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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

MODELING AND SIMULATING TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE

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By  
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With love,  
to Judy

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## MODELING AND SIMULATING TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE

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Democratization has gained a significant amount of notoriety since the collapse of the east european socialist states in 1989. Despite this, no model has been developed to satisfactorily explain this phenomena.

This thesis explores two reasons for this. The first is that previous writers on the subject focused on the goal -- democracy -- instead of the transition process itself. The second reason is that the models that were developed were all linear in nature.

Relying heavily on principles that have come from Chaos Theory, this thesis develops an iterative, non-linear model of the transition process. In order to test this model, a simulation of modern day Hungary is developed. The results of this simulation turn out to be suprisingly similar to what has happened in Hungary in recent years. In addition, the simulation was extended beyond the present and some predictions about the future were possible. These include the results for the spring, 1994 elections.

## Chapter 1

### **INTRODUCTION**

Adam: "The earth is shaking. What seemed firm and boundless is seething matter, irresistably striving for form, struggling to be born." -- Imre Madach, The Tragedy of Man<sup>1</sup>

Madach wrote those words in 1860 in the village of Alsosztregova in Hungary. He was a country lawyer and an amateur playwright. But for The Tragedy of Man, the greatest work of Hungarian literature, he would undoubtedly be completely forgotten. This work, however, has the timeless quality that is present in Shakespeare, Goethe and Lao-Tse. It is no wonder then that it is so easy to find an epigraph that accurately describes the current situation in Hungary and, indeed, all of Eastern Europe.

The firm and boundless communist dictatorships collapsed like soap bubbles in 1989. From this, each country began to make its way in its transition from authoritarian rule. Some, like Poland, chose the shock-therapy approach of immediate privatization of industry and agriculture, immediate convertibility of currency and the immediate dissemination of state assests. Others, like Hungary chose a "slow-go" approach that was supposed to gradually give up the reins of authority. Whatever the method, the goals were clear: free market, civil rights, and, most importantly, democracy.

As of this writing Poland has just put former communists back into power.<sup>2</sup> Nationalism is rampant in Slovakia and is threatening Hungary.<sup>3</sup>

The Balkan countries have completely deteriorated.<sup>4</sup> No eastern european country but Poland is showing growth in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>5</sup> The free market has not put a Mercedes in every garage and the Holy Grail of democracy is showing some tarnish.

In this maelstrom of change numerous academics have tried to explain various aspects of the transition process. In fact the field has a title and the study of "democratization" is now considered a "hot topic".<sup>6</sup> While their efforts have added much to the study of this subject, the thinking of these authors seems to me to be fundamentally linear: They proceed from authoritarianism directly to a result, usually democracy. Their thinking also seems to be non-general in that they do not adequately account for the variations in results that reality is capable of producing. Finally, they do not seem to have a predictive element. In other words, these writings are generally not able to give instruction on where a nation is in the process or counsel on what needs to be done (or avoided) in order to achieve a stable democracy. By focusing on democratization, they have lost sight of the important process -- that of transition from authoritarian rule.

Thus, this thesis has five goals. The first is to develop the critique (begun in the paragraph above) of the current models of transition from authoritarian rule. The second goal is to develop a general, non-linear, iterative model of transitions from authoritarian rule. This model will combine elements from the writings of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter on the transition process, Chaos Theory and simulation design.

The third goal is to design a simulation based on my model that will, as closely as time and personnel constraints allow, replicate the transition process of a country that is currently in the midst of that process. The fourth goal is to test this simulation and the final goal is to evaluate the results.

The study of transitions from authoritarian rule is a booming field. Likewise, simulations have been used to study historical events. In addition, research into on-going phenomena is also highly regarded. All this work does a good job of helping the researcher to classify the phenomena under study. In this thesis I hope to combine these three disparate fields of study and do something that has not been tried before - a simulation of a transition from authoritarian rule that uses current information in order to confirm a specific model and to predict the range of possible outcomes.

## Chapter 2

### CURRENT MODELS

"...This will lead them to the genetic question of how a democracy comes into being in the first place. The question is (or at least was, until the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) of almost equal interest in Eastern Europe." -- Dankwart Rustow, 1970<sup>7</sup>

#### General

As previously mentioned, the study of democratization seems to be a growth industry. This is for good reasons. The changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe and, particularly, in those successor states with nuclear weapons, are of more than a passing interest to us all.

The study of democratization and transitions from authoritarian rule, however, goes much deeper than the revolutions of Eastern Europe in 1989. According to Huntington, between 1828 and 1926 alone there were 33 attempts to democratize (of which only 11 were successful).<sup>8</sup> Thus, the problem of modeling the transition from authoritarian rule is much older than the research on the subject. In fact, it was not until 1970 that Dankwort Rustow attempted a comprehensive model of how, exactly, countries make the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy.<sup>9</sup>

Since then there has been a great deal of important research done in this area.<sup>10</sup> Many of these studies develop only one particular piece

of the democratization puzzle. Some focus on the period of time just prior to the onset of transition, i.e. the reasons that an authoritarian state gives up its power. Still others center themselves on the case study method, allowing the reader to draw his own conclusions.

Relatively few writers have actually tried to explain the period of time that begins when an authoritarian government decides to give up some of its power to the opposition to the time when a new form of government -- democracy or more authoritarianism -- takes its place. In short, few authors have tackled the transition from authoritarian rule.

Fewer still have tried to make their theory general in nature. Only one, Huntington, includes a predictive element in his model and, although several recognize a "form of circular interaction"<sup>11</sup>, none has attempted anything other than a linear model of the process.

In a sense, this is not bad. Everything happens linearly. Time, as far as we know, goes forward. Any good case study can trace a sequence of events, each event being a discrete block on a time line. For example, a revolution can be broken down into "grievances" that lead to the "formation of the mob" that leads to "the march on the government buildings" that results in the "trial and execution of the rulers". Each of these large, discrete blocks can then be broken into smaller ones. The "trial and execution of the rulers" can be broken into "the capture of the rulers", the "assembly of the court", the "issuance of the verdict", etc. Eventually, the conscientious case study researcher is inside the head of every person that was near the court at the minute that the verdict was read. Taken as a whole it all begins to look like

a Cantor Dust, a mathematical creation that is made by taking the middle third out of a line segment and then repeating the process ad infinitum.

It is then the job of the model builder to take all of this minutiae and say something very general about not only it but also all the minutiae from all of the other instances, ever, of the event under consideration. He does this knowing full well that the next instance probably won't fit his pattern at all. No wonder so few authors have attempted it.

In this chapter, I will detail their efforts. The first is Rustow, followed by Leonardo Molino. Next in line will be the theory of Samulel P. Huntington. This will be followed by an examination of the writings of Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter. Finally, I intend to address further the problem of linearity and to suggest an alternative.

### **The Models and Their Critiques**

#### **Rustow**

Rustow's model was the first to describe the birth, or genesis, of democracy. He recognizes the importance of this question and its distinction from questions involving stable or failing democracies<sup>12</sup>. He wants to talk, not about the functioning of democracy, but "how a democracy comes into being in the first place."<sup>13</sup>

Rustow lists 10 propositions which he believes apply to any genetic, as opposed to functional, theory of democracy. They are meta-theoretical in concept. That is, they are the rules by which a theory of a transition can be judged. Rustow considers the first seven to be

expansive in that they lift some conventional restriction. Briefly, they are: (1) Explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis, (2) correlation is not the same as causation, (3) not all causal links run from social and economic to political factors or (4) from beliefs and attitudes to actions, and the genesis of democracy need not be (5) socially, (6) geographically or (7) temporally uniform.<sup>14</sup>

Rustow calls the last three restrictive in that they set conditions for genetic models of democracy. They are: (1) Empirical data must cover a time period from just before until just after the advent of democracy, (2) countries where a major impetus comes from abroad can be ignored, and (3) a model can be derived from an examination of two or three cases.<sup>15</sup>

Utilizing these propositions, Rustow's genetic theory of democracy begins by assuming national unity.<sup>16</sup> He next identifies a preparatory phase characterized by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle. However, this political struggle cannot be one that dramatically undermines the assumption of national unity.<sup>17</sup> Next comes a decision phase in which democracy is seen as a compromise procedure designed to resolve the dispute(s) of the preparatory phase.<sup>18</sup> Finally comes the habituation phase in which the politicians who made the compromise sell it to the people.<sup>19</sup> Rustow uses the cases of Turkey and Sweden to demonstrate the applicability of his model.

There are several problems with Rustow's model. While the argument is internally consistent and some specially selected evidence



exists to confirm his model, he fails in three particulars. All of these criticisms go to the idea of self-limitation. That is, Rustow places so many significant limits on his model that it is very difficult to apply generally.

First, he insists on the assumption of national unity, by which he means that the vast majority of a people identify themselves with their country.<sup>20</sup> This excludes all countries in which ethnic tensions are a preparatory phase problem as well as some countries which opt for a decentralized system of government. Most east european countries would be eliminated from the model based on this assumption. Pre-Civil War U.S. (in which many southerners saw themselves as "Carolinians" or "Mississippians" rather than "Americans") would also be excluded.

Secondly, he proves the validity of his model with two carefully chosen examples. Put another way, Huntington claims that there have been 106 attempts at democratization since 1828.<sup>21</sup> Rustow puts his model to the test in only 23.<sup>22</sup> Thus, by Rustow's own restrictions, his model can explain only 21.7% of the total number of cases since 1928. Of the 62 successful democratizations, Rustow manages to explain slightly over a third of them. This is more respectable but clearly indicates that his efforts do not produce a "general" model.

Finally, he fails to identify what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful movement from one phase to the next. Couple this with the first two problems, i.e. that of identifying those states that meet the necessary precondition of national unity and

the restrictions on applicability, and the model fails to give a general accounting of transition from authoritarian rule.

### **Morlino**

Morlino's theory (published in 1987) rests on a dimensional analysis of the transition process. He sees each transition occurring across nine dimensions with "developmental factors" contributing to the process across seven additional dimensions.<sup>23</sup>

The defining dimensions are (1) duration, (2) extent of violence, (3) actors, (4) presence of the military, (5) type of agreement, (6) degree of formalization of the agreement, (7) degree of mass participation, (8) spectrum of emerging political forces and (9) structure and personnel in administration and judiciary.<sup>24</sup>

The developmental factors are (1) political tradition, (2) previous experience with mass politics, (3) type of previous regime, (4) duration of previous regime, (5) reason for collapse of the previous regime, (6) degree of organization of opposition in the previous regime and (7) modalities of transition.<sup>25</sup>

Morlino does not define a process by which the transition takes place. Instead he shows, by example, how each of these dimensions operated in selected various transitions. He then defines the three possible endings of this dimensional process. The first ending is "complete consolidation by the democratic forces", the second is the "maintenance of the democratic regime" and the final result is "a crisis that jeopardizes the new democracy"<sup>26</sup>.

All of these dimensions are good if the goal is to merely outline a way of thinking about the process. Morlino is much more ambitious. he sees his system as a way to "enable us to discern the particular multidimensional configuration of each establishment as well as each resulting democratic arrangement."<sup>27</sup>

He envisions each of these dimensions, at first it seems, as "a sort of continuum with two poles, along which we may place each country."<sup>28</sup> Having said this, he then defines discrete units along this continuum. For example, the extent of violence can be either "absent or present". Degree of mass participation can be either "high or low". The author may have envisioned these not as discrete yes-no type answers but as scales -- he does not tell us. However, several other of his dimensions do not lend themselves to one-dimensional scaling at all. For example, types of agreement can be implicit or explicit.<sup>29</sup> What if the agreement is both? The spectrum of emerging political forces can be "wide and complete or partial and incomplete."<sup>30</sup> Where does one place a "narrow and incomplete spectrum" on this particular continuum? What is the difference being defined in a "partial and incomplete" spectrum? This sloppy use of words belies the scientific accuracy promised.

Morlino does not indicate what specific weight he gives one factor over another. For example, he clearly perceives that the duration is not particularly relevant<sup>31</sup> while he sees the involvement of the military as crucial.<sup>32</sup> With the other dimensions it is not so clear.

Even if one assumes that Morlino has the correct variables and that they can be defined and weighted adequately, he does not specify

the process that uses these variables. To use an analogy, he gives us the x's and the y's but never tells us if we should add or subtract them.

Morlino's addition to transition literature is clearly the idea that multiple dimensions are involved in the process and that these dimensions can be defined rigorously and operated upon. That he does not do this himself does not subtract from this contribution.

### **Huntington**

Huntington believes that the transition to democracy is a delicate dance between the political groups involved in democratization, the crucial interactions between those groups, and the type of transition that the state is experiencing.<sup>33</sup>

The political groups that Huntington thinks are important are generically listed as Radical Extremists, Democratic Moderates, Reformers (further sub-divided into Democratizers and Liberals) and Standpatters. Radical Extremists and Democratic Moderates make up the opposition, while the Reformers and the Standpatters make up the authoritarian government.<sup>34</sup>

These groups interact in only three crucial ways: Between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the government and between moderates and extremists in the opposition.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, there are four processes of transition: transformation (The government takes the lead), replacement (the opposition takes the lead), transplacement (a combination of government and opposition

actions result in a transition) and intervention (a foreign power imposes a democracy).<sup>36</sup>

The process of transformation has five steps: The emergence of reformers, the acquisition of power, the failure of liberalization, subduing the standpatters and, finally, co-opting the opposition.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, replacement has three steps: the struggle to produce the fall, the fall, the struggle after the fall.<sup>38</sup> Transplacements have four steps: Government liberalization, increased opposition activity, government tightening, and negotiated transition.<sup>39</sup> Huntington goes into little detail on the process of interventions.

Huntington ends with a list of guidelines for democratizers. These are "lessons learned" from his study of transitions to democracy.<sup>40</sup> This constitutes the predictive element of this model. In short, Huntington is saying that if you follow these rules of thumb, you have a better chance of creating a democracy. Likewise, by identifying those groups that fail to heed Huntington's advice, it is possible to identify those countries that will fail in their attempt to democratize.

Huntington attempts to explain all of the transitions in the Third Wave. He is unsuccessful for three reasons. All three go to the subject of diffusion, that is, the division of an argument into so many pieces that the exceptions outnumber the rules.

First, I do not feel that his categorization is efficient. What is the difference between "the struggle to produce the fall" of the replacement process versus the first three steps of the transformation process versus the first three phases of the transplacement process?

What is the real difference between "subduing the standpatters" and "co-opting the opposition" on the one hand and the "struggle after the fall" on the other? All these distinctions without differences look good, but unnecessarily water down the model. It would be more efficient to devise one sequence of events (a la Rustow) and emphasize the differences caused by different transition processes.

Secondly, Huntington fails to give adequate recognition to the agendas of the political groups involved in democratization and, more importantly, the agendas of international organizations involved in democratization (I am thinking here of the Roman Catholic Church). These groups may have goals far beyond the one-dimensional motivational scale that Huntington uses.<sup>41</sup> These goals may cause a group to "sell out" the democratic revolution at any time. As well as questioning the completeness of Huntington's model, this criticism seriously questions the predictive value of the model (since significant variables are left out).

Finally, a reasonable man could find fault with Huntington's processes, their definition and their use.<sup>42</sup> Surely the USSR is more of an example of a transplacement than a transition? If the USSR is a transition, then why is South Africa a transplacement? These questions show that Huntington has no clear dividing line in mind between one process and another. In fact, there may be so much overlap that there is no real distinction at all.

### O'Donnell/Schmitter

Despite the fact that they claim that they have no theory, in the second chapter of their book, O'Donnell/Schmitter summarize, in chart form, the paths that they consider relevant to democracy.<sup>43</sup> The X axis is Democratization (defined as "the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to institutions previously governed by other principles, or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights, or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation"<sup>44</sup>). The Y axis is Liberalization (defined as "the process of redefining and extending rights"<sup>45</sup>). Thus, autocracies are in the lower left corner and political democracies are in the upper right corner. The basis for this chart lies clearly with Dahl's work on democracies<sup>46</sup>.

The authors first discuss the basic process of opening an authoritarian regime. They maintain that the problem of legitimation, the authoritarian regime's attempts to justify itself, is the Achilles' Heel of the regime.<sup>47</sup> This problem leads to dissension between hardliners and soft-liners in the government which, in turn, leads to an opening for the opposition. As opposition increases, the hardliners attempt to squash it. Soft-liners perceive that it is in their interests not to squash the opposition and begin to form a series of pacts with the opposition<sup>48</sup>.

Other than coup, outside imposition or defeat in war, the authors identify only one cause of movement on the graph - the formation of pacts. Pacts are "explicit, but not always publicly explicated or

justified, agreements among a select set of actors which seeks to define rules governing the exercise of power".<sup>49</sup> There are three crucial pacts: The military pact, the political pact and the economic pact<sup>50</sup>. Finally, the authors discuss the resurrection of civil society and the convocation of elections.

This is the best model of the three. It is not self-limiting as is Rustow's, nor is it too diffuse as is Huntington's. It recognizes the chaotic nature of the process and focuses on what I believe is the defining element of the transition process - the making of pacts.

This model lacks a predictive element. The authors occasionally offer advice (couched as observation) but seem to think that the process is too uncertain to predict<sup>51</sup>. Even though the authors hint at an undefinable thread that connects all of these examples<sup>52</sup>, they do not pursue it. Why? Why do not only O'Donnell and Schmitter but also the other authors refuse to come to grips with the data available?

One of the few tools available to social scientists with problems like these is linear regression analysis. It is a useful tool for understanding the connections in various sets of data. Take some variables and perform mathematical operations on them. Then take the mathematical data and compare it with the real world. If the fit is good enough, you have proved something. If the fit isn't good enough then the only thing you've proved is that your equation was wrong.

Thus these models could be seen as the first step towards a "democratization equation". Taken in this light, it is no wonder that these authors do not contemplate a non-specific theory. Defining the



variables alone, much less the operands, would be a horrendous task. Even then it may not be successful. Yet all of the authors admit that there is something unique and common to these types of events. The mere fact that they can say "democratization" or transition from authoritarian rule and we all (sort of) understand what they mean seems to confirm this.

Thus, it seems appropriate at this stage to ask if linear regression, and the kind of thinking that it requires, is, perhaps, the wrong tool for the job. A simple example should suffice.

A social scientist, without even knowing what the variables are, could say quite a bit about the 12 points in the following data set:




Fig. 1 Linear Regression Example # 1

There seems to be some clustering of information around some sort of axis that should be able to be expressed mathematically. The variables and the formula are also subject to some sort of manipulation. Our social scientist would certainly bemoan the lack of data points and

may even refuse to do a statistical analysis until more data is gathered.

Assuming a willingness to work with the data given, it is possible that he would come up with a linear regression that looked much like this:




Fig 2. Linear Regression Example # 2

If we pressed our hypothetical social scientist, he might be willing to hypothesize on the location of the next data point, with the qualifiers that the standard deviation equals such and such, that  $R^2$  is so and so, the  $\chi^2$ , alpha and beta require that we do this and that, etc.

It is my guess that the social scientist would be very surprised to learn that under no circumstances could the value of x or y exceed eight units, that the slope connecting any two sequential data points is exactly  $1/2$  or  $2^{53}$  and that any two sequential data points can always be described using a 30/60/90 degree triangle. The reason for these rather

odd characteristics is because the phenomena being described is the movement of a knight on a chess board:




Fig. 3. Linear Regression Example?

The point of the exercise is to show that, in most people's minds, there is a presumption that linear regression tells us something useful about a particular set of data. The degree to which it is used as well as the degree to which it is studied only serve to promulgate this notion. Clearly, there are some problems, such as this one, in which regression analysis, no matter how well it is done, tells us very little of any real use.

There is another way to think about the problem of transitions from authoritarian rule. Instead of a linear process, imagine an iterative one. Imagine a process that occurs not over time but each time. Thus, each time an event happens, it happens, at its basest level, in the same way and the output for one iteration of the process becomes the input for the next iteration. The knight always moves two

squares in one direction and one in the other. Initially this rule seems to have little to do with the data set. Ultimately, it completely explains it.

This kind of modelling is characteristic of Chaos Theory<sup>54</sup>. Despite its deceptive simplicity, Chaos is capable of producing incredible, even beautiful results. It is already being applied to many of the formerly intractable problems of the hard sciences. In the next chapter, I will develop a model of transition from authoritarian rule using its most powerful tool -- iteration.

## Chapter 3

### **THE ITERATIVE MODEL**

To capture this situation (i.e. transition from authoritarian rule), we propose the metaphor of a multi-layered chess game. In such a game, to the already great complexity of normal chess are added the almost infinite combinations and permutations resulting from each players' ability on any move to shift from one level of the board to another. Anyone who has played such a game will have experienced the frustration of not knowing until near the end who is going to win, or for what reasons, and with what piece. Victories and defeats frequently happen in ways unexpected by either player. -- Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule<sup>55</sup>

### **General**

As indicated in the last chapter an iterative model of the transition from authoritarian rule might provide some insight into the process that ordinary linear models do not. What might such a model look like? O'Donnell and Schmitter in quote above have some idea of what the process might feel like while Rustow, in his ground-breaking 1970 work, also identifies "a two-way flow of causality, or some form of circular interaction, between politics on the one hand and economic and social conditons on the other."<sup>56</sup>

In this chapter I start by assuming that these intuitions are correct. Then, after some assumptions and definitions, I will outline each phase that constitutes the process. The process itself is iterative, thus, in order to understand a transition in the light of this model it will be necessary to execute these phases a number of times. Only under these circumstances might a transition be understood. An attempt to apply this model and the results of that application will take up the next two chapters of this thesis.

## The Model

### Assumptions and Definitions

First, a transition is the interval between one political system and another<sup>57</sup>. It has a specific beginning and ending (which will be defined and discussed later) and usually results in the replacement of those currently in power. Transitions from authoritarian rule are particularly interesting in that they provide a "living laboratory" for a political scientist interested in studying the unrefined political process at work.

The first assumption inherent in this model of transition is that the outcome is not important<sup>58</sup>. To study transitions from authoritarian rule based on the outcome seems to be as useful as studying chess games in which white is the winner. In order to understand the process by which these transitions take place it is just as important to study situations in which democracy does not replace the authoritarian rule as situations in which it does. A complete model of the transition from authoritarian rule must allow for any possible outcomes.

The second assumption is that the main goal of groups involved in the transition process is to increase their political power relative to the other groups involved in the process. Political power is further defined as the ability of one group or individual to impose its desires on other groups or individuals. While each group involved in the transition process certainly has its own agenda, it is not possible to achieve that agenda without political empowerment.

The third assumption deals with violence. The model I will develop will not account for transitions which occur because of significant external intervention. While these are interesting events, I believe that they are so radically different in character from internally generated transitions that they cannot be compared. In short, I am assuming that Operation Just Cause and the Velvet Revolution are fundamentally different phenomena.

The fourth, and final, assumption is that the transition from authoritarian rule of the Eastern European states are typical of all transitions. I will draw largely from the experiences in the Eastern European states to validate many aspects of my model. Thus, I need to assume that these most recent experiences are representative of the whole.

On its face, this is my most questionable assumption. There is no obvious reason why these transitions should be any more or less typical than others. I will defend it on two grounds. The first is that the Eastern European experience runs the gamut from the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia to the bloody transition in Romania. This alone guarantees a wide variety of data that can be used to justify, but must also be incorporated into, any model of transitions from authoritarian rule.

Secondly, I am not trying to say something about a specific outcome but about the process itself. For example, if I were to say, based solely on the Eastern European experience, that the Roman Catholic church helped the transition from authoritarian rule towards democracy I

would be correct (particularly in the case of Poland).<sup>59</sup> This would also fly in the face of previous studies concerning Latin America.<sup>60</sup> Since the context for my analysis is process instead of goal, I feel that I can avoid this problem altogether and legitimately make this assumption.

By way of definition, I use the term regime and party as collective nouns. Oftentimes, people think of an authoritarian regime or party as represented by the individual who heads it (such as Saddam Hussein in Iraq). In this paper, I always mean the group of people who not only lead a party or regime, but also the people who provide direct and indirect support for it.

### **Pre-Transition**

Before the process of transition from authoritarian rule takes place, there must be some defining event or set of events that begins the process. This event or events are a result of the authoritarian regime attempting to legitimize itself in the eyes of the governed.<sup>61</sup> The different orientations towards political order of hard-line and soft-line elements within the authoritarian regime cause the policies of the government to, in some way, forment dissent.<sup>62</sup>

Under Stalin, for example, there were no different orientations within the government (or what few that did exist were quickly squashed). Upon his death in 1953, a struggle between hard-liners and soft-liners broke out that puts Khrushchev in charge. His visible softening at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was shortly followed by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. It was put down, of



course, but sets the stage for the eventual transitions in both Hungary and the Soviet Union.<sup>63</sup> It is these types of events that characterize the pre-transition phase.

### **Transition**

Dissent leads to opposition. The difference between the two is in level of organization. Whereas dissent is the grumbling of the man on the street, the organization of that dissent is what characterizes opposition. For me, what initiates the process of transition is the onset of opposition.<sup>64</sup>

The process of transition consists of eight distinct phases ("Phases" is an inaccurate word to describe the eight elements I see at play here. As a word, it implies sequence and a certain degree of order. These phases overlap each other, subsume each other, and provide context for each other. Despite this, a distinct set of actions takes place in each phase. For this reason, and lack of a better alternative, I use the word "phase.)).

In addition, the process becomes iterative and, to a lesser extent, nonsequential.<sup>65</sup> By this I mean that the next eight phases repeat themselves until the transition is complete (I will define what I mean by "complete" later). The process is somewhat nonsequential in that not all phases are always executed in each cycle and in that, under certain circumstances, a cycle may be involuntarily abbreviated.<sup>66</sup>

The following chart graphically displays the interrelationships between the eight phases. It is not designed to be understood at a glance. Instead it is a tool to help put the pieces together as I

discuss them. In short, it may appear complex and obscure at first but should become understandable, even helpful, as I discuss each phase.




Fig. 4. Phase Relationships

#### Phase 1 - Agenda Formation and Adjustment

Opposition to an authoritarian regime usually forms around one or more core issues. It is, in fact, these core issues which allow the organization of dissent in the first place. I believe there are five

core issues. While I have not adopted directly the "issue dimensions"<sup>67</sup> of other writers, these five represent a synthesis of the works of the authors cited below. They are:

a. Participation - The degree to which a regime "permits opposition, public contestation, or public competition".<sup>68</sup> In other words, participation represents the types of people allowed to hold office. In one-party systems, as in Eastern Europe until recently, membership in the party was the primary credential for holding office.<sup>69</sup> Educational, racial, religious and economic credentials might also be used to limit participation in the political process.

b. Inclusion - the "proportion of the population entitled to participate in a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of government".<sup>70</sup> This is, quite simply, the number of people who can vote coupled with the degree to which their vote counts (i.e. systems that give one man less than one vote, such as the South African system, or systems that give multiple votes to the people, such as the Hungarian system<sup>71</sup>).

c. Civil Rights - the degree to which the government can control the actions of the individual.<sup>72</sup> If constitutional rights are not enforceable, either due to the power of unelected officials or external manipulation, then the degree of participation and inclusion are not important.<sup>73</sup> In most of the Eastern European states, constitutions routinely established individual rights that were not enforceable.

d. Foreign Policy - the way the state appears to other states.<sup>74</sup> In other words, the degree to which a state has interventionist or non-

interventionist policies. Whether a government seeks a defensive or offensive posture in relation to other states seems to be significant issue during the transition. One of the major problems during the transition process lies in dealing with old quarrels.<sup>75</sup> Many of these quarrels are border disputes that were, temporarily at least, resolved during the period of authoritarian rule, such as Russia and Moldova over the Trans-Dniestr; Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria over Macedonia; and Rumania and Hungary over Transylvania. Their re-emergence indicates the degree to which foreign policy is a core issue during transition.

e. Economy - the degree to which the government controls the planning and execution of economic functions.<sup>76</sup> The inability of authoritarian economies, whether command or market based, to maintain pace with non-authoritarian economies is well-documented.<sup>77</sup> In addition, the desire to achieve a western standard of living (realizable, as the conventional wisdom supposes, through a market economy) was one of the defining issues of the transition from authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe.<sup>78</sup>

Each of these core issues provides a spectrum of advocacy. In other words, a person or party or nation can be thought to be strongly in favour of a command economy - the left hand side of the spectrum, so to speak. Another could be in favour of a market based economy - the right hand side of the economy issue. The same person might be on the left hand side of the foreign policy scale, i.e. strongly pro-interventionist.

It is now a small step to go from using these five scales in a general sense to using them in a specific sense. It is theoretically possible to make a scale, say from one to ten, and assign specific numbers on that scale that would represent where the opposition believes the country as a whole should be regarding that particular issue. In addition, it should be possible to determine where the country as a whole is, currently, regarding a specific issue. In other words, this set of scales would identify where the country's current set of policies and practices places it on each of the five scales. Obviously, this is largely the result of previous governments.

Thus it is possible to define the opposition's agenda as the difference between where the country is on the five core issue scales and where the opposition group wants the country to be. An example might be useful. Assume a country with a low level of participation, a high level of inclusion, a command economy, few enforceable civil rights and a moderately interventionist foreign policy. On a scale from one to ten participation might be a three, inclusion a ten, economy and civil rights both threes and foreign policy a five. Compare this to the opposition which wants a high level of participation as well as inclusion (say, a ten), a market economy (eight or higher), enforceable civil rights (nine or higher), and a non-interventionist foreign policy (eight or higher). While each of the issues appears to be weighted equally, the system allows the opposition group's position to be defined in terms that would effectively indicate weighting.<sup>79</sup> For example, an opposition group that did not care about a country's foreign policy

position could be said to be satisfied with any number higher than two but less than nine.

The advantage is parsimony. It is immediately obvious from such a system where lie the strongest disagreements as well as the areas of possible compromise between opposition and government. In addition, policies of a government and pronouncements by both the opposition groups and the government could be seen as movement to the left or right on the scales.

The problem with the system is coding. It would seem impossible to determine with any degree of precision where a government or opposition group would lie on such a scale. This would be particularly difficult in the area of civil rights. Imagine a country that was relatively libertarian if you belonged to the "correct" racial or religious group, but repressive otherwise. The countries of the former Yugoslavia are a good example of this; South Africa is another. The country's position is clearly not a one (completely repressive) or a ten (extremely libertarian). Other than that, arguments could be made for almost any position in between.

There are two counterarguments to this. The first is technical. In recent years, mathematicians have developed a system called "fuzzy logic". The purpose of this system is to reproduce analysis based on best-guesses. It works like this: An analyst gives his best guess at where a certain variable lies on a scale as well as a high possible and a low possible value. A normal distribution of possible values is established between the two centered on the best guess. Mathematical

functions then operate, not on the best guess, but on the probability curve in order to determine outcome. The result is that bad guesses are "smoothed out" of the system, producing a better overall result at the end.

The second counterargument is that coding problems are inherent in all social science models. To eliminate an otherwise useful model because of coding problems seems counterproductive. The issue is to what extent can coding errors be eliminated and to what extent can error propagation be reduced.<sup>80</sup>

Up until now I have discussed the two-tier system of government and opposition. This is clearly incomplete. There may, in fact, be several opposition groups, each with their own agenda (i.e. set of positions on the scales of each of the five core issues). The government may or may not be divided on its own agenda. The only thing that can be determined with any certainty seems to be where the country's policies and programs put it now on the five scales, and this is subject to change.

This does not invalidate the model but requires the introduction of several new concepts - interest groups, parties and political power. Interest groups are groups of people united by a common set of priorities, desires and expectations.<sup>81</sup> Nationalists, feminists, ecologists, and the army are all examples of interest groups.

I have talked briefly about parties before, but in the specific sense that I use them in this model, parties represent the political interests of interest groups and individuals on a national scale.<sup>82</sup>

This is the difference, for example, between Serbian nationalists and the party of Slobodan Milosevic which is the political instrument of those nationalists. Parties do not have to be legal to exist, nor do they have to have any place in the government. The interwar experience with the outlawed communist parties in Eastern Europe as well as the more recent experience with revolutionary parties such as Solidarity and Paraga's ultra-nationalist party in Croatia justify this broad definition.<sup>83</sup>

Government and opposition are composed of parties as I have defined them here. Each party thus has its own agenda and attempts to fulfill that agenda through the use of political power. A party's political power is defined as the quantitative and qualitative value of the party's people, leadership and ideas.

Political power is a relative concept. It is only valuable to the extent that it exceeds the political power of one's opponent's political power. That there are different levels of power is obvious. In theory, the level of political power of each party should be measurable.<sup>84</sup> An authoritarian government may have so much political power (as in the case of the communists in Albania under Enver Hoxa<sup>85</sup>) that other parties have, effectively, no power at all.

Just as with the use of scales for the core issues discussed above, so should political power be subject to quantification. It requires the same kind of best-guesses as discussed before and is subject to the same arguments and counterarguments. I would like to add that this quantitative type of thinking seems to be prevalent among



those actively involved in party politics. Politicians often talk of increases and decreases of political power due to a change in leadership or circumstances. Some rudimentary notion of how successful a certain position is or can be seems implicit in any political campaign. This notion of where one stands given one's political views would seem to be even more important in an authoritarian state since the consequences of failure are so much higher.

The final option, of course, is to change the agenda of a party. There is nothing inviolable about a party's agenda. Given that it represents fundamental beliefs of a group of people, I am forced to hypothesize that changing an agenda would be the last thing a party would want to do. Gorbachev tried to maintain the Communist party agenda while executing socioeconomic change in the period from 1985-1990, thus exposing the party's weaknesses and ultimately contributing to its loss of power.<sup>86</sup> Parties can also change their agendas so much that they become indistinguishable from other parties. A good example of this is the six post-world War II parties of Czechoslovakia who rapidly became indistinguishable from the Communist Party itself.<sup>87</sup>

Thus, the first phase establishes the political status quo for the remainder of the cycle. Under this model, each party knows basically where the state is on each of the five core issues and to what degree it will have to change the policies of the state in order to fulfill its agenda.

## **Phase 2 - Alliance Formation**

Alliances are formed between parties and interest groups. In some cases, the tie is so tight that the two are essentially inseparable. Solidarity in its early days might be an example of such a connection.<sup>88</sup>

The main reasons for these alliances are, for the interest group, to get access to the political power of the party and, for the party, to build its constituency which, in its turn, adds to its political power.<sup>89</sup> This is exactly the kind of pact that O'Donnell and Schmitter describe:

"An explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the "vital interests" of those entering into it"<sup>90</sup>

Interest groups provide an efficient way to bring people into a party. By allying oneself with an interest group, a party can effectively co-opt the group's constituency as its own. The only other way to build a constituency is to go directly to the people. This is less efficient and can incur the wrath of the interest groups who have been ignored. Parties also provide an equally efficient means for interest groups to get access to the political system.<sup>91</sup>

Since people normally fit into one or more interest groups, and the affiliation with one group may be stronger than the other, the party cannot expect to co-opt the entire group. It can, however, expect the interest group to deliver some portion of its constituency when the party needs it (e.g. elections, coups, etc.).

Interest groups must be wooed and won by parties. Certain interest groups, however, can be seen leaning toward certain parties from the outset. The army, for example normally sides with the government, while the intelligentsia normally side with an opposition party.<sup>92</sup> Thus, the process of incorporating them into some kind of party can happen so quickly that it is hard to determine which came first, the party or the interest group.

Other groups are approached later or not at all. These groups either do not add substantially to the party or they require extreme changes in the party's agenda to incorporate them. While it is not from Eastern Europe, the best example I can think of is the Ku Klux Klan. Though not actively approached, these groups still lean towards one party or another. Because they are marginalized intentionally, their contribution is considerably less than those interest groups that are actively pursued.

Important interest groups are likely to be approached by a number of parties and it is not unlikely to see an interest group change its affiliation. One of the best examples of this is the Catholic Church's change of position towards authoritarian regimes. It had a tremendous influence in the recent Latin American transitions from authoritarian rule as well as in Poland.<sup>93</sup>

This is clearly an on-going activity for parties and interest groups. For purposes of this model I place it second only for the sake of logic. It and the first phase clearly provide the context, the backdrop, if you will for the remaining phases.

### **Phase 3 - Coalition**

Parties now make their second pact. This pact is a coalition that forms a government. In states that are just beginning the transition from authoritarian rule, the party that represents the authoritarian interests is very likely to have sufficient political power to control the government for a considerable length of time. A good example of this is Poland which began the transition in 1980 but did not begin to openly share power with Solidarity until 1988.<sup>94</sup>

As time goes on and levels of political power change, coalition governments can emerge. These governments can be open coalitions as was the power sharing between Solidarity and the government in the last years of the eighties or covert coalitions as was the power sharing between Solidarity and the government in the middle eighties.<sup>95</sup> Parties which are not in the government are in the opposition. These parties, while clearly not representing a majority of the political power available, can also work together to bring about the downfall of either the government or key governmental policies.

Because this is a pact, it is subject to dissolution. Upon dissolution, a new pact, a new coalition, must be formed in the context of constantly changing alliances and, to a lesser extent, agendas. Since nothing has been accomplished, the only thing lost has been time.

Time is not normally on the side of a state making the transition from authoritarian rule. Usually, in fact, the state is in an economic mess.<sup>96</sup> When parties waste time forming and reforming coalitions instead of going about the business of governing (as happened in pre-war

Yugoslavia<sup>97</sup>), the standard of living begins to decline. As the standard of living begins to decline, people lose faith in the governmental process. Parties active in the process lose political power and may become marginalized.<sup>98</sup> Pre-war Yugoslavia and Germany are good examples of this.<sup>99</sup>

Thus, this process is not played out in a vacuum but against a populace that demands a better standard of living. Standard of living, in this model, represents the overwhelming non-political concern of parties. Certainly, the populace is willing to give governments some time to straighten out affairs - the experience in virtually all of the Eastern European countries shows this - but they will not give forever.<sup>100</sup> In short, parties must use their political power to form alliances and coalitions that will not only allow them to fulfill their agendas but also allow them to raise the standard of living (or, at least, not let it drop too low.)

#### **Phase 4 - Policy Selection**

Governments use policies to fulfill their agendas and to raise the standard of living. The nature of the policies depend on the country. Land reform, privatization and disarmament are all policies that have been pursued, to one degree or another during the transition from authoritarian rule in the Eastern European states.<sup>101</sup> While the choice of policies is terribly important to a great number of people, it is only important in this model to the extent that it changes the standard of living and that it allows the parties in the government to fulfill their agendas.

The choice of specific policies is yet another pact that is executed internally among the members of the government and, to a lesser extent, externally with the opposition.<sup>102</sup> As such, their choice represents a compromise that revolves around three concepts from this model: The effect that the policy will have on the standard of living, the degree of change that the policy will entail, and the degree to which the policy will allow one or more parties to fulfill their agendas.<sup>103</sup>

Problems arising from policy selection may cause coalitions to dissolve. In Poland, Czechoslovakia and other eastern european states, parties like Solidarity and Civic Forum can be viewed largely as anti-communist coalitions that splintered once the political power of the Communist Party was reduced enough to no longer be a threat.<sup>104</sup> The dissolution of governmental coalitions over policy selection without accomplishing anything - again pre-war Yugoslavia comes to mind - forces parties back into the context of agenda modification and alliance formation. The process begins again with only the loss of time and the possible reduction in the standard of living as a result.

#### **Phase 5 - Policy Support**

During this phase, parties use political power to either support or oppose specific policies. This phase overlaps the previous phase to a considerable extent. Despite this, I view support for a policy as a separate action from selection. There are several ramifications arising from this view.

First, small parties can use all of their political power to defeat or significantly modify specific, highly objectionable policies. Second, not all policies will get implemented. Parties may be so busy defending high priority policies that others are simply ignored. Finally, coalitions may dissolve over promised support that does not materialize.<sup>105</sup> The results of coalition dissolution are identical to the results in the last two phases.

#### **Phase 6 - Policy Implementation**

During this phase policies that were supported in the last phase are implemented. The success or failure of these policies depends on many things including, among others, the pre-authoritarian legacy with similar policies, the will of the people to execute the policies, the skill with which the policies are drafted, etc.

Three things can be said, in general, about policy implementation. The first is that only the probability of success or failure of a given policy can be assessed prior to implementation. Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign was designed to increase productivity by decreasing drunkenness on the job. It failed due to public backlash. The second is that the more radical the change in policy direction, the more that is at stake for the policy makers. It is probable that the failure of the radical economic change in Poland (initiated in January of 1991) to bring about equally radical change in the standard of living for the Polish people contributed significantly to the collapse of Poland's first post-communist government. The third is that, like the previous phases, policy implementation can result in the dissolution of a

coalition. In this case something was accomplished (although the results were probably negative since the coalition is dissolving) and the parties find themselves, once more, back in the context of alliance formation and agenda adjustment.

Elections can be announced by the government at any time. It is convenient to discuss them here because a logical time for a government to call for elections is after successful implementation of governmental policies.

Elections are held in a number of different ways. It can be highly inclusive with positions opened to everyone who cares to run. It can also be an instrument of repression in that it excludes certain minorities or parties from the process or in that it limits access to political positions. Elections can be one-party, two-party or multiple party. Political positions can be filled through a plurality system or a proportional system. The drawing of district lines can effectively isolate an interest group or party. In a state that is in transition, all of these considerations are subject to manipulation by the government that calls for elections.<sup>106</sup> In addition, all of these considerations can be subjugated to two core issues - participation and inclusion.

Participation and inclusion form a matrix that includes all possible forms of government.<sup>107</sup> Authoritarian regimes have low or little participation or inclusion, while more democratic regimes have higher levels of both. "Polyarchies" have virtually unattainable levels of participation and inclusion.<sup>108</sup>



Since any form of government can be graphed onto this matrix, it is possible to, theoretically, resolve all the issues of an election into these two variables. As with all the variables in this model, the problem comes in determining them precisely enough to be of some use. Also, as before, utilizing fuzzy logic techniques and best-guesses should provide some useful information.

Thus, rather than worrying about the exact rules of the election, this model focuses on how those rules make the system more or less participatory and inclusive.<sup>109</sup> The importance of this is, while the analyst will have to factor in all of the election variables into his conclusion, he will only have to come up with numerical values for two variables, participation and inclusion.

Elections are tools for the re-distribution of political power. Furthermore, the amount of power up for grabs depends upon how inclusive and participatory the elections are.<sup>110</sup> The sham elections of the communist Eastern European states are perfect examples of this. Although suffrage was general, important positions were given to party members, usually hand-picked by some committee. No real political power was redistributed as a result of these elections. On the other hand, many scholars have noted the effect of the first free elections - the founding elections - in a country. Redistribution of power can be immediate and overwhelming.<sup>111</sup>

#### **Phase 7 - Coup Phase**

Coups are means by which power can be seized by parties or individuals who currently do not have power or are in a risk of losing

what they do have.<sup>112</sup> Like elections, coups can take place at any time. Logically, they would take place because of some expectation or event, such as the expectation of defeat in elections or successful policy implementation by another party.

Coups are normally quite risky and quite unlikely to succeed. In order to increase the probability of success, there seem to be certain key interest groups that can alter the outcome. The army is certainly the most important and neutralizing or, preferably, having the army on your side is extremely important for a successful coup.<sup>113</sup> Other interest groups such as the media, beureaucrats, students, and the intelligentsia are important but have correspondingly less influence on the ability to successfully execute a coup.<sup>114</sup>

Thus the coup provides the context for the political portion of the transition just as standard of living provides context for the entire transition process. In fact, the primary indicator that the transition process is nearing an end is when the chance for a coup nears zero.<sup>115</sup>

### **Phase 8 - Elections**

Elections are the peaceful way to redistribute political power within a regime. While the announcement of elections is an activity that comes sometime earlier (I placed it in Phase Six for the sake of logic), the election itself normally occurs some time after its announcement.

The importance of the election depends, as I have stated, on the degree to which they are participatory and inclusive. In elections

which are neither participatory nor inclusive, the stakes are small and the winners will be determined by the rules established by the government. In highly participatory and inclusive elections, typically called founding elections, the winners are more likely to be determined by the skill with which alliances were formed and people recruited prior to the elections. Founding elections, however, are highly unpredictable by their nature and no amount of politiking can guarantee the result.<sup>116</sup> Thus, elections, while they exist within the context of the coup, provide the context for the other phases. Given the iterative nature of this model, everything political leads both to and away from elections.

### **Completion**

The transition process is complete when the country achieves a stable form of government. This could be a democracy or another authoritarian regime, based on religious or ethnic ideas, perhaps. A government is stable when the risk of coup nears zero. Since coups override the rest of the political process, their elimination signals that peaceful, procedural redistribution of political power has won out over more violent means.<sup>117</sup>

In conclusion, the model I have described is a simple, iterative political process complicated by the diverse positions among the parties on core issues, dramatically unequal amounts of political power among those parties, and all of the parties living under the spectre of coups. In the next chapter, I will apply this model to a specific situation, that of Hungary. The result of this application will be a simulation

that can and will be run and the results of which can and will be compared with the recent history of the Hungarian peoples.

## Chapter 4

### **THE SIMULATION**

The only perfect simulation is reality. -- Game Designer's  
Motto<sup>18</sup>

#### **General**

Once a model of an event is developed the real work begins -- that of taking a general model and turning it into a specific simulation. In this section I intend to outline, given my constraints, how I dealt with each section of the model. In other words, how I turned one specific section of the model into a specific section of the simulation. Simulation designers call this type of analysis "designer's notes". What I will do here will be far more extensive than normal. In concluding this chapter, I will discuss the actual running of the simulation.

#### **Constraints**

The first problem any designer has is the balance between realism and "playability". Playability is a design term that defines how easy it is to play a simulation. The easier a simulation is to play -- the less time it takes, the fewer number of players it takes, etc. -- the more playable it is. Against this must be balanced the need for realism otherwise the results of the simulation can be called into serious question. Ultimately, playability and realism are a zero-sum equation. The higher the level of playability, the lower the level of realism and vice-versa. The trick, then, is to pick the highest level

of realism that still allows the simulation to be played under current operational constraints.

Operational constraints might also be called sources of invalidity.<sup>119</sup> Regardless of name, these are the caveats, the warnings, if you will, to not only the design itself, but also the results. In a case such as this where those constraints are relatively severe the design could even be described as quasi-experimental<sup>120</sup>. Despite this fact, I believe that this is the best way to test the model put forth in the previous chapter. This said I still intend to "go ahead with experiment and interpretation, fully aware of the points on which the results are equivocal".<sup>121</sup>

There are seven basic operational constraints. The first is the event to be simulated. The more complex the event, the harder it is to design rules that are easily understandable. This constraint is independent of the model. A general model may fit several different situations. Some of these may be easier to convert into a simulation than others.

Here the event simulated is the transition from authoritarian rule of the country of Hungary. I chose Hungary because the research was easiest for me to do. I knew that I would spend the summer of 1993 in Hungary and that this would allow me to do extensive field research for the simulation. Field research is particularly appropriate for this kind of study.<sup>122</sup> In fact, I consider it mandatory and, thus, my ability to do current field research played the largest role in my decision to use Hungary as the subject of my simulation.

In addition, the Hungarian transition is not complete. This has several advantages. The first is that this transition has not been academically "evaluated". In other words, I do not have to look at this transition through the filter of someone else's value judgements. Secondly, my model of transition is specifically designed to have a predictive function. Thus I can not only explore the possibilities of the recent history of Hungary but also I can, perhaps, peer into its future.

The problems presented by Hungary, however, are significant. There are six parliamentary parties in Hungary. They are the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the Christian Democrats (CD), the Smallholders (SH), the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), the Young Democrats (YD) and the Socialists (SOC).<sup>123</sup> Each of these six would have to be represented by a participant. In addition, my field research indicated that two other parties, the Republic (or Republican) Party (REP) and the Hungarian Truth and Life Party (HTL), also had sufficient political power to be a factor in the elections (currently scheduled for spring, 1994). This meant that the optimal number of participants was eight, an extremely high number.

In addition, because the transition process is on-going in Hungary there is a dearth of current information on the situation. Books and articles published as recently as 1990 are woefully out of date. Hungary, in general, gets very little coverage in this country compared to the more exciting events happening in the Balkans. This problem was partially overcome by my trip to Hungary. I also subscribed, while

there, to the most respected English-language newspaper currently being published in Budapest, the Hungarian Times. This allowed me to stay current on the various issues, policies and interest groups that would alter the simulation.

The second constraint is the types and numbers of participants. Experienced, well-informed participants that fully understand the event that is to be simulated obviously allow an increase in realism without a decrease in playability. This type of participant requires little in the way of background information and, thus, more time can be spent on more realistic rules. In addition, these types of participants have an intuitive grasp of why certain rules are important.

My field of prospective participants was limited to students at Florida State University. Originally, I had hoped that I would be able to limit the group to graduate students. Given the number of players that I needed per iteration, this quickly proved to be difficult. In the end I had to approach numerous professors and various organizations to ask them to lend their support to the project. All gave their support unhesitatingly (one even used the project as a way of giving extra credit to his students). I even cajoled the local paper into publishing an article about my research in order to attract more students. All of these techniques worked insofar as I generally had interested, and, in some cases, enthusiastic participants. Their lack of knowledge of anything but the most rudimentary facts about Hungary was something that definitely had to be designed around, however.



The third constraint is the amount of time required for each iteration. Real time is the best possible rate of speed for a simulation. Real time means that time in the simulation and time in the event being simulated pass at exactly the same rate. Many simulations, particularly those used to train pilots or drivers, are executed in real time.

Because the length of time it takes to make a transition from authoritarian rule is measured in months and years, a real time simulation was obviously impractical. Given the nature of my participant pool, I knew that, regardless of interest or incentive, many of my prospective participants would not be able to contribute much more than three hours of time.

The fourth constraint is the number of times the simulation is to be played. Simulations that are only to be played once or twice are easier to set up than simulations that must be run hundreds of times. I set a goal of 10 iterations for this simulation. I felt that this was reasonable given my other constraints. In fact, I executed the simulation 14 times between September 10, 1993 and October 1, 1993.

The fifth constraint is money. Money allows the designer a great deal of flexibility in his design. Complex calculations can be done by computer if the money is available for one. Participants can be paid which guarantees, more or less, their presence and certainly acts as an incentive to participate. Money can be used to hire and train additional personnel in order to increase the number of times a simulation is run. These same personnel can be used to greatly increase

the accuracy of the research done for the simulation. In short, money allows the designer to raise the level of realism significantly without sacrificing playability.

Unfortunately, the budget for this program was limited to my own resources. This was not as significant a detriment as it might first seem. I have spent much of the last 20 years designing or participating in simulations. I am very familiar with the principles that apply to designing such a simulation. I also have a good feel for exactly what kind of information is required to make a simulation work. Finally, I have had considerable experience setting up and running simulations.

As to Hungary, I have considerable experience studying the country both before and after the revolution of 1989. As an Army intelligence officer stationed in Italy in the mid-1980's, I was responsible, as one of my jobs, for assessing the strategic capabilities of countries in the Warsaw Pact. Since then, I have been assigned as a Foreign Area Officer whose specific area of responsibilities includes all of Eastern Europe. Finally, as already mentioned, I was able to do extensive field research on Hungary during the summer of 1993. Particularly important for this project were a series of interviews I conducted while in Hungary with three experts on the Hungarian situation. While the substance and technique of these interviews will be described later, it is appropriate to say here that they provided the backbone for my research on the current situation in Hungary. There is no question, however, that this simulation would have been more realistic -- that the research would

have been better and the simulation more refined -- had I had unlimited, or even substantial, funds.

The sixth constraint is the presence or absence of an umpire. If a simulation must be designed to be run and played by someone other than the designer, it must be "idiot-proof". Each and every rule must be spelled out in great detail. Like a giant computer program, nothing can be left to chance. If, on the other hand, the designer will also serve as the umpire, then this kind of rigorous detail need not unnecessarily expand the rules. The umpire/designer can resolve minor difficulties about the rules during play. This is one of the few advantages I had. I would be the only person to run any of the simulations.

The final constraint has to do with the model itself. Some models are simply not capable of being turned into a simulation. The hallmark of this kind of model is multiple, mutually exclusive, incongruous patterns that are then burdened by non-specifiable terms. If the model is sufficiently well-thought out then the simulation that follows is easier to design. In a strictly Linnean sense, where classification leads to prediction and ultimately to control, the ability to design a simulation at all is a strong endorsement of a particular model.

## **Rules**

### **General**

The rules for the simulation (which I named "Hungary '93") were designed to meet two objectives. The first is that they must correspond step for step with the model. The second objective is that they must be

as user-friendly as possible (N.B. The reader is advised to refer frequently to the rules (See Appendix A) while reading this section).

### **Introduction**

The rules begin with a general introduction to the simulation. Several important points are made here. The first is the decision to call the simulation a "game". Many games that are played for pleasure, such as Monopoly or Risk, are in fact simulations that have completely sacrificed realism for playability. In some senses, simulations are a subset of the word game. I felt that by frequently using the word game it would alleviate some of the stress for the participants who might be unfamiliar with the concept of a simulation.

The second major point about the introduction is the statement of the player's goals. This was a deliberately misleading statement. It was clear from the outset that, given the time constraints for each iteration, that no player would ever be able to achieve the goals that were established for him in the beginning of the game. In short, there would never be time enough for someone to "win" the game.

The purpose of this deliberate deception was to encourage players to play the game as if they could win. The first problem was getting participants to come to the game. The second problem was to get them actively involved in it. By telling them up front that they could not win the simulation, I felt that their incentive to actively participate might diminish substantially.

In addition, this simulation, written as is, is not designed to be played for more than five or six turns. After that time the system

breaks down. A good example of how this happens comes with the discussion of various issues (See Appendix B). The status of health care, for example, is currently a major problem in Hungary.<sup>124</sup> A policy to fix the problem could be to increase the rate of privatization of health care. There are only so many times that the rate of privatization can be increased before health care is fully privatized. As turns progress, issues (and policies to resolve them) that are relevant in the context of today's Hungary become either resolved or overcome by events. Since predicting future issues and policies with any degree of accuracy is well beyond the scope of this study, the whole simulation is relevant to the current situation in Hungary only through turn six or so. This did not seem to be enough time for one player to emerge victorious and, in fact, this was the case.

The final point about the introduction is the reference to the "Fact Pack" (See Appendix D). The purpose of the "Fact Pack" was to educate the participants in a general way about the conditions that exist in Hungary. Charts<sup>125</sup> were chosen that would give the players sufficient background about the country to make reasonably intelligent decisions while, at the same time, be easy to read. This was one of the ways that the type of participant constraint, discussed earlier, was overcome.

After the introduction, the actual rules begin in earnest. The pattern was to start with the general and move to the specific. Thus, the first section deals with the overall sequence of play. This is to

familiarize the players with the way that each turn works and the purpose of each phase in that turn.

The phases themselves correspond exactly to those in the model. Beginning with the Agenda Adjustment Phase, each phase has rules that exactly define how the model will be translated into the simulation.

### **Agenda Adjustment**

In the Agenda Adjustment Phase players are allowed to make changes in their party's agenda. This agenda is defined by the five core issues of the model. The actual values of each core issue/agenda element is defined in the "Party Papers" (See Appendix E). These party papers not only define a player's agenda but also give that particular player information about how he perceives the other parties in the simulation. These papers are to be kept secret during the course of the simulation. Players were allowed to tell other players anything they wanted to about their party, including their agenda. The papers themselves, as a confirmation of the true agenda of a party, were kept secret in order to allow players to bluff.

The adjustments that could be made each turn to a party's agenda were relatively small. They could only be significant if promulgated over a series of turns. This was on purpose. Agenda adjustment was not to be seen as the solution to one of the "game-winning" conditions, i.e. that of making the National Position Chart (the set of five scales identifying where a country's current set of laws and policies place it) fit an individual party's agenda.

The easiest way to outline this problem is to first imagine a five-dimensional space. Each dimension corresponds to one of the five agenda elements. The National Position at any given moment is a rather fuzzy point in that space and represents the state of the nation on those five axes. The party's agenda can be imagined as an irregular, five dimensional solid some distance from the point. The object for the player is to apply force to the National Position in order to drive that point into the space defined by the irregular solid. The main tool for doing this in this simulation is the implementation of policies. Each policy will act as a vector along one or more of the five axes. Thus, the movement of the National Position can be seen as simple vector addition. Policy implementation, however, is difficult and requires a considerable amount of planning and effort. If agenda adjustment is too easy, then the rational player will simply ignore the headaches that accompany moving the point into the solid and will simply move the solid around the point!<sup>26</sup>

The agendas themselves were largely determined by field research done while in Hungary and through interviews conducted with three individuals: Dr. Gyorgy Szonyi, Director of the Department of Hungarian Studies and Professor of Political Science at the Jozsef Attila University in Szeged and native Hungarian; Mr. Zoltan Nafradi, Vice President of Dunabank (a small privately owned bank), former lecturer in economics at Jozsef Attila University, Chairman of the Young Democrat Party for Szeged and native Hungarian; and, finally, Mr. David Finch, contributing political and economics editor to the Hungarian Times,

political science graduate student, businessman and resident of Hungary since 1980. These interviews were conducted in July, 1993. The formal part of the interview lasted several hours. This was generally followed by a series of less formal discussions that filled in some of the gaps.

At the outset, I explained to each of these individuals exactly what I was doing as well as the nature of my model. I told them that I needed very specific value judgements about the various agenda elements that I saw as relevant. I explained to them that low numbers generally meant a more conservative (read communistic and interventionist) approach while high numbers generally meant a more liberal (read free-market and pacifistic) approach. I also asked them to rate each party for its overall political power. This would take into account not only the parliamentary representation but also leadership and financial position. This number, it was explained, was a relative one on an open-ended scale (unlike the 1-10 scale used for each agenda element). Each of them generally understood what I was trying to do and responded appropriately. The results of their responses are in Tables 1 below (Also included are the numbers actually used in the simulation).

Table 1 -- Interview Results

Agenda Elements	Part. Inc.	Civ. Rts.	Econ. For. Pol.	Pol. Pwr.
Parties				
HDF (Szonyi)	8	10	8	5-6 6 5
(Nafradi)	4-6	≥8	5-6	3-4 2-3 10
(Finch)	5-6	4-5	4-6	4 3-5 5
(Sim.)	8	5-9	5-6	3-6 3-5 7



Table 1 -- Continued

Parties		Part. Inc.	Civ. Rts.	Econ.	For. Pol.	Pol. Pwr.	
CD	(Nafradi)	3-6	≥8	4-5	2-3	4-5	3
	(Finch)	6-7	5-7	5-7	4-5	7-8	3
	(Sim.)	6-7	7-8	4-6	3-5	6-7	5
AFD	(Szonyi)	9-10	10	9	8	10	5
	(Nafradi)	8-10	≥8	4-5	7-8	7-8	5
	(Finch)	10	10	≥8	8	7-8	5
	(Sim.)	≥9	≥9	≥8	7-8	7-8	4
YD	(Szonyi)	9-10	10	10	9	10	4
	(Nafradi)	7-9	≥8	7-8	7-8	7-8	2
	(Finch)	9-10	10	10	9	10	4
	(Sim.)	≥9	10	≥8	7-8	6-8	4
SOC	(Szonyi)	8	10	5-7	4-5	8	5
	(Nafradi)	6-8	≥8	3-4	2-3	7-8	5
	(Finch)	9	9	6-7	2-3	8-9	3
	(Sim.)	6-7	7-8	5-7	2-4	7-9	3
SH	(Szonyi)	6-7	10	5-7	8	4	2
	(Nafradi)	3-6	5	5-6	2-3	2-3	4
	(Finch)	5	4	4-7	5-7	8	1
	(Sim.)	3-6	5	5-6	5-7	2-4	2
HTL	(Szonyi)						1
	(Finch)						1
	(Sim.)	5≤	6≤	5≤	6-7	2-3	1
REP	(Szonyi)						2
	(Finch)						1
	(Sim.)	4-8	4-8	4-7	≥9	3-8	1
N. Pos.	(Szonyi)	6-7	9-10	7	4	7	
	(Nafradi)	8	10	6	6	4	
	(Finch)	10	9	4	7	6	
	(Sim.)	8	9	6	5	4	

As is obvious by the chart, oftentimes there was little consensus about either the agendas or the relative political power of each of the parties. Where there was general consensus, such as with the Young Democrats (YD) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) I normally used that in the game. Sometimes I made modifications based on information

received after the interview. An example of this is in the Young Democrats' range on foreign policy. In the first place, I felt that Mr. Nafradi's assessment had the greatest chance of being correct on this agenda element. As the head of the Young Democrats in Szeged, one of the largest cities in Hungary outside of Budapest, he was in the best position to evaluate something like this (The same could not be said for participation and inclusion which were, in my opinion, technical terms that eluded him.).

After my discussion with Mr. Nafradi, the Young Democrats began to talk about reforming and re-arming the Army.<sup>127</sup> As a result of this information I adjusted the Foreign Policy Agenda Element slightly for the Young Democrats.

Where there was less than perfect consensus, I had to rely on my own judgment. This was bolstered by my notes which detailed exactly why each interviewee had rated each party as he had. It was also based on other, less formal discussions that I had with other students, professors and ordinary people that I happened to come into contact with. Finally, there were often specific news items that caused me to lean one way or the other on a certain element.

For example, the Christian Democrats have voted for a number of policies lately that would seem to defy their "protector of the poor" image.<sup>128</sup> These votes could be interpreted as representing their true position on the economy. After reading an analysis of the CD voting patterns, I concluded that these votes were made more for political

expediency than as a representative sample of their preferred policies on the economy and adjusted their agenda accordingly.<sup>129</sup>

Two exceptions to this general pattern were the Hungarian Truth and Life party and the Republic Party. The HTL came into being as a result in a split in the Hungarian Democratic Forum in the last week in June. Its leader, Istvan Csurka, is extremely conservative. He has called for Hungarian "lebensraum" and opposes the "selling out of the country".<sup>130</sup> His party's chances in the general election were probably damaged dramatically by Csurka's revelation that he had been an informer for the secret police.<sup>131</sup> Despite this, given his strong ties to the nationalistic movement in Hungary, I felt that it was imperative to include his party in the simulation. Unfortunately, by the time this became clear to me, I was not in a position to conduct a full interview with any of my three experts.

The second exception was the Republic Party. I discovered this party almost by accident during my final days in Budapest. It, like the HTL is a non-parliamentary party. The main source of its strength is in its wealthy and popular leader, Janos Polotas.<sup>132</sup> Mr. Polotas seems to stand for little except a virtual laissez-faire economy. His party is unknown outside of Hungary, but political insiders consider his party a real threat to exceed the five percent minimum required for party entry into parliament.<sup>133</sup> Given time limitations, I was not able to research this party as exhaustively as I would like. Therefore, the agenda developed for the Republic Party is the most insecure of the eight.

The National Position Chart is basically a synthesis of the views of the interviewees. The only exception to this is in foreign policy. There is some evidence to suggest that Hungary is more interventionist on this scale than the local experts would like to believe.<sup>134</sup>

The last element of the Agenda Adjustment Phase is the possibility of the disintegration of the party due to various adjustments in the agenda. I arbitrarily ascribed a one in six chance of a split each time an agenda was adjusted. It seems to me that this kind of split (which is basically over the ideological purity of the party) occurs fairly rarely. More importantly, I wanted to use only a six-sided die in the game. Most people are familiar with the six-sided die and I felt that this familiarity would be useful in helping the types of players that participated feel more comfortable with the simulation.

More technically, Hungary's election law is a mixed proportionally representative and pluralistic one.<sup>135</sup> A party can get individual candidates elected to a specific seat in parliament with a simple majority. Failing that, a party is required to have a five percent minimum of the vote in order to be represented in Parliament. This kind of constitution seems to keep the number of parties down.<sup>136</sup> It also would act as an incentive for a party, particularly a small one, not to split up, since it might lose representation in Parliament. This phenomena is accounted for by the rule that dissolves parties that have only the barest minimum of political power and split because of an agenda adjustment.

### **Alliance Formation**

The purpose of the Alliance Phase is to allow players to use political power to form alliances with various interest groups (See Appendix C). Each interest group also has an agenda, just like the parties. This agenda helps the player know which of the various interest groups are most likely to align themselves with his party (There is a penalty in the game for attempting to ally oneself with interest groups that have substantially different agendas than your own).

At the outset, two new concepts are introduced in this section: People Cards and Political Power Points. I used one 3x5 card to represent each percent of the population over 18 (See Appendix F). The cards are broken down by sex, ethnicity and religion according to the actual percentages in Hungary today.<sup>137</sup> On the back of each card is a number from one to nine. These numbers are arranged in a normal distribution within each category so that there are a great many more fives than either ones or nines. This number represents the "real" political strength of that one percent of the population. The purpose of this is to keep the players from counting the other player's People Cards in order to form an optimal strategy. In other words, the hidden number on the back creates enough uncertainty that no player can absolutely determine what would happen under a particular set of circumstances. Secondly, this number could be very important in low distributions of People Cards (during coups, for example). This would allow for extraordinary results that might occur if every card were

equal. Finally, in high distribution situations, the effects of this random, secret distribution would tend to average out.

Political Power Points are a numerical indicator of how powerful a given party is relative to all the other parties in Hungary. My first inclination was to set political power equal to the percent of the seats in Parliament (divided by 10) that a particular party received during the founding elections of 1990. This would have given the HDF four points, the AFD two points, and the rest one point apiece.<sup>138</sup> This was inadequate in three respects. First, the numbers for each of the parties have been seriously altered due to defections. In fact, the coalition government of HDF, CD and SH started with a 69.59% majority in the legislature. By 6 September, 1993, this lead had been eroded to a mere 50.64% majority.<sup>139</sup> Secondly, this definition of political power was too limited. Political power, as previously discussed includes votes in parliament, money, leadership and a host of other intangibles. Thirdly, this definition would not coincide with the changes in political power that were obvious by the answers given in my interviews.

Generally, the political power scores that were ultimately assigned to each of the parties represent a synthesis of the information given in the interviews. There were times, however, when I completely or partially rejected an interviewee's judgement. An example of this is Mr. Nafradi's assessment of the political power of the Young Democrats, his own party. Not only is his assessment out of synch with the others I questioned, it seems to fail to take into account that the YD was the

most popular party in Hungary at that time.<sup>140</sup> It is possible that Mr. Nafradi wanted his party to be perceived to be the underdog. Another example is the Christian Democrats. None of those interviewed was a Roman Catholic, the main interest group supporting the CD. I believe that they underestimated the Church's involvement in politics and its ability to influence its congregations.<sup>141</sup>

Once these two concepts are explained, the player is directed to the Interest Group Sheet. The names of most of the interest groups came out of same interviews that provided the information on the parties' agendas. Others, such as the information on the "skinheads" and environmentalists, was supplemented by various articles on those organizations.<sup>142</sup> None of these interest groups were assigned prior to the first turn of play. In other words, each player began the game without any interest groups supporting his party.

The purpose for this was two-fold. The first, and most important, reason was that the first turn was designed to be an undeclared practice round. Many of the students would come to the simulation with no experience in simulations and with only a cursory understanding of the rules (which they were provided with in advance). This meant that in the first turn it was necessary to walk the participants through the process while still allowing them to make the decisions. The second reason was to provide a "rationality test". Once the process was explained, rational decision makers would use the information in their Party Papers (See Appendix E) to choose interest groups that were not only the most appropriate but also the most powerful.

The power of the interest group was defined by two elements. The first was the number of people that the group could reasonably expect to influence directly during an election. This number is listed under the column marked "People" on the Interest Group Sheet (See Appendix C) and represents the percent of the population that will vote with the agenda of this interest group. This number is a function of the maximum size of the group coupled with the flexibility of that group's agenda. This is then adjusted for specific information obtained from research.

Two good examples are the environmentalists and the unemployed. Approximately 52% of the population considers the environment a very serious issue.<sup>143</sup> This represents the maximum size of the group. Its agenda, however, is fairly narrow, which would serve to exclude many Hungarians that might otherwise consider themselves environmentalists. This is confirmed by additional research that shows the number of hard-core environmentalists in Hungary to be fairly low.<sup>144</sup>

Officially, the rate of unemployment in Hungary is around 13%.<sup>145</sup> This number is first increased and then decreased by two factors discovered during my research. The first is that the Hungarian government automatically excludes from the list of unemployed anyone who is no longer eligible for the one year of guaranteed unemployment benefits.<sup>146</sup> It also does not include any estimate for the number of people employed by the black market or the largely untaxed services industry. This makes up, according to some estimates, 50% of the economy in Hungary, where tax evasion is almost the national sport (second only to soccer).<sup>147</sup> These two items, taken with the relatively



broad agenda of the unemployed, gives this interest group control of a larger percentage of its maximum size than a group like the environmentalists.

The second element of power is represented by the number of coup points that an interest group is worth. This number is found under the column headed "Coup" on the Interest Group Sheet. This number represents the value of an interest group to the holder during a coup attempt. The higher number the better.

Certain interest groups generally prove to be more important than others during a coup.<sup>148</sup> Factors that determine their importance include size of the group, equipment possessed by the group, location of the group, connections of the group and the physical ability of the members of the group to participate in a coup. For example, the elderly might lack the physical ability to participate in a coup, but might have a number of connections that could be useful to a coup leader. Students, likewise, are relatively powerful because of not only their physical ability to participate but also because of their numbers and their location in the larger towns in Hungary. Small farmers, on the other hand, have relatively little power to effect a coup because of their location outside of the main centers of power and their relatively few connections. In fact, given the state of Hungarian infrastructure, it is quite possible that the coup would be complete before the small farmers knew about it.<sup>149</sup>

Bidding for interest groups was conducted in rounds. Each round the player had the option of bidding one political power point for an

interest group or passing. This process was designed to even the field a bit by keeping players with more political power points guessing where the other players would allocate their resources. The player bidding the most points for an interest group had the greatest chance of actively getting the support of that group. This concept of an interest group going to the highest bidder in democratizing countries is fairly well documented.<sup>150</sup> The process here is somewhat modified by the necessity of the interest group having a similar agenda as that of the party in order to avoid certain penalties. Every attempt was made to determine the agendas for the parties separately from the those of the interest groups. Ideally, the determination of the agenda for each interest group and each party would be made by a different research team. Given that this was impossible, I designed one element several months after I had designed the other. This separation in time, coupled with the overall high level of complexity of the game, are the only assurances that I have that the agendas for the interest groups are not consciously linked to the agendas for the parties.

One of the options was for a player to bid on a group that another party already controlled. This was designed to simulate the process by which parties continually compete for the support of certain groups, particularly those with a great deal of power or very broad agendas or both. A good example of this is the media. Representing both the print and broadcast medias, it is a powerful group with a broad, almost nonexistent, agenda. Currently, the print media is free while the broadcast media is still in the hands of the government despite serious

attempts to put it into private hands.<sup>151</sup> This is typical of the situation throughout Eastern Europe.<sup>152</sup> The process of assault and counter-assault in the simulation is designed to represent the process, between now and the elections, of attempts by other parties to free and, it is hoped, control this potent force. To a lesser extent it also simulates the use of the printed word to neutralize the effects of other parties in their bid for the electorate.

Finally, the option of "going to the people" is included in the simulation. This is the process of using political power to exchange for people cards on a one-for-one basis. It is included because it is a possible strategy and, in an environment of intense competition for interest groups, might well prove to be the best one. However, the rational player will soon realize that the marginal utility of using his political power to directly influence one percent of the population is considerably less than using that same one point in order to acquire an interest group that represents several percentage points of the population.

### **Coalition**

The coalition phase is designed to allow the current coalition to either dissolve or to bring someone new on board. If the coalition dissolves (the simulation equivalent of a no-confidence vote in Parliament), then play does not resume until a new coalition, with 50% or more of the available political power in it, is established.

The rules on the dissolution and formation of coalitions are kept purposefully vague. This is designed to promote pact formation among the

players. The rules make it very clear that the pacts that they want to make (and break) are completely up to them.

### **Policy Setting, Support and Implementation**

These three phases represent the attempts by the government to come to grips with the current issues that face Hungary and to solve them while, at the same time, living up to their own agendas.

The issues currently confronting Hungarians are listed in the Issues and Policies packet (See Appendix B) that accompanies the rules. The issues themselves are taken from the Hungarian Times, Budapest Week and Budapest Sun for the period from 1 July, 1993 to 10 September, 1993. The short background essay that accompanies each issue comes not only from the newspapers but also from many conversations with Hungarians about how they felt about a certain issue. The essays deliberately try to present the Hungarian point of view, when feasible.

The policies that accompany each issue are more important for simulation purposes. They represent a spectrum of ways that a government can choose to deal with an issue. Each policy has a chance of improving or degrading the standard of living. The standard of living is a key element in this simulation. It represents the short term perceptions of the people as to how things are going. It is designed to answer the question in every citizen's mind, "Is what they are doing making life better for me?" The perception of success or failure is used instead of an absolute measure of success or failure since, in game time, many of the policies would not have enough time to be fully implemented. Given that the government's purpose should be to

improve the lot of its citizens, the standard of living number and its increases and decreases over time indicates how successful a government is.

Thus, for each point that the standard of living goes up, one political power point is given to the government (who can claim the lion's share of the credit for such a fortuitous event), while for each point that the standard of living goes down, the ruling coalition must lose a political power point, first from the largest member of the coalition and then down through the ranks for each point thereafter. This rule is designed to force the coalition to make an agreement about the spoils of successful policy implementation. In addition it punishes the leader of the coalition in the event of failure.

All policies are not created equal, however. Some have a better chance of being successful than others. Assigning the possibilities and degree of success was difficult and to some extent subjective. For policies that are currently on the table in Hungary - for example, the increased rate of privatization of co-operative farms<sup>153</sup> - best case and worst case scenarios could be gleaned from the rhetoric of the advocates and detractors of the policy. For policies that have never been seriously, or publicly, proposed (such as covert action against the Gabchikovo dam in Slovakia), the range of results of the implementation of such a policy are more of a hypothesis than a range firmly rooted in research.

There are two defenses for this kind of coding. The first is that, absent access to the secret conversations and agreements of the

real parties, there is no other way to code what is obviously a reasonable option. The second is that these types of educated guesses are oftentimes used by real decision makers in the absence of better information. The fact that the guess may not be correct or even close at all does not prevent people from using the technique.

The other aspect of a policy is its effect on the National Position Chart. Certain policies will change one or more of the agenda elements that make up this chart. This change will occur regardless of the effect that the policy has on standard of living. Thus if a policy is promulgated that increases the rate of privatization of health care then this can be seen as not only an attempt to increase the standard of living but also as an attempt to implement a specific agenda, in this case an economically liberal one.

Policy selection is done exclusively by the governing coalition. They are free however to make deals with the opposition regarding the selection of certain policies. This allows the government a certain ability to plot a strategy towards getting some or all of its goals accomplished. They could, for example, pick only one policy, knowing that, barring political defections, they have the majority of the political power and would be able to force the issue through. On the other hand, the coalition could attempt a shotgun approach that puts many policies on the table at one time. Some of these might even be red herrings used to draw political power away from the policies that the coalition considers crucial.

One rule which did influence policy selection is the rule that in any turn in which the standard of living goes down or stays the same, there is a two in six chance that the standard of living will go down another point in the final phase of the game. This rule is included to represent the political penalty for excessive gridlock. In practice, it encouraged the governing coalition to attempt to promulgate legislation that would have a positive effect on the standard of living. It is important to note that many democratically distasteful policies had just as much or better chance to increase the standard of living. These types of policies are necessary if the simulation is not going to dictate an outcome.

Once a series of policies are selected, the players allocate some, all or none of their political power in order to defeat or enact one or more of the policies. This allocation process occurs one point at a time over a series of rounds. This prolongation of the allocation process allows the players time to make and break agreements with each other. It also allows them time to develop strategy to defeat or pass certain policies. This phase was designed to be the most exciting and dynamic of all of the phases. In practice, as will be discussed fully in the next chapter, it proved to be exactly that.

The policy implementation phase is mostly a record-keeping phase. Policies that were supported in the previous phase are enacted. In game terms this means that the die is rolled to determine the results, if any, of the policies on the standard of living. In addition, any adjustments to the National Position Chart are also made at this time.

Finally, the amount of political power up for grabs in an election (determined by the level of participation and inclusion on the National Position Chart) is discussed here. It is placed here rather than with the election phase to remind players about the potential benefits that may accrue to either themselves or another player if elections are held.

### **Coups**

The coup phase is specifically placed before the election phase in order to give players an opportunity to decide whether or not a coup is in their best interests. Generally speaking if a player(s) has enough coup points to have a decent chance for a successful coup, then he probably has enough to do fairly well in the elections. By opting for elections, a player avoids any decrease to the standard of living, something that is almost inevitable during a coup. Coups, or overthrows of the transitional government as they are defined in the model, are a real risk in a nation undergoing transition from authoritarian rule, as the recent unpleasantness in Russia proves.<sup>154</sup> They might prove particularly attractive to a party that was in danger of being marginalized or eliminated during an election but currently had control of some of the stronger interest groups.

### **Elections**

The elections are designed to provide one of the more interesting results of the simulation. Since Hungarian elections are not scheduled until April of next year, the results of this simulation with regards to them will be a prediction arising from the model as opposed to a confirmation of it.



People cards are handed out to players according to thier interest groups. This process happens in reverse of the previous processes. In other words, the player with the lowest political power receives cards first. This arrangement is designed to keep the weakest player from not getting any cards at all. Since there are only 100 cards in the deck (each representing one percent of the voting population), it is possible, were the order of distribution reversed, that the smaller parties would get fewer of, and perhaps, none of the cards that they were due. Once all of the active interest groups are taken into account, those groups that were not activated are doled out to the parties that are closest in terms of agenda. These groups, since they were not actively wooed by the party, contribute only half as many points to the total as those from the active interest groups.

Once the cards are distributed, they are turned over to reveal their true values to their party. The players add up the results and political power points are distributed based on the results.

There are two important design comments to make here. The first is that Hungary has a mixed electoral system. In other words, members of parliament can be either directly elected from a specific district or they can come from a party list for those seats that were not filled directly.<sup>155</sup> The system above only attempts to simulate only the popular vote. There are two reasons for this. The first is that to try to simulate the effects of this mixed system would be absolutely too difficult. The direct elections are races that depend primarily on personality and location. The proportionally representative portion

relies on a complicated series of local and national lists. The research alone for this kind of simulation is well beyond the scope of the current project. Secondly, despite the fact that Hungary has a mixed system, the percentage of the popular vote closely paralleled the percentage of seats gained in parliament in the 1990 elections in all but one instance (that of the HDF).<sup>156</sup> Thus, it is quite possible to spend an enormous amount of time and effort to get a projected result that may be superior to the one provided by this system in only insignificant ways.<sup>157</sup>

The second design comment has to do with the structure of the simulation after either elections or coups. The simulation is designed to provide the appropriate incentives for participating in either an election or coup. Applying the results of either of these two events to the simulation and then continuing with it are beyond the true scope of the simulation. Part of the reason for this is that political power becomes highly skewed due to rounding after an election. In other words, political power points come in discrete one point packages while election results come in continuous percentages. Thus, the simulation is effectively over once either an election or coup takes place. Fortunately, elections tended to coincide with end of the three hour time limit and the game was ended for administrative reasons. It is important to note for further research that the initial allocation of political power as well as the continuing allocation of power during the simulation needs much more research if it is to be accurate over longer time periods.

The last phase of the turn is the victory determination phase. It is basically a record keeping phase before the players enter the next turn. Any and all adjustments that have not been made up to this time are made now. Ostensibly the phase is designed to determine if the last turn produced a "winner". Since this result is not a true goal of the simulation, players will always proceed to the next turn.

### **Executing the Simulation**

The logistics of executing a simulation such as this are nearly as intimidating as the process of devising the model and the rules. During a period of about three weeks, 50 people participated (almost all of them twice) in Hungary '93 during 14 iterations of the simulation at locations all over campus. Times for these simulations ranged from 9:00 AM Monday morning to 5:00 PM Sunday night. In some ways it was an added incentive to get the rules right since it was too much work to execute a simulation only to have the system fail.

Each of the 14 iterations went in much the same fashion. Through my contacts with various undergraduate and graduate classes and various student organizations, I had a list of approximately 75 people who were interested in participating. Students were then called as much as a week in advance in order to arrange a time to play. This initial call was then followed up with another call two days before the simulation in order to assure attendance. This procedure resulted in a low no-show rate of about 8%. Ideally, nine students were scheduled for each iteration (eight for the eight parties and one to take the place of someone that did not show up). This occurred in about 25% of the games.

The rest were played with a median of seven participants although two games were played with as few as five.

Students were expected to pick up a packet containing the rules, the Fact Pack, the Issues and Policies packet and the Interest Group sheet the day before the simulation. Ideally, students would have had more time to review the packet. Unfortunately, since simulations took place almost every day (sometimes twice in one day), there was a constant need to rotate the packets as quickly as possible. Two sets of the packets (approximately 50 pages for each of the nine players) still stretched my budget for photocopying.

Students were given explicit instructions (See Appendix G) about what to do with the packet upon receipt as well as when and where to be the next day. The rooms that I used always had a blackboard and sufficient desk or table space for each participant. Rooms with conference or seminar type facilities proved to be the best, but they were not always available. Upon arrival each participant was given a name tag and asked to put both his name and his party on it. Players were then asked if they had specific questions about the rules. Then, rather than explaining the rules in a vacuum, play began immediately. Participants were encouraged not to be afraid to make mistakes or ask questions during the first turn. On subsequent turns, advice (about game mechanics only) was handed out more sparingly and generally only when asked. Advice on strategy was never given.

If, for some reason, there were fewer than eight players present, then I played the roles of the absent parties. In this case I also

adjusted the parties such that I only played the least powerful parties - the HTL, REP and sometimes the SH. I tried to play these parties as neutrally as I could, taking actions that I knew would be rational given the game mechanics. I did not, however, participate in any negotiations or agreements beyond what was specifically asked of and in the best interests of the party. My play was thus uninspired and this fact might have skewed the results in those games slightly towards the more powerful parties.

I developed turn record sheets (Appendix G) to keep track of the significant information that came out of each turn. The analysis of this information makes up the bulk of the next chapter. I also included a questionnaire (Appendix G) for each participant to fill out when the game was completed. The questionnaire was designed to give me some feedback on how well the game played as well as how enjoyable the game was to play. I received some suprising results that are also documented in the next chapter. Also, as a result of the feedback received from the questionnaire, minor rule changes occured after each of the first three games. Each game went the full three hours with approximately 15 minutes needed for both set up and break down.

## Chapter 5

### **THE RESULTS**

Ninety percent of the time things will turn out worse than you expect. The other ten percent of the time you had no right to expect so much. -- Norman Augustine<sup>158</sup>

#### **General**

The results from the simulation seem to break down into four distinct groups. The first are the results which are common to all of the groups. These have mainly to do with the types and numbers of participants and provide a backdrop for interpreting the rest of the results. The second set are the results of the experiment as an educational experience for the participants. Although this particular experiment was not designed with either education or enjoyment as a primary goal, it seems to have offered both. The third set of results seems to confirm the validity of the model. This statement can be made since the simulation, which came from the model, was remarkably accurate in reproducing many of the policies, coalitions and circumstances that currently occupy Hungarian political life. The final set of results are perhaps the most interesting. These are the results that predict the future. The results of the elections and of coups conducted in the simulations fall into this category.

#### **Common Results**

The simulation was run 14 times in the last three weeks of September, 1993. Approximately 150 students were contacted directly. This was done with the co-operation of three political science

professors, whose graduate and undergraduate classes I briefed, and the World Affairs Program, an organization for students interested in international affairs. Times that were available to play the simulation were restricted to fairly rigid three hour blocks during the week when I was available. Of this 150 approximately 75 expressed interest by signing up to participate in the simulation. Exactly 50 students participated in the 93 total positions that were filled. All of those who signed up for the simulation were contacted. Some were not able to play due to scheduling difficulties. There was an 8% no-show rate. Thus, each student played an average of 1.86 times with median equal to one time (See Table 2 below).

Table 2 -- Participation

Times played	1	2	3	4	5
No. of players	25	14	5	5	1

The players who participated more than two times were usually part of a research group that I formed early on of extremely interested players. This research group participated in the simulation three times as a group. The results of their iterations will be separated from the average for comparison purposes in the other sections of this chapter.

At the outset I considered the problem of multiple participation to be a serious one. Agendas were to be kept secret in order to permit bluffing. On the other hand, in order to run the maximum number of simulations, multiple participation was a must. In addition, experienced players greatly speeded up the play of the game.

The problem of keeping agendas secret was not as serious a problem as first anticipated because by the end of the first turn, in almost all of the games, it became relatively clear where many of the parties stood on most of the issues. Secondly, since there usually were several days between simulations (and often as much as a week) for an individual, they were unable to remember exactly (although they did retain a general idea) what the agenda was of the party they had played. Finally, agendas proved to much less of a motivating factor than politics. This will be discussed more fully later in this chapter.

Students that participated tended to be upperclassmen with an average year in college of 3.7 (or second semester junior). The median year for the participants was the fourth, or senior, year. Table 3 gives the precise breakdown of students by year in school.

Table 3 -- Participant Grade

Year in school	Fr.	So.	Jr.	Sr.	Grad.
No. of players	4	3	11	19	13

Academic year of the player seemed to have little effect on ability to participate in this type of simulation. After watching all of the simulations, my own observation was that some of the best players were freshmen. Graduate students did, however, seem to be able to deal with the quantitative information better on average than the undergrads. All in all, I was suprised at how quickly students were able to pick up the essentials of the simulation. With few exceptions, play was very good.



Students came from all over campus although 80% were either political science or international affairs/international relations majors. Table 4 gives a detailed breakdown of students by major.

Table 4 -- Participant Major

Major	Poly-Sci	IA/INR	Bus.	Science	Misc.
No. of Players	23	17	3	5	2

Major also did not seem to be a good indicator of who would be a good player. On average, business and science majors seemed to me to be just as good at the game as political science or international affairs/relations majors. One student, a political science major, remarked to me that if this game was what politics was really like (something several of the other players in her group had confirmed) that she needed to change her major.

Incentives were offered to some students in order to participate. One professor offered a three point bonus to any student that participated. Of the 50 participants, 17 or 36% came from that class. Approximately 25% of that group returned for a second time. The only incentive for two time participants was that I offered them, as a graduate student, lawyer and army officer, any reasonable help I could. My impression, however, was that students participated a second or third time because they enjoyed the game and not for this meager incentive. To date, I have not had a request for assistance.

### **The Educational Experience**

One of the main constraints outlined in the previous chapter was the participant's lack of knowledge about Hungary. This was partially overcome in two ways: The inclusion of a Hungary Fact Pack and the inclusion of a detailed set of issues and policies. It occurred to me just before I started running the simulation in September that any person who actively participated in the project would, almost by osmosis, learn a great deal about Hungary, transitions from authoritarian rule and, even, design of social science experiments. Thus, I included, with each packet, a questionnaire for the participant to fill out after the simulation. My main purpose was to generate some form of feedback in order to identify problems with the rules. I also wanted to identify, as early as possible, those participants that might be interested in playing the game multiple times. Finally, I was interested to see if my hypothesis was correct and, after the simulation was complete and no further incentive existed, players had either enjoyed the experience or learned anything from it. My experience with simulations has shown me that there are generally people who enjoy the experience and people who don't and that the latter group significantly outnumbers the former. Thus my expectations concerning participant enjoyment were fairly low. I expected participants to learn a good deal but I was afraid that they might not recognize how much they had, in fact, learned. Thus, I expected these results to be slightly better than the previous ones, but still squarely in the middle of the range.

Only three questions were asked. The first was "On a scale from one to ten (one=very little, ten=very much), I enjoyed this game \_\_\_\_." The second question was "On a scale from one to ten, I learned \_\_\_\_." The final question was "Assuming I had the time, on a scale from one to ten, I would like to participate again \_\_\_\_." I then asked for comments. After each simulation, I instructed the participants to fill out the questionnaire. I also asked them to pay particular attention to the comments section and to make any comment that they desired. I noted that I was particularly interested in any flaws that they saw in the game.

The results were suprising. The average score for the first question was 9.36 with the median score at ten. The score for the second question was slightly lower but still substantially above my expectations. The average was a 8.52 while the median answer was nine. The final question provided the most suprising response with a 9.37 average and a median response of ten. The exact results of the questionnaire are included at Table 5.

Table 5 -- Questionnaire Results

Total No. of	3's	4's	5's	6's	7's	8's	9's	10's
Question 1	0	0	0	1	3	9	18	45
Question 2	0	0	3	3	9	10	13	24
Question 3	1	0	2	0	5	4	8	42

Players who participated more than once were not required to answer the first three questions. I did request however, that they fill out the comment portion of the questionnaire, if they had anything

significant to say. Some of this group of players did one or both. Since these participants probably played the second time for enjoyment, their scores might skew the results in favour of the simulation. Taking their responses out of the data set shows that there is little decrease in the scores for any of the questions (See Table 6).

For first time participants, the average response to question 1 was 9.28 while the median response was 10. Question 2 had an average response of 8.47 and a median response of 9. The final question showed an average response of 8.93 with a median response of 10.

Table 6 -- Responses of First Time Participants

Total No. of	3's	4's	5's	6's	7's	8's	9's	10's
Question 1	0	0	0	0	2	8	14	26
Question 2	0	0	3	3	4	8	11	14
Question 3	1	0	2	0	5	4	7	25

Comments about the experience were very favourable. Some compared this learning experience to the more traditional classroom experience. One student said that the game provided a "much better learning atmosphere than normal classroom procedure." Another stated that "something like this explains how politics works as well as the underlying factors behind why much better than any lecture or book." Perhaps the most provocative statement came from a freshman who wrote, "I've learned more about how the political cycle works in just these three hours than I did in my entire high school career."

Other students commented on the specific knowledge they gained by participating. One student wrote, "I knew little about the Hungarian government and, through this game, I feel that I learned a lot." Another student claimed, "I learned about the pressures that politicians go through trying to implement programs." One player who had participated multiple times commented, "This is the third time I've played and I'd play again. I honestly believe that this type of simulation is the best way to understand (as well as anyone can) politics."

Finally, many of the comments made by students defy classification. One wrote, "I'm working on my philosophical view of man. This helps tremendously." Another, perhaps with republican leanings, stated, "This simulation showed me that I would not be a very good socialist." My personal favourite came from a student who said, "I don't know what else to say, but this was pretty cool."

Part of the reason for these extraordinary scores and comments may be because the group tested was, to some extent, self-selecting. Students were requested and not required to participate. Thus, it is possible that only those students that had some interest in some aspect of the simulation would sign up. The argument for self-selection is partially countered by the fact that approximately 50% of those contacted signed up to participate and approximately a third of those contacted did participate. This shows a substantial degree of interest and may well meet or exceed the level of interest in any given pedagogical tool. A second counter argument arises from the fact that

sign up times were fairly rigid. It is possible that more people would have signed up with more a more flexible schedule. In short, it is impossible to know exactly how many people who did not sign up were truly interested but could not fit the game into their schedule.

### **Confirmatory Results**

The simulation follows the model. Thus, in order to confirm the validity of the model, it would seem necessary to run the simulation many times and then compare the simulation results with the historical ones. Ideally, other simulations would be designed for other transitions from authoritarian rule, they would be run many times and their results would be compared as well. Assuming that the model could accurately recreate the situations that exist in these countries, the model could be proven correct.

Unfortunately time and resources limited the testing of the model to only one test, that of Hungary. Thus the results of the experiment only tend to confirm the model. They do so in several ways, however.

Most convincingly, the results of the model confirm the strength of the current coalition in Hungary. Several commentators have remarked on the strength of the current coalition, despite waning popularity and outright defections. Since the founding elections in 1990, it has successfully weathered many storms, including, most recently, its much criticized proposal to increase the value-added tax and increase the enforcement of that tax.<sup>159</sup>

Simulation results tend to confirm this strength. In the 14 games there were exactly 46 turns executed. The Hungarian Democratic Forum,

the Christian Democrats and the Smallholders were each part of the ruling coalition for 42 of those 46 turns, or 91% of the time. Each of the other parties was also part of the coalition at some time in those 46 turns, but no party ever exceeded 9%. This is despite the fact that the rules constantly emphasize that a member can pull out of the coalition at any time, for any reason, after phase three in a turn. In addition, I made a point of highlighting this rule during the first turn of each game. I noticed that, in every game, players, at some time, explored the option of developing a new coalition. For a variety of reasons, ranging from political demands to personality differences, the current ruling coalition in Hungary was the overwhelming choice for the simulation participants.

A possible explanation that would discount these results is that players stayed with the ruling coalition because it was easiest. In other words, players who were admittedly inexperienced, both with the intricacies of the simulation and with the current situation in Hungary, would tend to stay with the pre-existing condition.

This argument is, in its turn, discredited by two facts. The first is that in order for a party to gain political power, absent an election, it must be a member of the coalition. This is obvious after the first turn. Players, in every game, actively attempted to join the coalition, or absent that, break it up so that they might be able to be a part of the new coalition government.

The second fact comes from the research itself. Three of the games were executed by what I called my "Research Group". This was a

group of players who, when they joined the group, had all played the simulation at least once. Thus, each player knew the rules and was familiar with the Hungarian situation. Three games were played using this group for a total of 12 turns. During ten of those 12 turns, or 83% of the time, the HDF, CD and SH were part of the ruling coalition, confirming the more general finding and, in its turn, the model.

The second confirmation comes from the relative increase in the standard of living. It has been much remarked upon that life has not become significantly better in Hungary since the revolution of 1989.<sup>160</sup> In fact, in some respects, it has become significantly worse. Hungary also has the highest level of per capita foreign investment in Central Europe, an unemployment rate that is among the best in the region and a growth rate of Gross Domestic Product that is second only to Poland among the former socialist states.<sup>161</sup>

These contradictory results are mirrored by the results of the simulation. The average increase in standard of living was one point, from five to six. The median value for standard of living at the end of each simulation was also six. While the range of values was from zero to ten, the distribution of values is almost perfectly normal with a one point deviation from the average explaining 50% of the cases. This modest increase in standard of living in the game seems to replicate the results experienced in Hungary.

The most potent attack on this evidence lies in the number of data points. Fourteen cases is hardly an extensive data set. Despite



conceding this, the current evidence should at least create a presumption that must be actively discredited.

A third type of confirmation comes from the types of policies that the governing coalition tried to pass. Given the strong relationship of the model to the simulation with regards to the coalition, one would expect that there would be a strong connection between the policies attempted by the Hungarian coalition and the policies attempted by the players of the coalition in the simulation. In many instances this turns out to be the case.

Excluding those cases in which a policy was attempted less than five times over the course of the 14 simulations, there are five policies that proved to be extremely popular. All but one are policies that were either suggested or implemented by the ruling coalition in Hungary.

The most startling of these is the policy of moving elections to an earlier date. In the game, players have the option of trying to hold early elections, or, alternatively, pushing them off to a later date. There is currently an attempt in Hungary to move the elections to the early part of Spring, 1994.<sup>162</sup> Given the steady decline of the popularity of the coalition,<sup>163</sup> there is a chance that the reason for the move is to preserve the position of the government as best as possible.

This is exactly the reason that, in the simulations, players tried to move elections up seven times. Having consolidated their positions, the coalitions in each of these games saw an advantage in holding early

elections. Five of these times the government succeeded in holding early elections and twice the move was blocked by the opposition. It is also important to note that elections only occurred in seven of the 14 games. In the remaining seven games, elections were not held in five because of the three hour time limit per simulation. In one other game, elections were postponed until a later turn. In the final iteration, the game ended with a coup.

Two more policies that were popular with participants also mirror positions taken by the Hungarian government. They are the use of a diplomatic response, as opposed to an economic or military one, to the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Transylvania. The government in Hungary has delivered a number of verbal and diplomatic warnings to both the governments of Slovakia and Romania about the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in their countries. Despite the fact that these warnings have become quite heated at times<sup>164</sup> and that there have been threats by the fringe elements of Parliament<sup>165</sup>, this is all that the government has done to address the situation. In the simulation, these two policies were pursued 17 separate times. They were successful 13 times, or 76% of the time. In addition, no other action was ever taken by any of the players to resolve this situation.

The fourth policy from the simulation that mirrors real life is the increased privatization of health care. This is a well known initiative in Hungary and was made in order to address serious problems in the health care system.<sup>166</sup> This policy was attempted 14 times and

was successful 12 of those times. In addition, attempts to nationalize health care were tried twice and defeated twice.

The last policy that was attempted and the only one that does not mirror an overt policy of the government is covert action against Gabchikovo Dam. This policy was attempted 12 times. It succeeded seven times and failed five times. There is no evidence that I can find that indicates that the government has considered such an option. I, of course, did not expect to find any either. The popularity of this particular policy may be the result of a "Rambo" mentality on the part of college students at Florida State University. As a military man, however, I would be surprised if this idea had not been bandied about the power circles in Hungary.

The major problem with the analysis above is that the vast majority of policies were attempted 5 or fewer times in the 14 games. In each simulation there was a list containing some 84 policies to choose from. Given this number of options, it is not surprising that only 48 of those policies were ever attempted. In the entire 14 game period, each of these 48 policies were attempted only an average of 2.6 times. The remaining 36 were never attempted. Thus, while there are five policies that clearly stand out and tend to confirm the model, there are 79 policies on which the data is inconclusive. Thus, given sufficient time and resources, this analysis of policy selection could be taken to its logical, and decisive, conclusion. Under the circumstances this evidence only supports the link between the model and reality and does not prove it.

The last confirmation of the model comes not from Hungary but from a well-known theory not used in the construction of the model. Riker's 1962 work on minimum winning coalitions states that a coalition will tend to have only the minimum number of members necessary to do the job. There are several good reasons for this. In the first place, the fewer the number of members, the easier it is to make decisions. Secondly, fewer compromises have to be made. Finally, the benefits have to be spread among fewer people.<sup>167</sup>

The results of this simulation are in line with this theory. Of the 46 turns of play, the number of members in the coalition exceeded the minimum in only five of those turns, or 11% of the time. In the remaining 41 turns of play, the coalition was kept to a bare minimum. Secondly, there was something that I called "the Smallholders Effect".

The Smallholder's Effect happened as soon as the player of the Smallholders realized that the political power structure inside the coalition was such that, if the coalition gained only two political power points, the Smallholder's could be excluded from the coalition. In order to defend against this, the Smallholders, upon realizing their position, would blackmail the other two members of the coalition into assuring the Smallholders player that he would receive the first political power point that the coalition gained. In short, there was an almost unconscious recognition of the theory of the minimum winning coalition by the Smallholders player.

I was unfamiliar with this theory when I designed the game, although I now find its logic impeccable. That this theory should be

found deep in the data derived from this simulation also creates a presumption that the model is accurate.

### Predictive Results

The most unusual aspect of this model is the fact that it was expressly designed to predict the short-term future of a country making the transition from authoritarian rule. One of the possible future revelations about the situation in Hungary has already been discussed -- covert action against Gabchikovo Dam. The simulation also generated predictions on two other elements -- the upcoming elections and the possibility of a coup.

During the 14 iterations, there were seven elections. In one iteration, the elections were postponed and, in five of the remaining six, elections were not held due to time. One game ended with a coup. The results of the elections are outlined in Table 7 (N.B. Results will not always add up to 100% due to rounding and due to additional parties that were formed during the games).

Table 7 -- Election Results

Game Parties	Avg.	1*	2	3	4*	5*	6	7
HDF	17%	22%	23%	7%	8%	18%	24%	15%
CD	28%	25%	24%	34%	15%	28%	25%	48%
YD	14%	9%	5%	21%	20%	11%	25%	7%
AFD	16%	12%	17%	6%	42%	12%	11%	12%
SOC	10%	11%	18%	17%	1%	12%	7%	4%
SH	6%	10%	3%	8%	4%	4%	3%	12%
HTL	4%	5%	5%	2%	8%	6%	3%	0%
REP	4%	5%	3%	5%	2%	8%	2%	2%

There are a number of interesting observations that can be made from these results. The first is the apparent loss of power that is suffered by the most powerful party in Hungary today -- the HDF. The highest result obtained by the HDF is equal only to the next to lowest result obtained by its close ally, the CD.

Reporting from observation only, the HDF seemed to be the target for a great deal of opposition attacks. Because they were the most powerful, they tended to draw the most fire. This, I think, left the CD the opportunity to go about its business in a quieter and, ultimately, more effective way.

Another observation is the parliamentary demise of the Smallholders in 57% of the elections. Currently, in order to get representation as a party in Parliament, a party must meet a 5% threshold. The Smallholders fail in 4 of the seven elections held. In all four of those elections, the CD and the HDF do not get 50% of the vote, indicating that, despite the average results, the current coalition has a less than even chance of retaining power after the next elections. In the remaining three elections, where the Smallholders do get over 5% of the vote, the current coalition is able to stay in power in two of those and has exactly 50% of the vote in the third. Thus the fate of the current coalition seems to depend on the fate of the Smallholders.

The results for the opposition are not any rosier, however, as a result of the predicament in which the ruling coalition finds itself. In only one of the seven elections do the AFD and the YD, the two

ideologically closest of the opposition parties<sup>168</sup>, find themselves with over 50% of the popular vote. In the three remaining cases where the current coalition is unable to form a government, both or either of these two parties would have to seek additional parties to form a coalition government.

One of the more interesting facets of this experiment was the use of a "Research Group". This group was made up of only experienced players and were willing to commit more than three hours at a time to run the simulation. Pulling the three games in which they participated out of the set of fourteen (these games are represented by the "\*\*") and analyzing the results provide an interesting comparison to the more general averages above. The results from these three games (elections were held in all three) are included in Table 8.

Table 8 -- Research Group Election Results

Party	HDF	CD	YD	AFD	SOC	SH	HTL	REP
Avg.	16%	22%	13%	22%	8%	6%	6%	5%

In only one of three research group games does the current coalition have an absolute majority of the popular vote. In the other two iterations, the Smallholders get less than 5% of the vote, reinforcing their possible importance in the upcoming elections.

Beyond the elections, there was one coup. Called by the Socialists, it was joined by the AFD and the YD. Based on the alliances that the coup members had, the coup had a 66% (4 in 6) chance of succeeding. The coup did succeed and the Socialists and the Young

Democrats came out of the coup with the most political power. The standard of living, however, was driven down significantly, simulating the large scale destruction that this coup caused.

One case is not enough to draw any significant conclusions about how potential coups in Hungary will play themselves out. In fact, in this case, the coup was probably a miscalculation on the part of the coup participants. Given that they were in a strong enough position to throw the coup, they were also in a strong enough position to win the elections, without the subsequent damage to the country.

What is more significant is that in 13 of the simulations there was no coup. Power passed peacefully from one regime to the next. This is fairly unique in this part of the world and indicates that Hungary may be on the road to a stable democracy. It is my sincere hope that this is one prediction that will come true.



## Chapter 6

### **CONCLUSION**

Simple systems give rise to complex behavior. Complex systems give rise to simple behavior. And most important, the laws of complexity hold universally, caring not at all for the details of a system's constituent atoms. -- James Gleick<sup>169</sup>

From the outset, this project has been an intensely personal one. As an Army officer responsible for intelligence concerning Eastern Europe, I know that I must understand the region and not simply know facts about it. Not to sound overly dramatic, but I know that my ability to analyze this region and predict responses correctly might well save lives during some future deployment. As I often told my professors, "Nothing I learn here is theoretical to me."

I also realized that my field research, my coding decisions and my running of the simulation were all central, and personal, aspects of the project. Given this level of involvement, I feel that it is imperative, in conclusion, to lay aside intellectualism for a time in favour of a more subjective assessment of this project, its results and its potential for further research.

I cannot remember a time when I did not feel that a well-designed simulation was the next best thing to reality. At age eight, after I had played my first conflict simulation (wargame) on the battle of Waterloo, I knew more about the failure of D'eron's First Corps in its late morning attack on Wellington's left than an eight year old probably had a right to know. Clean carnage, death by dice; wargames offered a

taste of the glory of victory without any of the dangers of being shot at or the discomfort that comes from lying in the mud.

I was hooked. I never played chess again (until that moment my favourite game). It had not even a touch of reality and, besides, it was too "simple". I learned to do rapid math and to think ahead. Finally, I learned a great deal about history, or more particularly, about the inevitability of history. I learned, for example, that Napoleon was absolutely correct in his assessment of his chances at Waterloo<sup>170</sup>. He held an enormous advantage over Wellington at the beginning of the day which he proceeded to fritter away. Napoleon knew his odds by having been a combat leader for over 20 years and the greatest military mind of the modern age. I know that he was right from having participated in about 20 iterations of the Battle of Waterloo in which I played his part in the battle.

In 1983 I first came into contact with Chaos Theory. In fact it played a significant role in my 1983 game called "Fighter" (a game of ship to ship combat in the fractal dimensions of a wormhole in space). The butterfly effect, strange attractors and the border between Spain and Portugal<sup>171</sup> quickly began to colour my thinking. And the pictures! The pictures that could be produced using Chaos Theory were so real that you could almost remember where that place was. Any mathematical system that could produce such lifelike pictures had to be in touch with reality somewhere.

Of course, Chaos Theory is everywhere today. Mainstream science magazines, like Discover and Scientific American, routinely feature

articles on Chaos. Walt Disney uses computers and Chaos to make the incredible backgrounds in its animated pictures. If Jeff Goldblum hadn't mumbled his lines so badly, almost every person in this country would know that the central scientific principle in Michael Crichton's Jurassic Park was Chaos Theory.

The thing that gives Chaos Theory its incredible power is iteration. That is, take some rules, execute them once and then (here's the big secret) take the output from one iteration and use it as the input for the next one. Do this a number of times and all sorts of interesting things begin to occur. More importantly, answers to previously impossible, non-linear, multi-variable problems suddenly start to appear. Iteration is also the thing that makes a simulation possible.

Here's the big connection: Transitions from authoritarian rule have all the hallmarks of a chaotic system. Elections, alliances, and coups all happen periodically. They are as unpredictable as the weather, but, like the weather, they seem to have limits -- boundaries beyond which they are loathe to go. It is cold in the winter and there will be a nationalist movement in Hungary. Social scientists work hard to understand these things, but like a man trying to build a house with a garden hose, they cannot get a linear theory to match reality. Linear thinking is the wrong tool for the complex job of understanding politics.

Thus, it seemed to me that the way to prove the linkage between Chaos Theory and the transition process would be by way of a simulation.

Of course, I have not proved, in a formal sense, anything. I do think, however, that I have made a strong case for an iterative model of transitions from authoritarian rule and have created a presumption that Chaos Theory and transitions are mixed.

Where could a researcher go from here? The possibilities are endless but I would like to outline a few of the paths that I think might prove the most fruitful. In the first place, the process should be computerized. This can happen in two ways. The first is by computerizing the tremendous amount of paper and pencil calculations that now have to take place in order to run the simulation. This would speed up the simulation considerably and would produce a larger data set with which to work. The second way to use a computer is more dramatic.

Each of the players has an optimal strategy each turn given his circumstances. Within this set of parameters, it would be possible to devise an expert system that could replicate that strategy. Each player could then be represented by a computer simulation of a human player. By nesting one simulation within the other, it would be possible to run hundreds of simulations within the time it currently takes to run one.

How would this expert system look? What key features would it have? There would probably be two. The first is iteration. It is hard to imagine a linear expert system nested inside an iterative simulation. The second is the application of Fuzzy Logic.<sup>172</sup>

Fuzzy Logic is a new way of thinking about non-discrete sets. Imagine the set of "long" things and you have an idea of what a fuzzy set is. This powerful new paradigm has already generated many

applications, from subway trains that are never late to rice cookers that never over-cook. It allows a researcher to put in plain english all of the rules that he thinks are important about a system. Almost as importantly, it allows those rules to be digitized so that they can be fed to a computer.

Thus, the expert system that would replace the player would be able to act on the rule, "If you're the Smallholders, blackmail your coalition partners into giving you some of the benefits of being in power before they, themselves, get too powerful." As skill with these new approaches grew, the murky waters of politics, foreign policy, and international relations might begin to clear. Even the depths of history might be explored as long dead political systems could be recreated and studied.

Perhaps. Perhaps we have just missed the warning over the door. "Abandon hope all ye who enter here," it says. Perhaps Chaos is just another paradigm lost. This research suggests that it is not. If it is true, then the world has just handed the social scientist a hammer.

## **Appendix A -- The Rules**

# "Hungary '93"

## Introduction

First, I want to thank you for volunteering to play Hungary '93. This game is designed to simulate the politics of a transition from authoritarian rule. You are the first people to play this game. This means that the rules may not be perfect. They may even have to be changed in the middle of play to make the system more realistic, or just more fair. It is this process that will help perfect this game and make it much more useful for the next people who play it. Again, I thank you.

**Note: Rules in boldface are particularly important.**

**Hungary '93** is a game for eight players and an umpire. It is designed to simulate the political process that a country undergoes when making a transition from authoritarian rule.

**The game is set in Hungary in the Fall of 1993. Each player represents the head of one of the major parties in the country. The goal of each player is to increase his party's political power and to meet his party's political agenda.** There are many obstacles to achieving these two goals. You may find yourself allying with your hated rival in order to get a crucial piece of legislation passed.

There is the unpredictability of elections and, of course, there is always the chance of a coup. In addition, the people will not be on your side if the standard of living is not raised.

**The game is played in turns. Each turn represents a cycle of political activity.** These cycles are of no fixed length of time. They could last anywhere from two-weeks to two months depending on what does, or does not, get accomplished.

**One of the main problems that you will face early on and, probably, throughout the game is forming coalitions with other parties.** The formation of coalitions is probably necessary to succeed. There are few rules in this game about how to form a coalition, i.e. what deals to make (and break). This is intentional, since this game is designed to reproduce the process and not any particular result.

**At this time you should take a look at the Fact Pack and familiarize yourself with the country of Hungary.** After that you should review these rules in detail. **Before play begins you will have the chance to ask the Umpire to explain any rules that you do not understand.** Good Luck!

## **Rules**

**Each turn of Hungary '93 is played in Phases (Note: All game terms are capitalized, i.e. "Phases").** There can be as many as nine Phases per turn or as few as three. **Briefly, the Phases are:**



1. The Agenda Adjustment Phase. Players adjust the five variables that make up their party's Agenda.

2. Alliance Phase. Player's attempt to form or cement Alliances with the various Interest Groups within Hungary. Player's can also appeal directly to the People in order to strengthen their position.

3. Coalition Phase. Parties attempt to form Coalitions with each other with the object of forming a Government.

4. Policy Selection Phase. The Government choses Policies that it wants to be implemented.

5. Policy Support Phase. Each Policy that the Government selected in the previous Phase is voted on by all of the Parties.

6. Policy Implementation Phase. Each Policy that was successfully passed in the Policy Support Phase is now implemented and the results are assessed.

7. Coup Phase. Any player may attempt a Coup.

8. Election Phase. As declared in the Policy Implementation Phase, Elections are held and the results thereof are assessed on the Parties.

9. Victory Determination Phase. If a) any player has an outright majority of the Political Power Points available and 2) if that player has met his/her Agenda, then he/she is declared the winner.

**Important Note:** In any Phase after the third but before the Coup Phase in which a Government no longer has a majority of the Political Power Points available (because one or more of the Coalition members decides to pull out), the remainder of the Phases are preempted and all Players proceed directly to the last (Victory/Determination) Phase.

This may not be completely clear to you. If it is clear then you are ahead of the ball game. If it is not, don't worry, I am about to explain each Phase in detail.

### **Setting Up The Game**

Each Player should have a copy of the Rules, a copy of thier Party Papers, some paper and pens or pencils. The Umpire will provide all additional forms and answer questions about the rules prior to the beginning of the game.

### **The Agenda Adjustment Phase**

Each Party has a secret Agenda. This Agenda is in a document (titled "Party Papers") that is separate from these rules. You may discuss the contents of your Party Papers with other players at your own discretion. You should NEVER show the contents to any other player. (The purpose for this is to simulate the uncertainty of

politics. In short, you know what the other guy is saying. What you don't know is if he is telling the truth.)

**The Agenda tells you in what direction you want to move Hungary.** Each Party's Agenda is divided into five Agenda Elements. Each Agenda Element is rated on a scale of 1 to 10. Each Element will have either a fixed number (3, 5, 6, etc.), a range of numbers (i.e. 3-8, 4-6, etc.) or a greater or lesser than number (i.e. 7 or higher, 5 or lower, etc.). **The Agenda's for all parties contain the same Elements:**

**1. Participation.** The Party's position on the degree to which political positions should be open to the public. Low numbers indicate low participation is desired while high numbers mean that the party wants to open public offices to as many people as possible.

**2. Inclusion.** The Party's position on the number of people allowed to vote. Low numbers here mean that your Party wants few or only certain people to vote while high numbers indicate a more general suffrage.

**3. Economy.** The party's position on the type of economy, command or capitalistic, that the country should have. Low numbers indicate the desire for a centrally planned economy while high numbers indicate a willingness to let the market control distribution.

**4. Foreign Policy.** The Party's position on affairs with other states, particularly those that are geographically closest. Low numbers here indicate a propensity to intervene in foreign affairs, to use the Hungarian Army aggressively and to generally make defense a high

priority. High numbers indicate a non-interventionist policy and a defensively oriented Army.

**5. Civil Rights.** The Party's position on individual rights. The higher the number here the more libertarian the government is while lower numbers indicate that your party favours the collective rights of the state over those of the individual.

**At this time you might want to review your Party Papers. It will help you understand your Party better.** The next section of the rules has to do with how your Party interacts with the other Parties and with the Government during the Agenda Adjustment Phase.

**In addition to each Party's Agenda, there is National Position Chart that details exactly where the country of Hungary currently stands in terms of each of the five Agenda Elements. At the beginning of the game Participation is set at 8, inclusion at 9, Civil Rights at 6, Economy at 5 and Foreign Policy at 4. (Note: National Position numbers are always fixed numbers (i.e. 3, 6, 8, etc.).**

The National Position Chart will change as a result of decisions and deals that you make with the other players. One of your goals is to make the National Position Chart match your Party's Agenda (Note: Your numbers can match the numbers on the National Position Chart exactly or, if you have a range of numbers for a particular element (i.e 3 to 5), then the National Position number is considered a match if it merely

falls between the two numbers (i.e the numbers would be considered a match if the National Position Number was a 3, 4, or 5)).

**During the Agenda Adjustment Phase you may change one Agenda Element by one increment.** This means that you can raise or lower a fixed number (Example: Your current Participation setting is 3. You could raise it to four or lower it to two). You can convert a fixed number into a range of numbers (Example: You can change the three in the above example to 3-4 or 2-3). You can increase or decrease a range of numbers (Example: You can make a range of 3-5 extend to a range of 3-6 or 2-5). You can increase or decrease a greater than or lesser than number (Example: A "greater than 8" could be converted to a "greater than 9" or a "greater than 7"). You can never convert a "greater than" to a "lesser than" or vice-verse. You can never convert a "greater than" or a "lesser than" to a fixed number or a range of numbers.

The purpose behind this rule is to allow the Players some flexibility (but not much) in changing their Party's Agenda. Agendas are important things to Parties. In fact, in this game, they are the defining factor. **Thus, if, at the end of the game, your party meets all conditions for victory but has changed its Agenda so much that it matches the Agenda of another Party, then the Party that changed its Agenda the least during the course of the game is the winner.**

**Another penalty for changing an agenda comes from the loss of support of part of the populous and from the possibility that**

**another party will be formed to maintain the "ideological purity" of the Agenda. These events can seriously weaken a Party.**

This is particularly true in Hungary given its proportionally representative system. Basically, if your Party fails to get 5 or more of the popular vote, you have little or no representation in the Hungarian Parliament. Thus, by changing your Agenda you run the risk that you will factionalize yourself out of existence. There is a one in six chance **(for each increment of 5 Political Power Points (rounding up))** each time you change your Agenda that your party will split and that 25% of your support (Interest Groups and People) will go to the new Party.

**Parties that have only 1 Political Power Point, change their Agendas and split up, lose all of their Political Power and are eliminated from play.**

Each turn, each player desiring an Agenda Change will fill out an Agenda Change Sheet and hand it to the Umpire. Sample Agenda Change Sheet:

Agenda Change Sheet

Party \_\_\_\_\_ Turn \_\_\_\_\_  
Change \_\_\_\_\_ Element from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_.

## **The Alliance Phase**

During the Alliance Phase, Players attempt to form Alliances with Interest Groups. Players may also go directly to the People (i.e use thier Political Power Points to directly acquire more People Cards). Note: This procedure may seem frightening at first glance. Don't worry about it since the controller will be there to help you with the math. The most important thing to take away from this section is the fact that if an Interest Group has a radically different Agenda than your Party, then it is difficult to form an Alliance with that Group.

A word about People Cards and Political Power Points. There are 100 People Cards. Each Card represents one percent of the population over 18. They are broken down by ethnic group (H = Hungarian, G = German, Gy = Gypsy), by religion (R = Roman Catholic, P = Protestant, U = Uniate, J = Jewish, O = other/athiest) and by gender (male stick figure = males, female stick figure = females) on the front of the cards. On the back of the cards is a number from one to ten. This number represents what that one percent of the population is actually worth to a Party (i.e. a "2" on the back means that roughly 20% of that one percent of the population is politically active). Thus, all People Cards are not created equal. The only times that People Cards are turned over are during Elections and Coups.

**Political Power Points represent a Party's political power relative to the other Parties. The higher the number the better.**

If a party's Political Power Points ever drop to zero then that Party is eliminated from the game. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) begins the game with 7 Points, the Christian Democratic Party (CD) with 5 and the Free Democrats (FD) with 4. The Socialists have 3 points while the Young Democrats begin with 4 points. The Smallholders begin with 2 points and the Hungarian Truth and Justice Party and the Republicans begin with 1 point apiece. Just as People Cards are somewhat abstract, so are Political Power Points. They are a function of a Party's leadership and organization as well as the number of people who are actually involved with the Party. Political Power Points go up or down depending on the success or failure of Policies, Elections and Coups. **The Umpire will post each Party's Political Power Points as they change. Thus, the number of Political Power Points that a Party has is always known by all the other Parties.**

There are many reasons to form Alliances. Most Interest Groups control a certain number of People Cards. Alliances are also important during Coups.

To form an Alliance, the player must first determine which Interest Group he is interested in. All of the Interest Groups are listed on the Interest Group Sheet that accompanies this packet.



The name at the left is the name of the Interest Group. Just like Parties, Interest Groups have Agenda's. These Agenda's can dramatically effect which Party a certain group will ally itself to. More on this in a minute.

The number to the far right of each line indicates the number of Coup Points an Interest Group is worth (more on this in the Coup Phase). The higher the number the better. The number listed under the "People" column is the number of People Cards the Interest Group controls. The letters to the right of the number indicates the kinds of cards that the Interest Group controls (The "3R" for example, on the Army Card means that the Army controls three randomly selected People Cards. A "H" = Hungarian, a "G" = German, a "Gy" = Gypsy, a "M" = male, a "F" = female, "RC" = Roman Catholic, "P" = Protestant, "U" = Uniate, "J" = Jewish and "O" = Athiest). If you add up the total number of People that all the *Interest Group* Cards are worth you will come up with a number higher than 100. This is for two reasons. The first is that sometimes Interest Groups can not deliver on thier promises, i.e. a Party makes an Alliance with an Interest Group and the Interest Group cannot live up to its end of the bargain. The second reason is that some Interest Groups represent many of the same constituents.

**At the beginning of the Alliance Phase each player can either allocate Political Power Points to make an alliance with an Interest Group, to steal an interest group away from another Party, to defend his existing Alliances or save his Political Power in order to go directly to the People. The Player with the**

highest number of Political Power Points will begin by announcing that he is bidding one political Power Point for one of the above mentioned options. All other players, in order of descending number of Political Power Points, will also make their "bids". Players may pass.

Once the bidding is over, Parties that have bid for Interest Groups that no one else has bid for (i.e. there is no competition) determine if the Interest Groups they have selected become active or not by rolling a six sided die. An Interest Group becomes active, in favour of that Party (i.e. forms an Alliance), if the die roll is lower than twice the total number of Political Power Points that that Party bid plus any Agenda Modifier.

The Agenda Modifier is the degree to which a Party differs with the Interest Group on each of the five Agenda Elements. A Party must add one to the die roll for each Agenda Element that differs from that of the Interest Group by 2 or more points. Example: The Make-Believe Party has a Participation, Inclusion, Civil Rights, Economy and Foreign Affairs scores of 9. It bids two Political Power Points for the support of the Army. Participation, Inclusion and Foreign Affairs are all within one point of the Agenda of the Army. The Make-Believe party's position on Civil Rights and the Economy differ from that of the Army by more than one point. Thus, two must be subtracted from the die roll (one for each of the Agenda Elements that is not in synch). Thus, the Make-Believe Party would have to roll a 2 or less (2 Political Power Points times two minus the 2 point Agenda Modifier) in order to win the allegiance of the Army.

If there is competition for an Interest Group then the Party who has bid the most Political Power Points rolls first, followed by the Party who bid the second most, etc. using the same rules as outlined above. If one or more Parties have bid the same amount of points then the Party with the lowest total Agenda Modifier goes first. If the Parties have the same Agenda Modifier then all parties roll a die and the one with the highest score goes first.

**Whether there is competition or not, if the die roll fails then no Alliance is formed and that Interest Group remains inactive until the next Alliance Phase.**

**Players may also allocate points to steal another Party's Interest Group or to defend his currently existing Alliances.** In order to steal an Interest group, a Party must announce during his bid which Party he is trying to steal and allocate Political Power Points to do so. If the Party that owns the Interest Group that is being stolen can and so desires, he may allocate points for defense. **Each point allocated for defense can negate, on a one for one basis any point allocated to steal an Interest Group.**

Example: The Hungarian Democratic Forum has the Army and Industrial Labour as two of its active Interest Groups. The Young Democrats allocate two points to steal the Army and the Free Democrats allocate 3 points to steal Industrial Labour. The Hungarian Democratic Forum allocates 4 points for defense. At the end of the bidding, the Hungarian Democratic Forum can cancel 4 of the 5 points allocated to

steal his Interest Groups. He can allocate these points in any way he desires.

Once the effects of defense have been taken into account, the Player attempting to steal must roll a die just as with inactive groups. Example: The HDF have an Alliance with the Army. The Make-Believers allocate 3 Political Party Points to steal it away from them. The HDF allocate no point for defense. The Make Believers roll a 3. Ordinarily this would be good enough if the Army were inactive since 3 points times two equals six and this is less than the 3 (+2 Agenda Modifier points for a total of 5) rolled. Since it is active and owned by the HDF the Make-Believers would add twice their Agenda Modifier or 4 to the die roll. Three plus four equals seven and is thus a failing roll.

**The minimum number of rounds of bidding will be equal to the number of Political Power Points in the most powerful Party. Bidding will cease at the end of the round in which that Party has bid his last Political Power Point or in which that Party indicates he will make no more bids (after the minimum number of bidding rounds, of course).**

**Finally, if any Parties have Political Power Points left (or have saved them expressly for this purpose), they may exchange Political Power Points for People Cards on a one for one basis.** This represents the Party going directly to the People.

Once all Political Power Points are allocated or all Players with Political Power Points left pass, **then Political Power Point levels**

are re-set to the levels that existed at the beginning of the Phase and the Players proceed to the next Phase.

### **Coalition Phase**

The goal of the Coalition Phase is to form a Government. A Government is formed when a party, or parties, with a simple majority of the Political Power Points in the game decide to do so. Example: At the beginning of the game the HDF, the CD and the Smallholders have 14 of the 27 outstanding points. This is sufficient to form the coalition that currently is in power in Hungary.

All parties that are not part of the Government are part of the Opposition. Once a Government is formed, then this Phase is over.

### **Policy Setting Phase**

The Government now decides which Policies it will pursue. There are a number of Issues in modern day Hungary that are demanding attention. Each Issue is outlined in Issues and Policies packet that accompanies these rules. **Now is a good time to familiarize yourself with these Issues (leave the actual Policies for a little later).**

There are many different ways of resolving each issue. The ways that are currently under consideration are listed in the Policies section that is below each Issue. these Policies run the gamut from conservative to radical, from ephemeral to real. Most Policies have a

chance of changing the Standard of Living. Virtually all Policies will change the National Position Chart. **Obviously, the Government should select Policies that balance the need for a rising Standard of Living with the need to implement their own Party's Agenda.**

Take, for example, the Issue of Farm Reform. One of the possible Policies is Major Privatization. Next to it is a chart showing the probable effects that this Policy will have on the Standard of Living when the Policy is executed. In this example, on a die roll of 1 or 2 on a six-sided die, the Standard of Living goes up 2 points. On a roll of 3 it goes up one point, etc. Then there are two "//". To the right of these two "//" is the change that implementation of the Policy will have on the National Position Chart (i.e. a National Position Modifier). Regardless of the change in Standard of Living, the Policy will have the stated effects on the National Position Chart.

**A word about the Standard of Living. The Standard of Living is an open-ended chart that indicates the general well-being of the people of Hungary at any given time. It begins the game at 5.** If it ever drops to zero, then the Parties that are in the Government at the time are eliminated (i.e their Political Power Points drop automatically to zero). Only parties in the Opposition remain. If the new Government, formed from these former Opposition Parties also fails to raise the Standard of Living above zero, then they, in thier turn are

eliminated. If all of the eight Parties are eliminated then the game is over and Hungary is given over to anarchy.

**The Standard of Living Chart goes up and down in a number of ways. First, every turn that nothing gets done (i.e. no Policies are successfully implemented) there is a 2 in 6 chance that the the Standard of Living will go down. Secondly, there is always a chance that a Policy will backfire and make the Standard of Living go down. Increasing the Standard of Living is also one way to increase your Political Power Points. More on that in the Policy Implementation Phase.**

**The Government may choose as many Policies as it has Political Power Points. Not all Policies picked will normally get implemented. Some of the Policies that the Government chooses may not get any support during the Policy Support Phase. Some of the Policies might be successfully challenged by the Opposition. In addition, even Policies that are supported and do get past the Opposition might not do what you intend them to do.**

**If, at any time during this Phase, a Player who is the member of a Government decides that, for any reason, he/she does not want to be in the Government any longer then he/she can pull out and join the Opposition. If, by pulling out, the Player drops the number of Political Power Points in the Coalition below the simple majority necessary to form a Government then the Government is dissolved and the**

Players immediately proceed to the last Phase of the turn (Victory Determination Phase).

### **Policy Support Phase**

During this Phase, players use Political Power Points to support or oppose certain policies. Beginning with the Party with the largest number of Political Power Points, each player, in turn, will allocate 1 Political Power Point either for or against a particular Policy. Any Policy that receives more No votes than Yes votes will not be implemented in the next Phase. Any Policy that receives an equal number of No and Yes votes will not be implemented. Any Policy that receives no votes at all will not be implemented in the next Phase.

The minimum number of rounds of voting will be equal to the number of Political Power Points in the most powerful Party. Voting will cease at the end of the round in which that Party has cast his last Political Power Point or in which that Party indicates he will cast no more votes (after the minimum number of voting rounds, of course).

Once voting is completed, any Party that is a member of the Government can pull out and become a member of the Opposition. If, by the loss of one or more members, the Government no longer has a simple majority of the available Political Power Points then the Government collapses and the Players will proceed immediately to the last Phase in the turn.



## **Policy Implementation Phase**

**Each Policy that was supported in the Policy Support Phase is now implemented.** To do this the Umpire consults the chart next to each Policy and rolls a six-sided die for each. The Umpire then adjusts the Standard of Living based on the results of the die rolls. Regardless of the die rolls, the umpire will adjust the National Position Chart based on the National Position Modifiers printed after the "/" of all supported Policies.

If the Standard of Living, after implementation of all Policies, goes down or remains the same as a result of a Government's Policies then the Government is deemed ineffective and the Standard of Living has a 2/6 chance of decreasing another point at the end of the turn (during the Victory Determination Phase). **If the Standard of Living increases after the implementation of all Policies, then the Government receives one Political Power Point for each point that the Standard of Living increased.**

**For each point that the Standard of Living increases overall, one Political Power Point is available for distribution to members of the Government.** Example: As a result of three successful Policies, the Standard of Living is raised 4 points. The Government has 4 Political Power Points that it must decide, internally, how to distribute.

At any time in this Phase, after the results of the Policy Implementations are announced, a Party that is a member of the Government may withdraw from the Government and become part of the Opposition. If this withdrawal lowers the number of Political Party Points in the Government below the simple majority threshold then the Government collapses and the turn ends

Elections are currently scheduled for Turn 4. The Government can keep this timetable, lengthen it, shorten it or eliminate elections altogether. The higher the levels of Participation and Inclusion, the more Political Power Points can be won during Elections (See Chart).

	10	1	2	4	6	8	10	10	12	12	14
L P	9	1	2	4	6	6	8	10	10	12	12
e a	8	1	1	2	4	6	6	8	10	10	12
v r	7	1	1	1	4	4	6	6	8	10	10
e t	6	1	1	1	2	4	4	6	6	8	10
l i	5	0	1	1	1	2	4	4	6	6	8
c	4	0	0	1	1	1	2	4	4	6	6
o i	3	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	4	4
f p	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	2
a	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
t		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
i											
o											
n											

Level of Inclusion

### Coup Phase

At the beginning of the Coup Phase, the Umpire will give all Players time (approximately 10 minutes) to conspire to stage a Coup.

During this time, any Player wishing to attempt a Coup, should calculate his chances and attempt to gain support from other players.

**Once the Umpire announces that time is up, any Party that desires may now announce that they will attempt a Coup.** Only one Coup attempt per turn may be made. A Coup Attempt is announced by one Party and then other Parties may join it or remain a part of the current process.

In order to determine the results of the Coup Attempt the total number of Coup Points of all the members of the Coup Attempt are added together. One half of the Coup Points of the Parties that are opposing the Coup are subtracted from this total. This result is then divided by 16. The resulting number is the die roll (or lower) needed on a six-sided die for a successful Coup (Example: Two Players have 32 Coup Points between them. They would need a 2 or less on a six-sided die to have a successful Coup).

**Coup Points for any Party equal the number of Coup Points from their active Interest Group Cards plus their total number of Political Power Points plus the number of People Points that they have** (People Points are listed on the backs of People Cards. Once a Coup attempt is made and all the Parties that wish have either joined or remained within the existing system, People Cards are authorized to be flipped over). Coup points are always rounded down (Example: A player has 31 Coup Points. He has a 1 out of 6 chance of a successful Coup).

If a Coup is unsuccessful then all participants in the Coup lose all but one of their Political Power Points. **Parties that have only 1**

**point are eliminated instead.** In addition, all of their Interest Group Cards are inactivated and all of their People Cards are turned in to the Umpire except one (chosen at random). Non-participants in the Coup get nothing but the satisfaction of seeing thier rivals squashed.

If a Coup is successful then all Political Power Point levels for all Players go to zero. To determine the new Political Power Point levels several die must be thrown. The Coup participants will throw as many six-sided die as there are participants. The highest number will go to the first Party to announce a Coup. The remaining numbers will go to the the Coup participants in descending order of Coup points contributed to the Coup Attempt. To the die roll all Coup participants will add 6, thus making their total number of new Political Power Points somewhere between 7 and 12. Finally, if a Coup is successful then the Election decision of the Government (made in the previous Phase) is considered null and void. **Thus, the Election Phase is skipped in a turn in which there is successful Coup.**

The non-participants in a successful Coup also roll one six-sided die apiece. From this die is subtracted 3. Any Party that has 0 or fewer Political Power Points after this die roll is eliminated from play. In addition, all of these Parties' Interest Group Cards are now inactivated. These Parties may only keep as many People Cards as they have Political Power Points. The remainder must be turned in. The Umpire will randomly determine which will be turned in and which will be kept by the non-participants in a successful Coup.

Special Rule: A Player or Players may attempt a Coup even if they have less than 16 Coup Points. In order for the Coup to be successful, the Player will roll 4 6-sided die and the result must be 24 (This is equivalent to an approximately one in 1200 chance). Whether the Coup under this special rule is successful or not, the penalties and rewards will be the same as under the more general rule above.

Whether the Coup is successful or not, there is a chance that the Standard of Living will drop as a result of an attempt. Thus any time a Coup is attempted, the Umpire will roll a 6-sided die. On a roll of 1 or 2, the Standard of Living drops no points; on a 3-4, the Standard of Living drops 1 point; and for 5-6 the Standard of Living drops 2 points. If the Army is an Active Interest Group of one of the Coup participants then 1 is added to the die roll. Thus, on a roll of 7, 3 points is subtracted from the Standard of Living.

### **Election Phase**

**The level of Participation and Inclusion determines how many Political Power Points are up for grabs during the Election Phase.**

Note: At any time up until the time the Umpire announces "Election", any Player in the Government may quit and join the Opposition and any Player from the Opposition may, at the discretion of the Government Players, be allowed into the Government.

Elections are fairly simple. Once the Umpire announces "Election", he will allocate People Cards to the various Interest Group

Cards one at a time beginning with the Player with the least Political Power Points. The Interest Group Cards that are "funded" in this way are chosen by the Players themselves. This will continue until the People Cards run out or all active Interest Group Cards are funded. Once active Interest Group Cards are funded, the same process continues with inactive Interest Group Cards until the People Cards run out.

A note about inactive Interest Group Cards. These cards represent Interest Groups that have not been actively wooed by one or more of the Parties. Each one however will lean towards a Party during an Election. **Thus, the Party that has the lowest Agenda Modifier is assumed to control that Interest Group during the funding process and during the subsequent Election. Parties that have equal Agenda modifiers will roll to determine who controls the Interest Group.**

The next step in the Election process is to determine the number of votes for each Party. To do this each Player turns over thier People Cards being careful to keep their People Cards separate from the People Cards belonging to their active Interest Groups and both of those separate from those of their inactive Interest Groups.

On the back side of each card is the number of People Points that each card is worth. Players simply add up the points in each of their 3 stacks (The number of People Points gathered by inactive Interest Groups is divided by half).

Political Power Points are allocated depending on the percentage of the vote that a Party received. For example, a Party receiving 30% of the votes cast will receive 30% of the Political Power Points

available. The Party with the highest percentage of the vote will receive Political Power Points first. Parties will receive Political Power in order of descending percentage of the vote. Any Party that does not get five or more percent of the vote in any election loses one Political Power Point.

Once the Political Power Points are distributed all of the People Cards are returned to the Umpire for redistribution in following turns.

### **Victory Determination Phase**

**The Umpire compares each Player's Agenda with the National Position Chart to see if they match. The Umpire then checks to see if any of the Parties that have have a simple majority of the available Political Power Points. If both these conditions are met then that Player is declared the winner.**

In addition, all adjustments that have been postponed until the end of the turn are made now (i.e. the Standard of Living adjustment due to the inability to form a Government in the Coalition Phase, etc.).

The game continues following the rules outlined above until one player is proclaimed the winner or until time runs out.

## **Appendix B -- Issues and Policies**



## **Issues and Policies**

The first part of each issue is a discussion of the Issue and its relevance in hungarian politics today. The second part outlines the various Policies that the Coalition can choose during the Policy Selection Phase. Remember that the Coalition can select and try to implement as many Policies as it has Political Party points.

The first part (before the "/") details what will happen to the Standard of Living if this Policy is implemented. For example if you look at the "Easy Ownership" option in the Foreign Ownership of Hungarian Land issue you will note that if you roll a 1, 2 or 3 on a six-sided die then there will be no change to the Standard of Living due to implementation of this Policy. On the other hand, a 4 through 6 will increase the Standard by 1. The second part outlines what will happen to the various National Position Indicators when this Policy is successfully implemented. In the case of Easy Ownership, two will be added to the National Position Indicator.

### **Issue: Foreign Ownership of Hungarian Land**

The debate centers over whether or not non-hungarians should be allowed to own land in Hungary. If non-hungarians are allowed to own land, then, the theory goes, they will bring much needed capital into the country in order to improve that land. This will, in turn, increase the tax base and thus increase the revenue generated from taxes allowing Hungary to enter the 21st Century. The counter argument goes that if non-hungarians are

allowed to buy land then they will exploit it and drain off all of the resources, returning nothing to either the state or the local populace. These critics often refer to the sale of Hungarian land to foreigners as the second Trianon. This is a reference to the Post WWI Trianon treaty that took much of the historically hungarian lands and gave them to surrounding countries (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania).

**Policies:**

Easier ownership      1-3=0 4-6=1 //+2 Econ

More difficult ownership    1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // 1 Econ

Impossible to buy more      1=-2 2-3=-1 4-6=0 //-1 Econ

Nationalization      1-2=-1 3-4=0 5-6=1 //-2 Econ, -1 For Pol, -1 Civ Rights (One time policy)

**Issue: The Treatment of Hungarians in Slovakia**

Since the division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics on January 1 of this year, it has become increasingly clear that the Czechs got all of the assets and the Slovaks have received all of the liabilities. This "divorce" has made the Slovak Republic one of the most depressed regions of Eastern Europe. With a high rate of unemployment and inflation and a history of ethnic intolerance, a strong nationalist movement has risen in the Slovak Republic. One of the most serious manifestations for Hungary is how the Slovaks are dealing with their sizable Hungarian minority.

Currently, the hungarians are undergoing low level persecution, but many of the more extreme Slovak nationalists are arguing for more severe forms of repression. Currently, the policy of using diplomatic channels to object to this treatment is winning Hungary some friends among the western world. On the other hand, the critics claim, ethnic hungarians are being persecuted and all the government does is talk.

**Policies:**

Diplomatic Reprisals 1-6=0 // For Pol 1

Economic Reprisals 1-2=-2 3-5=-1 6=0 // For Pol -2

Military Action 1=-3 2-3=-2 4=-1 5=1 6=2 //For Pol -4 (one time policy)

**Issue: Treatment of Hungarians in Transylvania**

As with Slovakia, the Hungarians in transylvania (one of the three great regions of Romania) are being persecuted by the Romanian government. They were brutally repressed under the Ceaurescu (Communist) regime and life has not gotten significantly better for them since the revolution. Romanians and Hungarians have a dislike for each other that goes back several centuries. One of the root cause of this is the repression that the Romanians suffered at the hand of the hungarians when transylvania was part of Hungary (prior to the Trianon Treaty at the conclusion of WW I). Needless to say, many hungarians feel very strongly about the plight of their ethnic brothers not to mention the rich farmland, forests and mines that are located in the region.

**Policies:**

Diplomatic reprisals 1-6=0 // For Pol 1

Economic reprisals 1-4=-1 5-6=0 // For Pol -2

Military Action 1=-3 2=-2 3=-1 4=1 5=2 6=3 // For Pol -4 (One time policy)

**Issue: Treatment of Hungarians in the Voivodina**

There are about 500,000 hungarians in the Voivodina. This is the area of northern Serbia. The entire area once belonged to Hungary but was taken away from it after WW I. The Serbs, routinely perceived as the brutal suppressors of both the Croats and the muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are also accused of making life uncomfortable for the hungarian minority in the Voivodina. The serbs have few friends on the international scene. Thus, actions taken against the serbs are less likely to cause problems abroad. Diplomacy and economic sanctions are of little help here because Hungary is already participating in the UN blockade of the region. Military action, however, done independently, would still be frowned upon by the international community. The Voivodina itself is a rich farmland area.

**Policies:**

Military action 1-2=-1 3-4=0 5-6=1 // For Pol -3 (One-time policy)

**Issue: Farm Reform**

Hungary used to produce, under the communists, 150% of its agricultural needs. This percentage dropped over the last two years when Hungary actually had to import grain. This year's harvest will be one third of previous years (this is in part due to a severe drought and a locust plague that hit Hungary this summer). It seems clear that something must be done. Current attempts at privatization have been uncoordinated, inefficient and slow. Politicians have tried to balance the rights of farmers with the need to privatize and the need to feed the country. Reformers say that Hungary should either go back to fully co-operative farms or those farms should be sold off as rapidly as possible in order to get entrepreneurs operating the facilities. Farm Reform and the land reform that goes with it is crucial if Hungary is going to achieve its eventual goal of EC membership.

**Policies:**

Greatly increase privatization 1-2=2 3=1 4=0 5-6=-1 //Econ 2, Civ rgts 2

Increase Privatization 1=1 2-3=0 4-5=-1 6=-2 // Econ 2, Civ rgts 1

Increase co-operatives 1=2 2-3 =1 4-5=-1 6=-2 // Econ -2, Civ Rght -1

Greatly increase co-operatives 1-2=1 3=0 4=-1 5-6=-2 // Econ -3, CR -2

**Issue: Gabcikovo Dam**

The Slovak Republic, in an attempt to provide itself with cheap hydroelectric

power, is building the Gabčíkovo Dam on the Danube. This Dam will substantively effect the watershed in Hungary. Many hungarians are afraid that they will not have enough water to irrigate their crops. This dam also gives the Slovaks considerable, some say excessive, influence over hungarian internal affairs. Policies range from diplomatic negotiations to covert action to sabotage the dam to economic or military warfare.

**Policies:**

Diplomatic Negotiations 1-2=-1 3-5=0 6=1 // For Pol 1

Economic Sanctions 1-2=-2 3-4=-1 5=0 6=1 // For Pol -1

Covert Action 1=-1 2-3=0 4-5=1 6=2 //For Pol -2 (One-time policy)

Military Action 1=-3 2-3 =-2 4=-1 5=1 6=2 // For Pol -4 (One-time policy)

**Issue: Rights of Minorities in Hungary**

Hungary is as close to an ethnically homogeneous state as you can imagine. Over 95% of the population is hungarian. Hungary currently has one of the most liberal sets of ethnic minority laws on the books in Eastern Europe. Despite this there are some parties that seek to blame Hungary's current problem on either the gypsies or the cosmopolitan (read jewish) influences in Hungary. These policies are particularly fashionable when one considers that hungarians are often persecuted outside their current homeland.

**Policies:**

Const. Guarantee Rights 1=-1 2-5=1 6=1 //Civ Rights 3 (One-time Policy)

Increase stat. guarantee rights 1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights 2

"Support" equal rights no effect // Civ Rights 1

Support minor repression 1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights -1

Legalize some discrimination 1-2=-1 3-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights -2, For Pol -1

Const. enforced discrimination 1=-2 2-3=-1 4-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights -3, For Pol -2  
(One-time policy)

**Issue: Taxation**

Hungary's current system of taxation is inefficient and burdensome. About 40% of personal income is taken in the form of taxes. Hungarians pay a 25% value added (sales) tax as well as an income, social security and health tax. This level of taxation has led to massive tax evasion. Some claim that it is the national sport. Since enforcement is spotty, some economists suggest that 50% of the hungarian economy is non-taxed.

**Policies:**

Increase taxes, maintain enforcement 1=-1 2-6=0 // Econ -1

Increase taxes, increase enforcement 1-2=-1 3-5=0 6=1 // Econ -2

maintain taxes, maintain enforcement 1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // Econ 0

maintain taxes, increase enforcement 1=-1 2-4=0 5-6=1 // Econ -1

decrease taxes, maintain enforcement 1=-2 2-3=-1 4-5=0 6=1 // Econ 1

decrease taxes, increase enforcement 1=-1 2-3=0 4-5=1 6=2 // Econ 2

**Issue: Sanctions against Serbia**

Sanctions against Serbia for its involvement in the war in Bosnia are going into their second year. Hungary has supported these sanctions as well if not better than many of the other neighbors of the new Yugoslavia. This support has cost the hungarians dearly (approx. \$1 billion), however, and many hungarians are calling for an end to the sanctions despite the fact that the U.N. has, in theory agreed to compensate the hungarians. This cost is primarily in trade that once flowed up and down the Balkan Peninsula. This trade is currently being rerouted through the second-rate roads of Rumania and Bulgaria. Border waits of up to 3 days for trucks are not uncommon. The Danube has also been the scene of some blockages of trade.

**Policies:**

Maintain sanctions and enforcement 1-4=-1 5-6=0 // For Pol 1

Increase enforcement 1=-2 2-4=-1 5-6=0 // For Pol 2

Maintain sanctions and decrease enforcement 1-3=-1 4-5=0 6=1 // For Pol -1

Decrease sanctions 1-2=-1 3-4=0 5-6=1 // For Pol -1

Remove Sanctions 1=-2 2-3=-1 4-5=1 6=2 // For Pol -2



**Issue: Church Laws**

In an attempt to curb the possible rise of fanatical sects in Hungary, several politicians have proposed a law that would cause any church with less than 10,000 members or less than 100 years of history in Hungary to lose its status as a religious institution. This will primarily benefit the Lutheran, Uniate and Roman Catholic Churches. There is also a move to return all of the lands formerly owned, operated or rented by churches to them as recompense for the Communist takeover. This law would primarily aid the Roman Catholic Church. Finally, for the first time in 45 years, there is a move to put chaplains back into the armed services.

**Policies:**

Strongly support church laws 1-3=-1 4-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights -2

Support church laws 1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights -1

Reject church laws 1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights 1

Strongly reject church laws 1-2=-1 3-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights 2

**Issue: Frequency Management**

Currently, all radio and television frequencies are still controlled by the state. The current government claims that it needs to control the privatization of such an important resource so that it does not fall into too few hands. The opposition claims that the government is merely stalling in order to preserve its monopoly.

**Policies:**

Immediately Privatize 1=-1 2-4=0 5-6=1 // Econ 1, Civ Rights 2 (One-time policy)

Slowly Privatize 1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // Civ Rights 1, Econ 1

Halt privatization 1=-1 2-6=0 // Civ Rights -1, Econ -1

Immediately nationalize 1=-1 2-6=0 // Civ Rights -2, Econ -1 (One-time policy)

**Issue: Privatization of Industry**

Hungary adopted a slow-go approach to privatization after the 1989 revolution. This contrasts sharply to the Poles, for example, who adopted the now famous shock therapy. The hungarian policy originally aimed at selling off most assets but at keeping the so-called family jewels under national control. These jewels included such companies as the Herend porcelain company and the MALEV Airlines. Unfortunately, this policy backfired as few buyers could be found for the outdated or obsolete factories that the hungarians were willing to sell. In addition, the hungarians often favoured local buyers, particularly employees, when granting contracts for purchase of firms. This seemed logical at the time but the typical result was that, with no new capital or new ideas, the employees quickly ran the once marginal industry into the ground. Most parties seem to accept privatization as a fact of life but argue about the speed. This is one of the biggest issues in Hungary today since the success of whatever plan that is chosen will have a direct effect on Hungary's goal of eventual EC membership.

**Policies:**

Increase speed of privatization 1=-2 2=-1 3- 4=1 5-6=2 // Econ 2, Civ Rights 1,

Maintain speed 1=-2 2=-1 3-4=0 5=1 6=2 //Econ 1(Current Policy)

Decrease speed 1=-2 2-3=-1 4-5=0 6=1 // Econ -1

Nationalize industry 1=-3 2=-2 3=-1 4=1 5-6=2 //Econ -3, Civ Rights -1 (One-time policy)

**Issue: Education Reform**

Some legislators want to introduce mandatory religion classes in school. Other modifications also need to be made including the breakup of large vocational schools and the introduction of a more entrepreneurial oriented curriculum in all schools.

**Policies:**

Mandatory religion in class 1-6=0 // Civ Rights -2 (One-time policy)

Optional religion classes 1-6=0 // Civ Rights -1

No religion in school 1-6=0 // Civ rights 2(One-time policy)

Change curriculum 1-5=0 6=1 // Econ 1

Maintain curriculum 1-6=0 // Econ -1

**Issue: The Army**

The hungarian army has not been a terribly effective fighting force in any war this

century. Currently, funds are being siphoned away from the service in order to pay for other more pressing matters. It is important that Hungary have an effective fighting force in order to defend the country, to be accepted into the NATO military structure or in order to successfully pursue more aggressive national policies.

**Policies:**

Maintain Army funding 1=-1 2-6=0 // For Pol 1

Increase Army funding 1-2=-1 3-6=0 // For Pol -1

Decrease Army funding 1=-1 2-4=0 5-6=1 // For Pol 2, Econ 1

(Note: Parties which support a decrease in funding cannot form an alliance with the Army or lose an alliance that currently exists. Parties that support a decrease in funding cannot advocate any military actions, overt or covert)

**Issue: Health Care**

Health care in Hungary was allocated for years like it was in almost any other Communist country. The higher up in the apparatus that you were, the better your care. With the revolution also came a demand by the citizenry that everyone receive the same level of health care that the former bosses received. This was impossible given the financial condition that the Communists left the country in. Thus, health care has been a major issue in Hungarian society these past four years. Again, the government adopted a slow-go approach to health care reform that has not been outstandingly successful. There

are numerous private clinics but they are too expensive for most hungarians (who average about \$200 per month in wages). In addition, the huge pot of medical insurance money paid by each worker is only available if the worker uses the socialized medical system.

**Policies:**

Immediately privatize 1=-2 2=-1 3-4=0 5=1 6=2 // Econ 2 (One-time policy)

Increase Privatization 1=-1 2-3=0 4-5=1 6=2 // Econ 1

Maintain pace of privatization 1-2=-1 3-4=0 5-6=1 //Econ 0

Decrease rate of privatization 1-2=-1 3-5=0 6=1 // Econ -1

Nationalize all private health providers 1=-2 2-3=-1 4-5=1 6=2 // Econ -2 (One-time policy)

**Issue: Participation**

Participation, as previously stated, is the ability of people to become involved in the political process. This does not mean the ability to vote -- that is called Inclusion. Participation is better seen as the ability of people to run for office. Many factors can effect a persons ability to run for office. Not all of those reasons are related to one's credentials, interest or ability to succeed in office. One of the major factors is money. Another is education and a third could be the nature of the district in which one lives. There are several Parties in Hungary today that would like to see the ability to run for office restricted on the basis of race or Party affiliation. Other, more subtle ways, like

gerrymandering, can be used to restrict peoples ability to participate. At the beginning of the game very few people are excluded from participating as candidates in the political process.

N.B. Parties that have been excluded immediately lose half of their Political Power Points and may not participate in elections. They may enter into all other activities. Interest Groups, religions, races and genders that are excluded may not "participate" in elections. Also note: The Interest Group differs from the ethnic or religious group in terms of their defining issue. For example, the Interest Group called the Calvinists is comprised of those Calvinists who are defined by their religion. Others, who may attend Calvinist services, might be more properly defined as Industrial Labour or some other Interest Group. This distinction is valid, particularly in Eastern Europe. Historically, Jews that were "assimilated" prior to WW II were able to avoid some of the reprisals aimed at them (particularly at the outset).

**Policies:**

Exclude a Party no effect // -50% of Pol Pow Pts of excluded Party Civ Rights, -#Pol Pow Pts of excluded Party Part

Include a previously excluded Party no effect // reverse of above

Exclude an ethnic Group no effect // -3 Civ Rights, -1 Part

Include a previously excluded Ethnic Group no effect // 3 Civ rghts, 1 part

Exclude a Religion no effect // -percentage of population/10 or -1, whichever is greater,

from Part, -50% of above or -2, whichever is greater, from Civ rights

Include and excluded religion no effect // reverse of above

Exclude a gender no effect // -%age of population/10 or -1, whichever is greater, from Part, 50% of above or -2, whichever is greater from Civ Rgts.

Include a previously excluded gender no effect // reverse of above

Exclude an Interest Group no effect // -1 if Group has 3 or fewer People cards, -2 if Group has more than 3 People Cards to both Civ Rights and Part.

Include a previously excluded Interest Group no effect // reverse above

Gerrymandering no effect // -1 Part, -1 Civ Rights

Limit Contributions no effect // 1 Participation

State Funding of Candidates no effect // 1 Participation

### **Issue: Inclusion**

As outlined above, Inclusion is the right of people to vote. For example, using the system I have set up here, the United States had an Inclusion rating of about 5 out of ten prior to 1920. Until then, women (about 50% of the population) did not have a right to vote. Literacy tests, property tests and age limits also serve to lower the Inclusion rating. Currently the voting age in Hungary is 18 and suffrage is universal. Some would even like to lower the voting age to 16. Others would like to severely restrict the rights of people living in Hungary to vote.

**Policies:**

N.B. All of the Policies in Participation above are available here. Instead of Participation, the negative or positive effects will happen to Inclusion. The Civil Rights adjustments will stay the same as they are above.

Lower Voting Age to 16 No effect // 1 Inclusion

**Issue: Inflation and Deficit Reduction**

This is one of the most pressing issues in Hungary. Indeed, throughout all of Eastern Europe, the pressures of inflation are endangering the reformist movements. To end inflation these countries, Hungary among them, must quit printing so much money and balance their budgets. Doing this abruptly, like the Poles, causes terrible hardships for anyone on a fixed income. There is no longer any money to subsidize food and transportation and those on pension, like former teachers, miners, scientists and army officers, to name a few, really take it on the chin. Couple this with the hardships of re-engineering an economy and a devalued currency and the effects are devastating for everyone. On the other hand, the effects of a persistent high level of inflation are equally as damaging. People tend to store their money in goods and not in the more efficient savings system. People buy things they may not need today because they know that the same amount of money will not buy them something else of equal value tomorrow. Bankers are hesitant to lend for the long term because they know that they will not receive



back what they lent out. Finally, one of the most sought after prizes in Eastern Europe is membership in the EC. In order to do this and in order to continue to get loans from the World Bank and other organizations, the Hungarians must continue to push down their rate of inflation (which currently stands at 23%). Of course, the far off holy grail of EC membership does not put food in the mouth of the elderly today.

**Policies:**

Sharply reduce monetary growth -2=1 -1=2-3 1=4-6 // 2 Econ

Reduce monetary growth -1=1-3 0=4 1=5-6 // 1 Econ

Increase monetary supply -1=1-3 0=4 1=5-6 // -1 Econ

Sharply increase monetary supply -2=1 -1=2-3 1=4-6 // -2 Econ

**Issue: Infrastructure**

Hungary's infrastructure, its roads, buildings, trains, etc., are crumbling, rusting and generally falling apart. In some places they are falling apart faster than they can be repaired, to say nothing of making the improvements that are necessary to bring the country up to the standard of Western Europe. More money should clearly be spent here, but where is it to come from?

**Policies:**

Maintain current level of funding 1-4=-1 5-6=0 // no effect

Increase funding, decrease social spending 1-2=-1 3-4=0 5-6=1 // Econ 1, Civ Rights

-1

Increase funding, cut fat from budget 1=-1 2-5=0 6=1 // Econ 1

**Issue: Elections**

Currently elections are scheduled for turn 4 of the simulation. A Coalition may try during the Policy Selection and Support Phases to move those Elections. They can be earlier, later or canceled altogether. The Policy is selected just as any other Policy is during the Policy Selection Phase. It either passes or fails in the Policy Support Phase as does any other policy. Its implementation is automatic and immediate.

**Policies:**

Move elections to Turn \_\_\_\_ No effect // No effect

Cancel elections No effect // Civ Rgts -3

## **Appendix C -- Interest Groups**

## Interest Groups

Group	Econ	Civ Rghts	For Pol	Inc	Part	People Coup	
Army	2-7	3-7	3-8	>=9	5-10	3R	25
Nationalists	2-7	2-5	1-4	5-6	5-6	4H	10
Entrepreneurs	>=7	>=7	>=8	>=8	>=8	2R	3
Urban educated	>=6	>=8	>=8	>=9	>=8	3R	5
Rural educated	4-8	5-8	3-7	>=7	4-8	4H	3
Small Farmers	4-8	2-6	2-6	5-8	4-9	4H	2
Miners	3-7	3-7	2-6	5-8	4-9	3H	5
Elderly	2-6	2-6	3-7	>=8	7-8	7R	5
Unemployed	2-8	2-8	2-8	>=8	>=8	6R	7
Media	2-8	2-8	2-8	>=5	2-9	12R	20
Communists	1-4	1-5	3-7	>=7	3-4	2R	2
Academics	>=7	>=8	>=7	>=8	>=8	2R	1
Students	>=7	>=8	>=7	>=8	>=8	6R	7
Environmentalists	6-8	7-8	6-9	>=8	8-9	4R	2
Industrial Labour	3-6	5-8	2-6	>=8	>=8	8R	10
Industrial mgmt	>=7	3-7	6-8	>=8	5-7	2R	5
Small Business	7-9	3-9	5-9	>=8	>=7	4R	2
Diaspora	7-9	5-7	1-4	>=9	>=9	2H	5
Jews	>=7	>=8	>=8	10	10	1J	1
Lutherans	7-8	8-9	7-9	>=8	>=8	2P	1
Uniate	6-8	6-9	6-9	>=8	>=8	2U	1
Calvinist	7-8	8-9	7-9	>=8	>=8	8P	3
Roman Catholics	4-7	4-7	4-6	>=7	6-8	12RC	7
No declared religion	5-9	7-9	3-8	>=8	>=8	8O	7
Germans	7-9	>=8	>=8	>=8	>=8	1G	1
Gypsies	>=8	>=9	>=7	>=8	>=8	1Gy	1
Feminists	>=7	>=8	6-9	>=8	>=8	2F	1
Skinheads	1-7	1-3	1-3	4=<	<=4	1H	10


## **Appendix D -- Hungary Fact Pack**

# ***Hungary Fact Pack***

**(For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation)**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

**Source: PC Globe (Novato, California: Broderbund), 1993  
(All info is from 1992 unless otherwise indicated)**



## Hungary Historical Highlights

The early Germanic, Slavic tribes were overrun by Magyar invaders by the 10th century. Hungary was long dominated by the Ottoman Turks. The Austrians established their control in the early 18th century.

1867 - Dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary established, giving Hungary internal self-government.

1918 - Defeated in World War I, loses extensive territories.

1920 - Monarchy approved; Adm. Nicholas Horthy named regent.

1939-1944 - Sides with Nazi Germany; annexes areas lost at end of WWI.

1944-1945 - Soviet forces subdue country; Hungary forced to return to pre-war borders.

1946 - Republic declared; Zoltan Tildy elected president.


1947 - Communists seize government, oust Tildy.

1956 - Imre Nagy named premier, promises political & economic changes; to prevent popular revolt, USSR invades, then arrests & executes Nagy.

1968 - Hungary participates in Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.


1989 - Hungarian parliament passes sweeping political, economic reforms, opens borders to West; Hungarian Communist party disbands.






# Hungary People

ETHNIC GROUPS




- Magyar
- German
- Gypsy & other

LANGUAGES



- Hungarian
- Romanl & other

RELIGIONS



- Roman Catholic
- Calvinist
- Lutheran
- Uniate
- Jewish
- Other

Nationality: noun--Hungarian's adjective--Hungarian

# Hungary Age Distribution

## MALES

Population: 5,104,748


Life expectancy: 68 years

## FEMALES

Population: 5,442,252

Life expectancy: 76 years

(Age)



Hungary Education				
	Schools	Teachers	Students	Students per teacher
Elementary	3,527	90,602	1,183,600	13.1
Secondary	944	30,835	526,167	17.1
Thlrd level	57	16,319	100,868	6.2
GNP for education: 5.6% Literacy rate: 99.0%				

## Hungary Health

Life expectancy at birth:  
Males: 68 years

Females 76 years

Crude death rate: 13 per 1000 persons die per year  
Infant mortality: 14 per 1000 live births  
Maternal mortality: 16.9 per 100,000 mothers die during birth  
Fertility rate: 1.8 children per woman

Hospitals:	148	71,338 persons per hospital
Hospital beds:	101,652	104 persons per hospital bed
Physicians:	32,200	328 persons per physician
Dentists:	3,988	2,647 persons per dentist
Pharmacists:	4,501	2,346 persons per pharmacist
Nursing personnel:	50,172	210 persons per nurse
Midwifery personnel:	2,613	4,041 persons per midwife


Medical care expenditures 2.1% of national budget  
Access to local health care: 100.0% with access  
Contraception use: 73.0% of married women  
Measles immunization: 95.0% infants (< 12 months) immunized  
DPT immunization: 99.5% infants (< 12 months) immunized  
AIDS cases reported: 1.00 per 100,000 persons  
// H means unavailable

## Hungary Crime

Offenses	Offenses per 100,000 persons	Offense/100,000 pop occurs every...
Total Offenses	1,747.80	5.0 hours
Murder	3.80	13.7 weeks
Rape	4.10	12.7 weeks
Serious Assault	51.90	1.0 weeks
Theft (all kinds)	1,021.90	8.6 hours
Aggravated Theft	306.20	1.2 days
Robbery and Violent Theft	14.50	3.6 weeks
Breaking and Entering	291.70	1.3 days
Theft of Automobiles	44.30	1.2 weeks
Other Theft	671.40	13.0 hours
Sex Offenses	13.70	3.8 weeks
Fraud	52.40	7.0 days
Currency Offenses	0.30	3.3 years
Drug Offenses	0.80	1.2 years

## Hungary Economy

Gross National Product (GNP)  
(millions of \$US)



GNP per capita (\$US): 2,647  
Annual growth: 1.6%  
% for defense: 5.2%



The economy which the Antal Government inherited when it took power in May 1990 was one which had been moving away from an orthodox communist command economy for a good number of years. The devolution began in the 1960s under the leadership of Janos Kadar. For the first six years after he became First Secretary of the communist Hungarian Workers' Party after the Soviet intervention to put down the Hungarian Revolution, Kadar enforced the old policies of heavy industrialization and collectivization, from which the regime had tried to get away after the death of Stalin in 1953. The results were predictably unsatisfactory. In 1963, with the economy in extreme stress and performing badly, Kadar came across a reform

Hungary Manufacturing		
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS	QUANTITY	UNITS
Automobiles (1989)	0	
Beer (1989)	8,740,000	hectoliters
Butter (1989)	38,000	metric tons
Cement (1989)	3,857,000	metric tons
Cheese (1989)	86,000	metric tons
Cigarettes (1989)	26,430,000,000	
Merchant Vessels (1988)	0	gross registered tons
Newsprint (1989)	0	metric tons
Paper & Paperboard (1989)	517,000	metric tons
Radlos (1989)	104,000	
Televisions (1989)	502,000	
Wine (1989)	5,000,000	hectoliters
Wool (1989)	9,000	metric tons
(0 means no production reported)		



Hungary Agriculture	
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS	QUANTITY (metric tons)
Barley (1989)	1,340,000
Coffee (1989)	0
Corn (1989)	6,996,000
Cotton (1989)	0
Eggs (1989)	236,000
Meat (1988)	1,098,000
Milk (1989)	2,812,000
Natural Rubber (1989)	0
Oats (1989)	149,000
Potatoes (1989)	1,332,000
Rice (1989)	28,000
Soybeans (1989)	51,000
Sugar (1988)	468,000
Tea (1991)	0
Tobacco (1989)	15,000
Wheat (1989)	6,540,000
(0 means no production reported)	
Land in agriculture: 56.8%	
Total agricultural workers: 887,800	
Percent of work force in agriculture: 18.4%	

Hungary Mining	
PRODUCTS (1989)	QUANTITY (metric tons)
Aluminum	87,000
Bauxite	2,906,000
Copper	0
Diamonds (carats)	0
Gold	0
Iron Ore	68,000
Lead	0
Magnesium	0
Phosphates	0
Salt	0
Silver	0
Tin	0
Uranium	0
Zinc	0
(0 means no production reported)	

Hungary Energy	
ELECTRICITY	
Capacity (1988)	6,846,000 kilowatts
Production (1988)	29,216,000 kilowatt-hours
Consumption (1988)	40,507,000 kilowatt-hours
Consumption per capita	3,841 kilowatt-hours
COAL	
Reserves (1988)	4,461,000,000 metric tons
Production (1988)	20,875,000 metric tons
Consumption (1988)	23,847,000 metric tons
Consumption per capita	2,261 metric tons
NATURAL GAS	
Reserves (1990)	123,000,000,000 cubic meters
Production (1989)	6,190,000,000 cubic meters
Consumption (1988)	10,487,000,000 cubic meters
Consumption per capita	994 cubic meters
CRUDE PETROLEUM	
Reserves (1990)	272,000,000 barrels
Production (1989)	13,000,000 barrels
Consumption (1988)	62,000,000 barrels
Consumption per capita	5.88 barrels

**Appendix E -- Party Papers**

**Party Papers  
For  
The Hungarian Democratic  
Forum  
(HDF)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

## **Hungarian Democratic Forum**

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
<b>Participation</b>	<b>5-7</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>5-9</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>3-6</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>5-6</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>3-5</b>	<b>4</b>

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game: 7**

**NEVER SHOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS PACKET TO ANY OTHER PLAYER. YOU MAY TELL THEM ANYTHING YOU WISH ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PACKET BUT YOU MUST NEVER CONFIRM IT BY SHOWING THEM THESE CONTENTS.**

The Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), although waning in popularity, is still the most powerful Party in the country. It is also the leader of the current Coalition that is in power. This is the same Coalition that took over the reins of government from the Communists in 1990 after the first free elections. Your support comes from Hungarian nationalists, the rural intelligentsia and the descendants of the landed classes in Hungary. You represent anyone who favors security and stability over all else. Despite this, you recognize the need for reform but feel that the process should be slow-go as opposed to shock therapy.

Your partners in this Coalition are the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The Smallholders are a relatively insignificant Party of conservative, rural landholders. The Christian Democrats are closer to your league in terms of Political Power and, because of the strength of the Roman Catholic Church, are increasing in popularity.

In direct opposition to you are the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats. These two Parties are your most serious threats. These two Parties are very closely allied. They are comprised mostly of Hungarian Yuppies and the intellectual elite. Both are more popular in the polls than is your Party. This may be because they have not been burdened with the job of governing over the past 3 years. You also know that the polls only matter at election time and are not the truest measure of Political Power.

The Socialist Party is what was formerly known as the Communist Party. Due to the various problems that your government has had over the last three years, this Party has come back from the dead and is perhaps as powerful as the Christian Democrats. It appeals to anyone who is nostalgic for the old days. This includes the elderly who have seen their pensions eroded by inflation, the Army and some farmers as well as the true believers from the communist era. Despite all this, no one seems to want to ally themselves with the Socialists for fear of alienating their core constituencies.

The Hungarian Truth and Life party is a spin-off from your Party. The reason they spun-off is because of their extreme brand of nationalism. At the time of their departure, you were glad to see them go. Their leaders have talked of the need for "lebensraum" and have voiced many of the same sentiments espoused by the Neo-Nazis in Germany. They are not very powerful yet but represent the silent majority of out of work, poor and poorly educated masses.

The last Party you need to contend with is the Republican Party. Its Political Power is very weak and tied directly to the personality and finances of its leader Janos Polotas. Its agenda seems to be reform minded, almost to the point of a complete lack of control.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You have the ability to disavow your allies and seek new friends if you so desire. You can also go with the ties that you have or even try to broaden your alliances. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!

**Party Papers  
For  
The Christian Democrats  
(CD)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**



## **Christian Democrats**

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
<b>Participation</b>	<b>6-7</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>7-8</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>3-5</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>4-6</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>6-7</b>	<b>4</b>

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game: 5**

**NEVER SHOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS PACKET TO ANY OTHER PLAYER. YOU MAY TELL THEM ANYTHING YOU WISH ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PACKET BUT YOU MUST NEVER CONFIRM IT BY SHOWING THEM THESE CONTENTS.**

Your party is not the most powerful party in Hungary today but it is one of the fastest growing. This is largely due to the backing of the Roman Catholic Church. It is also due to the support of many of the elderly who see your party and the church as the bringers of stability and security to a system that is changing so rapidly. You are the second most powerful member of the current Coalition that runs Hungary and have been a member of this Government since the first free elections in 1990.

Your partners in this Coalition is the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Smallholders. The Smallholders are a relatively insignificant Party of conservative, rural landholders. The same cannot be said for the Hungarian Democratic Forum. This Party came out of the 1990 elections in the strongest position. Although they are no longer as popular as they once were, they still have more Political Power than any of the other Parties in Hungary. Their Agenda is surprisingly close to yours but draws support from the nationalists in the country as well as from the landed classes and the rural intelligentsia.

In direct opposition to you are the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats. These two Parties are your most serious threats. These two Parties are very closely allied. They are comprised mostly of Hungarian Yuppies and the intellectual elite. Both are more popular in the polls than is your Party. This may be because they have not been burdened with the job of governing over the past 3 years. You also know that the polls only matter at election time and are not the truest measure of Political Power.

The Socialist Party is what was formerly known as the Communist Party. Due to the various problems that your government has had over the last three years, this Party has come back from the dead and is perhaps as powerful as you are. It appeals to anyone who is nostalgic for the old days. This includes the elderly (particularly the non church going elderly) who have seen their pensions eroded by inflation, the Army and some farmers as well as the true believers from the communist era. Despite all this, no one seems to want to

ally themselves with the Socialists for fear of alienating their core constituencies.

The Hungarian Truth and Life party is a spin-off from the Hungarian Democratic Forum Party. The reason they spun-off is because of their extreme brand of nationalism. At the time of their departure, the HDF was glad to see them go. Their leaders have talked of the need for "lebensraum" and have voiced many of the same sentiments espoused by the Neo-Nazis in Germany. They are not very powerful yet but represent the silent majority of out of work, poor and poorly educated masses.

The last Party you need to contend with is the Republican Party. Its Political Power is very weak and tied directly to the personality and finances of its leader Janos Polotas. Its agenda seems to be reform minded, almost to the point of anarchy.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You have the ability to disavow your allies and seek new friends if you so desire. You can also go with the ties that you have or even try to broaden your alliances. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!

**Party Papers  
For  
The Alliance of Free Democrats  
(AFD)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

### **Alliance of Free Democrats**

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
<b>Participation</b>	<b>&gt;9</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>&gt;9</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>7-8</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>&gt;8</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>7-8</b>	<b>4</b>

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game: 4**

**NEVER SHOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS PACKET TO ANY OTHER PLAYER. YOU MAY TELL THEM ANYTHING YOU WISH ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PACKET BUT YOU MUST NEVER CONFIRM IT BY SHOWING THEM THESE CONTENTS.**

Your Party is one of the major Opposition Parties in Hungary. Since the day in 1990 when the current Coalition came to power, you have been gaining in support. This is mainly due to the failures of the slow-go reform policy espoused by the current government. You are much more liberal in your views on a free market economy and you see the country as having a long way to go. This is clearly seen by the difference between where the country is and where your Agenda would like to place the country.

Your support comes from the urban areas of the country, particularly those in the west, near Austria. You can count on old line social democrats as well as the academic liberals (liberals in Hungary means those in favour of democratic reforms and a free market economy). Your closest ally is the Young Democrat Party. It is comprised of young, hard money yuppies who, while sharing much of your Agenda, are far more strident in the tone of their demands.

The members of the Coalition are the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats, although not particularly powerful at this time, are gaining considerable prestige, mainly due to the backing of the Roman Catholic Church. The Hungarian Democratic Forum Party came out of the 1990 elections in the strongest position. Although they are no longer as popular as they once were, they still have more Political Power than any of the other Parties in Hungary. They draw support from the nationalists in the country as well as from the landed classes and the rural intelligentsia. The Smallholders is a relatively insignificant Party of rural landholders.

The Socialist Party is what was formerly known as the Communist Party. Due to the various problems that the government has had over the last three years, this Party has come back from the dead and is perhaps as powerful as you are. It appeals to anyone who is nostalgic for the old days. This includes the elderly (particularly the non church going

elderly) who have seen their pensions eroded by inflation, the Army and some farmers as well as the true believers from the communist era. Despite all this, no one seems to want to ally themselves with the Socialists for fear of alienating their core constituencies.

The Hungarian Truth and Life party is a spin-off from the Hungarian Democratic Forum Party. The reason they span-off is because of their extreme brand of nationalism. At the time of their departure, the HDF was glad to see them go. Their leaders have talked of the need for "lebensraum" and have voiced many of the same sentiments espoused by the Neo-Nazis in Germany. They are not very powerful yet but represent the silent majority of out of work, poor and poorly educated masses.

The last Party you need to contend with is the Republican Party. Its Political Power is very weak and tied directly to the personality and finances of its leader Janos Polotas. Its agenda seems to be reform minded, almost to the point of anarchy.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You have the ability to disavow your allies and seek new friends if you so desire. You can also go with the ties that you have or even try to broaden your alliances. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!

**Party Papers  
For  
The Young Democrats  
(YD)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

## Young Democrats

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
Participation	9	8
Inclusion	10	9
Economy	7-8	5
Civil Rights	>8	6
Foreign Policy	6-8	4

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game:**

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Your Party is one of the major Opposition Parties in Hungary. Since the day in 1990 when the current Coalition came to power, you have been gaining in support. This is mainly due to the failures of the slow-go reform policy espoused by the current government. You are much more liberal in your views on a free market economy and you see the country as having a long way to go. This is clearly seen by the difference between where the country is and where your Agenda would like to place the country.

Your Party was founded with the principle that youth is good. In fact, at the outset, your Party would not allow anyone over the age of 35 to join. You have recently changed this policy, particularly since you are now perceived as the most popular Party in the Country regardless of the age of the voter. One of the main reasons for this support is that, as young people, you cannot be blamed for any of the other tragedies that occurred in Hungary in the 20th Century. Despite this, your hard-core support comes from the Hungarian Yuppie. These well-educated, well-to-do entrepreneurs are distrusted by almost everyone who benefited from the previous regime.

The members of the Coalition are the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats, although not particularly powerful at this time, are gaining considerable prestige, mainly due to the backing of the Roman Catholic Church. They must suffer, as you, however, as the junior partner in the Coalition. The Hungarian Democratic Forum Party came out of the 1990 elections in the strongest position. Although they are no longer as popular as they once were, they still have more Political Power than any of the other Parties in Hungary. Their Agenda is moderately close to yours but they draw support from the nationalists in the country as well as from the landed classes and the rural intelligentsia. The Smallholders is a relatively insignificant Party of rural landholders.

The Socialist Party is what was formerly known as the Communist Party. Due to

the various problems that the government has had over the last three years, this Party has come back from the dead and is perhaps as powerful as you are. It appeals to anyone who is nostalgic for the old days. This includes the elderly (particularly the non church going elderly) who have seen their pensions eroded by inflation, the Army and some farmers as well as the true believers from the communist era. Despite all this, no one seems to want to ally themselves with the Socialists for fear of alienating their core constituencies.

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The last Party you need to contend with is the Republican Party. Its Political Power is very weak and tied directly to the personality and finances of its leader Janos Polotas. Its agenda seems to be reform minded, almost to the point of anarchy.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You have the ability to disavow your allies and seek new friends if you so desire. You can also go with the ties that you have or even try to broaden your alliances. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!



# **Party Papers For The Socialist Party (SP)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

### **Socialist Party**

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
<b>Participation</b>	<b>8-9</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>&gt;9</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>2-4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>5-7</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>7-9</b>	<b>4</b>

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game: 3**

**NEVER SHOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS PACKET TO ANY OTHER PLAYER. YOU MAY TELL THEM ANYTHING YOU WISH ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PACKET BUT YOU MUST NEVER CONFIRM IT BY SHOWING THEM THESE CONTENTS.**

Your Party is the former Communist Party. This worked against you in the first free elections in 1990 but since then you have made a serious comeback. The reasons for this comeback are twofold. First you have not been a member of the Coalition that is currently in power. Secondly, there is certain amount of nostalgia for the security and stability of the old system. This is true particularly among the elderly, the officers in the Army and anyone else who benefited from the old system.

Currently you have no allies. This, however, may change in the upcoming elections. If you are able to garner enough votes to play the "swing man", you may be able to exact numerous concessions. Until then you may need to broaden your base of support or seek out tentative alliances with other Parties.

The members of the current Coalition are the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the violently anti-Communist Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats, although not particularly powerful at this time, are gaining considerable prestige, mainly due to the backing of the Roman Catholic Church. Your Political Power, at this time is about equal to theirs. The Hungarian Democratic Forum Party, on the other hand, came out of the 1990 elections in the strongest position. Although they are no longer as popular as they once were, they still have more Political Power than any of the other Parties in Hungary. They draw support from the nationalists in the country as well as from the formerly landed classes and the rural intelligentsia. The Smallholders is a relatively insignificant Party of rural landholders.

The Alliance for Free Democrats and the Young Democrats have close ties and have historically worked closely together as members of the Opposition. They are perhaps the strongest two Parties outside the Coalition. They draw on their support from the former dissidents, the intellectual elite, the entrepreneurs and the Yuppies in Hungarian society. Like you, they are benefiting from the experience of being outside of the government in the

last three years.

Despite their obvious strengths, at this time, they do not have enough power to form a government by themselves if the current Coalition should fail. This is where you might be able to "come to the rescue".

The Hungarian Truth and Justice Party is a small Party that split from the Hungarian Democratic Forum this summer. The basis for their Agenda is an extreme brand of nationalism that would claim back for Hungary all of the lost lands that were taken from it over the years. Their interventionist foreign policy is particularly incompatible with your Agenda.

The last Party you need to contend with is the Republican Party. Its Political Power is very weak and tied directly to the personality and finances of its leader Janos Polotas. Its agenda seems to be reform minded, almost to the point of anarchy.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You May have to seek new friends in order to grow. You can also go with what you have or even try to broaden your alliances or your Agenda. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!

# **Party Papers For The Smallholders Party (SH)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

### **Smallholders**

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
<b>Participation</b>	<b>3-6</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>5-7</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>5-6</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>2-4</b>	<b>4</b>

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game: 2**

**NEVER SHOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS PACKET TO ANY OTHER PLAYER. YOU MAY TELL THEM ANYTHING YOU WISH ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PACKET BUT YOU MUST NEVER CONFIRM IT BY SHOWING THEM THESE CONTENTS.**

Your Party is perhaps the weakest and most divided in Hungary. Although you can trace your roots back to prewar days, the Smallholders of today are supported only by the landholders and sons of landholders who had their property confiscated by the Communists. Your support is currently only in the rural areas and is very dispersed. You have a very real chance of being eliminated in the next elections.

Despite this, you are currently a member of the Coalition that is and has been ruling Hungary since the first free elections in 1990. You can rightfully claim some measure of the responsibility for the successes during that time. Unfortunately, the same can be said for the failures.

The other members of the Coalition are the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats, although not particularly powerful at this time, are gaining considerable prestige, mainly due to the backing of the Roman Catholic Church. They must suffer, as you, however, as the junior partner in the Coalition. The Hungarian Democratic Forum Party came out of the 1990 elections in the strongest position. Although they are no longer as popular as they once were, they still have more Political Power than any of the other Parties in Hungary. Their Agenda is moderately close to yours but they draw support from the nationalists in the country as well as from the landed classes and the rural intelligentsia.

In direct opposition to you are the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats. These two Parties are your most serious threats. These two Parties are very closely allied. They are comprised mostly of Hungarian Yuppies and the intellectual elite. Both are more popular in the polls than is your Party. This may be because they have not been burdened with the job of governing over the past 3 years. You also know that the polls only matter at election time and are not the truest measure of Political Power.

The Socialist Party is what was formerly known as the Communist Party. Due to

the various problems that your government has had over the last three years, this Party has come back from the dead and is perhaps as powerful as you are. It appeals to anyone who is nostalgic for the old days. This includes the elderly (particularly the non church going elderly) who have seen their pensions eroded by inflation, the Army and some farmers as well as the true believers from the communist era. Despite all this, no one seems to want to ally themselves with the Socialists for fear of alienating their core constituencies. Until now your Party has been rabidly opposed to any former communist involvement in government.

The Hungarian Truth and Life party is a spin-off from the Hungarian Democratic Forum Party. The reason they spun-off is because of their extreme brand of nationalism. At the time of their departure, the HDF was glad to see them go. Their leaders have talked of the need for "lebensraum" and have voiced many of the same sentiments espoused by the Neo-Nazis in Germany. They are not very powerful yet but represent the silent majority of out of work, poor and poorly educated masses.

The last Party you need to contend with is the Republican Party. Its Political Power is very weak and tied directly to the personality and finances of its leader Janos Polotas. Its agenda seems to be reform minded, almost to the point of anarchy.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You have the ability to disavow your allies and seek new friends if you so desire. You can also go with the ties that you have or even try to broaden your alliances. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!

# **Party Papers For The Republic Party (REP)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

## **Republic Party**

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
<b>Participation</b>	<b>4-8</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>4-8</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>&gt;9</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>4-7</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>3-8</b>	<b>4</b>

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game:**

**NEVER SHOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS PACKET TO ANY OTHER PLAYER. YOU MAY TELL THEM ANYTHING YOU WISH ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PACKET BUT YOU MUST NEVER CONFIRM IT BY SHOWING THEM THESE CONTENTS.**

Your Party, more than any of the others is represented by its leader, Janos Polotas. He is a very wealthy, very popular politician. Your Agenda is set by him. In this game you will assume his character more than any of other players assume theirs. Your support, such as it is comes from the wealthy in the country. Thus, your Agenda is one of the most unusual. The only item upon which you are firm is the economy. You see a Laissez-faire economy as the only way to go. Because you have very little real support, you have the ability to put your message across any way you chose and, thus, appeal to whatever segment of the population you wish to. You may gain enough support this way to become a real player in the political process.

Competing for the voters are the other seven Parties in Hungary. There are three in the governing coalition and the remaining are in the Opposition. The members of this Coalition are the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats, although not particularly powerful at this time, are gaining considerable prestige, mainly due to the backing of the Roman Catholic Church. The Hungarian Democratic Forum Party, on the other hand, came out of the 1990 elections in the strongest position. Although they are no longer as popular as they once were, they still have more Political Power than any of the other Parties in Hungary. They draw support from the nationalists in the country as well as from the formerly landed classes and the rural intelligentsia. The Smallholders is a relatively insignificant Party of rural landholders. Your Political Power, at this time, is about equal to theirs.

The Socialist Party is what was formerly known as the Communist Party. Due to the various problems that the government has had over the last three years, this Party has come back from the dead and is very powerful. It appeals to anyone who is nostalgic for the old days. This includes the elderly (particularly the non church going elderly) who



have seen their pensions eroded by inflation, the Army and some farmers as well as the true believers from the communist era. Despite all this, no one seems to want to ally themselves with the Socialists for fear of alienating their core constituencies.

Your main enemies seem to be the reform minded Alliance for Free Democrats and the Young Democrats. These groups are led by former dissidents and the new entrepreneurs. Although they have good records on supporting hungarian rights in foreign countries, they seem to be satisfied with the lands that Hungary currently occuppies. This and other items on their Agendas are wholly unsatisfactory to you.

The last Party is the Hungarian Truth and Life Party. Until recently, this group was part of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. They are noted for their extreme brand of nationalism. This almost xenophobic attitude attract many of the poor and poorly educated to their cause. The HDF was glad to see them go and they have few friends.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You May have to seek new friends in order to grow. You can also go with what you have or even try to broaden your alliances or your Agenda. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!

**Party Papers  
For  
The Hungarian Truth and Life  
Party  
(HTL)**

**For use in the Hungary '93 Simulation**

**Kristan J. Wheaton**

## **Hungarian Truth and Life Party**

<b>Agenda (Party)</b>		<b>Governmental Position</b>
<b>Participation</b>	<b>&lt;5</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Inclusion</b>	<b>&lt;6</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>6-7</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Civil Rights</b>	<b>&lt;5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Foreign Policy</b>	<b>2-3</b>	<b>4</b>

**Political Power Points at the beginning of the game: 1**

**NEVER SHOW THE INFORMATION IN THIS PACKET TO ANY OTHER PLAYER. YOU MAY TELL THEM ANYTHING YOU WISH ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THIS PACKET BUT YOU MUST NEVER CONFIRM IT BY SHOWING THEM THESE CONTENTS.**

Your Party is the newest of the Parties in Hungary. Your constituency, up until early this summer, was part of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Due to strong ideological differences, you and your followers felt that the HDF no longer represented you and decided to form your own Party to compete in the upcoming elections.

Other Parties label you as the "ultra-nationalist Party". You obviously feel that this is unfair. Your fundamental view is that Hungary ought to represent the interests of all Hungarians everywhere. This includes, in particular, those hungarians living in the (formerly) hungarian lands now occupied by the Slovaks, Serbs and Romanians. History would seem to be on your side as well as a large number of poor and dis-enfranchised young workers for whom this new-found freedom that is so much talked about means nothing.

You firmly believe that Hungary should be for hungarians and that Gypsies, Jews, Romanians, Slovaks and Serbs should have few rights or privileges in your lands. You know that there are a large number of people who, in their hearts, agree with you. Your problem is to get them to put those feelings into action.

Virtually all Parties are arrayed against you. The current governing Coalition was certainly glad when you left the HDF. The members of this Coalition are the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The Christian Democrats, although not particularly powerful at this time, are gaining considerable prestige, mainly due to the backing of the Roman Catholic Church. The Hungarian Democratic Forum Party, on the other hand, came out of the 1990 elections in the strongest position. Although they are no longer as popular as they once were, they still have more Political Power than any of the other Parties in Hungary. They draw support from the nationalists in the country as well as from the formerly landed classes and the rural intelligentsia. The Smallholders is a relatively insignificant Party of rural landholders.

Your Political Power, at this time, is about equal to theirs.

The Socialist Party is what was formerly known as the Communist Party. Due to the various problems that the government has had over the last three years, this Party has come back from the dead and is very powerful. It appeals to anyone who is nostalgic for the old days. This includes the elderly (particularly the non church going elderly) who have seen their pensions eroded by inflation, the Army and some farmers as well as the true believers from the communist era. Despite all this, no one seems to want to ally themselves with the Socialists for fear of alienating their core constituencies.


Your main enemies seem to be the reform minded Alliance for Free Democrats and the Young Democrats. These groups are led by former dissidents and the new entrepreneurs. Although they have good records on supporting hungarian rights in foreign countries, they seem to be satisfied with the lands that Hungary currently occupies. This and other items on their Agendas are wholly unsatisfactory to you.

The last Party you need to contend with is the Republic Party. Its Political Power is very weak and tied directly to the personality and finances of its leader Janos Polotas. Its agenda seems to be reform minded, almost to the point of anarchy.

The relationships that you have developed with these Parties is mostly only history. You May have to seek new friends in order to grow. You can also go with what you have or even try to broaden your alliances or your Agenda. Remember that your goal is twofold: To increase your Political Power and to implement your Agenda. Your success will be measured on how well you fulfill these two goals. Good Luck!

## **Appendix F -- People Cards**

Example of People Card



**Appendix G -- Miscellaneous**

**Turn Summary: Turn # \_\_\_\_\_**

**Pol Pwr Pts**

**HDF** \_\_\_\_\_

**CD** \_\_\_\_\_

**AFD** \_\_\_\_\_

**YD** \_\_\_\_\_

**Soc** \_\_\_\_\_

**SH** \_\_\_\_\_

**HTL** \_\_\_\_\_

**Rep** \_\_\_\_\_

**National Position**

**Econ** \_\_\_\_\_

**Civ Rts** \_\_\_\_\_

**For Pol** \_\_\_\_\_

**Part** \_\_\_\_\_

**Inc** \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Policies</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Ye</b>

<b>Current Coalition:</b>
---------------------------

<b>Standard of Living</b>
---------------------------

<b>Alliances:</b>
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**You will Play Hungary '93 on \_\_\_\_\_  
at \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_.**

**-- Please be five minutes early.**

**-- Please bring this packet with you.**

**-- Before you come, please:**

**-- Review the Rules, Interest Group sheet  
and Issues and Policies packet.**

**-- Read the Party Papers for your Party.**

**-- Review the information about Hungary in  
the Fact Pack.**

**-- Please call me at 942-9893 if:**

**-- You can not make it (call at least 24 hours  
in advance, if possible).**

**-- You have any questions.**

***Thanks,  
Kris Wheaton***

## **Questionnaire**

On a scale from 1 to 10 (1=very little and 10 =very much)  
please answer the following three questions:

-- I enjoyed this simulation...

-- During this simulation I learned...

-- Assuming I had the time, I would like to participate in  
this simulation again...

--Comments:

## **Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>Imre Madach, The Tragedy of Man, trans. George Szirtes (Gyomaendrod, Hungary: Corvina Kiado, 1988), 46.

<sup>2</sup>Pat Koza, "What's Left," Business Central Europe, October 1993, 13.

<sup>3</sup>Krisztina Fenyő, "Debate Increases Magyar-Slovak Tension," Budapest Week, 1-7 July 1993, 2.

<sup>4</sup>"Facts and Figures," Business Central Europe, October 1993, 72-73.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>A search in the Florida State University General Academic index for the period 1982-1987 yielded 13 articles with the keyword "Democratization". The same search for the period between 1988 to the present yielded 243 articles.

<sup>7</sup>Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics, April 1970, 340.

<sup>8</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, 16.

<sup>9</sup>Rustow, "Transitions", 337.

<sup>10</sup>Among the most important are Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1988); Enrique A. Baloyra, Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987); Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transition from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); John Herz, From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1982) as well as the volume by Huntington cited above.

<sup>11</sup>Rustow, "Transitions", 344.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid, 337-341.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, 340.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid, 346.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, 346-347.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, 350-352.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, 352-355.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, 355-357.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, 358-361.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid, 350-352.

<sup>21</sup>Huntington, The Third Wave, 14.

<sup>22</sup>Rustow, "Transitions", 349.

<sup>23</sup>Leonardo Morlino, Comparing New Democracies, ed. Enrique A. Baloyra (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1987), 57-64.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid, 57.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid, 64.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid, 76. Morlino's conclusion makes as little sense to me as it does to you. I am of the conviction that there was a typographical error in the text and what he actually meant to write is "maintenance of the authoritarian regime" as one of the alternative outcomes to a transition. This makes sense, but is not what is in the text. There is no second edition and I cannot find where this may have been corrected. Thus, I am forced to put down what he has written.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid, 56.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid, 53.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid, 57.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid, 57.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid, 59.

<sup>33</sup>Huntington, The Third Wave, 113, 122-123.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid, 122.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid, 123.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid, 124, 142, 151.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid, 124-139.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid, 142-149.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid, 152-153.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid, 141, 149, 163.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid, 122.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid, 113.

<sup>43</sup>Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 13.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid, 8.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid, 7.

<sup>46</sup>Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 7.

<sup>47</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 15.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid, 15-32.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid, 37.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid, 39-46.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid, 3, 66.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid, 66.

<sup>53</sup>I am measuring from the center of the square.

<sup>54</sup>For a general dicscussion of Chaos Theory see, James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking, 1987).

<sup>55</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 66.

<sup>56</sup>Rustow, "Transitions", 344.

<sup>57</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, p. 6.

<sup>58</sup>This is not a common assumption. See the models discussed in David Collier and Deborah Norden, "Strategic Choice Models of Political Change in Latin America," Comparative Politics (January, 1992), 229-243 and Huntington, The Third Wave, 109-163 for examples of models that do not assume this. Despite this, it is often recognized. See Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, "The Role of Interim Governments," Journal of Democracy (January, 1992), 75 and O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 3.

<sup>59</sup>Joseph Held, The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 269.

<sup>60</sup>Huntington, The Third Wave, 75.

<sup>61</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 15; Yossi and Linz, "Interim Governments", 75 and Klaus von Peyme, "Transition to Democracy or Anschluss? The Two Germanies and Europe," Government and Opposition 25 (Spring, 1990), 172.

<sup>62</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 17.

<sup>63</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, pp. xxxiv-xx.v and pp. 219-222.

<sup>64</sup>Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 138-142. Compare with O'Donnell/Schmitter, 6 and 26; and Gregorz Ekiert, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration," British Journal of Political Science 21 (July, 1991), 286-287 and 312.

<sup>65</sup>Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems In East Central Europe," Politics and Society 20 (March, 1992), 11.

<sup>66</sup>Rustow, Dankwart. "Transitions", 337-363. The idea that transitions from authoritarian rule occurs in phases is not new as evidenced by this article. The idea that these phases are iterative is.

<sup>67</sup>Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 128.

<sup>68</sup>Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy, 4. What Dahl calls "Liberalization", I refer to as "Participation", since the primary liberalizing attribute is the ability for more and more people to participate as candidates for elected office.

<sup>69</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, 11-15 and S.N. Sangmpam, "The Overpoliticized State and Democratization: A Theoretical Model," Comparative Politics 24 (July, 1992), 413.

<sup>70</sup>Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 4.

<sup>71</sup>Huntington, The Third Wave, 7 and John Hibbing and Samuel Patterson, "A Democratic Legislature in the Making: The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990," Comparative Politics 24 (January, 1992), 433.

<sup>72</sup>Schmitter, Philippe and Karl, Terry. "What Democracy is...and is not," Journal of Democracy 2 (Summer, 1991), p. 81-82 and Kitschelt, p. 13.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Lijphart, Democracies, 138-139.

<sup>75</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 28-32 and Huntington, The Third Wave, 169.

<sup>76</sup>Lijphart, Democracies, 129-132; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 45-47 and Huntington, The Third Wave, 59-72 and Valerie Bunce, "The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europe," World Policy Journal (Summer, 1990), 405-406.

<sup>77</sup>David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March, 1992), 24-35.

<sup>78</sup>Atlas of Eastern Europe (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1990), 35-37 and Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 244.

<sup>79</sup>Lijphart, Democracies, p. 144.

<sup>80</sup>For a general discussion of coding problems in the social sciences see Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989).

<sup>81</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 58; Lijphart, Democracies 141-143 and Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 177.

<sup>82</sup>Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Systems", 2 and O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 58.

<sup>83</sup>Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 177; Held, History of Eastern Europe, 3-9 and 260 and Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 203-204.

<sup>84</sup>Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Systems," 28 and Figs. 4-7. Kitschelt tried, in a rudimentary way to define the political power of a party. I am talking about a much more specific measure.

<sup>85</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, 34-53.

<sup>86</sup>Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 179-191.

<sup>87</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, 129.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid, 260.

<sup>89</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 58.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid, 37.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid, 58.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid, 39-40 and 49-50.

<sup>93</sup>Huntington, The Third Wave, 75.

<sup>94</sup>Held, p. 263-264.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid, 263-264 and 274.

<sup>96</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 46.

<sup>97</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, 318-319.

<sup>98</sup>Benjamin Franklin may have been thinking about this process when he said, "Gentlemen, we must all hang together or, certainly, we will all hang seperately."

<sup>99</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, 349.

<sup>100</sup>Huntington, The Third Wave, 292-294.

<sup>101</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, p. liv-lxix.

<sup>102</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 38 and John Sloan, "The Policy Implications of Democratic Regimes in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, 116.



<sup>103</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 38 and Huntington, The Third Wave, 169-171 and Sloan, "Policy Implications", 124.

<sup>104</sup>Held, History of Eastern Europe, 146 and 275-276.

<sup>105</sup>Huntington, The Third Wave, 290-292.

<sup>106</sup>Lijphart, Democracies, 150-168.

<sup>107</sup>Dahl, Polyarchy, 6.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Systems", 9.

<sup>110</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 57-59.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid, 61-64 and Huntington, The Third Wave, 174-178.

<sup>112</sup>Gregor Ferguson, Coup D'Etat: A Practical Manual (New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 1987), 13.

<sup>113</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 25.

<sup>114</sup>Ferguson, Coup D'Etat, 20.

<sup>115</sup>O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 25.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid, 62.

<sup>117</sup>Rustow, "Transitions," 358-360. Although Rustow is talking about transitions to democracy, I find that the idea that some general, minimal level of satisfaction is the signal that the process is complete compelling.

<sup>118</sup>This saying is fairly common among game designers. trying to reference it, however, is like trying to reference "a rolling stone gathers no moss."

<sup>119</sup>Donald T. Campbell and Juan C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), 5. it is clear from reading this book that Campbell and Stanley did not consider simulations when they wrote it. Thus, none of the categories which they develop precisely fit what I am trying to do. However, thier thinking on sources of invalidity definately influenced my thinking on my constraints.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid, 34.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

<sup>122</sup>Earl Babbie and Theodore Wagoner, Practicing Social Research (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1992), 285.

<sup>123</sup>Zoltan D. Barany and Louisa Vinton, "Breakthrough to Democracy: Elections in Poland and Hungary", Studies in Comparative Communism, Summer 1990, 207.

<sup>124</sup>Michael Muller, "Health Service in Ill Health," Daily News (Budapest), 2-8 July 1993, 3.

<sup>125</sup>Charts were provided by PC Globe (Novato, California: Broderbund, 1993).

<sup>126</sup>If policies are forces that move the National Position towards some specified agenda then, unless we are to adopt a pre-newtonian concept of motion, they will probably force them into and then through the irregular solid that defines the agenda. This momentum that a policy develops could be simulated. Given the time constraints in this design, it was considered unnecessary.

<sup>127</sup>Katalin Szephegyi, "Army Cannot Defend Country Claims Fidesz", The Hungarian Times (Budapest), 23 August 1993, 1.

<sup>128</sup>Gabor Szilagyi, "Laszlo Surjan: The Strong, Silent Type," The Hungarian Times (Budapest), 28 June 1993, 7.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid.

<sup>130</sup>"New Right Wing Party Enters Fray", Daily News (Budapest), 25 June 1993, 1.

<sup>131</sup>David Fink, "Official's Skeletons Stay In Closet", Budapest Sun, 8 July 1993, 1.

<sup>132</sup>Gabor Szilagyi, "Palotas: Entrepreneurial Politician," The Hungarian Times (Budapest), 26 July 1993, 7.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>"Slovakia Says Hungary Obstructs Council of Europe Entry", The Budapest Week, 24 June 1993, 2 and Bill Reynolds, "Austria Calls for an End to Hungarian-Slovakian Bickering," The Hungarian Times, 13 September 1993, 2.

- <sup>135</sup>Barany and Vinton, "Breakthrough", 203-204.
- <sup>136</sup>"Eastern Europe: The old world's new world," The Economist, 13 March 1993, 5.
- <sup>137</sup>PC Globe (Novato, California: Broderbund, 1993)
- <sup>138</sup>Barany and Vinton, "Breakthrough", 207.
- <sup>139</sup>"Changing the Tie that Binds," The Hungarian Times, 6 September 1993, 7.
- <sup>140</sup>"Hungarian Youth Party Tries to Grow Up," The New York Times, 18 April 1993, International 11.
- <sup>141</sup>Ralph Della Cava, "Thinking about Current Vatican Policy in Central and East Europe and the Utility of the 'Brazilian Paradigm'," Journal of Latin American Studies, No. 25, 257-281.
- <sup>142</sup>Dinah Kohler, "Hungarians Low on Environmental Learning Curve," The Hungarian Times, 19 July 1993, 5 and "Hungary Steps Up Attack on Rightist Opponent," The New York Times, 19 March 1993, Section A, 9.
- <sup>143</sup>Kohler, "Environmental Learning," 5.
- <sup>144</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>145</sup>"Country Indicators," Business Central Europe, September, 1993, 73.
- <sup>146</sup>Nicholas Clegg, "Off the Books," Budapest Sun, 1 July 1993, 1.
- <sup>147</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>148</sup>Ferguson, Coup D'Etat, 91-110.
- <sup>149</sup>I spoke with the Vice-Mayor of Szeged in the middle of July. he said that if he had five million dollars to use in Szeged he would spend every penny on infrastructure.
- <sup>150</sup>Mwangi S. Kimenyi, "Interest Groups, Transfer seeking and Democratization: Competition for the Benefits of Governmental Power May Explain African Political Instability," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, July 1989.
- <sup>151</sup>John Nadler, "Experts Split on Frequency Law," The Hungarian Times (Budapest), 12 July 1993, 5.

<sup>152</sup>Slavko Splichal, Media Privatization and Democratization in Central-Eastern Europe," Gazette, No. 49, 3-22.

<sup>153</sup>David Fink, "Farm wars: Rebel MPs Push for Faster breakup of Co-ops," Budapest Sun, 1 July 1993, 1.

<sup>154</sup>"Yeltsin", Newsweek, 10 October 1993, 50.

<sup>155</sup>Barany and Vinton, "Breakthrough," 202-204.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid, 207.

<sup>157</sup>Or as Mr. Augustine puts it: "The last 10 percent of performance generates one-third of the cost and two-thirds of the problems." Norman Augustine, Augustine's Laws (New York: Viking, 1983), 107.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid, 268.

<sup>159</sup>David Fink, "Budget Win Gives MDF Confidence," Budapest Sun, 15 July 1993, 1.

<sup>160</sup>"Changing the Ties that Bind," The Hungarian Times (Budapest), 6 September, 1993, 7.

<sup>161</sup>"Country Indicators," Business Central Europe, September 1993, 75.

<sup>162</sup>Gabor Szilagyi, "Constitutional Confusion Still reigns Over Election Dates," The Hungarian Times (Budapest), 27 September 1993, 3.

<sup>163</sup>"Changing the Ties That Bind", 7

<sup>164</sup>Reynolds, "Austria Calls", 2.

<sup>165</sup>Chris Stephen, "Hungary's Avenger Waits", New Statesman and Society, February 1993, 10

<sup>166</sup>Ernest Beck, "Health care Recovery Gets Underway," Budapest Week, 24 June 1993, 5.

<sup>167</sup>Riker, Coalitions.

<sup>168</sup>Lucy Hooker, "Liberals Grapple With Electoral Pact," Budapest Week, 8 July, 1993, 3.

<sup>169</sup>Gleick, Chaos, 304.

<sup>170</sup>Napoleon's famous quote is "We have ninety chances in our favour and not ten against us." David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: McMillan, 1966), 1067.

<sup>171</sup>One of the first uses of fractal geometry -- the way Chaos is made visible -- was in examining the border between Portugal and Spain. It was found that the length of the border depends mainly on the size of your ruler. Benoit Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1982), 25-34.

<sup>172</sup>An excellent study of Fuzzy Logic is found in Daniel McNeill and Paul Freiberger, Fuzzy Logic (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).

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### Biographical Sketch

Kristan Joseph Wheaton was born in Dallas, Texas on Friday, June 13, 1958. As a child he lived in New Orleans, Dallas, McMinnville and Lebanon, Tennessee. After graduating from Castle Heights Military Academy in 1976, he matriculated to the University of Notre Dame on an Army ROTC scholarship where he graduated in 1980 with a Bachelors Degree in Business Administration (Accounting). He attended law school at the University of South Carolina and received his Juris Doctor degree in 1983. He served as president of Wheaton Publications, a simulation design company in 1982-83. He passed the South Carolina Bar that summer and then went on active duty with the U.S. Army.

As an officer in the Army he has served as a Personnel Officer (S1), an Intelligence Officer (S2) and as the commander of A Company, 2nd Battalion, 13th Infantry (made famous in Harold Coyle's novel, Under Fire). He has designed two simulations for the Army. He has attended numerous army schools including the Defense Language Institute, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Officer's Advanced and Basic courses as well as the Communications Security course, Tactical Combat Intelligence course and the Nuclear Weapons Release Procedure course.

He has served overseas in Vicenza and Ceggia, Italy and is certified in four languages, Serbo-croatian, Italian, Bulgarian and Slovenian. He has been awarded the Meritorious Service Medal and the Army Commendation Medal.

He is married to Judy (Reynolds) Wheaton. He has one son, Charles Frances, and he and his wife are expecting their second child.