. See "Turkish Election Results May Shift Basic Policy," *The New York Times*, November 18, 1991.

36. Among Turkish politicians, Ozal was probably the most openly supportive of the Kurds. Whereas others refused even to utter the word Kurd—claiming that these people were actually "mountain Turks"—Ozal regarded such behavior as indefensible. See "Succession, Kurds Pose Challenges," *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1993.

37. See "Turkey Says Bush Rejects Kurdistan," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1992; also "U.S.-Backed Group Obscure in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, June 23 1993.

38. There is no mystery about how the PKK was able to step up its operations in the area. Given the resulting chaos, it would have been a simple feat to infiltrate additional cadres. What is puzzling are the numbers reported. Reliable sources put the PKK's strength (at the time of DESERT STORM) at between 5,000 and 10,000. This is extraordinary—the group never had more than a few hundred throughout the entire Iran-Iraq War. It has been suggested that the PKK was buying recruits. (A State Department official told the author, "The PKK is the employer of last resort.") Another theory is that many of the alleged PKK cadres were in fact Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The author finds both these theories plausible (although the suggestion that the PKK paid for members raises the question of where did the money come from?). For reports on the initial attacks see "Kurdish Clashes in Turkey," *The Washington Post*, July 12, 1991.

39. See "Firebombing kills 11 at Istanbul store," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 26, 1991. It is estimated that since the inception of the PKK's active war against the Turkish government, some 7000 lives have been lost.

40. See "Turkey Sets Up Buffer Zone In North Iraq to Curb Rebels," *The Washington Post*, August 8, 1992; "Turks Attack Separatist Kurds in

North Iraq," *The New York Times*, August 7, 1992; "Turkey Says It Made Raids Inside Iraq," *The Washington Post*, August 6, 1992, and "Kurdish Rebels, Turkish Troops Clash; Dozens Reported Killed," *The Washington Post*, August 31, 1992. Also "Violence Intensifies Between Turkey, Kurds," *The Washington Post*, June 26, 1992; "Kurds In Turkey Seem To Be Nearing Full-scale Revolt," *The New York Times*, March 30, 1992, and "Turkey's Efforts to Quell Rebel Kurds Raises Alarm in Ankara and Europe," *The New York Times*, March 27, 1992. Also "Bonn Condemns Turkey For Attacks on Kurds," *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1992.

41. Talabani's accusation caught the western media by surprise because, until then, most experts on the PKK had tabbed Iraq as their benefactor. That Talabani (who had much to gain from fostering the view that Baghdad was behind this) would instead point to Iran, lends credence to his claim. See "Iran Is Reported to Aid Turkish Kurds in Iraq," *The New York Times*, October 25, 1992; "Iraqi Kurds Say Iran Is Backing A Rival Faction," *The Washington Post*, October 25, 1992; "Turkish Army Presses Offensive in Iraq," *The Washington Post*, October 24, 1992; "An Odd Alliance Subdues Turkey's Kurdish Rebels," *The New York Times*, November 24, 1992, and a letter to *The New York Times*, "On Iraq-Turkey Border, Kurds Are Being Used to Kill Kurds," October 28, 1992.

42. However, the Iraqi Kurds refused to hand over captured Turkish Kurds to the Turkish army, which angered the latter. The Turkish commanders charged the Iraqi Kurds had merely absorbed the PKK into their ranks. Assured by the Barzanis that the PKK was interned in camps below the 36th parallel, the Turkish army commanders threatened to invade central Iraq to destroy them. See *FBIS-WEU-93-118*, "PKK Said To Shift Camp to Iraq With Talabani's Help," June 22, 1993; also Istanbul, IKIBIN'I DOGRU, November 8, 1992.

43. For an account of the Kurdish movement in Iraq under Mulla Mustafa Barzani during the 1960s and 1970s, when the Kurds were essentially serving the interests of various Western governments, see Pelletiere, *The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf*. For an account of how the Kurdish population suffered because of Mulla Mustafa's policy see Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas*.

44. For the hostility of Turkey's President Demirel toward the Kurds see "Turkey Says Bush Rejects Kurdistan," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1992.

45. See "U.N. Warns of End to Kurdish Relief," *The New York Times*, May 23, 1993, and "Aid Workers in Kurdistan Fear Attacks," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1993.

46. In fact, many of the weapons the Turks are using against the Kurds originally came from the United States, although certainly Washington never

intended that they should be used so. On Secretary of State Christopher's promise of continued military aid, including helicopter gun ships see "Turkey's First Woman PM Must Reforge Party Image," *The Financial Times*, June 14, 1993, and "Christopher Gives Turks Plan to End Rights Abuses," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1993.

47. See *FBIS-WEU-93-144*, "Government Handling of Kurds Viewed," July 29, 1993.

48. In addition we regard the present situation of the Iraqi Kurds as potentially explosive. The Iraqi Kurds are being asked to perpetuate a state of affairs that is against their interests. It is unrealistic to suppose that they will put up with this ambiguous arrangement indefinitely. See "Desperate Kurds Consider Turning Once More to Saddam," *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1993.

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50. See "Turgut Ozal, 66, Dies in Ankara."

51. See "Reformer who built on Ataturk's legacy," *The Financial Times*, April 19, 1993.

52. At the start of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad had only one means of getting its oil to market (other than trucking it through Jordan); that was a single pipeline through Turkey. By 1983, it had contracted to build a second line through Turkey, which was rushed to completion. Still, until Saudi Arabia allowed Iraq to tap into its pipelines to the Red Sea (which came comparatively late in the war), Turkey was Iraq's only conduit to the world market.

53. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, even as it was continually clashing with Tehran over the Kurds, Ankara continued to permit vital supplies to transit its territory to reach Iran. However, periodically it would remind Tehran of its dependence on Turkey by holding up that traffic at the Turkish-Iranian border.

54. Iraq's trade with Turkey at this time was estimated to be \$3 billion a year. See "Quick Action by Turkey On Sanctions a Starter," *The New York Times*, August 8, 1990. At the time, Iraq supplied half of Turkey's oil imports and paid it \$300 million a year in transit fees. See "Iraqi Official Urges Turkey Not to Shut Oil Pipeline," *The New York Times*, August 6, 1990.

55. *Ibid.*

56. "U.S. Boosts Turkish Textile Quotas," *The Washington Post*, November 21, 1990.

57. See "Turning Foreign Pledges of Aid Into Reality Proves a Delicate Task," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1990.

58. See "Bush in Turkey, Mutes War Talk," *The New York Times*, July 21, 1991; "Clinton to Continue Foreign Aid Cut," *The Washington Post*, August 14, 1993; also "The Turkish Question: How Important is It?" *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1993.

59. See "Clinton to Continue Foreign Aid Cuts," *The Washington Post*, August 14, 1993, *Milliyet*, May 2, 1993, p. 16, in "Commentary Criticizes U.S. Aid," *FBIS-WEU-93-086*, May 6, 1993, p. 54; Lynn E. Davis, "FY 1994 Security Assistance Budget Requests", U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dispatch, IV, No. 22, May 31, 1993, pp. 402-405, "U.S. Military Aid, Washington's Approach Viewed," *FBIS-WEU-93-149*, August 5, 1993, pp. 44-45.

60. See "A debut of fire for Turkey's premier," *The Financial Times*, June 14, 1993; "Economic woes mount for Ciller," *The Financial Times*, August 6, 1993; "Turkey's first woman PM must reforge party image," *The Financial Times*, June 14, 1993, and "The Turkish Question: How Important is It?" *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1993.

61. Among the most lethal is Dev Sol. It is Marxist—more truly so than the PKK, in the sense that Dev Sol cadres have an appreciation of, and respect for Marxist analysis.

62. Included in this category of extreme radicals would be men like Motashami Pur and Ahmad Khomeini. It is perhaps significant that Motashami, who is still a power in Tehran, was Iran's ambassador to Damascus at the time that Iran and Syria first orchestrated the terror war.

63. See *FBIS-NES-91-185*, September 24, 1991, "U.S. Said Damaging Tehran-Ankara Relations."

64. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, in an interview made the following comment—"Kurdistan is fast becoming a region where the revolution is maturing. For that reason, efforts are under way to control Kurdistan by making use primarily of the U.S. "Hammer Force" (PROVIDE COMFORT, ed.), and the collaborationists. A revolutionary Kurdistan means the emancipation of the Middle East from the control of imperialism." *FBIS-WEU-93-133*, July 14, 1992. Also see "Iran and the Kurds," *Middle East International*, August 6, 1993 ("...suspicion that the U.S. intends to use the [Kurds'] western-protected enclave in northern Iraq to undermine the

regime in Tehran is at least partly responsible for the recent escalation of attacks by Iranian forces against Iranian Kurdish rebel groups."). Iran's Kurds, long dormant politically, have recently revived and begun attacking the Rafsanjani government. Also see "PKK Official on Iranian, U.S. Kurdish Policy," *FBIS-WEU-93-099*, May 25, 1993 ("The developments in the north and south have rendered the Iraqi territory dangerous for Iran. Add to this the irritation felt by the United States against the Iranian regime, then the possibility arises of the south turning into a base for the toppling of the Iranian regime."). See also "Rebel Radio Views Tripartite Meeting in Tehran," *FBIS-NES-93-112*, June 14, 1993. ("Iran has a bone to pick with Turkey because it let the United States and its allies use its military bases to protect the Iraqi Kurds.")

65. See "White House to Step Up Plans to Isolate Iran, Iraq," *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1993.

66. See "Attacks Focus the Spotlight on Kurds' Tangled Affairs," *The New York Times*, June 25, 1993, and "Kurdish Militants Raid Turkish Sites In European Cities," *Ibid*.

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68. Iranian ambassadors, operating out of their European embassies, direct terrorist networks. The central direction point of this network is considered to be the Iranian embassy in the Vatican. See Kenneth Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993, p. 100.

69. See "Hizbullah Sentiment Seen Spreading: Unsolved Murders Rise," *FBIS-WEU-93-052*, March 19, 1993.; also "Beat The Devil," *The Nation*, July 26, 1993.

70. See "Turkey Accuses Islamic Ring That Killed 3—Has Links to Iran," *The New York Times*, February 5, 1993.

71. See *FBIS-WEU-93-137*, July 20, 1993, "Summons Iranian Envoy on PKK 'Complicity'"; also "Iranian Embassy Official Denies Reports of PKK Support," *FBIS-WEU-93-137*, and "PKK Member Reveals Iranian Links With 'Terrorist Activity'," *FBIS-WEU-93-140*, July 23, 1993.

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75. See "Turkey seeks consensus on Kurds," *The Financial Times*, November 17, 1992.

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