MORE CIVILIANS ON THE WEST POINT FACULTY: GOOD FOR THE ARMY, OR NOT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

GEORGE H. RHYNEDANCE, IV, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1993

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More Civilians on the West Point Faculty:
Good for the Army, or not?

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The 1992 Defense Authorization Act directed the Army to adopt a policy of hiring and maintaining a greater number of civilians on the faculty at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. Currently and historically, the military-to-civilian faculty mix has been about 96 to 4 percent. This thesis examines the civilianization issue in terms of cost. Comparative analysis is the methodology. The study defines cost in three ways. The first is purely fiscal. The second is an examination of how this change might affect the ability of the USMA to continue to attract the country's best young officer candidates. Finally, the third examination of cost is a study of the impact a change of this magnitude will have on the future of the Army's officer corps. The thesis concludes civilianization of a portion of the USMA faculty will probably cost a bit less than the current structure, will not adversely affect the Academy or the officer corps, and in fact, will strengthen this portion of the Army's pre-commissioning system. Based on that conclusion, the author recommends the USMA consider eliminating most of the military permanent associate professors on the faculty in favor of civilian equivalents.
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Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

MORE CIVILIANS ON THE WEST POINT FACULTY: GOOD FOR THE ARMY OR NOT? MAJ George H. Rhynedance, IV, USA, 128 pages.

The 1992 Defense Authorization Act directed the Army to adopt a policy of hiring and maintaining a greater number of civilians on the faculty at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. Currently and historically, the military-to-civilian faculty mix has been about 96 to 4 percent.

This thesis examines the civilianization issue in terms of cost. Comparative analysis is the methodology.

The study defines cost in three ways. The first is purely fiscal. The second is an examination of how this change might affect the ability of the USMA to continue to attract the country's best young officer candidates. Finally, the third examination of cost is a study of the impact a change of this magnitude will have on the future of the Army's officer corps.

The thesis concludes civilianization of a portion of the USMA faculty will probably cost a bit less than the current structure, will not adversely affect the Academy or the officer corps, and in fact, will strengthen this portion of the Army's pre-commissioning system. Based on that conclusion, the author recommends the USMA consider eliminating most of the military permanent associate professors on the faculty in favor of civilian equivalents.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

They say the true test of a master's topic is whether it is as important to you at the end of the project as it was at the beginning. I can't honestly say I was "in love" with this topic when I started. What I can say is I have grown to love it over the duration of the effort. The emotions associated with this issue are both infectious and interesting. These emotions not only caught, but held my attention.

Many people assisted me in the research and preparation of this study. In fact, more people than I can reasonably devote adequate space to here. A few however, stood out, and deserve special recognition.

To all 46 men and women I polled or interviewed who understood the importance of timely, quality response in support of a project like this, thanks. Special thanks to three individuals who were especially helpful; Mr. David Hackworth and Mr. Rick Atkinson who provided both thoughtful, and motivating responses and suggestions to my inquiries; and Colonel Patrick Toffler who opened the data
base in the Office of Institutional Research at the USMA to
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Next, my thesis committee deserves my appreciation
because they had the patience and the expertise to keep me
focused and motivated, even during the lulls. LTC Lee
Kichen, my chairman, for being a friend and confidant
throughout the project. LTC Ralph Bodenner, second reader
and "slasher", for his advice and suggestion in the
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testing my resolve, and checking my sanity.

Finally, my wife Cristina, and my children George
and Elisa, who stood by my side, even when the Army sent us
to Kansas. They provided me unconditional love,
understanding, and patience as I occasionally struggled
with piled up deadlines or frustration over the development
of the project. My love for them is immense, they are the
reason this project was a success and this year was one of
the best of my life.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In 1802, President Thomas Jefferson officially established the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York. Though it was actually in operation a year earlier, the presidential authorization formalized the USMA as the primary training ground and commissioning source for regular army officers. That tradition has endured for nearly two centuries. Today, as in the past, the goal of the USMA is "to provide the Nation with leaders of character who serve the common defense."\(^1\)

Theodore J. Crackel, in his book The Illustrated History of West Point, describes graduates of the USMA as having...fought with distinction in each of the nation's wars, beginning with the War of 1812, and, since the early days of the Civil War. [They] have provided the Army's senior leadership -- Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Schofield, Hugh Scott, Tasker Bliss, Peyton March, Pershing, MacArthur, Patton, Eisenhower, Bradley, Maxwell Taylor, Creighton Abrams, and H. Norman Schwarzkopf, to name only a few. But their influence has been even more pervasive. They have provided America with leaders in all walks of life.
-- in business, agriculture, the professions and in government. They built the railroads that made this a continental nation; they have been explorers, professors, bishops, and presidents. And, day in and day out, that contribution is being expanded, as today's graduates make their mark. 

The U.S. military recently began a period of change. This period began in 1989 with the "collapse" of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, and the "democratization" of the (former) Soviet Union. Suddenly, America faced a reduced need to maintain a strong military presence in Europe, which had become the hallmark of U.S. strategic policy since the end of World War II.

Congress and the media bantered about the term "peace dividend" to describe the resultant return on "military" money when the force was "reshaped" to meet the reduced global threat. However, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved the continued need for a rapidly deployable, powerful military force ready to meet the many challenges of rapidly changing world interests.

In this era of shrinking defense appropriations, members of Congress and other governmental agencies are aggressively pursuing ways to increase government efficiency and savings. This search certainly does not exclude military budgets. In fact, as evidenced by the 1992 presidential campaign, the Department of Defense has
been a prime "target of opportunity" for recent reductions in government spending.

On October 3, 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the 1993 Defense Authorization Act which, among other things, directed the USMA and the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) to reduce the number of officers teaching on their respective faculties and to hire a greater number of civilian faculty members. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) described the motivation for the legislation in the following manner:

The Department of Defense (DoD) spends over $1 billion annually to educate and train young men and women to become military officers. The Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, and the Chairman of its Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, asked [the] GAO to determine the cost of educating and training students at the academies, assess their effectiveness in producing high quality career officers, and evaluate the effectiveness of oversight of academy management and operations.

The U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) currently uses a military-civilian faculty mix of approximately 50-percent military and 50-percent civilian. The resulting inference is that Congress considers the USNA a "model" program. With only minor variation, the bill was signed into law by then-President Bush on October 23, 1992. (see applicable portions of the law's text at Appendix C)

Throughout this study, I will refer to the term civilianization on many occasions. For the purposes of
this thesis, civilianization is any increase in the number of civilian faculty members that is considered or occurs as a result of the 1993 Defense Authorization Act.

The issue of faculty civilianization is one that has been discussed periodically for the past thirty years. At various times since the mid-1960s, it has "bubbled" to the surface in both Congress and the media. William A. Knowlton, USMA superintendent from 1970-74 recalled:

The first time I encountered this idea was in the mid-1960's.... That time it disappeared because the U.S. Naval Academy which had a predominantly civilian faculty, was having great accreditation difficulties. The second time was when I was West Point's superintendent [1970-74]. Now we are again being told that civilian classroom teachers would be cheaper.

Now, as the Department of Defense (DoD) struggles with "downsizing the force" and searches for increased efficiency and money savings at its primary and field operating agencies, the civilianization issue has once again surged to the forefront. Staffs at the USAFA and the USMA are now faced with preparing plans to determine the best mix of civilian and military faculty members at their institutions, in order to comply with the new law. Howard Graves, current superintendent of the USMA comments,

...it is important to note that the legislation which addresses civilian faculty at USMA does not require a specific mix of civilian and military faculty. Rather, it authorizes civilian faculty as the Secretary of the Army deems necessary. Further, it requires the Secretary of Defense to submit
recommended legislation increasing civilian faculty and reducing the number of permanent military faculty.10

This study is significant because the required change in faculty mix will fundamentally change a major part of the USMA system, a system that has been producing great military and civilian leaders for almost two centuries, and one that by all accounts is working well.

Background

Since its establishment, the USMA has been guided through both academic and military training by a predominantly military faculty and staff. That faculty and staff have gone through many evolutionary changes over the years; changes that included incorporating reserve officers into the faculty, establishing an academic board to oversee the curriculum, and allowing cadets to choose a major academic concentration, to name a few.11 Through it all, the USMA has been consistent in its faculty design, weighted heavily in favor of military instructors. The current percentage of military to civilian faculty members at the USMA is about 96 to 4.12

In terms of comparison, civilianization has proved its viability in the USNA faculty. Through historical circumstance the faculty is "split about evenly between military and civilian personnel."13 About 50 percent of
the USNA faculty have doctorate (generally Ph.D.) qualifications, compared to 26 percent at the USMA, while civilian institutions offering undergraduate degrees boast faculties with an average of 79 percent doctorate qualified.

Though considered a model program by the Congress, according to the GAO, the credentials of the military faculty at the USNA have also been criticized due primarily to their relative lack of education with respect to their civilian counterparts (an interesting comment considering the USNA requires a Ph.D. from its military faculty members). At the same time, the GAO points to weakness in the civilian faculty base due to uncompetitive pay rates at the USNA. The primary GAO concern is with faculty recruitment and retention. Both issues have been raised regularly by the Middle States Accreditation Association and the Accreditation board for Engineering and Technology since the mid-1980s.14

The purpose of this thesis is to fully examine the issue of civilianizing the faculty at the USMA. In order to do that, I pose one primary and three subordinate research questions. The primary research question is:

What will civilianization of the faculty at the United States Military Academy cost the army?
Cost can take many forms, some tangible, and some less tangible. I will assess the cost in terms of three subordinate questions designed to divide the subject into what I consider its purest form. These subordinate questions also serve as the organizational background for the thesis. They are:

1. How much money will it **cost** the army to civilianize the faculty at the USMA? (Or conversely, how much will the army save?)
2. How much will civilianization of the faculty at the USMA **cost** in terms of continued ability to attract cadets with career aspirations?
3. How much will civilianization of the faculty at the USMA **cost** the army's future officer corps?

Though civilianization may, in fact, represent an increase in fiscal (and possibly academic) efficiency, there is an element of risk associated with changing the USMA system, considering the performance of USMA-educated leaders throughout history. That risk includes the possible compromise or destruction of the integrity of the USMA system, a system the army considers the nucleus of its precommissioning program. That concept also raises some interesting questions. My intent is to provide
answers to these questions and to raise others that may require further study.

Research Methodology

Based on my research question, I did a comparative analysis of the relative merits of each option. Faculty civilianization at the USMA is an emotional issue for those close to it. Additionally, it is a legal requirement, so the question of whether or not it is a good idea is relatively insignificant. However, because this requirement will change a fundamentally sound system of education, it warrants further scrutiny. With that in mind, I went about collecting data on the subject of faculty development at the USMA. From that point, I evaluated the merits of each side of the issue relative to the overall mission of the academy and reached a conclusion. I based my research on interviews and literature available in the public domain. The interviews expand the information presented by the source information discussed in the literature review (Appendix A).

Subject Matter Expertise

There are two sources I closely monitored as I wrote the thesis. The first was the Department of the Army (DA) and the second the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
and related reports generated by the professional staffs assigned to the SASC.

At the DA, I established contact and worked with LTC John McGowan, from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and the U.S. Army's primary action officer for USMA matters. In addition, LTC Marilla Cushman of Army Public Affairs provided liaison with other DA staff agencies, as necessary. I also worked with LTC Charlie Abell of the Army's Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL) to communicate with key staff members in the SASC. These contacts were primarily aimed at answering the question: what caused the SASC to inquire about faculty civilianization in the first place?

**Interviews**

Changing the faculty at the USMA means many things to many people. The mere mention of a change of this magnitude is met with heretical disbelief in some circles, with passionate reclama in others, and an almost clinical distance in still others. Since the law has been enacted, the change will occur, that is not at issue. However, I felt it necessary to examine the effects of this legal change from the perspective of those closest to it and those affected by it. I sent a letter to a control group of subject matter experts, asking them to address my
primary and subordinate research questions concerning faculty civilianization and the USMA (Appendix B). This was not a survey, but a polling of individuals with expertise in the subject matter.

The control group consisted of 71 participants, representing a true diversity of experience in the army, at the USMA, and at executive levels of civilian education. Included in the control group were the current and four former USMA superintendents, 24 retired and active duty general officers (from different commissioning sources), the president of the USMA Association of Graduates, eleven current and former leaders at military academies (USMA, USNA, USAFA), eleven civilian leaders from universities and colleges, and three Members of Congress. (For a more comprehensive breakdown of sample generation and content, see Appendix B.)

Certainly, time was a factor in collecting this information, so I did not personally interview each person with whom I initially corresponded. Instead, after reviewing each of the 46 returns from the correspondence, I followed-up and clarified, by telephone, information from seven respondents.

Each individual I contacted had a different degree of expertise or experience which lent credibility to their opinions. Many respondents were products, or at least
benefactors (military or civilian professionals who have had personal or professional experiences with those products) of the USMA system. This expertise ranged from distinguished military service, to teaching experience at a military school, to personnel administration experience at the DA level, to interested and respected members of the media and Congress.

Other Sources

I reviewed information from recent accreditation studies to determine if there is a clear advantage to one system over the other (USMA over USNA). I also monitored and reviewed legislative language as it became available and continued to monitor GAO coverage once the President signed the defense authorization bill into law. Since undertaking this study, there were no subsequent reports by the GAO.

Finally, each academy has an Office of Institutional Research (or equivalent) that, among other things, monitors and evaluates this type of legislation. At the USMA, MAJ Mike Tucker of the Department of Military Instruction provided initial liaison with that group, headed by COL Patrick Toffler. I also contacted Dr. Michael Halbig, Associate Dean for Faculty at the USNA.
Conclusion

After considering the information available, it is my conclusion that civilianization of the faculty will represent a slight financial benefit to the army. Additionally, because appropriately qualified civilian faculty are generally considered an advantage (when compared to military faculty) by accreditation agencies, the USMA can expect an increase in the quality of academic instruction as well. Finally, the introduction of more civilian faculty members in supervisory positions will add value to the USMA program by exposing cadets to civilians as both teachers and mentors. This aspect of civilian "oversight" is not completely unlike the constitutional requirement placing the uniformed military subordinate to civilian leadership.
CHAPTER 2

THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

In my examination of the impact of civilianization of the faculty at the USMA, the first factor I will examine is cost. As I stated earlier, cost can take many forms. In this study, I will examine three; money, sustained recruiting ability, and the future. In this chapter I will examine the question; how much will it cost the army to civilianize the faculty at the USMA? I believe the cost of the status quo and the cost of a greater number of civilian faculty members are essentially equal. The purpose of this chapter is to quantify and compare these costs.

In its purest sense, cost is simply dollars and cents. Actual cost is probably the most tangible and measureable factor in this study. But cost is also a relative term, therefore, I will examine cost as it applies first to military and then to civilian faculty members. The basis for my comparison is the current cost of the military faculty members at the USMA. This expense is
relatively steady because the military pay schedule is relatively constant. Any change in the faculty will result in a corresponding increase or decrease in cost to the army.

So how does one compare the two? One way is to compare all the costs of hiring a teacher to instruct at an institution. Another way is to compare entire faculties in terms of overall cost. I will do both, however, I will not examine every possible civilian to military faculty permutation between the current USMA model (96:4) and the USNA model (50:50)¹. That would be exhaustive and of limited utility since cost is only one part of the much greater whole that this paper will address. Instead, since the basis for this study is civilianization of only a portion of the faculty (up to fifty percent), I will compare the cost of single faculty members. I will base the comparison on civilian positions that are comparable to the four levels of faculty at the USMA. I will compute the cost of the USMA faculty in its present configuration. Then I’ll compute a fifty percent version of the same to compare the two. I’ll add some important factors I consider more difficult to assign value, and finally, suggest a conclusion.

**Background**

A fundamental requirement in the 1993 law provides the USMA leadership, in conjunction with the Secretaries of
the Army and of Defense, the latitude to propose to Congress an appropriate level of civilian staffing for the USMA faculty. Assuming fifty percent is the highest level of civilian faculty considered (a valid assumption since the USNA, considered the congressional model, is staffed at 50 percent civilian), and that there is some degree of resistance to the change, the actual proposal to the Secretary of Defense, and subsequently to the Congress, will be something less than fifty percent.

Carl Builder, in his book *The Masks of War*, a discussion of "American military styles in strategy and analysis," suggests that the military institution is not only resistant to change forced upon it, but also parochial and somewhat defensive about complying with such change. "They [military institutions] will find ways to ensure their survival, security and esteem even if they are reorganized or restructured or legislated; and, like us, they will pretend to rationality and altruism as they do so. Thus, calls for restructuring the military services are not likely to lead to any significant changes." Basically, according to Builder, it would not be abnormal for the army to resist this legislation, at least to some degree. In fact, in this legislation's early development, the army (through the Department of Defense) was both aggressive and comprehensive in its defense against the proposal.
In fiscal year (FY) 1989, the services reported spending over $650 million in producing about 3,200 graduates from the service academies. Broken out by service, the expenditures were $239 million at the USMA, $233 million at the USAFA, and $178 million at the USNA.¹

Though there are some similarities, there are two major reasons it is difficult to establish a valid comparison of operating costs among the three service academies. First, the cost reporting systems at the three academies are different. Each academy comptroller reports and accounts for costs differently, a deficiency pointed out in the July 1991 GAO report entitled, "DOD Service Academies, Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed." Without uniformity in accounting, accurate program comparisons are problematic, at best.²

Second, the academies are physically different, making straight-line comparison rather like comparing apples to oranges. For instance, while on the surface, the USNA appears to be considerably cheaper to administer (see figures above), it is also considerably smaller in size than the USMA and the USAFA. The USMA maintains 16,000 acres and 11 million square feet of building area, the USAFA maintains 19,000 acres and 7.8 million square feet of building area, and the USNA maintains 338 acres and 4.3 million square feet of building area. Another incongruent
area for comparison is medical care. The USMA and the USAFA maintain and operate a hospital on academy grounds, while the USNA maintains only a clinic. Obviously, there is a considerable difference in the amount of money required to run each academy based simply on the physical size of the institutions, with the USNA costing considerably less.

In fact cost comparison was so nebulous, it caused the GAO reporters to comment, "inconsistencies in reporting methodologies make cost comparisons across the academies difficult. While we were able to identify a number of cost categories where differences among the academies were apparent, inconsistencies in the academies' cost reports make more detailed comparisons problematic."

Using that evaluation as a backdrop, there are two main reasons it would be equally difficult to compare faculties in a purely fiscal sense. First, each academy develops the cost of faculty members differently, and second they each have different qualification requirements for faculty admission. For instance, once the Army identifies and slates officers to teach at the USMA, they are sent to graduate training at a civilian institution to get a masters degree. (USAFA operates the same way.) The Army funds this training. Conversely, the USNA does not consider potential instructors eligible for selection to
the faculty unless they are academically qualified (at least completed a masters program). I'll discuss this point in greater detail later.

Military Faculty

Prior to examining the cost, it is important to understand the structure of the 488 member USMA teaching (versus administrative, or non-teaching) faculty. It is broken into two parts; non-rotating (or tenured) faculty and rotating (or non-tenured) faculty. Rick McPeak, a USMA graduate and former associate professor in the USMA Department of Foreign Languages describes the faculty positions at the USMA. Instructors are rotating faculty members who teach 12-18 cadets, three to five times per week in their primary academic discipline. Assistant professors are typically rotating faculty members who do the same duties as instructors. The primary difference is that assistant professors can carry course director responsibilities in addition to their instructor duties. There is no financial difference in the positions, because military officers of the same rank receive the same pay regardless of the duties they perform.

Associate professors are known as permanent associate professors (PAP) at the USMA. Rotating faculty members do not normally fill these positions. Essentially, PAPs are tenured members of the faculty. At the USMA, they
supervise the rotating faculty's execution of the academic program.

Professors are department heads at the USMA. They are the senior members of the academic discipline and as such are responsible for the administration of the department. They are non-rotating, military, Ph.D.-qualified academicians permanently assigned to the USMA. Additionally, each department has a staff of permanent associate professors who are responsible for directing and supervising the rotating faculty.10

In a 1992 unpublished information paper from the USMA, the faculty was described in the following manner. The tenured faculty includes 23 military professors, as well as professors of specific disciplines.11 Associate professors supervise the rotating faculty and advise on the presentation of classes and the development of curricula.12 The rotating faculty is primarily made-up of instructors and assistant professors. Not every faculty member fits well into one of these definitions though. There are some "hybrid" situations in which a rotating faculty member might serve as an associate professor for an interim period. Those situations are relatively infrequent and because military pay is consistent and not tied to job position or title, I have ignored them.
Civilian Faculty

Civilian faculty positions follow the same disposition as military faculty at the USMA. The American Almanac of Jobs and Salaries uses the same job titles as the USMA, and describes the four civilian faculty positions as follows:

Instructors are entry-level positions for persons who have not quite completed the requirements for the Ph.D. degree. For the most part, instructors teach 9-12 hours a week, all in the basic courses.

Assistant professors are also entry-level jobs, but usually require the Ph.D. These people also teach 9-12 hours per week and frequently supervise the running of large undergraduate courses. At the same time, they must write scholarly articles or books if they wish to become permanent, tenured members of the faculty. To be granted tenure by the department means that one has been accepted as an able scholar and teacher.

Associate professors are almost always tenured. This rank has become increasingly difficult to obtain. These people teach an average of six to nine hours per week, usually most of the upper-division courses, a few graduate courses, and they occasionally supervise doctoral dissertations.

Professors are the highest level of "rank". Professorship is based exclusively on one's publications and intellectual standing within the academic community; only rarely does teaching ability enter into the decision. At most universities, full professors teach three to six hours per week and supervise doctoral dissertations.

Military Faculty Costs

Since the rotating faculty constitute the majority of the USMA faculty, it is a lucrative "target" for
reduction as well as study. I will examine the rotating faculty first.

At the USMA, each officer on the rotating faculty has a master's degree, but none have doctorate-level degrees. About one-third of the rotating faculty leave the USMA each year due to normal military stationing requirements. These instructors are replaced by new faculty members "fresh" from master's-level graduate schooling. The rotation is continuous. There are about 352 members on the rotating faculty.\textsuperscript{14}

The typical non-tenured (rotating) military faculty member holds the rank of captain or major when they arrive at the USMA for assignment. An army captain with 10 years of military service, living off the post, is paid an annual salary of $49,320 (figures rounded to the nearest dollar). This figure is broken down into monthly totals as follows:\textsuperscript{15}

<table>
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<th>Allowance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Base pay (salary)</td>
<td>$3,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance:* BAQ with dependents**</td>
<td>$537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance: BAS***</td>
<td>$134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance: Variable Housing****</td>
<td>$432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monthly total</strong></td>
<td>$4,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yearly total</strong></td>
<td>$49,320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* An important point to be made is that allowances are provided to service members tax free. In this particular case, nearly $13,000 of the total is exempt from federal income tax.
** BAQ is the basic allowance for quarters, an amount prescribed for soldiers, in graduated levels, based on rank, designed to offset the cost of civilian housing when government quarters are not available. BAQ is paid monthly.1

*** BAS is the basic allowance for subsistence which is paid to offset the cost of food, clothing, and other basic necessities not provided by the army. BAS is paid monthly.3

**** Variable Housing is an allowance paid in addition to BAQ to offset housing costs in certain high housing cost areas of the country when the service member is not assigned to government quarters.2

There are a couple of constraints that can adjust this figure, $49,320, up or down. First, if the officer is drawing some type of incentive pay (flight, language proficiency, etc.) the total will increase, based on that allowance. For instance, the same captain on flight pay (drawing the maximum allowance of $650 per month) would increase the yearly total as follows:1

Captain with 10 years of service: $49,320

Allowance: Monthly flight pay: $650
Yearly flight pay: $7,800
Yearly base pay: $49,320
Yearly total: $57,120

If that same captain were also entitled to language proficiency pay, the basic total would increase by $1,200 ($100 per month for 12 months), for a total of $58,320.
Certainly, a combination of allowances or incentives could adjust the total a small amount either way as well.

The presence of BAQ indicates the officer is drawing the allowance because government quarters are not available. This entitlement, along with VHA, offsets housing costs away from the post. Another point to consider is the "with dependents" BAQ rate. If the officer had no family, this allowance would decrease slightly.

Finally, the cost to the army increases with promotion. If the captain in the example were promoted to major his or her basic entitlement for pay would increase accordingly. Cost to the government for a major with twelve years of service is broken down as follows:

- Major with 12 years of service: $3,334
- Allowance: BAQ with dependents: $649
- Allowance: BAS: $134
- Allowance: Variable Housing: $444

  Monthly total: $4,561
  Yearly total: $54,732

Flight and proficiency pay could increase that amount by factors of $7,800 and $1,200 respectively, increasing the overall cost of the instructor to $63,732.

There are 352 rotating faculty members (instructors and assistant professors) at the USMA. Captains outnumber majors by about two to one. Typically, only a few officers
draw incentive pay. The vast majority draw base pay and allowances only. Therefore, for the purpose of comparison and in order to portray a representative amount of cost without "low-balling" or "high-siding" the figures, I will use the mean yearly income of a captain with 10 years of service and a major with twelve years of service, neither receiving incentive pay, as my baseline. This figure, $52,026, represents the cost to the army for each instructor and assistant professor on the USMA faculty.

USMA Associate Professors are typically Ph.D.-level lieutenant colonels on their second teaching tour, or recognized as academicians in their fields of study. To establish a basis of comparison I will use a married lieutenant colonel with 16 years of service (by army standards, a junior lieutenant colonel), receiving no incentive pay:

- Lieutenant Colonel-16 years service $3,827
- Allowance: BAQ $764
- Allowance: BAS $139
- Allowance: Variable Housing $444

*Monthly total $5,174

Yearly total $62,088

USMA professors, normally department heads or heads of discipline, are long-term members of the faculty. They hold the rank of colonel, a permanent designation. To
establish a basis of comparison I will use a married colonel with 26 years of service (by army standards, fairly senior), receiving no incentive pay:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allowance</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel with 26 years service</td>
<td>$5,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance: BAQ</td>
<td>$792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance: BAS</td>
<td>$139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance: Variable Housing</td>
<td>$444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly total</td>
<td>$7,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly total</td>
<td>$84,696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Colonels and lieutenant colonels frequently have quarters provided on the post, thus no variable housing allowance or basic allowance for quarters. However the cost to the government is equivalent to the authorized compensation. In the interest of maintaining a degree of consistency, I will develop compensation figures for all faculty members in the same way.

**Civilian Faculty Cost**

With respect to civilian faculty alternatives, "a GAO study of this matter indicated that there could be significant improvement in the quality of faculty and a reduction in cost if the military service academies moved toward a more balanced mix between civilian and military faculty."
The bottom-line question is how much does it cost to employ a doctorate-level civilian instructor at the USMA compared to a masters-level military instructor?

The American Almanac of Jobs and Salaries as well as the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992 provide detailed information on expected, competitive salaries, education levels, and typical student "contact" time for different types of civilian faculty positions. Those compensations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Position</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Workload (class hrs/wk)</th>
<th>Average Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instructor entry</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>$26,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Prof. entry</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>$35,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asso. Prof. tenured</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>$42,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor tenured</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>$55,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Salary figures are from 1991.*

Finally, the same Abstract used above, lists $10,500 as the 1992 average level of "fringe benefit" provided to educators at public institutions of higher education. Added to the average salary, the average compensation figures that I will use for comparison are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Title</th>
<th>Average National Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>$36,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Prof.</td>
<td>$45,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26
Finally, there is a recent development in the academic world that is less tangible, but bears consideration as the USMA establishes pay schedules for civilian members of the faculty. According to The American Almanac of Jobs and Salaries, since 1980 there has been a development that demands change in the wage and salary practices at American colleges and universities. That change "is the necessity of paying science, computer science, engineering, and business teachers more money to prevent them from seeking careers in private industry. While the results of this practice won't be known for several years, it is probably safe to predict that the complaints from professors in the humanities and social sciences will be long, [and] loud. This phenomenon will undoubtedly cause some relative increase in civilian compensation schedules and will have to be accounted for by the USMA.

Since the USMA must answer the GAO criticism about academic credentials (as it makes the transition to a heavier mix of civilians on the faculty), the new instructors, as a minimum, would have to be hired as doctorate-qualified, entry-level assistant professors.
Cost Comparisons

Since the USMA uses the same faculty position titles as the national standard described in *The American Almanac of Jobs and Salaries* (see above), this allows for an immediate comparison between USMA faculty positions and typical faculty positions in civilian institutions. For the purpose of clarity, a representative rotating faculty member, or military assistant professor is compensated by the army at a rate of $52,026 per year, compared to a civilian assistant professor who would require a rate of at least $45,800, a savings of $6,226 per instructor.

A comparison of associate professors nets a savings of $9,388 per instructor, with compensation rates at $62,088 for military faculty and $52,700 for civilian.

A comparison of professors nets a savings of $18,396 per instructor, with compensation rates at $84,696 for military faculty and $66,300 for civilian. At every faculty level the civilian alternative appears more economical.

When it comes to aggregate comparisons however, it seems numbers are only as good as the "numbers crunccher" analyzing them. Major General William Matz puts this issue into a fairly clear perspective by saying, "when it comes to potential cost savings, my bet is that I can select any
two good accountants who could convincingly argue either side of that [the cost] issue."^{27}

Clearly, civilian faculty are somewhat more economical. How economical they are is ultimately based on the final number of military and civilian faculty engaged and the final level of compensation for civilian instructors.

There are 488 members on the USMA faculty. Nineteen are civilians, 352 are rotating members of the faculty and 117 are tenured, non-rotating members of the faculty (including 23 USMA professors).^{28} Based on the costs established earlier, the cost of the current faculty is:

- Rotating faculty (352 @ $52,026) $18,313,152
- Civilian instructors (19 @ associate professor compensation, $52,700) $1,001,300
- Non-rotating associates (94 @ $62,088) $5,836,272
- Professors (23 @ $84,696) $1,948,008
- Total cost per year, current faculty $27,098,732

If the faculty were adjusted to reflect a staffing of fifty percent civilian and fifty percent military, the cost would change accordingly. Before calculating the costs, it's necessary to hypothetically adjust the faculty to fifty percent. I will do that by position. Since there are already 19 civilian instructors and I calculated them previously at the associate professor level, I will account for them with the PAPs who also hold associate professor-level positions. Again, in an effort to prevent
"low-balling" the figures, and because the current USMA system makes no dollar cost distinction between instructors and assistant professors, I will use the military instructor figure determined earlier and the civilian assistant professor figure to establish the initial comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty Type</th>
<th>Number of Faculty</th>
<th>Average Salary</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military instructors</td>
<td>176 @ $52,026</td>
<td></td>
<td>$9,156,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian instructors</td>
<td>176 @ $45,800</td>
<td></td>
<td>$8,060,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military associates</td>
<td>57 @ $62,088</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,539,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian associates</td>
<td>56 @ $52,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,951,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military professors</td>
<td>12 @ $84,696</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,016,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian professors</td>
<td>11 @ $66,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>$ 729,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total comparative cost (fifty percent civilian, 50 percent military faculty)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$25,453,244</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The financial difference between a fifty percent civilian faculty and a relatively pure military faculty, at the current USMA faculty strength is $1,645,488. Certainly a cost savings of $1.6 million is significant taken at face value, but taken in terms of the USMA's annual operating budget of about $239 million, it represents a cost savings of well less than one percent. In fact, it is only six tenths of one percent. Taken in terms of the annual defense budget, worth tens of billions of dollars, $1.6 million is inconsequential, at best. In this budget cutting era, however, no program or institution in the Department of Defense is protected, and all should be prepared to "ante up" when savings can be achieved. The includes the USMA.
Other Factors

Most financial costs are easy to quantify and explain, as I demonstrated above. But some are a bit more esoteric and as such are difficult to quantify yet directly related to the "money" issue. Some of these costs are difficult to quantify because a program is not in place from which to draw tangible numbers. Other costs are embedded and can only be compared based on hypothetical situations, projections, or perceived relative deprivation. All bear consideration. In this section, I will consider the civilian pay schedules, tenure, and benefits.

Congress gave the army the latitude to establish an independent pay schedule for civilian instructors at the USMA. One facet of the bill signed into law by former President Bush stipulates that, "compensation of persons employed under this subsection shall be as prescribed by the Secretary [of the Army]."²⁷ The challenge is to establish that schedule so that it is lucrative enough to attract high quality instructor candidates to the area, but not cost restrictive. Brigadier General Gerald E. Galloway, Jr., the Dean of the USMA academic board thinks civilian interest in this program will not be a problem. "Will we be able to attract top-quality civilians? If the number of inquiries I already have received are any indication, we certainly will."²⁸
Next comes the question of tenure and advancement for faculty. With so many of the current faculty, military (PAP's) and rotating, the USMA has never really had to deal with the concept of tenure to any great extent. Having set the dollar baseline for both rotating faculty members and civilian professorships above, it is important to now draw the comparison between more senior members of the teaching staffs, particularly associate professors and professors. This should fully answer the question of cost for increased civilian staffing.

Tenure is "granted by the [academic] department [and] means that you have been accepted as a scholar and teacher, that you are eligible for promotion, and that you can be dismissed from your job only for the gravest of reasons." 31 Tenure is one of the measures of success that professional academicians strive to achieve. It should be obvious, or at least fair to say, that the USMA will have to be prepared to provide some degree of upward mobility and tenure to civilian faculty members (see note #28). That evolution is not measurable until the army establishes it's hiring policy for civilian faculty members. In the meantime, even though there are a small number of civilians on the USMA faculty, in accordance with the new law, the Secretary of the Army must yet develop an appropriate pay schedule for the civilian faculty, so there
is no valid basis for comparing tenured academic leadership compensations at the USMA and at other institutions.

The GAO indicated accreditation reviews in recent years have "raised concerns regarding the lack of doctorates among the faculties (at the service academies, primarily the USMA and USAFA) in comparison to civilian institutions." The report specifically indicated "most military instructors at the academies do not have the academic credentials and the teaching experience of their civilian counterparts at comparable civilian institutions. In addition, the military status of these instructors makes them subject to duty rotation, which creates continuous faculty turnover and leads to an annual influx of inexperienced teachers."

The GAO comments indicate a need for additional doctorate-level instructors, citing negative comments on accreditation reviews as their basis. However, the Middle States Accreditation Association has been equally enthusiastic about the faculty make up and the energy and youthful vigor of the rotating faculty. In an army information paper prepared for the Secretary of the Army during the army's initial rebuttal to the legislation, the Middle States Accreditation Association was credited with praising the USMA faculty for "their freshness of knowledge, their enthusiasm and high motivation, [and]
their association with current state of the art activities in the [academic] field.36

With respect to the GAO criticism about rotation of faculty members, there is a clear split among proponents and opponents of the system. Generally, for those who support the USMA system as it is, regular rotation of military faculty members represents a healthy exchange and added value to the USMA and the army. While those who support a greater number of civilian instructors feel the depth and scope of academic exposure provided by a faculty with more civilian academicians far outweighs the current system in potential academic benefits.37

Finally, a quick note on perceived relative deprivation, a term I will use in a literal sense. As an intangible financial factor, compensation schedules will have to reflect human competitiveness. I didn't research this phenomenon to any great degree, so I am applying the "common sense" method of developing it. Suffice it to say that when the USMA and the army determine appropriate pay schedules for the civilianization of the faculty it would be wise to assume that a civilian instructor will expect to be compensated at a rate roughly equal to both his academic civilian counterparts at other institutions, and his military co-workers in the event the salaries are close to being equal. To do otherwise, or to ignore this factor all
together could lead to low retention of civilian instructors, or unhappy faculty members or both.

Conclusion

Cost is an ambiguous issue. In most cases, financial cost is easy to quantify. In some, it is difficult until actual programs are in place so that factual comparison can occur. Cost arguments clearly distinguish the two sides of the issue though. There doesn't seem to be any middle ground. Those for civilianization can show "definitively" how the army will save money if some amount of faculty is civilianized. Those against the issue can show, just as clearly, how much more civilians will actually cost the Army. Who is right is another debatable issue. After examining the information available, "crunching" the numbers, and considering some of the less tangible costs, I'm convinced the financial implications of civilianizing the USMA faculty are essentially equal, despite the cost savings I have represented here.
CHAPTER THREE

WHY CHOOSE WEST POINT?

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether faculty civilianization will affect the USMA's ability to attract cadets with army career aspirations. I'll examine cadet propensity to determine why cadets actually seek appointments to the USMA.

Propensity is "a particular disposition of mind or character".¹ My intent here is not to delve deeply into the psychic recesses of the average cadet, or into prospective cadets' minds, but to answer the very basic question about attraction; why do young adults choose the USMA? Probably the best place at which to find the answer is the USMA itself. The USMA collects data on, and measures propensity through the Office of Institutional Research. They collect data annually and collate it in ten year groupings to describe the profiles of entering classes at the USMA.² Participation in the study is mandatory for all new cadets.
**Propensity**

One of the USMA survey questions attempts to establish why typical applicants seek appointment to the USMA and asks cadet respondents to indicate their own personal primary reason or reasons for applying. The cadets are given ten response choices. These ten responses range from, desire to be an army officer to inexpensive college education. Five of the choices clearly out distance the others in popularity among the respondents.³

In the study for the USMA Class of 1995, which entered the institution in July 1991, 1,240 cadets were admitted and surveyed. Of the 1,240 cadets surveyed, some individuals chose more than one reason as their first priority, so there were a total of 1,448 responses. Five of the ten reasons represented 83 percent of the total responses. The five reasons, in their survey rank order were; desire to be an army officer, quality of the academic program, personal self-development, USMA's overall reputation, and leadership training.⁴ The top two choices are particularly relevant and warrant further examination.

In the study for the USMA Class of 1996, which entered the academy in July 1992, 1,181 cadets were admitted and surveyed. Of the 1,181 cadets surveyed, there were a total of 1,171 respondents who made 1,363
responses. Five of the ten reasons represented 84 percent of the total responses. The five reasons, in their survey rank order were; desire to be an army officer, USMA's overall reputation, quality of the academic program, personal self-development, and leadership training. Interestingly, in this class, the USMA's reputation has replaced the quality of the academic program as the second priority among cadet respondents.  

In the 1995 class survey, "desire to be an army officer", ranked highest with 326 respondents (22 percent) indicating it was their highest priority in pursuing an appointment to the USMA. "Quality of the academic program", followed next in importance to the survey sample with 244 respondents (17 percent) indicating it was their highest priority. "Personal self-development", (238 responses or 16 percent), "USMA's overall reputation", (233 responses or 16 percent), and "leadership training", (161 responses or 11 percent) followed for a total of 1,202 responses out of 1,448 or 83 percent. The remaining 17 percent of the responses were pretty evenly spread among; "quality of intercollegiate athletics", "family influence", "economic necessity", "quality of the physical development program", and "inexpensive college education".  

In the 1996 class survey, "desire to be an army officer", ranked highest with 269 respondents (23 percent)
indicating it was their highest priority in pursuing an appointment to the USMA. "USMA's overall reputation", followed next in importance to the survey sample with 267 respondents (23 percent) indicating it was their highest priority. "Quality of the academic program", (263 responses or 22 percent), "Personal self-development", (218 responses or 18 percent), and "leadership training", (131 responses or 11 percent) followed for a total of 1,148 responses out of 1,363 or 84 percent. The remaining 16 percent of the responses were also fairly evenly spread among; "quality of intercollegiate athletics, family influence, economic necessity, quality of the physical development program, and inexpensive college education".

Cadet Expectations

Where desire to be an army officer ranked highest among the new cadets, another survey question may provide more insight into the propensity issue. In a separate category, "cadet expectations", cadets were asked their career intentions and given five possible responses; stay until retirement, stay beyond the five-year (currently six-year) commitment, undecided, probably leave, or definitely leave. The largest group of cadets, 43 percent (class of 1995) and 42 percent (class of 1996) indicated they were undecided about service beyond their mandatory
committment upon their arrival at the USMA. This trend has not changed significantly over the last ten years.¹

In terms of propensity trends, information taken from the classes of 1990-1995 showed career intent seeming to develop during a cadet's tenure at the USMA. In fact, in the 1995 and 1996 class surveys, new cadets indicated at least some desire for army service ("stay until retirement", "stay beyond five-year obligation", or "undecided") beyond service school obligation at a rate of nearly five to one.²

Consider the mission of the USMA: "to educate and train the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate shall have the attributes essential to professional growth as an officer in the regular army, and to inspire each to a lifetime of service to the nation."³ It hints that service beyond the required six-year obligation is not a necessary prerequisite for admission to the USMA, but rather a desired outcome of the USMA experience. Certainly that desire is present in some individuals, but the USMA charter also challenges the USMA to develop it in all cadets.

Faculty Composition

Assuming faculty composition is at least part of the attraction of the USMA's academic program, then the most
obvious indicator that faculty composition has little effect on propensity is the 1995 class survey. It indicated only 17 percent considered faculty (again, as part of the academic program) as the most important factor in respondents decisions to pursue an appointment to the USMA.\textsuperscript{11}

Candidate propensity with respect to the USMA faculty is an issue generally not debated to any great extent among proponents and opponents of civilianization. Propensity seems to hinge predominantly on issues other than the composition of the faculty. In fact, it seems that most agree faculty composition is an issue most cadet candidates are aware of, but not overly concerned about, in terms of attraction.

Walter F. Ulmer, former USMA Commandant of Cadets, and currently President and CEO of the Greensboro, N.C.-based Center for Creative Leadership comments:

I am not certain that a fifty percent civilian faculty would have any negative impact on recruiting high quality cadets. Candidates appear generally informed of faculty mix, and I don't believe the civilian faculty at the Naval Academy can be considered a deterrent to their recruiting program. In fact, some high school counselors may be more enthusiastic about USMA as an academic institution if the teaching staff had greater civilian representation.\textsuperscript{12}

Brigadier General Leonard Holder, Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army element of Central Army Group and a product of the ROTC system agrees:
I do not believe that the quality of the faculty figures much in a cadet's decision to attend the academy. The faculty is quite good but it's not at all the attraction of [the] USMA. Cadets sign-up to be career officers; the corps, the military training program, and the promise of a commission satisfy most of their military goals.13

When asked whether civilianization of the faculty would affect the USMA's ability to attract cadet candidates with career aspirations, Perry Smith, former U.S. Air Force Major General, USMA graduate, and special commentator covering the Persian Gulf War on the Cable News Network, responded, "I don't think this is true".14

Rick Atkinson supports the broadening aspect of a civilianized faculty based on a well-informed candidate base.

Certainly some potential cadets -- those seeking to immerse themselves body and soul into a military culture -- will be disheartened by the loss of West Point's unique faculty composition; I suspect that will be agreeably off-set by the academy's ability to attract cadets looking for a bit more diversity in their college experience."15

With that commentary dismissing faculty composition as an issue affecting new cadet propensity, there are two other distinct categories of thought to consider. First, those who believe that any change will negatively affect the USMA and everything about it. The colloquialism, "disgruntled old grad", best describes this faction, but because this perspective is so parochial in nature and so heavily steeped in emotion, it isn't measureable enough to
consider in great depth. It is, however, present and to a certain extent influential, and as such must be recognized in the interest of academic honesty.

The second group is more informed. Generally, members of this group are academicians who have experience with civilian and military education systems. Dr. Theodore Galambos, professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Minnesota and former USMA exchange professor, believes a higher number of civilian faculty members at the USMA will, in fact, undermine the USMA system, resulting in reduced "drawing-power" at the USMA. "A transformation of the USMA into a more-or-less equal [of] any other private university would reduce its attraction to talented high school students who look for a military career."14

Young adolescents considering their future are faced with many choices when selecting the appropriate institution for their college careers. Part of that selection process is determining their goals and needs during attendance at an academic institution, and what that institution can actually "deliver".

One thing that sets the USMA apart from civilian universities is that it is a military academy with a primary purpose of "providing the nation with leaders of character who serve the common defense."17 This charter sets the
USMA and other service academies apart from their civilian counterparts. It requires a program that is academically competitive with the best universities in the country so that it can attract high quality high school students. But it also requires presentation of that program in a manner consistent with the career the students have sworn to undertake. This military "flavor" is a key ingredient in developing the selfless attitudes and career desires that are required by the USMA and the army. This flavor is also well publicized in the college catalog, through military academy liaison officers, and informal discussion, so potential cadets have to be considered, if not well-versed, at least fairly well-informed about the USMA's education system, the faculty composition, and the military training objectives at the USMA prior to arrival.

Dr. Galambos says, "service means at best a tough existence, often away from loved ones, and at worst it means giving up your life for our country. USMA does, of course, do more than create military officers; it educates first-rate engineers, scientists, linguists, etc. in the very fine academic programs there. But the common thread is that all are first soldiers, then professionals in civilian callings."  

Why then do young adults choose the USMA as the source for their education? Arguably, there are two
reasons; for the career opportunity, and for the academic program. Whether or not a cadet attends the USMA with a military career in mind (and the majority do not), they are obligated for a period of six years of army service upon graduation. This allows the USMA and the army the opportunity to develop career aspirations in both new cadets and junior officers. In fact, indications are that academies do a better job of developing career aspirations in their products than other institutions. The GAO report indicated, "Academy graduates have historically remained in the service longer than officers from other sources: 46 percent remaining on active duty longer than 15 years, compared to 28 percent of officers from other sources." Additionally, cadet exit survey results (another set of data tabulated by the Office of Institutional Research at the USMA) indicate a generally upward trend in level of commitment since entrance at the USMA among graduating seniors. At the same time, graduating seniors in the class of 1989 indicated the strength of the academic program at the USMA was contained in the instructors, the classroom discussion, and the additional instruction; essentially, the teaching faculty. The survey did not however, address the civilianization issue per se.

The academic program (of which faculty composition is an integral part) remains challenging and comparable to
most colleges in the country that offer undergraduate instruction in the arts and sciences. The Gourman Report of Undergraduate Programs in American and International Universities gave the USMA an overall academic rating of "good", the second highest attainable rating of the five rating options available to the education committee that publishes the report.\textsuperscript{21}

The difference is that the academic program at the USMA is designed to provide the nation with graduates that are "enlightened military leaders of strong moral courage whose minds are creative, critical and resourceful."\textsuperscript{22} As important as this distinction may be (actually, or perceived), it is probably transparent to the average young person involved in the search for an undergraduate institution.

Many view the USMA as a prestigious institution, deeply founded in tradition and the military life style. That reputation is omnipresent. It is not just based on the quality of the faculty, nor on the Army as a career, nor on the various programs offered. Each of these factors play a small part in the sustainment of the USMA reputation. It is not easy to pinpoint exactly what it is that brings the majority of the young people to the USMA or what causes them to apply for admission. It is, however, easy to say that there is clearly not one factor, but a
combination of many that draw young people to the academy. Of those many factors, faculty composition is only a very small portion.

It is, therefore, my view that an increase in civilian representation on the faculty at the USMA will not adversely affect the ability of the USMA to attract quality candidates with career aspirations.
CHAPTER 4

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

In addition, and in contrast to the cost of a civilianized faculty, there are intangible factors to consider when examining the issue of civilianization of the USMA faculty.

In chapter one, I posed the question of faculty civilianization in terms of cost to the future of the army. In this chapter, I will further examine it. Obviously, doing so is difficult to quantify in tangible terms. Certainly, one can't predict the future of the officer corps, but I consider it is important to assess current thought to determine possible future impacts.

Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Dean of the USMA Academic Board, in a recent article in Assembly magazine explained, "cadets tell us they were attracted to West Point primarily by the quality of the academic program and the opportunity to follow in the footsteps of our graduates in serving the army and the nation."
American military leaders with USMA backgrounds have led this nation in wars, civil service, and politics since its inception. Since 1949, of the twelve Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, six have been USMA graduates, while there have been 33 Army Chiefs of Staff, 24 of them USMA graduates.² It is this history of service and success that in fact may beckon young Americans to consider the USMA for their college education, essentially, academic and leadership training opportunities.

The first of these issues, academic training, is supported by the faculty which is made-up of mostly military members. "The faculty at West Point consists of 489 men and women: 72% are rotating faculty (non-tenured, military), 25% are permanent (tenured, military) faculty and 4% are civilians."³ To fully quantify the faculty that is 352 rotating faculty members, 117 permanent faculty members, and 19 civilian faculty members. Additionally, academic qualifications of the faculty include 25.4 percent with doctoral degrees, 3.5 percent who only require the dissertation to complete Ph.D. requirements, 3.3 percent have law degrees, 67 percent have masters degrees, and .8 percent are foreign officers who teach foreign languages and have only bachelor degrees.⁴ Faculty strength varies somewhat from year to year, but remains relatively constant in terms of overall numbers.
Regular outside reviews of the academic program indicate the faculty (rotating and tenured) provide more than ample academic quality. In a recent accreditation review, the Middle States Accreditation Association said, "the academy has dedicated and enthusiastic faculty members who are appreciated by their students. The student work, course outlines, examinations, texts and students' comments all support the conclusion that the faculty do what they claim to do, teach cadets the essential knowledge skills for leadership." Additionally, the association commented, "the engineering majors and fields of specialization are carefully designed and rigorously delivered by a well-qualified and dedicated faculty to well-prepared and highly motivated students." The Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology put it most succinctly: "the faculty is the strength of the program and includes a good mix of young, aggressive talent with individuals of experienced leadership."

Another independent review, this time of the engineering program, by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology, was equally enthusiastic about the faculty performance in the Department of Engineering. "Faculty-student interaction and rapport is outstanding. The faculty are technically sound and enthusiastic about undergraduate teaching. The involvement of faculty with
individual cadets and their accessibility to students are principal strengths of the program."  

Conversely, the General Accounting Office pointed out two areas of criticism with the faculty at the USMA; faculty turn over and academic credentials. Specifically, the comments in the GAO report indicated:

...most military instructors at the academies do not have the academic credentials and the teaching experience of their civilian counterparts at comparable civilian institutions. In addition, the military status [of the majority] of these instructors makes them subject to [regular] duty rotation, which creates continuous faculty turn over and leads to an annual influx of inexperienced teachers.  

The GAO implication is that faculty turn over degrades the quality of the academic program and that non-tenured (master degree qualified) military faculty members are of questionable proficiency in the classroom. In fact, there are those who argue convincingly for the teaching preparedness of the rotating faculty. Brigadier General David Hale, USMA graduate and former USMA instructor calls the rotating faculty members uniquely qualified for their instructor positions. He argues that army captains recently out of troop assignments (as most rotating faculty members are) have just completed the most demanding teaching assignments of their careers; for it is at company-level that young army officers manage, coach, and train (essentially teach) their soldiers to become a cohesive warfighting element.
Many find rotation an arguably good thing in that it provides "fresh" ideas and thought while limiting the academic over-familiarization that comes with time and exposure. Recently, a Naval Academy midshipman who participated in the Army-Navy academic exchange program commented on just that.

The military professors are rotated every two to three years so they are not burned out. At the Naval Academy, the civilian professors with tenure seemed not to care much about their students. Sometimes, it seemed that the civilian instructors at Navy were burnt-out on teaching the same material for so long. Also, by rotating the military professors to and from the army, the Military Academy receives a fresh flow of new ideas and perspectives into the academic environment.

Additionally, there are 79 military faculty members serving in professor or permanent associate professor positions that have achieved the Ph.D. in their respective disciplines. This lends academic credibility to the USMA faculty and academic departments, however, these professors are a minority in the army, and really do not represent an appropriate alternative to hiring civilian Ph.D.s for a couple of reasons. First, the army would incur additional cost sending military officers to school to obtain a Ph.D. A cost that would quickly prove restrictive in my view. Second, achieving the Ph.D. is an intensive educational process that takes time. The more time invested in education at the field-grade-level, the
more time an officer is away from the army. This loss of
current Army experience is exactly what the army should
prevent and what I would argue against in terms of army
currency and academic stagnation.

Mentorship

While military faculty members have a manifest
function to teach, their latent function is much more broad
and includes mentorship at every level. Former faculty
members, cadets, and graduates all attest that some of the
most important work done by the military faculty at the
USMA is done outside of the classroom.

Only a military officer can lend insights—good and
bad—as to what it is like to be an officer in the United
States Army. Those insights should reflect experiences
which are relevant and recent (another argument for a
rotating faculty). At the USMA, officership preparation
occurs as much in the formal setting of the classroom as it
does in the informal setting of a faculty members living
room. This exposure isn't readily measurable because it
isn't structured or required, but it contributes to the
expansion of a cadets horizons, attitudes, and growth as a
young adult and a future officer.11

Each officer on the faculty at the USMA has a vested
interest in their dealings with cadets. As professional
soldiers, we must live, work and fight with those we teach in Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and the USMA because not only are we exposed to the products of the system, we are benefactors of that system. A civilian professor at a civilian university, by contrast, simply turns his students out to the civilian world, maintaining only minimal contact with them during their academic development.

In fact, the USMA "prefers military to civilian instructors because it believes that military professors serve as role models for cadets, provide motivation toward a military career, better relate course material to military concerns, and can assist in military training [when not teaching]."  

Retired General H. Norman Schwarzkopf explains his allegiance to the concept of mentorship as an instructor at the USMA during the Vietnam War era.

Often, I'd put aside the textbook, sit on the edge of the desk, and talk about what it meant to be an officer, about values and morality and honor. I felt that was my responsibility far more than teaching the principles of friction and why wheels roll down hills. Sure, I wanted the cadets to understand mechanics -- but only so they'd graduate and become good army officers. 

Cadet summer training is one area where military faculty members bring special expertise. Currently, many of the military faculty take-on additional duties
supporting some aspect of the summer training for the corps of cadets. Broad changes in the military faculty's depth would undoubtedly affect the ability of the USMA to provide an adequate number of officers to support the normal summer military training demands. The implication is that the USMA would have to solicit significant outside assistance to accomplish underclass summer training. This would obviously cost the USMA and the army some amount of money (travel funds for support troops, billeting, per diem, etc.), and would impact on the readiness of the regular army unit tasked to provide the support.\(^1\) The USMA challenge would be to determine how to do more with less without decrementing the standards that have been established over time. Whether or not that challenge could be met is a topic for further research, but the concern I would raise to the "management" of the USMA is, where would the tactical training expertise come from if the rich pool of officers, known as rotating faculty, were reduced significantly?

Mentorship takes many forms though. Military faculty members provide important military acculturation training to future army officers that their civilian counterparts cannot.

One aspect of this military acculturation is known as "sponsorship" at the USMA. Officer faculty members at
the USMA, as a matter of course, sponsor two or three cadets for the duration of their assignment. Sponsorship is informal cadet visitation to faculty member homes for the purpose of exposure to a military family environment. Sponsorship provides an outlet which exposes cadets to the family support structure the military community finds so important.

Sponsors typically forge friendships or relationships with "their" cadets that last for many years. These friendships tend to travel parallel and sometimes divergent paths. For example, a colonel in an army unit, a former instructor at the USMA, may find himself in a position to provide quality career guidance to a former cadet, now an officer serving with him, or in a like unit. An untitled USMA information paper prepared to defend its current faculty mix offers this point in support.

Military officers are vitally concerned with the products of West Point. Because they will be serving with their students in the future, they create a challenging environment that positively supports the goal of providing graduates who can think clearly, decide wisely, and act decisively under pressure.18

Though these types of relationships occur in varying degrees at the OCS, or in ROTC programs, the sheer density of officer faculty members available at the USMA make the likelihood of them happening much greater. It's this
closeness that makes the officer corps in the army much different from the leadership structure in and missions of similar civilian organizations or institutions.

Compensation

As I stated earlier, appropriate salary and benefits decisions regarding civilian faculty have been left to the Secretary of the Army by the Congress.

According to the Dean of the USMA Academic Board, the 1992 law that dictated the increase in civilian faculty also provided authorization for the Secretary of the Army to establish a pay system for the civilian faculty that is separate from the normal GS [General Schedule] system. Pay is based on comparable salaries in the academic community by discipline and academic rank, so compensation packages will be competitive.¹⁶

Competitive pay would have to include some type of compensation to offset the cost of sponsoring cadets, sponsoring extracurricular activities, or instructing during summer or "intersessions" if that were required of civilian faculty members. Whether civilian members of the faculty would be willing to provide the broad range of exposure to cadets that the military faculty now provides gratis is an interesting one.

An unpublished USMA paper entitled, "Why does West Point have a predominantly military faculty?" develops an interesting, if not biased, comparison of civilian and military faculty roles.
Military officers spend most of their non-teaching time serving the institution in wide-ranging activities. For example, last year (1991), 243 faculty members taught intersession (between terms), 126 were principle (sic) trainers for the cadet's summer military training, and over 50 instructors participated in cadet advanced development sessions during the summer. During the year, 86 faculty members were part of the cadet honor education teams, which provide instruction about moral-ethical conduct at West Point and in the army.

Additionally, 267 officers participated as coaches or sponsors of the 112 extracurricular activities and competitive team sports at West Point. And, 216 officers were mentors for freshmen cadets. These activities provide some of the best opportunities for faculty-cadet interaction and develop lifelong bonds that strengthen the health and vitality of the Academy and the army.

Civilian instructors could be offered stipends to fill some of the extracurricular requirements,...[but] to reduce those activities to jobs done for overtime pay would not set the example of care and concern that the academy is attempting to create in each graduate.

Less important than cost is the suitability of the faculty for mentoring cadets in the ideals and issues of the military profession, and cadet exposure to military officers who dedicate themselves to selfless service. Each of the officers that currently participate in these activities do so as part of the selfless service [ethic] that the academy is trying to build in each cadet.17

There would certainly be a cost associated with civilian faculty stipends for extracurricular involvement. That, like all numbers in this study, is difficult to accurately quantify, and would most probably require a cost-benefit analysis to "pin-down". Suffice it to say, the cost would have to be considered based on the actual number of civilians hired to the USMA faculty and current...
competitive rates for academic overtime compensation in excess of fringe benefits compensation.

On the other hand, civilian faculty members provide a broadening aspect to the acculturation of cadets that is equally hard to quantify. A civilian faculty member would provide life experience unencumbered by the regimentation of the military lifestyle. The benefit of this relative lack of exposure to the military is as difficult to quantify as any level of mentorship previously discussed, but is equally important to note. Rick Atkinson speaks of the benefits of civilian influence and provides a model of compromise concerning balance between military and civilian faculty when he says:

When I think of some of the senior army officers I most admire, they typically have been exposed to the polymorphic world of a university somewhere in their careers in ways that I believe encouraged them to be more unorthodox and less rigid in their thinking than otherwise might be the case, e.g., Gen. Colin Powell, a graduate of CCNY; Maj. Gen. Wes Clark, USMA '66, a Rhodes scholar at Oxford; Brig. Gen. George Crocker, USMA '66, who spent two years at Duke getting a master's degree. While I'm a strong supporter of the military academies for the tradition, espirit, and values they represent, I believe that exposing cadets to a broad diversity of opinions, styles, and backgrounds is also important—and you would hope that a heavily civilianized faculty would embody some of that diversity. There will still be military role models a-plenty—half the faculty, tactical officers, the superintendant and commandant, visiting guests and lecturers, etc.¹⁸

In terms of socialization, the USMA, by virtue of
its regimentation and ties to tradition, must certainly be considered deficient in the intricacies of regular (non-military) college social life. Whether or not this is important to a military institution could be debated ad infinitum, but it clearly seems important when a young lieutenant is first faced with subordinates and peers who are not as exposed to, or steeped in military traditions as he or she. In that respect, a graduating cadet or young lieutenant could certainly be viewed as socially naive, or at least lacking in the "street-smarts" of the "real world". In his book about Colin Powell, Howard Means interviewed Major General William Roosma who supports this premise. "From our point of view, there was an advantage [to having gone to the USMA], we were probably more grounded in some of the military aspects [of the job]. On the other hand, on the social side, the ROTC people [graduates] might have had the advantage."

In terms of military socialization, a reduction in the number of military instructors will most probably degrade the military socialization of the cadets. Major General William Matz, an ROTC graduate and Deputy Commanding General of I Corps and Fort Lewis, Washington expresses his doubts succinctly. "Cadets spend most of their four years in the classroom; this is where the bulk of the socialization process takes place. They will be
socialized either way. The question is, what sort of values will they receive with civilian professors doing the socialization versus senior military officers?²⁰

With a faculty strength of 488 to go with the over 4,000 members of the Corps of Cadets, the faculty member-to-cadet ratio is slightly less than 10:1. If the military faculty were cut by half that ratio would increase correspondingly to about 20:1. Typical platoon-level mentorship occurs between a second lieutenant and his platoon at ratios exceeding 20:1 (platoon size can vary substantially among Army branches, some bigger, some smaller).²¹ So even if the faculty decreased by a factor of one-half, mentoring and military socialization would occur to some extent just by virtue of the numbers involved. Captain Scott Nagley, Army officer and Master Instructor in the USNA Department of Chemistry agrees. "I think anytime you have three hundred military officers per four thousand midshipman or cadets, there are plenty of role models to go around. Additionally, the integrity and professionalism exhibited by the civilian faculty provide a positive influence on the midshipman or cadets."²²

One concern about mentorship I haven't covered deals with mentoring and developing the faculty. Major General Matz articulates the issue:

The process of mentoring rotating faculty begins when the officer is selected to attend
graduate school, and ends approximately five to six years later when the young major returns to the field army. This is a critical time for most officers. For many, their commitment from schooling is completed and they are at their first major decision point for retention. Without a strong base of senior officer mentors to role model a long-term commitment to the service, I'm worried that retention of many quality officers may suffer.

[Additionally], how do we develop future academic department heads? Without the opportunity to experience the roles currently occupied by permanent associate professors, how can we expect to develop competent department heads? The analogy would be to remove battalion command as developmental experience for future brigade commanders and expect them to be qualified to command a brigade. We wouldn't think of placing a college professor in command of a brigade; similarly, we can't expect a brigade commander to be qualified to lead an academic department at a major university.²³

The last area I'll examine is the value of graduate degree training for the officers who serve at the USMA. This issue is closely tied to the financial issues I examined earlier. From former superintendent Knowlton, for officers on the teaching staff, the assignment means an opportunity to gain a graduate degree, nail down expertise and share in conferences and seminars across many disciplines in a stimulating environment. It is a time to write, think, share thoughts and prepare for higher posts.

They [the service academies] also graduate instructors who go back into service with better intellectual preparation for the tough jobs of the future and with professional ties of respect and friendship with those who later will be their subordinates and someday, their superiors.²⁴

Conclusion

What impact will civilianization of a portion of the faculty at the USMA have on the future of the Army? As I
stated in the introduction chapter, this is a difficult issue to quantify and is at the very least emotional among proponents and opponents.

One interesting point is that the intangible factoring I've described is more important to those who have some expertise or experience in the army and with the USMA. Knowlton commented on the investigatory efforts that led to last year's legislation. "If this present effort resembles the analyses of the past, the analysts (who tend to lack experience in uniform) quantify only those things that are easy to quantify, and wind up ignoring the intangibles that are so vital to the military profession." True to Knowlton's "prediction" the GAO reporting on the academies has provided little substantive information on anything that isn't easily quantifiable.

The omission of intangible advantages and disadvantages is neither fair nor honest in evaluating this issue. So many aspects of the argument revolve around such intangibles as socialization, acculturation, retention, mentoring, selfless service, or academia. Taken individually or as a group, these factors are important to the development of our army's future leadership and simply can not be ignored.

Though many would argue the USMA system is working fine, the army is getting smaller, and the USMA must take a
responsible leadership role in sharing the "downsizing" efforts. The challenge is to affect the appropriate degree of change without undermining those intangible factors.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
The purpose of this study has been to examine the implication of civilianizing the faculty at the USMA and to reach a conclusion on its relative merits. Most importantly, the purpose is to determine the effect this change would have on the institution (USMA), its graduates, and the army.

Further Research
During my research, a number of issues set themselves apart in their scope so as to be logical topics for further, detailed examination. Certainly, the plan for implementing the changes at the USMA could provide a sound avenue for detailed research and recommendation with potential for immediate implementation. Another area that I suggest deserves more detailed and definitive examination is cost. What are the intangible factors at the USMA worth? As a follow-on question to the implementation of
the new faculty mix, a topic for further consideration is that of tenure and retention. How will the USMA be able to hire civilians competitively with no guarantee of tenure or advancement? If tenure is offered (perhaps through unionization), how will the USMA deal with a tenured radical?

Another issue that came up occasionally in my research was the cost of advanced civil schooling for the military faculty. There appears to be much consternation over how to apply that cost, or even if it is applicable when comparing potential civilian or military faculty costs. A cursory examination led me to believe the cost should be "rolled" into the price of the military faculty member when comparing. A more detailed examination may be in order to consider prorating the cost over the career of the officer, and so that the value of the degree, to the Army, can also be quantified and evaluated.

My research suggested two other ancillary issues. First was the possibility of combining all the service academies into one general military academy. The other was the possibility of physically combining senior service colleges at the USMA to consolidate and expose cadets, mid-term career officers, and senior field grade officers to one another, at one location for the purpose of saving money and increasing mentorship.

Finally, as of this writing, the Secretary of
Defense had not provided proposed legislation on this issue to the Congress. Once submitted, that proposal demands further examination, as well.

All these questions and topics are important. They surfaced during my research, yet quickly exceeded the scope of my study. They each deserve further consideration and scholarly examination.

Conclusions

As the author and a USMA graduate, I'm convinced it is germane to this study for the reader to understand that minimizing my personal bias was a significant challenge, in itself. At the outset, my "long gray heart" told me civilianization was a bad thing for the institution. Admittedly, I was "sure" the outcome would be negative for the USMA; essentially, a congressionally-mandated weakening of the structure. Surprisingly, and in the interest of academic honesty, my research led me to exactly the opposite conclusion; that more civilian academicians on the USMA faculty will be good for the academy and will ultimately strengthen the leaders who are products and benefactors of the USMA system.

In fact, civilianization of the faculty at the USMA will represent a slight financial savings to the army while increasing the quality of the academic instruction. Additionally, the introduction of civilian faculty members
will add value to the USMA program by exposing cadets to civilians as both teachers and mentors. This aspect of civilian "oversight" is not completely unlike the constitutional requirement placing the uniformed military subordinate to civilian leadership.

In this chapter, I will examine the results of the research. I will submit my answers to the primary and subordinate research questions and will recommend a method of implementing the change.

**Question #1**

How much money will it cost the army to civilianize the faculty at the USMA? Or conversely, how much will the army save (through civilianization)? These two questions were the basis for my cost comparisons in chapter one. Though in the overall scheme, the monetary cost is essentially equal, there is a financial advantage to adding civilians to the USMA faculty.

I chose to compare military to civilian faculty positions typically available at both the USMA and in civilian institutions. After defining the USMA’s faculty positions, I computed salary figures for military officers holding those positions. I considered those figures the "base line" for my comparison. I then defined typical civilian faculty positions and computed their relative
costs in terms of average salary compensation. When compared, those costs, which included fringe benefits (civilian) and allowances (military), showed a slight financial advantage associated with hiring each new civilian onto the USMA faculty.

Next, I computed the difference based on the current USMA faculty make-up and a "hybrid" mix of approximately fifty percent military and fifty percent civilian. Of course, the cost benefit was magnified significantly. However, that significance, less than one percent, paled in comparison to the overall scheme of operating budget amounts at the USMA and in the Department of Defense.

Finally, I considered some less tangible issues. Where actual costs seemed to favor more civilians on the faculty, the more esoteric costs, the ones that are more difficult to define or to visualize seemed to support the status quo. In other words, as I examined the "other issues" it seemed that each had an associated additional cost to support a civilian member of the faculty, but each was mitigated in the case of military faculty members by virtue of their pay and allowances.

I would have preferred to have a yes or no answer to the subordinate question and the figures to support the results, but I am now convinced that the solution is not a simple one. My conclusion, and the answer to the question
about money savings is this: while I see clear cost
advantage, however slight, in terms of easily identifiable
costs associated with increasing the number of civilians on
the faculty at the USMA; I see an equally important cost
associated with issues that are less tangible. These costs
have to be identified and added to the equation. Is it
equal to or significantly greater than $1.6 million to make
one option clearly less costly than the other? I don’t
know and I think there is significant opportunity to study
those cost aspects at further, considerable length. The
conclusion my research led me to is that civilianization of
some amount of the faculty will be “cheaper” however, I
consider that difference ($1.6 million) insignificant in
terms of the sheer magnitude of the general operating costs
associated with the military academies.

Question #2

How much will civilianization of the faculty at the
USMA cost in terms of continued ability to attract cadets
with career aspirations? Nothing.

My research indicated that faculty composition is
such a small portion of a separate small portion of the
attraction factor of the USMA that civilianization will
have little or no impact on the ability of the USMA to
continue to draw the nation’s "best and brightest" to the
institution.
Young Americans seek appointment to the USMA for a variety of reasons, among them the USMA academic program. Those who choose the USMA based solely on the strength of the academic program do not represent a majority of the applicants. In fact, the reasons for seeking appointment to the USMA were diverse enough that no one reason clearly captured a majority of the respondents to the USMA surveys.

The USMA has a vested interest in maintaining a high quality academic program so that equally high quality applicants will continue to pursue the education offered. Part of maintaining that high quality academic program is maintaining motivated teachers able to relate the military experience to their classroom instruction. In this aspect, civilianization of the faculty "falls a bit short."

Conversely, the academic credibility gained by a higher concentration of doctorate-qualified instructors would probably satiate even the most ardent critic of the USMA system.

I'm convinced, based on my research, that these are the key issues and that they agreeably mitigate each other. Obviously there are "trade-offs" associated with each option, but again, the influence of the faculty mix on propensity is minute, at best.
Question #3

How much will civilianization of the faculty at the USMA cost the army's future officer corps? In my view, this question strikes at the heart of the entire issue. I consider this point the most important of all those examined. The country's ability to muster high-quality army leaders in time of crisis is not something to be taken lightly. Fundamental changes to the system at the USMA have to be considered in this light.

USMA is the nucleus of the army's pre-commissioning officer training base and, as such, provides the army with something special. Major General Matz, as a benefactor, but not a product of the USMA, describes this concept as well as I have heard it described.

There is something 'special' and intangible about our academies that continues to attract fine young people to our calling. This is not and cannot be replicated anywhere else. It is something the American Army should not lose as it trains and prepares its future leaders to win on the battlefield. In the final analysis, this is what a USMA education is all about."

My research led me to one interesting conclusion in this particular aspect of the study. Those with experience in the service or familiarity with the USMA system were quick to point out, almost to a fault, that there are many factors about the USMA that are not easy to recognize, but that are essential in the development of our army's officer training, nonetheless. They believe that ignoring or
failing to recognize these factors opens the potential for the "structure" to weaken.

My research uncovered the premise that those with no military experience or limited exposure to a service academy simply did not understand the importance of those intangible (or difficult to quantify) factors. In fact, most chose to ignore the intangible factors that make the USMA so important to the army’s officer corps.

My research supported that premise. To illustrate, the GAO reports presented to the concerned congressional committees on this matter, neglected, or largely ignored those factors.

The answer to the subordinate question is not simple. In terms of future impact on the army and the army’s officer corps, there should be no impact. In fact, it is incumbent on today’s army leadership, those with the responsibility to affect the change, to weigh the issues carefully, consider the future implications of their choices and make those choices in the best interest of the army of the future.

Essentially, the challenge is to change a system that is working well and to continue to operate it at the same high level without sacrificing the quality (army leaders) that continues to validate the system. This is a challenge I believe that can be met.
The Research Question

What will civilianization of the United States Military Academy cost the army? As I said at the beginning of the chapter, I believe the cost to the army is minimal, if the changes are executed in a thoughtful and precise manner. There are many facets to this issue that are not immediately recognizable to the uninitiated. Again, if all are weighed carefully, and considered in the appropriate context, the USMA will probably experience a strengthening influence.

Recommendation

I believe the military flavor of the USMA's academic program must be preserved. To that end, my research has led me to what I consider an optimal solution to increasing the number of civilians on the teaching faculty at the USMA. Doing so doesn't get the faculty to the level directed by the Congress, but it meets the intent of increasing the number of civilians teaching at the USMA without undermining the very system upon which it was founded. My recommendation is arguably the best solution in terms of maintaining the quality in the army's officer corps.

That solution has three parts:

1. Maintain the rotating faculty.
2. Replace all permanent associate professors with civilian equivalents.

3. Maintain the military department heads.

Working from the "ground" up; the rotating faculty provides fresh, motivated academic guidance as well as recent "real Army" experience to the cadet students. This is important. This, if nothing else, must be preserved.

In addition to the value added to the military acculturation of the cadets, the rotating faculty bring added value "back" to the army when they complete their teaching tour. They have been exposed to the world of academia and bring a freshness of thought back to the army when they leave their classrooms. The rotating faculty have participated in scholarly seminars and have written for publication in their disciplines. Of all members of the faculty, the rotating members provide the greatest value to the USMA faculty and the army.

The second part of my recommendation is replacing the permanent associate professors with civilian equivalents. Associate professors supervise the development of curricula and the rotating members of the faculty. It follows that these individuals, in the interest of academic credibility, ought to be professional academicians. Military associate professors "lose the green" in their uniforms and become professional
academicians on active duty, an untenable position in this era of personnel drawdowns. All the added value of a rotating faculty member brings back to the Army is lost in the PAPs. Their army experience is generally not recent, and by academic seniority standards, PAPs are not up to par with their civilian counterparts because they have had to spend only short periods of time "in the army" while balancing the remainder of their time increasing academic credentials.

For example, a married army officer couple go to graduate school and teach at the USMA for a total of six years (two in graduate school and four on the rotating faculty). Their army experience is recent (assigned to graduate school following eight years of time "in the field", serving with troops). At the end of their tour at the USMA, they are junior majors and have been selected for attendance at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Additionally, they have been selected by the USMA to return as PAP's. The officers serve a year at the CGSC, go to a unit for a year to serve on a staff and achieve field grade qualification, then go to advanced civil schooling to earn a doctorate-level degree. Once complete, they return to the USMA and serve as PAPs. At that point, they are literally no more qualified to act as academic supervisors than they were when they left. And, with the exception of
the one year on a troop staff to "get qualified", their "real army" time hasn't increased significantly, either. Suddenly, though with the best intents, two officers are professional academicians at the USMA with minimal army qualifications and equally minimal academic qualifications.

Conversely, a Ph.D.-level academician of approximately the same age, as a rule, has been in the academic field for ten years and is truly an academic professional. The elimination of military PAPs for a civilian version will add significant academic credibility to the USMA academic program.

Eliminating PAPs does however, raise and leave unanswered the question of how we educate, train, and groom future military department heads. By eliminating the PAPs, I would eliminate the "natural" progression of the status quo. One where PAP's can aspire and move into a vacant USMA professorship. I would suggest, though, that there would be no shortage of qualified military academicians to fill these voids. First, as the army becomes more and more technologically complicated, it will require a core of highly educated (Ph.D.) "thinkers" to develop it. This core could provide some of the "talent" from which to draw in order to fill those positions at the USMA. ROTC professors of military science (PMS) would be available, as well. The army regularly details senior officers to serve
in PMS positions. Assuming academic competence (Ph.D.), current and serving PMSs could be another source from which to draw for the USMA. Finally, my recommendation is not so rigid that should the USMA leadership desire to mark faculty members for possible future service at the academy in a professorship, it could not groom them. This is not the case. In fact, I would submit that one of the challenges to the USMA is how they decide to attack the dilemma of continuity between military professors in the wake of this new law.

Finally, the USMA is a military school. The academic department heads should be military officers. There should be no change in the structure of the department heads. In fact, military professorship is a part of the equation that should be well protected by the USMA and the army.

The challenge in maintaining military department heads is providing the opportunity for active duty army officers to achieve the academic qualifications necessary to be considered qualified for that duty.
Chapter One


5Written interview with Dr. Michael C. Halbig, Associate Dean for Faculty, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 12 January 1993.


Changes at the USMA cited in the text represented quantum leaps from the status quo at the time of their implementation. Additional information on the evolution of the USMA can be found in Crackel, The Illustrated History of West Point.

Stephen A. Ingalls, "Staff Study: Recommended Military/Civilian Faculty Mix at the United States Military Academy (USMA)," (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992), p. 2.

GAO, p. 24.

GAO, p. 24-26.


The Office of Institutional Research, as the name implies, studies every aspect of the USMA from new cadet propensities to attend, to senior class satisfaction with the West Point experience. The research studies include the implications of change at the USMA. Since the current legislative directions represent significant change, the Office of Institutional Research has been involved in evaluating its impact.
Chapter Two

Faculty composition information comes from many different sources. The information on the USMA comes from Stephen A. Ingalls, "Staff Study: Recommended Military/Civilian Faculty Mix at the United States Military Academy (USMA)," (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1992), p. 2. The information on the USNA comes from a written interview with Dr. Michael C. Halbig, Associate Dean for Faculty, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 12 January 1993.


GAO, July 1991, p. 12-20


GAO, July 1991, p. 16.


Interview with U.S. Army Major Rick A. McPeak, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 8 March 1993.

Military professors are department heads, while discipline professors are subordinate permanent faculty members with specialized academic skills. For example, the Head of the Department of Foreign Languages has a number of discipline professors in specific languages. The Department of Physical Education also has a number of discipline professors. Professors of discipline bring specialized skill that otherwise would not be available from permanent associate professors or rotating faculty.


Pay Chart, VHA Rates, p. 6, p. 12.

Pay Chart, VHA Rates, p. 6, p. 12.

Pay Chart, VHA Rates, p. 6, p. 12.

Pay Chart, VHA Rates, p. 6, p. 12.

Pay Chart, VHA Rates, p. 6, p. 12.

Written interview with Mr. Fred Pang, Staff member, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C., 13 January 1993.


Abstract, p. 169.

Almanac, p. 111.

Almanac, p. 110-111.

Matz interview.

Talking Paper, 1992, p. 2. Additionally, USMA civilian professors are largely tenured positions in the Departments of Foreign Languages and Physical Education that are difficult to fill with Army officers. As stated by former USMA superintendent Dave Palmer in a January 31, 1993 interview, "we got there [to the current faculty structure] not by careful analysis, but by continuing to do things as we had all along."
It would be my guess the USMA civilian faculty position titles and pay schedules will closely mirror the USNA's Naval Faculty Schedule, and that tenure-like stability and regular fiscal incentives will be offered civilian faculty members in lieu of upward mobility.


39 Gerald E. Galloway, Jr., "Civilian Faculty at West Point," Assembly (January 1993), p. 46.

40 Almanac, p. 111.

41 GAO, July 1991, p. 23.

42 GAO, July 1991, p. 23.

43 GAO, July 1991, p. 3-4.


47 Talking Paper, 1992, p. 13-25 (consisting of Appendix C with Tabs A-E). This analysis, prepared by a West Point source, compares cost figures for military compensation using Army composite standard rates, then develops a model comparing three colleges (Colgate, Cooper Union and Lehigh) to the USMA in terms of faculty compensation. The conclusion in the model is that cost differential is minimal across the continuum between the schools compared; a valid conclusion based on the data as presented. This analysis however, serves to support the notion that cost is an ambiguous issue and that when comparisons are generated, figures can be as diverse as the sources and agendas of those analyzing the data.
Chapter Three


2 The Office of Institutional Research at the USMA collects data on cadet classes each year. These data are compiled to "describe ten-year trends in the profiles of entering classes at the U.S. Military Academy." These reports have been prepared for each class since 1971. Each survey consists of about 100 hundred questions ranging in scope from demographics to propensity issues to new cadet expectations. The information is taken from the Class of 1995 report. U.S. Military Academy, Class Characteristics Through the Class of 1995 (West Point, New York: Office of Institutional Research, 1992).

3 Class Characteristics 1995, p. 11-12.

4 Class Characteristics 1995, p. 12.


9 Class Characteristics 1995, p. 34.


14 Written interview with Mr. Perry Smith, CNN Atlanta, Augusta, Georgia, 30 December 1992.

Written interview with Dr. Theodore V. Galambos, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 14 January 1993.

USMA Catalog, p. 5.

Galambos interview.


USMA Catalog, p. 28.
Chapter Four


3________, "Talking Paper: Why does West Point have a Predominantly Military Faculty?" (West Point, New York: Unpublished, 1992), p. 2. Numbers used have been rounded to facilitate understanding and maintain simplicity.

4Talking Paper, p. 2.

5Talking Paper, p. 8.


8Interview with U.S. Army Brigadier General David R. E. Hale, Assistant Division Commander, 7th Infantry Division (light), Fort Ord, California, 28 January 1993.

9Talking Paper, p. 5.


These thoughts on officer mentoring at the USMA were paraphrased from a written interview with Major General Charles W. McClain, Jr., Chief of Army Public Affairs. As the Chief of Public Affairs, MG McClain has had regular access and interaction with other senior Army leaders, primarily Army Staff members, and has been in a position to watch the legislation that affects the USMA unfold in the Army and the Congress.

12GAO, p. 25.

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15Talking Paper, p. 3.

16Gerald E. Galloway, "Civilian Faculty at West Point?, Assembly, January 1993, p. 39 & 46.

17Talking Paper, p. 6.

18The quotation supporting a civilian influence at the USMA was taken from a written interview with Mr. Rick Atkinson, author and Berlin Bureau Chief for the "Washington Post". Atkinson's book, *The Long Gray Line*, which chronicles the "American journey of West Point's Class of '66", is considered by many to be one of the most definitive works about the USMA in modern times.

19Howard Means, *Colin Powell; Soldier/Statesman-Statesman/Soldier* (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1992), p. 106. Additionally, it's interesting to note that in the case of General Powell, his "street-smarts" were learned growing up on the streets of the South Bronx. If anything, ROTC probably tempered this aspect of his personality somewhat.


21Personal experience of the author in platoon level positions in an Armored Cavalry Squadron's Howitzer Battery, and as an Attack Helicopter Battalion, AH-64 Attack Company Commander.

22Written interview with U.S. Army Captain Scott G. Nagley, Master Instructor of Chemistry, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., 1 March 1993. Nagley

23Matz interview.


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Chapter Five

APPENDIX A

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of the literature review is to evaluate the information published on my topic, to examine what others have written, and to discover what questions others have asked. Because this is a timely topic, the vast majority of research material available comes from primary sources. To a large degree, no one has undertaken a detailed analysis of this topic.

In fact, the majority of the literature I have reviewed comes from three sources: government publications, reports and testimony; newspapers and magazines; and books.

Government publications, reports and testimonies have provided the most thorough consideration. Newspaper and magazine coverage has generally run as a result of some type of GAO or Congressional activity. Treatment of the subject in books is rather nebulous and focuses on the academies or other academic facilities in general terms.
During my collection of source material, I have come across six different GAO testimonies or reports that examine the subject in some detail. One in particular, "Review of the Cost and Operation of DoD's Service Academies," I consider one the most complete examinations of the question I am researching. It examines in detail the academic programs at the three major military academies (USMA, USNA, and USAFA). Testimony focuses on such areas as faculty staffing and credentials, accreditation, financial operations, cost trends, retention, and attrition. For its completeness, the testimony is also, in my view, somewhat jaded in its coverage of the subject matter. After all, the testimony responded to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel in response to its (the subcommittee's) request. Although the information is specific in its scope, it is also significantly different than the official DoD response.

Where the GAO reports and testimonies run largely in favor of civilianization of the faculty at the USAFA and the USMA, the DoD position has remained consistently against civilianization. In fact, in the DoD report by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, the defense community, particularly the army, articulates in some detail its justification for operating the service academies the way it does. In most cases, the
DoD report concedes the points made in the GAO testimony, but qualifies each in a way that effectively mitigates them, forcing readers or legislators to make up their own minds.

In related reports, the GAO has examined the academy preparatory schools ("DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer Mission and Better Oversight"), the intermediate and senior service schools ("DOD: Professional Military Education at the Four Intermediate Service Schools" and "DOD: Professional Military Education at the Three Senior Service Schools"), and the Service Academies' historic contributions to officer accessions ("Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers during Benchmark Periods"). Not all of these reports have application to this study, but each report was undertaken at the request of a Congressional committee or a member of Congress. This Congressional interest is significant because it gives the reader an idea of the depth of the studies that have been recently undertaken in the "world" of military academics.

The congressional "language" (both in reports and the wording of the law) is the cornerstone of my research effort. It is from this language that we can understand the law and the legislative intent of the law. The legal language directs the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to
submit recommended legislation for "establishing at the
USMA and the USAFA a faculty composed of approximately
equal numbers of civilian and armed forces
personnel...."¹ (See Appendix C) This, in turn will
require the USMA and the USAFA to develop (and submit to
the SecDef for approval and forwarding), plans for future
faculty development that are in compliance with the new
law.

There are two unpublished reports, known in the army
vernacular as "talking papers" that provide a fairly
complete compilation of facts that apply to the issue of
civilianization. The first, an undated paper titled "A
Predominantly Military Faculty at USMA," makes point after
point on why a "predominantly military faculty provides a
high-quality undergraduate education to the cadets of the
Military Academy."² Though the paper makes no mention of
an author, it should not be considered atypical since most
officers on army staffs regularly write informational
material for internal use that is without by-line.

The second, (again no author mentioned), is titled,
"Why does West Point have a predominantly military
faculty?" It is a more formal and thorough dissertation,
which examines the subject in terms of faculty composition,
duties, and quality of education. It delves into cost and
provides evaluations by former students of their education
while at the USMA. Comments included in the paper by both accreditation agencies and former students are very supportive of the current system. Of particular interest are the comments of a USNA exchange student who was extremely articulate and positive about the USMA educational experience in comparison to the USNA.

Cost analysis information is available in documents prepared by a number of sources. They include primarily the resource manager at the USMA, the Office of the DCSPER at the Department of the Army, and the GAO. In most of these reports, cost is analyzed in terms of USMA-USNA graduate comparison, USMA-USNA-USAFA operating budgets, USMA-ROTC cost per graduate and alternative faculty compositions. The first subordinate research question deals with cost in terms of dollars. These documents will be critical in fully developing that question. One particular document, an annex to the USMA talking paper, "Why does West Point have a predominantly military faculty?" is comprehensive and exhaustive in its coverage of cost factors. It breaks down the major costs of running the USMA faculty and compares it to three "like" civilian institutions used as comparative models. This is, in my opinion, a high quality document for illustrating some of the costs associated with civilianization of the USMA faculty.
Newspaper coverage of the issue has been relatively light in the major news markets. Only on rare occasions does the question of civilianization of the faculty at the USMA come into the public eye.

Even more rare is a follow-up to a media article on the subject. The heaviest, or at least the most consistent, coverage has come in the newspapers aimed specifically at the military and their families; Army Times and Air Force Times. In general, the news coverage has simply been a review of testimony or reports. All have limited analytic value, but are valuable source documents for background and research development.

On the other hand, editorial coverage has been emotional and inflammatory. In a recent editorial, former USMA superintendent William Knowlton dismissed the move to civilianize with three points. He argues many of our great military leaders taught at the USMA, where they also acted as mentors for cadets. He mentioned such names as Schwarzkopf, Galvin, and Franks. He said military officers carry the majority of the load in extra-curricular activities; something which is significant at the USMA, but not what civilian instructors are paid to do. He closed his remarks with a third point noting that military instructors teaching at the USMA have a unique opportunity to develop academically (through research and publishing in
academic markets) both while preparing to teach, and as a member of the academic community while teaching at the USMA.

Journals and magazines have also covered various aspects of the issue of faculty civilianization. The most thought provoking piece in a journal was presented in 1985 by Mr. Ben Schemmer, editor of *Armed Forces Journal International*.

Schemmer, a graduate of the USMA, questioned the utility of a military academy in terms of growing costs. His coverage touched-off a veritable firestorm of replies that ran largely in defense of the present system.

In a recent issue of *Assembly* magazine Brigadier General John Lawlor discussed the utility of the maintaining the military academies. Though not focused exactly on the issue of civilianization, he made some interesting comparisons between the USMA graduate and the ROTC graduate. In my view, his argument is both compelling and pertinent. He argued the major difference between the two systems is that cadets experience military acculturation twenty-four hours a day in military and academic training of one sort or another, compared to ROTC participants who are taking "Defense Department supervised military studies as part of their academic curriculum." He intimated, the need for USMA graduates is more important today as the army downsizes, than it ever has been.
Educational journals have published articles that are more academically oriented, focusing on recruiting to the military schools and comparing different military schools. All of the articles mention faculty credentials in some form or treat the academies drawing power with prospective applicants.

In *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, an article entitled, "West Point gives bright high-school students a taste of cadet life in effort to lure them to the academy," author Susan Dodge described the interactive program taking place at the USMA to allow high schoolers the opportunity to go the the USMA and for a week and participate in cadet life. The program's intent is to provide high quality high schoolers an opportunity to see the USMA first hand, from a cadets point of view, in the hope it will be attractive to the potential applicant. This article provides some interesting insight into the issue of propensity which I will examine in chapter three.

More recently, some of the key leaders at the USMA have expressed their thoughts and concerns specifically on this subject and on its periphery. In one interview, Colonel Pierce Rushton, Director of USMA Admissions explained in great detail how the USMA "stacks up" against other comparable colleges in the country. In a related article entitled, "What makes a West Point Education
Great?," Brigadier General Gerald Galloway, Dean of the Academic Board explains just that. He specifically allowed that a combination of high quality students, thoughtful curriculum, "superb" faculty, focused training, and high quality facilities team-up to make a truly enviable course of study and training for USMA cadets.

Books have not been written specifically addressing the civilianization issue. Books in general terms have been invaluable sources in the historical development of academic staffs both at the USMA and elsewhere. Books represent the most diverse base of knowledge for developing my thesis. Such distinguished military theorists as Mao Tsetung and Richard Simpkin have discussed the importance of the correct faculty in a military school. Mao Tsetung said, "for a military school, the most important question is the selection of a director and instructors and the adoption of a training programme (sic)."

In the book It Doesn't Take a Hero, retired General H. Norman Schwarzkopf explained how, as an instructor at the USMA, he found it extremely important to nurture and mentor cadets both in and out of the classroom. In fact, Schwarzkopf explained how he sometimes took class time to simply talk with cadets about the army and the profession of arms.
Stephen E. Ambrose explains much of the history of the USMA in his book, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point. One particular passage in the book described both Superintendent MacArthur's attempts to change the academic curriculum and the faculty selection procedures, and the Academic Board's resistance to those changes. He explained the Board's reluctance to embrace MacArthur's proposals citing "fear that any tampering with the framework would bring the entire edifice tumbling down, and that some traditions and practices could be defended only on the ground that they had always been [that way]."

Howard Means, in his book about Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, described how ROTC and USMA lieutenants (in the case of Powell) feel in their initial encounters. He made a key point about perceived relative strengths and weaknesses of each programs products that I use in chapter four.

Rick Atkinson, in his book The Long Gray Line offers some very keen insight into the USMA experience. In fact some believe Atkinson's portrayal of the USMA Class of 1966 truly captured the essence of West Point through the eyes of the individuals involved.

Theodore Crackel has traced the history of the USMA in a fairly comprehensive manner in his book, The Illustrated History of West Point. Additionally, Charles
Todorich in his book *The Spirited Years: A History of the Antebellum Naval Academy*, described the early years of the USNA’s history. Both works are excellent sources of descriptive and anecdotal passages about the customs and traditions of the academies.

In more generic terms, Carl Builder’s book, *The Masks of War* offered insight into the military services and their motives as they are affected by tradition and strategy. Interestingly, one of his key points is that the military as an institution is resistent to change; a "civilian perception" that was clearly borne out in my research. This perception will receive detailed analysis in my thesis.

In the book called *The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S.*, edited by Lawerence Korb, an essay entitled, "The Service Academies in Transition: Continuity and Change," by John P. Lovell addresses military acculturation and propensity at the USMA. Powell discusses regular cadet exposure to the "ever-present" symbols and reminders "of the achievements and heroic exploits of academy graduates." Additionally, Powell contends that in the 1940s (and presumably today) the main attraction of the USMA to young Americans was the prospect of a "free" four-year education.
Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood edited the book *The Military: More Than Just a Job?* One particular essay, "Value Formation at the Air Force Academy," by Thomas M. McCloy and William H. Clover describe the U.S. Air Force Academy program of military acculturation, examining in great detail some of the same propensity issues I have examined in chapter three.

The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching provides general commentary on faculty roles, curricular policy, value development and undergraduate education in the reference book *Missions of the College Curriculum*. I found the sections on accreditation and faculty development particularly helpful in the early stages of my research. More reference-type information is found in the book, *The Gourman Report. A Rating of Undergraduate Programs in American and International Universities*. In addition to background information, this book also rates institutions in disciplines ranging from agriculture to computer science.

In an essay entitled "The Ethics of Leadership II," Malham M. Wakin discusses the "socialization" of the profession of arms. Wakin touches on some of the same principles that Huntington does, though he focuses more on integrity and ethics than Huntington. This essay won't provide much in the way of insight to support the thesis
effort, but it does reinforce the customs and traditions of
the service angle in the development of leaders.

Similarly, in his book *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel
Huntington discusses "Officership as a Profession" in an
essay that discusses the issue of mentorship and
acculturation in developing leaders and the
responsibilities of the profession.

Notes

   Office, 1992), p. ___.

2. "Talking Paper: A Predominantly
   Military Faculty at USMA." (West Point, New York:

3. John D. Lawlor, "Do we need a West Point?", Assembly,

4. Pierce A. Rushton, Jr., "Admissions Update: The

5. Mao Tsetung, "Problems of Strategy in China's
   Revolutionary War," *Selected Military Writings of Mao
   Tsetung* (Peking, PRC: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 77-89,
   92-98, and 131-137, excerpt reprinted in U.S. Army Command and
   General Staff College, *C610 Syllabus/Book of Readings*
   (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, July 1992), p. 139.

   History of West Point* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
APPENDIX B

Letters

In order to lend credibility and depth to my thesis, and to poll a population that had the ability to lend academic and professional expertise, I conducted interviews with 71 subject matter experts. I sent letters to former military officers, leaders at military academies and military schools (current and former), academic experts, knowledgeable members of the media and members of Congress to ask for input on my primary and subordinate research questions. To those 71 letters, I received 46 responses— a response rate of nearly 65%. In terms of results, the respondents favored civilianization to some degree at a rate of nearly 3:1.

It's important to point out this was not a survey, but rather a polling of the concerned rank and file in an effort to develop conventional wisdom on the subject. With that in mind, not every response contained useful information. Responses "ran" from being merely emotional reiterations of resistance to change, to thoughtful and
insightful expression of scholarly ideas. All responses, however, added to the information base for this thesis. Many comments and ideas required additional research or thought.

I've included the letter introducing the study in this annex. The complete list of those polled follows the letter and the bibliography contains a list of those who responded.

I selected the control group based on my knowledge of the subject, then expanded as necessary as the research matured. My desire to accurately assess both sides of the issue guided the selection process.

Three distinct phases went into building the list of 71. In the first phase, I began by selecting 30 (a random number) people associated with the military or with education in one form or another. They included nine general officers that had served as superintendent or commandant of the USMA or another traditional military school (The Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, New Mexico Military Institute); eight members or former members of the army staff, seven academicians, six of whom had served at the USMA as visiting professors, and one a pre-eminent military sociologist; four members of the media I considered experts in military reporting based on my experience as an Army public affairs officer; a
professional staff member from the Senate Armed Services Committee; and the president of the USMA Association of Graduates.

When compiled and evaluated, that list lacked the depth necessary and essential to the project. For the second phase, I expanded the scope of the list. The army office of general officer management provided a list of active duty general officers and their sources of commission. From that list 16 more general officers for the sample were selected. I chose the participants without regard for commissioning source. In fact, I concentrated on selecting non-USMA graduates from high quality, traditional ROTC programs. This portion of the sample was exclusively military though and demanded more balance. In conversation with my thesis committee and at the suggestion of others providing academic input and participating in the development of the thesis, I expanded the list to 60 people, including civilian members of the army secretariat, key members of congress, more academicians, the assistant dean for faculty at the USNA and the current superintendent of the USMA. On final inspection, I was not satisfied with the overall balance achieved with this sample either. The USNA "side" of the argument was not well-represented.

To correct that I solicited input from ten members of the faculty at the USNA including the superintendent,
the dean, civilian instructors, and military officers on the faculty. Doing so provided a population to sample that well represented the expertise on the subject. Though its generation may not have been adequately scientific, it most certainly represents a comprehensive and responsive sample.
Dear:

My name is George Rhynedance. I am an army major attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In addition to the normal academic curriculum, I am pursuing a master's degree in an associated program.

The MMAS -- Master of Military Art and Science -- is a program designed to allow independent research and scholarly writing in a discipline that contributes to the military field of study. (I have enclosed a synopsis of the program for your review.)

My thesis deals with the recent congressional legislation that directs the United States Military Academy to adopt a faculty mix of fifty percent military and fifty percent civilian, a far cry from the current mix of about ninety-six percent military and four percent civilian. I contend this direction represents a phenomenal change in the traditional academic standard at the academy.

My thesis revolves around that change, and focuses on cost. I will examine cost in terms of three factors:

The first factor is money. I believe the change will cost the academy some amount of money saved or spent (more or less depends on how one works the numbers).

The second factor is somewhat less tangible in terms of cost, but important nonetheless. I believe the change will have an impact on the USMA's ability to attract the "best and brightest" for career army service.

The final factor I will examine is the cost of the change in terms of impact on the future of the army's officer corps.

I would very much appreciate it if you would take a few minutes to give me your thoughts on these issues. I will use your response in developing my thesis and answering my thesis question: What will civilianization of the faculty at the United States Military Academy cost the Army?
As a mid-career army officer, I certainly have a vested interest in the success of the USMA program, but your input represents both the academic expertise and the actual army experience I feel is essential to the credibility of this project.

Please send me your response in the enclosed postage paid envelope at your earliest convenience. Would you mind if I followed-up your response with a telephone call to clarify or expound on your points?

Finally, I appreciate the opportunity to "interview" you in writing. Thank you very much, in advance, for your assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely,

GEORGE H. RHYNEDANCE
Major, U.S. Army

Enclosure
Interview Population


Abrams, Creighton, W., Jr. Brigadier General, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans & Policy, Allied Forces Southern Europe.


Beeman, Richard, R., Ph.D. Dean, School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania.

Berry, Sidney, B. Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (retired), former Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy.

Blackwell, James, A. Major, U.S. Army (retired). Military Analyst for CNN during the Gulf War, currently deputy director for political-military studies and senior fellow in international security studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Brady, Patrick, H. Major General, winner of the Medal of Honor, father of West Point graduate, former Chief of U.S. Army Public Affairs, currently serving as Deputy Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army, The Presidio of San Francisco.


Chapman, James, H. Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve. Kansas-area Naval Academy Information Officer (admissions counselor at-large).

Childs, Leo, M. Major General. U.S. Army. Director, Command, Control & Communications Systems, U.S. PACOM.
Clark, W., D. Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Coffman, Edward, M., Ph.D. Former Visiting Professor at the USMA and the USAFA, currently Emeritus Professor, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison.


Fraser, Harvey, Ph.D. Brigadier General, U.S. Army (retired). Former Professor of Mechanics, USMA.


Galambos, Theodore, V., Ph.D. Former Visiting Professor, USMA, currently, Director of Civil and Mineral Engineering, University of Minnesota.

Garrett, Joseph, G. III. Colonel, U.S. Army. Executive Officer to the Director of the Army Staff.

Geremia, John, O., Ph.D. Chairman, Department of Mechanical Engineering, United States Naval Academy.

Gerspacher, William, F. Acting President, North Georgia College.

Glenn, John. Member, U.S. Senate. Chairman, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel. Democrat, Ohio.

Goodpaster, Andrew, J. General, U.S. Army (retired), former Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy.


Graves, Howard, D. Lieutenant General, U.S. Army. Superintendent, United States Military Academy.

Halbig, Michael, C., Ph.D. Associate Dean for Faculty, United States Naval Academy.

Hale, David, R. E. Brigadier General, U.S. Army. Assistant Division Commander, 7th Infantry Division (Light), former instructor at the USMA.


James, Robert, L. Captain, U.S. Army. Instructor, Department of Electrical Engineering, United States Naval Academy.

Keller, Richard, F. Major General, U.S. Army. Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division, Germany.

Kichen, Lee, F. Lieutenant Colonel. Staff Group Leader, Combined Arms and Services Staff School. Former action officer in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army Headquarters.


Kroshl, William, M. Commander, U.S. Navy. Associate Chair and Senior Instructor, Department of Mathematics, United States Naval Academy.

Lowry, Mark II., Ph.D. Colonel, U.S. Army (retired). Professor of Geography, Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, Kentucky.


McClain, Charles, W., Jr. Major General, Chief of U.S. Army Public Affairs.
Moskos, Charles, C., Jr., Ph.D. Department of Sociology, Northwestern University.

Muir, Malcolm, Jr., Ph.D. Former Visiting Professor, USMA, currently Chairman, Department of History and Philosophy, Austin Peay State University.

Mullane, Denis, F. President, Association of Graduates, USMA.

Nagley, Scott, G. Captain, U.S. Army. Master Instructor, Department of Chemistry, United States Naval Academy.


Palmer, Bruce, Jr. General, U.S. Army (retired).

Palmer, Dave, R. Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (retired). Former Superintendent, United States Military Academy.

Pang, Fred. Professional staff member, United States Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Peay, J.H. Binford III. General, U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff.

Quester, George, H., Ph.D. Visiting Professor from Harvard, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy.

Reno, William, H. Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (retired), former U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Schemmer, Benjamin, F. Former editor of "Armed Forces Journal International" magazine.


Schneider, Richard, Ph.D. President, Norwich University.


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Shapiro, Robert, H., Ph.D. Academic Dean and Provost, United States Naval Academy.


Siebring, B. Richard, Ph.D. Former Visiting Professor, USMA, currently Emeritus Professor, Department of Chemistry, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

Silberman, Robert, S. Former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.


Smith, Perry, M. Major General U.S. Air Force (retired). Military analyst for CNN during the Gulf War. Former Commandant of the National War College, currently president of Visionary Leadership, LTD.

Soloman, Mary, K. Captain, U.S. Air Force. Former senior instructor, Department of Aerospace Engineering, United States Naval Academy.


Vuono, Carl, E. General U.S. Army (retired), former U.S. Army Chief of Staff.


Walker, Grant, H. Major, U.S. Army. Master Instructor, Department of History, United States Naval Academy.

Review of the Law

The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader the text of the congressional and legal "language" that applies to this subject. I have provided excerpts from both the report and the bill language accompanying House Resolution (HR) 5006. The HR was passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate and was signed by the President in October 1992.

As an introduction, report language is usually written in layman's English and is the source for divining Congressional intent. The Congress also puts many of the requirements for studies and reports to Congress in report language. Bill language, on the other hand, is law. Many times it is very difficult to understand because it is usually fragmented and amends a provision of Title 10, U.S. Code, or some other statute.¹

Excerpt from HR 5006 Report Language

Military Service Academies (secs. 521-524)
The Senate amendment contained six provisions (secs. 511-516) that would effect (sic) certain efficiencies in the operation of the
military service academies. The rationale for these provisions is contained in the report by the Senate Armed Services Committee on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. The Senate provisions are discussed below.

Section 511 would require that no more than one two-star general or flag officer may be assigned to each of the military service academies.

Section 512 would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by April 1, 1993 for implementing the recommendations of the March 1992 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) on the academy preparatory schools.

Section 513 would require the Secretary of Defense to submit legislation by April 1, 1993 to conform faculty staffing at the United States Military Academy (USMA) and the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) to the faculty staffing at the United States Naval Academy (USNA) (50/50 military/civilian mix), and to phase-out the assignment of permanent military professors at the USMA and USAFA.2

The report goes on to say, with regard to the Senate provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit legislation to conform the civilian-military faculty mix at the USMA and the USAFA to that at the USNA and to phase-out the assignment of permanent military professors at these institutions (sec. 513), the amendment would instead require the Secretary of Defense to submit recommended legislation for increasing the number of civilian faculty at the USMA and the USAFA. The amendment would also provide the USMA and USAFA the same civilian hiring flexibility that currently is authorized for the USNA.2

Excerpt from House Resolution 5004

SEC. 523. COMPOSITION OF FACULTIES AT UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY AND AIR FORCE ACADEMY.
(a) Civilian Faculty at Military Academy. Section 4331 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection [author's note: not all sections applied, only those that did are included]:

(1) The Secretary of the Army may employ as many civilians as professors, instructors, and
lecturers at the Academy as the Secretary considers necessary.

(2) The compensation of persons employed under this subsection shall be as prescribed by the Secretary.

(3) The Secretary may delegate the authority conferred by this subsection to any person in the Department of the Army to the extent the Secretary considers proper. Such delegation may be made with or without the authority to make successive redelegations.

(b) Not applicable to the study.

c) Proposed Legislation to Increase Civilian Faculty Members. Not later than April 1, 1993, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives recommended legislation for:

(1) increasing the number of civilians on the faculty at the United States Military Academy and the United States Air Force Academy; and

(2) reducing the number of officers of the Armed Forces assigned or appointed as permanent faculty at the United States Military Academy and the United States Air Force Academy.4

Notes


4Ibid., p. 100.
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