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**Air Force people
building the world's most respected
air and space force –
global power and reach for America.**


FOREWORD

For the first time in nearly half a century, the Department of Defense is sculpting a defense strategy without the image of an implacable and monolithic Soviet Union. The new *National Military Strategy* articulated by Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell responds to the new era and provides the military underpinnings for the President's *National Security Strategy*. The Air Force supports this new vision through its most fundamental reshaping since it was established as a separate Service nearly half a century ago. Beginning nearly three years ago with our strategic planning framework — *Global Reach-Global Power* — we have adapted the inherent and long-standing components of Air Power to the rapidly changing global environment.

During Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice's recent Congressional testimony, he briefed the House Armed Services Committee on the fundamental changes underway within the Air Force that allow us to address the challenges and opportunities of the emerging international security environment. *Reshaping for the Future*, available through Air Force Public Affairs, provides a written account of that testimony.

This *Air Force Issues Book* complements *Reshaping for the Future*, and provides information on a wide range of specific concerns to our future Air Force. We have chosen the Question/Answer format to give you a representative view of the questions Secretary Rice and Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak are being asked by Congress, the media, and the public.

We hope you find this edition of the *Air Force Issues Book* useful in understanding and telling the Air Force story. Please direct any questions or suggestions you may have to the Air Force Issues Team at (703) 695-0137 or DSN 225-0137 or write to SAF/LLX, Pentagon, Room 4D961, Washington, DC 20330-1000.


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The Air Force today is undergoing the most fundamental reshaping it has experienced in its history. The broad sweep of change has touched every corner of the institution. We are not paring down. We are building a new, smaller Air Force from the ground up. This reshaping and restructuring has been driven by the demands of a new era — new thinking, new security challenges and opportunities, new fiscal constraints and new technology. We began preparing the Air Force for this new era nearly three years ago.

The first step was to develop a strategic planning framework. We did that with *Global Reach—Global Power*, capitalizing on what airpower brings to the Nation's defense — speed, range, flexibility, precision and lethality. Our second initiative was to incorporate **modern management principles** into every aspect of how we do business. We are streamlining and delayering, removing roadblocks to improvement and moving authority down in the organization. Finally, by planning within our vision and managing wisely, we have designed a **program for what the President and the Nation will need** in the future.

The President has outlined a vision of security without superpower confrontation, and we are sculpting a defense strategy without the image of an implacable and monolithic Soviet Union. But emerging security concerns are still global in scope and the need for American leadership remains critical. Central Intelligence Agency Director Robert M. Gates put it well when he said, "The side effects of success... will continue to have destabilizing and dangerous implications and will confront us with new and unexpected dangers." And, as General Colin L. Powell has pointed out, we occupy a "unique position of trusted leadership," a position that dictates we continue to work to **preserve collective security in a splintering world.**

We face two challenges. The first is to retain the ability to deal with the residual threats to U.S. interests around the world, even though — unlike the past 45 years — the location, dimension, timing and technology level of these threats will be difficult to predict. The second — perhaps more difficult — challenge is to create, carefully and affordably, the backbone of our forces for after the year 2000. We need to identify and pursue what we will need to deal confidently with the uncertainties of the future, concentrating on a **superior core of capabilities** — those we need to ensure any potential aggressor cannot rapidly close the gap between him and us.

The security demands of this new era play to the **inherent strengths of air and space power.** In this age of uncertainty, space forces allow us to monitor activities around the world and to know the battlefield even before our forces arrive. And, with smaller forces overall and fewer deployed overseas, airpower's ability to respond rapidly with great precision and effect will be invaluable — and a capability that will be America's alone. Ours will be the Air Force of first and last resort. **A helping hand or a clenched fist — airpower can, and has, delivered both.**

... emerging security concerns are still global in scope and the need for American leadership remains critical.

**ISSUE:
Budget*****In view of the global and fiscal changes, how does the Air Force justify an increase from the FY 92 to FY 93 budget?***

The Air Force budget is one component of the overall Department of Defense (DOD) budget. The various components of the DOD budget may experience temporary increases or decreases to allow effective long term financial management and efficient investment. For example, this year the Air Force has several programs going into higher production rates: the C-17, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). Therefore, for this year our budget may decrease less dramatically than the other services. But comparison of budgets from one year to the next does not depict overall trends.

In the long term, all service budgets are decreasing. From the recent peak in 1985 through 1993, service Total Obligation Authority decreases (1992 dollars) are: Army, 34 percent; Navy, 29 percent; and Air Force, 33 Percent. For 1985 to 1997, the decreases are: Army, 43 percent; Navy, 36 percent; Air Force, 40 percent. If the National Foreign Intelligence Program is excluded, the Air Force decline is the fastest of the three services. All of the services are building force structures appropriate for the post-Cold War national strategy, based on substantially lower budgets.

What is the impact of going beyond the President's proposed \$50 billion defense cut?

Additional cuts would have a direct and immediate impact on our warfighting capability. Using a House proposal of an additional \$50 billion cut (\$7.6 billion in FY 93) as a reference point, the effects would be dramatic. Assuming an equal share to the Air Force, we would have to cut 93,000 more military people on top of the 126,000 we've already lost or programmed to be lost between 1988 and 1993. We would have to slash flying hours by another 180,000 hours (nearly 15 percent), dragging us back to training levels not experienced since the late 1970s. In addition, we would have to cut another 11,000 civilian jobs. Corresponding reductions in our Procurement and Research & Development (R&D) accounts would sacrifice some of our investments in core capabilities and also result in the loss of additional jobs in the defense industry. We are already reducing at a prudent but painful rate in response to rapidly changing world events. A more precipitous decline in defense spending would force us to break faith with our dedicated all-volunteer force and erode the capability of the finest Air Force ever to take to the skies.

ISSUE:
Force Structure

What core capabilities are essential for the future?

To identify and pursue what we will need to deal confidently with the uncertainties of the future and build the backbone of the forces for the 21st century, we are emphasizing core capabilities, those that play to our distinctive competencies as a nation. These competencies are those that we would rely on in any future conflict, those that we are uniquely well qualified to contribute to a coalition undertaking. They include the ability to:

- Maintain global situational awareness;
- Inflict strategic and operational paralysis on any adversary by striking key nodes in his war making potential;
- Hold emerging strategic capabilities in developing states at risk, while being prepared to defend against limited missile attack;
- Deploy sufficient, quality forces worldwide to be able to deter or defend;
- Assure access to any region via air, maritime and space supremacy;
- Assist international efforts for relief, peacekeeping and drug interdiction; and
- Sustain a research and industrial base sufficient to keep our technological edge.

What methodology is the Air Force using for making reductions?

Air Force planners use the "strategy-to-task" methodology for force structure planning. We start with the President's National Security Strategy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy to develop specific objectives and mission area tasks. We then determine the force structure necessary to achieve those objectives and maintain our essential core capabilities. Finally, we develop a budget to support the required force structure. In a nutshell, this is the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System used throughout DOD.

SUSTAIN DETERRENCE

Nuclear Forces

Nuclear deterrence is a **bedrock requirement of national security**, even as the types and numbers of forces required for deterrence undergo historic change.

In September 1991 and again in January 1992, the President announced bold initiatives to reshape our nuclear forces. We took 450 Minuteman II Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and all bombers off alert. As directed by the President, we will accelerate the deactivation of Minuteman II missiles scheduled for elimination after the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty is ratified. If the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agrees to remove all land-based multiple, independently targetable missiles, the Air Force will eliminate all Peacekeeper missile silos, reduce the number of warheads on the Minuteman III from three to one, and shift many aircraft in an already smaller bomber force to primarily conventional roles.

The President's initiatives point us toward a deterrent force designed for **long-term security**, rather than a competition in increasingly complex nuclear delivery systems and basing modes. We are already restructuring the missile force to emphasize **stability and system safety at lower numbers**. We cancelled the rail mobile portion of the Peacekeeper and closed out Peacekeeper production. Procurement of the ACM has also been reduced and the Small ICBM and SRAM II were terminated.

While we are reversing the effects of a decades-long arms race, we must take care to provide for essential maintenance and upgrades to the forces we retain in a **balanced TRIAD**. Improvements in guidance systems, launch control equipment and refurbishment of missiles and launch facilities are life extension efforts that will ensure the Minuteman III continues to meet high standards for maintainability and reliability. Although the changing requirements of deterrence will allow us to shift many of our bombers from nuclear to conventional missions, the bomber force will remain a hedge against any unanticipated changes in the strategic deterrence equation.

Strategic nuclear forces represent a smaller slice of overall Air Force spending in FY 93. Reflecting historic changes, the Strategic Air Command will stand down in June and the new United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) will assume responsibility for strategic nuclear force targeting and control. At the same time, we realize that global nuclear deterrence will be an indispensable element of our national security for the foreseeable future and that, as weapons of mass destruction proliferate, **our strategic forces must remain flexible**.

Although the changing requirements of deterrence will allow us to shift many of our bombers from nuclear to conventional missions, the bomber force will remain a hedge against any unanticipated changes in the strategic equation.

**ISSUE:
USSTRATCOM**

Is the operation of the new USSTRATCOM on track?

As planned, the Strategic Air Command will stand down on June 1, 1992 and the new USSTRATCOM will be activated. General George L. Butler has been nominated to be the first CINCSTRAT. The USSTRATCOM provisional headquarters at Offutt AFB, NE, under the command of Brigadier General Robert E. Linhard, is developing and implementing the activation plan. The new command will allow consolidation of functions and result in nearly 20 percent manpower savings.

**ISSUE:
START**

Given the President's Nuclear Initiatives and unilateral cuts by both sides, is START still relevant?

The threat of a nuclear confrontation with the republics of the former Soviet Union has greatly decreased, but START remains key to our national interest. START will enhance our national security due to its planned weapons reduction and verification regime. Reducing the number and throwweight of warheads decreases the threat and potential scale of nuclear war, allowing us to field fewer, more stabilizing weapons systems such as single warhead ICBMs and a flexible bomber force. However, while the President's Nuclear Initiatives and unilateral proposals by both sides portend deeper cuts than START, there are no specific verification procedures attached to the initiatives offered by either side. The START treaty addresses verification procedures essential to guaranteeing compliance and monitoring of strategic modernization programs. START provides a valuable foundation from which to proceed with further reductions in strategic forces.

**ISSUE:
TRIAD**

Do we still need a TRIAD of nuclear forces?

Nuclear deterrence remains fundamental to U.S. defense strategy and the TRIAD is a proven component of nuclear deterrence. The President's National Security Strategy states nuclear deterrence is the "number one defense priority." Deterrence is no longer exclusively concerned with the former Soviet Union, which still maintains a formidable nuclear arsenal. An increasing number of potentially hostile states developing or purchasing weapons of mass destruction also pose a significant threat to U.S. interests. Our TRIAD, which will emphasize stability and system safety at smaller numbers, remains effective because potential adversaries realize they cannot successfully attack or defend against all three legs. Consequently, losses clearly outweigh any potential gain. As we adapt to the new environment, the TRIAD concept is still valid. The diversified capabilities of the TRIAD provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a range of options to handle potential threats.

ISSUE:
ICBMs

What are the plans for our ICBM force structure?

The plans for our ICBM force changed significantly in the past year as a result of the President's Nuclear Initiatives. Additional proposals made to the CIS, if accepted, would make the 500 Minuteman IIIs the backbone of our ICBM force, reduce its number of warheads from three to one and modernize these systems.

ISSUE:
Minuteman

How do we plan to extend the life of Minuteman III?

To ensure the Minuteman III remains a viable system beyond 2010, major life extension projects include rocket motor repour/remanufacture, upgrades to the guidance/control system, the Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting modification program to replace aging command and control equipment, and the RIVET MILE program to refurbish launch facilities and launch control centers. These programs will ensure Minuteman III continues to meet high standards for reliability and maintainability.

Theater Operations and Power Projection

As we refocus our defense efforts toward **regional concerns**, the ability to project power — often into areas where we have little or no permanent presence — becomes increasingly important. Global instability and the drawdown of our forces overseas translate into an even **greater need for quick reaction, long reach and precisely applied firepower**. Airpower can rapidly assemble and quickly apply decisive force to deter conflicts or terminate them swiftly and with minimum loss of life.

The challenge before the Air Force is to provide Global Reach-Global Power even as we sharply reduce force structure.

The challenge before the Air Force is to provide **Global Reach-Global Power** even as we sharply reduce force structure. We will reduce to 28.4 Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWE) in FY 93 on our way to a base force of 26.5 by FY 95 — from a peak of over 40 in the late 1980s. To accommodate this smaller force and preserve combat power, we are **adjusting our organizational structure, investing in prudent modernization and reshaping our active-Reserve force mix**.

The Air Force has always contended that airpower should be treated as a unified whole in order to bring its full capability to bear. Desert Storm validated that belief. Consistent with this **integrated vision of airpower**, we are restructuring our major commands and combat wings. Overseas commanders in Europe and the Pacific will now control all the assets they need to make airpower a unified whole within their theaters. Elements of the three major combat commands based within the Continental United States (CONUS) — Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command and Military Airlift Command — will reorganize into Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) on June 1. Fighters, bombers and ICBMs — what may be thought of as shooters — will be in the new ACC along with some tankers, airlifters, reconnaissance aircraft and command, control and intelligence platforms, and will train to effectively support all of the warfighting Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs). Some composite wings will mirror this integration on a smaller scale, packaging a tailored mix of aircraft and their support assets at a single base. The mobility assets — the majority of airlifters and tankers — will form the new AMC.

Our key modernization programs will maintain Global Reach - Global power into the 21st century. The B-2 melds **stealth technology with range and payload** in a system that accomplishes the work of many different types of aircraft. The F-22 guarantees the United States a superior, fast, stealthy fighter to penetrate hostile air space and destroy enemy aircraft to **maintain air superiority, a prerequisite for all military operations**.

The Air Reserve Components (ARC) play an important role across the breadth of our activities. As the active component draws down to Base Force levels, the Guard and Reserve will maintain their current manpower levels. However, cuts below Base Force levels would necessitate ARC as well as active reductions.

**ISSUE:
Fighter Force
Structure*****Why 26.5 Fighter Wing Equivalents?***

The challenge before the Air Force is to provide Global Reach-Global Power even as we sharply reduce force structure. This calls for highly flexible mobile forces that can respond rapidly to a wide variety of potential threats. The size of the Base Force is defined by the need to meet the demands of more than one regional crisis. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan apportions the Base Force required to meet the National Military Strategy. The apportionment is based on Theater CINC requirements and available forces.

How many Fighter Wing Equivalents did we use in Operation Desert Storm?

The U.S. Air Force provided over 10.75 FWEs for Operation Desert Storm. In addition, we provided 81 conventional long-range bombers, a squadron of Special Operations Forces (SOF), and a variety of specific mission aircraft (over 112). However, it is important to remember the rationale behind these numbers. First, we planned on other assets (Navy, Marine and Coalition) providing over 30 percent of the required sorties. Secondly, we assumed a variety of Global Mobility, Space, and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence assets, along with the in-theater infrastructure, would be available to support the force. We had over 55,000 personnel in-theater to complete the task. Finally, we knew the existing geographic, weather and enemy threat factors. A different enemy in another geographical region might require a very different response.

What are the benefits of composite wings?

The composite wing is designed to increase the lethality/effectiveness of our combat forces. Combat wings are tailored to use the unique strengths of different aircraft optimized against specific mission requirements. The composite wing operates multiple aircraft from a single base under a single wing commander. The wing lives, plans, trains, deploys, and fights together as a single unit, epitomizing the "train like you're going to fight" axiom. Composite wings offer the opportunity to increase effectiveness of a smaller force structure through organizational synergy.

Why do we need a forward presence in the southern region of Europe?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to validate the requirement for a permanent U.S. presence in the southern region. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has repeatedly stated that if only two USAF wings were based in Europe, he would want one to be in the southern region. A permanent presence maintains a credible deterrent in this critical area, demonstrates U.S. commitment/resolve, promotes alliance cohesion and preserves critical geostrategic military capability in the region.


**ISSUE:
Fighter Force
Structure**

Why not increase multi-role vice specialized mission procurement?

A portion of our fighter force structure must be designed to accomplish specific critical tasks, such as counter air and marginal weather/night precision air-to-ground missions. A proportionally larger multi-role force would be less capable than our present force mix. Specialized aircraft are superior to multi-role aircraft in their specific mission areas. We need the current mix of multi-role aircraft for the flexibility they offer and specialized mission aircraft to accomplish specific jobs. This allows us to accomplish the total mission at the most cost effective rate. We have carefully configured the force to ensure the proper balance.

Why not increase the Air Reserve Component/active mix?

The Air Force continues to recognize that the ARC plays a vital role across the breadth of our activities and is increasing the ARC proportion of the Total Force. The Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will maintain their current manning levels even as the active component reduces by more than a quarter from its mid-1980s level. The ARC will grow from one-third to more than 42 percent of the total fighter force by 1995, and if we include the air defense interceptors, 48 percent of fighter cockpits will be filled by Guardsmen and Reservists. As with the fighter force, the ARC is building on its already impressive contribution to mobility. Over half of all our airlift flight crews are in the Guard and Reserve, and by 1995 nearly half of all tanker and airlift force structure will be in the ARC. ARC performance in Desert Storm validated our confidence in them. However, the Total Force mix is determined by a myriad of factors, some of which include readiness, overseas basing, rotation base, initial training costs, and operations tempo. Our current plans push our reliance on the ARC to the maximum.



**ISSUE:
F-22**

Why does the Air Force need the F-22?

The F-15 has been the air superiority champion since it was first introduced into the Air Force inventory in 1974. Since then, the former Soviet Union has introduced two comparably performing aircraft, the MiG-29 and SU-27. As a result, the airmanship of our pilots and our avionics provide the telling difference today — an advantage that a determined adversary could overcome. The F-15 has been the champion of the air, but every champion must eventually retire, and we will have to begin retiring F-15s in 1998 as they reach the end of their service life. The F-22 is needed to replace these F-15s, to ensure that we can still accomplish the air superiority mission. It will become an instant champion in the tradition of the F-15 and will remain so well into the 21st century.

**ISSUE:
F-22*****Why can't an upgraded and less expensive version of an existing fighter accomplish this mission?***

Air Superiority is such a key element of our warfighting strategy that we are not interested in giving any enemy a "fair match." Air superiority is much more than a contest between individual aircraft. It means the air battle takes place in enemy airspace, not in our own. We need to win in the air and win decisively. To do that we need to have the "first look, first kill" advantage. We have looked at upgrading F-15s and F-16s, but these upgrades proved to be costly and much less effective than the F-22. The F-22's unique characteristics of low observability, high maneuverability, and supersonic cruise will provide American fighter pilots the decisive edge for victory the first time and every time. The F-22 is the only aircraft that can do that.

What specific advantages does the F-22 have over existing fighter aircraft?

First, the F-22 will be much less expensive to maintain and operate. It will take approximately 45 percent fewer aircraft maintenance personnel to keep the F-22 mission ready. That means that we can maintain 648 aircraft with nearly 7,500 fewer personnel than with the same number of F-15s. We can deploy an F-22 squadron of 24 aircraft with 8 C-141 loads compared with 17 C-141 loads for a 24 aircraft squadron of F-15s. This will be increasingly important as forward bases decline and greater emphasis is placed on rapidly deployable assets.

Second, better reliability and maintainability are being designed into the F-22, giving it slightly higher mission capable rates and much higher sortie rates while requiring fewer support personnel and less maintenance equipment.

Third, the F-22 will give our pilots an unequalled advantage over adversaries. Stealthiness (keeping the enemy from seeing us) — coupled with an advanced radar (letting us see them) — will give the F-22 the first look at an enemy aircraft, the first crucial step in achieving the kill. Weapons planned for the F-22 like the AMRAAM will give the F-22 the first shot. This combination will ensure the F-22 gets the first kill against multiple enemy aircraft, in many cases without ever entering the enemy's weapons envelope — a first round knockout and the challenger never threw a punch.

Finally, the F-22's superior agility will help ensure victory. The F-22 represents an increase in capabilities over existing fighter aircraft that could be compared to the advantages the F-15 enjoyed over other fighters of the early 1970s. It combines high reliability, first look, first shot, first kill. The F-22 will get to the fight faster, with a greater radius of action, and a smaller logistics tail than any other fighter in our history.

**ISSUE:
F-22**

If the F-22 is so capable, why does the Air Force plan to buy roughly the same numbers of F-22s as F-15s? Given the current and projected threat, why so many?

We have balanced air superiority assets within our Base Force with the other essential elements of U.S. airpower. Keep in mind that, as overall force structure comes down, the leverage provided by total control of the air becomes even more critical. We should also remember that when we fight in coalitions, like we did in the Gulf, we should be prepared to contribute those capabilities that we as a nation are uniquely well qualified to provide. This includes controlling the air. When we fight as part of an international team, ours will be the Air Force of first and last resort.

Will the F-22 conform to the new DOD Acquisition Policy?

In many ways the F-22 program serves as a model of an effective defense acquisition program. The framework of the new acquisition strategy incorporates key features that have been part of the F-22 program since the beginning. We established the need in the mid-1980s and have verified the requirements repeatedly since. We minimized technical and manufacturing risk through our prototype program and early risk reduction efforts. We flew over 150 hours on the four prototype aircraft, logged over 4,000 hours during prototype engine development, have over 100 sorties in the avionics flying labs, and programmed over one million lines of corresponding Ada computer code. The F-22 is the least concurrent fighter program in history. Finally, we have kept fighter pilots operationally integrated in the F-22 development throughout to ensure we minimize operational risks.

Reports say the F-22 may turn out to be heavier than planned. Won't this affect its capability?

Let's lay to rest some misleading information on F-22 weight growth. In 1984 the Air Force established a 50,000 pound "goal" for the F-22 program. This goal was established to help maintain program discipline early in the concept development stage. Last August, after the completion of the Dem/Val risk reduction program, we estimated an F-22 would weigh approximately 60,000 pounds. Dem/Val allowed us to make difficult trades between performance, reliability, maintainability, and cost. The EMD weight estimate of approximately 60,000 pounds was used to program cost as well as aircraft performance. These factors became the criteria for the Defense Acquisition Board when it approved the F-22 for EMD. Now the challenge is to prevent weight creep. We know of no reasons to make compromises on the user's range or performance requirements. The bottom line is the Dem/Val program established a sound weight estimate. Now we will execute a disciplined design process that pays close attention to aircraft weight.

**ISSUE:
F-22**

Will the F-22 have an air-to-ground capability?

With four external hardpoints capable of carrying the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and the interface for smart weapons capability, the F-22 will have an inherent capability to perform the air-to-ground mission. We will ensure that we preserve this capability as we proceed with the aircraft's development.

**ISSUE:
Advanced Strike/
Interdiction Aircraft
(AX)**

What is the degree of Air Force participation in the AX program?

The Air Force has a requirement to begin replacing its deep interdiction fighter force (F-111F, F-117A and F-15E) in the 2010 time frame. Therefore, the Air Force is collaborating with the Navy in the development and procurement of a common advanced strike/interdiction aircraft to fulfill this requirement. The Air Force is a full partner with the Navy in writing a single operational requirements document, has a participating member on the source selection process and has integrated Air Force engineers and acquisition personnel into the Navy Program Office. We are also providing the Navy with access to classified advanced technologies developed through Air Force programs. The Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations meet quarterly to review evolving requirements and ensure the AX design meets the critical needs of both services and remains affordable.

Can the F-22 fulfill the AX mission?

While the F-22 will possess some inherent air-to-surface capability, it is being developed for the air-to-air superiority role, while the AX will fill the deep strike/interdiction mission. Industry is examining ATF derived technologies (i.e., avionics, propulsion, materials and production techniques) to support AX development.

**ISSUE:
Multi-Role
Fighter (MRF)**

What is the Multi-Role Fighter and when will it be fielded?

The MRF program will explore a variety of alternatives to replace the F-16 multi-role fighter after the turn of the century. This program is essential to preserve our ability to wage a devastating air campaign in the future. This year Milestone 0 concept exploration and definition studies will examine the options available for a follow-on to our F-16 fleet. Alternatives include a modest or significant upgrade to an existing aircraft, or developing a new aircraft. The timing of this program will be worked out during the next several years as design studies are completed. Using the new DOD acquisition policy, the Air Force will pursue a system which is both affordable and responsive to defense needs.

**ISSUE:
F-16*****Does the Air Force plan to modify the F-16 for the Close Air Support (CAS) role and, if so, when?***



The Air Force needs a CAS/Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) aircraft capable of continuous combat operations, under the weather, day or night. The DOD position is this requirement can best be met by modifying F-16 aircraft to optimize their CAS/BAI mission capabilities. Air Force planners are closely evaluating specific program alternatives vis-a-vis the evolving threat, our planned force structure, and fiscal constraints. The current Air Force program develops and procures systems to retrofit approximately 300 Block 30 F-16 aircraft for the CAS/BAI role. The program, as structured, is a combination of F-16 CAS/BAI unique elements, applicable core avionics upgrades (applicable to other F-16s, as well), and a program to enhance night operations capability. Under this plan, the future CAS/BAI force would be comprised of all retained A-10s, modified Block 30 F-16s, and Block 40 F-16s with Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night capability. While we are reviewing these and other F-16 alternatives, there has been no Air Force decision to date to change this plan.

How severe is the F-16 crack problem, what is its impact on mission and life expectancy, and what are the fixes?

The minor cracks we discovered recently are due to weight growth and more stressful flying than originally anticipated. Consequently, we have established a long-term structural modification program starting in FY 93. All pre-Block 50 F-16s will require structural modifications in order to reach an 8,000 hour service life. Presently, there is no immediate F-16 crack problem, no safety of flight indications, and no grounded aircraft.

**ISSUE:
F-117*****With a reduced buy of B-2s, should the Air Force buy more F-117s?***

No, for two primary reasons. First, as successful as the F-117 was during the Gulf War, it is no substitute for the B-2's superior range and payload capability. Sufficient numbers of B-2s, with state-of-the-art stealth technology, could have achieved similar results to the F-117 in less time, while risking fewer American lives. Secondly, restarting the F-117 assembly line to procure earlier generation stealth technology is not cost effective. We will continue to capitalize on the F-117's combat proven combination of stealth and precision, but not through greater numbers of F-117s. We are making planned F-117 improvements to sensibly maximize our investment.



**ISSUE:
A-10**

Is the Air Force keeping A-10s in the inventory and, if so, for how long?

As recently as the FY 91 President's Budget, all A-10s were to be retired from the inventory. However, the combat proven tank killer remains a part of the 26.5 FWE Base Force. Two A-10 FWEs, one active and one ARC, will be retained through the Future Year Defense Plan. A-10s will be used in composite wings near Army units to enhance responsiveness.

**ISSUE:
Bomber Force
Structure**



What are the plans for our bomber force structure?

Current plans call for a total bomber force of 20 B-2s, 97 B-1Bs, 95 B-52Hs and 41 Conventional B-52Gs by FY 97. The President's Nuclear Initiatives stress converting our bombers to a primarily conventional role. Therefore, our bomber force is undergoing a process of readjustment and redefinition of roles and missions. This process will result in a force mix which emphasizes prompt, powerful conventional warfighting capable of responding to more than one regional crises while retaining a nuclear capability.

**ISSUE:
B-2**

How will the Air Force employ 20 B-2s?

While the B-2 will retain its potential as a nuclear bomber, the updated mission statement reflects the priority of its conventional role. The B-2 will hold at risk and, if necessary, attack an enemy's war making potential, especially those time critical targets which, if not destroyed in the first hours or days of a conflict, would allow unacceptable damage to be inflicted on the friendly side. These targets include emerging capabilities in some states for the production, support and use of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, a force of 20 B-2s will allow us to deliver a telling blow against the massed conventional forces of an adversary threatening or invading a friendly state. It will also be capable of destroying the backbone of enemy air and air defense capabilities — one essential step in achieving friendly air supremacy.



**ISSUE:
B-2*****What is the capability comparison between 20 and 15 B-2s?***

The President's 20 aircraft buy will allow us to field 16 Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) aircraft in two operational squadrons. The flexibility and versatility of 20 B-2s would significantly increase our capability for sustained combat operations. For example, during the early stages of a conflict, one squadron could fly combat missions from the CONUS while the second squadron deployed to U.S. controlled forward bases. With precision weapons the 20 B-2 force will cover more time-critical targets. The ability to bring continuous firepower to bear against the enemy could be the vital difference in a sustained air campaign.

15 B-2s cannot guarantee the same results. In some cases our ability to provide support, retrofit test aircraft, and perform other modifications and upgrades could be strained. In the best case, with full funding, we estimate that we would field only a single squadron of up to 11 PAA aircraft and lose the deployment and training advantages as well as the extra firepower of the two squadron buy. Without full funding — as in the force capped at 15 proposed by some last year — we would field less than 11 PAA, and perhaps as few as 9 PAA. Compared to the full 16 PAA plan, this is a substantial decrease in capability. 20 B-2s provide significantly greater assurance the primary mission of the B-2 can be accomplished.

**ISSUE:
B-1B*****What are the plans for the B-1B?***

The reduced threat of a nuclear confrontation with the former Soviet Union allows the B-1B to take on an expanded conventional role. Currently, the B-1B is certified to deliver Mk-82 gravity bombs and Mk-36 sea mines while other conventional weapons delivery testing continues. Our planned modifications to the B-1B will cost approximately \$2 billion and include an Inertially Aided Munitions capability, Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) upgrades, interface for future smart weapons, Global Positioning System (GPS), computer memory enhancements and anti-jam radios. The most pressing need for the B-1B remains deferred logistics support which will allow transition to less expensive organic maintenance and provide a deployable capability while saving the Air Force \$1.03 billion through FY 99. In the smaller, tougher Air Force the B-1B will play a vital role.

**ISSUE:
B-52*****What are the plans for the B-52?***

We are currently refining our plans for the B-52 within the overall mix of bombers for the future. The remaining 44 Air Launched Cruise Missile capable B-52Gs will be retired by the end of 1992 and we began the conventional modification of 47 B-52Hs in FY 92 to enhance their conventional capabilities. The B-52H will retain its nuclear capability but will also obtain conventional capabilities similar to those of the B-52G beginning in FY 95.

ISSUE:
Advanced
Medium Range
Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM)

Why do we still need 12,000 AMRAAMs?

The AMRAAM will augment the AIM-7 on the F-15 and provide the F-16 fleet with a long needed ability to fight beyond visual range. The annually updated production requirement is based on the current and projected worldwide threat. Subsequent to submittal of the FY 93 Amended President's Budget request, the Air Force completed a requirements review which revised the production requirement to 9,600 missiles. The details of this reduction are presently being refined in the budget process; however, this won't alter the FY 93 request. The marriage of AMRAAM with our current fighters should meet our air superiority needs through the turn of the century.

Is AMRAAM ready for full-rate production?

AMRAAM, a key element of the joint air-to-air missile master plan, has been very successful in the most thorough test and evaluation program of any missile to date. Additionally, the specifications and manufacturing processes necessary to produce the missile have been improved, making AMRAAM more producible and reliable. The missile provides significant, necessary improvements over earlier missiles, especially with its range and multi-target launch and leave capabilities. Reliability goals have been met and the missile is ready. Full-rate production is needed to achieve an economic production rate and provide missiles to units in a timely manner. The DAB reviewed the program on April 23 and authorized full-rate production.

ISSUE:
Sensor Fuzed Weapon
(SFW)

With the reduced enemy armor threat and the current inventory of Maverick/Combined Effects Munitions, why continue SFW development and procurement?

To better arm our smaller force, we are pursuing technologically smarter weapons with greater capability and increased lethality. The SFW has demonstrated its ability to achieve multiple kills per pass against the kind of armor formations we saw in the Gulf War and can expect to see elsewhere. Analysis indicates the SFW is more cost effective than single kill per pass weapons.

ISSUE:
Joint Weapons
Development


What are you doing in the area of joint service weapons development programs?

The JDAM program, for which the Air Force is executive agent, will mate an inertial navigation kit — updated by the GPS — and a precision seeker to our existing general purpose bombs. Each bomb will be able to steer itself to the target, even in weather unsuitable for current optical and laser weapons. The Joint Standoff Weapons program, for which the Navy is executive agent, expands the Navy's Advanced Interdiction Weapons System program to integrate the SFW BLU-108 submunition for Air Force use.

ISSUE:
Special Operations
Forces (SOF)

What are the plans for our SOF structure?

Current plans call for a SOF structure of 14 MC-130E Combat Talon Is, 24 MC-130H Combat Talon IIs, 12 AC-130U Spectres (to replace, over time, nine AC-130Hs), 25 HC-130 Combat Shadows, 36 MH-53J Pave Low IIIs and 10 MH-60G Pave Hawks. As the active duty force structure builds to these numbers in this decade, 10 AC-130As will be retired to non-flying storage from the AFRES. These will be supplemented by the acquisition of nine AC-130Hs from the active duty force. Our other Reserve unit will convert from five HH-3Es to five HH-60G Pave Hawks. Our lone ANG unit will continue to operate six EC-130Es. SOF force structure will continue to grow until the middle of the decade when SOF will level off as we reach our force build goals.



Airlift and Tankers

The continued health of airlift and tanker assets is essential if we are to rapidly respond in a world where **crises arise suddenly and demand immediate action**, where prepositioning may not always be possible. The integration of these assets into AMC on June 1, 1992 underscores the importance we place on maintaining Global Reach.


The C-17 is critical because the C-141 fleet averages 33,000 hours per airframe and another Service Life Extension Program is economically infeasible. The C-17 offers **greater throughput and an increased ability to deliver outsized cargo to austere fields**. However, even with the planned force of 120 C-17s, the eventual retirement of the C-141s will drive our overall airlift capacity below the 57 Million-Ton-Miles per Day (MTM/D) cited in the recent Mobility Requirements Study (MRS).

The continued need for a robust theater airlift capability was underscored ... during Desert Storm ...

The continued need for a robust theater airlift capability was underscored by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's "left hook" operation during Desert Storm where C-130s moved 13,843 troops and 9,395 tons of key equipment. We are modernizing this vital capability with the acquisition of 165 C-130H models.

As with the fighter force, the ARC is building on their already impressive contribution to mobility. Over half of all our airlift flight crews are in the Guard and Reserve, and by 1995 **nearly half of all tanker and airlift force structure will be in the ARC**.

We are also taking steps to enhance the contributions to Global Reach made by our tanker force. Re-engining is increasing the capability of the KC-135 fleet. The re-engined "R" models have **more power, can take off at greater weights and consume less fuel** during flight. The efficiency and effectiveness of the KC-10 fleet will be improved by retrofitting a portion of the fleet with multiple refueling stations. A portion of the KC-135 fleet will also be equipped with wing mounted air refueling pods for probe and drogue operations. The possibility of adding refueling probes to Air Force fighters is also being explored.



**ISSUE:
C-17*****How is the C-17 test program progressing?***

The flight test program was initiated with the flight of the first aircraft (T-1) on September 15, 1991. Currently the program is slightly behind the Air Force planned flying hour/test points schedule due to a combination of early aircraft fuel leaks and inclement weather. This delay is not unusual with only one test platform. The second aircraft (P-1) was delivered to flight test in May 1992. Full-scale structural testing is underway. Strength testing should be completed by April 1993. Durability article testing is scheduled to begin in the summer of 1992 and the first lifetime objective of 30,000 hours should be completed by the summer of 1993.

Will there be additional cost growth in the C-17 program?

The Air Force estimate for the completion of the Full-Scale Development (FSD) and initial production contract (1 test aircraft/6 production aircraft) is \$7.45 billion while the OSD estimate ranges from \$7.4 to \$8.2 billion. These projections have remained relatively stable since June 1991. The contract ceiling for FSD and Lots I and II is \$6.6 billion. Since this is a fixed price incentive contract, all costs over the contract ceiling are the financial responsibility of the contractor.

Will the C-17 meet technical performance requirements?

The Selected Acquisition Report (December 1991) projection for the range/payload performance is 160,900 pounds at 2,400 nautical miles (based on the engines operating at specification performance levels). Preliminary estimates of the engine Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC) project it to be approximately 2.8 percent short of required performance specification. While these projections are based on analysis only, the System Program Office has initiated three separate reviews of weight, drag, and fuel consumption to evaluate the potential for improvements in each area. An engine SFC improvement program has been started and has achieved an approximate one percent gain. Aircraft P-2 (June 1992 delivery) will be the first aircraft delivered to flight test that will be instrumented for collection of inflight performance data.

Are the contractor's problems behind us?

The recent contractor performance trends have been positive, but there is still work to do. Aircraft T-1 was "flight ready" when it was delivered to Edwards AFB for initial testing. It flew an unprecedented 10 missions in the first 25 days. The contractor is performing in accordance with the production/schedule recovery plan. Production progress and quality are improving with each shipset. The plan to improve in-position work (work performed in correct sequence during assembly) is meeting objectives, resulting in less rework, increased efficiency, and reduced cost.

**ISSUE:
KC-135*****Why is the Air Force retiring KC-135 assets?***

The FY 93 President's Budget retires 75 PAA KC-135As at the rate of 25 per year during FYs 92-94. This decision was the result of an analysis of the tradeoffs between tanker capability and current fiscal constraints. Projected reductions in receiver force structure make these retirements acceptable. Retiring these aircraft allows the Air Force to avoid \$1.6 billion in modification costs alone.

Why is the KC-135E not being re-engined?


The program was terminated because the incremental performance gained by converting the KC-135Es did not justify the \$3.2 billion modification cost. This cost would not be amortized until after FY 2020. The net benefit of re-engining E-models is substantially less than re-engining the A-Model

**ISSUE:
Mobility
Requirements Study*****Does the MRS recommend additional C-17s?***

The MRS supports the need for 120 C-17s which, along with other airlift assets, will provide a 57 MTM/D capability. Although we will be buying all the C-17s we can afford until FY 98, the study does suggest that DOD readdress (in the mid-1990s) airlift requirements and capability in the outyears as the final C-141s begin to retire.

**ISSUE:
C-141*****Why is the Air Force planning to repair and modify the C-141 if it will be retired soon?***

The Air Force plans to retire 106 of the most heavily flown C-141s. These aircraft are undergoing repairs necessary to ensure continued safety of flight until retirement. The retirement of these aircraft will be phased starting in FY 93. The remaining 128 aircraft will undergo safety modifications and reliability/operability improvements to extend their service life to 45,000 hours. Modifications will include autopilot and all weather landing system upgrade, fuel quantity indication systems and the Congressionally mandated ground collision avoidance system.



The force multiplying effects inherent in space-based systems – global coverage, low vulnerability, and autonomous operations – were thoroughly validated.

The Air Force has established a new baseline for space and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C³I) operations because of the dramatic capabilities made available, for the first time, directly to field forces in the Gulf War. **The force multiplying effects inherent in space-based systems — global coverage, low vulnerability, and autonomous operations —** were thoroughly validated. The full range of space capabilities were integrated with air and ground campaigns. GPS provided precise navigation, the Defense Support Program (DSP) relayed early warning of Scud attacks, the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) provided flexible, battlefield communication and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) gave unprecedented weather information directly to the users.

On future battlefields, commanders will rely on the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System (MILSTAR) for **flexible, jam resistant, low probability of intercept command and control**. To improve real-time battle management, we are also developing essential upgrades to the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and we are proceeding with the development and procurement of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) aircraft.

The recent launch of an Atlas II booster with a new DSCS III satellite continues our commitment to **rapid, secure communications** for our force. Early warning of ballistic missile attack will be enhanced by the improved, space-based tactical warning/attack assessment program (formerly FEWS), an interim improvement to DSP.

We have also made important strides in the space launch arena. All three launch vehicles that are the core of the recovery program are now flying. We are committed to modernizing our **aging infrastructure** and are working with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on the National Launch System (NLS) to address long term needs for cost effective, assured access to space.

**ISSUE:
MILSTAR*****Does the restructured MILSTAR comply with Congressional direction to support the tactical user and reduce the constellation size?***

The restructured program's addition of a new tactically oriented Medium Data Rate (MDR) payload on the MILSTAR satellite will significantly increase communication capacity and provide highly mobile tactical users with assured anti-jam communications. The Air Force is conducting system level trade-off studies to determine how to satisfy MDR requirements within the existing bounds of satellite space, weight and power, as well as overall program costs, schedule and risk. Consistent with Congressional direction, the first MDR payload will be added to the fourth and subsequent satellites with delivery planned in 1998.

The restructured MILSTAR program employs a constellation of six satellites (decreased from eight). This reduction results in some high latitude areas no longer having guaranteed 24-hour coverage and complicates the task of meeting the needs of diverse MILSTAR users. Of special interest is the optimal means of satisfying the critical polar requirements. Toward this end, a number of alternatives are being evaluated, including polar satellites or placing MILSTAR packages on other satellites to specifically target northern latitude requirements. This approach could potentially allow MILSTAR satellites to focus on the higher concentration requirements for mid-latitude users.

**ISSUE:
Follow-On
Early Warning
System
(FEWS)*****Why FEWS versus DSP?***

The improved, space-based tactical warning/attack assessment system — formerly called FEWS will expand on the capabilities of DSP to meet a broad range of tactical ballistic missile threats and enhance the nation's space-based tactical warning/attack assessment capabilities. Ballistic missile proliferation, coupled with needed system improvements, dictates a new requirement for assured, continuous, and worldwide coverage.

Are BRILLIANT EYES and FEWS capabilities redundant?

The Air Force will study potential FEWS/BRILLIANT EYES capability overlap during the FEWS Dem/Val phase. The two systems are designed for different missions. BRILLIANT EYES does not meet tactical warning/attack assessment requirements due to its distributed architecture and localized areas of interest. FEWS doesn't meet the mid-course tracking requirements to provide an accurate handover to defensive systems but fulfills a continuous global mission to provide launch warning to the NCA as well as the CINCs.

ISSUE:
**National Launch
System (NLS)**

Why does the nation need NLS?

NLS is more than just another hardware development program. Rather, it is a fundamental shift in the philosophy behind how we will conduct future launch operations. The goal we are trying to achieve with the NLS is to develop, with NASA, a new family of launch vehicles that can meet the broad range of national security, civil, and commercial launch needs — with significant improvements in performance, reliability, flexibility, and cost effectiveness. Transitioning to a more reliable, responsive, and cost effective launch system is key to our plans for modernizing the nation's launch infrastructure. The current vehicles (DELTA II, ATLAS II, TITAN II, and TITAN IV) are heavily modified ICBMs or based on equivalent technology. These launch vehicles, while adequate for today's needs, cannot cost effectively meet the needs and international competitive challenges of the future. The satellites we are building and launching today require safe, reliable, assured access to space. Accordingly, we must continue to make modest investments in our current launch systems, including a program to update our aging launch infrastructure, to get us into the next century — to the point where the transition to NLS will be complete.

ISSUE:
**National Aerospace
Plane (NASP)**

What is the Air Force objective in the NASP program?

NASP is a joint DOD/NASA technology demonstration program that "will develop and demonstrate hypersonic technologies with the ultimate goal of single-stage-to-orbit" (National Space Council, July 1989). NASP will provide the technology options in propulsion, materials, engines, flight controls and avionics for the next generation of operational aerospace vehicles. Phase I, concept exploration, was completed in 1986. The current phase, technology development and demonstration, should be completed by March 1994. Phase III will design, build, and test two X-30s. However, the decision to enter Phase III has been slipped to September 1993 due to Congressional funding reductions.

What is the relationship between NASP, NLS, and the Single Stage Rocket Technology (SSRT) Programs?

NASP is a joint DOD/NASA research program to develop the enabling technologies for manned airbreathing single-stage-to-orbit and hypersonic cruise. NLS is a joint DOD/NASA acquisition program with a first launch in 2002 to provide the next generation of launch vehicles using current state of the art manufacturing technologies. SSRT is a Strategic Defense Initiative Organization program to demonstrate sub-scale, sub-orbital rocket technology for potential use in a reusable system. The Air Force views NLS as the next generation launch system while NASP and SSRT are applications a generation beyond NLS.

**ISSUE:
TITAN IV*****What has been done to fix the Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade (SRMU) program?***

The first full scale test firing of the SRMU for the Titan IV in April 1991 ended in catastrophic failure. After extensive analysis, the Air Force determined that a design flaw caused a failure where the rocket motor segments are joined. Following extensive modelling and redesign, the problem was corrected. A critical design review was completed last February and a retest of the motor is scheduled for late May 1992. Five test firings will be conducted on the SRMU prior to a first launch in FY 94.

Does the Titan IV restructure satisfy launch requirements while maintaining the industrial base?

The Air Force executed a program slowdown in September 1991 to align production with launch requirements. The production rate decreased from ten per year to five per year to support launch requirements while maintaining an industrial base of critical skills until a follow-on buy is initiated in FY 95.

**ISSUE:
Space Nuclear
Thermal Propulsion
(SNTTP) Program*****Why is the Air Force interested in a nuclear-powered engine?***

The Air Force is interested in a nuclear thermal powered engine for upper stage launch applications primarily because a nuclear engine offers more than twice the performance of chemical rocket engines. This translates into smaller transfer vehicles taking significantly heavier payloads into medium and high orbits. The SNTTP was initiated in October 1991 to validate the technology for a prototype engine. Although the Air Force leads this technology program, an Memorandum of Agreement is being coordinated with both NASA and the Department of Energy to define each agency's responsibilities in this effort.

**ISSUE:
Joint STARS*****What is the status of the Joint STARS Program?***

The program met the OSD exit criteria before proceeding with advance procurement for the first two production aircraft and is in the process of awarding the contract. The final phase of contractor developmental testing and the start of government testing began last October. Plans call for a total of 20 aircraft (19 operational and one test aircraft) with an IOC of FY 97. The capability to provide near real-time battlefield surveillance and targeting information for the Air Force and Army remains a high priority.

Quality Air Force

Quality Air Force describes our approach to reorienting, restructuring and resizing aerospace forces. Our careful attention to personnel, training and education, infrastructure, Reliability and Maintainability (R&M), and advanced technology reflects this commitment.

***During this process,
recruiting and retaining
the best people will
remain our highest
priorities.***

The Air Force will reduce military end strength in FY 93 by approximately 35,000 to reach 449,900 while also reducing our civilian force to 213,870. During this process, recruiting, training and retaining the best **people will remain our highest priorities**. Our concerns are the timing of the drawdown, keeping faith with a successful all-volunteer force, preserving the right mix of skills and experience among our rated and non-rated personnel, and preparing and motivating the force that remains. We will also endeavor to provide assistance for those transitioning to civilian careers.

During this period of fundamental change, training grows in importance. In fact, so important that we are calling 1992 the Year of Training and are doing a "wall-to-wall" system review. We have reduced flying hours programmatically, but because of changes in force structure we have maintained flying hours per month for aircrews at a steady level. Training is tied directly to our Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. In O&M, we are already on the lean edge.

Readiness remains a primary concern. The FY 93 budget balances readiness and sustainability. To lower and better control costs and to allocate funds for the greatest need, we are improving our business practices.

Equally important to readiness is infrastructure. Here our focus is on the timing and funding of base closures, improving environmental protection, accelerating site cleanup, promoting pollution abatement, maintaining aging facilities on our remaining bases, arresting escalating energy costs, completing essential construction, and improving quality of life. Major Military Construction (MILCON) in FY 93 will drop beneath previous lows in FYs 91 and 92. We have not increased real property maintenance. However, we have continued to increase our commitment to environmental compliance with expenditures that exceed \$1 billion in FY 93.

Our insurance for the future rests on our R&M and Science and Technology (S&T) programs. In our new integrated weapon system acquisition process, R&M is "built-in" early. A robust S&T effort maintains a balance between core programs and areas of significant military import.

The desire for truly integrated weapon system management is the basis for our decision to create Air Force Materiel Command. It demonstrates our restructure themes of streamlining, consolidating, integrating, divesting and empowering — characteristic of a Quality Air Force.

**ISSUE:
Military End Strength*****How will the Air Force meet military end strength?***


In order to meet reduced military end strength, the Air Force has been drawing down since 1986 using a balanced approach of constrained accessions, voluntary early releases, career force constraints and early retirements. Involuntary separations are used only as a last resort. Use of the Voluntary Separation Incentive/Special Separation Bonus (VSI/SSB) will greatly reduce and may eliminate the need for involuntary actions for enlisted personnel in FY 93, although early indications are that the officer responses to VSI/SSB may be insufficient to avoid involuntary actions.

**ISSUE:
Civilian End Strength*****How is the Air Force reducing civilian end strength?***

The Air Force will be able to reduce its FY 92 civilian end strength through use of the DOD hiring freeze, attrition, and Reduction-in-Force (RIF). Additional RIF will be necessary in FY 93 because of base closures and force realignments. Work load related programmatic cuts will also result in RIF.

**ISSUE:
Training*****Why has the Air Force designated 1992 as the "Year of Training," and what are the objectives?***

The Air Force role is to organize, train, and equip aerospace forces for combat operations. This past year we have successfully implemented a variety of organizational changes, but we have never conducted a wall-to-wall review of our training programs. This year we will examine Air Force training to determine if we are organized correctly and if there is a consistent set of training policies and suitable standards. Our goal is to help ensure a quality force by providing all Air Force personnel the right level of training at the appropriate time during their careers.



**ISSUE:
Training**

Given the overall force structure reductions, do we need to continue with the program outlined in the 1989 Training Aircraft Masterplan?

While we have continued to make adjustments to the Masterplan to reflect force structure revisions and budgetary restrictions, the underlying requirements remain. The requirements which generated the T-1A (Tanker Transport Trainer System (TTTS)) are still valid. The first T-1A was delivered in January 1992 and procurement is progressing on schedule. However, due to diminished training requirements, we have reduced the total T-1A buy from 211 to 180. This will support our long-term TTTS training requirements. Similarly, we plan to execute the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System on time to replace our T-37s and the Navy's T-34Cs. This joint program, designed to meet both the Air Force's and Navy's primary aircraft training requirements, will provide significant cost savings and management efficiencies throughout the development, procurement and operational phases. On the other hand, we are examining alternatives to a developmental effort to replace the T-38 with the Bomber-Fighter Training System. This is potentially the most expensive proposition in the Masterplan, and we are seeking ways to minimize the cost without compromising the quality of training.

**ISSUE:
Base Closure**

What is the status of the current base closures? Will there be another round of base closures?

We are in the process of closing bases in accordance with the recommendations of the 1988 and 1991 Base Closure Commissions. A total of 18 bases were recommended for closure in addition to one major realignment. Pease AFB, NH, was closed on March 31, 1991 and property disposal is underway. An additional 10 bases are scheduled for closure in FY 93, beginning with three bases (England AFB, LA, Eaker AFB, AR, and George AFB, CA) in December 1992. Six more bases are scheduled for closure and one base, MacDill AFB, FL, is scheduled for realignment in FY 94. Castle AFB, CA, is scheduled for closure in FY 95. Missions generally are scheduled to depart closure bases six months to one year prior to the closure date. Two additional Base Closure Commissions are scheduled by law to convene in calendar years 1993 and 1995.

**ISSUE:
Overseas Presence**

Why is the Air Force maintaining such a large presence in Europe?

Our FY 95 European end strength of 44,800 is half that of FY 85. It preserves a 3.25 FWE force compared to a previous level of 8.5 and supports our base force capabilities of air superiority, close air support and interdiction. Additional manpower, like the base at Incirlik, Turkey, supports the intelligence, communications, transportation and supply infrastructure required for an overseas presence. U.S. military presence in Europe contributes to stability during a period of rapid change. It allows us to meet the nation's commitment to NATO and to sustain our leadership in European security. This leadership, in turn, allows us to influence political and economic decisions in an area of vital U.S. interests.

**ISSUE:
Overseas Presence**

Why is the Air Force not reducing its European forces at a quicker pace?

We are already reducing our FY 95 European military presence to the minimum level necessary to support our Base Force responsibilities. This drawdown rate has already adversely affected the people involved in the relocation process. Bringing people back at this already accelerated pace has saturated the household goods pipeline, causing many service members and their families to be stationed at new duty locations while their belongings remained behind in Europe. Children are being forced to change schools in mid-year, and many spouses have lost their jobs, unexpectedly creating added financial pressures on those families. Further accelerating the pace of this return of our people from Europe will only increase the severity of the hardships.

What is the net marginal cost of troops deployed in Europe versus the CONUS?

To keep our forces in Europe the net marginal cost is \$264 million annually over the cost of stationing those same forces in CONUS. The net marginal cost results from additional allowance entitlements incurred with an overseas assignment and include an overseas station allowance and permanent change of station costs.

**ISSUE:
Permanent Change of
Station (PCS) Policy**

Have you reviewed the three-year PCS policy in light of the smaller force and cost of moves?

We looked at our three-year minimum time-on-station policy last July, along with several other issues related to reducing PCS moves and saving money. We concluded that a change to our three-year rule was not needed. While we can expect to make fewer moves in the future, the projected drawdown will keep the proportion of moves we make about the same.

**ISSUE:
Rated Force
Management**

Why is the Air Force continuing to pay a pilot bonus?

Although masked by the force drawdown, pilot retention remains a problem. Because of the steady demand for commercial pilots, our well-trained pilots continue to enjoy attractive opportunities outside the Air Force. We continue to retain only one out of three of our pilots in the critical 8 to 12 year group. Despite force structure reductions, we are projecting a shortfall of 3,000 pilots by FY 97. Therefore, like a reenlistment bonus, a pilot bonus is fundamental to shaping and retaining the quality force needed for the future.

**ISSUE:
Rated Force
Management**

How does the Air Force allocate Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) slots to Air Force Academy, Officer Training School, and Reserve Officer Training Corps graduates?

The Air Force is committed to maintaining a balance of commissioning sources into UPT. We are currently managing a temporary problem where the percentage of Academy graduates comprise 50 percent of the UPT entrants in FY 92-94, up from 30 percent in FY 80-91. We are currently reviewing out-year options to return to a balanced distribution among all sources starting in FY 96.

What is the status of the Pilot Banking Program and how long will it last?

The pilot banking program was initiated in FY 91 in response to rapid force structure cuts inside the lead time to adjust accessions. The UPT production rate was cut by 45 percent from FY 91 to FY 92 and 603 pilots were placed (banked) in a variety of non-flying jobs for three years. The first banked pilots are scheduled for requalification training in March 1994 — 34 months after UPT graduation. The banking program was originally planned to terminate at the end of FY 92. However, backlogs awaiting major weapons system training and resultant training delays may necessitate continued banking.

**ISSUE:
Women in
Combat Aircraft**

What is the status of allowing women to fly Air Force combat aircraft?

Although the Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces will not make their final recommendations until November 1992, the Air Force is already measuring impact on operational readiness and planning to implement a gender-neutral assignments system. We will cooperate fully with the Commission.

**ISSUE:
Health Care**

What is being done to control rising costs?

We feel the DOD Coordinated Care Program will aid cost control and provide better access to health care. Enrollment and establishment of local health care networks is expected to begin this year at 34 CONUS Air Force sites. This program gives the medical treatment facility commander the authority, flexibility and tools needed to perform the health care mission. Other programs to contain cost growth include alternate use of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services funds (CHAMPUS), the management efficiency program, the Veteran Affairs/Air Force Resource Sharing where Veterans Administration hospitals let their facilities be used for services not available in DOD facilities, and the Health Care Finder Program which identifies CHAMPUS providers.

**ISSUE:
Health Care**

What plans does the Air Force have to provide medical care for retirees once a base closes?

The Air Force recognizes the medical needs of DOD retirees in base closure locations and is participating in an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs joint service working group that addresses this issue. This working group is developing recommendations concerning health care delivery policies for areas not served directly by a military hospital, including bases identified for closure. In the meantime, we sought and have the support of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for pursuing a managed care request for proposal for a private contractor to provide health care for retirees in some areas.

**ISSUE:
Medical Service
Retention**

What impact has Desert Storm had on recruiting and retention?

The number of medical service applications fell during Desert Shield/Desert Storm but are significantly up for FY 92. The ANG and AFRES had similar experiences. However, we concluded that these effects are temporary and short term. Although many people have not reached their first decision point, we see no long-term impact on medical service retention and do not anticipate future problems. We still lose one out of two medical professionals at their first exit point. Therefore, we are seeking increased compensation through targeted bonuses and other incentives while bringing in additional civilian medical support personnel through unrestricted hiring.

**ISSUE:
Recruiting and
Advertising**

Why does the Air Force continue to spend so much on recruiting and advertising when you are downsizing and the economy is so conducive to easier recruiting?

The Air Force recruiting budget has actually decreased by 22 percent during the last three years, while our accessions have increased by 20 percent over last year. Our accessions will again increase by eight percent in FY 93 with no corresponding increase in the budget. It is inaccurate to assume that today's economy is "conducive to recruiting." While youth unemployment has risen slightly, the youth population — our prime recruiting target — is actually decreasing. In addition, more than two-thirds of our advertising budget focuses on health care professionals and we continue to fall short of those recruiting needs. Our recruiting problem is not just one of quantity. Our main concern is quality. We must continue to invest in recruiting to ensure we continue to get quality people in an increasingly competitive job market.

**ISSUE:
Total Quality
Management
(TQM)**

How is the Air Force implementing TQM?

We are incorporating the principles of TQM in a Quality Air Force, building the world's most respected air and space force to achieve Global Reach-Global Power for America. These principles, proven in the public and private sectors, offer us an integrated, systematic approach to developing a Quality Air Force leadership style reflecting the themes of streamlining, stronger command links, and consolidation with decentralization. The main tenets of our Quality Air Force emphasize leadership involvement (articulating a vision and policies at the top); decentralized organization (tear down functional walls, eliminate unneeded layers); employee involvement (worker level teams with clear-cut mission and autonomy); training (to support involvement and empowerment); open corporate culture (with information sharing emphasizing customer involvement); and fact-based decision making (without which, improvement is accidental and temporary). An Air Force Quality Council, co-chaired by the Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary, was established to provide senior guidance. The Air Force Quality Center has been established to be a center of expertise to support Air Force organizations in their efforts to implement quality principles.



ISSUE:
**Operations and
Maintenance Funding**

Is O&M funding adequate to support readiness of the force structure?

The requested level of O&M funding is sufficient to maintain readiness for the reduced levels of force structure and operating tempo we have programmed in FY 93. The requested O&M funding reflects a carefully devised balance of resources and needs. We continue to have concerns about the pace of the reduction in infrastructure and basic logistical support, including depot maintenance backlogs and real property maintenance. Any cuts to O&M will further degrade sustainability and will have an immediate impact on current force readiness.

How will an O&M funding cut in flying hours affect Air Force readiness?

The flying hour program is designed to meet aircrew training requirements and assure a responsive and ready force to meet national security needs. One Congressional proposal is to cut FY 93 O&M funding by \$4.5 billion. To absorb the Air Force share (approximately \$1.5 billion) of this proposed O&M reduction, we would have to reduce flying hours supporting our combat coded aircraft by at least 14.8 percent.

Our overall flying hour program is funded at approximately 85 percent of the total training requirement — the minimum acceptable level based on our experience. An additional cut of 14.8 percent in hours will place all of our major weapons systems well below acceptable levels for combat readiness. Aircrew training levels will degrade. Aircrews will be unable to maintain mission ready status. Some of our aircrew members would not be able to even maintain basic flying qualifications. A disproportionate number of already limited resources would have to be dedicated to a constant cycle of requalification and recertification. This would lead to loss of the multi-role capabilities of many weapons systems and significantly increase the time required to prepare for conflict. Additionally, fighter operations have demonstrated that a decrease of one hour per crew, per month equates to an increase of .5 in the accident rate per 100,000 hours. Any resultant savings from this proposed flying hour reduction is more than offset by the unnecessary loss of additional lives and equipment. Finally, training and readiness in the Air Force would be seriously degraded.

Why is O&M not declining at the same rate as other accounts?

The O&M funding decline has outpaced force structure changes and is a top concern consistently identified by our field commanders. FY 93 funding reflects a 23 percent decline since FY 90. The slowed pace of decline in FY 93 (1.4 percent) will allow reductions in force structure and management changes to catch up to the already reduced O&M funding levels of those years.

**ISSUE:
Excess Inventory*****What is the Air Force doing to reduce excess inventory?***

The Air Force has an aggressive inventory reduction program and through this program has already reduced inventory by six percent in FY 91. Numerous improvements in the way we compute and stock materials are being made in compliance with the DOD Inventory Reduction Plan. We are also following Congressional direction to restrict stock fund buying to 80 percent of sales. The Air Force's projected inventory for 1997 is \$28.3 billion — down more than 26 percent (\$10.2 billion) since 1991.

**ISSUE:
Depot Maintenance
Operations*****Does the Air Force anticipate the consolidation of depot maintenance facilities as a result of the defense drawdown?***

The Air Force has no current plans to close depots. We will reevaluate the posture and workload of the depots during the 1993 base closure analysis. Our depots are essential for providing wartime/peacetime repair and have capabilities not available anywhere else. As the Air Force downsizes its existing depots, it can consolidate some into newer, more efficient facilities while preserving capital investment for quick expansion if needed. We are making our depots increasingly competitive and increasing the amount of interservice work load. The objective is to get our depots into such "fighting trim," that organic maintenance will be our most cost effective option.

**ISSUE:
Environmental
Cleanup*****Will the environmental cleanup keep pace with the base closure process?***

The Air Force is committed to completing the environmental cleanup process and will take remedial actions prior to closure dates wherever feasible. Clean up at Round I bases is sufficiently funded and on schedule. However, funding delays threaten our Round II base closure cleanup efforts. The FY 92 DOD supplemental appropriations request combined with correction of conflicting FY 92 legislative language and the FY 93 budget request are needed to sustain our efforts. The actual impact of funding delay is on community reuse plans and our ability to dispose of property in a timely fashion. It does not present any environmental threat. Closures can proceed as planned.

**ISSUE:
Industrial Base*****What is the Air Force doing to preserve the domestic industrial base?***

The Air Force is integrating industrial base considerations into the acquisition process. We are funding a five-part program in this effort: industrial planning to identify bottlenecks/shortfalls/opportunities and recommend solutions; the Manufacturing Technology program, to transition R&D breakthroughs from the labs to the factories; an industrial modernization incentive program, to encourage industry to invest in modern capital equipment; facilities, to maintain government owned plants with unique defense capabilities; and, the Defense Production Act, Title III, to create/expand domestic capacity.

**ISSUE:
MILCON**

What has the Air Force done to keep MILCON requirements within fiscal constraints?

Our strategy is to achieve a balanced downsizing of our facility requirements to match the downsizing of the active forces by meeting three criteria. Facility requirements must be able to adequately support the assigned missions of a downsized force. Requirements must be sized and configured so that we can afford adequate funding for maintenance and repair. The reduced facility requirements must not compromise the quality of our facilities. To meet this strategy, we are in the process of closing 18 CONUS bases, realigning a 19th base and withdrawing from another base. We also have a major effort underway to withdraw from a substantial number of overseas bases. This includes both total and partial withdrawals at 24 installations through FY 95. Also planned are several new initiatives to reduce our facility structure. We are downsizing logistics depots, consolidating research laboratories and improving the utilization of existing facility space to increase efficiency. Within fiscal constraints, the Air Force has made sacrifices necessary to achieve a responsible quality level.

Although we are complying with the procedures, we could experience limited availability in our expired accounts. Furthermore, it could be possible some accounts may experience liabilities that exceed available balances. We are looking at these while developing new business strategies which would allow us to manage current appropriations within the requirements of the change in legislation.

**ISSUE:
Defense
Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act**

What is the status of Air Force implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)?

The DAWIA requires the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to establish policies and procedures for effective management of the DOD acquisition workforce including creation of a professional Acquisition Corps within each of the Military Departments. Designation of acquisition categories within DOD was completed Oct. 1, 1991 and a list of critical acquisition positions is to be published no later than Oct. 1, 1992. The DAWIA also requires the SECDEF to establish and charter a defense acquisition university structure (consisting of one or more institutions) to provide for professional educational development; conduct research and analysis of defense acquisition policy issues; and operate as a centrally directed and managed structure no later than Oct. 1, 1992. Establishment and implementation of criteria/procedures for membership in the Acquisition Corps is on schedule and due by Oct. 1, 1993. Appropriate career paths for civilian and military acquisition personnel will be developed in terms of education, training, experience, assignments, and promotions. Establishment of education, training and experience requirements for each acquisition position are on schedule and are to be effective no later than October 1993.