


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NATIONAL UNIFICATION AND TRANSITION
IN
THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

by

Eric Hugh Brandenburg

June 1993

Thesis Advisor: Donald Abenheim

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**NATIONAL UNIFICATION AND TRANSITION
IN
THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES**

by

Eric Hugh Brandenburg
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., University of Utah 1982

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of the requirements for the degree of


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
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
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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

The unification of Germany on 3 October 1990 formed a watershed event for the closing twentieth century. Will Germany become a hegemonic power in the new strategic environment? What are the strategic implications of the present restructuring of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr)? Since the Berlin Wall crumbled under the shadow of the Brandenburg Gate, Germany, Europe, and the international community have undergone historical change. The Soviet bear looming on the Central European Front has vanished as well as the Bipolar World and the division of Germany. With the effective statecraft of the United States and its allies, national unification of Germany became a reality.

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has a population of 80 million, the fourth largest economy in the world, and a strategic location in heart of Europe. No other country in Europe plays such a critical role in shaping the future course of the European Community (EC). Germany already plays a leading role internationally in economic, political, and strategic affairs.

This study examines the factors that have contributed to the strategic restructuring of the Bundeswehr. Not since its activation in 1955 has the Bundeswehr experienced such dramatic changes as have occurred since unification in 1990. From a national defense force posture aligned within

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Bundeswehr is making a transition to highly mobile, rapid-reaction units that can be deployed at short notice anywhere in the world. This step is a direct consequence of the fundamental changes that have taken place in the political and security environment in Europe, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Upon unification in October 1990, the FRG assumed the task of military expansion into the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The East German National People's Army (NVA) was perceived by the West German Bundeswehr as a challenge which was politically and ideologically integrated to Soviet military power. The NVA was regarded by some NATO analysts as the most effective armed force in the Warsaw Pact. It was equipped with modern weaponry and was regarded the most professional army in Eastern Europe.

The international agreements that determined future force level requirements on Germany are the Two-Plus-Four Talks of 1990 and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Germany agreed to meet a future end-strength of 370,000 troops by 1994. Besides the reduction in forces, Germany must dispose of vast amounts of equipment including thousands of armored vehicles and stockpiles of ammunition that Germany inherited from the NVA. Never before has the Bundeswehr been confronted with the need to reduce its military potential so drastically.

The German defense debate since January 1991 has focused on the issue of amending the German Basic Law or constitution. This move will perhaps allow Bundeswehr participation in future multilateral out-of-area operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Chancellor Helmut Kohl has called for a constitutional amendment that would allow German forces to participate in future UN operations as well as future European actions organized under NATO or the Western European Union (WEU). Certain German politicians and military leaders quite rightly emphasize that Germany's significance in the world is also measured in terms of its ability to rapidly provide military assistance to allies under attack, just as the Germans expected and received assistance from their cohorts during the Cold War.

Together, these factors have been conducive to a major reorientation of German defense planning. However, internal and external anxieties about a revival of German militarism have produced a confused defense policy. Not only in Europe but around the world, enduring memories of Hitler's War still limit Germany's ability to play a role commensurate with its economic and military strength, as well as its geopolitical importance. For many, the unification of Germany brought back images of the Prussian-German past that had faded through the years since 1945.

Due to historical coincidence, German diplomacy was fully engaged in the process of unification when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The Gulf War marked a turning point for the Bundeswehr. Germany suddenly found

itself criticized for being a pacifist by not sending military forces to fight with the allied coalition in Iraq. These accusations occurred despite the constitutional obstacles in sending troops. The war highlighted how quickly and dramatically the expectations of Germany's neighbors and allies had changed and how inadequate the German defense policy had become in light of these changes.

Not long after the Gulf War, Germany was riddled with accusations by alliance partners for being too assertive in the Balkan quagmire. The swift recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991, is believed by many to have accelerated the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. An unfortunate analogy was drawn between this recent German initiative and the alliance between the Third Reich and the Croatian Ustasa regime of World War II.

Today, the Bundeswehr faces a head-on challenge at home against greater economic, political, and social crises of unity. With the overwhelming economic and social costs of unification, the defense budget will become a tasty piece to carve in the total pie of the federal budget. It has come as a tremendous shock for Germans to realize that unification is more complex, more time consuming, and more expensive than they realized in 1989-1990.

Will the enormous cost of unification cause Germany to turn inward from the international community? Germany is in the midst of a crisis that defies easy comparisons with past historical patterns. This thesis will argue that Germany is not nationalizing its defense structure. Makers of German defense

policy understand that their future security can only be achieved within the context of integrated defense structures with its Western allies.

With these concepts in mind, the strategic question for force planners is: Will there be the capability with a slashed military budget and a massive reduction in forces to provide defense at home and fulfill its international duties? How does this military institution reflect greater political realities?

Germany must reequip and reorganize its forces to conduct out-of-area missions. The German government must also resolve the constitutional dilemma to deploy forces under the auspices of the UN in order to fulfill the UN Secretary General's desires.

It is no coincidence that a German White Paper on the armed forces has not been published since 1985, and attempts since then have been discarded time and again. To assess the German military of the future, it is essential to express the German perspective on the Bundeswehr and how the force plays an integral part in German society. The Bundeswehr is a crucial instrument of German security policy. With the end of the Cold War, the Federal Republic must confront the issue that the Bundeswehr no longer exists solely to protect Germany. It is the twofold process of this study to examine the historical context of the Bundeswehr and the future functions it will have to perform.

II. A DIFFICULT FATHERLAND

One should recall that modern Germany as a single nation-state dates back only to 1871. Unification came as the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century accelerated and as a result of passage of arms. Otto von Bismarck's diplomacy and the effective Prussian army brought the separate German lands together and established a single government.

During the Thirty Years' War, Germany was twice on the verge of unification, in 1629 by Albrecht von Wallenstein and in 1631 by Gustavus Adolphus.¹ Both men failed to unite the German principalities and the dawn of the empire was postponed for 240 years.

The legend of Prussian-German military invincibility was born over three centuries ago. The Great Elector, Frederick William of Brandenburg, created what we know as Prussia.² The Brandenburger had little chance to prove his military skills convincingly. Europeans, exhausted by the Thirty Years' War, "took saber-rattling for great deeds, and believed in Brandenburg-Prussian superiority."³

¹Jacob C. Burckhardt, Reflections On History (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1979), p. 337.

²David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II To Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 179.

³Erwin C. Lessner, Blitzkrieg and Bluff: The Legend of Nazi Invincibility (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1943), p. 3.

In his memorandum to his successor, Frederick William wrote in 1667, "Alliances to be sure are good, but forces of one's own, upon which one can rely, are better. It is these, thank God!, that have made me considerable since the time when I began to have them."⁴ Prussia developed a great advantage over its neighbors in Europe, both German and foreign. It created an effective administrative apparatus and a modern draft system that provided Prussia with a disproportionately large standing army.⁵

The superiority of the prussian army was made possible by its organization, peacetime training, and perfection in military strategy. The origins of the Prussian General Staff date back prior to 1806. Gerhard von Scharnhorst implemented the general staff and reorganized the War Ministry in 1809.⁶ He created a special division that educated, mobilized, organized, and trained the Prussian army.⁷

In the essence of Prussian military tradition, it was the Prussian military which defeated Napoleon at Leipzig in October 1813, and imposed its hegemony upon Germany in 1866. At the dawn of forging the German Empire,

⁴Gordon A. Craig, The Germans (New York: New American Library, 1982), p. 238.

⁵Josef Joffe, "German Defense Policy: Novel Solutions and Enduring Dilemmas," in Gregory Flynn, ed., The Internal Fabric of Western Security (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 64.

⁶Hajo Holborn, "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 283.

⁷Ibid.

the army created a state, and not vice versa. "Prussia is not a country with an army but an army with a country."⁸

After 1866, military values permeated the most elite areas of German society. When the Second Reich was established in 1871, after defeating France, the military was the critical factor in the strategic calculus of Germany. As a result, the empire created by Bismarck and the Prussian military did not fully recognize popular sovereignty and true self-government.⁹ Germany was in essence an authoritarian state.

From 1871 to 1945, the German military was the main obstacle to "effective parliamentary government and progress toward democracy."¹⁰ During World War II, the Western Allies agreed that the German General Staff and the Wehrmacht (German Army) would be abolished. "Germany would never again be allowed to have an army."¹¹

These ambitions were nullified by the Cold War. After World War II, Germany was divided into two separate entities. The traditional hegemonic power of the Wehrmacht was gone, but both East and West Germany rearmed.

⁸Michael G. Roskin, Countries and Concepts: An Introduction to Comparative Politics, fourth edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 144.

⁹Craig, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 238.

¹¹Ibid., p. 237.

Hitler and National Socialism were merely replaced by Stalin and Communism as the free world's enemy number one.

After the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces on 8 May 1945, Germany was carved up by the Allies. According to the Berlin Declaration, Germany was divided into American, Soviet, British, and French occupation zones. The FRG was established on 21 September 1949, although its sovereignty was limited by the Allied military occupation.

III. FORMATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR

All too soon, the Cold War brought the Americans to call for the arming of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany. How would western security against the Russians be assured, yet still protect the West against the revival of German militarism? The answer which emerged in 1955 was the Bundeswehr.

The Bundeswehr was created over a fifteen year period from 1950 until 1965. Initially, the Germans were to provide a contingent to a joint European army. After 1954, the Germans were to create their own national armed forces, a task which was not fully completed until the late 1960's.¹² Of crucial importance, the new force was born while memories of German aggression and genocide remained fresh in ones mind. Many in America and Europe wanted to assure that Germans would never again bear arms.

The young Federal Republic in the fall of 1949 faced its own set of security problems. The FRG was utterly defenseless and stood essentially alone and outside the emerging structure of NATO defense.¹³ Even though evidence pointed towards some kind of association or alliance between the new state and the West, the precise means did not yet exist.

¹²Professor Donald Abenheim, "Military Thought in the West German Armed Forces" (manuscript, Naval Postgraduate School, 1988), p. 6.

¹³Ibid., p. 55.

President Harry Truman's first answer to the Soviet threat in Europe had been the highly successful diplomatic measures of 1947. The Truman Doctrine proclaimed support for regimes resisting communism. The Marshall Plan provided financial support to aid the economic recovery of wartorn Europe.

On the contrary to receiving significant development aid from the United States, the FRG government of Konrad Adenauer had no federal police force on hand at the time when the Volkspolizei (KVP) in the GDR was acquiring heavy weapons and combat echelons for mechanized warfare.¹⁴ In the Soviet zone of occupation, a handful of former Wehrmacht officers began to plan the armed force that ultimately became the German contribution to the Warsaw Pact, the NVA.¹⁵

While the NATO allies and the WEU would defend their own troops should these be attacked on German soil, the western zones of occupation in the FRG were outside the aegis of NATO. The citizens of the FRG had no assurance that anyone would come to their defense should the vicious Russian bear come rumbling across the border of the Soviet zone. In effect, the FRG was essentially a "no mans land" for the defense of western Europe.¹⁶

When Konrad Adenauer became Chancellor of the FRG in September 1949, he spoke directly to the Allied High Commissioners on the problems of

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 55.

a western security guarantee. He was ambitious to bind the western allies to a system of collective defense. Adenauer was unyielding to the Western allies, that they would have to take the Federal Republic as a full partner in a collective security system, or not at all.¹⁷

As late as one month before the outbreak of the Korean War, the American State Department reaffirmed their position on the Potsdam Agreement of demilitarization. They insisted that a demilitarized Germany remained the policy of the United States, despite the growing calls from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Germans would have to make some kind of contribution to Atlantic defense.¹⁸

With the Allies in firm control of Germany, the outbreak of the Korean War surprised the free world. It was widely thought that aggression in Asia could easily trigger a communist move in Western Europe. This prompted a reappraisal of Soviet ambitions in the minds of American policymakers and the requirement to strengthen NATO.¹⁹

Could Germany be protected from a Soviet attack without rearmament? In 1948, the Berlin Blockade and the airlift from the three Western zones to

¹⁷Dirk Verheyen, The German Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 111.

¹⁸Abenheim, manuscript, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁹Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense After World War II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 4.

Berlin should have indicated a need for greater conventional forces. In 1950, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles noted that "a defense on the Rhine would mean the loss of Germany, while holding a line along the Elbe was problematical due especially to a lack of troops."²⁰ The West Germans could fill this void in Central Europe. However, Germany in 1950 had barely begun to recover from the devastation of Hitler's War.

The Allies had agreed to demilitarize the Third Reich and disband all military formations, while sending to the dungeon leading officers guilty of war crimes.²¹ The armament of the Federal Republic would be an international political problem. However, only the occupying powers could make this decision after an arduous process of debate. The Western allies would have to overturn their policy of demilitarization as directed in the Potsdam Agreement. To many Europeans in the 1950's, the rearmament of Germany would send waves of fear shuddering throughout the continent. As early as 1949, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer suggested rearming Germany to gain immediate economic and political benefits.²² A balance had to be found

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Donald Abenheim, Reforging The Iron Cross (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 39.

²²Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "German-American Relations in the Postwar Decades," in Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred-Year History, Volume II: The Relationship in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), p. 94.

that would employ German strength for Western defense, while it integrated the Federal Republic into a collective defense system.

Although the young Federal Republic was militarily helpless and open to attack by the Soviet Army, it had valuable assets to draw from which the West would use for a successful continental defense. German leaders, "conscious of their strength despite the appearance of weakness, made a virtue out of necessity."²³ They successfully made demands upon the occupiers as the move towards a German defense contribution accelerated.

Despite the pathetic weakness of the FRG at its birth, the geography of the Cold War, the enduring strength of the German economy, and the elite potential of the future German soldier strengthened the FRG in a direct way. This development fostered the emergence of German figures who were concerned with the defense of the FRG, especially in the wake of the Russian attempt to cut off Berlin from the West.²⁴

Konrad Adenauer sought the advice of former Wehrmacht officers who had not disgraced themselves in the Third Reich. These officers analyzed what they had done in the war and how they had succeeded and finally failed on the battlefield.²⁵ One outstanding officer who advised Adenauer on military and security matters was General Hans Speidel, Erwin Rommel's Chief of Staff in

²³Abenheim, manuscript, op. cit., p. 58.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 9.

France. Speidel was a prominent general with extensive general staff experience. He exerted an important and longstanding influence on Konrad Adenauer and the emerging strategic ideas of the FRG government.²⁶

General Speidel described West German security as the "concern of the whole of Europe."²⁷ He rejected ideas of an international guarantee of neutrality for a demilitarized Germany. He was all too conscious of the threat posed to central Europe by the massed power of the Soviet Army.

General Speidel was committed that the "strategic vacuum between the Oder and the Rhine should be filled by the Western allies."²⁸ As early as 1948, Speidel believed that Germany should turn to the United States, the only country capable of fulfilling this demand.²⁹

Konrad Adenauer based his demands on the Western Allies for security largely on the military and strategic concepts of General Speidel. The Federal Republic had to protect its citizens against attack through a policy of deterrence. Adenauer's grand strategy was to be assured by an alliance with the West. The threat of nuclear and conventional weapons in NATO would be the teeth of his security guarantee.³⁰

²⁶Ibid., p. 59.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., p. 36.

The Germans were willing to contribute conventional combat forces in the shape of a German contingent in a mutual collective security system.³¹ Adenauer advanced his objective by placing the decision on the shoulders of the Military Governors and the High Commissioners. Initially, Hans Speidel gave little mention to the role of German forces in the defense of Central Europe. However, in his strategical and operational ideas of the years 1950-1954, Speidel added a role for German forces to the defense of Europe.³² He signified that a German contribution of combat forces was to take place within a collective European army. This action would muffle fears that German soldiers would revive Prussian-German militarism.

Speidel also called for the complete political and military equality of Germany and its eventual membership in NATO.³³ Only through NATO would the Federal Republic be able to fulfill the grand political demands which Konrad Adenauer put forth. Adenauer embraced Speidel's strategy wholeheartedly.³⁴

The Korean War and the need to align firmly the FRG with the Western Allies led to policy changes within NATO. In the Summer of 1950, the North

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., p. 61.

³³Ibid., p. 62.

³⁴Ibid., p. 66.

Atlantic Alliance pressed the issue for a military contribution from the Federal Republic of Germany.³⁵

President Harry Truman examined NATO's early weakness and came to the conclusion that "without Germany, the defense of Europe was a rearguard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany, there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East."³⁶ If the Western allies were to take the risk of rearming the Germans, they must accomplish two goals at once: "the new system of European defense must simultaneously include the manpower and military genius of the Federal Republic, while at the same time the new security system must prevent the Germans from sowing the dragons teeth of an army of aggression."³⁷ American pragmatism and anticommunism led the U.S. government to capitalize on German professional military expertise.

What first led to United States insistence on rearming West Germany was troop strength within NATO.³⁸ Other significant military-strategic factors involving this decision were: the need to counter Soviet conventional force superiority, counter the rearmament of the communist satellite states, deter an

³⁵McGeehan, op. cit., p. 29.

³⁶Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Volume II (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), p. 253.

³⁷Abenheim, manuscript, op. cit., p. 57.

³⁸Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political Leaders (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957), p. 8.

attack by the People's Police (KVP) of the GDR, employ German manpower resources (considered impressive both as fighters and as experienced veterans of Russian campaigns), and lastly to make up for any material deficiencies in a time of crisis.³⁹

Another strategic factor considered in the equation was Germany's geographic position in Europe. Based on NATO strategy, the establishment of a forward line of defense was crucial to prevent the Soviets from overrunning the occupied areas in the event of an attack.⁴⁰

The need to arm the Federal Republic now fully coincided with the interests of the United States, Germany, and NATO. In May 1955, the Paris Treaties granted the FRG sovereign status, membership in NATO, and authorized it to raise a contingent force of 500,000 men.⁴¹ This diplomacy stipulated a contribution by the Bundeswehr to western defense within the framework of NATO and the WEU.

With the rearmament of Germany and a democratically instituted government, the Cold War brought a distinct change between the Bundeswehr and the Wehrmacht. The Bundeswehr is the first military force in Germany that was created from an effective democracy. The FRG abandoned much of

³⁹McGeehan, op. cit., p. 28.

⁴⁰White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, (Bonn: Federal Minister of Defense, June 1985), p. 27.

⁴¹Craig, op. cit., p. 242.

the Prussian legacy and developed a very enlightened form of discipline and leadership. This theory is based on the idea that a military force in a democracy must treat people fairly.⁴²

A significant number of citizens in the Federal Republic had enough of war. They never again wanted to wear a uniform and bear arms.⁴³ This public anxiety about the profile of a future war in Germany, helped to make a reasoned discussion of operations and strategy in the 1950's and 1960's far more problematic, than for example in the United States. The ethical, political, and social constitution of the Bundeswehr during this period took up far greater attention and energy than did questions of operations and strategy.

The political and economic rehabilitation of West Germany, and its integration into a Western democracy, "was far more significant than the eventual reappearance of German soldiers."⁴⁴ The German's constructed a highly successful economy in the post-war period. Throughout the Cold War, one might perceive the attitude of Germans as: "The Bundesbank is more important than the Bundeswehr."⁴⁵

⁴²Ibid., p. 244.

⁴³Abenheim, op. cit., p. 153.

⁴⁴McGeehan, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴⁵Opinion expressed by Professor Donald Abenheim, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

The Bundeswehr was created as a force within NATO and not as "an instrument for independent military power projection on the part of the FRG."⁴⁶ The enduring fears of militarism in the Federal Republic set very strict political limits on what professional soldiers could do and say in the FRG. In turn, these soldiers faced profound political and social obstacles to the fulfillment of their mission.

The Germans have learned that a state cannot solve power problems with armed forces solely. Militarism had been the worst evil of Prussian-German history. Therefore, the combat units of the Bundeswehr, with the exception of territorial units, would be placed under the operational control of NATO.⁴⁷ German soldiers faced a constant challenge of adapting to, and exerting influence upon, NATO strategy. The evolution of strategic and operational ideas in the Bundeswehr, has reflected this ongoing struggle.⁴⁸

During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr played a key role in NATO by providing effective conventional forward defense in Europe. The FRG was the only country in the North Atlantic Alliance to commit all its combat-ready forces available for operations within the scope of NATO defense planning.⁴⁹

The geographic location of West Germany along the border of the Warsaw Pact

⁴⁶White Paper, op. cit., p. 72.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Abenheim, manuscript, p. 1.

⁴⁹White Paper, op. cit., p. 111.

required significant conventional forces. The Bundeswehr provided the main contribution of these forces at the border in Central Europe.⁵⁰ The main mission of the Bundeswehr became over time to deter war rather than to fight a war.

In comparison, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, the Bundeswehr eclipsed the British and French armed forces.⁵¹ The latter have nuclear weapons, but the Germans have built an impressive and modern military in Europe. It is the Germans and Americans who bore the primary burden of Western defense within NATO during the Cold War. This shared German-American leadership fostered the development of the Bundeswehr.

For thirty-five years the Bundeswehr was poised to resist Soviet military aggression. Today it is obvious that in the near future there is little chance of a coordinated military offensive against Germany by any military forces that were part of the former Soviet Union. One can also presume that if such a threat to German national security were to exist in the near future, there would be sufficient warning time to enlarge and improve the Bundeswehr in order to respond to that threat.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 110.

⁵¹Abenheim, manuscript, op. cit., p. 60.

IV. SOURCES OF CHANGE

When the FRG and the GDR decided to unite in 1989-1990, they agreed to abolish the NVA in favor of the Bundeswehr. Based on the Two-Plus-Four Talks which concluded in Moscow on 12 September 1990, Article 3 of the Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany states: "The Government of the FRG undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and naval forces) within three to four years."⁵²

Of significant note is the overall ceiling of 345,000 troops (ground and air) accepted by Germany during the 1990 CFE Treaty.⁵³ Germany was the only country with a politically binding commitment to the number of troops it could have. The 1990 CFE Treaty limited five types of weapons but did not include troop reductions. To the dismay of German leaders, this imposed an outlying restriction on the newly sovereign nation. As a number of security experts

⁵²"Treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany," 12 September 1990, Article 3, Section 2; Adam Daniel Rotfeld and Walther Stütze, eds., Germany and Europe in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 184.

⁵³Catherine Guichard, Treaty On Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE): A Primer (Congressional Research Service, 5 July 1991), p. 6.

noted, it was evident that the Germans wanted a manpower cap for the other nations in the CFE Treaty, just as they had in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty."⁵⁴

In July 1992, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the former Warsaw Pact countries, and most of the European countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed the "Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength."⁵⁵ Also known as "CFE 1A," this agreement is the follow-up to the previous CFE negotiations. Unlike the limits committed by Germany in the original CFE Treaty (weapons and personnel), the ceilings established by CFE 1A were unilaterally declared by each state, not subject to negotiation, and require no country to cut its forces.⁵⁶ Many of these conditions were fully implemented by Germany within a year of unification, an exceptional achievement. The most arduous and direct efforts were those to close the NVA's facilities and to retire most of its personnel and equipment.⁵⁷

The NVA was established in 1956 and formed an integral part of the Warsaw Pact. In peacetime, the NVA comprised of 170,000 troops from the

⁵⁴This judgement is based on the author's interviews with specialists in European security.

⁵⁵Lee Feinstein, "25 Nations Sign CFE Follow-On," Arms Control Today, July/August 1992, p. 29.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The New Germany: An Overview," in Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Germany and The New Europe (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 21.

army, air force, and navy.⁵⁸ On 1 October 1990, the Warsaw Pact began to vanish. The NVA command discharged all general and flag officers. Furthermore, all professional soldiers over 55 years old were released.⁵⁹ On 2 October 1990, the NVA ceased to exist.

On 3 October 1990, unification day, approximately 90,000 service personnel and about 47,000 civilian employees joined the Bundeswehr on the basis of special preliminary terms of service. The 6,000 remaining regular members of the border troops and the civil defense organization of the GDR were taken over by the Bundeswehr.⁶⁰

To supervise the smooth transition after unification, the Federal Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg established the Bundeswehr Eastern Command and the Military Administrative District VII at the former NVA headquarters in Strausberg near Berlin.⁶¹ This command, staffed with Bundeswehr officers and civilian officials, worked with the remaining NVA staff. Nearly 2,000 servicemen and several hundred civilian officials from the Bundeswehr took over commanding the newly established units and agencies.⁶²

⁵⁸Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," AUSSENPOLITIK, 2nd Quarter 1992, p. 165.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 164.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 164.

⁶²Ibid., p. 165.

Initially, Bundeswehr officers took over most command functions. Only units of company size and half the battalions were headed by former NVA officers. The first conscripts since 3 October 1990 from the former GDR entered the Bundeswehr in January 1991.⁶³

On 1 July 1991, Bundeswehr Command East completed its formal responsibilities and was replaced by Bundeswehr territorial commands in each of the five new states. These districts consisted army, air force, and navy command structures of the Bundeswehr structure for post-1994.⁶⁴

Unfortunately, several factors associated with personnel will affect both the quality and quantity of German forces. For example, the GDR's National People's Army (NVA) was politically and militarily linked to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Their equipment structure and training were largely patterned on the Soviet model.⁶⁵

In view of Major Harald Renk, the first NVA officer to be commissioned in the Bundeswehr, East German soldiers were told: "Our ties are all with the Soviet Union and the armies of fraternal socialist states."⁶⁶ The soldiers of the NVA were consistently brain-washed with political jargon from the forces of

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Kelleher, op. cit., p. 21.

⁶⁵Werner von Scheven, op. cit., p. 165.

⁶⁶Ernst-Michael Brandt, "The first easterner gets a permanent commission with the former enemy," (Die Zeit, Hamburg, 30 October 1992), The German Tribune, 6 November 1992-No.1539, p. 4.

communism within the WTO. "They were taught to feel implacable hatred of the most aggressive forces of imperialism and their spearhead, the Bundeswehr."⁶⁷ Furthermore, political documentation recovered from the NVA proves that the Bundeswehr was the main object of anti-NATO hate training.⁶⁸

After unification, the total strength of the combined East and West German forces was approximately 590,000 troops, of which 90,000 had previously belonged to the NVA.⁶⁹ Not only did the German Armed Forces have to be reduced, but the NVA had to be terminated and parts of it placed in the Bundeswehr. By December 1994, the entire reorganization should be completed in accordance with the internationally established parameters. Even after the force reductions, the Bundeswehr will remain the largest military force in Western and Central Europe.⁷⁰

With the increase in Bundeswehr forces after unification, it became crucial to the Western Allies to keep Germany in NATO. In July 1990, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the former Soviet Union

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Werner von Scheven, op. cit., p. 166.

⁶⁹Joseph S. Gordon, "German Unification and the Bundeswehr," Military Review, November 1991, p. 21.

⁷⁰Feinstein, loc. cit.

agreed that a united Germany could remain in NATO.⁷¹ This step was a significant achievement since the North Atlantic Alliance is the embodiment of security in Germany, as well as Europe. Furthermore, with the vast change in the operational and strategic environment since 1990, the Bundeswehr must now structure their forces to fulfill the needs of NATO, the United Nations (UN), and national defense.

Firmly aligned within NATO, Germany must ensure that the Bundeswehr can provide effective forces both to manage crises and to counter an attack on an ally or itself. As indicated in The Alliance's New Strategic Concept: "Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time."⁷² In light of NATO's new strategic concept, Bundeswehr units for United Nation blue helmet missions, crisis reaction, and humanitarian aid will be needed on short notice and equipped differently. The demise of the Soviet Union has changed expectations about the most probable military operations.

⁷¹Rotfeld and Stützele, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁷²"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991, p. 12.

Today, a major topic in the German Ministry of Defense and beyond is the "out of area" issue. Many German politicians and military leaders emphasize that Germany's credibility in NATO will be measured in terms of its ability to provide military assistance to allies in a crisis.⁷³ On 2 October 1990, Chancellor Helmut Kohl in an address to South African president F.W. De Klerk stated: "Now that German unity with complete sovereignty has been achieved, the FRG is prepared to participate in UN measures aimed at preserving and restoring peace through the deployment of its forces. We will create the necessary internal conditions for this."⁷⁴

Chancellor Kohl's belief is appropriate in light of the military solidarity the FRG received from NATO allies during the past four decades. Furthermore, there has been great controversy within the government leadership over the future shape and size of the Bundeswehr. Defense Minister Volker R  he cited the goal of the Bundeswehr as "an army in the alliance."⁷⁵ With the responsibilities of a sovereign nation, comes the necessity for Germans to participate in international affairs. Defense Minister R  he has also stressed the need for active participation in UN peacekeeping

⁷³Christoph Bertram, "The Bundeswehr is still trying to find its real place in the changed world," (Die Zeit, Hamburg, 4 September 1992), The German Tribune, 11 September 1992-No.1531, p. 5.

⁷⁴"South Africa's De Klerk," Johannesburg SAPA(2 October 1990), FBIS-WEU-90-192-U(3 October 1990):17

⁷⁵"R  he Cited On Bundeswehr NATO Participation," Die Welt(18 April 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-076(20 April 1992):6.

operations. The record of German armed forces since 1945 suggests why this goal has been so difficult.

V. POLITICS OF SECURITY

While Defense Minister Volker R  he argues for German forces to participate in international crises, the out-of-area issue for the Bundeswehr has brought forth great controversy amongst German parliamentarians. For Germany, war has remained a relatively ineffective means to realize political objectives. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the foundation of the constitution (the Basic Law).

In May 1949, four years after the demise of the Third Reich, the Basic Law was proclaimed by the Parliamentary Council. After twelve years of Hitler's tyranny and four years of military occupation, the western part of Germany, with the concurrence of the three occupying powers, adopted a liberal democratic constitution which would guarantee a stable economic and political future.⁷⁶ An important principle of the Basic Law is that the state owes its existence to the will of the people, not vice versa as in National Socialist or Communist systems.⁷⁷

Second to the United States, the German Federal government has become the most effective democratic institution in the free world. In May 1989,

⁷⁶The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 3.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4

celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Basic Law, President Richard von Weizsäcker expressed: "The adoption of the Basic Law by the parliamentary council opened the way for a German state, which is committed to democracy, human rights and peace, and has earned the world's respect."⁷⁸ The fundamentally democratic concept of the Basic Law is expressed in an essential phrase: "All power stems from the people."⁷⁹

The Bundestag (German Parliament) is the popularly elected federal legislature consisting of 662 members. The Bundestag seats only those parties which receive five-percent of the popular vote. The five-percent clause is to prevent an echo of the Weimar Era, when the National Socialists German Workers Party rose to power. The electoral law guarantees political stability while the election results reflect the political will of the people.⁸⁰

The Bundesrat (Assembly of Constituent States), the second chamber, represents the sixteen states of the FRG. It also shares in the legislative process. Each state is allotted a number of voting seats depending upon the size of its population. The Bundesrat's consent is required for constitutional amendments and for federal legislation which directly affects the states

⁷⁸"Speech by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker," German Information Center (New York: 24 May 1989), p. 1.

⁷⁹The Basic Law, loc. cit.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 5.

affairs.⁸¹ In practice, because of its corrective function on behalf of the states, the Bundesrat may be called the restraining branch of parliament. Problems can arise for the Federal Government when the minority party in the Bundestag has a majority in the Bundesrat.⁸²

The Basic Law also addresses the significance of the political parties to the political process. For the first time in German constitutional history, the parties are essential instruments of the political will of the people. Candidates for parliamentary election undergo a selection process within their parties before qualifying for the ballot.⁸³

As in any true democracy, it is the legislators which must determine how to employ military forces. The key articles in the Basic Law that dominate the controversy amongst German parliamentarians are Articles 24 and 87a of the Basic Law. Article 24, Entry Into A Collective Security System, section (2) "For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world."⁸⁴

⁸¹Ibid., p. 6.

⁸²Ibid., p.5.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid. p. 24.

Article 87a, Build-up, Strength, Use, And Functions Of The Armed Forces, was inserted by federal law of 19 March 1956, section (1) "The Federation shall build-up armed forces for defense purposes. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure shall be shown in the budget."⁸⁵ Section (2) of the same article reads: "Apart from defense, the armed forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law."⁸⁶ To prevent a rehearsal of the past, Article 26 of the constitution explicitly bans the preparation for wars of aggression.⁸⁷

The issue of the role of the military is the source of considerable conflict within the government and among the political parties. The discussion within the parliament has been not so much on when and how the Bundeswehr should be used for out-of-area missions, but whether such actions are allowed by the Basic Law.

A recent example of this quagmire is the participation of German forces in NATO AWACs surveillance flights over Bosnia. The patrols are staffed to one-third by German personnel. With the UN resolution to not only observe,

⁸⁵Ibid. p. 54.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid.

but also to direct fire, the nature of the reconnaissance mission changes to an active military role.⁸⁸

The nature of this mission, many in Germany believe, violates the constitutional mandate that the German military may be used only for defense purposes. Others in Germany argue that the deliberate vagueness of the German constitution on the conditions under which military activity can occur, are a reflection of the past and should be revised. Some interpret the constitution to say that military actions under the aegis of the UN are permitted, because they are not explicitly forbidden.⁸⁹ This latter line of thought supports German military activity under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The Free Democratic Party (FDP) forced the AWACs issue to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. The FDP wants to clarify the extent to which the Bundeswehr may participate in UN missions that are out of the NATO area.⁹⁰ On 8 April 1993, the court approved German participation in the AWACs mission but has not ruled on the issue of constitutionality.

⁸⁸"Security Council Decision on Bosnia Puts Pressure on Germany to Resolve Issue of the Role of the Military," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 2 April 1993), p. 1.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰"Bundestag Approves Somalia Mission For German Armed Forces," The Week In Germany, 23 April 1993, p. 1.

The AWACs issue is an example of how diverse the German politicians interpret the Basic Law. The constitution directs but does not define the use of the Bundeswehr. Germans are extremely conscientious of the constitution and will fallback on the written law when a stipulation occurs as the out-of-area question.

To interpret the Basic Law as it is written, does "a system of mutual collective security" mean the UN, NATO, or WEU? In a historical context, one would assume that Article 24 refers to NATO. This interpretation would not allow German forces to deploy out-of-area as defined in NATO doctrine. What exactly does the law mean by "defense purposes," as defined in Article 87a? During the Cold War, the German parliament would have no problem defining this. If the Soviets penetrated the Central European Front, the Bundeswehr would have been used to protect the Fatherland along with the collective defense of NATO.

Article 87a was created by the German parliament to prevent the assignment of Bundeswehr troops outside of NATO territory.⁹¹ These legal restrictions were written into the Basic Law in the 1950's. After the Bundeswehr was created in 1955, it was decided amongst the FRG, United

⁹¹The Basic Law, op. cit., p. 54.

States, United Kingdom, and France that Bundeswehr forces would only be used for defending NATO territory.⁹²

Prevailing interpretations of the Basic Law hold that the Bundeswehr may be used only for defensive purposes within NATO. However, the German Ministry of Defense has defined a mission of the Bundeswehr as to be available for assignment in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, after amendment of the Basic Law.⁹³

All the political parties believe that the constitution should be less ambiguous concerning the deployment of forces. Changes need to be made in reference to the deployment of German forces to participate in UN military action. These changes should be completed by 1994. This will be necessary given the differences of opinion in the German parliament regarding the interpretation of Articles 24 and 87a of the constitution.⁹⁴

It is important to resolve these legal questions because the Germans must endow the Bundeswehr to future European security and international crises. The recent Bundestag vote to deploy troops to Somalia is a prime example. On 21 April 1993, the German parliament approved sending 1,600 soldiers to

⁹²"Germany's Contribution to the Gulf Effort," German Information Center (New York: 21 February 1991), p. 1.

⁹³Horst Siedschlag, "The New Defense Model," conference presentation, 9 April 1992, p. 8.

⁹⁴Ibid.

Somalia in June 1993.⁹⁵ The Free Democrats, who had forced the AWACs issue to the Karlsruhe court, accepted the view of Christian Democrats that German soldiers would fulfill a purely humanitarian mission in Somalia. There is general agreement in the Bundestag that a unified and sovereign Germany must assume responsibility for international peace and international law.⁹⁶

What constitutional instruments are necessary to support a decision to use force? The German government is currently debating possible changes to the constitution. The debate focuses whether the Basic Law permits Bundeswehr action in a global network. This measure would require a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament (Der Bundestag and Der Bundesrat) so that the Bundeswehr can be deployed within the context of UN peacekeeping missions, under a clean constitutional slate.⁹⁷

⁹⁵"Bundestag Approves Somalia Mission for German Armed Forces," op. cit., p. 1.

⁹⁶"Freiheit und Verantwortung gehören zusammen," Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bonn: September 1992), p. 1.

⁹⁷Ibid.

VI. POLITICAL OPINIONS

To understand the controversy within the German Parliament over amending the constitution, it is crucial to discuss the divergent opinions of the political parties. The German political party system is very similar to the pre-1990 system in the FRG, with a few changes. After unification, 12 million additional voters registered for the Bundestag election of 1990.⁴⁶ Even with the substantial increase in voters, the outcome did not fundamentally change the balance of political forces within the parliament.⁴⁷ Since the election of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1982, the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition has been the driving force in the parliament.

A. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)/CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION (CSU)

The CDU was pioneered after the Second World War, partly as a successor party to the old Catholic Center Party of the pre-1933 period. Under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer in the post-war era, the CDU succeeded in "bridging the gap that had traditionally separated Catholics and Protestants in

⁴⁶Michael Kreile, "The Political Economy of the New Germany," in Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Germany and the New Europe (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 63.

⁴⁷Ibid.

German life."¹⁰⁰ The CDU has also provided a political haven for conservatives, national constituents of the past, and for millions of refugees who fled to the Federal Republic from the despotism of eastern Germany during the Cold War.

It is the CDU where one can find the virtue of traditional German values. Officially, the CDU adopts what one may call "Christian realism" along conservative lines.¹⁰¹ Amongst members of the party, there is considerable obsession with duty, honor, and country. German national rights and identity are supreme principles amongst party members. Furthermore, the CDU is absorbed in national security problems and despises Communism and Socialism.¹⁰²

The CDU and CSU alliance has not always been a congenial marriage. The Christian Social Union of Bavaria is almost entirely Catholic, and tends to be clearly more conservative and nationalistic than the CDU.¹⁰³ Its anti-communism is especially strong within the party membership. Furthermore, a deep ideological gap separates the CSU from the Social Democratic Party. Under the tenacious leadership of Franz-Josef Strauss, now deceased, the CSU

¹⁰⁰Verheyen, op. cit., p. 57.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Ibid.

provided a significant contribution to the Federal Republics foreign policy during the Cold War.¹⁰⁴

The CDU is juxtaposed to the CSU in their ideological goals for the German armed forces. They believe the Bundeswehr must take part in collective security defense measures. Both parties foresee future international crises where Germany must play a more expanded role. On 10 February 1993 at the Munich Security Policy Conference, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the CDU stated: "Germany is a UN member. Those who claim the rights of a member must also fulfill the duties. Anything else cannot be reconciled with Germany's dignity."¹⁰⁵

Since unification in 1990, the party of Chancellor Kohl and the CSU have favored German participation in military missions outside the NATO area. Until recently, their coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party, opposed any military involvement in Bosnia without a change in the constitution.¹⁰⁶ Prior to the ruling by the Federal Court in Karlsruhe, the AWACs issue brought momentous criticism between Defense Minister Volker R  he of the CDU and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of the FDP. After the court ruling, Kinkel and

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵"Kohl Addresses Munich Security Policy Conference," Bonn Bulletin(10 February 1993), FBIS-WEU-93-030(17 February 1993):5.

¹⁰⁶"Coalition Decides to Expand Participation in Bosnian Airdrop and Serbian Embargo; Agrees to Disagree in AWACs Conflict," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 26 March 1993), p. 2.

Rühe praised the decision to have aircrews remain in the AWACs. As expressed by Kinkel; "The FDP is now in agreement that the Germans continue the mission."¹⁰⁷

Using the AWACs controversy as one example, the CDU and CSU agree that any reservations in the wording of the constitution need to be eliminated. They want the Basic Law changed for political reasons.¹⁰⁸ The two parties propose a change in Article 87a section (2): "German armed forces are only for collective security systems and self-defense as the constitution explicitly allows."¹⁰⁹ This is contrary to the present interpretation for only defense purposes.

The CDU/CSU also propose expanding Article 87a in order to deploy armed forces concerning collective security systems: "The German government is allowed, without approval from the Bundestag, to deploy forces in a collective security system, as far as there are means, concerning humanitarian aid, catastrophic help, or environmental protection. Deployment concerning UN peacekeeping missions need a single majority vote in the Bundestag.

¹⁰⁷"Government Expresses Relief at Karlsruhe AWACs Decision; SPD Warns Against 'Carte Blanche'," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 16 April 1993), p. 1.

¹⁰⁸Stares, op. cit., p. 140.

¹⁰⁹"Ein deutscher Beitrag zu internationalen Friedensmissionen? Übersicht über die Positionen der Parteien und Gruppen des Deutschen Bundestages," Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bonn: September 1992), p. 2.

Peacemaking operations need a majority vote in the Bundestag and authorization by the Chancellor.¹¹⁰

This amendment would rectify any ambiguity in the constitution. However, the CDU and CSU do not want their proposal before the floor of the Bundestag prior to Summer break of 1993. Until then, they want the issue to remain open for new compromising solutions.¹¹¹ This is a stall tactic similar to a filibuster in the U.S. Congress. The two parties are pursuing this due to fear of not achieving the two-thirds vote necessary to pass their amendment. Since they have the majority of seats in the Bundestag, no other party will be able to pass their proposal either. This will make it highly unlikely that any change will be written into law until after the break.

The CDU and CSU also want to prevent the other parties from writing any restrictions into the Basic Law on the deployment of forces.¹¹² One can assume this action by party members so they can observe how the peace process in the Balkans civil war is resolved. Therefore, the Kohl government has not brought the issue of amending the constitution to the floor of the Bundestag for a formal vote.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid.

B. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD)

The Social Democrats are Germany's oldest political party. They can look back on a heroic record of resisting the Third Reich. Generationally, the SPD is divided. The older members are reform oriented. Many of them are today's SPD leaders who were socialized by the Third Reich, World War II, and postwar reconstruction experiences.¹¹³

On the other side is the younger and more critical generation. They have been socialized in a postwar environment of economic abundance and the Cold War.¹¹⁴ They are especially prominent in the left wing of the SPD. Some of them left the party in the 1980's to join the ranks of the liberal minded Greens.

Former SPD Party Chairman Björn Engholm has been strongly in favor of Bundeswehr participation in blue helmet operations. Unfortunately, Engholm resigned from his post on 7 May 1993 due to an election scandal. He was accused of committing perjury and laundering money.¹¹⁵

The SPD is split over the out-of-area issue. The left wing of the SPD has generated strong resistance to any expansion of the Bundeswehr's role. In May

¹¹³Verheyen, op. cit., p. 56.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵"Björn Engholm Resigns from All Posts; Successors Are Yet to Be Named," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 7 May 1993), p. 1.

1991, the SPD declared its support for constitutional change to allow only UN peacekeeping missions.¹¹⁶ This decision was possible only as a vote of confidence in Engholm's leadership. Furthermore, the SPD "refused to sanction German participation in combat missions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, with or without operational control by the UN Military Staff Committee."¹¹⁷

The aim of the SPD's proposal is to place the deployment of blue helmets under the UN, on a secure constitutional basis. They want to make this possible by changing the Basic Law. They believe neither Article 24 or 87a of the constitution, as it reads now, allows peacekeeping actions or formal blue helmet operations that are based indeed under international law, as customary right.¹¹⁸

Concerning a reform process of the UN, the Secretary General wants to have contingent troops from as many countries as possible under UN command. In this sense, the UN will ask Germany to participate and the SPD would approve the necessary contracts and constitutional basis.

The SPD wants explicitly to state in the Basic Law what to do with blue helmet operations, leaving no flexibility.¹¹⁹ The SPD wants everything written down concerning deployment of forces for blue helmet operations.

¹¹⁶Stares, loc. cit.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸der Parteien, op. cit., p. 7.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

They want to think of every possibility that can take place. The problem is they may sooner or later be faced with a situation where this is contradictory.

The Social Democrats propose this change in Article 24: "The government is only allowed to provide forces to the UN for peacekeeping operations without combat tasks if the UN or other countries are asking for unarmed members of German forces to fight against environmental dangers, provide humanitarian aid, and to help when catastrophic events occur."¹²⁰ Any other use except as noted in their proposal would not be allowed.

Furthermore, they recommend "the government can provide forces if the UN Secretary General is asking for them and if there is a solution by the UN Security Council as well as the conflict involved countries agree. These forces must be equipped with only light weapons and there has to be only enlisted professionals who ask to be selected to go."¹²¹

The SPD also propose a change in Article 87a: "Only for defense of country and for defense operations in reference to our mutual assistance pact, it is allowed to employ forces as far as the constitution allows that explicitly for peacekeeping means."¹²²

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 8.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Ibid., p. 9.

This proposal is bound to bring future problems concerning German security policy. The SPD is making it clear that there is no way for combat operations of German armed forces under the UN. Last year, the Social Democrats blasted Defense Minister Volker R  he for ordering ships to the Adriatic Sea. The German government, through its agreement in helping NATO and WEU, sent ships for coastal surveillance monitoring the embargo on Yugoslavia. The SPD opposition maintains that the Basic Law bans all military actions except for self-defense.¹²³

Prior to the AWACs ruling by the Federal Court, the SPD considered filing another complaint about the deployment of forces as unconstitutional. The SPD claims to support blue helmet peacekeeping operations, but it demands that the Basic Law be changed.¹²⁴ Recently, heavy resistance to the Bundeswehr mission in Somalia has also been announced. The SPD questions whether all these actions are consistent with the constitution.

There is recent evidence that the hard line against Bundeswehr combat missions is breaking up. Foreign Policy spokesman Karsten Voigt and Security Policy spokesman Walter Kolbow have advocated a clear change of course.

¹²³Ferdinand Protzman, "Germany's Troops To Go To Somalia," The New York Times, 21 April 1993, p. A4.

¹²⁴"SPD, FDP Reject Bundeswehr Use," S  ddeutsche Zeitung, 15 April 1993, p. 1.

Voigt said recently: "The SPD would not be able to govern unless it changed its stand on the issue of Bundeswehr missions."¹²⁵

C. FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (FDP)

The Free Democratic Party has been represented in the Bundestag since the founding of the Federal Republic. The party will play an essential role in getting the Basic Law amended. The SPD/FDP coalition dissolved after the nomination of Helmut Kohl for Chancellor in 1982.¹²⁶ Since then, the Free Democrats have joined the bandwagon with the CDU and CSU to form a coalition.

The FDP has expressed the need for political solutions and a broad consensus on the out-of-area issue. The Free Democrats have stated: "It is without dispute, that when an international crises occurs, in every case, all diplomatical and political means must be exhausted, before deployment of armed forces, which are a last resort."¹²⁷

The Free Democrats support an amendment to allow German forces in any action under the auspices of the UN.¹²⁸ The FDP does not dispute that there

¹²⁵"SPD's Voigt, Kolbow Advocate Bundeswehr Combat Missions," Munich Süddeutsche Zeitung(4 February 1993), FBIS-WEU-93-027(11 February 1993):28.

¹²⁶Stares, op. cit., p. 14.

¹²⁷der Parteien, op. cit., p. 3.

¹²⁸Stares, op. cit., p. 27.

is a peacekeeping and peacemaking function of German armed forces. The point the FDP makes is that a unified Germany, on the basis of the UN Charter and to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), must fulfill their international responsibilities.¹²⁹ They see no reason to withdraw from this responsibility. Referring to themselves as liberals, the Free Democrats decided that "German forces in the future should be allowed to take part when decisions of world security have to be supported with force."¹³⁰

This position of the FDP could mean blue helmet operations as well as last consequence combat operations for what the agreement of the members of the Bundestag and majority deem necessary. The FDP has pointed out: "the liberals are ready for changing the constitution."¹³¹ In this context, the participation of German forces in UN missions can only be allowed after changing the Basic Law.¹³²

The FDP propose that the Bundeswehr can be deployed if there is agreement from a majority in the Bundestag. Peacekeeping means decided by the UN Security Council or in a sense of the UN Charter should be authorized as far as Germany is a part of those.

¹²⁹der Parteien, op. cit., p. 4.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Ibid., p. 5.

¹³²Ibid.

Concerning peacemaking measures, Bundeswehr forces may be authorized referring to Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter, and to a resolution by the UN Security Council. Everything else pertaining to this measure should be laid down in federal law. These proposals assume that deployment of forces in commitment to ones allies is allowed referring to Article 24 and 87a of the Basic Law.

The Free Democrats are encouraging the Social Democrats to come to this solution.¹³³ The FDP is ambitious to achieve a wide consensus on the out-of-area issue. The Free Democrats have asked the Social Democrats to notice that they also have a part in foreign policy, and would like them to agree with the coalition on this issue.¹³⁴ Furthermore, the FDP is optimistic, after the constitution is amended, that a broad agreement will prevail to allow the Bundeswehr to take part in international crises.

Based on a constitutional premise, the Free Democrats forced the AWACs issue to the German Federal Court. On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council voted on military enforcement of the ban on flights over Bosnia. The FDP was adamant that the German military role may be expanded only with the explicit approval of the constitutional court. After the court ruled that Germans may continue to fly in the radar reconnaissance planes, Foreign

¹³³Ibid., p. 6.

¹³⁴Ibid.

Minister Klaus Kinkel rallied the party around the courts decision. After a joint press conference after the decision became known; "We have reached the goal that we wanted to reach."¹³⁵

The Free Democrats know that one cannot force such measures with a iron fist. Someday when the Bundeswehr is deployed for an out-of-area crisis, every German soldier will have rights under a clean constitutional basis, support from the German people, and not just from some political parties. Therefore, the FDP hopes for a change in the Basic Law shortly after Summer break. They believe the SPD must respond to international responsibilities of Germany and no longer disagree. Because the CDU and SPD are divided on the issue, strong support by the smaller Free Democratic Party is crucial in the decision.

D. GREEN PARTY/ALLIANCE 90

The western Green Party, which was founded in the FRG in the early 1980's, allied themselves with the civil rights group Alliance 90 of the former GDR.¹³⁶ Their position with reference to the out-of-area issue reflects their views on human rights and the protection of minorities.

¹³⁵"Government Expresses Relief at Karlsruhe AWACs Decision; SPD Warns Against 'Carte Blanche,'" op. cit., p. 1.

¹³⁶"Western Greens and Eastern Alliance 90 Vote to Unite," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 22 January 1993), p. 2.

From a global point of view, the Greens want new thoughts on global protection rather than the old categories of security policy. They stress human rights and the protection of minorities cannot be rejected as interference in the inner affairs of countries precipitates. In contrast, the German government is supporting the classical instruments for civilization for international linkage and is therefore mostly making policy of non-military conflict solution.¹³⁷

The Greens assert that peacekeeping operations are the last level of conflict resolution in which solutions of non-military have been overcome. Peacekeeping operations are the end of conflict solving and are not the entry into the escalation dynamic of military force.¹³⁸ The Greens insist that blue helmets must have no escalation, only deescalation functions.

The Greens argue that peacekeeping operations by their nature belong to Chapter VI of the UN Charter. There are no categories where customary rights exist.¹³⁹ However, UN blue helmet operations are a useful tool to secure a resolution. As a consequence, the Greens demand the following: "The Bundestag may authorize the deployment of German forces to take part in peacekeeping operations. The government should use all state and non-state, non-military, non-violent means of conflict resolution. German forces are deployed only for the UN as an international collective security system, not

¹³⁷der Parteien, op. cit., p. 12.

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 13.

¹³⁹Ibid.

under NATO or WEU command. Reform of the UN Charter is necessary. The aim is to eliminate the status of permanent members of the UN Security Council and sacrifice the veto each country has. Deployment of forces are only for peacekeeping operations referencing Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A maximum number of 2,000 soldiers are allowed to join such forces from Germany. The Bundeswehr must further reduce and restructure their forces, a structure which has the aim of never being able to start a war itself."¹⁴⁰

The last line of this proposal is already written in Article 26 of the Basic Law. The Greens want armed forces which are unable to take the first step. Making the armed forces unable to attack makes them ineffective. The Greens might as well say they want no forces. They do want a civil security system, without the military or police.¹⁴¹ The Greens are advertising environmental topics, they are out of sync with reality. Bottomline, the Greens have a real problem with authority.

Referring to Article 24, the Greens believe "the government can leave sovereign rights to international organizations as long as the rights of states are considered."¹⁴² Furthermore, they want a two-thirds majority vote in the Bundestag as far as sovereignty rights of the state are involved.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 15.

The Greens propose the following to Article 87a: "The government can commission forces for defense, but their growth and organization depends on the budget. The government is allowed to give other organizations the right to commission forces which will serve in a system of collective security for keeping peace in the world."¹⁴⁴ This is a very general statement by the Greens. There is nothing concrete in the Greens logic for changing the Basic Law and deployment of forces.

The Greens want to reduce the power in the government from the top, down to the state level. This sounds like placing the region into vestiges as it was prior to German unification in the 1870's. The Greens constantly want to reduce the defense budget. They give ideas but lack real concrete solutions. The Greens have unrealistic ideas on German security policy and how the country should enter the 21st century. They should focus their ideas on how the emissions from a Mercedes Benz effects the pine trees in the Black Forest.

The Greens have further defined the mission of the Bundeswehr for peacekeeping operations. "Members of the armed forces are allowed to defend the FRG and to be involved in defense operations concerning commitments to ones allies. Only in the case that attack is through no fault of the FRG, may forces deploy out-of-area for peacekeeping means. For those measures, the government can assign forces to conflict involved countries if the UN Secretary

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

General is asking for them and the UN Security Council has decided in this sense. Those forces will only be equipped with light weapons for self-defense and must consist of active professionals and enlisted who volunteer for such missions. Every operation in this sense needs two-thirds majority of all members of the Bundestag. Germany is not to be involved in peacekeeping concerning neighboring countries.¹⁴⁵ Do statements like this need to be made in a sovereign nation's constitution? This proposal is illogical.

The state law can allow the forces in the case of actual defense or crisis in accordance to police rights, protect civil objects, and assume tasks concerning direction of traffic, as far as this is necessary to the task of defense.¹⁴⁶ This assumes that your military will be used for directing traffic. The Greens want to make this a topic in the Basic Law. The forces have in every situation to pay attention to current police rights and work together with the responsible authorities.

The Greens are just criticizing and do not know how their ideas effect the wealth of the people and the German nation. Other parties at least have an idea on what the future of Germany and the Bundeswehr should look like.

The Greens/Alliance 90 intend to make application in reference to the points described. They no longer want to link restructure of the UN

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 16.

organization with the agreement of having German blue helmets for UN operations. They demand UN reform.

Based on this analysis, the Greens no longer subscribe to practices that are sync with German society. Due to a constitutional court ruling following the 1990 elections, the Greens were spared from the five percent threshold requirement to win seats in the Bundestag.¹⁴⁷ This was a one-time exception for the Greens and does not guarantee that they will survive the 1994 federal election. Younger Germans are turning more conservative. If the Greens cannot "rejuvenate themselves with good issues and new voters, the Greens will become a minor party of aging hippies."¹⁴⁸

E. PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (PDS)

The PDS is the offspring of the defunct Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the former GDR. The PDS are former communists, who claim to be socialists. They, like the Greens, are too small to enjoy all the rights accorded to other parties. The PDS also was allowed to be represented in the Bundestag, only because of the special arrangement made following the 1990 federal election. It would not be surprising to see them as a party of the past after the 1994 federal elections.

¹⁴⁷Stares, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁴⁸Germany Part III, op. cit., p. 205.

The PDS postulate that the international situation allows a new foreign policy approach which is oriented on peace policy criteria. "Forces as a means of politics were unuseful and were not serving the interests of humans. Therefore, especially today, forces are unnecessary. But nevertheless, power politics and interest oriented practices are influencing how other countries act. This is clearly evident in the behavior of the wealthy countries in the West."¹⁴⁹

The PDS has a hypothesis to change the behavior of political policy. "This can happen on different levels, first a country can explicitly refuse to use military means to force own interests. It can show this practically through refusing extra territorial use of the military. A country can in advance say they can never have forces outside their own limits."¹⁵⁰

Similarly, the PDS believe that cooperative policy can be demonstrated through installment and help of civil organizations. "A new friendly international system can be achieved through cooperation. Cooperation also means to refer exploitation of the periphery and of the resources for short term profit interests."¹⁵¹ This theory sounds like an idea along the lines of Marx, Lenin, and Engels.

¹⁴⁹der Parteien, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Ibid.

Excluding military intervention, the PDS believe "conflict reducing support measures have to be made possible and non-intervention regimes have to be developed."¹⁵² They maintain that wealthy capitalistic countries must refer to military intervention because they sell their weapons to the Third World. Furthermore, there foundation is due to greed by the capitalists.

The PDS is assigning guilt to the West. Since the West sells weapons to a country for profit, they believe the West cannot enforce their policies and destroy the country they sold them to. This logic would clearly blame the arms sales to Iraq on U.S. and German businessmen. Another analogy of a party that grew-up in a communist society.

In light of this discussion, the PDS demand from the government: "to agree to conflict prevention and conflict ending competence of the CSCE, only if there are no military components."¹⁵³ The PDS does not want to have changes in the CSCE which gives them more authority, unless CSCE agrees to have no military components. The PDS refuse to have a commission of CSCE blue helmet troops and ensure that CSCE cannot take, or have, the means to assign other troops for blue helmet operations. Green helmet troops of CSCE should have only non-military character, and should only consist of members from civil engineer and catastrophic organizations.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

The PDS wants the Bundestag to make sure that neither now or in the future, German soldiers will be employed alone outside the limits of Germany for military or civil operations, or together with other countries, or in the frame of international institutions. They demand from the government that all prior agreements given to other countries about Germans in blue helmet operations under UN, NATO, or WEU, be eliminated. The PDS accuse the German government about misinformation on UN operations such as Cambodia, and accuse them of hiding information from the people.¹⁵⁵

These accusations are not true. There are many channels that the German government can deliver information, including the media, to inform the public on these operations. You can't demand to be informed every place, all the time. For example, George Bush could not tell the American public when he was going to strike Iraq. In fact, this is why the FRG wants to keep conscription service. The draft will keep the military closely aligned with the people.

It is highly unlikely the PDS will be involved in the future on major issues within the German government. They, as the Greens, have no skill at mediating between imagination and reality.

F. REPUBLIKANER

As an expression of voter frustration, the right-wing Republican Party made substantial gains in the state of Hessen on 7 March 1993. In the only

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

German election held this year, the Social Democrats suffered extreme losses. Chairman Engholm described the losses for his party as a "considerable reverse."¹⁵⁶ Both his party and the CDU are casualties of a deep frustration on the part of the voters toward all those who govern in Hessen and Bonn. Chancellor Kohl saw the scanty results for his party as "an expression of the poor public image of the CDU."¹⁵⁷

This victory for the right-wing is not to be construed as a rise in German nationalism and the birth of the Fourth Reich. German citizens are disillusioned by the asylum problem, record postwar unemployment, and the problems of unification which have stymied the CDU/CSU/FDP governing coalition's ability to lead.

G. FURTHER ANALYSIS

Besides the conception of legality which interprets the Basic Law as allowing combat operations in reference to the NATO contract, but not operations under UN, today there are more and more politicians and legal authorities having another point of view. There is a far reaching consensus that a sovereign Germany, as a member of international security organizations, must take responsibility as a member to secure and restore peace in the world.

¹⁵⁶"Engholm: Local Elections in Hessen a 'Warning Signal' for CDU and SPD," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 12 March 1993), p. 1.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

On 13 January 1993, the governing coalition indicated it would seek a change in the Basic Law to explicitly allow Bundeswehr participation in UN operations.¹⁵⁸ The agreement provides for German participation in peacekeeping and peace-restoring operations. Furthermore, the agreement would provide for combat operations under the auspices of NATO, CSCE, or WEU even without a decision by the UN Security Council.¹⁵⁹ UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called for a "comprehensive participation" by Germany in all UN missions.¹⁶⁰ The SPD thus far have only agreed to strictly peacekeeping operations.

The governing coalition do not want the out-of-area issue so defined that it cannot fit in the Basic Law for future problems or crises. The SPD even wants the use of forces for humanitarian aid written into the constitution.¹⁶¹ Only the UN should have the monopoly to force someone to deploy troops, even though most of the countries in the UN have dictatorial governments vice democracies.

The Ministry of Defense has indicated that troops serving outside of NATO jurisdiction would only consist of three to four battalions trained for

¹⁵⁸"Governing Coalition Seeks German Involvement In UN Blue Helmet Operations," The Week In Germany (New York: German Information Center, 15 January 1993), p. 1.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Ibid.

¹⁶¹der Parteien, op. cit., p. 8.

blue helmet operations.¹⁶² This requirement would affect only a small part of the Bundeswehr's personnel and material.¹⁶³ As noted by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel: "Within the framework of her constitution, Germany has already assisted with UN operations in Angola, Cambodia, Central America, and Namibia."¹⁶⁴

The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition should force the issue and get an amendment to the Basic Law. An amendment to the constitution to deploy forces will be difficult to pass in the parliament. This is why the two parties want to wait until after Summer break. They are afraid of responding too quickly. Unfortunately, this is appeasement at its best. What good is a democracy if there is no solution? The Western allies need to know they can confide in the Germans in a time of crises. As recently expressed by Defense Minister R  he: "The nature of Germany's sovereignty requires a military force that can be used flexibly. If it is neglected, our foreign policy also threatens to lose credibility."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶²Bertram, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Speech by Klaus Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the FRG in an address at the 47th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, German Information Center, 23 September 1992, p. 2.

¹⁶⁵"Bundeswehr Only Partly Combat-Ready," Hamburg Die Welt(4 February 1993), FBIS-WEU-93-027(11 February 1993):24.

VII. CONTEMPORARY INFLUENCES

Several crises in the last three years have pressed the issue for German military forces to participate in regional conflicts. One example would be the Gulf War analogy. The unification of Germany coincided with the Iraqi crisis. After Saddam's forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, German politicians were hesitant to become involved in the Gulf crisis since it might interfere with unification.¹⁶⁶ As discussed by Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher: "Even after unity and sovereignty were gained, Germany's reaction to the Gulf conflict continued to be profoundly shaped by the legacies of the post-war period."¹⁶⁷ The FRG's slow reaction to requests from the United States for financial assistance for the Gulf War helped to stimulate the unfavorable press coverage Germany received on the issue.

The media only exacerbated the poor public image Germany received concerning its military assistance and public abstinence in the Gulf crises. However, politicians argued that the German Basic Law prevented combat

¹⁶⁶Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Germany in the Iraq Conflict," in Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, eds., Western Europe and the Gulf (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1992), p. 39.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

troops from being deployed to the Gulf conflict.¹⁶⁸ Much of the bad press and accusations were due to the export of dual-use items to Iraq. It is imperative to understand that Germany played a vital role in assisting the allied coalition in the conflict. The truth of the matter can be confirmed by Christoph Bertram: "Had it not been for air bases located in Germany, from which U.S. troops were flown to the Gulf, and for the availability of massive German ammunition supplies, Operation Desert Storm would scarcely have succeeded."¹⁶⁹ Overall, Germany provided \$11.4 billion to the allied coalition in the form of military hardware, services, and cash payments.¹⁷⁰

The Gulf War was a prime case to scrutinize the Basic Law. In reference to Article 24 and 87a, Germany supported a NATO partner even when it did not entail the defense of German territory. The Bundeswehr was deployed to Turkey as part of NATO's effort to deter Saddam.

The crisis in Yugoslavia is mounting with unforeseen consequences. Germany has pledged DM114.7 million in direct aid to the region, compared to Italy's DM86.4 million and the United States DM82 million.¹⁷¹ Germany

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁶⁹Christoph Bertram, "Visions of Leadership: Germany," in Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler, eds., From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 55.

¹⁷⁰"Germany's Contribution to the Gulf Effort," loc. cit.

¹⁷¹"Direct Aid Pledged to the Former Yugoslavia," The Week in Germany (New York: German Information Center, 4 December 1992), p. 5.

is also conducting a naval role in the Adriatic Sea in support of UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. However, the German vessels have a limited role there. They cannot enforce sanctions, but merely report ships suspected of breaking the UN embargo.¹⁷² Once again, the Germans open themselves up to being accused of half-hearted gestures.

At present, the Ministry of Defense plans to "maintain compulsory military service" along with preparing the Bundeswehr for "blue helmet" operations outside the NATO area.¹⁷³ Last year, these plans did not meet popular approval in Germany. According to a study conducted by the Academy for Information and Communication which the Bundeswehr runs, two-thirds of all Germans advocate a volunteer army.¹⁷⁴ A clear majority reject German soldiers participating in UN missions similar to the Gulf War. Furthermore, there was only broad support for the Bundeswehr to participate in UN peacekeeping "blue helmet" operations.¹⁷⁵

In spite of public opinion, it is unlikely that Germany will go to a volunteer force. First, Germany has one of the lowest birth rates in the world. The Bundeswehr will face declining numbers in the draft-age groups in the

¹⁷²"Cabinet Approves Limited Naval Role in Adriatic," Hamburg DPA(19 November 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-224(19 November 1992):7.

¹⁷³"Kohl Addresses Munich Security Policy Conference," op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁷⁴"Bundeswehr Study Cites Lack of Popular Support," Der Spiegel (20 April 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-077(21 April 1992):15

¹⁷⁵Ibid.

nineties. The Bundeswehr will therefore have to extend the term of basic military service or take other measures to maintain personnel strength at 370,000 after 1995.¹⁷⁶ Second, a volunteer force is extremely expensive. Germans don't like running budget deficits. According to the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Germany's national debt will rise by seventy percent to DM2 trillion (\$1.2 trillion) by December 1995.¹⁷⁷ Third, conscription service has worked very efficiently during the last four decades in the FRG.¹⁷⁸

As for public opinion on UN missions, it seems unlikely that a united Germany will retain a "status quo" approach on its international duties. In the late 1980's, the Allensbach Institute, conducted a survey in the FRG on the out-of-area issue. They found a relative majority of West Germans were against any participation by the Bundeswehr in UN missions.¹⁷⁹ The prevailing opinion then was that Germany's past weighed more than international obligations.¹⁸⁰ It precluded any participation of German forces.

¹⁷⁶White Paper, op. cit., p. 112.

¹⁷⁷"Institute: DM2.5 Trillion National Debt by 2000," The Week in Germany (New York: German Information Center, 8 May 1992), p. 5.

¹⁷⁸Opinion of Donald Abenheim, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

¹⁷⁹"Report: Public Favors Role in UN Peacekeeping Missions," Frankfurter Allgemeine(11 February 1993), FBIS-WEU-93-030(17 February 1993):13.

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

Today, only a minority makes reference to Germany's past in this respect. Only 31 percent of those surveyed in western Germany are against the participation of German forces.¹⁸¹ Of significance, 54 percent regard it beyond comprehension that a country as important as Germany should shirk its international responsibility.¹⁸²

In the new federal states, public opinion is different. Those who support German participation in UN combat missions balance out those who oppose the role. After four decades of a military driven society, the impetus has died in the minds of east Germans. They are more aware of the threat of combat forces, rather than heir peacemaking function.¹⁸³

The governing coalition in the German Parliament must increase public sentiment on the need to participate in combat operations. In a May 1991 nationwide poll conducted, Germans favored the continued leadership of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)/Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition over that of the opposition parties in the Bundestag.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁸²Ibid.

¹⁸³Ibid.

¹⁸⁴"Split Over Paragraph 218," Munich Süddeutsche Zeitung(12 June 1991), FBIS-WEU-91-113(12 June 1991):12-13.

Unfortunately, the future of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition and the leadership of the CDU is uncertain. The internal problems with the economy, "the Skinheads," and the foreign asylum issue may cause trouble for the Christian Democrats in the 1994 election. According to a poll taken by the Emnid Opinion Research Institute, if Bundestag elections were held on 9 November 1992, the SPD would receive 38 percent of the vote and the CDU/CSU a close 37 percent of the vote.¹⁸⁵

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has put up the most resistance to changing the constitution and the deployment of Bundeswehr forces in an out-of-area crisis. The SPD is the major factor in the equation. They are the largest opposition party, holding approximately thirty-six percent of the seats in the Bundestag. A two-thirds majority in the Bundestag is only possible with their support.

The government achieved the support of the SPD for corpsmen in Cambodia, and the airlift of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁸⁶ These measures by the Germans have been strongly supported at home and abroad.¹⁸⁷ However, the inability of all the political parties to agree on the legality of troop deployments under the auspices of the

¹⁸⁵"Opinion Poll Shows SPD Leading CDU/CSU," Hamburg, Welt Am Sonntag(08 November 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-220(13 November 1992):12

¹⁸⁶"Rühe: FRG UN Missions Lack Necessary Basis," Mainz ZDF Television Network (12 July 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-138(17 July 1992):11.

¹⁸⁷Ibid.

UN has created strong opposition to the Bundeswehr engaging in military operations outside of the homeland. One thing is clear for the overwhelming majority, that participation in UN combat missions should only involve professional soldiers and volunteers.¹⁸⁸

Chancellor Kohl explained in August 1990 that "there cannot be a division of labor where Germany stands aside making money while the rest of the world does the dirty work."¹⁸⁹ As ambitious as some may be to see the Germans play a role in blue helmet operations, the Bundeswehr is not yet a fully capable force for dealing with international crises.¹⁹⁰ According to Hans Ruhle, chief of planning under Manfred Woerner in the Defense Ministry (Woerner has since risen to the post of NATO Secretary General), the Bundeswehr is "conditionally combat ready."¹⁹¹ Ruhle's statement is based on facts: "There is currently not a single formation of battalion size on up that would be available as a self-contained unit for operational employment. There are no formations manned exclusively by fully trained soldiers in the Bundeswehr."¹⁹² This may come as a shock to most of the international

¹⁸⁸"Report: Public Favors Role in Peacekeeping Missions," loc. cit.

¹⁸⁹"Freiheit and Verantwortung gehören zusammen," op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁹⁰"Bundeswehr Seen Lacking Deployment Capability," Munich *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (17 July 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-140(21 July 1992):14.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Ibid.

community, especially when one considers the military potential of the Germans.

Added to this problem is the Bundeswehr's equipment. At best, German soldiers are outfitted to meet the requirements of operational employment in NATO's jurisdiction, but not out of area.¹⁹³ At present, a change in equipment to the degree necessary would cost more money than the taxpayer is willing to pay.¹⁹⁴ Unification will limit financial resources for many years. Political interests will continue to be focused on domestic concerns as is the case in the United States.

How do the Bundeswehr soldiers view their new operational role in the international spectrum? When will the troops involved be confident about the operational principles of a rapid-reaction force and peacekeeping operations? How do the soldiers feel about being subjected to substantially greater danger than standing guard duty near the Fulda Gap? All these questions are important to the average German soldier.

Today, the Bundeswehr is not the most esteemed institution in the heartland of Germany.¹⁹⁵ Many soldiers do not believe they are being used properly or perhaps feel misunderstood. The debate on compulsory military

¹⁹³Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵"Article Analyzes Declining Bundeswehr Morale," Bonn LOYAL (May 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-117(17 June 1992):17

service and on the size of the Bundeswehr has a direct effect on the soldiers esprit de corps.¹⁹⁶ A large organization like the Bundeswehr, which is primarily made up of people, is especially in need of high morale, integrity, and security. There is no better feeling in the world than waking up in the morning and looking forward to going to work. A person must enjoy what he is doing and be proud of what he is doing. An effective military establishment needs personnel with high self-esteem.

The Bundeswehr must have a common vision and high expectations. Poor morale in the forces may ultimately block the operational capability of the Bundeswehr. As a result, this will directly affect the acceptance of the Bundeswehr in German society.¹⁹⁷ It will take leadership from the German Parliament, not just the Chancellor and the Defense Minister, to give the Bundeswehr the label as an "elite force" in which they desperately deserve.

One can be certain there are units with good superiors who keep morale high amongst their troops. However, the overall picture looks bleak as did the morale in U.S. forces during the 1970's. As Defense Minister R  he cited on 12 July 1992: "The soldiers need good equipment, they need social security, and they must feel that their missions are supported at home."¹⁹⁸ Only with these

¹⁹⁶Ibid.

¹⁹⁷Ibid.

¹⁹⁸"R  he: FRG UN Missions Lack Necessary Basis," Mainz ZDF Television Interview(12 July 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-138(17 July 1992):11.

assurances will support for UN "blue helmet" operations be there if body bags start coming home to Germany. The Bundeswehr needs support from the government and the people.

From this lesson on cohesion in the military, the Germans can learn from one of their own. Clausewitz "made the psychology of the soldier, his commander, and the society they served an essential part of the theory of war."¹⁹⁹

There needs to be effective leadership from the German government. The Chancellor and Defense Minister can raise the issue all they want, but it will take a strong coalition in the German Parliament to make the Bundeswehr an elite fighting force available for duty under the auspices of the United Nations. Whatever may happen to the Bundeswehr, reflection on its mission and its military structure is something that should be done in the German Parliament.²⁰⁰ Clausewitz wrote: "The political purpose for which war is fought should determine the means that are employed and the kind and degree of effort required. The political purpose should also determine the military objective."²⁰¹ On the contrary, what Clausewitz failed to ingrain in the

¹⁹⁹Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 204.

²⁰⁰"Retired General on Future Mission of Bundeswehr," *Der Spiegel* (10 August 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-162(20 August 1992):12-13.

²⁰¹Paret, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

Germans was an overall grand strategy. You cannot expect to win two world wars by uniting the industrial powers of the world against you.

Germany has the capability to strengthen the United Nations as an international organization. Even though Germany is a non-nuclear member, the economic, military, and political influence the country possesses should grant it a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

With limited financial resources due to unification, the Bundeswehr will not receive the priority it deserves in the German government. The 1993 Defense Budget at DM50.8 billion is the second highest individual budget in the German Federal Budget.²⁰² Unfortunately, the defense budget has dropped by DM1.31 billion in 1993.²⁰³ In light of the scarce resources, how will the Ministry of Defense finance its new force structure? In this situation, the programming and budgeting of the Bundeswehr will follow three steps: reduce operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, prioritize all procurement projects, and intensify international cooperation.²⁰⁴

²⁰²"Draft Budget Cuts Defense Spending," Berlin DDP(18 August 1992), FBIS-WEU-92-160(18 August 1992):13

²⁰³Ibid.

²⁰⁴Siedschlag, op. cit., p. 18.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Can the Germans continue to satisfy their international obligations through "checkbook diplomacy" in the future? After amending their constitution, the Germans should assume all the rights and responsibilities of a member of the UN. A united and sovereign Germany must fulfill all the duties for preserving world peace outlined in the UN Charter. During his recent visit to Bonn, the UN Secretary General indicated: "We need the FRG's complete participation in peacekeeping, peace-creating, and peacemaking measures."²⁰⁵ The current UN operation in Somalia will remind German politicians, once again, of the need to fulfill their international duties.

Two years have gone by since Chancellor Kohl's speech on 2 October 1990 to South African President De Klerk. Today, there is little popular support in Germany for UN blue helmet operations, nor are there financial resources within a decreasing defense budget. But who can say that popular support is always right? After all, 90% of the people in the 1935 Saarland plebiscite voted to join the Third Reich.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵Boutros-Ghali paraphrased by Kohl in "Kohl Addresses Munich Security Policy Conference," op. cit., p. 5.

²⁰⁶Jackson J. Spielvogel, Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1992), p. 199.

German politicians are not accepting their country's military responsibilities fast enough to satisfy Germany's foreign critics. We are living with a new generation of Germans who are dedicated to the principles of democracy. Since 1949, the German democratic experience has been highly successful. Experts in international security agree that Germany's leaders must cast off the burden of the past and start acting like the leaders of a sovereign nation.

There are difficult issues of culture and history. The dilemma for German politicians is that, if they try to preach a return to traditional virtues, they run the risk of sounding like Nazis.²⁰⁷ The new generation of Germans has much to be proud of. They wish to have nothing to do with the negative elements of the nation's past. Although he was never a Nazi, Franz Josef Strauss, former Prime Minister of Bavaria and CSU member, used to tell Germans that they should not be ashamed of their past.²⁰⁸ The carnage of World War II was not entirely Germany's fault. Pride in Germany is nonetheless growing slowly.

Many Germans see unification as an opportunity to reestablish national dignity. If the Germans want to be respected as full participants in the international community, they will have to learn to accept the military responsibilities that entails. This will be the key to Germany's future position

²⁰⁷David Marsh, The Germans: The Pivotal Nation, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 33.

²⁰⁸Roskin, op. cit., p. 183.

in international politics. From an old Chinese proverb: "We do not inherit the land from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children."

Today, Germany is facing extraordinary issues of sovereignty. The Germans are not adjusting easily to these changes. The international community should recognize that the reconstruction of Germany will take longer than was originally predicted. Germany is still the single most important ally of the United States in Europe with reference to its conventional combat power, its economic strength, and its political influence. The Bundeswehr faces a head-on challenge with the political and social crisis in Germany at the moment. The Germans are acutely aware from their past of how political turmoil can result from serious economic and social crisis. However, with all the burdens of unification, the Bundeswehr can be lauded for mastering the challenges of fusing two formerly opposed armed forces.

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