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


SSI Special Report

Strategic Outreach Conference Report

**The Western European Union
in the 1990s:
Searching for a Role**

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Strategic Outreach Roundtable Paper and Conference Report

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 1990s:
SEARCHING FOR A ROLE

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This document was edited by Dr. Thomas-Durell Young and LTC William T. Johnsen of the Strategic Studies Institute, who served as organizers of this roundtable. It is approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.


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FOREWORD

The growth in European defense integration since the latter 1980s has become a vexing issue for U.S. policymakers. U.S. policy has long supported European integration as a means to underwriting stability on that important continent. However, with the end of the Cold War, the value of NATO as an agent and means for pursuing U.S. security and diplomatic objectives in Europe has increased, at a time when its inherent value is continuously being questioned. It is little wonder, therefore, that initiatives to expand and increase Western European defense activities and prerogatives are seen as being inimical to NATO and, therefore, U.S. interests. A better factual understanding of the Western European Union (WEU), and of initiatives for European defense integration and associated problems, is of interest to the defense community and to the U.S. Army, as well.

As executive agent of the Chief of Staff of the Army's Strategic Outreach Program, the Strategic Studies Institute organized a roundtable discussion of this issue in Washington, D.C., in May 1993. The centerpiece of this meeting was a discussion of a paper presented by the widely-known expert on European defense integration and the WEU, Dr. Peter Schmidt of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany. In addition to his extensive background and writings on these issues, Dr. Schmidt also had the advantage of recently having spent six months at the WEU's Institute for Security Studies in Paris. Keeping very close track of the ensuing discussion of experts at this roundtable was Dr. Wolfgang Schlör of the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh. An edited version of Dr. Schmidt's paper and Dr. Schlör's summary follow.

The Strategic Studies Institute is most appreciative of those who participated in the roundtable, as well as the Washington Office of the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung for co-sponsoring this meeting. We are pleased to offer this essay and roundtable summary to the literature on the WEU and European Defense Identity.



JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
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SSI Workshop with Dr. Peter Schmidt
Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Washington, DC, May 6, 1993

Summary of Discussion

Rapporteur: Dr. Wolfgang F. Schlör, Ridgway Center,
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Proceedings:

I. NATO Membership Expansion.

- o Some of the "poorer" NATO members will be against accepting new members, because they would lose benefits by membership expansion. The armed forces of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey have been greatly improved with aid from other NATO members (infrastructure, support for less-developed defense industries, equipment hand-me-downs etc.) If East European countries were to join NATO, they might become the prime recipients of such aid.
- o East European membership in the WEU might be less threatening to Russia than NATO membership, because it is linked to EC membership.
- o There is a basic difference between expanding NATO and expanding the WEU: The current members of WEU do not have the choice to keep new EC members out, while candidates for NATO have to be accepted by all of NATO's current members (e.g., Turkey could block the admission of a new NATO member in retaliation for not being accepted as a full WEU member.
- o However, since the Petersberg declaration of 1991, WEU membership requires that new members subscribe to all previous resolutions, to include the Petersberg resolution. Thus, new memberships are highly conditioned and might cause a problem for formerly neutral countries, such as Sweden.
- o Despite the intentions laid down in the Maastricht Draft Treaty on Political Union, the WEU and EC are likely to remain separate entities. Nevertheless, special interests by France and Britain will continue to provide an impetus for developing the WEU.
- o The reason for attaching sweeping conditions for new WEU members is to raise the threshold, in particular

to prevent neutral countries from watering down the WEU mandate.

- o Expanding NATO or the WEU does not necessarily have to hurt the effectiveness of these institutions. More important than membership is the mandate and the decision-making process. For example, the EC is able to use a large membership to its advantage in the field of trade relations and agriculture because its members have transferred sovereignty to the institution. There is no reason why a similar arrangement cannot work for NATO or the WEU.

II. U.S. Reasons for Opposing European Defense Initiatives.

- o The attitudes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) toward new European defense initiatives are heavily influenced by U.S. officials seconded to NATO, which have been alarmist in the past. However, the consternation about European initiatives is less among people with more knowledge about the European process.
- o One of the concerns in the United States about independent European security institutions is the risk of Washington being dragged into conflicts resulting from unilateral European actions. However, the possibility for such inadvertent involvement seems remote. Moreover, it exists even without WEU initiatives. For example, NATO AWACS aircraft patrolling over Hungary could cause an attack on Hungary. NATO could be forced to defend Hungary without a formal security relationship.
- o France missed a unique opportunity when it decided not to participate in the NATO command structure reform process. If it had done so, the United States probably would have agreed to new NATO structures with greater European influence. On the other hand, the participation of France in the integrated command structure would have complicated the process. One could argue that France stays out of exactly those parts of the alliance which it wants and needs to function well.

III. NATO vs. WEU.

- o The collective defense role of NATO will not be sufficient to sustain support within the United States. NATO has to evolve into one of two directions:
 - oo It can extend some form of security guarantee to other countries beyond the EC (which, in the United States, is perceived as strong and wealthy enough to care for itself) or,
 - oo It can develop into a framework for out-of-area missions conducted jointly by the European members and the United States. The latter is likely to be difficult, since out-of-area operations tend to be ad hoc.
- o Regardless of where NATO is headed, it is departing from its emphasis on collective defense and extended deterrence. It is ironic that the first combat role for NATO (the enforcement of the no-fly-zone) is part of a UN-sponsored peace-enforcement mission, even though peace-enforcing is at odds with NATO's original identity. Yugoslavia is also the first case of crisis management where NATO is involved as an institution, as opposed to a de facto framework providing the capabilities to an ad hoc coalition (such as Desert Shield/Storm).
- o It appears that the East European countries want to join a NATO that no longer exists, namely a NATO providing collective defense.
- o On the other hand, a case could be made that peace-enforcing is part of containment strategy, as it keeps local and regional conflicts from spreading, causing spill-over for the NATO area.
- o While there are still many reasons for NATO's existence, the "sell" has become harder than during the Cold War, and the search for a new role for NATO has become necessary.
- o Nevertheless, the argument that NATO needs to redefine its role will become less important as NATO becomes more involved in resolving international crises.

- o De facto, NATO is playing an extensive role in international peacekeeping operations. The Yugoslavia peacekeeping headquarters is build around the core of NORTHAG headquarters, utilizing additional personnel from other countries. All ad hoc arrangements in the region will be based on NATO structures, regardless of the official label.

IV. WEU Military Initiatives.

- o The principal reason for promoting the WEU is the ultimate goal to create one single political actor in Europe. The realization of this goal is not conceivable without a European security identity. The inherent contradiction, that this security actor would still be dependent on the United States in all major contingencies, is usually not addressed. Hence, there is a political, but not a military, rationale for a stronger WEU.
- o WEU command arrangements continue to be a problem, because, heretofore, they have been decided ad hoc. There is no permanent command structure. If a commander for an operation is needed, the country holding the WEU presidency at the time provides him. There is very little prospect, for the moment, that a commander could be chosen according to military or practical requirements.
- o WEU operations during the Gulf War provided an example of these command problems. The WEU minesweeping operations were headed by a French "coordinator," whose actual role was limited to that of a figurehead. All command and control was provided by NATO staffs. All other WEU operations in the Gulf War comprised only French and Spanish naval forces.
- o The blockade operation in the Adriatic sea, where both the WEU and NATO have deployed naval contingents, has posed fewer problems. However, the circumstances of WEU's involvement are unique and are unlikely to be repeated again: Italy happened to hold the WEU presidency at the time, and thus provided the commander of the naval contingent. This commander would not only have been the natural choice, but he was also the commander of NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, thus controlling both the NATO and the WEU forces.

- o A possible solution to reconciling the need for a European military component and for operational soundness would be to create structures within NATO where Europeans play a greater role. For example, Germany proposed to place the ARRC planning staff not directly under SACEUR. Such European-dominated command structures could then be used on an ad hoc basis for West-European mandated operations.
- o For a credible WEU operational role, the establishment of an integral relationship with NATO is mandatory. Those who would like to see a substantial role for the WEU are likely to promote such a relationship.
- o One impetus behind strengthening the WEU is the concern among Europeans that they might want to pursue international security policies which the United States is reluctant to follow. For example, the WEU satellite ground station in Spain provides an independent intelligence capability, completely separate from NATO.
- o However, independent action would also be possible on an ad hoc basis by utilizing European components of NATO staffs. In addition, only minor cases are conceivable where the United States would not join the West European NATO members in a military operation.
- o If the WEU were to create a formal European caucus within the NATO council, the effectiveness of NATO as a political institution would be endangered. NATO would lose its flexibility, because a non-negotiable European standpoint would be pitted against the U.S. position.
- o Another implication of European security initiatives is the undermining of the U.S.-German security relationship. It could be argued that, by supporting the policy of a common European defense policy, Germany loses the United States as an outside partner to bargain with France within the EC and WEU. France, on the other hand, has the southern member states of the EC and WEU as potential allies.
- o On the other hand, some of the smaller member states of the EC and WEU have a strong interest not to be overpowered by France and Germany. Thus, they might

be looking for the United States as an outside ally within NATO. However, some of the smaller countries have developed skills at playing the bigger powers against each other.

V. Multinational Force Structure.

- o While NATO provides the benefits of an integrated, well-trained force structure, these benefits are likely to disappear over time. Close integration, as well as an extensive infrastructure, were necessary during the Cold War, and the resulting experience will be available only during a short transition period.
- o NATO's decision to create multinational corps was based on the need to sustain some measure of force structure which multinational corps might justify. These corps will help to preserve joint training experience despite force reductions, and create integration at lower levels. A smaller force structure might also drive NATO toward greater interoperability, which has been an elusive goal during the Cold War.
- o An advantage of multinational corps has been that they make it easier to justify defense improvements, vis-à-vis the domestic political constituency. The creation of the Dutch airmobile brigade, for example, would not have been possible if it had not been justified with its role in a multinational division.
- o On the other hand, the role of multinational corps in justifying defense expenditures has its limits. While the concept might be able to promote certain capabilities over others, it was not able to prevent the free fall in European force structures over the past few years.
- o A possible problem with multinational corps is the creation of operational dependencies which lead to incomplete national force structures. For example, there will be no Dutch army corps structure, because the remaining Dutch division is to be integrated in a joint German-Dutch corps, led by a German headquarters. Thus, the Netherlands has lost the independent capability for national large-unit training. Also, more importantly, if certain

countries decide not to participate in operations, this could impede remaining NATO forces.

- o However, with the exception of very small armed forces, this danger will be limited. Multinational corps only "exist" for training and wartime purposes. In peacetime, national corps, or a replacement organization, will still be present.
- o Moreover, NATO members increasingly prefer the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) over Main Defense Forces in their national defense priorities, due to the higher profile of the ARRC. This has led it to grow 10 division equivalents. For practical purposes, 5 divisions are the maximum capacity for ARRC, and not all of the ARRC is supposed to be deployed in a given contingency. Moreover, some units are dual-hatted to the ARRC and Main Defense Forces. Finally, the receding threat from the East and the buffer zone formed by Eastern Europe may not warrant a large defense force in Europe anymore.
- o There are additional questions about the capabilities of the ARRC. Many of the European NATO members have territorially based Combat Support/Combat Service Support formations that cannot easily be transferred out of region. For instance, German divisions, as currently structured, could not be sustained away from Germany. Thus, NATO members should reduce the number of forces in ARRC and focus on logistics and modernization of remaining forces instead.
- o Guidelines for the deployment of the Eurocorps in NATO contingencies maintain that any assignment would have to be ad hoc. However, the implications of this restriction are probably not severe, because planners can assume a generic corps with given capabilities in contingency plans.
- o The current division of labor tends to allocate special capabilities and leadership to the United States, while European allies assume ground combat. With regard to Yugoslavia, there is an ongoing debate in the United States whether this division of labor should be maintained. This debate is further complicated by the question whether the United States should become involved at all campaigns, given that Europe possesses both the force structure and the projection capability for Yugoslavia.

- o Currently, there is no specialization among NATO allies in Yugoslavia. All participants in the no-fly-zone enforcement provide fighter aircraft. Also, there is no principal difference between the naval assets that are used to monitor the arms embargo. Overall, it is easier from a planning point of view to avoid a division of roles, because it reduces dependencies on single countries.

VI. Public Opinion and Accountability.

- o The creation of a common European security policy means that responsibility is passed on to another level of decisionmaking. From a national perspective, responsibility tends to get lost as it gets passed on. This fear is the background of the current German debate on amending the constitution to allow out-of-area combat. The Bundestag wants to introduce a special vote on such operations to retain some measure of sovereignty over security policy. The German government, meanwhile, is using Somalia and Yugoslavia to force the parliament into accepting a solution.
- o The public perception of the WEU and NATO in Germany or elsewhere is not overly influenced by the possibility of combat in Yugoslavia or Somalia. Because all NATO countries have a policy of sending only professionals or volunteers into out-of-area operations, the public remains relatively unaffected by this debate.
- o Overall, there is currently a vacuum in international leadership in NATO. The public would be willing to follow if there were more concrete guidelines where NATO wants to go, and what it needs to do. Thus, the public skepticism in supporting security policies expresses in fact a failure of international leadership.
- o There is also a need to provide focus: The proliferation of institutions that are involved in international security confuses the public and contributes to the problem of accountability. The right response to this problem, however, is not to increase the reliance on national resources, but to strengthen the international level and make national planning consistent with this level.

- o There might be different approaches to improve this situation, depending on the country involved. The United States, for example, has relied on a bottom-up approach in forming decisions about security policy (see the debate on Desert Shield/Storm). Germany, on the other hand, has a tradition of strong government, and a top-down approach.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 1990s: SEARCHING FOR A ROLE

Introduction and Historical Overview.

From an historic point of view, the modified Brussels Treaty, which established the Western European Union (WEU), had only a subsidiary and complementary, and thus unproblematic, function in its relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community (EC), and European Policy Cooperation (EPC). It was adapted after the decision to arm the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and its purpose was to monitor the rearmament process. As a condition of armament, Bonn had to agree to forego the production of Atomic Biological and Chemical weapons and additional strategic armaments.¹ This added a second dimension of control to the integration of West Germany in NATO. The FRG was thereby placed under two control regimes, one European, the other Atlantic. Whereas the Atlantic Alliance was principally conceived as an alliance of sovereign states with equal rights, the WEU treaty contained certain discriminatory elements with respect to West Germany. Therefore, from the German viewpoint, a prerequisite for the activation of the WEU in the 1980s was the elimination of the unequal treatment in the treaty framework.

The modified Brussels Treaty also regulated the maximum troop strength which each of the European states should make available to NATO. Additionally, it provided a legal framework for the presence of armed forces from the United Kingdom on the Continent.² The WEU treaty thus represented an important legal and political prerequisite for the European contribution in the Atlantic Alliance.³ Giving the WEU an independent function in the organization of Western defense was neither foreseen nor anticipated in the mid-1950s. With the issuance of the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU in June 1992, however, the Treaty's previous purpose has radically changed.

After the mid-1950s, all other actual or conceivable tasks within the framework of the treaty in security, defense, social, and economic, as well as cultural areas, were increasingly fulfilled by other organizations, such as the Council of Europe, NATO, etc.⁴ Beyond its two main functions, the WEU only gained the interest of treaty partners when envisaged results could not be achieved through some other international organization, i.e., it became almost the organizational choice of last resort. In this sense, the WEU had a reserve or support function in the network of European organizations and committees and was not given an independent

area of competence which could cause it to come in conflict with other organizations. The WEU today continues to be seen by many as an auxiliary organization which is useful only so long as defense policy questions cannot be directly integrated into the EC.

Although the mutual assistance clause identifies the WEU as a collective defense system, the WEU was not conceived as an "alliance in the shadows," as the title of a recently published book on the WEU suggests.⁵ Instead, it had the early mission of creating the necessary European political foundation for the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance, and later for subsequent European states' membership in NATO. With regard to other areas of competence as well, the WEU had no independent quality. This fact can be read from the treaty itself. The 1954 WEU treaty describes the duplication of NATO military staffs as undesirable. In military matters, the WEU's committees dealing with security issues were therefore referred to, but guidance was provided by NATO, a distinction which was observed until recently.⁶ The mutual assistance obligation of the WEU Treaty (Article V) consequently remained without practical relevance. The establishment of a military planning unit, planned by the WEU in December 1991, will consequently be called a planning "cell," instead of a planning "staff."

However, the Treaty was not without its own singular value and successes. Its arms control function established the necessary conditions for the rearmament of West Germany. The WEU also assisted in the solution of the Saar question in 1955-56. It also served in the case of Great Britain's accession to the EC, long opposed by France, by patching over the rift in economic relations from 1963 to 1970 between Continental Europe and Great Britain.⁷

It was principally France's efforts in the early 1980s that resulted in the rediscovery, or renaissance of WEU. This policy was not intended to ring in, or even carry out, a fundamental reform of the Atlantic-West European security system and readjust the relations among WEU, NATO, and EC/EPC. Rather, French policy was concerned with the support of specific Alliance defense policy concepts, most significantly in the area of nuclear deterrence. The purpose was less to support deterrence per se as an instrument of Western security policy, than to keep the FRG, which in the view of the French had increasingly developed neutralist-pacifist tendencies, firmly in the Western camp. Paris envisaged the revitalized WEU to provide a forum for European security policy consultations as well as a medium for dialogue between Western Europe and the United States, but without endangering NATO.

French, and indeed Western European, concerns over U.S. policy included the objectives and implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the lack of a two-way street in arms exports between the United States and Europe, and the confrontational policy of the Reagan Administration toward the Soviet Union.

However, during the 1980s, frictions and problems within the Alliance, or rather between WEU members and the United States, did occur. The United States criticized, for example, the attempts of the Western Europeans to consolidate their positions within the framework of the WEU. The United States did welcome, however, the coordination function which the WEU exercised in the maritime engagement of West European states in the minesweeping action during the Iran-Iraq war in 1986-1988 and later intensified in the 1991 Gulf War.⁸

Within the context of Western European integration, problems between the EC/EPC and the WEU did not develop since the WEU limited itself to questions which the EPC could not address (i.e., security), or at least in a formal sense. In the Single European Act of 1987, EC states agreed to coordinate only the "political and economic aspects" of security policy in the framework of the EPC. Thus, the WEU remained clearly complementary to the goal of EPC.

The dramatic political events in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s changed decisively the context of NATO, EC/EPC, and the WEU. Previously, the relationship among these three organizations had been marked by how collective defense of the Western world would be organized. Following the eastern revolutions, whereas the predominance of the Atlantic Alliance was not called into question, the question inevitably arose how collective self-defense could be linked to the development of emerging cooperative security organizations. This was expressed in four concrete questions:

- o How should the collective self-defense function of the Atlantic Alliance be organized in this new era?
- o What role should European institutions play in this process?
- o In what ways and by what means should the development of "cooperative security" be advanced, and which roles should go to NATO, or West European institutions (i.e., EC/EPC, WEU)?

- o How can security institutions, which until now had to organize the task of defense, be built into an overarching system of collective security via the UN or a regional organization like the CSCE?

The development of the WEU and its institutional connections to NATO will not be analyzed in detail in this paper. These are set out in the December 1991 Maastricht Draft Treaty and the June 1992 Petersberg Declaration of the WEU states. Rather, the questions concerning the relations among WEU, NATO and the proposed European union will be investigated with regard to the three major security concepts: collective self-defense, cooperative security and collective security.

The WEU and the Collective Self-Defense of Western Europe.

As previously mentioned, the revised Brussels Treaty was formally conceived as a mutual assistance pact, in whose center stood a comprehensively formulated mutual assistance clause in the case of an attack on a member country "in Europe."⁹ As this task was completely fulfilled by NATO, the WEU's mutual assistance obligation played no role in political and military practice. In the course of the activation phase of the WEU in the 1980s, the dominance of NATO in security affairs was not called into question. Although NATO was founded on a somewhat more weakly formulated assistance clause, its integrated staffs and command structure demonstrated the readiness to organize the defense of Western Europe in the framework of the Alliance. This central function of NATO was not disputed until the beginning of the 1990s. This challenge relates to two issues.

First, geographically, the obligation of solidarity of the NATO member states holds only to the territory of the member countries and the region north of the Tropic of Cancer.¹⁰ Objectively, this mutual assistance obligation was restricted to the case of military aggression. Second, a farther reaching obligation for consultation was already provided for, if in the opinion of one of the parties, "the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."¹¹ Thus, the Atlantic Alliance does have the necessary bases for being a comprehensive security arrangement which can extend beyond concrete solidarity in case of an attack.

The activation of the WEU the 1980s did not influence the central tasks of the Alliance. The WEU increasingly received the task of coordinating military actions outside of the NATO treaty area. This development took place although the WEU treaty, contrary to a repeatedly expressed view, offers no

clear foundation for such actions. The Brussels treaty only requires the member states to consult in given cases if, regardless of the area, an endangerment of peace (or a danger for economic stability) arises.¹² An obligation to military action beyond the mutual assistance obligation in case of an attack on one member country "in Europe" is not contained in the treaty.

In political practice, it was primarily Great Britain, as evidenced by the Anglo-Italian proposal of October 1991, that sought to use the WEU for military actions outside the NATO treaty area. This linked its objective to define a mission for the WEU while keeping it complementary to NATO and maintaining the Atlantic Alliance as fully functional in its narrower area of responsibility. France, on the other hand, and increasingly the FRG as well, pursued contrasting and farther reaching goals. They viewed the WEU as supporter of a fully established political union of Western Europe with the capability to care for its own defense.¹³ From their perspective, the formation and organization of armed forces in Europe should be decoupled from identifiable and concrete threats and risks. The proposed political union should have a common defense policy, not necessarily because it has to be organized on the basis of recognized risks and threats and the lack of a pan-European security system, but rather because political logic requires that such a union have all instruments of state action at its disposal, including the use of armed force.

The WEU has been regarded by many to be solely as an intermediate step in development of a comprehensive integrated political union. This view is ultimately directed toward giving the proposed union an independent military capacity to act not only outside the NATO treaty area, but inside it as well. Correspondingly, the Petersberg declaration of June 19, 1992 states:

Military Units of the WEU member states, which are employed under the command of the WEU, may be employed in conjunction with their contribution to common defense in agreement with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels treaty.¹⁴

The choice of which treaty framework and organization will be applied to these forces was deferred until a concrete case arose.¹⁵ The WEU and NATO are thus formally placed on the same level with respect to the mission of the collective defense of Western Europe.

In the context of this development, overlap and duplication cannot be avoided. The tense situation between WEU and NATO is demonstrated by the proposed ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which is under British command, and whose missions are planned by a planning staff at SHAPE, and the Franco-German Eurocorps, which could be assigned to WEU missions by the mid-1990s.¹⁶ These two military units are based on different political models of Europe. The ARRC arose from the idea of a stronger role for the European states in the framework of a more comprehensive alliance of sovereign states. It was also seen as a response to the recognizably diffuse new risks and dangers beyond Europe, which must be addressed with more flexible forces. The Franco-German Eurocorps, by contrast, stems from the objective of reaching political union within EC. There are no direct military justifications for this new contingent. The corps is a political instrument, designed to realize certain visions of a political union, which stands next to the Atlantic Alliance, but is itself completely independent. For this reason, NATO missions can only be assigned as supplementary to the corps.¹⁷

Formally, the missions of both forces stand in competition. The ARRC will primarily have the mission of defending the NATO area (and therefore the territory of the WEU states as well), and could be used for crisis management. The Eurocorps will concern itself with such missions in accordance with proposals for its use under both the Washington and Brussels treaties.¹⁸ However, this competition remains hypothetical to a certain extent, since the nature of military planning is now based much less than before on concrete geographical areas and more on flexible planning of specific military capabilities. Nevertheless, a duplication in planning and administration is unavoidable. It thus becomes clear that there will be two planning staffs for two military organizations which share some of the same units for similar or the same missions.

With regard to collective defense, the WEU formula that it may act where NATO will not or cannot is not a clear division of labor: if NATO would not act in case of direct attack to WEU countries which are also members of NATO, this would leave the Alliance without substance. The only clear-cut division of labor conceivable would be to establish a bipolar Alliance within which this force contributes to the defense of the Alliance territory with a European orientation. Whether this kind of concept can work will be discussed later.

At the same time it is evident that due to the new circumstances:

- o the Alliance cannot survive if its functions are restricted to the collective defense of the NATO Treaty area; and,
- o the idea of a fully-fledged Political Union including security and defense makes no sense without the idea that this Union also has, in principle, the potential for collective self-defense.

This does not raise great problems under current circumstances because:

- o collective self-defense is not the major problem of today from the perspective of the Central Region, vice Southern Region, countries; and,
- o NATO's military structure is in place and Western Europe can contribute to it by the assignment of military forces when required. As long as WEU does not create its own integrated military structure for the defense of the WEU states, the duplication of NATO's military structure (which would probably be dangerous for the persistence of the NATO Alliance) is avoided.

Cooperative Security.

Until the beginning of the 1990s, the WEU had a mission which was internal and was not externally oriented. This was true as well for the policy of cooperative security which greatly expanded following the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. The Atlantic Alliance, which through the Harmel concept in the 1960s had already introduced détente as a cooperative element into the security policy of the West, naturally expanded this function and formulated liaison relationships with the states of the former Warsaw Pact. Under German and American pressure, this ultimately became the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November-December 1991.¹⁹ The NACC was able to achieve an important success, in that all Eastern states approved the implementation of the CFE Treaty. Politically, this development took place against the backdrop of French resistance which originally sought to confine the Alliance solely to the mission of "collective defense." The Alliance was only able to agree on the liaison concept after the November 1991 Rome Summit. At this meeting the Alliance officially approved of European integrated defense structures. Soon after this important meeting, the WEU made its own efforts to establish liaison relations with its former eastern adversaries.²⁰

The WEU liaison concept, however, was developed from another point of view than that of the NATO approach. Whereas the NACC sought to involve the former adversaries in a system of cooperative security, the WEU concept was conceived:

- o either from a perspective of the long-term expansion of the future European union;²¹
- o or, what is closely interrelated, from a traditional *cordon sanitaire* type of concept.

The connections of the WEU to Central Europe include only the Central European neighbor states of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the newly formed Czech and Slovak Republics. This policy was intended to suggest to those states that, given the right circumstances, they too could become EC members in the long term. Ultimately, this is the only justification for having this committee address fundamentally the same themes as the NACC.²²

Again, the difference stems from two different political goals. A goal of a fully-fledged Political Union of Western Europe is to create special links with neighboring countries in the security and defense field. On the other hand, the objective of the NACC is to include formerly hostile Warsaw countries in a framework of consultation and cooperation and possibly joint action. It is important to have in mind that, at least to a certain extent, WEU's Consultative Forum depends upon the existence of NACC, at least as long as the CSCE does not provide a strong collective security framework (which is rather unlikely). NACC avoids the negative perception of Eastern countries that WEU's liaison forum is nothing more than the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* against Eastern Europe and, especially, Russia. Great difficulties could develop if this Consultative Forum would become really the open door for new WEU members without accepting NATO membership. NATO membership could be extended without extending WEU's membership, but not the other way around. This thesis is supported by the American attitude that such a development could enmesh the United States via WEU in possible conflicts which might lead to the NATO case. Nevertheless, until recently, the WEU has avoided this problem by giving privileged access to WEU to NATO members (associated status), and by declining to give WEU membership to non-NATO members. This problem will continue to surface in the years to come during the EC negotiations with Austria, Finland and Sweden (which have their own security agenda) and who have applied for EC membership.

The Role of NATO and the WEU in Collective Security Systems.

In preparation for the Rome summit of the NATO Council of Ministers in 1991, there were disagreements in the Alliance as to what role the political and military organs of NATO could play in the context of the UN or CSCE. France opposed any role for NATO in this area. Proposals by the Netherlands and Great Britain for the use of NATO in the context of UN or CSCE actions were rejected at the time. In the course of the Oslo NATO Council meeting in spring 1992, it was agreed, primarily at the insistence of the Netherlands, to go beyond the Rome Declaration and extend the prerogatives of the Alliance to contribute to actions of the CSCE. Thus, NATO peacekeeping activities within the political context of the CSCE would also be considered on a case-by-case basis.²³ Finally, during the NATO Council meeting in Brussels in December 1992, the Alliance overcame French resistance to NATO accepting a possible peacekeeping role under the UN auspices.²⁴

This expansion of NATO missions beyond the parameters of the Rome Declaration, and against the opposition of France, was only possible because WEU members have shown themselves ready to give the WEU more comprehensive missions than those of NATO. The WEU's Petersberg Declaration states that in the future the military forces of WEU members will come under the command authority of the WEU.²⁵ They can then be used for *all missions* within the context of the UN Charter, as well as in the mutual assistance obligations of Article 5 of the Washington and WEU treaties, for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, combat actions for crisis management, and measures for the establishment of peace.²⁶ The WEU thus decisively expanded its capacity to act in several respects:

- o in military actions outside the treaty area when taking into consideration the consultation clause of Article VIII of the WEU Treaty,
- o limitations of missions to those under collective security systems (i.e., the UN or a future CSCE) is no longer present,²⁷
- o the use of forces in the framework of the UN or future CSCE is expanded to include all forms of military action,
- o whereas the previous intention was for WEU states to assign "military units" to the WEU, it is explicitly stated that these units be composed of *all branches of the armed forces*.

For the time being the WEU has thus secured for itself a foundation for worldwide action without specific restrictions to certain types of missions or forms of legitimacy. By contrast, NATO's room for maneuver according to the Oslo and Brussels Declarations remains formally restricted to peacekeeping missions in the framework of a future CSCE or the UN.

Nevertheless, the formal distinctions between peacekeeping and peacemaking have become less and less discernible in reality. NATO is currently enforcing the no-flight zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and is controlling the application of United Nations sanctions in the Adriatic Sea. This development indicates a tension between formal potential tasks and real capacities of both organizations:

- o whereas the Petersberg declaration formally freed the WEU from almost any restrictions with regard to the use of force (if nations agree), the potential to undertake major military actions remained very limited;
- o whereas NATO has formally remained limited more or less to peacekeeping actions it has a much greater military potential at its disposal.

Conclusions, Perspectives, and Problems.

The Maastricht Draft Treaty proceeded from the assumption that the WEU will be expanded into the defense policy instrument of the European union with a common foreign and security policy. Only in this perspective do the steps toward collective self-defense in the framework of the WEU take on actual meaning. This is the only way to justify the WEU taking on tasks in those areas which until now were the responsibility of the individual countries, NATO, or the WEU itself. At least at the declaratory level, the WEU is placed on the same plane as NATO with regard to the task of "collective self-defense."²⁸ The debate over the expansion of the WEU into an organization which, like NATO, has armed forces assigned to it, must be considered within the context of the effort to expand the EC into a European Political Union. The WEU has only been used as a tool because the goal of addressing defense questions directly in the EC is not possible at this time. In spite of these difficulties, the traditional thesis that defense policy is the last field to be ceded to the competence of the European union was abandoned. Now, even official circles are promoting the view that the inclusion of defense policy in the European union process would be conducive to integration. And, like

NATO, the WEU is developing, albeit with a limited circle of participants, its own liaison concept analogous to the Atlantic Alliance. In fact, WEU states are giving that organization latitude for more potential activities in the framework of collective security systems than they are prepared to allow NATO itself to do.

However, this policy faces a range of difficulties and contradictions at present. The instrument of common foreign and security policy is relatively weakly formulated in the Maastricht Treaty framework. The qualified majority decision mechanism foreseen by the treaty for joint actions is only usable when all members have agreed in advance that this decision rule can be applied. That two members of the EC (Ireland and Denmark) are not members of the WEU makes it unavoidable to grant the WEU some relative autonomy in its relationship to the proposed European union as an organization based on a principle of consensus between states. In addition, it is not yet conceivable that one country would defer to a majority decision in the case of such a sensitive question on the use of military force. The specific political framework for the WEU is thus of a loose nature, which further weakens the political argumentation for the additional expansion of the WEU.

This gives reason to doubt that the notion of a "two pillar alliance" is a reasonable description for the future structure of the NATO Alliance. Whereas the United States certainly represents--by political-military capacity--one pillar of the Alliance, it remains rather unclear what exactly the European pillar is. Two additional points raise doubts whether the bipolar model may work as easily as assumed:

- o The West European pillar being becoming isolated from the Atlantic Alliance. This raises the question whether the principles of transparency and compatibility which are at the heart of the NATO Alliance will work.
- o The complex nature of the Western European decision-making process in security affairs makes it very difficult for the United States to regard Western Europe as a single political actor with whom it can negotiate. Once members agree on an issue, there is an inherent inflexibility in the subsequent EC position during later negotiations.

The debate over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the aftermath of the 1992 negative Danish referendum on

Maastricht, the Petersberg Declaration, as well as the decisions of the European Council in Lisbon have intensified the problem of the political union as the framework for the WEU in two ways. First, the ratification and full implementation of the treaty by EC members can no longer be considered as certain.

Second, the Petersberg Declaration has raised the threshold of accession to the WEU on one side. On the other side, the EC heads of state in Lisbon have accelerated the process of expanding the EC, first by including major EFTA states. The WEU now requires not only that new members accept the WEU Treaty, but also that they sign on to all WEU declarations since the 1984 Declaration of Rome.²⁹ This includes the WEU Platform of 1987 which includes a Credo for the policy of nuclear deterrence. This may, at the very least, pose difficulties for some of the states interested in EC membership, e.g., Sweden and Switzerland. In so doing there exists the danger that the gap between EC and WEU membership is not converging, but widening.

As a general rule, political and military situations in conflicts beyond the treaty areas of NATO and the WEU may provoke differing reactions in the NATO and WEU member countries when it comes to the actual decision to use military forces, as the example of Yugoslavia clearly shows. This, therefore, makes it unlikely that the WEU and NATO will be militarily active with the full participation of all member states. Under current conditions, alliances in general will more than likely play the role of back-up institutions, like in the Gulf war, rather than that of political and military coordinating bodies. Against this backdrop, it seems less pressing to duplicate military structures.

Opening the Atlantic Alliance solely for blue helmet actions in the framework of the CSCE or the UN, whereas WEU enjoys an unlimited freedom of action, contradicts political-military realities. Political practice has, therefore, already gone beyond the approach of the Oslo and Brussels ministerial meetings. In the years to come, Western Europe will only be capable of undertaking major military actions together with the United States which, at least currently, means within the NATO framework. The Yugoslavian case also indicates that the distinction between "European" and "Atlantic" contingencies is not a reasonable approach for a theoretical division of labor between Western Europe (i.e., Political Union, WEU) and the United States (i.e., NATO).

It is clear that Western European political dynamics within the EC inhibit the potential of downgrading the importance of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance in important questions of security and defense policy. This occurs at a time when significant and fundamental questions concerning the Political Union of Western Europe have not been solved and important architectural problems such as the development of the CSCE and NACC have yet to be clarified. Therefore, it is possible that the competitive economic relationship between Western Europe and America will be transferred to the area of security policy. Whether the complex political structures of Western Europe can overcome the new political challenges tied to such a development remains an open question.

ENDNOTES

1. For details, see Protocol No. III of the revised Brussels Treaty of 1954.
2. See Protocol No. II of the revised Brussels Treaty.
3. Although the WEU Treaty also contained an ABC weapons control regime for all member states (Article III of Protocol No. III), this control was never exercised with regard to the nuclear weapons of France although it was foreseen that the number of weapons on the Continent would be set in this case by a majority decision in the WEU Council.
4. Article I, Clause 2 of the treaty reads: "The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VII, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations."
5. See Peter Schell, *Bündnis im Schatten. Die Westeuropäische Union in den 80er Jahren*, Bonn/Berlin, 1991.
6. Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty states: "In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."
7. At this time there were quarterly ministerial consultations in the framework of the WEU which had the economic situation in Europe as the subject.
8. See Peter Schell, *Bündnis im Schatten*, p. 217ff.
9. Article V of the WEU Treaty reads, "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all military and other aid and assistance in their power."

10. Article 6 of the NATO Treaty reads, "For the purposes of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America . . . on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic Area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories."

11. Article 4 of the NATO Treaty.

12. Article VIII, 3, of the WEU treaty reads: "At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability." In the French version of the Treaty, the somewhat farther-reaching concept of *concerter* is found in place of "to consult." The justification for the expansion of the WEU's field of action is generally that consultations have no sense without the readiness to act together militarily if needed.

13. See the Franco-German initiative of October 14, 1991. For a description of this "French philosophy," see Nicole Gnessotto, "European Defence: Why Not the Twelve?," *Chaillot Papers*, Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, Paris, 1991.

14. Author's emphasis.

15. See also the speech by State Secretary Jörg Schönbohm, "*Das Euro-Korps als Baustein für eine europäische Verteidigung*," at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation on June 15, 1992. Concerning the Eurocorps he says, "It is quite simply so that in a concrete situation either NATO acts or the WEU acts, especially then when NATO cannot act or does not wish to act."

16. The planning staff is not assigned to SHAPE, but rather only "at SHAPE" which principally opens up the possibility of using it outside of NATO, that is to say the European theater.

17. The Franco-German Eurocorps should also carry out "humanitarian actions." For this purpose, the French units stationed on German soil are certainly structured "too heavily."

18. Next to this it should have missions under the preservation of national borders and the stipulations of the United Nations Charter including the preservation or establishment of peace and humanitarian actions.

19. This concept foresees the following meetings: annual ministerial meeting, periodical gatherings at the ambassadorial level, meetings between the NATO committees (including the Military Committee) and corresponding institutions in the partner states.

20. See Item 51 of the Rome Declaration of the Atlantic Alliance.

21. One can also assume that it represents a kind of security policy *Vorfeldorganisation* since it includes states which themselves barely have a long-term chance of admission.

22. According to the Petersberg Declaration the following themes should be dealt with in this context: security architecture and stability in Europe, future development of the CSCE as well as arms control and disarmament, especially the implementation of the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty as well as the Vienna Documents of 1992. It is foreseen that the Foreign and Defense Ministers meet at least once yearly and a consultations forum be established between the standing council of the WEU and the embassies of the countries concerned which convenes at least twice yearly at the seat of the WEU. The NATO Cooperation Council concerns itself with political and security policy questions, arms control, questions of military planning and military affairs, arms conversion, economic questions, participation of scientists from Central and Eastern Europe in NATO scientific programs, consultation in questions of political planning, etc.

23. Communiqué of the ministerial conference of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo on June 4, 1992, Item 11.

24. See the Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Atlantic Council on December 17, 1992.

25. See the Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, No. 68, June 23, 1992, pp. 649-655.

26. See Items 3 and 4 of the Petersberg Declaration.

27. In Article 52 (1) of the UN Charter, regional agreements or institutions are not excluded. Furthermore, Article 53 (1) states: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . ." Therefore according to the UN Charter, if the CSCE were to become a regional organization, the critical question of "enforcement measures" could only be addressed on the basis of a Security Council decision.

28. The German position, that *Bundeswehr* troops would only fulfill their mission in the case of defense in the context of NATO, is compatible with this view. Other countries can have other preferences, however.

29. See Chapter III, B of the Petersberg Declaration.