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Peacetime Military Engagement:
A Framework for Policy Criteria

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Executive Summary

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT:
A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY CRITERIA

The end of the global threat to U.S. national security from the former Soviet Union raises new questions about the proper amount of military force and (for the first time in more than 4 decades) about our national security interests. A major part of the debate about these questions involves the need for the U.S. Military to undertake missions other than those involving major regional conflicts and the feasibility of undertaking those missions.

The sharply changing nature of the challenges to U.S. interests now requires criteria for determining whether and when military forces should be deployed. In the past, those criteria have been loosely defined in terms of the directness of threats to U.S. "survival" or the likelihood of local conflicts escalating to the point where U.S. physical or economic well-being was threatened.

United States Forces have been used to resolve a number of conflicts that did not meet those deployment criteria; but, those conflicts appeared to be so overshadowed by the larger threats to U.S. security from the Soviet Union that ad hoc rationales for involvement in small-scale local conflicts sufficed. Moreover, the immense size and capability of the U.S. Military made small-scale operations appear to be "low-risk excursions." The first rationale, risk to direct U.S. survival, is no longer relevant. The second rationale, low-risk feasibility, is less convincing because military forces and capabilities are being reduced. National and Department of Defense policymakers need a new set of criteria to guide them in making decisions about when to employ U.S. Forces to solve an increasingly diverse and complex array of problems.

A REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

New U.S. security strategies and policies should focus on regional security issues and on the creation of regional security regimes as the most viable alternatives to reliance on either the United Nations (U.N.) or major powers as the primary foundation for international security.

The changing nature of the challenges to U.S. interests and the increased need for collaboration with international partners and for coordination between government agencies means that the DoD will need to manage greater complexity. The DoD must also adjust to the dominant role of the Department of State in establishing military objectives as part of its orchestration of the range of conflict resolution mechanisms.

"Burdensharing" by other nations or international organizations will become a principal criterion for engagement in peacetime military missions. Measuring the United States' and others' contributions to peace management will require consideration of a broader range of burdensharing indicators than those used in the past to measure contributions

to formal alliances such as those with NATO and Japan.

CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING PEACETIME ENGAGEMENTS

A regional security strategy will not always be effective. The United States must sometimes act unilaterally. We designed a framework that addresses the criteria that can be relied upon to help determine whether and when U.S. Forces should deploy for peacetime engagement missions. That framework compares military options for solving domestic and international security problems with non-military options. The framework uses four criteria for assessing the relative need for military force and four criteria for determining the feasibility of military solutions.

ORGANIZING AND TRAINING FOR PEACETIME ENGAGEMENTS

We disagree with the argument made by some that particular units of the Military's Active Force should be specially earmarked, equipped, and trained for particular types of peacetime engagement missions such as supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations. Such a policy would unduly limit the flexibility that is needed when allocating manpower and resources to meet changing priorities. Also, one cannot forecast when a peacetime engagement mission will quickly evolve into a major combat operation. One should view peacetime engagement missions along a continuum.

The DoD's managers should facilitate planning, programming, training, and mission execution across the spectrum of national security objectives and missions; DoD's policy management should not be structured by specialized mission "categories." It appears that the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations are structured to focus on particular missions, which may detract from their ability to support broader policymaking.

We encourage the trend of assigning all missions to the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) rather than assigning some missions to the Military Services as executive agents of DoD. For example, the Army has responsibility for the domestic support of U.S. disaster relief and control of civil disturbances. Those domestic missions should be assigned to the new CINC Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), who would have control over all CONUS-based forces. We do not believe that CINC LANTCOM should be given the exclusive mission of supporting U.N. operations.

Peacetime engagement missions will place the greatest demand on combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) resources. The overall reduction in U.S. force levels means that the Reserve Components will therefore bear an increasing burden of satisfying those mission requirements. The DoD should consider either substantially increasing the ability of Reserve Components to participate in prolonged assignments or increasing the ratio of CS and CSS to combat resources in the Active Duty Force.

The implications of the new peacetime engagement environment for training and doctrine are substantial. The Army is already innovating new doctrines for Combined Army Operations and Domestic Support Operations. The complexity of peacetime engagement missions also calls for special attention to developing simulation capabilities to support planning and training. We recommend that the DoD make such a simulation effort a priority program under the Defense Modeling and Simulation Initiative.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Political uncertainty left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have unleashed a number of local conflicts between political, ethnic, and religious groups. Those local conflicts could threaten international security. Economic destitution and the lack of appropriate social control mechanisms in other parts of the world, particularly in Africa, also threaten international security. The United States and international organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.) and NATO are now beginning to intervene in order to prevent interstate or regional escalation of conflicts, unacceptable human suffering, and egregious violations of human rights. The United States has responded to these challenges in an ad hoc fashion, usually as the leader of U.N., coalition, or allied political and military action.

The U.S. Government in general and DoD in particular are attempting to develop a coherent set of policies that will guide U.S. activity aimed at dealing with future international conflicts. This policy debate is related to the concurrent debate about the appropriate roles and missions of reduced U.S. Armed Forces. The roles and missions debate includes reconsideration of priorities and DoD organizational responsibilities for determining the use of the Armed Forces in solving domestic and international issues ranging from disaster relief to countering drugs and terrorism

This report describes a framework for identifying and evaluating potential policies for using U.S. Military resources for missions other than major regional conflicts (MRCs) that

directly threaten U.S. national security. The framework describes (a) the definition of missions sometimes (and inappropriately) categorized as "nontraditional," (b) criteria for determining whether U.S. Military resources should be deployed for such missions, and (c) implications for organizing and training in DoD if U.S. Forces are employed in that manner.

We agree with many military leaders who say that so-called nontraditional missions have been undertaken by the U.S. Military for many years. Use of U.S. Military Forces during the Boxer Rebellion, the Russian Revolution, and repeatedly in the Caribbean and Central America are examples of what is now called "peacemaking" or "peace enforcement," for example. What is non-traditional is that these missions will likely become the dominant claimants on military resources, and will require new policies to guide doctrine, organization and training.

PROBLEMS WITH DEFINITIONS

The term "peacetime engagement" [initially used by the Department of Defense (DoD)], or the terms "peacetime support operations" and "operations other than war" (suggested more recently) are more accurate terms to describe the entire spectrum of non-MRC missions. Clearly, a common language must be used to promote unambiguous communication between members of the policy-making and military implementation communities.

We recommend that the term peacetime engagement be adopted as the umbrella phrase including all non-MRC military engagements. We will use this phrase throughout this report.

We prefer the term peacetime engagement because it indicates (1) an assignment of units and not just selected personnel or equipment that have a technical support function, and (2) commitment of U.S. Forces to such an extent that there is a cost to readiness in terms of a measurably decreased ability to conduct other missions over time.[1] We will use the term "peacekeeping" in its traditional and narrow sense of meaning intervention occurring only at the request of the parties to a conflict that has halted; but, we will use "peacemaking" as an umbrella term covering all methods for resolving an incipient or ongoing conflict — from diplomacy and sanctions to forceful intervention. Chapter 3 describes these terms and provides examples in some detail.

BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATES

The traditional development of a National Security Strategy and its enabling National Military Strategy establishes a linkage between important national interests and the Military Forces and capabilities needed to satisfy those interests. The varying types of challenges to U.S. national security now highlight what has become an inadequate element of that policymaking framework. Current policies no longer provide adequate criteria for determining whether and when to engage U.S. Military Forces in hazardous operations. In the past, those criteria have been loosely defined in terms of the directness of threats to U.S. "survival" or the likelihood of local conflicts

escalating to the point where U.S. physical or economic well-being was threatened.

In the past, U.S. Forces were used to resolve a number of conflicts that did not meet those criteria, but those conflicts appeared to be so overshadowed by the larger threats that ad hoc rationales for involvement in small-scale local conflicts sufficed. Besides, the immense size and capability of the U.S. Military made small-scale operations appear to be "low-risk excursions." The first rationale of risk to direct U.S. survival is no longer relevant; the second rationale of low-risk feasibility is less convincing as military forces and capabilities are reduced. National DoD policymakers need a new set of criteria to guide them in making decisions about when to employ U.S. Forces to solve an increasingly diverse and complex array of problems. The Cold War criteria of threats to national survival and the fundamental well-being of the U.S. population have been so "ingrained" in national security decision-making that there are now no milestones for determining whether the "threat" justifies the use of military resources.

The designers of the National Security Strategy that has emerged during the past several years attempted to foster "regional defense policies to reflect new priorities . . .

> [and have] . . . altered other critical defense policies, such as arms control and security assistance, to conform to the new defense strategy and to reflect the realities of the new international security environment."[2]

Of the four critical elements (i.e., Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution) comprising that strategy, Forward Presence and Crisis

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[1]There is a threshold, for example, below which would fall, the numerous and important engineering projects carried out by the Army Corps of Engineers in support of non-DoD organizations, and assignment by other organizations of technical assistance teams for medical and environmental support functions.

[2]As reported to the U.S. Congress by former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney in his *Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1993*, p. 1.

Response emphasize missions that involve U.S. Armed Forces in non-MRC tasks against a foe directly threatening U.S. national security. Forward Presence, for example, attempts to shape the security environment by providing "a tangible demonstration of U.S. commitment in regional and global affairs . . . .

> [It] includes forward basing and rotational and periodic deployments as well as exercises, port visits, military-to-military contacts, exchanges, security assistance, and humanitarian aid."[3]

The second such element, Crisis Response, requires that the United States maintain rapidly deployable power projection capabilities for multiple contingencies. Former Secretary Cheney's 1993 report emphasizes that Crisis Response applies not only to MRCs, such as the recent coalition effort against Iraq, but also to protecting our interests in low-intensity conflicts and "supporting or participating in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief."[4]

As described by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his 1992 report, the National Military Strategy (NMS)

> "contains a number of departures from principles that have shaped the American defense posture since the Second World War . . . . Our military strategy implements the new, regionally-focused defense strategy described in the President's National Security Strategy of the United States and builds upon the Annual Report to the President and Congress provided by the Secretary of Defense."[5]

The NMS outlines eight Strategic Principles that "allow us to exploit the weaknesses of those who might challenge U.S. interests."[6] The NMS then describes the nature of the forces that are required and how they must be deployed – emphasizing that "our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars."[7]

The Planning and Employment section of the NMS not only affirms the focus on deterring and fighting regional wars, but it also clearly indicates the need for decentralized planning by the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) for a diverse spectrum of military options. The four categories of operations that the CINCs must plan for match the four elements of the National Security Strategy: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.

The foregoing linkages between the National Security Strategy and the NMS do not provide guidelines for determining whether and when military forces must be deployed. Decisions about when to deploy military forces have been made in an ad hoc manner in the recent past according to the events of the moment. Some attempts have been made to provide general guidelines, such as the strategic principle of "decisive force" mentioned in the NMS (stated another way by then Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger as "is it do-able?" in evaluating U.S. entry into Somalia).

Criteria that ensure a comprehensive and measured assessment of the threat to U.S. interests and the feasibility of successful intervention must be identified. The recent petitioning by State Department officers for intervention in Bosnia was undoubtedly founded upon their expert assessment of the situation. We believe that a framework for such expert assessments should be formalized so as to

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[5] The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy*: 1992. p. 1.
[6] These Strategic Principles are Readiness, Collective Security, Arms Control. Maritime and Aerospace Superiority, Strategic Agility, Power Projection, Technological Superiority, and Decisive Force. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

develop options that have thoughtfully considered both threats and feasible solutions.

CHAPTER 2

TYPES OF CONFLICTS APPROPRIATE
FOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE

Developing criteria for engaging in any military mission necessarily requires the making of decisions about the roles and missions that are appropriate for the DoD. The roles and missions debate ranges from consideration of new roles for the Reserve Components to earmarking particular U.S. units for U.N. operations.

Senator Sam Nunn has proposed a Civil-Military Cooperation Program to use some military resources on the domestic front to perform what he calls community regeneration missions in the United States.[1] Those missions could include rehabilitation and renewal of community facilities, establishing a National Guard Youth Corps, and public health outreach, to name only three. The concentration of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units with the Reserve Forces is used as an argument to show that these missions fit the current capabilities of National Guard and Reserve Forces. Senator Nunn contends that some of those resources might be more effec tively used to address domestic problems than similar problems overseas. It is clear that the assignment of Reserve Components to such tasks must be considered along with other potential domestic and international missions for those forces.

Some concerned parties are less enthusiastic about shifting the central focus of the U.S. Military away from MRC contingencies. One concern is that emphasizing missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief will dull the ability of the Military to carry out its primary combat mission against sophisticated military opponents. Another concern is that active engagement in peacekeeping or humanitarian missions could bog the United States down in ethnic or tribal conflicts that are of little consequence to the U.S. national interest. Those concerns lead some to argue that the United States should not have an aggressive policy of engaging in such peacetime operations but instead should focus its military resources on preparing to respond to major regional conflicts.

The January 1993 *Report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* focuses on the capabilities needed for potential missions, but it does not offer criteria for when to engage in those missions. That Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) report acknowledged that the issue of roles and missions is not yet resolved, although some major decisions have been made. The report demonstrates that the "center of gravity" of planning, identification of resource requirements, and mission execution is shifting from the Pentagon to the CINCs in the field. The JCS report reviews this progress and establishes the argument for completing this shift with the assignment of CONUS forces to the CINC Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). The CINC LANTCOM could have responsibility for supporting U.N. peacekeeping and humani-

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[1]*Forging Civil-Military Cooperation for Community Regeneration. Remarks prepared for delivery before the Senate Armed Services Comm.* 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., (23 June 1992) (statement of Sam Nunn, U.S. Senator).

tarian operations, for conducting counter-narcotics and counterterrorism operations, and for participating in civil disturbance operations within CONUS.

The new organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicates that support for U.N. operations will play a strategic role in policy considerations. The new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping is being identified as the likely policy focal point to provide support for U.N. operations. This organizational emphasis, along with President Bush's proposal to earmark particular U.S. units for employment in U.N. operations, may promote the benefits of specialization but may also limit flexibility in a total force whose smaller size will place a premium on the ability to shift along the mission spectrum.

PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS DEFINING THE DEBATE

Two principal issues define the roles and missions policy debate. The first issue (introduced above) is whether and when the United States should plan to apply its military resources in circumstances other than to counter a direct threat (i.e., MRC) to U.S. national security. The second issue involves the size, organization, and management of Military Forces for appropriate peacetime engagement missions.

The use of U.S. Military resources is only one of the options that can be employed to address the types of problems for which peacetime engagement missions could be designed. Table 2-1 shows the general types of domestic and international security problems, decision-making entities, and the options for addressing those problems.

The array of options for resolving international security problems portrayed in Table 2-1 illustrates that the peacetime engagement of U.S. Military Forces can occur under a broad set of missions that are themselves only a part of the potential solutions.[2] One characteristic of virtually all of the responsive options is that U.S. participation will almost always be in collaboration with other nations and international organizations. United States' interests often may have to be compromised to accommodate the potentially conflicting interests of those other nations and organizations. This means that DoD policymakers will probably have less influence over the decisions about whether and how to engage U.S. Military resources than they did in the past.

The array of options shown in Table 2-1 demonstrates that geographically based regional security regimes can play an important role in bridging the gap between complete U.N. involvement and unilateral U.S. action. Many conflicts occurring in the foreseeable future will be based locally, and they should be most effectively resolved in a local or regional context. A major objective of U.S. foreign policy should be the support of regional security regimes that are able to resolve local conflicts without intervention by the United States or a major power. Intervention by the U.N. or a major power should be considered only when local or regional efforts are failing. With the exception of its long history of leadership of the NATO alliance, U.S. proponency of regional security regimes has not been necessary in view of the overwhelming military capability of the United States to handle security problems that

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[2]Table 2-1 suggests that domestic and international order can be maintained by a number of security systems ranging from private markets to over management by the major powers. This latter concept of a "managed peace" under the United Nations Charter has been recently articulated by Eugene Rostow in *Toward Managed Peace*, Yale University Press, New Haven. 1993.

arise outside the NATO-Warsaw Pact environment. However, burdensharing should now become a global security concept that mandates local resolution of conflicts as the norm and U.N. or major power intervention only as a last resort.

Chapter 3 describes the security problems and peacetime engagement options shown in Table 2-1 in greater detail. The model of the international security environment evidenced by Table 2-1 then becomes the foundation for an analysis (in Chapter 4) of policy criteria for whether and when to commit U.S. Forces to peacetime engagements. The implications of these policy criteria for DoD organization, doctrine, and training are then developed in Chapter 5.

TABLE 2-1

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTROL OPTIONS

Security problems	Decision-making entities					
	Non-military			Military		
	Bilateral	International	Nongovernment	U.N.	Regional Gov'ts.	Major powers
Socioeconomic under development	Foreign aid and development assistance		Markets		Nation-building	
Economic and natural disasters	Foreign aid and humanitarian assistance			Disaster assistance		
Organized crime	Counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations			Counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations		
Conflicting economic and political claims	Diplomacy, intermediation, and sanctions				Support for diplomacy, intermediation, and sanctions	
Armed military and/or pre-military conflict				Peacemaking		
Post-conflict settlement of claims (e.g., business, political, etc.)				Peacekeeping		

intense interagency coordination, planning, and cooperation that in the past occurred only facilitation of coalition building; and, when necessary, support for combined operations.

CHAPTER 3

DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY IN PEACETIME ENGAGEMENTS

INCREASED PEACETIME ENGAGEMENTS

Although the Cold War dominated national security concerns and military planning and budgets for over 4 decades, U.S. Forces have been called upon more and more often in recent years to respond to conflicts that were not directly related to the Cold War. Those conflicts usually had their roots in political, religious, or ethnic disputes or socioeconomic unrest, such as the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the war in Afghanistan, and the insurgences in Central America. Although responding to these conflicts was not its primary mission, the U.S. Military's involvement in them increased as the Cold War threat disappeared — culminating in late 1991 in the first MRC engagement by U.S. Forces since the Vietnam conflict.

A growing consensus says that the burden of responding to international security problems should be shared by many nations. Collective security has become the new standard for engagement. United States' efforts to strengthen the international response to crises through multinational operations under the auspices of regional or international security organizations is increasing. The U.S. Military has participated in several U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping efforts and has experience in planning and undertaking joint peacekeeping efforts with allied countries, such as in establishing the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 1981. More recent U.S. involvement in U.N. activities in Yugoslavia and Somalia reflect continuing support for peacetime engagement missions.

Table 3-1 summarizes recent peacetime engagement operations undertaken by U.S. Forces. Those operations are described in terms of type of mission, primary objectives, U.S. Government lead agency and other U.S. agencies involved, the DoD lead agency and other DoD players, the reason for the operation and/or level of conflict, and the status of U.S. efforts. We rank the types of missions in ascending order from missions that are unlikely to involve combat (such as disaster relief) to those where U.S. forces are likely to confront hostilities (e.g., peacemaking).

Domestic and International Disaster Relief

Domestic and international disaster relief operations often benefit from the unique capabilities of the Military. On the domestic front, the U.S. Army and other forces were deployed to South Florida in August 1992 in response to one of the most devastating hurricanes in recent U.S. history, Hurricane Andrew.

TABLE 3-1

RECENT PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT MISSIONS

Mission type	Events: operations, location, and date	Primary objectives	U.S. lead and other U.S. agencies involved	DoD lead and other DoD players	Reason for operation and/or level of conflict	Status of U.S. efforts
U.S. disaster relief	Hurricane Andrew, Florida, August 1992	Deliver vital services to disaster victims, assess damage; food, shelter, clothing, etc	FEMA, HHS, DoD, DOT, American Red Cross, other voluntary relief agencies, others	A DoD coordinator, U S Army, Comptroller, OASD(R&MA), OASD(PA), others	Devastating hurricane, no conflict	Completed
Foreign disaster relief	Operation Sea Angel, Bangladesh, 1991	Deliver vital services to disaster victims, assess damage; provide food, shelter, clothing, etc	State, DoD, AID, USIA, American Red Cross, DOT, Justice, CIA, NSC others	OASD(ISA), DoD coordinator, MILDEPs, Comptroller, OASD(R&MA), OASD(PA), General Counsel, DSAA, and others	Typhoon/no conflict	Completed
	Operation Fiery Vigil, Philippines, 1991		"same as above"		Volcanic eruptions at Mount Pinatubo no conflict	Completed
Domestic civil disturbance	Riots, Los Angeles, 1992	Calm civil unrest due to race riots, control looting, restore order	Governor, DoD, Army, Justice, FBI, HHS, relief agencies, others	U.S. Army, National Guard, Active Forces, Reserve elements, and others	Civil violence, riots, looting	Completed
Noncombatant evacuation (NEO)	Operation Sharp Edge, Liberia, 1990	Protect U S Embassy, conduct NEO	State, DoD, DOT, HHS, USIA, Justice, NSC, CIA, others	OASD(ISA), U S Army, OASD(R&MA), OASD(PA), JCS, DSAA, Comptroller, General Counsel, Unified Commands, SOF, others	Civil unrest	Completed
	Operation Eastern Exit, Somalia, 1991	Complete emergency evacuation	"same as above"		Civil war, embassy overrun	Completed
	Operation Badge Pack, Zaire-Congo, 1991	Evacuate U S and foreign personnel from not-torn areas	"same as above"		Civil unrest, riots	Completed
Humanitarian assistance intervention	Operation Safe Passage, Afghanistan, 1988	Clear land mines, provide medical aid to Afghan refugees	State, DoD, AID, NSC, CIA, USIA, DIA, U N Rep, American Red Cross, other relief agencies, and others	OUSD(P), JCS, DSAA, MILDEPs, OASD(R&MA), OASD(PA), General Counsel, Comptroller, SOF, and others	Support to Afghan resistance groups	Ongoing
	Operation Provide Comfort, Turkey/Iraq, 1991	Airdrop aid/supplies to Kurdish refugees, enforce no-fly zone	"same as above"		Distribute relief, food, and medical supplies	Ongoing
	Operation GTMO, Cuba, 1991	Provide relief aid to Haitian refugees	"same as above"	"same as above"	Assistance pending return to Haiti	Ongoing

Note: AID = Agency for International Development; CIA = Central Intelligence Agency; DEA = Drug Enforcement Administration; DIA = Defense Intelligence Agency, DISA = Defense Information Systems Agency; DOT = Department of Transportation; DSAA = Defense Security Assistance Agency; FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS = Health and Human Services; INS = Immigration and Naturalization Service; IRS = Internal Revenue Service; Justice = Department of Justice. MILDEPs = Military Departments; NATO Rep = U S Representative to NATO; NEO = noncombatant evacuation operation; NSC = National Security Council. OASD(C3I) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense; OASD(ISA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), OASD(PA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); OASD(R&MA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve and Manpower Affairs), OASD(RA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), OUSD(P) = Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); SOF = Special Operations Forces; U N Rep = United Nations Representative; USIA = U S Information Agency

TABLE 3-1

RECENT PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT MISSIONS (Continued)

Mission type	Events/ operations, location, and date	Primary objectives	U.S. lead and other U.S. agencies involved	DoD lead and other DoD players	Reason for operation and/or level of conflict	Status of U.S. efforts
Humanitarian assistance intervention (continued)	Operation Provide Hope, former Soviet Union, 1992	Give humanitarian assistance to former Soviet Republics	State, DoD, AID, NSC, CIA, USIA, DIA, U N Rep., American Red Cross, other relief agencies, and others	OUSD(P), JCS, DSAA, MILDEPs, OASD(R&MA), OASD(PA), General Counsel, Comptroller, SOF, and others	Economic disruption, social unrest	Ongoing
	Operation Provide Promise, Bosnia, 1992	Support U N relief operations	"same as above"	"same as above"	Airdrop relief supplies, civil war	Ongoing
Peacekeeping	U N led operations established since 1991	Maintain negotiated truce, deter conflict, facilitate resolution of conflict/ problems, etc	State, DoD, NSC, AID, Justice, CIA, U N Rep., USIA, DOT, others	OUSD(P), OASD(R&MA), OASD(PA), Comptroller, General Counsel, JCS, MILDEPs, SOF, others	Nominal to moderate level of conflict	Ongoing U S Forces' support for U N actions
	Angola Verification Mission II				Monitor cease-fire, aid elections	Ongoing
	Iraqi-Kuwait Observer Mission	"same as above"	"same as above"	"same as above"	Monitor buffer zone	Ongoing
	U N Mission, for Referendum, W Sahara	"same as above"	"same as above"	"same as above"	Monitor cease-fire, hold a referendum	Ongoing
	Observer Mission, El Salvador	"same as above"	"same as above"	"same as above"	Monitor human rights, separation of forces	Ongoing
	U.N Temporary Authority, Cambodia	"same as above"	"same as above"	"same as above"	Supervise government functions and elections	Ongoing
	U N Protection Force, Yugoslavia	"same as above"	"same as above"	"same as above"	Monitor cease-fires between factions	Ongoing
	U.N Operation, Somalia	"same as above"	"same as above"	"same as above"	Protect U.N relief efforts	Ongoing
Counter-narcotics	Operation Just Cause, Panama, 1989	Restore civil government, combat/deter drug trafficking	State, DoD, DEA, Customs Service, FBI, Coast Guard, INS, USIA, IRS, Justice, others	OASD(RA), OASD(C3I), OUSD(P), DSAA, DISA, JCS, MILDEPs, SOF, others	Restore civil rule, reduce flow of drugs into United States/ offensive operations	Completed
	Andean Drug Strategy; Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; 1991	Train host nation police, defeat drug production	"same as above"	"same as above"	Exercises and mobile training teams/ high-level conflict	Ongoing

Note: AID = Agency for International Development; CIA = Central Intelligence Agency; DEA = Drug Enforcement Administration; DIA = Defense Intelligence Agency; DISA = Defense Information Systems Agency; DOT = Department of Transportation; DSAA = Defense Security Assistance Agency; FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS = Health and Human Services; INS = Immigration and Naturalization Service; IRS = Internal Revenue Service; Justice = Department of Justice; MILDEPs = Military Departments; NATO Rep = U S Representative to NATO; NEO = noncombatant evacuation operation; NSC = National Security Council; OASD(C3I) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense; OASD(ISA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); OASD(PA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); OASD(R&MA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve and Manpower Affairs); OASD(RA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs); OUSD(P) = Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); SOF = Special Operations Forces; U N Rep = United Nations Representative; USIA = U S Information Agency

TABLE 3-1

RECENT PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT MISSIONS (Continued)

Mission type	Events/ operations, location, and date	Primary objectives	U.S. lead and other U.S. agencies involved	DoD lead and other DoD players	Reason for operation and/or level of conflict	Status of U.S. efforts
Counter-terrorism	Achilles Lauro Operation at sea	Use offensive measures to prevent/deter/ respond to terrorism	State, DoD, CIA, DIA, Justice, FBI, NSC, others NATO Rep, others	OUSD(P), CIA OASD(SOLIC), MILDEPs, JCS, SOF, others	Varying level of conflict ranging to combat operations	Completed
	U.S. Strike on Libya	"same as above"	"same as above"	"same as above"	Offensive air strike operations	Completed
Peacemaking	Operation Earnest Will/ Prime Chance, Persian Gulf, 1987	End Iranian actions against international shipping	State, DoD, NSC, CIA, DIA U.N. Rep, Justice, AID, DOT, others	OUSD(P), OASD(R&MA), JCS, DSAA MILDEPs, SOF, combatant commands, Comptroller, General Counsel, OASD(PA), others	Coalition response, offensive operations	Completed
	Operation Golden Pheasant, Honduras, 1988	Show of force support deployment			In response to Nicaraguan border incursions	Completed
	Operation Promote Liberty, Panama, 1989	Restore civil rule, local government capabilities			Internal development following offensive Operation Just Cause	Ongoing
	Operation Desert Shield, Persian Gulf, 1990	Deter Iraqi occupation of Kuwait	"same as above"	"same as above"	Followed by offensive operations under Desert Storm	Completed
	Operation Proven Force, Turkey, 1991	Threaten second front in Iraq	"same as above"	"same as above"	Strikes, raids, combat search and rescue	Completed
	Operations Provide Relief/Restore Hope, Somalia, 1992	Protect U.N. operations relief	"same as above"	"same as above"	Civil war, war torn conditions, local gunmen	Ongoing

Note: AID = Agency for International Development; CIA = Central Intelligence Agency; DEA = Drug Enforcement Administration; DIA = Defense Intelligence Agency; DISA = Defense Information Systems Agency; DOT = Department of Transportation; DSAA = Defense Security Assistance Agency; FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS = Health and Human Services; INS = Immigration and Naturalization Service; IRS = Internal Revenue Service; Justice = Department of Justice; MILDEPs = Military Departments; NATO Rep = U.S. Representative to NATO; NEO = noncombatant evacuation operation; NSC = National Security Council; OASD(C3I) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense; OASD(ISA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs); OASD(PA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); OASD(R&MA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve and Manpower Affairs), OASD(RA) = Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs); OUSD(P) = Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); SOF = Special Operations Forces; U.N. Rep = United Nations Representative; USIA = U.S. Information Agency

In 1991, U.S. military forces were deployed as part of two foreign disaster relief operations.[1] Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh was in response to a devastating typhoon. Operation Fiery Vigil in the Philippines was in

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[1] The DoD defines a foreign disaster as an act of nature (flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, epidemic) or an act of man (riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, epidemic) that is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant U.S. disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or an international organization. Foreign disaster relief includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicines, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (DoD Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, 4 December 1975.)

the wake of a series of devastating volcanic eruptions.

According to a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) study of Federal disaster response in the aftermath of the Hurricane Andrew operation, inadequate damage assessments, inaccurate estimates of needed services, and miscommunication at all levels of government slowed recovery efforts. The report indicated that the Federal government's strategy for dealing with disasters makes no provision for comprehensively assessing damage or the needs of disaster victims. The Federal government also lacks explicit authority to prepare for a disaster adequately when there is advance warning. Finally, state and local governments generally lack the training and funding needed to respond to disasters on their own.[2]

The DoD Components participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after the Department of State determines that disaster relief will be provided. The State Department must formally request DoD assistance and advise DoD about (1) the countries, international organizations, and/or individuals to be assisted; (2) the form of assistance requested; (3) the types and amounts of materiel and services requested; (4) the amount of funds allocated to the DoD for such services; and (5) other information pertinent to the particular relief operation.

It is widely recognized that the Military Establishment has unique capabilities, resources, and expertise to support disaster relief efforts. A number of Federal civilian officials have called for a greater role for DoD in Federal CONUS disaster response policy. The Military could be brought in immediately after a disaster or even prepositioned in predictable disasters such as hurricanes. The DoD's logistical capabilities for transporting materiel and personnel to disaster areas and its use of aerial surveillance and satellites to make damage assessments are essential to the rapid deployment of relief agencies.[3] Consideration is therefore being given to whether DoD should take over some of the functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and whether a senior Administration official should be delegated the responsibility for coordinating disaster response.

Domestic Civil Disturbances

Civil unrest and domestic violence, such as the 1992 race riots in Los Angeles, are crises where the U.S. Military could be called in to break up hostile elements, deter or end looting and rioting, restore order, and support repair and relief operations. The U.S. Army was recently designated as the DoD executive agent for domestic civil disturbances. These types of missions usually involve Army National Guard and Reserve elements rather than active Army units.

Senator Sam Nunn also has proposed the use of military resources on the domestic front to address domestic civil problems and to perform community regeneration missions. Those

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[2]U.S. General Accounting Office, *Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy*, Testimony before the Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations, GAO/T-RCED-93-4, 27 January 1993.

[3]See William Claiborne, "Enlisting a Better Response to Disaster," *The Washington Post*, 28 January 1993, p. A19. A study by the Inspector General of FEMA regarding its handling of Hurricane Andrew indicated the following failures: (1) no timely damage assessment was made, (2) FEMA waited for specific requests for aid, (3) cost-sharing delayed the Federal response, (4) other Federal agencies waited for assignments from FEMA, (5) mass care by multiple agencies was not well coordinated, (6) the public was cut off from information sources, (7) victims were confused by the multiple aid programs, and (8) administrative support systems were unsatisfactory.

regeneration missions c.ild include rehabilitation of community facilities, establishing a National Guard Youth Co.ps, and public health outreach. The concentration of CS and CCS units in the Reserve Forces is used as an argument for the proposition that these missions fit the capabilities of National Guard and Reserve Forces. With the possible assignment of CONUS forces to the CINC LANTCOM, responsibility for the conduct of civil disturbance operations within CONUS could be placed with this CINC.

Noncombatant Evacuation

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) involve the evacuation of civilians from hostile or conflict-ridden environments. The NEOs are distinguished from combat search and rescue, which is a specific task performed to recover distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. For the most part, NEOs involve the evacuation of U.S. citizens and foreign diplomatic personnel and other nationals from a foreign country, usually at the request of the U.S. Ambassador. In undertaking these missions, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are often deployed with general-purpose forces as part of a joint military operation.

The State Department has primary responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. noncombatants, including DoD dependents, with certain exceptions.[4] The DoD, through the JCS, directs, coordinates, and monitors military participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. The Army is the designated DoD executive agent for NEOs, and it coordinates within DoD and with other Federal and local agencies in planning for

the reception in CONUS and the onward movement of evacuees. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare also has responsibilities for receiving evacuees in CONUS.

Recently, the U.S. Military has undertaken several NEOs. In April 1990, U.S. Forces were deployed in Operation Sharp Edge in Liberia: first to help protect the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia and then later to undertake a noncombatant evacuation mission. In January 1991, U.S. Forces were deployed in Operation Eastern Exit in Somalia to evacuate U.S. Embassy staff and foreign diplomatic personnel from the embassy compound before it was overrun by hostile forces. Then again in 1991, in Operation Badge Pack in Zaire-Congo, U.S. Forces were employed to evacuate U.S. and foreign personnel from riot-torn areas.

Humanitarian Assistance Intervention

Humanitarian assistance intervention is the deployment of U.S. Forces to provide assistance in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property. While such assistance may enhance U.S. security, it is often intended to fulfill moral obligation. The assistance is intended to be of limited scope and duration and is designed to supplement the efforts of civilian authorities that have the primary responsibility for providing such assistance. Humanitarian assistance intervention involves rendering aid to political prisoners, immigrants, and refugees, as well as to victims of civil strife, ethnic conflict, and aggression and also includes efforts like Operation Provide Transition, during which

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[4]DoD Directive 5100.51, *Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad* (short title: *Noncombatant Evacuation*), 16 February 1973. Also see "State-Defense Policies and Procedures for the Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad in Time of Emergency" (short title: *"Joint Statement"*), Enclosure 1 to DoD Directive 5100.51.

U.S. Forces were deployed to facilitate free elections in Angola.

In recent years, U.S. Forces have been called on several times to undertake humanitarian assistance operations. While the causes and dynamics of the situations vary widely, one recurring element is the difficulty of disengaging U.S. troops from the operation. One example is Operation Safe Passage, which began in 1988. U.S. Forces were deployed to northern Pakistan to provide land mine clearance training and medical assistance to Afghan resistance groups and their families, and U.S. involvement through special operations support is ongoing. Another example is Operation GTMO, which began in 1991 to provide assistance to Haitian refugees at the Guantanamo Naval Station in Cuba pending their return to Haiti.

Operation Provide Comfort is another important example. This humanitarian relief operation began in 1991 and was carried out in conjunction with allied forces to protect Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northern Iraq. The operation's initial objective called for airdropping relief supplies and providing emergency medical assistance and then shifted focus to food distribution and resettlement activities. U.S. Forces established and operated temporary camps in Iraq to coordinate international support, which led to the eventual transition of relief operations to civilian administration.

While U.S. Forces have now accomplished the provision of humanitarian relief assistance to Kurdish refugees, U.S. involvement and military support remain ongoing. After completion of the ground phase of the operation, the mission shifted to enforcing the no-fly zone that blankets the resettlement area.

U.S. Forces are enforcing that zone and are involved in contracting supplies needed in northern Iraq. This kind of open-ended commitment to protecting the Kurdish refugees parallels one of the principal concerns about Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

United States involvement in more recent humanitarian intervention operations, such as in Operation Provide Hope to the former Soviet republics and Operation Provide Promise in Bosnia, has raised serious questions about humanitarian operations. Of particular concern are the issues of the objectives and desired outcomes of these missions. In Bosnia, for example, the U.S. airlift and food airdrops (being part of a U.N. operation) have been described as a symbolic effort launched in lieu of more direct military intervention. According to some experts, one of the pitfalls of such symbolic efforts is that without a clearly defined mission and goals, the U.S. Military will become more deeply involved in the conflict than it intends.[5]

Further complicating the issues is the legal authority for humanitarian assistance intervention. The international law doctrine of state sovereignty and nonintervention in the internal affairs of states is a serious legal obstacle, although there appear to be grounds on which a state or states could intervene in another state to end intolerable violations of human rights. The *United Nations Charter* also creates legal obstacles to humanitarian intervention. Article 2(4) prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," and this prohibition has traditionally been binding regardless of the motives, intentions, or goals involved. Article 2(7) prohibits U.N. intervention "in matters [that are] essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." The only exception to these provisions is provided by

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[5]"The Dangers of Military Symbolism," *The Baltimore Sun*, 14 March 1993, p. C1.

Article 51, which is the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

Under Article 39, however, the U.N. Security Council may determine "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or action of aggression," and Article 42 provides that after peaceful remedies have failed, the Security Council may take military action "to maintain or restore international peace and security." In December 1992 in Somalia, when the Security Council authorized the use of force to protect relief operations, it determined that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constituted a threat to international peace and security.

Some scholars have argued for wider U.N. jurisdiction in matters of fundamental human rights and for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention under U.N. auspices. One argument is that while sovereign states may have jurisdiction over their citizens, such jurisdiction is conditional upon minimum standards of human rights. With the rising need for humanitarian assistance interventions, the issue of legal authority is being given renewed attention, and support for more flexible arrangements is growing.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations are generally defined as military operations conducted with the consent of parties to a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce and facilitate diplomatic resolution of a halted conflict. They generally involve monitoring a cease-fire agreed to by the combatants, and they proceed in an atmosphere where peace exists and where one or more of the former combatants prefers peace over war. As of May 1992, the United Nations was sponsoring 12 ongoing peacekeeping operations; of these, 7 were established in 1991 or later.

The U.S. Military has participated in many U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping efforts to date, and it also has experience in planning and undertaking joint peacekeeping efforts with allied countries, such as in establishing the MFO. As a result of the Middle East Peace Treaty and the inability of the United Nations to provide a peacekeeping force to monitor the return of the Sinai to Egypt, in 1981 the United States took the lead, along with Israel and Egypt, in establishing a multinational peace-keeping force for deployment to the Sinai. The MFO is composed of peacekeeping forces from nine nations; its headquarters is in Rome, Italy.

The United Nations establishes peacekeeping operations to facilitate permanent settlements of international conflicts and to act as a neutral body and catalyst to expedite settlements. Peacekeepers can be assigned to unarmed observer missions, to lightly armed peacekeeping forces, or to missions combining both. These observers and troops must maintain a neutral stance and act with complete impartiality. Their presence is intended to deter violence, and as such, they are permitted to use force only in self-defense.

Peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council and financed with the approval of the U.N. General Assembly. Thus, they generally reflect a broad international consensus. U.N. operations can be proposed by the Secretary General or member countries. The Security Council reviews the request and

the permanent members can veto establishment of any new operation. Once the mandate of the operation is approved and the strength and composition of the force are determined, member countries are solicited to contribute troops or observers.

The Department of State oversees U.S. interests in U.N. peacekeeping operations. When the State Department receives a U.N. request for cooperative action, it coordinates with DoD to provide the requested assistance.[6] The DoD has supported U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1948, when the first mission was established.[7] Since then, the DoD has furnished supplies, equipment, military airlift and sealift, and other logistics support. It has also detailed military planners to U.N. Headquarters and has sent military observers to U.N. missions in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The Secretary of Defense authorizes the detailing of personnel and/or furnishing of support by memorandum, which also designates a DoD executive agent for the mission (currently the Army for nearly all peacekeeping missions) and establishes the obligation authority available to provide the assistance.

An important factor of U.N. peacekeeping is that the *United Nations Charter* stipulates that regional organizations shall make every effort to settle local disputes before referring them to the Security Council. It also directs the Security Council to encourage the use of regional arrangements to resolve local disputes and, where appropriate, to use regional arrangements for enforcement action under the Council's authority. Six regional organizations have had roles in resolving regional conflicts: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Economic Community of West African States, the MFO, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization of African Unity. Four of these organizations have participated in peacemaking and election-monitoring activities, and two are engaged in current peacekeeping operations.

Other regional and international organizations have complemented U.N. peacemaking and peacekeeping activities with varying degrees of success. As demonstrated by the OAS and MFO, regional and multinational approaches can be an effective substitute for U.N. arrangements. Regional and other international organizations will be called on in the future to play an increasingly important role in peacemaking and peacekeeping, but there will be times when regional arrangements may not be appropriate or feasible. Ultimately, the U.N. Security Council must evaluate each new conflict situation on a case-by-case basis.

In his September 1992 speech before the United Nations, former President Bush called for increasing U.S. support for international and regional peacekeeping efforts. He stressed the growing importance of peacekeeping as a

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[6]United Nations' requests for DoD assistance have recently increased, yet some DoD policies and procedures for providing this support are outdated. According to a recent GAO study, DoD systems and controls for defense assistance to U.N. peacekeeping can be improved. See U.S. General Accounting Office, *United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations*, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-92-247, Washington, D.C., September 1992.

[7]Article 43 of the *United Nations Charter* calls for member states to make Armed Forces available to the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Congress granted the President authority under the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 79-264), as amended, to detail up to 1,000 U.S. Armed Forces personnel to the United Nations in any noncombatant capacity and to furnish and/or loan facilities, services, supplies, and equipment. Under a delegation of presidential authority set forth in Executive Order 10206 (January 1951), the Secretary of State, upon request by the United Nations for cooperative action, can ask the Secretary of Defense to provide personnel and furnish other needed assistance.

mission for the U.S. Military and directed the Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. He also emphasized the continuing need for U.S. support for the efforts of NATO and CSCE and other competent regional organizations to develop peacekeeping capabilities as a complement to U.N. capabilities.[8]

Counternarcotics Operations

Early in his Administration, as a result of the rise in crime and violence associated with drug use and trafficking, former President Reagan declared that illegal drug smuggling into the United States was a national security problem. While DoD had been supporting U.S. law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics activities since 1981 through equipment loans, training, radar coverage of major drug trafficking routes, and so forth, DoD had not taken a direct role in drug interdiction. As part of the FY89 DoD Authorization Act, Congress gave DoD certain drug interdiction responsibilities. Those responsibilities include serving as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States and integrating U.S. command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network.

The DoD has established an organizational structure for this mission similar to that used for traditional military missions.[9] For addressing policy issues, DoD designated an Assistant Secretary of Defense to be the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support and to serve as the Secretary's principal staff assistant and advisor for drug control policy, priorities, systems, resources, and pro-

grams. That office and its responsibilities were initially established in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel but were later transferred to the OASD for Reserve Affairs [OASD(RA)]. In support of the counternarcotics mission, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I is responsible for overseeing the planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition of DoD C3I assets and their integration into an effective communications system.

In fulfilling its counternarcotics mission, the DoD uses the centralized command structure traditionally employed for other joint missions, with regional execution of the operations phase. The Secretary of Defense has delegated operational authority to selected Unified and Specified Command CINCs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is responsible for defining organizational responsibilities and for developing the plans necessary to implement the detection and monitoring mission. Regional execution is handled through the five CINC organizations; in some cases, CINC authority is implemented through a joint task force. Through this structure, DoD also provides intelligence support to U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies.

The DoD supports the drug interdiction activities of the law enforcement community by providing drug-related intelligence data. It collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence data on drug trafficking, and it maintains an extensive network to conduct and coordinate counternarcotics intelligence activities. First, with funds appropriated for the counternarcotics mission, it authorized the Defense Communications Agency to purchase tele-

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[8] "Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly," the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 21 September 1992.

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Drug Control. Status Report on DoD Support to Counternarcotics Activities.* GAO/NSIAD-91-117, Washington, D.C., June 1991. Also see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Drug Control: Issues Surrounding Increased Use of the Military in Drug Interdiction,* GAO/GGD-91-10, Washington, D.C., December 1990.

communications equipment for loan to law enforcement agencies to facilitate interoperable and secure communications. Second, it established an automated telecommunications information network (the Anti-Drug Network) to link DoD and law enforcement agencies' drug interdiction operations and intelligence organizations and to transmit and display tracking information on suspected drug smugglers.

One of the objectives of Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989 was to combat drug trafficking by apprehending General Manuel Noriega and bringing him to the United States for trial. As a result of that operation, U.S. and Panamanian cooperative efforts to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States have increased, though those efforts have been less than successful because Panamanian law enforcement agencies lack the necessary training and resources. The two governments have signed agreements to promote cooperation in reducing drug trafficking and money laundering, and the United States is providing about $1 million of aid to assist Panamanian law enforcement agencies in reducing narcotics-related activities.[10]

In support of U.S. objectives to combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs, DoD also began its Andean Drug Strategy counternarcotics operation in 1991. U.S. Forces were deployed and continue to train host nation police and armed forces dedicated to counternarcotics, primarily through exercises and mobile training teams. The principal focus of DoD efforts is on the drug source area (the Andean Ridge nations of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru). The secondary focus of DoD efforts is on the transit area (Central America) and the countries surrounding the drug source area, while the tertiary focus is on potential sources and transit areas in the remaining South American nations.[11]

U.S. Forces also provide operational and maintenance support, materiel, and advice to the counternarcotics organizations of foreign countries. U.S. Forces also provide support to U.S. law enforcement and other agencies involved in counternarcotics efforts. The U.S. Government organizations involved include the Customs Service; the Coast Guard; the DEA; the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the IRS; the INS; the USIA; and the State Department's Narcotics Assistance Staff.

Counterterrorism

Terrorism is the unlawful or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. Counterterrorism operations are offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Combating terrorism is defined as the set of actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Counterterrorism is one of the five primary missions associated with U.S. SOF.[12] The primary mission of the SOF in this U.S. Government interagency activity is to apply highly specialized military capabilities to

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[10]U.S. General Accounting Office, *Narcotics Control in Panama*, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-91-233, Washington, D.C., July 1991.

[11]Antonio J. Ramos, Ronald C. Oates, and Timothy L. McMahon, "A Strategy for the Future: United States Southern Command," *Military Review*, November 1992, pp. 32 – 39.

[12]Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Forces – Posture Statement*, Washington, D.C., June 1992.

preempt or resolve terrorist incidents abroad. Counterterrorism operations are conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DoD Forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. Those operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities, and they may support conventional operations or be pursued independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible.

Terrorism will likely be an increasing threat to U.S. and international security. Over 230 anti-American incidents occurred in 1990.[13] The decade of the 1980s showed that U.S. Administrations are increasingly willing to use, and the public is willing to support, military force against terrorism when necessary. Grenada, Libya, Panama, and the Persian Gulf showed U.S. capabilities to respond with resolve to terrorist incidents.

Terrorist tactics appeal to groups that operate outside the internationally recognized conflict boundaries. The Middle East and Latin America will continue to be the most likely operational bases for terrorist organizations and other radical groups, followed by Spain, the United Kingdom, Africa, and the restructured Eastern Europe.[14] The United States will also continue to experience threats from the radical Islamic fundamentalist movement, which is largely anti-American and committed to expansion in the Middle East and Africa.

Peacemaking

Of all the peacetime engagement missions considered here, peacemaking is the least clearly defined, in part because of the wide range of potential missions. In broad terms, peacemaking consists of activities intended to bring hostilities to an end and to bring hostile parties to agreement. Those activities generally occur while fighting is ongoing and can include efforts that range from diplomatic initiatives and intermediation to orchestrating a political settlement and undertaking peace-enforcement and peacetime support operations. For intractable conflicts, the employment of military forces in a variety of ways to create a cease-fire between warring parties is likely to be required.[15]

In recent years, U.S. Forces have been deployed to a number of regions around the world to undertake peacemaking operations. Some of those U.S. operations are described below.

Operations "Provide Relief" and "Restore Hope" in Somalia were conducted by a U.N.-sanctioned allied intervention force, led by the United States, to protect famine relief supplies and food shipments from local gunmen. Due to the war-torn conditions of the country and the lack of a central government, the United Nations sanctioned, and the Somali people initially welcomed, intervention by foreign troops in early December 1992; however, anti-American demonstrations in late February 1993 indicated a loss of some Somali popular support for the allied operation.[16]

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[13]Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans*, 1990, p. 1.

[14]U.S. General Accounting Office, *Low Intensity Conflict in a Changed and Changing World*, National Security Papers Prepared for GAO Conference on Worldwide Threats, Appendix VIII, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-92-1045, Washington, D.C., April 1992, pp. 125 – 140.

[15]For a discussion of the definitions of and missions involved in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement, see Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement. The U.S. Role in the New International Order*, U.S. Army War College, Fourth Annual Conference on Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., February 1993.

[16]"Aidid: Somalis Humiliated by U.S.-Led Forces," *The Washington Times*, 16 March 1993, p 9

Operation "Proven Force" followed Operations Desert Shield/Storm when the United States threatened Iraq with a second assault front from Turkey. As allied coalition forces were staging in Saudia Arabia to force Iraq's army from Kuwait, another joint task force was established. The idea for what became Operation Proven Force surfaced in August 1990. The operation's goal was to undertake short-term raids from Turkey into Iraq. This effort was later merged with related efforts by the U.S. European Command and the Special Operations Command involving combat search and rescue missions. In January 1991, joint task force (JTF) Proven Force was formed.

Operation "Just Cause" focused on the removal of General Manuel Noriega from power during this U.S. Military operation in Panama on 20 December 1989. One of the operation's objectives was to combat drug trafficking by apprehending General Noriega and bringing him back to the United States for trial. The operation was the culmination of two and one-half years of U.S. pressure against Noriega's rule. Special Operations Forces assisted in much of the initial joint force planning, and the full range of special operations capabilities was employed in the initial operation and in support of general-purpose forces. United States Forces are also currently participating in *Operation Promote Liberty* in Panama to help restore civil government and law enforcement and promote internal development.

Operation "Earnest Will-Prime Chance" was undertaken in 1987 by U.S. and allied forces in response to Iranian actions against international oil tankers transiting the Persian Gulf. Coalition forces performed escort, patrol, and interdiction duties; captured Iranian mine-laying ships; and carried out assaults on off-shore oil platforms used by the Iranians to harass international shipping.

MANAGING COMPLEXITY: CONCLUSIONS FROM RECENT EVENTS

Peacetime engagement missions are marked by unprecedented complexity in planning, command, and control. This complexity results from (1) the nature of the military operation itself, (2) the significant roles played by non-DoD departments and agencies, (3) the significant participation (and sometimes leadership) of non-U.S. Government entities, and (4) the dominant role of the Department of State in establishing military objectives as well as orchestrating all of the mechanisms of conflict resolution.

Coordination among the Military Services through JTFs has become a hallmark of U.S. operations. A greater degree and level of interagency coordination is also required with a larger group of participating government departments and agencies. No longer is planning and coordination required simply between members of the traditional national security establishment. In counternarcotics operations, for example, the DoD must coordinate its efforts with the Customs Service; the Coast Guard; the DEA; the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the IRS; the INS; the USIA; and the State Department's Narcotics Assistance Staff.

Despite the military implications of these missions and DoD's major role in them, the foreign policy implications are broader in scope and approach. The Department of State is usually the lead agency in what often becomes a very complicated interagency action. Indications from past U.S. involvements suggest that successful conflict resolution requires

intense interagency coordination, planning, and cooperation that in the past occurred only during intense crises. The successful execution of such efforts requires focused, integrated, and sophisticated interagency teamwork. This basis for success has neither been fully developed nor consistently applied by the U.S. Government or DoD.

The DoD should urge the Department of State to make the Security Assistance Program, as well as the other elements of the Foreign Assistance Program, contribute directly to a regional security strategy. The lion's share of security assistance resources that go to Israel and Egypt unquestionably reflect the fact that the principal goal of a U.S. regional security strategy is to promote peace in the Middle East by maintaining close military relationships with these two key states.

The key issues for national security strategy-making are (1) whether the allocation of foreign assistance is currently optimal and (2) whether security assistance resources are more productive than resources devoted to U.S. Force capability. The DoD managers, for example, have consistently stated over the years that Security Assistance Resources are more productive, on the margin, than resources devoted to U.S. Force capability.[17] If this is true, then relatively more defense resources should be allocated to Security Assistance Programs. The first issue regarding optimal allocation of security assistance and other foreign assistance resources should also be explicitly addressed in terms of contributions to a regional security strategy. More effective use of Security Assistance Programs could include more military-to-military contacts such as joint training activities to improve regional stability;

facilitation of coalition building; and, when necessary, support for combined operations. Bilateral economic assistance through the Economic Support Fund and Development Assistance Programs also must address the issue of appropriate support for a regional strategy.

A closer relationship has developed between military peacetime engagement missions and sanctions aimed at reducing conflict or potential causes of conflict. Operation Desert Storm, for example, was preceded, accompanied, and followed by sanctions. Although the Department of State is clearly responsible for policy on sanctions, the DoD will need to become more involved in developing options for sanctions that may substantially affect potential military operations. The apparent effect of sanctions on Yugoslavia in obtaining Belgrade's initial support for a Bosnian cease-fire accord is a recent example. The more effective use of sanctions and foreign assistance, along with military peacetime engagement missions, highlights the theme of a more complex relationship between mechanisms of conflict resolution.

One final conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that the geopolitical environment in which decisions are made to commit U.S. Military resources in the future will be markedly uncertain and complex in terms of threats to U.S. interests and the feasibility of using military resources to satisfy potential mission requirements. In the face of such complexity and uncertainty, the dangerous dichotomy may be that decision-makers respond to crises in an ad hoc manner on the one hand or create a rigid framework of rules that may lead to ineffective decisions on the other hand. A

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[17]"Judiciously spent dollars for security assistance can often produce a larger return than those same dollars spent for our own forces." Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY87 Budget, p. 36. This is only one example of such statements.

framework for decision-making criteria is needed that offers a balanced consideration of (1) the U.S. interests that may be threatened, (2) alternatives that may be available to deal with the problem, and (3) the feasibility of using alternatives that employ military resources. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of these issues.

CHAPTER 4

CRITERIA FOR DESIGNING
A PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT POLICY

WHETHER AND WHEN TO ENGAGE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

> ... [D]ecisions on what actions states should take in response to various situations are not automatic and cannot be fixed by rule. They are inherently political decisions and must be tailored to the unique circumstances of the case with one eye on past precedent, to be sure, but with another on the urgency with which states, and their constituent citizens and taxpayers, view the problem and its relevance to their national and collective interests.[1]

The foregoing quotation applies to decisions about placing a nation's armed forces at risk in order to resolve a security problem that does not imminently threaten that nation's well-being. At its face value, the quotation is a rationalization for case-by-case policymaking. This chapter examines whether there are criteria that can be used to describe conditions under which particular kinds of engagement would be appropriate and, therefore, could be used to shape policy instead of merely reacting to each issue.

Table 2-1 from Chapter 1 implies the possibility of describing such conditions since it shows the relationship of particular categories of security problems to alternative mechanisms for resolving those problems. Can more explicit conditions be described, however, that would provide operationally useful criteria for policy? The following sections examine criteria that might determine (1) what the relationships should be between peacetime engagement and a 2-MRC strategy and (2) what conditions and thresholds could be identified for different kinds of engagements in missions below the level of an MRC.

Table 4-1 describes, in greater detail than Table 2-1, the array of assistance options that are relevant to peacetime engagement.

High Policy

One way to look at relationships between a 2-MRC strategy and peacetime engagement missions is to consider the relative complementarity or substitutability between them. Current policy appears to view peacetime engagement missions as only marginally complementing MRC missions, as evidenced by the view we heard expressed often that peacetime engagement missions are "lesser, but included missions."

Complementary missions exhibit a negative relationship between the changes in demand for the first mission capability and the price of the second mission capability. For example, the U.S. demand for peacetime engagement missions appeared to decline during the Carter administration as the price of the major mission (i.e., strategic deterrence) increased. This Cold War relationship between strategic deterrence and peacetime engagement during the Cold War caused increases in the U.S. defense budget. The former Soviet Union was then forced to shift defense spending to deterrence. The Soviets' demand for their own peacetime engagements decreased as evidenced

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[1]Jeffrey Laurenti, Executive Director, *Partners for Peace: Strengthening Collective Security for the 21st Century*, United Nations Association of the United States of America, p. 14.

TABLE 4-1

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTROL OPTIONS

Security problem	Decision-making entities				
	Nonmilitary		Military		
	Government and international organization	Nongovernment	U.N.	Regional	U.S.
Socioeconomic under-development					
U S	Federal, state, and local programs	Community projects, voluntary organization assistance, contract support	N/A	N/A	National Guard/Reserve program assistance Active Force project assistance
Non-U S	Bilateral and international developmental assistance	Nongovernmental organizations and voluntary organization assistance, contract support	Support projects concurrent with peacekeeping	Bilateral and regional organizational support for developmental assistance	Support for AID or international aid (nation building)
Economic and natural disasters					
Economic disaster	Provide and coordinate assistance	Voluntary organizations, contract support	Humanitarian relief	Humanitarian relief	Humanitarian relief
Natural disaster	Provide and coordinate assistance	Voluntary organizations, contract support	Humanitarian relief	Humanitarian relief	Humanitarian relief
Human rights abuses and organized crime					
Humanitarian rights abuses (below threshold calling for peacemaking)	Assess, protest, and publicize; refugee assistance; sanctions	Assess, protest, and publicize; refugee assistance	Refugee safe haven and coordinate multinational efforts; sanctions support	Refugee safe haven	Refugee safe haven, sanctions support
Drug trafficking	Assess, protest, publicize, and coordinate intergovernment control; sanctions	Assess, protest, and publicize; contract support to government efforts	Coordinate multinational efforts; U N forces support law enforcement agencies; sanctions support	Border control; surveillance; support law enforcement agencies	Border control, surveillance, support law enforcement agencies; sanctions support
Terrorism	Assess, protest, publicize, and coordinate intergovernment control	Assess, publicize; contract support to government efforts	Coordinate multinational efforts; U N forces support law enforcement agencies; sanctions support	Border control, surveillance; support law enforcement agencies	Border control, surveillance; support law enforcement agencies; sanctions support
Armed conflict					
Peacemaking	Encourage parties to resolve conflict, promote cooperation, contribute resources, sanctions	Publicity; contract support to government efforts	Chapter VI or VII of *United Nations Charter* (peace enforcement)	Initiate intervention or promote and support *United Nations Charter* intervention; sanctions support (peace enforcement)	Initiate intervention or promote and support regional or *United Nations Charter* intervention; sanctions support (peace enforcement)
Major regional conflict (MRC)	Encourage parties to resolve conflict, promote cooperation, sanctions	Publicity; contract support to government efforts	Chapter VII of *United Nations Charter*	Initiate intervention or promote and support *United Nations Charter* intervention; sanctions support	Initiate intervention or promote and support regional or *United Nations Charter* intervention; sanctions support
Settlement of claims					
Before or during a conflict					
Peacekeeping	Encourage parties, promote cooperation, contribute resources	Publicity; contract support to government efforts	Chapter VI of *United Nations Charter*	Initiate intervention or promote and support *United Nations Charter* intervention	Initiate intervention or promote and support *United Nations Charter* intervention; sanctions support

by their withdrawals from Afghanistan and Angola, for example.

The constellation of threats to national security has now changed, and the United States is reestablishing its budget priorities to ensure a markedly lower defense budget. With respect to a new, lower defense budget, considerations of substitutability and complementarity can be useful policy criteria.

One mission is a substitute for another if the demand for the first mission capability increases when the price of the second mission capability increases.[2] Although there are implicit references to substitutability in statements that describe the value of humanitarian relief missions, for example, in preventing social unrest from exploding into open conflict, there does not now appear to be any explicit consideration of tradeoffs between such "deterrence missions" and the warfighting alternatives. A similar gap appears to exist when considering resources for domestic missions that may be substitutable, such as community regeneration missions substituting for missions to resolve domestic disturbances that may arise in depressed areas.

Substitution among missions can be measured in terms of capabilities gained or foregone. That tradeoff can be illustrated by considering a hypothetical peacekeeping mission directed to help maintain peace in a recent conflict that either was or could become an MRC. If the peacekeeping force can significantly lower the risk of an MRC, then a portion of the military resources that would have been dedicated to the potential MRC mission (that never occurs) is instead available for other missions. Joint peacekeeping and "MRC-deterrent" missions should be configured so that they can quickly switch their missions to peacemaking with a credible capability for forcefully terminating any resumption of conflict before it becomes an MRC. Of course, the cost of such a "deterrent" force would include the political costs of negotiating the presence of a force that is more substantial than the lightly armed peacekeeping force normally used by the United Nations. Several of America's NATO allies make that kind of tradeoff by making some of their forces available over long periods of time for U.N. missions, thereby hoping to reduce the risk of future conflicts that might require larger forces. Some of the Scandinavian countries even dedicate reserve forces, including volunteers, to those long-term missions (a further indication of their economy-of-force nature).

The explicit consideration of complements and substitutes can help identify conditions under which tradeoffs of resources and capabilities can be made (where substitutes are available) or not (where complements exist). Those considerations could be helpful in planning and programming for the effective combinations of mission capabilities that could be provided, from peacetime engagement to MRCs, for a given budget. Those mission capabilities can then provide a sound basis for determining the feasibility of engaging in particular missions, which we consider next as one of the two principal meta-criteria for engagement.

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[2]This generalization ignores what economists call the "income effect," which may render this generalization incorrect when the change in the price of the second mission capability is very large or there is a significant change in the budget (income). The very large decrease in the defense budget following the sharp decline in the major threat is indeed the event that has altered mission relationships so as to now make substitutability and complementarity even more important considerations.

Peacetime Engagement Policy Conditions

A number of criteria have been proposed for determining whether or not to undertake peacetime engagement missions. Table 4-2 summarizes those criteria.

The first four criteria describe the potential need for peacetime engagement missions, while the last four criteria (i.e., 5 − 8) are indicators of the feasibility of succeeding in those missions. Criteria 1 − 4 can be used to rank particular threats, and criteria 5 − 8 can then be used to evaluate the feasibility of those missions to counter each threat. A ranking scheme would not be very difficult if only four criteria must be addressed for each case.[3] A very simple graphical model can be constructed here if criteria 1 and 2 are collapsed into a generic violation of human rights criterion, and criteria 6 and 7 are collapsed into a generic cost criterion. Figure 4-1 portrays this graphical model.

The top left-hand diagram in Figure 4-1 allows consideration of alternative combinations of three potential requirements justifying peacetime engagement missions. The blocks are representative cases to show, for example, how the Bosnian, Somalian, and Iraqi scenarios can be compared. Somalia's position is far enough along the scale of human suffering to justify engagement, even though its measure against the other two criteria would not justify intervention. The Bosnian and Iraqi examples, on the other hand, could justify missions based on either the grounds of human suffering or regional spill-over but perhaps not on the grounds of human rights violations (at least up to the early stages of these conflicts).

The bottom right-hand diagram in Figure 4-1 allows for consideration of tradeoffs among feasibility criteria. For example, the diagram portrays a potential policy threshold as the "surface" area ABCD. Such a feasibility threshold surface reflects the judgment of military and foreign policy decision-makers about what is acceptable under the circumstances. Case 1 portrays a hypothetical example where, say, a peacemaking mission could be undertaken. In this case, the relatively high cost and low probability of success are compensated for by a high degree of burdensharing by other participants. Case 2 is another example where the mission is feasible and where the low level of burdensharing is compensated for by a higher probability of success and lower cost.

Case 3, on the other hand, is an example where the mission is not feasible because it cannot rate high enough on any one or more of the criteria to move across the threshold. Case 3 might have represented Bosnia in early 1993, with the peacemaking mission becoming feasible (Case 1) after a sufficient number of countries (and NATO) signed up for participation. The probability of success may not have changed and the cost may have increased, but the spreading of costs and risks over a large number of participants now makes the mission feasible.

AUTHORITY FOR MANAGING PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

The discussion here focuses on the political regime that is appropriate for initiating peacetime engagement missions, not on legal instruments (such as Title 10 of the U.S. Code or Chapters VI and VII of the *United Nations Charter*). Policy deliberations about the division of labor between political jurisdic-

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[3]Any one of a number of multi-attribute evaluation models could be used here, ranging from simple graphical representations such as the two-dimensional "cobweb" model to computer-assisted models that consider risk.

TABLE 4-2

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA

No.	Criteria	Comment
	Potential need for peacetime engagement missions	
1.	Private criminal behavior that affects many more people than the number of criminals involved	Potential missions are for antidrug activities and counterterrorism operations, where behavior is beyond the control of local law enforcement agencies
2.	Government abuse of human rights (e.g., egregious unlawful confinement, denial of free speech, and brutality)	Potential missions are humanitarian relief and peacemaking, where abuse becomes intolerable.
3.	Human physical suffering (e.g., starvation, malnutrition, disease, and forces of nature)	Potential missions are humanitarian relief and peacemaking.
4.	Risk of domestic or interstate conflict becoming regional (e.g., disregard for international law such as border violations and provocation of neighboring states or ethnic groups)	Potential missions are humanitarian relief and peacemaking, where anarchy reigns or at the request of one or more parties to a local conflict and peacekeeping after parties have agreed to end the conflict or have had peace imposed.
	Feasibility of the mission	
5.	Likelihood of success (including timeliness)	Function of problem, mission, and resources assigned
6.	Military resource cost	Expected casualties, dollars, or reduced readiness to handle other missions if dollars are constrained
7.	Political cost	Loss of ability to influence events elsewhere
8.	Extent of burdensharing	Other participants and distribution of cost shares

tions can result in appropriate changes in the legal instruments if the arguments for doing so are sufficiently persuasive. This section presents some considerations for U.S. policymakers in choosing, or influencing the choice of, the appropriate political regimes to manage peacetime engagement missions.

United States' interests may often be more effectively served by promoting regional security regimes that are recognized by the United Nations and that become acceptable "agents" for dealing with regional problems. These regional regimes are likely to be more responsive to local crises, and their intervention would minimize the costs incurred by the United States in trying to influence the course of events.

Table 4-3 summarizes the criteria for supporting alternative political jurisdictions or regimes that should have responsibility for initiating and managing peacetime engagement missions. Although more than one criterion can be used to justify a particular jurisdictional responsibility, each criterion alone can be an independent justification. The criteria in Table 4-3 deal only with considerations involving the extent of the threat, the resources needed, and the scope of operation. They do not include feasibility considerations that would be made by the responsible political jurisdiction.

Several general principles for supporting or influencing the focus of responsibility for a particular mission, in addition to the obvious principle of capability to carry out the mission,

FIG. 4-1. RANKING OF THREATS AND EVALUATING MISSION FEASIBILITY

might be (1) to keep responsibility at the lowest political jurisdictional level and assigned to as few participants as possible, (2) to minimize the risks of escalation, and (3) to minimize the cost of the mission. In each case, the United States should try to influence assignment of responsibility to a regime or jurisdiction that best meets U.S. interests.

These principles indicate that the United Nations may not be the best choice in many cases although we believe that the United States should always try to promote U.N. involvement in international security issues and certainly try to obtain U.N. support for any responsible regime. United States interests often may be more effectively served by promoting regional security regimes in appro-

priate areas of the world regimes that are recognized by the United Nations and become acceptable agents for dealing with regional problems. These regional regimes are likely to be especially responsive to local crises and they would minimize the cost to the United States of influencing the course of events in those locales.

As a practical matter, regional security regimes might consist of regional powers or influential hegemonic states, instead of regional organizations. The United States could minimize the risk of supporting only one nation by continuing to promote a regional organization with leadership from the regional power.

Finally, it is worth noting from Table 4-3 that these principles can apply to missions

TABLE 4-3

CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL JURISDICTION OR REGIME

Mission type	Political jurisdiction or regime				
	United Nations	Regional	Regional hegemonic state or key nation	United States Federal Government	State or local government
Domestic U S disaster relief or civil disturbance				When state or local measures are inadequate	When state or local measures are adequate
Domestic U S counterdrug or counterterrorism		When regional orgs can decisively control the problem	When foreign nation can decisively control the problem	When state or local measures are inadequate	When state or local measures are adequate
Foreign natural or environmental disaster relief	When regional or national measures are inadequate	When national measures are inadequate	When local national measures are inadequate	When the United States is a major target or if participation is requested by others	
Humanitarian relief	If requested by a local or affected nation(s) or a regional org If international security interests are threatened by inadequate relief	If requested by a local or affected nation(s) If regional security interests are threatened by inadequate relief	If requested by a local nation(s) If national security interests are threatened by inadequate relief	If requested by others If U S interests are threatened by inadequate relief	If requested by the United States as best able to manage the mission
International counterdrug	If requested by a local or affected nation(s) or regional org If international security interests are threatened by inadequate measures	If requested by a local or affected nation(s) If regional security interests are threatened by inadequate measures	If requested by a local or affected nation(s) or international org If national security interests are threatened by inadequate measures	If requested by a local or affected nation(s) or international org If national security interests are threatened by inadequate measures	If requested by the United States as best able to manage the mission
International counterterrorism	Same as for counterdrug	Same as for counterdrug	Same as for counterdrug	Same as for counterdrug	Same as for counterdrug
Peacekeeping	If requested by parties to a conflict	If requested by parties to a conflict or the U N	If requested by parties to a conflict, the U N , or regional org	If requested by parties to a conflict, the U N , a regional org , or a hegemonic state	
Peacemaking	If requested by some parties to a conflict If international security is threatened	If requested by some parties to a conflict or the U N If regional security is threatened	If requested by parties to a conflict, the U N , or regional org If national security is threatened	If requested by parties to a conflict, the U.N., or regional org If national security is threatened	

being assigned to appropriate states in the United States for both domestic and international problems. For example, some U.S. states could develop special capabilities to undertake certain missions that might make them effective agents of the U.S. Government in unique international situations.

Managing peacetime engagement forces from different international political jurisdic-

tions can introduce another degree of complexity into an already complex management problem, although the mere presence of forces from multiple jurisdictions can be an important force multiplier itself and can substantially reduce the political risk to any one participant. United States policymakers should carefully weigh these benefits against the cost of complex coalition operations. There is some evidence that the cost of coalition operations rises more

than proportionally (i.e., exponentially) to the number of participants, even if there is complete accord about the mission's objectives. Of course, the possibility of an increased risk of failure can result from disagreement about those objectives as the operation proceeds. An argument could be made for creating coalitions with as many participants as possible but then subsequently delegating operational control of particular missions to single specific national forces; this was done in Operation Desert Storm. As experience is gained in coalition operations and likely coalition partners develop greater inter-operability, multinational forces should become more cost-effective.

CHAPTER 5

DoD ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
FOR PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

OVERVIEW

Planning and programming resources for peacetime engagement missions offers a particular challenge. The DoD has established executive agents among the Military Services to carry out those functions for some missions. For example, the Department of the Army was designated the executive agent for domestic missions such as disaster relief and control of civil disturbances. The technique of using executive agents was useful when such missions had no relationship to primary warfighting missions; that is, they would not compete for resources when warfighting missions were undertaken. Now, however, there may be some relationship even between domestic missions and other combat missions, and it is much more likely that all missions will compete for similar resources, such as CS and CSS units. Thus, the move to assign all missions and appropriate resources to the CINCs would contribute to more consistent and comprehensive planning and programming for missions across the spectrum. Assignment of all CONUS forces to the CINC LANTCOM, for example, would be a worthwhile decision. Program planning and budgeting for prioritized contingency operations within a coherent regional security strategy should eliminate the need for separate budget line items for particular missions, as now appears to be the case.[1]

Planning and programming for international missions clearly requires some joint effort with potential coalition partners. *Partners for Peace* makes the case for strong policy, planning, and intelligence roles for the United Nations, with a need for the United Nations to develop a military staff structure similar to NATO's.[2] The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff appear to believe that the U.S. Military should remain independent of direct controls by a United Nations Headquarters military staff. Clearly, the commitment of U.S. units to a U.N. rapid deployment force, proposed by the United Nations Association of the United States of America and implied by former President Bush in 1992, would make some planning by a U.N. staff for U.S. employment and training highly likely. Even earmarking particular units for possible U.N. contingency missions could call for some direct staff supervision from United Nations Headquarters.

An alternative to the potential loss of U.S. control and flexibility because of U.N. planning and programming is the promotion by the United States of regional security regimes. Regional security regimes would focus planning and programming more effectively on likely missions and contributing participants, and they would be the more appropriate mechanism for implementing logistics preparations and training. Moreover, U.S. foreign assistance could probably be more effectively integrated

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[1]For example, a recent news article noted that $398 million is being allocated for a combination of peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief missions and that Defense Secretary Les Aspin indicated that further funds may be transferred to the "line item." "Aspin Budgets for U.S. Peacekeeping Role," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 3 April 1993, p. 6.

[2]*Partners for Peace, op. cit.*, p. 14.

with military resources at the regional level than globally through the United Nations.

DoD ORGANIZATION

Department of Defense organization should continue to promote CINC responsibility for mission implementation and should provide greater CINC responsibility for planning and programming as part of a region-based national security strategy. Counternarcotics and counterterrorism should be part of that strategy. In 1989, the DoD elevated counternarcotics to a major mission area under CINC direction. The Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) offers a model for that strategy effort. The CINC LANTCOM could be given operational authority to carry out counternarcotics operations within CONUS as requested by, or coordinated with, state authorities.

Terrorism is a unique threat to U.S. and international security. It can shift rapidly from a localized act that might be dealt with by local law enforcement agencies to multiple acts that threaten national or regional security. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations [ASD(SO)] should be vested with the power to centralize direct global counterterrorism policy and intragovernment coordination. The primary counterterrorism mission is appropriately assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command. The CINC LANTCOM, as commander of all CONUS forces, would be best positioned to allocate resources to the counterterrorism mission for U.S. security.

The DoD's organizational structure should facilitate a regional security strategy. The traditional structure of the OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Department staffs has reflected a strong and effective geographical alignment. The complementary nature of functional staff organizations should also be retained to ensure that similar functions receive attention across Military Service and geo-

graphical boundaries. The temptation to structure organizations and staff to particular missions, however, should be resisted. The U.S. Special Operations Command is an exception to this rule simply because the particular skills and mission assignments appropriate to special operations lend themselves to a unique organization. The regional CINCs are appropriate foundations for a regional security strategy. The DoD should reject the temptation to employ the CINC LANTCOM as the "peacekeeping" CINC so that regional issues are dealt with by the appropriate regional CINCs. Besides, CINC LANTCOM will have enough to do with its own regional responsibilities, which should include counternarcotics, domestic disaster relief, and U.S. civil disturbance missions.

The focal point within the DoD for integrating policy and planning for peacetime engagement missions, along with the policy and planning for other missions (such as MRCs and strategic defense), should be the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD(P)]. However, the current organization of OUSD(P) is structured along mission as well as policy functions. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping appears to have policy responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking missions in support of U.N. operations. We believe that giving responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking mission policy to the ASD for Democracy and Peacekeeping will make that office a special advocate of such missions rather than bringing its functional expertise to bear in support of a comprehensive regional security strategy. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict has recently been redesignated as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations [ASD(SO)]. Responsibility for low-intensity conflict policy would have clearly included peacekeeping and peacemaking and, therefore, might have introduced some conflict with the ASD for Democracy and Peacekeeping inside

OUSD(P). Despite this recent rationalization of the ASD(SO) charter, we believe that the mission orientation of the ASD for Democracy and Peacekeeping will introduce unnecessary conflicts with the ASD for Regional Security and the ASD for Plans and Policy within OUSD(P) and with the Joint Staff and CINCs outside of OSD.

There is some indication from OSD officials that overall responsibility for peace-time engagement missions such as peacekeeping and peacemaking can be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy can provide the kind of high-level policy attention and integration that is required. The Deputy Secretary of Defense should not be placed in an advocacy position for particular capabilities since he or she will have to mediate conflicts between advocates within the Defense Resources Board and in other forums.

The propensity to compartmentalize organizational mechanisms for solving inter-national security problems is even evident in *Partners for Peace* by the United Nations Association of the United States of America:

> Good office mediation, negotiation, and conciliation, as well as the deployment of lightly-armed peacekeeping forces, should all be the charge of a department of political affairs and conflict resolution. A separate department of international peace and security should be responsible for U.N. missions of an enforcement character, including the maintenance of embargoes and the deployment of military forces under U.N. authority to restore peace and security in the face of armed opposition.[3]

The United States should resist this sort of compartmentalization at home and discourage it within the United Nations. United States military strategy and policy will likely become less autonomous in the future as military solutions to security problems become inte-grated with other solutions in a more hetero-geneous array of domestic and foreign policy tools. This will likely mean that the DoD may shift often from a lead to a supporting role in the resolution of some security problems. In par-ticular, there will likely be an increase in the requirements for DoD personnel to play a larger number of roles and develop a wider range of skills and capabilities than ever before.

TRAINING FOR PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Former President Bush indicated the need for some U.S. Military Forces to be trained specifically for U.N. peacekeeping operations because those operations require specialized techniques that are not part of conventional combat operations. We disagree. The likelihood of forces shifting missions along the continuum of peacetime engagement missions favors providing all forces with the capability to undertake any mission (with the exception of SOF).[4] We believe that the type of training needed to support peacekeeping missions and to be able to shift rapidly to peacemaking missions when necessary will enhance rather than detract from unit effectiveness in missions at the major warfighting end of the conflict spectrum. Recent events in Somalia and Bosnia further indicate that mission boundary conditions can change rapidly and that decision-makers will not have the luxury of being able to

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[3]*Partners for Peace*, p. 14.
[4]One DoD official with experience in peacekeeping missions who disagreed with us believed that peacekeeping forces could not quickly shift to a peacemaking role and cited the need to conduct some retraining and reestablishment of a combat "mind set" before engaging in a peacemaking mission.

shift between specialized forces. We hope that the new doctrines developed by the Services — such as those embodied in the Army's new FM100-8, Combined Army Operations — and by the Joint Staff include this flexibility.

Training should become more sophisticated to reflect the greater variety of skills employed by the Forces. Many military units and specialized individuals will find their repertoire of tactics and techniques expanded to accommodate the new range of missions. For some types of units and skills, such as those in the CS and CSS areas, the techniques and tactics may not significantly change, but those units and people will be subject to a more complex array of "rules of engagement." In other cases, probably for combat units and skills, the range of tactics and techniques will broaden as well.

The quantum increase in the complexity of peacetime engagement operations and sophisticated training demand higher educational levels of force personnel. Simulation techniques for planning and training are likely to be used for training in real engagements.[5] Simulation can save some training costs, but higher educational levels mean higher costs and/or fewer personnel. Requiring more education and training for a given force also lowers the availability of personnel to their units and hence lowers unit readiness. These cost and quality considerations may indicate that the Reserve Forces should be more actively involved in peacetime engagements. Consideration should be given to the long-term formation of Reserve Component units made up of volunteers, as practiced by some of the NATO

countries. Activation of Reserve Component units for extended periods should offer the possibility of some specialization by those Reserve Component units in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions, thus reducing the demand on the Active Forces.

Interoperability among National Guard, Reserve, and Active Forces will become more important. Even if Reserve and National Guard forces are earmarked for low-spectrum missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, while regular forces are focused on peacemaking and other high-spectrum conflicts, all forces must be increasingly interoperable since the boundaries between missions can shift rapidly. The differences in technologies available to all forces should be reduced over time to facilitate interoperability, particularly in the areas of C3I. For example, Navy Reserve units are not now able to fully assist active Navy units in drug surveillance missions because of the differences in C3I capabilities.

OTHER IMPLICATIONS

Promoting a regional security strategy with a continuum of missions may need to be supported by more flexible legislative authorities that make DoD resources more responsive to potential security threats. An example of the need for greater flexibility in legislative authority is the proposal made by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to the Secretary of Defense in June 1992 to amend the authority to activate selected reservists. That proposed amendment would allow the President to extend active duty for selected reservists from two periods of 90 days to two periods of 180 days each, and to delegate to

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[5]Increased education and training in morality and ethical conduct of mission operations will also be needed for two reasons. First, the conduct of peacetime engagement missions involves greater proximity to noncombatants and direct coordination with civilian representatives. Second, mission planning requires an understanding of the underlying social-political values and conflicts, which can be better understood if viewed from a more comprehensive, historical perspective.

the Secretary of Defense the authority to order up to 25,000 selected reservists to active duty. These proposed authorities are intended to ensure that Reserve Forces have sufficient time to deploy and carry out their missions once activated, and they could provide some gradation in the visibility of Reserve Component unit deployment that would be more responsive to quick-reaction missions where the use of full Presidential call-up authority might not be needed. The DoD may want to consider proposing even greater extensions of Active Duty, perhaps for volunteers (as discussed above), and to increase the number of reservists that the Secretary is authorized to order to active duty.

Another example of possible legislative authority deals with the need for greater flexibility in the effective use of the increasing volume of excess military equipment in the U.S. and allied Armed Forces. Current efforts in the DoD are largely being directed at removing that excess cost burden from the property accounting books as rapidly as possible. DoD should be examining the potential for regional contingency stockpiles that would reduce the need for U.S. Forces to deploy in future contingencies with a costly equipment train. Those stockpiles could also be used by allies or coalition partners in independent operations of mutual interest. Legislative amendments might include allocation of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund to these needs and delegation of authority to the Secretary of Defense to contract (perhaps with potential host nations) for services to manage the stockpiles.

Fortunately, the new acquisition policies that promote technological superiority and procurement flexibility, albeit at the risk of lower readiness for large-scale forces, do facilitate support for a more uncertain range of small force requirements. This balance in favor of rapid prototyping and insertion of new technologies into a smaller equipment inventory should be maintained. The challenge for force planners will be to optimize the allocation of less expensive, less mature equipment, versus more expensive sophisticated equipment across time and space for many possible contingencies. Part of the solution to this challenge may be in structuring forces that are "good enough" for certain contingencies rather than trying to use the best forces everywhere. Leveraging U.S. participation in coalition forces would be another economy-of-force solution.

An acquisition-related issue is how to handle the industrial base problems that arise when defense budgets are reduced. Credible arguments can now be made to support the idea that U.S. industrial mobilization for major, sustained warfare is unlikely. A regional security strategy should generate acquisition policies that rely upon the strengths of a global economy and the new directions in which industries are moving to remain competitive. The DoD should be increasingly willing to risk the (unlikely) need for industrial independence for the more likely, and more broadly beneficial, benefits gained through interdependence.

The importance of preparing to operate cooperatively with coalition partners, or even individual temporary allies, is being stressed in DoD plans, policies, and strategies. Nevertheless, there are widely varying efforts by the Military Departments to institutionalize coalition doctrine and C3I planning. The Navy and Air Force have consolidated coordination of international activities at the departmental

level, while the Army's international activities are still highly decentralized. At the same time, the Army's progress in developing new doctrine for coalition warfare should be a model for the other services.

As missions become more complex and operational constraints become more sensitive to political, social, and environmental considerations, the premium on effective C3I will rise dramatically. Consideration should be given to reducing the complexity of cross-service C3I capabilities, consolidating Service schools so that "jointness" is promoted,[6] increasing foreign and other U.S. Government department attendance at U.S. military schools, increasing foreign language training, providing improved simulation capabilities for planning and training to include allies and likely coalition partners, consolidating Service intelligence agencies, and improving integration of military intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planning and operations.

Finally, there is a growing need for greater use of simulation modeling to support planning and training for this wider range of potential missions. Modeling peacetime engagements will be even more difficult than modeling conventional conflict engagements between two opposing forces. Yet, it is precisely the complexity of relationships in peacetime engagements that makes their representation even more important for planning and training. This complexity calls for the use of simulation techniques that can reasonably represent key relationships and the uncertainty inherent in them. The greatest value of developing simulation models of complex systems is that the act of building the models provides timely insights into the current systems that would not have otherwise been discovered except by observing the actual systems over a very long time. In contrast with the very structured nature of optimizing or predictive modeling, simulation offers more flexibility in changing the environment — which makes simulation appropriate to the shifting conditions of peacetime engagement. The DoD should make simulation a priority modeling program under the Defense Modeling and Simulation Initiative. This initiative was created in 1990 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to promote the joint application of modeling and simulation within the DoD. The policy criteria that have been developed in this report could provide the basic framework for structuring a simulation effort, and the descriptions and definitions of different missions could serve as the initial raw material.

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[6]One of the senior Service's schools might be designated "College for Coalition Operations," which could become a "U.S. Center for Coalition Operations, Doctrine and Training." The Industrial College of the Armed Forces could be a candidate for such a school, under the management of the National Defense University.

GLOSSARY

A.I.D.	=	Agency for International Development
ASD	=	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD(SO)	=	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
ASEAN	=	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
C3I	=	command, control, communications, and intelligence
CIA	=	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	=	Commander in Chief
CONUS	=	Continental United States
CS	=	combat support
CSCE	=	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSS	=	combat service support
DEA	=	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	=	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA	=	Defense Information Systems Agency
DOT	=	Department of Transportation
DSAA	=	Defense Security Assistance Agency
FBI	=	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	=	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO	=	General Accounting Office
HHS	=	(Department of) Health and Human Services
INS	=	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRS	=	Internal Revenue Service
JCS	=	Joint Chiefs of Staff

JTF	=	joint task force
LANTCOM	=	Atlantic Command
MFO	=	Multinational Force and Observers
MILDEPs	=	Military Departments
MRC	=	major regional conflict
NATO	=	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Rep.	=	NATO Representative
NEO	=	noncombatant evacuation operation
NMS	=	National Military Strategy
NSC	=	National Security Council
OAS	=	Organization of American States
OASD(C3I)	=	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
OASD(ISA)	=	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
OASD(PA)	=	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OASD(R&MA)	=	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve and Manpower Affairs)
OASD(RA)	=	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
OSD	=	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD(P)	=	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
SOF	=	Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM	=	Southern Command
U.N.	=	United Nations
U.N. Rep.	=	United Nations Representative
USIA	=	United States Information Agency

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A major part of the debate over U.S. national security interests and the application of military force examines the need for, and the feasibility of, the U.S. Military to undertake missions other than those involving major regional conflicts (MRCs). These missions include disaster relief, counterterrorism, counterdrugs, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. We designed a framework of criteria to address these issues, and to place military solutions to international security problems in the context of other, nonmilitary solutions. The report also identifies the implications of "peacetime engagement" missions for DoD organization and training.

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