

AD-A273 989

THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S
COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS TO DEFEAT
THE SENDERO LUMINOSO (SHINING PATH)

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ROBIN L. MEALER, MAJ, USA
B.S., York College, York, Pennsylvania, 1980

DTIC
UNCLASSIFIED
DEC 21 1993

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

93-30785

93 12 21 1 21

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 4 June 1993	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
----------------------------------	-------------------------------	---

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Peruvian Government's Counterinsurgency Efforts to Defeat the <u>Sendero Luminoso</u> (Shining Path)	5. FUNDING NUMBERS
---	--------------------

6. AUTHOR(S) Maj Robin L. Mealer	
---	--

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College, ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
---	--

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
---	--

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited.	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A
---	---------------------------------

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This study analyzes the counterinsurgency efforts of the Peruvian government to defeat the Maoist Shining Path movement. An examination of the government response within the context of the Peruvian environment reveals the government's failure to recognize socio-economic conditions which give the Sender its strength. The author further examines the nature of the insurgency, its leader, ideology, objectives, organization and tactics which contribute to the movement's success. The government's military solution to a political-military problem and its subsequent failed counterinsurgency efforts validate the hypothesis that Peru is losing the war against the Sendero.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Sendero Luminoso, Shining Path, Peru	15. NUMBER OF PAGES 93
---	---------------------------

	16. PRICE CODE
--	----------------

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
---	--	---	----------------------------

**THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S
COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS TO DEFEAT
THE SENDERO LUMINOSO (SHINING PATH)**

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

**ROBIN L. MEALER, MAJ, USA
B.S., York College, York, Pennsylvania, 1980**

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTOR 3

**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993**

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Availability for Special
A-1	

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE


Name of candidate: Major Robin L. Mealer, U.S. Army

Thesis Title: The Peruvian Government's Efforts to
Defeat the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)


Approved by:


LTC Frank S. Smallwood, M.A. Thesis Committee Chairman


LTC Clark M. Delavan, B.A., B.S. Member


John T. Fishel, Ph.D. Member

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:


Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT'S COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS TO
DEFEAT THE SENDERO LUMINOSO (SHINING PATH) by
Maj Robin L. Mealer, USA, 93 pages.

This study analyzes the counterinsurgency efforts of the Peruvian government to defeat the Maoist Shining Path movement. An examination of the government response within the context of the Peruvian environment reveals the government's failure to recognize socioeconomic conditions which give Sendero its strength. The author further examines the nature of the insurgency, its leader, ideology, objectives, organization, and tactics which contribute to the movement's success. The government's military solution to a political-military problem and its subsequent failed counterinsurgency efforts validate the hypothesis that Peru is losing the war against the Sendero.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Unless you have completed a project of this magnitude, you can not realize the importance of this page to acknowledge those who assisted and guided in the completion of this thesis.

I will forever be indebted to my committee: LTC Steven Smallwood for teaching me to think critically and to develop content literacy, not only in Latin American Studies, but in all aspects of learning; to Dr. John Fishel whose thoughts and insights on Peru were invaluable; and to LTC Clark Delavan, a fellow Chinook pilot and Air Assault Soldier, for your moral encouragement and mentorship in achieving this goal.

I would like to thank Carol Ramkey and the staff of the Combined Arms Research Library at Ft. Leavenworth. Their untiring efforts were critical to the success of this project.

A special word of thanks to Staff Group 2C, especially MAJ Doug Rogalla and his printer, who without their assistance I never would have finished.

To my parents - Frank and Sandy Forbes, Bob and Judy Ehly, and to my husband, Jerry, whose love, support, and long distance phone calls sustained me through the writing of this study - thank you.

Finally, and most importantly, William Ward once said, "The mediocre teacher tells. The good teacher explains. The superior teacher demonstrates. The great teacher inspires." It is to Mrs. Bertha Spahr, a great teacher, who inspired me to pursue a college education and join the Army as an officer, that I dedicate this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
CHAPTER 1 - Thesis Parameters	1
CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review	7
CHAPTER 3 - The Nature of the Society	11
CHAPTER 4 - The Nature of the Insurgency	41
CHAPTER 5 - The Nature of the Government Response and Conclusions	60
ENDNOTES	78
BIBLIOGRAPHY	89
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	93

CHAPTER 1
THESIS PARAMETERS

Introduction

This master's thesis is a study of the Peruvian government's efforts to defeat the Communist Party of Peru-Sendero Luminoso. (The terms Sendero Luminoso, Senderistas, Shining Path, and the Communist Party of Peru will be introduced during this study and are considered interchangeable.) Research and analysis will validate the working hypothesis that the government is losing its war against the Sendero. Analysis will focus on the nature of the society, the nature of the insurgency and the government's response. The analytical model found in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict will be the principal framework for analysis.

Background

As an insurgent movement emerges, its success depends not only upon the development of its own power, but more importantly on the ability of a government to mobilize its counterinsurgency efforts. The emergence of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) insurgency movement in Peru

occurred in 1980 on the eve of the country's first democratic elections in years. Senderistas attacked voting polls and destroyed ballot boxes in remote Andean villages. Since that time, the violence has claimed the lives of over 25,000 persons and resulted in the destruction of over \$20 billion of public and private property.¹

The government's counterinsurgency efforts have been "reactive" rather than "proactive." Initially the Sendero was considered only a regional threat so the government did not respond nationally until 1981.² In 1982, the government finally declared a state of emergency in Ayacucho, the birthplace of the Sendero, to deal with the insurgency. The discovery of mass graves in this region in 1984 indicated that the military had overreacted violently in dealing with the Sendero.³

In 1985, President Garcia's administration formulated a strategy (CONAPLAN) based not upon oppression, but rather "pacification." His plan provided for economic assistance, selective amnesty for adult Sendero members, and pardon for minors. The CONAPLAN also called for an open dialogue with the rebel leaders. Additionally, the military was forced under his administration to answer for atrocities, and members were relieved from service if found responsible of human rights violations. As a result

military operations in the emergency zones were temporarily deactivated and defense was passed to "peasant patrols." Economic assistance was never comprehensive and the Sendero took advantage of the peasant defense. The military returned to the region in force; human rights violations by the military occurred again; and by late 1989, one-third of Peru was under a state of emergency. The "regional" threat of the Sendero was spreading.⁴

Historical illegitimacy of the government may be the causative factor in the inability of Peru to establish a solid counterinsurgency effort. Three hundred years of Spanish colonial rule were marked by authoritarianism and mercantilist economic practices and gave the colonists little experience in handling their own affairs. Even after Peru declared its independence in 1821, the authoritarian and mercantilist practices continued for at least the next 150 years. The government has been led by individuals who have placed self above service to their country and their party. Most presidencies have been marked by struggle among contenders, often ending in a military coup.⁵

The most recent coup resulted in the "twelve-year rule" when from 1968 until 1980, Peru was governed by the military. This also served as the incubation period for the Sendero Luminoso. During the military rule, leaders

attempted land reform, combined with establishment of an industrial base. The land reforms failed and inflation developed creating greater social injustice and economic crisis.⁶ Peru's standard of living today is one of the lowest in South America. Twelve million of Peru's 22 million people are estimated to be living in poverty, forming a recruiting ground for Sendero's forces.⁷

President Fujimori, elected in 1990, declared early in his presidency that he intended to adopt a strategy of law reforms and respect for human rights in his efforts to defeat the Sendero. His plan was to create social equalization--all citizens have an equal chance to advance and an equal share of the benefits and must acknowledge their equal obligations to the state. To win against the Sendero, the government must encourage, rather than suppress, the growing number of democratic forces that are willing to stand up to the terrorists. Fujimori has vowed to end the insurgency before his five-year term ends in July 1995.⁸

Although his plan is based upon democratic principles, Fujimori imposed military-backed, one-man rule by dissolving the Congress in April saying they were blocking his attempts to implement economic reform and a counterinsurgency strategy. Fujimori's government enjoyed recent success with the capture September 12, 1992 of

Abimael Guzman, the Sendero leader. His arrest, considered the harshest blow to the organization, has not stopped the violence and unless a national mobilization occurs the attacks will continue. More importantly, unless Fujimori attacks the root causes of poverty, social inequity, and political instability, new insurgent movements may arise.⁹

Assumptions

The assumption is that the government is in fact losing the counterinsurgency.

Limitations and Delimitations

Limitations are those constraints and restrictions beyond my control that impact upon this thesis. Travel to Peru is not possible during this study.

I am a non-Spanish speaker and therefore my research will be limited to English sources only.

I will limit the scope of my research to 1980-1991. I will not examine in detail the counterdrug campaign being waged by the Peruvian and the United States governments. However, I will discuss the coca farming as it relates to the economic organization and performance of the society. Additionally I will not cover United States national interests in Peru, except where it relates to the US

reduction of foreign aid and its effect on the Peruvian economy.

Significance of the Study

The end of the Cold War created a multipolar world with the emergence of the United States as the sole surviving superpower. Our future National Security Strategy will undoubtedly have to include methods for dealing with local and regional conflicts. The insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts in Peru could possibly serve as a framework for analysis of future counterinsurgencies and US counterdrug wars. Peru's loss could indicate where priorities should be placed in the development of an effective counterinsurgency operation and shed more light on why insurgencies are effective.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature search has revealed numerous publications on Peru and the Sendero Luminoso.

Several quality works provided information on social, economic, and political conditions within Peruvian society. Peru, A Country Study prepared by the Federal Research Division of Congress was the most comprehensive compilations of information about the country. A more in-depth analysis of socio-economic problems in Peru was presented in Hernando de Soto's book, The Other Path. De Soto analyzes the Peruvian government, its economic policies, and society's response to these policies through the creation of an informal economy.

Latin American Politics and Development, edited by Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline includes an essay by David Scott Palmer entitled, "Peru: Democratic Interlude, Authoritarian Heritage, Uncertain Future," which traces the country's societal development and difficulties to its colonial heritage.

Palmer also addresses the insurgent movement in his book, The Shining Path of Peru. Further information on the

insurgency appears in reports by the RAND Corporation authored by Gordon McCormick: "From the Sierra to the Cities" and "The Shining Path and the Future of Peru." Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano produced a current valuable study of the Sendero organization in Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism.

Several post graduate papers addressed the insurgent's and government strategies. Colonel Peter Rostron, of the United Kingdom, authored a paper in 1992 at the United States Army War College entitled, "Peru: Forum For a New United States Security Strategy," which provided an assessment of current insurgency-counterinsurgency strategy.

Many of the sources which address the insurgency also include information on the government response. One of the most valuable sources available for current information is a book, Shining Path, published by Simon Strong, a correspondent for the New York Times and The Independent. Strong who having lived in Lima provides an eyewitness account of the tragedy occurring in Peru.

A cross-reference of a source listed in a Fort Leavenworth Foreign Military Studies Office paper entitled "Peru, Sendero Luminoso and the Narcotrafficking Alliance" produced an English translation of President Alberto

Fujimori's 1990-1995 Counterinsurgency Plan published in the Lima magazine Que Hacer in August of 1991.

The computer access in the Combined Arms Research Library to the Reuter's Information Service provided detailed articles, especially on the occasion of Abimael Guzman's arrest in September of 1992.

Research Design

My committee chair recommended that I read War Cones to Long An by Jeffrey Race in order to obtain an unbiased account of revolution and counterrevolution in a Vietnamese province. It provided insight into how a revolutionary social movement, led by a communist party using the technique of people's war, rose to victory despite a government's efforts to stop them. It parallels the rise of the Sendero. Additionally, I studied Bard O'Neill's Insurgency and Terrorism which provides a systematic and very comprehensive format for analyzing and comparing insurgencies. The book includes a chapter on the government response to insurgent goals, strategies, and means.

I selected the analytical model in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. The framework found in Appendix C of this manual allowed me to focus on three categories: the society, the insurgency,

and the government. I then devoted a chapter to each of these three areas, formulating my research plan to analyze the insurgency in the context of Peruvian society and the counterinsurgency necessary to defeat it.

CHAPTER 3
THE NATURE OF THE SOCIETY

An analysis of the society of a country examines specific groups and their value systems, economic factors affecting those groups, the relationship of political groups to various social and economic groups, and the historical evolution of those groups as a product of the environment.

Social grouping in Peru reveals a distinct inter-relationship of occupation, ethnicity, economics, geography, and history. A study of classes in social forces in Howard Wiarda's Latin American Politics and Development defines Latin American society as "a two-class society of lords and peasants, elites and masses, even though there has always been a small middle class."¹ Peruvian society follows Wiarda's pyramidal societal model and divides along three broad categories: a small elite, a diverse and larger middle class, and a larger lower class. The society remains primarily oligarchic--with the wealth status and political power held by the elite.

The apex of the societal pyramid is held by approximately 15 percent of Peru's 21 million people.

These elites of society are of European ancestry and trace their heritage to the early Spanish colonialists. The middle class of Peru is not as easily racially defined. Approximately 38 percent of Peru's population are of mixed race, primarily of European-Indian descent, and are referred to as mestizos. Some sources refer to the mestizos as criollos, or whites. However, mestizos who are pure-blooded Indians which exist in this class status because they have disavowed their Indian heritage and adopted Western or modern ways of life are referred to as cholos.² Based upon this definition of ethnicity, mestizos fall into the middle or upper-lower class of Peruvian society.

There is little ambiguity in defining the ethnicity of Peru's lower class. There is a Sierra saying, "The Indian is the animal closest to man."³ The term "Indian" in Peru today has come to be equated with second-class citizens. To be an Indian is to be inferior. In spite of their glorious Inca past the Indian is stereotyped as drunken, superstitious, lazy, dirty, addicted to coca, and engaging in pagan religious practices. Although constituting the majority, 46 percent of the population, the Indians do not feel themselves to be a part of European Peru. This is a social division many of them feel satisfied with, isolated from mainstream society.

Ethnicity is defined geographically in Peruvian society. As Peru divides among three ethnic and socioeconomic classes, it also divides among three distinct geographic regions. The three distinct regions are the coastal desert (costa), the mountain region (sierra), and the tropical rain forest or selva region.

The costa region, comprised of 1400 miles of coastal strip along the Pacific Ocean and the western slope of the Andes, is primarily desert except for the oases created at the bottom of river valleys flowing from the Andes. The country's most productive agricultural land as well as its capital, Lima, lie in the mouths of these coastal valleys. The coastal area was the first region to be exploited by the Spanish colonialists for commercial agriculture. As a result of the Spanish acquisition of prime farmland in the coastal region, the resident Indian population declined to approximately two percent of the total population by the 17th century.⁴ This decline of the Indian population in this region was the combined result of the use of Indian males as laborers in the silver mines, epidemics of European diseases, and the flight of Indians to regions beyond the control of the Spaniards. Present-day coastal society is homogeneous in nature, more reflective of historical Spanish influence.

Although the Spaniards possessed an interest in the Sierra for its abundant mineral wealth, most of their resources were expended in developing the coast. Colonial policy created an elite class of Spanish landholders and a feudalistic system of land tenure. Hacienda society was organized around the landowner, the sharecropper, and the peasant. The sharecropper, or yanacóna, a Quechua term meaning landless class, rented the land. In return the landlord furnished water, seeds, capital, and farming implements. The sharecropper's collateral was the pledge of as much as 50 percent of the harvest to the landowner. Other hacienda systems required the Indian peon to work three to six days on the hacienda leaving only one to four days to till his own plot. Government reforms in the 20th century designed to help the the yanacóna overcome the abuses of the hacienda system, created a fourth class, wage laborers, who were hired as a response to the reforms. In some cases the hiring of wage laborers eliminated the sharecroppers.

Although the pattern of landownership on the coast served to create a powerful and wealthy elite, historical patterns of development also created other bases for wealth and power. Agribusiness provided opportunities for financial success in industry, banking and finance, internal marketing, and processing. Economic development

led to the growth of large urban centers on the coast. As early as 1940, massive numbers of Indians migrated to the cities in search of work and a means of upward social and economic mobility.⁵ This major shift of Peru's population to the large urban centers of Lima, Callao, Arequipa, and Trujillo has resulted in major societal changes. One source indicates that by 1979, two of every five Peruvians lived in a city of greater than 50,000 resulting in the overtaxing of educational, social, and health services.⁶

The Indians who migrated to the urban centers left from the Sierra, a region defined by the Andes mountain range. The Sierra region encompasses 26 percent of the territory of the country and consists of a high plateau which increases in elevation as it extends southward. Within the plateau are three mountain ranges interconnected by ridgelines which rise 1000 to 2000 meters above the level of the plateau. The highest section is the Cordillera Blanca where the highest peak, the Huascarán rises to 22,180 feet. The region is one of extremes in temperature, geography, and environment.

Hot house tropic climatic zones exist in the depths of gorges cut by rivers where altitudes quickly descend thousands of feet. These river valleys are well-irrigated level lands, at altitudes of approximately 4200 meters

above the gorges, can be used as pasturage. For this reason the Sierras' most densely inhabited regions exist in this arable land at altitudes from 2000 to 3400 meters above sea level. The region rises to a empty, grass covered temperate zone known as the puna and finally to the snow covered glaciers of the mountain peaks at altitudes exceeding 16,500 feet.

The Sierra was the cradle of civilization in South America, home of the Inca Empire. Cuzco, situated near Arequipa in a basin at 11,000 feet served as the Inca capital. In the Quechua language, Cuzco means navel and was so named to mark its position as the center of the empire. It is the descendant of the Inca, who today manages to exist in this demanding and extreme environment. Although the Indian of this region traces his ancestry to the Inca, there is both ethnic and regional diversity among the inhabitants of the region. Ethnicity is defined in the region by the language of the two main ethnic groups, Quechua and Aymara. Those who speak Spanish are considered either white or mestizo.

Ethnicity, or "Indian-ness," is also defined by increasing altitude. At altitudes greater than 4,000 meters the population is purely Indian, due largely to the Indian migration to avoid Spanish exploitation.

Regional diversity exists among the agricultural production of each zone. The lowest altitudes are reserved for tropical crops, to include coca production, while the inhabitants of the next zone produce cereal crops. Subsistence farming is found in the third highest zone, while the highest elevations are unsuitable for crops and instead lend themselves to livestock raising. The social system of the Sierra therefore mirrors these ecological regions. It is a mixture of peasant communities, haciendas, and small peasant landholdings.

The third and final, most eastern region of Peru is the Selva. It consists of the tropical rain forest of the Amazon River. Although 63 percent of the land area of Peru lies east of the Andes in the Selva region only 14 percent of the people manage to make their living there. Early Indian settlers first established small settlements on the river banks of the region. No great ruins of the Inca civilization have been found in the region and tribes inhabiting some of the area today are still quite primitive. The tropical forests of the region are too thick and waterlogged to permit any type of large scale agriculture and made the region unsuitable for Spanish exploitation. At one point in the 20th century, the region became a source of natural rubber which created Iquitos, no longer the boom town it once was. More recent discoveries

of oil in the region have not created major centers of production, although some population and commercial activity centers do exist on river banks throughout the area.

The most promising region of the selva is the western portion, the montana or the ceja de la montana the "eyebrow of the mountain," which consists of the valleys descending from the eastern slopes of the Andes. The montana is an area of rich tropics with some evidence of Inca civilization. This area, however, is somewhat isolated as the rain forest blocks eastward development, while the Andes hinder any development to the west. Various attempts have been made to develop the region for the agricultural production of bananas, sugar, cocoa, tea, and coffee. This is also the region where coca is cultivated. A hindrance has been the lack of the means to profitably export the crops to markets. Few roads connect this region to the west through the Sierra, and those that do follow the river valleys through high-altitude mountain passes which become impassable when flooded. Society in the region is based primarily on kinship. Two types of Indians live in the Selva, the nomadic river valley dwellers and the sedentary village inhabitants.

The country's diverse geography can be one explanation for Peru's economic and developmental

weaknesses. Extreme diversity in soil, climate, and altitude exists in the regions just described. These areas are capable of producing every type of agricultural crop and livestock. There are vast amounts of natural resources to include minerals, such as iron ore and oil and waters abundant in fish. The geographic segregation of regions by the Andes mountain chain has created three disjointed "countries" within a country. Therefore, the Selva is cut off, the coast with its cities and productive agricultural land has an unequal distribution of the population, and the Indian agrarian society of the Sierra is relatively unproductive.

Peru is the fourth largest country in Latin America (after Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico) with an area of 1.3 million square kilometers. Less than two percent of the land is cultivated to support the population of 21 million people. The integration of various groups into a productive cohesive economy have proved difficult. One-third of Peru's inhabitants live outside the market economy.⁷

Therefore, even though there is an abundance of natural resources, which should facilitate economic development, Peru is suffering from near economic collapse. Accelerating negative growth rates, hyperinflation, and depletion of foreign currency reserves

have spiraled the country into one of the highest per capita foreign debts in Latin America.

An analysis of Peru's economic decline must first explore what constitutes the economic base. The inherent strength of the economy lies in the diversity of the export economy. Foreign and domestic investors export mineral resources and produce cotton and woolen textiles, but employ less than two percent of the workforce.⁸ Peru had the capabilities to develop its own resources without the introduction of foreign capital. Most of the businesses belonged to European immigrants. These well-developed industries, to include silver, gold, and copper mining, were sold to outside investors in the early 1890s. The United States, with the purchase of the the Cerro de Pasco mine, brought \$9.5 million into the country which should have provided for economic expansion. However, rather than invest the money in the country, Peruvian mine owners took the money abroad and invested it elsewhere.⁹ Additional foreign investors continued to dominate the expansion of mining operations and by 1968, much of Peru's industry and mining was under the control of foreign capital.

To remedy the situation, the military regime used expropriation and by 1975, had acquired sugar estates, mining operations, petroleum rights, and all banks. Large

cooperatives were given exclusive rights to specific industries, but not without conditions favoring the government, such as the state ownership of 50 percent of the shares. Businesses would be run with the cooperation of established workers' councils and at the end of a specified period, ownership would be turned over to the state and the worker-stockholders. Locations of certain cooperatives were dictated, for example in areas away from Lima, to facilitate the development of other regions.¹⁰

The plan might have succeeded had the government not run out of money due to non-productive oil wells, a drop in fishing export profits, and the reduction of world sugar prices. The government's lack of capital was also attributed to insolvent government bonds, closing of foreign banks, and the high interest payments owed to foreign investors. The financial crises of this period required international negotiation to restructure outstanding debts to the expropriated companies in order to enable Peru to meet its financial obligations. In fact a 1974 World Bank loan was granted only on the condition that Peru would reimburse the expropriated companies. Total indebtedness continues to grow, with payments going primarily to interest on the debt. Large percentages of gross national product (GNP) and the balance of trade earnings must therefore go to debt repayment rather than

investment development of the country. Peru's debt exceeds \$8 billion, with 53 percent of export earnings going to debt repayment.¹¹

As the export earnings decrease, internal economic activity contracts with substantial continued increases in the external debt. During periods of contraction, housing starts, construction, and basic services decline as the demand from the manufacturing sector decreases. These fluctuations have excessive social costs. The urban poor employed in construction and service industries, whose salaries are already low by Peruvian standards, are affected the most by lack of jobs, layoffs, and high rates of inflation. Malnutrition is a consequence of the decline in the standard of living as families cut back on food in order to exist within their means.

Peru's malnutrition problems are also related to agricultural production. Peru is unable to feed her people. Although agriculture exists as a small percentage of the gross domestic product (less than 13 percent in 1978) it employs 42 percent of the labor force.¹² Agricultural production has stagnated since the 1960s, making Peru dependent on imports of foodstuffs. The import of basic foodstuffs has further compounded the country's external debt problems. Land use, agrarian reforms,

government intervention, and natural disasters have also contributed to the demise.

Less than 3 percent of Peru's land area is cultivated. The coast, inhabited by over one-half the population, contains 800,000 hectares of irrigated, fertile land centered in the mouths of river valleys. At one time, 80 percent of the land existed within 920 latifundios, a system of large landholdings owned by primarily Spanish descendants. This number decreased in 1968 through the implementation of government reforms which created cooperatives. Prior to 1967, portions of land were also devoted to the agribusiness industry, with their associated factories occupying available land area. The majority of the country's cultivated land, 2.3 million hectares, lies in the Sierra. Approximately 600,000 hectares lie in the Selva, where its productive development is hampered by the inability to export food to the west.¹³

The coast has historically been the most productive agricultural region of Peru. Irrigation is the key to productivity and government irrigation projects have been focused primarily in this region. Technologically advanced farming methods combined with irrigation have produced high yields of sugar cane, cotton, rice, vegetables, and fruits.

The Sierra has the smallest yields per cultivated acreage. Government irrigation projects have neglected the

small plots of the Sierra farmer. Most of the Sierra inhabitants are landless or farm small plots under three acres using primitive farming methods. The yields of these plots are barely large enough to support the owners and their families. To provide for a family of four it is thought to require at least 12.5 acres. The inefficiency of the region could be improved through land redistribution and educational methods backed by an adequate system of government credit for the small landowners, irrigation and technical assistance, and fair market pricing of produce.

This is not to say that agricultural reform has not been attempted by the Peruvian government to effect more equitable distribution of wealth while also enhancing agricultural production. Agricultural reform began as early as the 1920s when the country's urban middle class and business groups attempted land redistribution as a means of promoting commercial agriculture. By expropriating small latifundios, they attempted to expand production by turning over ownership of the land to industrious tenants. By the 1930s, political parties, such as the APRA or Alianza Popular Party, began to push for secure tenancy agreements for landowners in an effort to disband the hacienda system. The movement was met by strong resistance by the landowners. In the 1940s the landowners sold out to avoid expropriation, dividing the

land into parcels and selling plots to peasants who could afford to purchase the land. Those peasants who could not afford to buy the land accelerated the decline of the haciendas by organized rebellion concentrating upon localized protests and petitions to ownership of land. Nonviolent occupations of haciendas occurred until the 1960s, when the protests took a more organized and violent turn.

In 1964, an Agrarian Reform Law was enacted with the objective of dividing feudal estates among the workers to farm and modernize. Tenants and full-time wage earners, backed by part-time laborers, seized estates from absentee owners. The law's provisions were complex and included numerous exclusions and exceptions. Enforcement of the law was both costly and difficult to administer. Political opponents of the program reduced the funds and many peasants were still left landless.¹⁴

By 1968, the military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado was determined to end civil unrest and shift the power of sole ownership of land out of the hands of the elite. There were few exceptions in the reform law demonstrated by the military's expropriation of even commercial estates. Owners were paid cash, bonds, or shares of stock in state-owned industries. The bonds could be converted to cash if invested in new industrial plants.

The military regime hoped to not only improve the rural areas of the country but also facilitate urban renewal. The government also established cooperative farms, governed by administrative councils responsible to the government. The councils consisted of larger property owners, former full-time wage earners, and tenants on the estates. A shortfall of the program was that once again the part-time wage earners were not represented. Additional problems of the reform included: the landowners stripped the estate of livestock and equipment, full-time laborers were declared part-time workers so as not to share in the benefits of the expropriation, parcels were distributed to relatives rather than to the cooperatives, and the reform did nothing for the greater than 300,000 minifundistas, landowners of small landholdings, and greater than 600,000 landless.¹⁵ The management councils wanted to hire as few outside laborers as possible in order to maximize profits. New owners of the land became disgruntled over the lack of government agricultural services available, lack of fertilizer and irrigation programs, and low prices for crops. As a result the landowners created more export crops increasing Peru's need to import food. Investment in agriculture was difficult to obtain, and with the expropriation of major estates, foreign investors and former landowners withdrew capital from state-owned banks. Any available loans went

to larger, productive estates. Workers under the old system had their own livestock and small plots of land but were now expected to participate in the government established cooperatives with little or no economic benefit.

Additionally, tensions mounted between the workers and wealthy villagers who shared in benefits of the cooperatives although not required to physically participate.

The successes of the program were that by 1977, farms greater than 70 acres in the mountains and 120 acres on the coast had been redistributed, 80,000 workers received one quarter of the 46 million acres in Peru devoted to agriculture and 3 million acres of pasture, 275,000 village families no longer had to pay rent or access to pasture and a total of 20 percent of the rural population benefited in land redistribution. Additional benefits of the program included 50,000 families receiving salaries two to three times greater than before and were able to share in the government established services such as schools and medical care.¹⁶ The military reforms had succeeded in removing landlords and the traditional source of sole landowning power and influence in politics but failed to equitably redistribute that power among other members of the society.

By 1981, the hacienda was gone but in its place were the cooperatives that were plagued by lack of capital, administrative experience, and government support. The cooperatives became the target of peasant resentment. The governments of Fernando Belaunde Terry (1980-1985) and Alan Garcia Perez (1985-1990) also attempted to carry out land redistribution programs. The cooperatives became no more than collections of small landholdings. Larger commercial farmers reduced or totally stopped production and the agricultural wage fell from \$1.20 a day in 1982 to \$.50 in 1985.¹⁷

The social conflict of landownership in the aftermath of failed government reforms is largely responsible for the mass migration of rural poor to the cities transforming the society of Peru from an agricultural to an urban society. During the aforementioned periods, 1930-1980s, of land reform the population of the capital city of Lima multiplied by 7.6 times. The number of migrants increased from 300,000 in 1940 to 1,900,000 in 1981.¹⁸ Increased birth rates and lower infant mortality rates also added significantly to urban population growth rate.

This phenomenon of migration is not totally due to failed land reforms but other "push-pull factors" as well. The population is pushed from the land as a result of

droughts, rural poverty, mechanization of the farming industry, and inability of existing land to support family size. The pull factors of Lima and other cities include: the building of highways facilitating migration, the development of mass media publicizing the opportunities of the city, available land, and lower infant mortality rates in the urban centers. The availability of higher wages, semi-skilled workers triple their wages, salary earners quadruple their wages, and professional workers earn six times the existing wages in the Sierra; educational opportunities; and the city as the center of political decisionmaking also served to alter the society of Lima and the country.¹⁹

Lima's rapid growth caused national problems as the city attempted to deal with migration void of urban planning. The influx of new workers outpaced the capacity of the urban economy's ability to provide jobs.²⁰ Many of the plans were aimed at keeping the rural population rural rather than assimilating the migrants into society. Migrants were barred from legally established social and economic services--access to housing, education, businesses, and jobs. In order to compensate for the government's inadequacy and to survive, the migrants conducted illegal activities to achieve legal objectives. The migrants established squatter settlements

by seizing land on the outskirts of Lima. The inhabitants of the illegal slums created their own self-help community development programs, organized allocated land, and provided basic services to inhabitants. The pueblos jóvenes, young towns, improved as resources became available, provided low-income housing, and fulfilled needs the government was unable to provide. The age of the settlement is reflected in establishment of utilities, schools and health centers and to the point where settlements have evolved into officially recognized districts.²¹

Economically, the growth of cities led to new types of employment for migrants unable to find employment elsewhere. This informal economy created in service and retail sectors provides little job security for the employees but again compensates for government barriers. The social organization of Peru is based upon mercantilism --"the belief that the economic welfare of the State can only be secured by government regulation of a nationalist character."²² It is a system where the government of the state depends upon elite groups which in turn are sustained by state privileges. In order to survive, the informal non-elitists of society create housing, trade, and mass transit industries outside the laws of the government. The amount of resources and productivity expended to overcome

mercantilist oppression is a potential which the government has failed to tap and serves to weaken the government's democratic process.

The threat to the government's legitimacy has not resulted in the government's ability to offer a viable alternative. From a historical perspective the Peruvian government, whose democracy remains challenged by authoritarian rule and preservation of the oligarchy, has possessed numerous variables for influencing the development of revolutionary potential. The history of the state has been ruled by military or military-backed regimes. Alan Garcia's election in 1985, marked the first time in forty years that one elected official passed the executive office to another.²³

One of the country's most influential political parties developed from the nationalist and socialist movement occurring in 1920's based upon the teachings of Manuel Gonzalez Prada. Two young intellectuals, Jose Carlos Mariategui and Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, influenced by Prada's reformist philosophy founded a movement known as the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), APRA or People's Party.²⁴ The party's programs, aimed at giving the Indian greater significance in society, became the voice of the oppressed: anti-imperialist,

anticapitalist, and anti-United States.²⁵ APRA's reformist ideology and ability to organize created a united front of intellectuals, middle-class, and workers and appealed to the Indians of Peru. Mariategui and Haya de la Torre parted ways over philosophical differences with Haya de la Torre emerging as the movement's sole leader in a 1931 attempt at becoming the elected president of Peru.²⁶ Although defeated, Haya de la Torre continued to mobilize support for the Apristas.

Peruvian governments oppressed the efforts of the APRA and denied the movement recognition as a genuine political power even though the party prevented the emergence of a more radical alternative.²⁷ Finally in 1945, the Apristas shared power in a government they had supported at the polls. When the government was overthrown in 1948 by a military coup, the Apristas were driven underground, and Haya de la Torre was forced into exile.²⁸

In 1956, Manuel Prado won a second term as president with the support of the APRA. Later, Haya, was victorious, winning open elections in 1962. The election was not won by a clear majority. No candidate in the 1962 election received the required one third of the vote, although Haya had 33 percent, followed by Belaunde's 32 percent, and Odría's, the former dictator, 28 percent. The election

went to Congress for resolution, however, in order to ensure his victory, Haya offered his support to Odria. The deal provoked a military coup and split the APRA. The army continued to obstruct the election of APRA in 1963 and 1968, but never fully eradicated the party's appeal to the masses. It continues to organize party schools, head unions, cooperatives, and universities. Strongest in northern Peru, the APRA remains an influential power.²⁹

The Accion Popular (AP), Popular Action Party, founded in 1956, was based upon popular cooperation and action for the reformation of Peru. A period of social mobilization occurred during the 1960s as a result of the development of agricultural capitalism and the disintegrating influence of the old land-owning elite. When AP's candidate, Fernando Belaunde Terry, won the presidential election in 1963, the expectations of the masses were focused on Belaunde's vision of the need for "Peru's own Conquest."³⁰

Belaunde's political philosophy was not very different from that of the APRA--both parties agreed that Peru's social ills could be cured through agrarian reform, economic development, schools, housing, and improved communications.³¹ Both parties had the support of the middle and working class, and the political climate which emerged consisted of a delicate balance between two

political blocs of relatively equal strength. The AP controlled the executive branch and was supported by the military while the APRA in opposition held the majority in congress. The resultant congressional gridlock, created by the APRA forces in congress that were supported by the Odristas (those loyal to previous dictator General Manuel Odría) in coalition with conservatives and landowners, succeeded in delaying many of Belaunde's proposed reforms.³²

Belaunde was initially successful in carrying out some reforms in spite of the lack of congressional support. In 1963, municipal elections were held as promised and a critical agrarian reform act was passed in 1964.³³ International relations improved as a means of providing economic assistance for planned development programs. Foreign governments who viewed Peru as a profitable field for their investments perhaps contributed to Peru's economic collapse as Belaunde's foreign debts mounted.³⁴ A major catalyst of the President's removal from office was Peru's protest of Belaunde's dealings in 1968 with the International Petroleum Company, a Standard Oil subsidiary. Belaunde exercised negotiation versus expropriation and was viewed by his fellow Peruvians as overgenerous in cancelling the company's tax arrears.³⁵

Belaunde made little attempt to challenge the increasing power of congress, thus creating a fear in the military that APRA would win the next scheduled election in 1968.³⁶ Economic decline, Belaunde's perceived incompetency to govern, and the military's required mobilization against the rising threat of insurgency precipitated the October 1968 coup when tanks of the Peruvian army broke down the palace gates and the military forcibly removed the president.³⁷

General Juan Velasco Alvarado, chairman of the Joint Armed Forces Command, became president and appointed an all-military cabinet in an attempt to return the country to a state of national dignity. The military Docenio ("twelve year rule" 1968-1980) was founded upon an ideology that included social solidarity, a worker managed economy, participatory social democracy, and programs of national development.³⁸ Its first reform was the expropriation of International Petroleum Company's oil fields.³⁹ From this point, the military through the use of discipline and force, initiated numerous reforms based upon a rapid expansion of government influence and control. The resultant failure of the first phase of the Docenio's programs was due to three major factors. The government's ambitious reforms hinged on economic growth and failed to succeed in the spiraling economic decline of the country.

Secondly, much of the military's decision making was conducted in secret, without support of the populace, thereby creating an increase of mistrust of the government. General Velasco's illness, in 1973, created a leadership void and disunity in the military and a marked inability to continue with the regime's programs.⁴⁰

The main achievements accomplished during Phase I were a break from traditional oligarchic rule, a shift to a state-controlled economy, and improvements in international relations. The authoritarian "revolution from above" did little, however, to improve the perceived relative deprivation of Peruvian society.⁴¹

Phase II of the Docenio occurred on August 29, 1975, when Velasco was removed from power by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. Morales Bermudez planned to consolidate the reforms of Phase I and proceed with a less radical approach to unify both the military and the country.⁴² Phase II faced, in 1977, with continuing economic and political pressures represented a gradual withdraw of the military from the political scene, a return to civilian rule, and a failure to achieve its reformist objectives.⁴³

The elected civilian administration in 1980 of Belaunde, ousted in 1968 in part due to over a 30 percent inflation rate and a \$700 million debt, now faced a 60

percent inflation rate and an \$8.4 billion debt.⁴⁴

Belaunde's administration was also faced with the increased level of violence attributed to Sendero Luminoso and the TUPAC Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). These combined economic and political difficulties weakened Belaunde's popular support and resulted in a marked shift to the left as evidenced by APRA's success in the 1985 elections.⁴⁵

The election of APRA president Alan Garcia in 1985 marked the first time in 40 years that one elected official followed another. The Garcia government's economic reforms began by further nationalizing industries and creating an economic model which actually resulted in a brief period of economic recovery.⁴⁶ Garcia's most radical reform for domestic economic stimulation was his 10 percent limit (of annual export earnings) toward international debt repayment.⁴⁷ This short-term program had devastating long-term effects, when more capital went out in debt repayment than came back in new loans.⁴⁸ Economics were further affected by Garcia's announcement of the nationalization of domestic banks. The weakened economic conditions eroded public confidence in the administration and served to accelerate the insurgency.⁴⁹ Garcia's popularity declined to less than 15 percent, inflation rates totalled 2,178,434 percent during his five-year term, and rumors of a military coup d'etat were prevalent.⁵⁰

Instead, a virtual unknown, Alberto Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, of the self-proclaimed Cambio 90 (Change 90) Party won a landslide victory in the 1990 elections.⁵¹

Fujimori ran a racist campaign. As a non-white, non-bureaucratic member of a non-tested party, Fujimori appealed to the Indian population as a voice for social and economic change.⁵² Upon assuming office in 1990, Fujimori resumed full debt payments as a method of reintegrating Peru into the international economy. He also attempted a shock effort through the application of free-market and land reforms to energize the country's failed economy.⁵³

Fujimori's most radical move occurred on April 5, 1992, when he suspended congress and the judiciary and assumed emergency powers with the support of the military in a self-coup (autogolpe).⁵⁴ Fujimori accused the congress he disbanded of stifling his efforts to implement tough anti-guerrilla measures against the Sendero.⁵⁵ His move attained a 70 to 85 percent popular support rating, while internationally it was viewed as a means of undermining the democratic process. Fujimori's future success will be measured by how well he can reform the social and economic conditions of Peru, ward off a military coup, or worst-case, a Sendero victory.

An analysis of Peruvian society has revealed that the country is an insurgent's dream and provides textbook examples of the accelerators necessary to mobilize the population against the government. The accelerators include economic crisis, lack of regime legitimacy, racial problems between segments of the population, human rights abuses, lack of infrastructure, and a large rural area geographically isolated from and neglected by the ruling elites.

After five to six years of 5000 percent average inflation, the population has lost what little faith they had in the central government. The historical social stratification, reinforced by these economic conditions has fed popular discontent, turning the "hearts and minds" of the people toward an alternative - the Sendero, and limited the level and scope of the government's counterinsurgency efforts.

There is a history of conflict, both racial and geographical, which can be explained by one or more of the following: urban-rural, coastal-interior, center-periphery, and White-Mestizo-Indian. Centuries of isolation of the Andean highlands and the eastern jungle regions of the country cannot be corrected without a viable economy to support massive reforms. These racial and social stratifications, created by government neglect,

explain in part the ineffectiveness of the government's psychological operations programs in countering the Sendero propaganda.

The Peruvian military has historically been the principal pressure group in the society. Traditionally it has been in the service of the government, defending it externally and preventing internal rise of its adversaries. The Peruvian government has been too willing to turn the counterinsurgency over to the military in an attempt to solve militarily what is both a military and political problem. As a result, violence has beget violence, violating the population's basic human rights.

The nature of the society, therefore, is the foundation or basis for understanding the insurgency's agenda and counterinsurgency efforts of the government. The various groups within Peruvian society who feel deprived of life's basic necessities present exploitative potential to the Sendero, and more importantly, blame the government for their sad state of affairs.

CHAPTER 4
THE NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY

The major threat to the internal security and democracy of Peru is the Sendero Luminoso, founded in 1970 by Abimael Guzman Reynoso (also known as Comrade Gonzalo or Presidente Gonzalo), a professor at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayacucho.¹

The roots of the movement are imbedded in the development of Peru's Communist Party. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, opposition to colonialism, traditionalism, and clericalism became the formative basis for the ideology of liberal publicist Manuel Gonzalez Prada (1840-1918).² His message was that feudalism must be destroyed and the Indians made to rise up against their masters.³ Two of Prada's students had a major impact on the modernization and reformation of Peruvian society. One, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, created the American Popular Revolutionary Party (APRA) while the other, Juan Carlos Mariategui chose the path of Marxism.⁴ Mariategui did not initially condone bloody revolution as an immediate solution, but rather taught a gradual rebuilding of the old system of cooperative labor.

as this program would enhance the status of the Indian. Mariategui viewed government assistance as an integral part of the plan through the implementation of rural education programs and the introduction of modern farming methods.⁵ In 1928, Mariategui founded the Socialist Party of Peru, whose ideology, now shifting from peaceful change, espoused a peasant and Indian revolution as a means of ensuring national development.

Soon after Mariategui's death in 1930, the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) emerged from the Socialist Party. The Communist Party's historical pattern of splitting into various factions eventually gave rise to the Shining Path. In 1964, the Communist Party fractured into two major factions aligned with the Sino-Soviet split of 1963. The pro-Chinese Maoist PCP-Red Flag (Bandera Roja) and the pro-Moscow majority's ideological differences were over the emphasis assigned to "armed struggle." The pro-Moscow faction sought a peaceful solution to Peru's problems while the pro-Chinese faction followed the doctrine of Mao's protracted popular war. The Red Flag declared that the revolution would originate in the countryside through the mobilization of the peasantry, commit itself to armed struggle, and move victorious in the final encirclement of Lima, and the eventual collapse of the state.⁶

After travelling to China in 1965 to observe the Maoist Cultural Revolution, Guzman joined Red Flag's Regional Committee in Ayacucho. Guzman stood out as an intellect and mentor, a charismatic leader clearly able to influence others, specifically his students. His position in the university lent credibility to his teachings of the scientific concept of society, downplaying the promised utopia of religion. As one student stated, "He washed your brains, he cleaned your thoughts when confused; he clarified problems, he had an answer for everything."⁷ His efforts were focused upon one premise, "The only thing which interests me in life is to bring about revolution in Peru."⁸

As the chief strategist, spiritual head, and leader of his followers, Guzman set his mobilization plan into action. He learned the Quechua language, conducted socio-economic studies among the poorer peasants of Ayacucho, and created a school of practical studies in the peasant communities for his students.⁹ Guzman's status in the university increased with his appointment as head of planning, head of university personnel, and finally head of Ayacucho's teacher's union. Through his establishment of a radical faculty, Guzman exercised control over the students, who in turn became teachers themselves, thus building a core of political activists.¹⁰

The first test of Guzman's organization came in 1969. General Juan Velasco passed a law (Decree 006) which threatened to limit free public access to secondary schools. Education is significant to the Indians who view it as the only means of upward mobility in order to attain lower middle class status. The government decree sparked a wave of strikes and violence with Guzman at the helm. The public response was so great that the military repealed the decree. Guzman was jailed, accused of inciting the attacks, but he had won his first major victory.¹¹

The violent victory also resulted in a split among the factions within the Peruvian Communist Party-Red Flag. By 1970, Guzman's faction which believed in violence to achieve reforms, broke from the PCP and designated their movement the "Communist Party of Peru in the Shining Path of Mariategui" (Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui). Following the teachings of Mao Zedong and Juan Carlos Mariategui, the movement's name is derived from Mariategui's, Seven Essays of Peruvian Reality, which includes the statement that "Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution."¹²

Guzman, who within the organization is considered the "Fourth Sword of Marxism" (after Marx, Lenin, and Mao) continued to mobilize support for Shining Path by

personally training the initial leadership. The placement of the trained cadre into the rural areas of Ayacucho to indoctrinate and recruit within the Indian villages, while marrying into and becoming part of the villages themselves, lent credibility and legitimacy to the new organization.¹³

There are several reasons for the initial success of the movement in Ayacucho. First, the cadre followed the leadership and vision of one individual without question. Second, most followers came from the university environment of San Cristobal de Huamanga, which was controlled by fellow Communists and provided a setting for persistent, unopposed teachings of Maoist thought. The students then provide assistance to the local population in line with educational programs designed to facilitate regional development. Third, the local populace was more attuned at this time to community and regional activities in light of the absence of state involvement, accelerated by the relative decline in government expenditures in the region to less than one percent after 1970. Fourth, the negative effects of the military government's agrarian reforms during this period further isolated Ayacucho.¹⁴

Guzman continued to mobilize popular support during the 1970s constructing his theory of revolution and further indoctrinating his followers. Despite the claim to

be a Maoist based, peasant revolution, most of the upper and middle-level leadership is drawn from the middle class, with the rank and file composed of a cross section of rural poor and unemployed urban fringes of society.

By the late 1970s, Guzman, now known as Comrade Gonzalo, moved underground in preparation for implementing the revolutionary strategy of the "popular war." The war, composed of five stages, has the ultimate objective of creating the new state of Peru. Although the strategy possesses five phases, it clearly is a modification of Mao's strategy of protracted popular warfare.

Bard O'Neill's book Insurgency and Terrorism describes Maoist strategy as consisting of three sequential phases, each differing in respect to the correlation of forces and the outcome of the preceding phase. The first phase is the strategic defensive, the time when the enemy is on the offensive and the insurgents must concentrate on survival, political organization, and low-level violence. As the insurgents achieve success through effective mobilization of popular support, they move to the second phase, the strategic stalemate. Guerilla warfare is the most critical activity of this phase, designed to isolate the people from the government through violence and armed resistance. This stage is characterized by an expansion of the organization and regions they control. Success in

this phase is marked by a transition to mobile-conventional warfare and the initiation of the third and final stage, the strategic offensive. The principal military objective of this phase is to destroy, through the use of regular forces, the government's main forces and effect the collapse of the state.¹⁵

Phase one of the Shining Path's five phased plan to achieve the New Democratic Republic occurred in the 1970-1980 time frame. Entitled, "Agitation and Propaganda," its aim was to mobilize the population by raising class consciousness and calling attention to the inequalities of wealth, status, and power. Phase two, "Sabotage and Guerrilla Action," conducted during the 1980-1983 period, was designed to destroy Peru's socioeconomic system by attacking the symbols of the state and supporting revisionist elements. Guerrilla action was directed against property belonging to the state and large companies. It anticipated gaining support among the impoverished populace by wreaking havoc upon an already devastated economy. Revolutionary violence plays a prominent role during phase three, "Generalized Violence and Guerrilla Warfare." This phase, which began in 1983, focuses upon the further use of violence and terror to gain support for Sendero throughout the country. Success in this phase creates the need to establish support bases to

further expand the security network of the movement. Therefore the fourth phase is titled, the "Conquest and Expansion of Support Bases." In order to achieve the new society the final phase is entitled "The Fall of the Cities and Total Collapse of the State." The success of this phase will occur through unified support of the rural population, surrounding and isolating the cities, and the subsequent collapse of Peru.¹⁶ Here Guzman strays from the Maoist definition of rural revolution to account for the distinct differences of 1990 Peruvian urban society versus the rural society of revolutionary China in the 1930-1940 time period by including a popular uprising in the cities, especially Lima, as the last step in his strategy.¹⁷

Sendero's force structure designed to accomplish the five-phased plan is thought to be a highly centralized organization for strategic and political decisionmaking, but one that allows for decentralized execution due to communications constraints. The insurgency is a hierarchial intellectually based organization which operates on three distinct levels: national, regional, and local. These layers are further subdivided into sections, cells, and committees.¹⁸

At the national level is the National Central Committee comprised of Guzman (at least until his capture

in 1992) and a small core of advisors. It is this directorate which establishes ideology, strategy, and policy for the organization. At the next level are six regional committees: Southern (Cusco, Tacna, Puno), Eastern (Ucayali, Huanuco, San Martin), Northern (Ancash, Libertad, Lambayeque), Central (Junin and Pasco), Primary (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac), and Metropolitan (Lima and Callao). Each regional command is responsible for carrying out the directives of the Central Committee; establishing bases, recruitment, building local support; and planning and carrying out local operations within the boundaries of the regions.¹⁹ The regions are further broken into zones, sectors, and cells with their own military detachments.

The military arm of the party, the EGP (The People's Guerrilla Army) is organized into three main levels: The Fuerza Principal (Main Force), Fuerzas Locales (Local Forces), and Fuerzas de Apoyo (Support Forces). This organization parallels Mao's description of orthodox forces, combat groups (by region), and self-defense units in Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare).²⁰

As in Mao's concept the Main Force or orthodox force operates throughout the country and is made up of the most ideologically trained, hard core activists. The Local or regional combat forces operate within a specific region or

department. They are not as well trained or armed as the Main Force. The Support Forces are self-defense forces which respond when given the order to assemble for an operation.²¹

The Sendero organization is also subdivided into five decreasing levels of support for the movement. At the top of the pyramid is the Central Committee composed of Guzman and his top lieutenants, followed by the regional commanders responsible for military activities within their zone, the militants which compose the Popular Guerrilla Army, the activists who educate and mobilize the population, and finally the sympathizers who provide support and possess interest in Sendero ideology.²²

Additional support is provided to the movement through various organizations under the general title of People's Revolutionary Defense Movement. These organizations, located in Lima, include the Laborers and Workers' Class Movement, Popular Peasant Movement, Popular Aid of Peru, and various other grassroots organizations which are designed to provide assistance and service to the insurgency.²³ The political arm of the party is present in other selected areas through the establishment of Popular Committees. When enough Popular Committees exist in an area, a support base can be declared.

Party ideology, strictly adhered to by the organization, could best be described as a synthesis of the work of Mao and the native socialism of Jose Carlos Mariategui. Guzman borrowed the Maoist view of reality, based upon the central role of the peasantry and rural-based revolution, and adapted it to the social and political reality of Peru.²⁴ Guzman added his own interpretation of Chinese Marxism with Andean traditions which in context presents a purely Peruvian ideology.²⁵ It follows Mariategui's theory that the foundations of Peruvian socialism can be traced to the Inca civilization, destroyed by Spanish colonialists and since repressed by the ruling elites.

Sendero traditionally has not asked for nor received external support. With little outside assistance, the movement has been able to maintain its strength and remain essentially an internal phenomenon.²⁶ Guzman states that communist movements in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China strayed from the original teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao and challenges them to return to the truth and away from revisionist practices.²⁷ Sendero does maintain a propaganda apparatus based primarily in Europe (Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Greece, and England) and also in factions of the US Communist Party. In the 1980s, seized documents also indicated a Bolivian Committee of Support to

the Revolution in Peru (CSRP). These factors all indicate the understanding of breaking from traditional isolationist policies and enlisting external support for the revolution.²⁸

The significance of Peru to United States foreign policy is the country's status as the world's major producer of cocaine.²⁹ Narcoterrorism, the relationship of drug producers and terrorist insurgents, is a common phenomenon in all coca and cocaine-producing countries in South America.³⁰ The association exists in other Latin American countries because both sides share a common interest in the destabilization of the government. The more crucial link, however, is in monetary benefits, i.e., terrorists involvement in narcotrafficking and use of earned funds to supplement insurgent activities within the country. The association is difficult to prove, specifically in the case of Peru, because both principals are operating outside the law.

Coca, used to manufacture cocaine, flourishes in the Upper Huallaga Valley, located on the eastern slopes of the Peruvian Andes. The chewing of coca leaves dates back to Inca times, when the effects were believed to bestow euphoria and mystical powers.³¹ The Spanish did learn that the chewing of coca leaves staved off hunger, and began providing it as a food substitute to the Indians

working in the gold and silver mines. In modern Peru the cultivation of coca serves as a means to stave off poverty. According to President Fujimori, approximately 5 percent of the population depend on coca growing for their livelihood.³² Business International's economic profile of Peru estimates that as of 1989, approximately 200,000 hectares were devoted to coca cultivation.³³ Conservative estimates place export earnings at \$7.24 billion annually or approximately 20 percent of the legitimate GNP.³⁴ According to US Drug Enforcement Administration reports, Peru produces 80 percent of the coca entering the United States as cocaine.³⁵

The magnitude of these figures support the government's counterinsurgency plan. It serves as a means of supporting a depressed economy, but more importantly it serves as a source of economic aid from the United States in its commitment to fight the war on illegal drugs.³⁶ The economic aid and US intervention, however, serves to fuel Sendero propaganda such as that found in a June 1990 article in El Diario that the US is using cocaine trafficking as a means to intervene against Peru supporting further "Yankee imperialism."³⁷

Shining Path has also benefited from the government's antidrug efforts as evidence of corruption among the police and government officials attempting to

eradicate the crop surfaced.³⁸ Army units sent into the UHV to fight the Sendero, allowed coca growing to continue to win the support of the peasants. Sendero has won support of the coca growers, especially when the government has failed to provide agricultural and economic alternatives. Additionally, it has improved its status in the peasant's eyes as protection from both the brutal drug barons and the government's antidrug squads.³⁹

The connection between drug money and arms for the Sendero has yet to be proven.⁴⁰ There are no outward signs of wealth among Shining Path members. Captured Sendero weapons are all those used by Peruvian military or security forces. It is presumed that if Sendero is benefitting financially from the drug trade, the money is being used to finance daily activities, or it is deposited in overseas banks, and is therefore impossible to trace.⁴¹ The impact of the connection is not only for tracing Sendero funding, but more importantly the connection's effect on US foreign policy towards Peru and continued economic aid.

Sendero also garners strength from the United States through the manipulation of human rights organizations. Sendero's violence and the government's inability to administer justice and maintain order resulted in a downward spiral where violence increased on both sides,

affecting the government's already weak position. America's Watch, established in 1981, to monitor human rights in Latin America has revealed that more than one-half of Peru's citizens live under a state of emergency, lacking basic protection against arrest, incarceration, or extrajudicial execution by armed and police forces or paramilitary groups. US support of Peru's counter-insurgency efforts cut \$10 million in aid to the army in a call for the Peruvian government to account for human rights abuses in dealing with Sendero.⁴² Fujimori countered, labeling America's Watch and Amnesty International as organizations interested only in defense of the human rights of the terrorists.⁴³

Sendero is also guilty of human rights abuses, using terror to establish and maintain control and as their primary tactic to effect the destruction of the Peruvian state. The group was credited in 1990, with over 1500 murders, of which fewer than 200 were police or military personnel.⁴⁴

Having built a base of support at the University of Huamanga and surrounding Ayacucho, Sendero first employed the violence tactic in 1980. On the eve of the country's return to democratic elections on May 17, 1980, Sendero launched an attack against polling places in Ayacucho, destroying ballot boxes.⁴⁵ Further attacks occurred over

the next few months throughout the department against targets, all state related, such as police stations, government offices, and nationally sponsored development projects.⁴⁶

Sendero's next tactic was the employment of "people's trials" to punish by execution landowners, money lenders, and corrupt officials. The trials resulted in executions of cattle thieves as early as 1981 in the town of Chuschi. The executions were significant because the thieves were from a neighboring village and played upon age-old animosities between the two communities. Support of the executions was widespread.⁴⁷ By 1983, violence had escalated and had spread throughout many regions of the Sierra, especially in those areas historically neglected by the government. Sendero moved into the villages, created "zones of liberation" and proliferated further violence by rounding up local administrators, community leaders, and non-supporters, and conducting trials and executions for crimes against the people.⁴⁸

In the mid-1980s, as a move toward its final objective of Lima, Sendero modified its tactics to include the infiltration of the shantytowns surrounding the capital.⁴⁹ The change in tactics not only supported attainment of the final objective of Lima and preparation for popular uprising, but also coincided with the country's

accelerating urban migration. The urban targets are selected to enhance the movement's legitimacy at home and abroad, and through the press coverage, point out the government's inability to suppress their actions.

Sendero has proven to be adaptable to specific government responses. The impression that "the revolution has a thousand eyes and ears" indicates that a fully mobilized intelligence apparatus is in place to anticipate the state's actions.⁵⁰ Assassination targets are selected, not only for their prominence, but also for their involvement in the counterinsurgency efforts.⁵¹ Sendero's targets continue to include various symbols of the government: infrastructure, power lines, bridges, and government officials who get in the way of creating the New Democratic Republic.

The exact size of the organization is not known and estimates of strength range anywhere from 3,000 to 6,000, with 50,000 to 60,000 sympathizers.⁵² Sendero emphasizes the recruitment of the disaffected young, Quechua-speaking Indians, who view Sendero as a vehicle for change.⁵³ Recruitment is a methodical process, difficult to infiltrate, due to the movement's ability to foster cohesion, copaternity, kinship, peer pressure, and organizational identity.⁵⁴ Women's participation in the movement is viewed as a means for feminist liberation, as

women play an extremely important role in the organization. They are assigned the most violent of terrorist missions as a means of proving themselves within the Sendero.⁵⁵

The recruitment and training process follows a lengthy indoctrination process where the prospective candidate must establish himself at the lower tiers of the the organization. The process involves hands-on experience under the leadership of the more senior members, reinforces ideology, and promotes a sense of belonging. The system serves to strengthen the ideological foundation and generate future leaders of the organization.⁵⁶

Sendero is winning its insurgency campaign. Generally characterized as a Maoist organization, it has demonstrated its ability to adapt in not only the rural areas of Peru, but also in the cities. Its strength lies in its cohesiveness as an organization, with centralized, intellectual development of ideology and decentralized execution of its tactical operations.

Using terror as a primary tactic it has developed a mass following among the disgruntled elements of the population, focusing upon the ethnic inequalities and socioeconomic problems of the country.

Sendero has managed to progress to its last and final stage of its ideology practically unopposed.

Sendero is now active in twenty-one of Peru's twenty-four departments with more than fifty percent of the population existing in government emergency zones which serve to restrict their basic human rights. The cost to the government has exceeded billions of dollars and burdened the country's already crippled economy.

Sendero is a political party which provides political answers to the problems in Peruvian society and a clear strategy for the country's future. Its success is attributed to the government's historical inability to provide a viable alternative.

CHAPTER 5

THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The national aim of the Peruvian government is to defeat the Sendero insurgency and to protect the national identity of the country. The current strategy to achieve that goal is based upon the principle that there is both a military and political solution to the insurgency.¹ President Fujimori remains committed to defeating the insurgency by 1995, having outlined a series of programs to achieve that goal.

The military Campaign Plan drafted by the Joint Command, an advisory group made up of the chiefs of staff of the three services, is being implemented by the armed forces, National Police which includes the government's counterterrorism office (DIRCOTE), and civilian defense organizations. The plan's objective is to protect key political targets and engage the Sendero in the field.² The armed forces will fight the insurgents in the emergency zones of Huamanga, Mantaro, Huallaga, Ucayali, and Ica in a four-phased effort, in priority: (1) Phase One occurred from January to August of 1990 and focused upon the national elections; (2) Phase Two ran from August 1990

until 31 July 1992 and concentrated on regaining control of critical areas; (3) Phase Three, from August 1992 to 1994, will include cleanup operations; and finally (4) Phase Four conducted during 1995, will involve complementary operations.³

Although the military has the lead on the implementation of the plan, the National Police will have an active role in supporting the military in the emergency zones. The government has also enlisted the support of the population through the establishment of self-defense forces, rondas campesinas.⁴

The most important aspect of the Fujimori plan is the political war, one designed to enhance local confidence in the central government, undermine the basis of Sendero support, and establish a state identity in the country. The political war, waged by all levels of government and various social organizations, consists of six key elements. The ideological element consists of confronting Sendero ideology with democratic ideas. The intelligence element has posed an ongoing challenge for the government in infiltrating Sendero; however, recent coordination has improved collection and evaluation methods in order to gain precise knowledge of Sendero activities. The third element, headed by the counterterrorism division DIRCOTE, will conduct deception operations aimed at the enemy.

The fourth element is the government's psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign, directed against the enemy, the friendlies, and the neutral uncommitted. The objective of the plan is to bolster friendly commitment, induce defection and disillusion among the enemy, and gain the support of the uncommitted to the friendly side. The fifth element is a war of organization which aims at separating the Sendero from the people and overcoming, through antiterrorist efforts, the will of the organization. The sixth and final element is a war of the masses, Peru's attempt to develop in the population a psychological commitment to the nation-state through a series of various social reforms.⁵

The most critical element of both plans is financing. The government's legitimacy has been historically affected by the failure to carry out necessary social reforms in the wake of ever-increasing inflation. Adequate budgeting also severely affects the effectiveness of the armed forces and police organizations to carry out the war against the insurgency. Economic mobilization will be needed internally and externally for the government's pursuit in its efforts to defeat the Sendero.

The first element of effective counterinsurgency strategy is an examination of balanced development. This element includes an analysis of whether the basic causes of

discontent have been addressed and prioritized, whether all groups have been included in the proposed reforms, whether the programs reflect the national aim, whether PSYOP programs are in place to mitigate the negative effects, and whether there is a mechanism in place to collect positive and negative criticism of the plan.⁶

Balanced development is not occurring in Peru due largely to the current state of economic affairs. The year 1992 marked another period of economic recession. Credit is impossible to obtain. Additionally, financial institutions collapsed mid-year. The economic condition of the country was further worsened by a severe drought which aggravated the country's agricultural production (down 5.8 percent from 1991). Foreign investment, necessary for economic stimulation, was frozen or withdrawn as a response to Fujimori's autogolpe.⁷

Progress has been made in the reduction of inflation from 139.2 percent in 1991 to 56.7 percent in 1992, largely as a result of current market-oriented reforms. However, the government has still been unable to reduce inflation below 3 percent per month.⁸

There are ever increasing reports of labor unrest, specifically in the mining industry. Since 1990, 25,000 union members have lost their jobs, while many more anticipate layoffs as a result of the government's plan of

privatization of Peru's mining industry.⁹ There is growing concern in the country that the disenfranchised members of the mining labor force will become a new source of Sendero recruits.

Employment in other sectors of the formal economy, down by 21 percent in 1992, continues to shift to informal activities. In March of 1992, monthly wages averaged \$75.¹⁰ Support for Sendero continues to rise among the urban poor, especially among the "de-peasantized" sector, those unable to subsist in the country's agricultural regions and unable to find employment in the cities.¹¹

The results of economic decline are evident throughout the country. The government faces not only the problem of balanced development, but the ability to maintain the status quo. Four of five houses in Peru lack water, sewage, and electricity. Life expectancy among the low-income populace is less than 50 years, while one in eight infants dies before attaining his first birthday. The country's infrastructure is deteriorating through government neglect, further exacerbated by its identification as a Sendero high-payoff target.¹²

Lack of sufficient health care for the population has also contributed to a cholera epidemic. The disease which broke out in 1991 initially claimed more than 2,288 lives and infected more than 231,000 people from Peru's

poorest areas.¹³ The deaths present further evidence of social inequity, victimizing the poorest slum dwellers of the population whom the state has failed to assimilate.

Government efforts to provide reforms for the poor and launch effective counterinsurgency programs can only be improved through external economic aid, specifically from the United States. President Fujimori faces the challenge of acquiring approximately \$255 million in US economic aid this year as well as creating access to loans from international financial institutions.¹⁴ The major obstacle to external aid remains evidence of Fujimori's commitment to democracy and respect for human rights.¹⁵ It is not clear whether the US will fund any element of the counterinsurgency efforts or instead continue to focus its attention exclusively on the war on cocaine.¹⁶

It is critical for the government to recognize the necessity to counter Sendero's economic appeal through balanced development benefitting all sectors of the population. Feedback indicates that the Shining Path has difficulty creating support bases in regions where a strong network of national or regional political or social organizations exist. In areas where the government or the church has responded to meet the needs of the people, Sendero violence is not tolerated.¹⁷

Government development programs alone will not produce total loyalty to the government. The population must be mobilized through the development of a psychological commitment to the nation-state concept and an enhancement of the legitimacy of the government.¹⁸ The people must regard the government as a better alternative than the insurgency.

The government has faced historical problems of legitimacy. In the battle to win the "hearts and minds of the people" the government has often alienated itself from the masses by favoring only the elitist elements of the society.¹⁹ The government's failure to move toward the people's side is evidenced by its failure to recognize concrete grievances such as land reform, injustice, poverty, and corruption.²⁰

Peru's political system has historically provided false hopes and empty promises. Civilian governments since 1980 have marked the longest period of continuous constitutional rule since the 1895-1945 period.²¹ These periods of struggle between ruling powers have resulted in the government's inability to provide equitable distribution of resources and provide bureaucratic efficiency. The end result is one of a lack of social mobilization and a fragile democracy.²²

In spite of its historical lack of legitimacy, the majority of Peruvians still favor a democratic government to a revolutionary or military alternative.²³ Therefore the Fujimori government must implement an effective psychological campaign to increase its popular support.

The government's ability to propagandize its programs is hampered by the lack of an effective national informational program. Communications are hampered by geography, poor infrastructure, and historical neglect of the interior. Again, economics appears to be a major reason for the lack of infrastructure. The lack of funds has hampered government efforts to not only create new roads, but also to maintain existing ones. Surveys indicate that only 12 percent of the road system is in good working order.²⁴ Long stretches of road connecting the Andes to the Selva are closed from October to April because of rainfall, further isolating the geographic regions of the country. Railroads do not provide an alternative means of transportation, as only approximately 30 percent are in a serviceable condition.²⁵ In a country of 22 million people, the combined circulation of available newspapers is approximately 884,000. There are 15 television channels in Peru, however, only three transmit nationwide.²⁶

The Sendero uses the media as a means of furthering its PSYOP aims: presenting the party's desired image of

power, capacity, ubiquity, and responsibility for violence and capitalizing on the government failures to repress the movement through active neutralization and security measures.²⁷

Neutralization of the movement has proven to be extremely difficult since the government for the most part has assumed a reactive rather than proactive response to Sendero. The initial outbreaks of violence were ignored, then considered as a minor disturbance propagated by some misguided radicals.²⁸ Sendero was able to move unobstructed in the creation of support bases and infrastructure which permeated most of the country. The government did not act until 1981, when it passed a broad anti-terrorist law.²⁹ The existing legislation did not provide prosecution of the criminal acts of terrorism conducted by Sendero. The judicial reforms caused immediate controversy, raising questions to the preservation of individual rights and freedoms promised by the new democratic state. The Belaunde law on terrorism, Legislative Decree 46, defined terrorism as a criminal act and enforcement of the act as a means of protecting the security and stability of the state.³⁰

What resulted from the Legislative Decree was the inability of the judicial branch to enforce the law and maintain a balance of prosecuting terrorism and still

protect the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. As a result Sendero members were released from prison for lack of evidence while innocent citizens were arrested with little proof of their Sendero support. The government was also unable to provide security and protection for its magistrates in the provinces and therefore moved all terrorist cases to the capital, burdening the Court of Lima.³¹

The south-central Andean region became the focus of the government's developing counterinsurgency strategy.³² An enemy operating within the population is extremely difficult to identify. The military elements sent to the Andes experienced frustration in their inability to separate Indians who support Sendero from the Indians who do not.³³ Counterinsurgency efforts were further strained when Sendero moved its campaign to the capital. Sendero began working on infiltrating and influencing workers and union organizations in Lima in 1985.³⁴ One advantage to the counterinsurgency efforts conducted in the cities was that the military ties its support base to the urban garrison and was supported in its tactics by the greater availability of informants.³⁵ The security apparatus therefore has proved much more effective in the urban campaign than in the rural one.

The rural security efforts began in late 1981 when Belaunde launched his military pacification campaign. The first counterterrorist organization sent to Ayacucho in late 1981 was the Sinchis, a specially trained counterinsurgency group of the Guardia Civil formed in 1965 after the initial communist uprising.³⁶ The Sinchis' methods were extremely brutal in accomplishing their task of rounding up, arresting, and interrogating suspected terrorists. Those found guilty were beaten, tortured, and taken to jail in Lima.³⁷ Sinchi-inflicted abuses proved ineffective against the Sendero and served as a source of propaganda which further diminished the Belaunde regime's legitimacy.³⁸

Belaunde's next tactic was to employ the aid of the military to combat Sendero's growing strength. The first regular army units were deployed to Ayacucho in December of 1982. Army General Clemente Noel, regional commander, began a two-phased operation consisting of sweeps through the mountainous areas to eradicate active Sendero operatives and enlistment of local peasant support in a civil defense effort against the terrorists.³⁹ Like the Sinchis, the army employed brutal methods which resulted in 1000 deaths after only six months of intervention.⁴⁰

The army's strategy for combatting Sendero was detailed in a 1983 interview with retired General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra,

"In order for the police forces to succeed, they will have to kill member and nonmembers alike of Sendero, because this is the only way to ensure success. If the army kills 60 people, maybe three are Senderistas."⁴¹

Noel's successor, General Adrian Huaman, who spoke Quechua, did attempt to persuade the Belaunde government to adopt a political solution to complement the on-going military efforts. His ideas were met with government opposition and he was subsequently relieved.⁴²

The Belaunde government also applied the constitutional declaration of a state of emergency in Ayacucho. The emergency zone concept, applied as a response to the Sendero threat to national security, suspends basic personal rights such as the right to assembly, travel, and inviolability of residence. Forces operating within the emergency zone may search and arrest without warrant and serve as the sole governing body of the region.⁴³

The emergency zones, patterned after the French strategic hamlet concept, had the same affect in Peru as evidenced by their application in Indochina. The concept devotes its resources to a physical reinforcement of historical and societal abuses. The heightened security

measures designed to protect the population, restrict the very rights of the innocent the measure is designed to secure. The controls on movement and loss of rights serve to further degrade the legitimacy of the government.⁴⁴ The concept did little to halt the growth of the Sendero. By the end of 1983, the departments of Huancavelica, Apurimac, Huanuco, La Libertad, Pasco, and Junin were areas of Sendero operations and by 1984, operations were further extended to Cajamarca and Ancash.⁴⁵

President Garcia's election in 1985 resulted in a new approach to the government's counterinsurgency strategy. Garcia's CONAPLAN included a pacification drive, economic assistance, amnesty for insurgents, and proposed a peace commission for establishing open dialogues with the Sendero leadership.⁴⁶

The Garcia administration did make efforts to provide equitable distribution of resources to Peru's lower classes. New housing, schools, and nutritional programs were initiated in rural areas. Those peasants that provided the government with intelligence information on Sendero activities were rewarded with zero-interest loans.⁴⁷

Garcia also announced a reorganization of the police forces, suspending those officers suspected of corruption. In an effort to curb human rights abuses, gain control of

the military, and establish himself as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Garcia dismissed the president of the Armed Forces Joint Command and the Civil Military Commander of the Ayacucho Emergency Zone.⁴⁸

The lack of economic support hindered the development phase of the new plan, while the military phase of the counterinsurgency was affected by the killing of 250 Senderistas in Lima jails. Garcia's image as the country's defender of human rights was severely undermined and the focus once again turned to a military solution to counterinsurgency.⁴⁹

The spiral of violence continued to increase. Estimates of civilian deaths in 1989 attributed to terrorist and military actions number over one thousand.⁵⁰ The increase in violence created the perception that the government had lost control and was unable to guarantee law and order or personal security.⁵¹ The population's response to the climate of fear was the reemphasis of self-defense forces, created as early as 1983. Until 1989, the groups received little support from the military who feared that any attempts in arming the civilians would result in the arming of the Sendero.⁵²

The self-defense forces do present economic benefits as a low cost alternative to provide security in areas where the military cannot provide a permanent presence.⁵³

The military counterinsurgency shifted to defensive tactics after 1988, largely in response to allegations of human rights abuses. The objective was to eradicate Sendero, but not actively seek them out, employing defensive rather than offensive tactics. Troop morale became a serious problem because of low wages (a general earns \$250 per month and a private earns \$10 with a ration allowance of 20 cents a day⁵⁴) and the hostility of the local population to the presence of an "invasion force."⁵⁵

Institutional rivalries also hampered the counterinsurgency programs. Unity of command and the sharing of intelligence information was nonexistent among the various civil-military organizations.⁵⁶ As the result of a lack of effective intelligence network, the movement continues to grow. By 1989, Shining Path gained complete control of the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), gained support in Lima, and was able to shut-down the flow of food from the Andes to the capital.⁵⁷ Garcia's efforts had failed and by 1990, 63 of the country's 183 provinces were under military control.⁵⁸

President Fujimori's inaugural address on 28 July, 1990, stressed the defeat of the Shining Path as the administration's top priority.⁵⁹ His counterinsurgency plan presents a clear interrelation between and among the four elements of counterinsurgency strategy.⁶⁰ In principle the current counterinsurgency plan includes a military program designed to protect key political targets and engage Sendero units in the field. It includes a complementary economic development plan designed to stimulate rural investment and raise local living standards. Finally, a political program is designed to enhance confidence in the government's legitimacy, undermine the basis of Sendero support, and establish a "Peruvian" identity in the rural areas of the country.

The implementation of the counterinsurgency plan will fail for several reasons. The unity of effort in the establishment of a national strategy has vested sole power in the military. Sendero's organizational structure provides for centralized control and unity of effort with decentralized execution.

Peru has been unable to mobilize a coordinated effective intelligence network. Once information was obtained, the government failed to take action on the information.⁶¹ Sendero's organizational structure is very difficult by design to infiltrate. Due to government

neglect during Sendero's mobilization period, the movement was able to create an effective intelligence network, which promotes the premise that: "the revolution has a thousand eyes and ears."⁶²

The plan's application must stress the minimum use of violence. Early responses in Peru led to deaths of many innocent civilians in the counter-terror campaign. The general's statement that: "if the Army kills 60, at least three will be Senderista," perpetuates the spiraling downward concept of violence.

In the government response, the effectiveness of the civil-military government support is critical. The government has traditionally isolated portions of society. Military operations in response to Sendero, the establishment of emergency zones, and human rights abuses does little to build public confidence in the central government.

External support for Peru's counterinsurgency efforts is focused primarily on the United States. US economic aid still hinges on the eradication of illegal drugs and evidence of the government's ability to curb human rights abuses. This leads to the most critical reason for the plan's failure--economics. Lack of external support, the government's failure to regenerate economic growth and provide for basic human services,

further undermines the government's legitimacy and serves the interests of the insurgent's.

On September 13, 1992, Abimael Guzman Reynoso and some of his high command were captured by the Peruvian police. Guzman's statement to the antiterrorist police chief, General Antonio Vidal, at the time of his arrest, "I've only lost one battle. You know the party is now in place throughout Peru. We have advanced too far to be defeated now."⁶³ Although the arrest boosted Fujimori's popular support, Peru continues to lose its counter-insurgency efforts through its failure to attack the root causes of poverty and other social ills which accelerate the rise of violent opposition.

Further study should address the necessity of establishing a viable political-military solution to an insurgency. The impact of the military's position in Latin American society and the pressure the military exerts on society to facilitate change should be examined for its effects on government legitimacy.

From a US perspective, further study should be devoted to US assistance to countries facing an insurgent threat funded by narcotrafficking. The literary search conducted for this paper failed to prove a narcoterrorist connection and its effects on a US counter-drug campaign.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

¹Michael L. Smith, "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes" in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 16.

²Henry Dietz, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer 1990): 138.

³America's Watch Committee, Peru Under Fire: Human Rights Since the Return to Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 7-9.

⁴Dietz, 137-140.

⁵David Scott Palmer, "Democratic Interlude, Authoritarian Heritage, Uncertain Future" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 260.

⁶U.S. Army, DA Pamphlet 550-42, Peru: A Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop, American University Foreign Area Studies, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1989), 177.

⁷Peter Rostron, "Peru: Forum For a New Security Strategy?" (Study Project, US Army War College, 1992), 4

⁸Ibid., 14-20.

⁹Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru (New York: Times Books, 1993), 264-270.

Chapter 2

¹U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), Appendix C.

Chapter 3

¹Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, "The Context Of Latin American Politics" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 13.

²Robert Marett, Peru (Boulder: Westview Press, 1969), 209.

³U.S. Army, DA Pamphlet 550-42, Peru: A Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop, American University Foreign Area Studies, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1989), 73.

⁴Ibid., 83.

⁵Marett, 125.

⁶DA PAM 550-42 (1989), 62.

⁷Marett, 199.

⁸DA PAM 550-42 (1989), 115.

⁹Robert E. Gamer, The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective (Dubuque: Brown Publishers, 1988), 370.

¹⁰Ibid., 371.

¹¹Ibid., 383.

¹²DA PAM 550-42 (1989), 130.

¹³Gamer, 300.

¹⁴Ibid., 301.

¹⁵Ibid., 303.

¹⁶Ibid., 304.

¹⁷Ronald H. Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas" in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 94.

¹⁸Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1989), 8.

¹⁹Ibid., 9.

²⁰John Crabtree, Peru Under Garcia: An Opportunity Lost (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 7.

²¹DA PAM 550-42 (1989), 103.

²²De Soto, 201.

²³Crabtree, 12.

²⁴Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer, The Growth and Culture of Latin America: The Continuing Struggle for Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 286.

²⁵DA PAM 550-42 (1989), 29.

²⁶Worcester, 289.

²⁷David Scott Palmer, "Democratic Interlude, Authoritarian Heritage, Uncertain Future" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 265

²⁸Worcester, 288.

²⁹Victor Alba, Peru (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), 67.

³⁰Crabtree, 13.

³¹Marett, 187.

³²DA PAM 550-42 (1989), 36.

³³Marett, 189.

³⁴Ibid., 189.

³⁵Palmer, "Democratic Interlude, Authoritarian Heritage, Uncertain Future" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Wiarda, 265.

³⁶Alba, 47.

³⁷Marett, 194.

³⁸Palmer, "Democratic Interlude, Authoritarian Heritage, Uncertain Future" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Wiarda, 266.

³⁹Ibid., 275.

⁴⁰Ibid., 267.

⁴¹DA PAM 550-42 (1989), 54.

⁴²Ibid., 55.

⁴³Ibid., 57.

⁴⁴Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, "The Acceleration of Modernization, 1930 to the Present" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 42.

⁴⁵Crabtree, 30.

⁴⁶Ibid., 36.

⁴⁷Ibid., 39.

⁴⁸Palmer, "Democratic Interlude, Authoritarian Heritage, Uncertain Future" in Latin American Politics and Development, ed. Wiarda, 269.

⁴⁹Crabtree, 212.

⁵⁰Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru (New York: Times Books, 1993), 155.

⁵¹Ibid., 53.

⁵²Ibid., 54.

⁵³Ibid., 189.

⁵⁴Ibid., 265.

⁵⁵Mary Powers, Editorial, "Peru's Fujimori Reaps Fruits of Guzman's Capture," Reuter World Service (Reuters America), 19 September 1992: #116238.

Chapter 4

¹David Scott Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 152.

²Bynum E. Weathers, "Factors Affecting the Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict in Latin America" in Low

Intensity Conflict in the Third World, ed. Lewis B. Ware, (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1988), 93.

³Robert Marett, Peru (Boulder: Westview Press, 1969), 148.

⁴Weathers, 94.

⁵Marett, 150.

⁶Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1990), 4.

⁷Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru (New York: Times Books, 1993), 14.

⁸Ibid., 14.

⁹Ibid., 15.

¹⁰McCormick, 5.

¹¹U.S. Army, DA Pamphlet 550-42, Peru: A Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop, American University Foreign Area Studies, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1989), 100.

¹²Weathers, 95

¹³Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Che Guevara: Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 321.

¹⁴Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Corr, 153.

¹⁵Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), 36.

¹⁶Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, The Washington Papers (New York: Praeger, 1990), 30.

¹⁷David Scott Palmer, Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), 12.

¹⁸Tarazona-Sevillano, 55.

¹⁹Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, "The Organization of the Shining Path" in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 172.

²⁰Arthur Campbell, Guerrillas: A History and Analysis (New York: The John Day Company, 1968), 271.

²¹William G. Graves, "The Shining Path: The Successful Blending of Mao and Mariategui in Peru" (MMAS Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 120.

²²Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso, 68.

²³Ibid., 63.

²⁴Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Corr, 153.

²⁵Strong, 64.

²⁶Tom Marks, "Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru," Small Wars and Insurgencies 3 (Spring 1992): 41.

²⁷Strong, 248.

²⁸Ibid., 224.

²⁹Peter Rostron, "Peru: Forum For a New Security Strategy?" (Study Project, US Army War College, 1992), 6.

³⁰Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso, 100.

³¹Ibid., 107.

³²Rostron, 21.

³³Business International, Peru: Country Profile 1992-1993, Annual Survey of Political and Economic Background (London: Business International, 1993), 15.

³⁴Rostron, 21.

³⁵Business International, 15.

³⁶Strategic Studies Institute, Strategy for Peru: A Political-Military Dialogue, ed. Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 15.

- ³⁷Strong, 107.
- ³⁸Ibid., 102.
- ³⁹Jose E. Gonzales, "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley" in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 115.
- ⁴⁰SSI, Strategy for Peru, 15.
- ⁴¹Ibid., 17.
- ⁴²America's Watch Committee, Peru Under Fire: Human Rights Since the Return to Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), xiii.
- ⁴³Ibid., 5.
- ⁴⁴Ibid.
- ⁴⁵McCormick, 15.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., 15.
- ⁴⁷Billie Jean Isbell, "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho" in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 65.
- ⁴⁸McCormick, 20.
- ⁴⁹Gordon H. McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path, (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1992), 1.
- ⁵⁰Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Corr, 165.
- ⁵¹Strong, 266.
- ⁵²Graves, 107.
- ⁵³Strong, 60.
- ⁵⁴Michael L. Smith, "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes" in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 27.
- ⁵⁵Marks, 37.

⁵⁶Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso, 74.

Chapter 5

¹R.G. Breene, Jr., "Fujimori's Address to the Latin American People," Latin American Times, 11 (1st Qtr. 1993): 23.

²"1990-1995 Counterinsurgency Plan Assessed," QueHacer (July-Aug 1991), 48-50.

³Ibid., 48-50.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), C-8.

⁷Business International, Peru, Bolivia: Country Report First Quarter 1993, Analysis of Economic and Political Trends Every Quarter (London: Business International 1993), 14.

⁸Ibid., 15.

⁹Ibid., 17.

¹⁰Business International, Peru: Country Profile 1992-1993, Annual Survey of Political and Economic Background (London: Business International, 1993), 13.

¹¹Ronald H. Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas" in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 84.

¹²America's Watch Committee, Peru Under Fire: Human Rights Since the Return to Democracy (New Haven: Yale University, 1992), 2.

¹³Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru (New York: Times Books, 1993), 191.

¹⁴Business International, Country Report, 6.

¹⁵David Scott Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict:

Old Threats in a New World, ed. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 161.

¹⁶Ibid., 161.

¹⁷David Scott Palmer, Shining Path of Peru, ed. David Scott Palmer, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), 245.

¹⁸U.S Army Command and General Staff College, C520. Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Fort Leavenworth: US Army CGSC, 1993), 35.

¹⁹Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), 186.

²⁰Ibid., 138.

²¹Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Corr, 155.

²²Strong, 220.

²³Palmer, Shining Path of Peru, ed. Palmer, 245.

²⁴Business International, Country Profile, 24.

²⁵Ibid., 25.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Palmer, Shining Path of Peru, ed. Palmer, 244.

²⁸Henry Dietz, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer 1990): 138.

²⁹Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1990), 16.

³⁰Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, The Washington Papers (New York: Praeger, 1990), 80.

³¹Ibid., 85.

³²Ibid., 89.

³³Ibid., 91.

³⁴Gordon H. McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path, (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1992), 7.

³⁵Ibid., 63.

³⁶Dietz, 138.

³⁷Berg, ed. Palmer, 94.

³⁸Dietz, 138.

³⁹Ibid., 139.

⁴⁰McCormick, Future of Peru, 17.

⁴¹Elena S. Manitzas, "All the Minister's Men: Paramilitary Activity in Peru" in Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence, ed. Martha K. Huggins, (New York: Praeger, 1991), 88.

⁴²Dietz, 139.

⁴³Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso, 90.

⁴⁴Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 193.

⁴⁵McCormick, Future of Peru, 17.

⁴⁶Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso, 93.

⁴⁷Dietz, 140.

⁴⁸John Crabtree, Peru Under Garcia: An Opportunity Lost (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 109.

⁴⁹Ibid., 111.

⁵⁰Ibid., 186.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Dietz, 140.

⁵³Carla Anne Robbins, "Cocaine, Communism and Crisis in Peru," US News and World Report (18 September, 1989): 45.

⁵⁴Harry Anderson, "The Next Nasty War?" Newsweek (21 May, 1990): 36.

⁵⁵Crabtree, 202.

⁵⁶Ibid., 205.

⁵⁷Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Corr, 159.

⁵⁸Ibid., 159.

⁵⁹Ibid., 160.

⁶⁰C520, Low Intensity Conflict (1993), 36.

⁶¹Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem" in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Corr, 163.

⁶²Ibid., 164.

⁶³Mary Powers, Editorial, "Peru's Fujimori Reaps Fruits of Guzman's Capture," Reuter World Service (Reuters America), 19 September 1992: #116238.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Alba, Victor. Peru. Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.
- America's Watch. Peru Under Fire: Human Rights Since the Return to Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Burns, E. Bradford. Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977.
- Campbell, Arthur. Guerrillas: A History and Analysis. New York: The John Day Company, 1968.
- Corr, Edwin G. and Stephen Sloan, editors. Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
- Crabtree, John. Peru Under Garcia: An Opportunity Lost. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992.
- DeSoto, Hernando. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1990.
- Gamer, Robert E. The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1988.
- Huggins, Martha K. Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991.
- Loveman, Brian, and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., editors. Che Guevara: Guerrilla Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985.
- Marett, Robert. Peru. Boulder: Westview Press, 1969.
- O'Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1990.

- Palmer, David Scott, editor. The Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- Strong, Simon. Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru. New York: Times Books, 1992.
- Tarazona-Sevillano, Gabriela. Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.
- Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey F. Kline, editors. Latin American Politics and Development. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Worcester, Donald E., and Wendell G. Schaeffer. The Growth and Culture of Latin America: The Continuing Struggle for Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Periodicals and Articles

- Anderson, Harry. "The Next Nasty War?" Newsweek (21 May 1990): 36-37.
- Arbulu, Enrique Obando. "1990-1995 Counterinsurgency Plan Assessed" QueHacer (Jul-Aug 1991): 48-50.
- Business International. Peru: Country Profile, Annual Survey of Political and Economic Background. (1992-1993): 1-39.
- Business International. Peru, Bolivia: Country Report, Analysis of Economic and Political Trends Every Quarter. (1st Qtr 1993): 1-19.
- Contreras, Joseph. "Peru: Looking For a Miracle, Japanese Style." Newsweek (23 April 1990): 36.
- Davis, Robert. "Sendero Luminoso and Peru's Struggle for Survival" Military Review 70 (January 1990): 79-88.
- Dietz, Henry. "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement" Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer 1990): 123-150.

- Hazleton, William A., and Sandra Woy-Hazleton. "Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Peru's Struggle against Sendero Luminoso," Terrorism 11 (1988): 471-490
- Manwaring, Max G., and John T. Fishel. "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach," Small Wars and Insurgencies 3 (3) (Winter 1992): 272-310.
- Marks, Tom. "Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru," Small Wars and Insurgencies 3 (1) (Spring 1992): 22-46.
- Mason, T. David and Janet Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru," Terrorism and Political Violence 1 (4) (October 1989): 516-538.
- McClintock, Cynthia. "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," World Politics 37 (October 1984): 48-84.
- Meyer, Dan C. "The Myth of Narcoterrorism in Latin America," Military Review 70 (March 1990): 64-70.
- Robbins, Carla Anne. "Cocaine, Communism and Crisis in Peru," U.S. News and World Report (18 Sept. 1989): 45-49.
- Story, Christopher, editor. "Peru: Alan Garcia, the Senderists, and the Background to Fujimori's Seizure of Abimael Guzman," Latin American Times 11 (4) (1st Qtr. 1993): 16-23.
- Weathers, Bynum E. "Factors Affecting the Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict in Latin America" Low Intensity Conflict in the Third World (August 1988): 81-104
- Wheat, Andrew. "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology" Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer): 41-55.

Government Documents

- US Army. DA Pamphlet 550-42, Peru: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1981.
- US Army and Air Force. Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, DC: Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, 1990.

US Army. C520 Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.
Fort Leavenworth; US Army Command and General
Staff College, 1993.

Unpublished Dissertations, Theses, and Papers

Claudio, Arnaldo, and Stephan K. Stewman. "Peru,
Sendero Luminoso and the Narcotrafficking
Alliance." Foreign Military Studies Office,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992.

Graves, William G. "The Shining Path: The Successful
Blending of Mao and Mariategui in Peru."
Master of Military Art and Science. Thesis, US
Army Command and General Staff College, 1992

McCormick, Gordon H. "From Sierra to the Cities: The
Urban Campaign of the Shining Path." Study, RAND,
National Defense Research Institute, 1992.

_____. "The Shining Path and the Future of Peru."
Study, RAND, National Defense Research Institute,
1990.

Rostron, Peter. "Peru: Forum for a New United States
Security Strategy?" Individual Study Project, US
Army War College, 1992.

Schulz, Donald E., and Gabriel Marcella. "Strategy for
Peru: A Political-Military Dialogue." Special Report
on Roundtable held at US Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,
June 11, 1992.

Trinquier, Roger. "Modern Warfare: A French View of
Counterinsurgency." Combat Studies Institute, US Army
Command and General Staff College, January 1985.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

MAJ Arnaldo Claudio
Foreign Military Studies Office
U.S. Army Combined Arms Command
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

LTC Clark M. Delavan
Department of Joint and Combined Operations
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Department of Joint and Combined Operations
ATTN: LTC Tom Adams
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Directorate of Training and Doctrine
Threat Intelligence Branch
ATTN: CW4 Stanley
Headquarters, US Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker
Fort Rucker, Alabama 36362-5000

DR John T. Fishel
Department of Joint and Combined Operations
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

LTC Frank S. Smallwood
Department of Joint and Combined Operations
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Mrs. Bertha Spahr
Dover Area High School
West Canal Street
Dover, Pennsylvania 17315