


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THESIS

DEFENSE DOWNSIZING AND BLACKS IN THE
MILITARY

by

Roy L. Nixon

June 1993

Thesis Advisor:

Mark J. Eitelberg

Thesis Co-Advisor:

Gregory Hildebrandt

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Defense Downsizing and Blacks in the Military

by

Roy L. Nixon
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, 1987


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
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


Roy L. Nixon

Approved by:



Mark J. Eitelberg, Thesis Advisor



Gregory Hildebrandt, Thesis Co-Advisor



David R. Whipple, Chairman

Department of Administrative Sciences

ABSTRACT

Blacks have joined the enlisted ranks of the American military in record numbers since the end of the draft. However, the armed forces are now engaged in the process of downsizing, and there is some speculation that blacks may be disproportionately affected by the reduction-in-force. This study analyzes defense drawdown policies, force demographics, historical trends, and environmental factors in an attempt to determine the overall impact of the proposed cuts in military manpower on persons in different racial/ethnic groups. The results show that black representation in the military has declined somewhat since 1990; and that it may continue to fall as the force reduction processes over the next several years and possibly beyond. It is recommended that further study be undertaken of the differential effects of the force downsizing on persons in the various racial/ethnic groups; and that the search continue for effective alternatives to the current enlistment test in screening applicants to the military.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Current policies associated with the military force reduction will affect the recruitment and retention of black enlisted members affiliated with all branches of the armed services. This reduction-in-force may affect the black segment to a greater extent than the general military population.

B. PURPOSE

This study provides manpower analysts with timely information that should aid in the decision-making process on force reductions. It attempts to measure the likely impact that proposed recruiting and retention policies associated with the force reduction may have on black enlisted members. Detailed observations on the black segment of the enlisted force are provided. These should prove beneficial to analysts in their evaluation of various downsizing scenarios.

C. BACKGROUND

Historically, the main body of the U.S. military has consisted of a relatively small career force made up of volunteers. In times of major wars or national emergency, this career force has been augmented by conscripts from the

general population [Ref. 1]. Once the national emergency has subsided, the force is reduced and the policy of conscription is rescinded. A related concern in the manning of the force--namely, which members of the society will be considered qualified to serve in times of peace or war--has never been definitively resolved.

Blacks have played an important role in the military throughout the nation's history, having served from the earliest days of the Revolutionary War to the more recent battles of Operation Desert Storm. As one analyst has noted, the black experience within the military has historically been shaped by policies of exclusion during peacetime, and that of wide acceptance during times of war [Ref. 2]. These policies led to the creation of a system in which blacks served in the military at a level that was below their proportion within the national population during times of peace and at or near a proportionate level during times of war. Progress toward equal opportunity for blacks in the military has been an uneven process, sometimes hampered or heightened by constants in society such as prejudice, idealism, and manpower shortages.

During the Civil War, the need for manpower led to the induction of 186,000 blacks for service in the Union Army. About 30,000 blacks served in the Navy, which constituted

about 25 percent of that service's total Civil War strength. Following the Civil War, idealism fostered the creation of four all-black cavalry units. During most of the nineteenth century, blacks served in an integrated Navy, comprising up to 30 percent of total enlisted strength. During the 1900s, policies paralleling Jim Crow legislation of legalized segregation led to restrictions on the service of blacks in the military. During World War I, blacks constituted only 1.2 percent of total Navy enlisted strength. Although there were separate drafts for whites and blacks during World War I, mobilization ensured that blacks serving in the Army would approximate their proportion within the general population (about 10.7 percent). Approximately 368,000 black men were drafted during the First World War, which constituted about 13.1 percent of all draftees. Due to retrenchment and the curtailment of enlistments following World War I, at the outbreak of World War II, blacks made up only about 1.2 percent of enlisted strength in both the Army and the Navy. [Ref. 3]

Concerned with equal-rights, black civil-rights leaders sought to use World War II to expand opportunities for members of their communities. In response to these pressures, legislation was passed stating that no discrimination would be allowed against any person on account of race or color in the selection and training of men for military service. [Ref. 4]

World War II would call to arms all available manpower. The Roosevelt administration decreed that the proportion of blacks in the Army was to be commensurate to that group's proportion in the national population. With national threats looming on the horizon, the Burke-Wadsworth Act was passed in 1940 establishing the first peacetime conscription in the nation's history [Ref. 5]. From 1940 to the end of 1945, the military grew from a force of 458,000 to a size of 12,123,000 [Ref. 6]. Although black military strength never reached "proportionality" during the Second World War, over 900,000 blacks served in the Army, 167,000 in the Navy, and about 17,000 in the Marine Corps [Ref. 7].

At the close of World War II, the national economy was in a state of growth. The better-educated and qualified conscripts of both races were ready to return home to available jobs and the prospect of a new life helped by G.I. Bill benefits. During 1945 and 1946, the services discovered that, as the armed forces were demobilized, the percentage of blacks within the enlisted ranks was increasing. The Army estimated that black representation would reach 15 percent or more by 1947, exceeding that group's wartime high of 9.58 percent. The Navy also expected rises in black enlistments during the short term. The Gillem Board was organized to study the concerns on how to best employ blacks within the Army. The major recommendation coming from this study was that, in the event of another war, manpower should be provided to the

military from the general population without regard to race. Issues of integration were not reviewed.

Due to the emerging Cold War, America's new responsibilities as a world power, and concerns for military efficiency, racial integration would soon become a reality in the U.S. military. With Executive Order 9981, signed in July 1948, President Truman rescinded the policy of segregation within the military. Removal of this artificial barrier would eventually lead to increased opportunities for blacks in the military services.

Concerned that the nation should not be caught off-guard again, the military did not return to the small, pre-World War II force levels. During the late 1940s to the early 1970s, the military stabilized at around 1.5 million troops and increased to levels around 3.5 million during the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. The policy of peacetime conscription was continued to maintain this large force, except for an 18-month break from March 1947 to July 1948 [Ref. 8].

The number of young men eligible for military service doubled during the period 1955 to 1975 [Ref. 9]. Relatively stable military manpower requirements determined that only a small portion of each year's 18-through 21-year-old-cohort be called to arms through selective service.

During the 1950s, 80 percent of each year's cohort faced the prospect of military duty through selective service. By the early 1960s, this number had decreased to 60 percent; and

by the late 1960s, it had dropped to 30 percent [Ref. 10]. Pay for the first-term inductee was below the civilian wage. This, coupled with the inherent risks of military service, led to concerns that the men drafted were doing so at an economic and social disadvantage in relation to their counterparts who avoided the draft.

The issue concerning equity of military service had come to public attention at various times, leading to presidential campaign promises by Adlai Stevenson (a Democrat) and Barry Goldwater (a Republican) in 1956 and 1964, respectively, to end the military draft. During 1966, prompted by the unpopular war in Vietnam, "equity" became an issue of widespread discussion. In his 1968 presidential bid, Richard Nixon promised to look at returning the military to a volunteer force, if elected. In March 1969, President Nixon created an advisory commission to study the feasibility of eliminating military conscription and plan for an all-volunteer military [Ref. 11]. The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (or "Gates Commission") determined that economic incentives could be used to adequately attract volunteers of sufficient quantity and quality. [Ref. 12] After much debate--which centered around the issues of force composition, cost, military capability, and patriotism--Congress voted to institute the policy of an "All-Volunteer Force" (or AVF) beginning in June 1973.

In contrast to conclusions drawn by the Gates Commission, blacks elected to participate in the enlisted ranks of the armed forces at levels that exceeded their proportion in the national population. Various reasons have been offered to explain these participation rates. The most popular and widely accepted reasons include: the military is viewed as an equal opportunity employer by black Americans; the military provides blacks with socioeconomic opportunities and job training that cannot be obtained as readily in the civilian sector; and military employment is viewed as a source of status within the black community. [Ref. 13]

The Cold War came to an end in November 1989. As a result, it has been determined that the United States no longer requires a large military to meet its national objectives. A reduction of military forces is required; however, this time, it will not be as simple as it was following previous conflicts. The present military is a force comprised exclusively of volunteers. The economy is not enjoying rapid rates of growth, and discharged veterans face the prospect of returning home to conditions of unemployment. These individuals came into the military for various reasons, believing that, if they did a good job, the military would be a source of long-term employment. Unlike conscripts, the majority of these individuals do not look forward to release from military service.

In an effort to reduce the defense budget by \$122 billion over five years, the current Department of Defense policy is to trim the military force to a level of about 1.6 million individuals or less by the end of fiscal 1997. Some individuals believe that current budget cuts may even require the military to reduce its forces beyond this level. This would be especially true if the economic assumptions and evaluations of defense needs used to estimate current costs prove wrong. [Ref. 14]

Because blacks made up a significant portion of the military during the build-up of the All-Volunteer Force--representing as much as 23 percent of all active-duty enlisted personnel at the start of the 1990s--it can be predicted that they may likewise represent a large porportion of the force reductions.

D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methods employed in this study include the gathering of information from the most current and relevant literature, analysis of enlistment and retention trends established during the All-Volunteer Force, and telephone interviews. Through the analysis of demographic data, changes in black representation within the military have been determined, based on current manpower policies associated with the force reduction.

E. INFORMATION SOURCES

This study uses a range of historical and current literature in discussing black issues over the course of the all-volunteer period. In addition, data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) are used to establish trends associated with military applicants, recruits, and career enlisted personnel, including their demographics and aptitude test scores.

F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The organization of this thesis is designed to present a comprehensive understanding of blacks in the military and concerns associated with that group in relation to the force reduction. Chapter II presents a variety of background information, ranging from a historical perspective on blacks in the All-Volunteer Force to a discussion of the "pros and cons" associated with current downsizing policies. Chapter III analyzes historical data and trends established over the all-volunteer period. Future characteristics of the military force are projected based on these trends and expectations concerning population changes, demographics, education level, and aptitude test scores. Chapter IV discusses black participation rates and provides an in-depth discussion of the data, research methodology, and findings. Chapter V discusses the conclusions drawn from the findings and offers recommendations based on the study.

II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

For decades, the United States defense plan focused on world communism and the Soviet Union. As explained by Tyler, military planning required that a force of sufficient size be maintained that could simultaneously fight a ground war in Europe and a smaller war elsewhere, most likely in the Middle East or Asia. That plan led to the growth of a large defense establishment and the spending of hundreds of billions of dollars on new weapons. [Ref. 15]

Personnel are generally considered the "military's greatest asset." When other elements of the defense machinery, such as weaponry, technology, training, or spare parts are found lacking, service members are expected to fill the void and somehow compensate [Ref. 16]. In order to meet the challenges of the future, the military services are expected to recruit and retain sufficient people with the proper skills.

Over the first two decades of the all-volunteer military, black participation within the enlisted force increased, at times raising concern that this group may be far too overrepresented in relation to its presence in the general population. To adequately understand and discuss the effects of the post-Cold War drawdown on the black segment of the

population, it is helpful to first review the history of black participation within the AVF.

Extensive literature has been written on the AVF. Major topics of interest have been cost, recruitment (and associated quality and quantity issues), force composition and racial balance, the service of women and other groups affected by exclusionary policies, equity, black overrepresentation, and the social benefits and burdens of military service. Several of the above issues are reviewed here, since they serve to identify public concerns and outline black contributions during the all-volunteer era.

The AVF has experienced varying degrees of success since 1973. In evaluating the performance of the volunteer military, the key determinants have generally been the attainment of manpower goals and the quality of new recruits, based on their education and enlistment test scores.

The AVF period can be divided into five phases. Economic and political considerations that have affected recruitment and the associated issues of manpower quality and quantity serve as period boundaries. The phases that clearly delineate the AVF are: 1973 to 1976; 1977 to 1980; 1981 to 1989; 1989 to 1992; and a new phase starting in 1993. Each of these phases is discussed below with respect to the black segment of the enlisted force.

B. FORMULATION OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

President Richard Nixon appointed the Gates Commission in March 1969 with the mandate to study the costs and practicality of an AVF. Eight months later, the Commission reported its findings, concluding that an AVF was feasible.

In previous years, Congressional debates had been held on the subject of returning the military from a selective service system to an all-volunteer force. On each occasion, the idea was scrapped due to large cost estimates. According to the Gates Commission, to maintain a force of 2.5 million personnel, \$2.54 billion (in 1971 dollars) in additional pay would be required each year [Ref. 17]. This was an acceptable cost figure to Congress in relation to previous cost estimates of \$6 to \$8 billion annually.

On the hotly-debated issue of race and force composition, the Commission arrived at the following conclusions:

An army of the poor and blacks would not result. Black enlistments in an AVF would be only one percentage point higher than in a draft. [Ref. 18]

The Commission estimated that, in the short-run, black representation would reach 15 percent of the total, with a projected decline to 14.1 percent during the 1980s. Indeed, by the first half of 1974, black representation in the enlisted force had reached a level of 14.9 percent [Ref. 19].

Some observers maintained that the Gates Commission findings on cost and composition were unsubstantiated. As of

1974, with a force level of 2.1 million individuals, the increase in salary expenditures far exceeded the original cost estimates even without adjustments for the declining manpower quality [Ref. 20].

Cost and racial composition estimates provided by the Gates Commission have been criticized by numerous scholars who have conducted studies on the AVF [Ref. 21]. In fact, the Commission's projections have not withstood the scrutiny of careful review nor the test of time. As concluded by Moskos and Janowitz in 1974:

It ought to have been apparent that there was no effective basis for making definitive manpower estimates on the quantity and composition of the all-volunteer force. At best one can report current trends and offer informed speculations as to the future. [Ref. 22]

1. Phase I (1973 TO 1976): Early Recruiting Successes

In November 1971, Congress passed a bill that paved the way for the eventual end of the draft. The career force received an 11.6 percent pay raise along with a substantial increase in basic allowance for quarters. First-term enlisted pay was also raised substantially, doubling from \$134.40 to \$268.50 per-month. Authorizations were established for enlistment bonuses and other AVF-related special pays. This pay raise proved to be large enough to attract sufficient volunteers. [Ref. 23]

The authority to draft men was scheduled to end in June 1973. As the Gates Commission had envisioned, the number of military volunteers increased, even though the United

States was still engaged in the Vietnam war. The last draft call was issued in December 1972. Due to the large number of persons volunteering for military service, the AVF was thus implemented six months early, commencing January 1973.

During Phase I, the military was able to attract sufficient numbers of volunteers of the quality demanded. As one analyst points out, this was primarily due to a weak economy, high youth unemployment, a large pool of available manpower (with the tail end of the baby-boom generation), and, for a brief period, military wages comparable to those of civilian counterparts. [Ref. 24]

2. Factors Leading To AVF Racial Composition Changes

Black participation in the military has been on the rise since the armed forces were ordered to integrate their ranks by President Truman in 1948. In 1955, blacks comprised 8 percent of the force. In 1962, this figure had increased to 8.3 percent; and by 1970, blacks accounted for 9.8 percent of the force, with the highest concentrations in the Army. During the 1960s, blacks were found to reenlist at nearly twice the rate of whites. [Ref. 25]

At the end of 1974, black composition within the enlisted ranks reached a level of 15.7 percent. Five years later, black enlisted participation increased to 21.2 percent for all services combined, and stood at over 32 percent in the enlisted ranks of the Army. [Ref. 26]

Early literature on the topic of force composition tended to draw the connection between the end of the draft and rising levels of black participation in the military, failing to explore the many other possible reasons behind this phenomenon. In a 1977 study, Cooper attempted to pinpoint the factors that led blacks to enlist at a greater rate than their white counterparts within the youth population. [Ref. 27] Cooper concluded that increased education levels of blacks, higher unemployment rates, and a lack of comparable wages in the civilian sector were the dominant factors that accounted for increased enlistments by blacks after the start of the AVF.

From 1955 to 1970, the proportion of blacks receiving a high school diploma increased threefold. These rising education levels, and related improvements on the military's enlistment test, served to increase the number of blacks found eligible for military service.

Black teenagers during this period experienced exceedingly high levels of unemployment compared with their white counterparts. Between the period 1965 to 1973, the rate of unemployment for white youths aged 18 to 19 averaged 10.7 percent [Ref. 28]. During a comparable timeframe (1960 to 1970), unemployment levels among black youths in the same age group averaged 22 percent. Unemployment levels for black teenagers increased to 30 percent or more beginning with fiscal 1971 [Ref. 29]. These high levels of unemploy-

ment in the civilian labor market consequently "pushed" many black youths toward enlistment in the military.

The earnings potential for blacks in the civilian labor force also lagged behind that for whites. Although modest gains had been made in this area over the 1960s, during the early 1970s median income levels for blacks were again on the decline. In 1971 and 1972, a fulltime, year-round, employed black man between the ages of 18 to 24 could expect to earn 85 percent of the wage of his non-black counterpart. By 1974, this figure had decreased to just 72 percent. [Ref. 30]

C. THE DECLINE OF THE AVF

Confident that the early successes of the volunteer military would continue, lawmakers focused their attention on other issues. Because they did not fully understand the economic and social considerations upon which the AVF was based, all-volunteer recruiting came perilously close to failure.

1. Phase II: 1976 to 1980

The early successes of the AVF led many lawmakers and government officials to believe that the military would continue to attract sufficient recruits. Believing that military pay was adequate, if not excessive, Congress did little to maintain a rate of pay comparable to that of the civilian wage. Legislation was passed authorizing defense

cuts and pay freezes, yet the civilian minimum wage was increased, serving to widen the military-civilian disparity in pay [Ref. 31].

The G.I. Bill, a longstanding program that provided scholarship assistance to service members and veterans, was discontinued due to concerns of its high cost and inefficiency. A main argument was that a large quantity of recruits did not view the G.I. Bill as a tangible benefit upon entry; and they only took advantage of the program after leaving the military, thus making it a costly recruiting program. Furthermore, the G.I. Bill was originally intended to provide readjustment assistance and compensation to persons who served in the military during periods when the draft was used, not under an all-volunteer environment when pay and other benefits were relatively high. The group of recruits who aspired to achieve higher education through military service were now offered a newly-created program called "VEAP" (or the Post-Vietnam Era Veterans' Educational Assistance Program) as a replacement for the G.I. Bill. [Ref. 32]

VEAP was offered to individuals joining the military after 1 January 1977. It required service members to make voluntary monthly contributions, which the government would match in prescribed limits. The maximum level of government-provided assistance, however, was far below the amount of money once available through the G.I. Bill. Furthermore, it could be argued that the pay disparity, coupled with the

monthly VEAP contribution, served to lower the wages available to the quality recruit interested in acquiring a college education.

In the general economy, the recession bottomed out and a trend toward growth was starting. Youth unemployment rates were falling. The unemployment rate for white youths remained substantially lower than that of black youths, thus providing white youths with relatively greater encouragement to pursue civilian employment opportunities.

In addition to the above, the following concerns have been cited as possible contributors to the low recruitment rates of the late 1970s:

- a. Excessive media coverage on the problems of the AVF;
- b. Low public opinion of military service, compounded by continued anti-Vietnam sentiments;
- c. Trends by youth away from blue collar jobs and military enlisted service toward college and white collar jobs;
- d. Large-scale federal social programs offering jobs to many youths who would otherwise have enlisted in the military; and
- e. Growing federally-sponsored scholarship programs that made it possible for low-and moderate-income youth to attend college without a military service commitment (a "G.I. Bill without the G.I."). [Ref. 33]

Between 1977 and 1980, it was apparent that the required number of recruits could be achieved only by lowering quality standards. Realizing that recruitment would be difficult over this period, some branches of service decided to forgo

manpower quantity and use their limited resources to attract quality recruits [Ref. 34].

2. Quality Standards Affected by the AFQT Misnorming

Besides economic considerations, a major factor that led to an increase in the number of blacks within the military during Phase II of the AVF was the AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) "misnorming," which occurred from January 1976 to September 1980.

The AFQT is an aptitude composite derived from a combination of verbal and math subtests on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). It serves as a measure of "trainability" during the enlistment screening process, and is also used to compare the distribution of recruits across the services by aptitude. [Ref. 35]

During 1976, a new ASVAB form was developed for service-wide use in enlistment screening. The AFQT subset of the newly created ASVAB was to be normed to World War II standards, based on the assumption that the distribution of mental aptitudes within the youth population had remained fairly stable over the years. In February 1980, errors were discovered in the methods used to norm the test. Corrective measures were taken once the error was revealed, and a new ASVAB was introduced in October 1980.

As Eitelberg notes, the net result was that, for four years and nine months, enlistment standards were essentially reduced and the services accepted many recruits who would

otherwise have been deemed unqualified [Ref. 36]. The high-quality recruiting years that the services had initially reported turned out to be years in which quality as well as quantity were lacking. The Army was especially affected: its initial recruiting report for fiscal 1979 showed that 9 percent of all new recruits scored in AFQT Category IV (the lowest grouping of scores on the test, including the 10th through 30th percentiles); in reality, as it was later found, approximately 52 percent of the Army's recruits scored in Category IV on the AFQT.

D. REBUILDING OF THE AVF

By 1981, lawmakers faced a choice of returning to the draft or supporting the AVF with the proper resources.

1. Phase III: 1981 to 1989

Under the Reagan administration, basic pay, allowances, and special pay were raised during fiscal 1981 and 1982, which served to bring military pay up to a level considered comparable with civilian wages. VEAP supplements were instituted by the Army and Navy, and a new G.I. Bill was authorized.

Concerned with manpower quality, Congress placed a limit of 25 percent on AFQT Category IV recruits in fiscal 1981. The Army was also directed to recruit a minimum of 65 percent high school graduates; and non-high school graduates could be accepted only if they scored above the 30th

percentile on the AFQT. Additional "quality floors" were placed on the services by Congress for fiscal 1982 and 1983. In 1982, no service was allowed to have more than 25 percent of its recruits scoring in AFQT Category IV; and in 1983, this restriction was tightened to no more than 20 percent. [Ref. 37]

Even though the economy took a downturn after 1983, and pay comparability declined, the desired quality and quantity of recruits were generally obtained throughout the 1980s. In an attempt to discover why the 1980s were successful recruiting years, Warner found that, besides the economic forces of relative pay and civilian unemployment, an important determinant of high-quality military enlistments was the improved use of recruiting resources made available to the services by Congress [Ref. 38]. The recruiting practices and resources found to be most important included the willingness of the services to modify recruiter strength as market conditions dictated, the establishment of recruiting goals, the offering of educational benefits to potential quality recruits, and the expenditure of advertising dollars.

E. REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE SPENDING

Late 1989 marks the breakup of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact under the strains of unsound economic policies. These rapidly changing events promised to

influence the military environment in which the United States had operated for over 40 years.

Billions of dollars had been spent over the years to maintain a capable deterrent to military aggression posed by the Soviet Union. Some lawmakers contended that, with the end of the Cold War, resources that had been used for defense should be redirected toward pent-up domestic needs. Phase IV is marked by those events and how they changed U.S. military defense strategy.

1. Phase IV: 1990 to 1992 (End of the Cold-War)

For 40 years the enemy had been clearly identified as world communism led by the Soviet Union; but, now, the enemy was a faceless threat. In his 1990 State of the Union address, President Bush talked about the changing world. He described the period as a time of great transition, great hope, and yet great uncertainty. Taking a cautious approach, he announced that elements of the military posture, namely troops stationed in Europe, could now be reduced. [Ref. 39]

Following his speech, there was a great deal of discussion and debate concerning the nation's defense needs. Topics centered around how quickly troop reductions could occur, what were the best ways to reduce the defense establishment, and what types of savings could be realized. The desire for a "peace dividend" set the tone for this period.

Generally, Congress wanted greater cuts in military expenditures and force reductions than deemed appropriate by the Executive Branch or the Pentagon leadership. In its fiscal 1991 budget authorization, Congress demanded much deeper cuts in defense expenditures and manpower than the President had requested. Force reduction procedures were outlined for the services, in an effort to minimize the impact on mid-career personnel who would be forced out prior to having served 20 years.

a. Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield

The start of Operation Desert Shield in August 1990 brought a temporary halt to the force drawdown. For the first time since the Vietnam War, America sent a large contingent of troops, numbering over 570,000, to a foreign land. Facing the prospect of war, with a new and basically untested military, the nation watched as events unfurled in the Persian Gulf.

Based on the enemy's force, battle scenarios, and probable duration of battle, America's casualty estimates ranged from a few hundred to over 40,000. Support for the President and his handling of the Iraqi conflict remained high among the general public, but tended to wane as possible casualty estimates rose. [Ref. 40]

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm revived an old debate that has periodically focused attention on the AVF, namely, the overrepresentation of blacks in the enlisted

force. Issues concerning the service of blacks centered primarily on fairness and the systemic causes of black overrepresentation.

In a 1989 Pentagon report to Congress analyzing the composition of the military, it was found that blacks accounted for 14 percent of the nation's 18-to 24-year-old population, yet they accounted for 22 percent of all enlisted personnel. Blacks made up 26.7 percent and 19.9 percent, respectively, of the Army and Marine Corps infantry units. (Infantry units are most likely to see action during ground engagements.) [Ref. 41]

b. Benefits and Burdens of Military Service

As noted by Eitelberg, America's armed forces provide their members with many benefits in peacetime and substantially increased burdens in times of national emergency [Ref. 42]. This understanding was reinforced in 1991, as the expectations of war in the Persian Gulf heightened. For black youths, the benefits in peacetime centered on opportunities for employment and education, training, travel, and the prospect of improving one's socioeconomic standing.

Desert Storm underscored the fact that, due to their overrepresentation in the armed services, black Americans, as a group, faced a relatively greater chance than did whites of being killed or wounded. Leaders within the black community and government were torn over this issue. Months earlier, they had expressed concern that the drawdown

might disproportionately affect black youths. Once hostilities were likely, the position of many black spokesmen centered on "fairness," in the sense that the burdens of defense should be distributed equitably across all segments of the national population. [Ref. 43]

Supporters of the AVF emphasized that this was a wholly volunteer military, comprised largely of high aptitude individuals, who were aware of the inherent risks associated with their service. From this viewpoint, the AVF concept is one based on the principles of equal opportunity. It was also said that, along with patriotic reasons, black youths are attracted to the military because it is perceived as being "color blind," where people are judged on the merits of their work and not on the color of their skin. Institutions in the larger society, on the other hand, have been unable to provide blacks with similar opportunities.

Desert Storm turned out to be an unusually short war. There were 266 American service members killed in the war, and blacks represented 15 percent of the total. Dorn attributed the low percentage of black casualties to the short duration of the war, the fact that protracted ground battles did not occur, and the relatively small number of casualties overall [Ref. 44]. A highly-qualified and trained military force, coupled with high-technology weapons, was seen to have helped bring the war to a speedy end. Further, Representative Les Aspin released a House Armed Services

Committee report showing that, even though blacks were overrepresented in the U.S. military, they did not face a disproportionate risk of death in combat [Ref. 45].

Operation Desert Storm forced the nation, once again, to question basic principles associated with all-volunteer service in the military. Issues that arose from the gulf war included the fairness of force composition, ethnic/racial representation, the role of women in the military, the proper level of quality to staff a high-technology military, and the military's role in the training and social advancement of America's youth.

With Desert Storm in the background, attention returned to the force drawdown. Throughout the remainder of this phase, the Bush administration expressed concern that the drawdown be carried out slowly, because of increasing uncertainties in the world environment. In the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton ran on a platform that promised to reduce the military at a faster pace than that proposed by President Bush. Clinton won the election, and his presidency marks the start of Phase V.

2. Phase V (January 1993 and Beyond--What the Future Holds)

The nation's revised defense plan calls for a force that is overwhelmingly superior to those of regional powers, such as that of Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. It must also have the capability to be involved in one other regional

contingency of a lesser nature, and be able to maintain a presence in other critical overseas areas. [Ref. 46]

Using the fiscal 1987 force level of 2,174,000 active-duty military personnel as a base, the Bush drawdown called for a 25 percent reduction-in-force by fiscal 1997 [Ref. 47]. When Congressional budget negotiators requested an illustrative fiscal 1991 defense budget that reflected a speedier 25-percent drawdown, the Bush administration proposed a fiscal 1995 active-duty force of about 1.6 million individuals. [Ref. 48] As expected, the Clinton administration requested larger defense-wide cuts than those established under President Bush. Along with the defense cuts, there has been a call for accelerated manpower reductions. The current Department of Defense plan is to reduce the military's active force to a level of 1.4 million members by the end of fiscal 1997 [Ref. 49].

The key question, then, is how will the force drawdown affect the number of blacks in the armed forces? This issue is explored in the next chapter.

III. THE POST-COLD WAR DRAWDOWN

A. INTRODUCTION

Both the Pentagon and Congress desire that the force reduction be guided by readiness requirements with a sensitivity toward personnel issues. The fair treatment and trust of service members has been shown to be of major importance. Transition programs, such as counselling, employment assistance, verification of military experience, and job fairs are available to all separating service members. People who are forced to leave the military may receive separation pay and a final opportunity to sign up for the Montgomery G.I. Bill. Health benefits are provided to former members and their families for periods of 60 to 120 days after separation based on years of service. Family housing may be provided for up to 180 days after separation based on a "reasonable rent fee"; and commissary/exchange and base privileges are authorized for up to two years after discharge. [Ref. 50]

Within DoD, individuals having acquired between six and 19 years of active service are classified as "mid-career" personnel. As of March 1992, mid-career personnel accounted for nearly 45 percent of the force [Ref. 51]. Because mid-careerists face the prospect of being released prior to their eligibility for retirement, a common objective of those

parties planning and implementing the drawdown is that it be carried out with the least hardship toward this group of individuals.

In formulating the fiscal 1991 Defense Authorization Bill, Congress instructed the Department of Defense to reduce military end-strength primarily through the control of accessions and the management of expected turnover. The drawdown procedures were stated as follows:

- a. Restrict accessions only to those numbers needed to sustain the smaller force envisioned for fiscal year 1995.
- b. Dismiss as many as possible of those members having acquired 20 years of service yet remaining on active duty. Congress changed provisions in the personnel system to encourage these members to voluntarily separate, and made it easier for the services to dismiss them involuntarily. As an example, provisions were authorized to reduce mandatory in-grade time for officers and enlisted members.
- c. Hold down reenlistments to a level which would be necessary to sustain the force envisioned for fiscal year 1995.

Only after these measures were exhausted, would Congress allow the services to use involuntary separation procedures. The military services have used involuntary separations chiefly as a means to more precisely align and shape the force structure [Ref. 52]. To date, involuntary separations have been kept to a minimum and used principally to force the departure of retirement-eligible individuals.

To accomplish the drawdown, the services have relied mainly on their ability to restrict accessions, control reenlistments, and encourage the voluntary separation of mid-

careerists through the use of the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB). The VSI and SSB offer monetary incentives to personnel who elect to leave the military before qualifying for retirement. The programs were authorized by Congress in fiscal 1992 as a way of "keeping faith" and honoring the service of mid-career personnel.

B. EFFECTS OF THE DRAWDOWN ON BLACK ENLISTED MEMBERS

Since 1991, officials within DoD have claimed that (1) the force drawdown will not have a differential impact on minorities or women; (2) members of these groups will probably separate in numbers roughly proportional to their representation among all members of the total force; and (3) when the drawdown is completed, the demographic composition of the force will probably be the same as it was before the drawdown. [Ref. 53] In a report released in early 1993 by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), it was once again stated that the drawdown was not expected to have a disproportionate effect on minority or female members. However, this time it was also said that demographic trends cannot be precisely projected until after 1997 (when the drawdown is complete), since the services are using a variety of measures to balance and shape the force [Ref. 54]. This chapter of the thesis examines the prospects for participation by blacks in the

military, considering present strategies to reduce the active-duty force.

1. Occupational Mix

The Department of Defense divides enlisted occupations into 10 general areas. These 10 areas can also be distributed according to three skill levels, based on the type of occupation and eligibility requirements used to place service members in occupational training [Ref. 55]. Thus, "low-skill" occupations, by definition, usually involve less complicated tasks and have the lowest aptitude or test score standards for entry. The occupational areas, with their corresponding skill levels, and proportion of enlisted personnel assigned to each during fiscal 1991 are displayed in Table 1. As of fiscal 1991, nearly one-third (31 percent) of the active enlisted force was assigned to a low-skill occupation. Forty-one percent were assigned to an occupation requiring mid-level skills, and 22 percent to a highly-skilled, high-technology occupation.

During fiscal 1991, blacks accounted for 22.9 percent of the enlisted force. Table 2 shows the racial composition of each enlisted occupational area as of fiscal 1991. Based on these percentages, the majority of blacks were concentrated in mid-skill or low-skill occupations. The occupations reflecting the highest levels of overrepresentation for blacks were Administration, Service and Supply, and Medical/Dental.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA AND SKILL LEVEL, FISCAL 1991

OCCUPATIONAL AREA	SKILL LEVEL	PERCENT
(0) Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists	L	17.7
(1) Electronic Equipment Repairers	H	10.0
(2) Communications and Intelligence Specialists	H	9.9
(3) Medical and Dental Specialists	M	5.8
(4) Other Allied Specialists	H	2.3
(5) Functional Support and Administration	M	15.5
(6) Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	M	20.0
(7) Craftsmen	L	4.0
(8) Service and Supply Handlers	L	8.8
(9) *Non-occupational		6.0
Total		100.0

Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Oct. 1992, p. 59.

* Non-occupational includes patients, students, those with unassigned duties, and unknowns. Skill level: H = high, M = mid-level, L = low. Note: Skill level has been categorized by major occupational groups. As pointed out by Eitelberg [Ref. 55], skill levels may represent the average for the occupational group; however, each occupational group could include occupations requiring skills that are either above or below the group average.

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA AND RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP, FISCAL 1991

Occupational Area		White	Black	Other	Total
0	Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seaman-ship Specialists	69.3	23.6	7.1	100.0
1	Electronic Equipment Repairers	82.9	13.2	3.9	100.0
2	Communications and Intelligence Specialists	71.6	23.8	4.6	100.0
3	Medical and Dental Specialists	64.7	26.6	8.7	100.0
4	Other Allied Specialists	74.9	19.8	5.3	100.0
5	Functional Support and Administration	57.2	34.8	8.0	100.0
6	Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	76.2	17.4	6.4	100.0
7	Craftsman	78.1	16.3	5.7	100.0
8	Service and Supply Handlers	62.3	30.5	7.2	100.0
9	Non-occupational	77.7	17.2	5.1	100.0
All Occupations		67.4	22.9	9.8	100.0
Rows may not add to total due to rounding. * Non-occupational includes patients, students, those with unassigned duties, and unknowns.					

Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Oct. 1992, p 63.

Due to the reduction of forces and the changing military mission, it is likely that the military's occupational mix will be modified. Since blacks are disproportionately represented in certain occupations, there is a possibility that they may be disproportionately affected as well by any change in the distribution of military occupations or skills. As shown in Table 3, during fiscal 1973, 48 percent of black enlistees were assigned to a low-skill occupation. By 1991, black representation in these

occupations had decreased to 32.6 percent. Over this 18-year period, black representation in high-technology occupations nearly doubled from 9 to 17.9 percent. At the same time, the proportion of blacks working in mid-level occupations increased slightly from 43 percent in 1973 to 45 percent in 1991.

2. Quality Standards

During peacetime, a tool available to DoD for the purpose of force reduction is the control of personnel quality standards. An increase in quality standards can serve to restrict accessions and limit reenlistment opportunities for the marginally qualified.

A "high quality" recruit is currently defined as a person who possesses a high school diploma and scores in the upper 50th percentile on the AFQT. It has been demonstrated, and generally accepted, that high-quality recruits are more likely, on average, to complete training and to be promoted at a quicker pace than other recruits. Readiness and discipline problems have also been found to diminish with the higher-quality recruit. [Ref. 56]

Possession of a high school diploma has been found to correlate with a person's "adaptability" to military service (or completion of a first-term contract), while scores on the AFQT are generally indicative of a person's "trainability" (or likelihood of successfully completing training). Currently, to gain entry into the military, a non-high school graduate

Table 3. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA AND RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP IN FISCAL 1991 COMPARED WITH PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF BLACKS IN FISCAL 1973.

Occupational Area		FY 1973	FY 1991		
		Black	Black	White	Other
0	Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seaman-ship Specialists	27.0	19.0	18.6	20.5
1	Electronic Equipment Repairers	4.0	6.0	12.3	6.4
2	Communications and Intelligence Specialists	4.0	10.7	10.8	7.6
3	Medical and Dental Specialists	5.0	7.0	5.8	8.3
4	Other Allied Specialists	1.0	2.1	3.0	2.0
5	Functional Support and Administration	23.0	24.4	13.4	20.4
6	Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers	15.0	15.8	23.1	20.9
7	Craftsmen	4.0	3.0	4.8	3.8
8	Service and Supply Handlers	17.0	12.1	8.4	10.4
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<p>Columns may not add to total due to rounding Note: non-occupational includes patients, students, those with unassigned duties, and unknowns. Non-occupational data was unavailable for fiscal 1973. To provide realistic comparisons, the non-occupational group was excluded from the fiscal 1991 distributions.</p>					

Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Oct. 1992, p 62.

(including those with an equivalency certificate) is required to attain a higher score on the AFQT than that of a high school graduate (though the services have admitted relatively few non-graduates in recent years). This is done because considerable differences have been found in the attrition rates of military personnel based on their educational attainment (i.e., whether they are a high school graduate, non-high school graduate, or holder of a GED high school equivalency certificate). [Ref. 57]

AFQT scores are grouped into five major categories. Table 4 shows these AFQT categories and their corresponding percentile scores along with the expected level of trainability. Category I individuals are of the highest quality sought by the military services. Because members of this group have a high propensity to attend college following high school graduation and are highly sought by civilian employers, the military services draw only a small segment of these people [Ref. 58]. By law, the services are restricted from accepting individuals with test scores below the 10th percentile. This being the case, Category IV personnel are of the lowest quality deemed acceptable by the military. In addition to the limitations imposed by Congress, whenever possible, the services attempt to restrict their enlistment of "CAT IV" personnel. The bulk of recruiting resources are targeted toward persons in categories I through IIIA. The end result is that the majority of service manpower requirements are derived from AFQT Categories II and III (including persons in Category IIIB).

In general, men usually score higher than women on the ASVAB subtests associated with mechanical and electronic skills. Women tend to out-perform men in the administrative areas. On average, whites tend to score higher than non-black minorities, who, in turn, tend to score higher than blacks. [Ref. 59]

TABLE 4. ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST (AFQT)
CATEGORIES BY PERCENTILE SCORES AND
ESTIMATED LEVEL OF TRAINABILITY

CATEGORY	AFQT PER- CENTILE	LEVEL OF TRAINABILITY
I	93 - 99	Well Above Average
II	65 - 92	Above Average
III-A	50 - 64	Average to Above Average
III-B	31 - 49	Average to Below Average
IV-A	21 - 30	Below Average
IV-B	16 - 20	Below Average
IV-C	10 - 15	Below Average
V *	01 - 09 *	Well Below Average *


Source: DoD Instruction 1336.5 of 15 Jul 1987, Automated Extracts of Active Duty Military Personnel Records. Eitelberg, M.J., Manpower for Military Occupations, Department of Defense, p. 74, 1988.

Note: * Not permitted to serve in the military by law.

The number of blacks with a high school diploma has been increasing. As depicted in Figure 1, since 1975 a higher percentage of black youths entering the military for the first time (identified as "non-prior service" or NPS), tend to possess a high school diploma as compared with their white counterparts. However, a relatively large proportion of black high school graduates also enter the military with a score in AFQT Category IV.

Figure 2 shows the AFQT scores of new recruits by fiscal year from 1973 through 1992. Since 1980, enlistments of high quality recruits (depicted by Categories I - IIIA) have increased substantially. Modest downturns have been

experienced in Category IIIB. The sharpest declines are found for AFQT Category IV personnel. In 1981, persons scoring in Category IV accounted for approximately 21 percent of all new recruits. By 1992, this figure had declined to less than 1 percent. Figure 3 shows that, although black high-quality




Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accession File, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA

Figure 1. Percent of New Recruits Who Possessed a High School Diploma at Time of Entry by Race, Fiscal 1973-92

accessions have shown positive growth since 1980, the percentage of high-quality accessions who are black still remains below that of whites (and all new recruits as a


whole). Since 1989, black-high quality recruitment has increased by 16 percentage points. As depicted in Figure 4, this increase in quality was borne mostly at the expense of



Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accession File, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA

Figure 2. Percentage Distribution of New Recruits By AFQT Category and Year of Entry, Fiscal 1973-92


persons in Category IV, who declined by 13.5 percentage points over the same period. This suggests that a sizable number of individuals who would have been qualified for military service in 1989 were considered basically unqualified just three years later.



Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accession File, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA

Figure 3. Percent of New Recruits Who Scored in AFQT Categories I-III A by Race and Year of Entry, 1973-92

The force drawdown will reduce the number of personnel of all races or ethnic backgrounds within the armed forces. However, if the drawdown is accompanied by an increase in quality standards, it is quite likely that blacks, who tend to have the lowest scores on the AFQT, will be disproportionately cut off from opportunities to serve in the military [Ref. 60]. Current trends in the areas of personnel turnover and enlistments are analyzed to explore this speculation.



Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accession File, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA

Figure 4. Percentage Distribution of Black New Recruits by AFQT Category and Year of Entry, 1973-92

3. Personnel Turnover or Separation

Within a manpower system, turnover (or loss) of personnel must be managed to create and maintain a stable workforce. DoD uses the term "separation" to depict turnover. There are two main types of separation, voluntary and involuntary. Involuntary separation covers all losses for reasons beyond the control of the individual, such as death, ill-health, excessive supply of personnel, or failure to meet

minimum behavioral or performance standards. Voluntary separations from the enlisted force occur when the individual leaves, usually to return to civilian life, to pursue training opportunities, or to enter an officer commissioning program.

[Ref. 61]

Separation statistics for recent years within the AVF are shown in Tables 5 and 6. As presented in Table 5, during 1986 there were 315,638 enlisted separations for reasons other than dropping from the rolls, reenlistment, record correction, and drops from the strength count due to reasons of desertion,

TABLE 5. NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL "LOSSES" BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP, FISCAL 1986, 1989, AND 1991

RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP	1986	1989	1991
White	77.6	77.1	75.4
Black	17.9	18.0	19.2
Other	4.5	4.9	5.2
Unknown	0.1	0.1	0.3
Total			
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	315,638	303,106	266,110
<p>Notes: Losses represent all separations for reasons other than dropping from the rolls, reenlistment, record correction and drops from strength count due to reasons of desertion, imprisonment, or missing in action/prisoner of war. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.</p> <p>Source: Active Duty Loss Files maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA.</p>			

imprisonment, or missing in action/ prisoner of war. In fiscal 1991, 266,110 individuals separated from active duty. Between the five-year period from 1986 to 1991, "other" minorities separating from the military increased by 0.69

percentage points. At the same time, separations for blacks increased by 1.31 percentage points, and white separations declined by 2.23 percentage points.

Table 6 shows that, from 1986 to 1991, the percentage of white men separating has remained near 89 percent and that of white women near the entire female separation average of 11 percent. The separation rate of black men has declined by almost 4 percentage points over the period, from 87 percent in

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE LOSSES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RACE (WHITE AND BLACK) AND GENDER, FISCAL 1986, 1989, AND 1991

FISCAL YEAR	MALE			FEMALE		
	WHITE	BLACK	ALL	WHITE	BLACK	ALL
1986	89.5	87.2	89.1	10.5	12.8	10.9
1989	89.5	85.0	88.7	10.5	15.0	11.3
1991	88.8	83.2	87.7	11.2	16.9	12.3

Notes: Losses represent all separations for reasons other than dropping from the rolls, reenlistment, record correction and drops from strength count due to reasons of desertion, imprisonment, or missing in action/prisoner of war. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Source: Active Duty Loss Files maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA.

1986 to 83 percent in 1991. Separations by black women, on the other hand, increased from less than 13 percent in 1986 to almost 17 percent in 1991.

These figures show that separations from military service by black women have been increasing since the mid-to-late 1980s. Proportionately, the separation rates for black

men are lower than those of all other groups. A major concern here is the finding that black women, in particular, are experiencing a higher rate of separation than that of the total female population.

Historically, less than 10 percent of new recruits during a given year will complete 20 years of service and thus qualify for retirement benefits [Ref. 62]. During fiscal 1991, approximately 1,300 retirement-eligible individuals (including officers) were involuntarily separated. Data for this study were derived from records of individuals having enlisted during the all-volunteer force era. Presumably, only a small number of individuals who enlisted in 1973 to 1976 will face the prospect of an involuntary separation starting in 1994. Based on this premise, the major emphasis of this study focuses on voluntary separations. Two programs that have been used to shape the occupational mix through voluntary means are the VSI and SSB.

4. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB) Programs

The purpose of the VSI and SSB programs is to influence mid-career personnel serving in overmanned or non-critical skill areas to leave the military voluntarily. Compensation for VSI is based on the member's monthly base pay amount (excluding housing allowances, subsistence pay, and special pays) multiplied by 12 (months). This composite is multiplied by .025 times the member's years of service. The

calculated amount is then payable each year for twice the number of years the member served. Unlike VSI, SSB is a lump-sum payment. It is calculated as 15 percent of the member's monthly base pay, multiplied by 12 (months) and multiplied again by the number of years on active duty. Over the long-run, a larger sum of money can be attained through the VSI program.

In 1992, the typical SSB participant was a white man with 11 years of service, who entered the military with an AFQT score in Category IIIB, and was working in a mid-skill occupation. Although similar, the VSI participant was distinguished from the SSB-taker by seniority (15 years of service, on average) and a higher score on the AFQT (Category II).

During 1992, 42,751 enlisted members elected to participate in one of these programs. Of those voluntarily separating, 39,154 (91.6 percent) opted for the SSB and the remaining 3,597 (8.4 percent) elected the VSI. The number of expected participants is smaller for 1993, with 12,095 (88 percent) having applied for the SSB and 1,654 (12 percent) signing up for the VSI. From 1992 results, it is clear that the SSB is the more attractive of the two programs. Service members opting to take the VSI were most likely to be serving in pay grades E-5 to E-7 upon separation. Of the SSB participants, the largest percentages were in pay grades E-4 to E-5.

Appendix A shows the actual participation rates for 1992 SSB and VSI takers by DoD occupation codes, race, sex, and AFQT category. Appendix B shows the number of individuals who have signed up for VSI or SSB in 1993. These members may still be on active duty, but must leave the military by the end of the fiscal year.

During both years, the majority of takers came from the following occupational areas: Functional Support and Administration; Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repair; Infantry, Guncrews and Seamanship Specialties; and Electronic Equipment Repair. In both years, the proportion of highly-skilled individuals provided with exit bonuses was less than the proportion of highly-skilled individuals in the force during 1991 or 1992.

Blacks accounted for 32.4 percent and 17.1 percent of the SSB and VSI participants, respectively, during 1992. This equates to an overall participation rate of 31.1 percent. During 1993, blacks are expected to constitute 23.2 percent of all participants. During both 1992 and 1993, the four DoD occupational areas with the largest number of black separations were Functional Support and Administration, Infantry, Guncrews and Seamanship Specialties, Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repair, and Service and Supply.

In 1992 and 1993, personnel who had an AFQT score in Category IV accounted for about 6.9 percent of the active-duty

enlisted force. During these years, a large proportion of the people separated under the VSI/SSB programs originally entered the military with an AFQT score in Category I. For example, in 1992, 9,396 individuals were so classified, which amounted to 22 percent. In 1993 the number decreased to 1,276 people, representing 9.3 percent of the total. Of the black enlisted members taking advantage of the VSI or SSB program, 39.3 percent were classified as being in AFQT Category IV in 1992 and 18.6 percent in 1993.

In summary, black voluntary separations were much higher than that group's proportion of the force as a whole in 1992. Of those members having volunteered to take the VSI or SSB during fiscal 1993, the proportion will decrease from the 1992 level; however, once again, blacks will be disproportionately represented based on their percentage in the total force.

Based on the distribution of VSI and SSB takers by AFQT score, it appears that the voluntary separation programs tend to "favor" service members who were classified as being in Category IV when they first enlisted. A large number of blacks were in these ranks. With the reduction of Category IV individuals in the force, black quality will be expected to increase in future years. This may lead to reduced opportunities for the 16 percent or so of the black enlisted force whose AFQT score is below the 31st percentile.


5. Recruitment

Yearly enlistments (or accessions) are based on planned manpower needs, taking into account current strength levels adjusted for projected separations and reenlistments. Prior to legislation authorizing the VSI and SSB programs, reducing accessions was the primary means available to the services in their effort to prevent disruptions to readiness and alleviate possible hardships for mid-career personnel.

Accessions have decreased significantly from pre-drawdown levels. As shown in Table 7, non-prior service (NPS) accessions have decreased from over 400,000 in the early 1970s to a level slightly over 200,000 in 1992. Since 1980, blacks have constituted approximately 19 percent of each year's NPS accessions. In 1989, the last year before the drawdown officially commenced, blacks represented 21.4 percent of all new recruits. Throughout the 1980s, the number of black recruits remained fairly constant; and it then declined markedly after 1989. In 1992, black representation within the accession cohort was 16.4 percent. This is the lowest level observed since the inception of the AVF. This decrease amounts to a 24-percent reduction in black accessions over the three-year period.

Figure 5 shows that the proportion of "other" minorities within the total enlisted force has been increasing at a higher rate than that of blacks since 1982. Since 1989, the proportion of blacks within each year's class of new

recruits has declined while that of whites and other minorities has increased.



Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accession File, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA

Figure 5. Percentage Distribution of New Recruits by Racial/Ethnic Group and Year of Entry, Fiscal 1973-92

During the six-year period from 1986 to 1992, the number of new recruits has declined by 37.7 percent. Tables 8 and 9 show the annual percentage change for white and black accessions since 1986. During this period, the overall effect on white and black accessions was a decline of 38 percent and 46.6 percent, respectively. The force reduction encountered

TABLE 7. NUMBER OF NEW RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES COMBINED) AND PERCENTAGE WHO ARE BLACK BY FISCAL YEAR, 1973 - 1992

FY	New Recruits (Total)	Percentage Who Are Black
1973	455,917	16.9
1974	395,554	20.6
1975	419,169	17.6
1976	397,842	16.9
1977	399,310	20.0
1978	356,325	22.9
1979	315,763	26.0
1980	359,790	22.1
1981	327,757	18.9
1982	305,732	18.8
1983	305,013	17.9
1984	309,816	18.3
1985	301,447	18.6
1986	314,860	19.1
1987	299,337	19.7
1988	272,627	20.7
1989	277,528	21.4
1990	224,082	20.8
1991	200,727	16.7
1992	200,810	16.4

Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Military Services, (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991); Defense Manpower Data Center; Department of Defense, Report "America's Volunteers: A Report on the AVF," 1978, and Service 1391 reports.

Note: "New Recruits" (or non-prior service accessions) are persons who entered military service (as an enlistee) for the first time.

TABLE 8. NUMBER OF WHITE NEW RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES COMBINED) AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY FISCAL YEAR, 1986-92

Fiscal Year	New Recruits	Percentage Change From Previous Year
1986	228,907	--
1987	212,792	-7.0
1988	186,510	-12.4
1989	186,105	-0.2
1990	154,886	-16.8
1991	142,426	-8.0
1992	141,538	-0.6

Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accession File maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA.

by the white segment was also of a more gradual nature than for blacks, with the largest reductions occurring in 1988 and 1990. Blacks, on the other hand, faced a more pronounced change, with the largest cuts coming in 1990 and 1991.

These findings suggest that blacks, in general, have faced a larger reduction in enlistment opportunities than have other segments of the population. In proportional terms, black accessions have been reduced from AVF historical levels since fiscal 1989; however, the shares of other minorities and whites have actually increased.

Although the previous discussions centered around various tools and programs used to carry out the force downsizing, they all serve a common purpose, which is to shape the total force. In an effort to link the above findings,

TABLE 9. NUMBER OF BLACK NEW RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES COMBINED) AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY FISCAL YEAR, 1986-92

Fiscal Year	New Recruits	Percentage Change From Previous Year
1986	59,765	--
1987	58,580	-2.0
1988	54,909	-6.0
1989	57,498	+5.0
1990	46,172	-19.7
1991	31,924	-31.0
1992	31,905	-0.05

Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accession File, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA.

changes realized within the total force as a result of drawdown policies are analyzed in the next chapter.

IV. TOTAL FORCE CHANGES

A. INTRODUCTION

By the close of fiscal 1992, the total enlisted force end-strength was 1,519,782. In comparison with the fiscal 1990 end-strength (1,732,414), this amounts to an enlisted force reduction of 12.3 percent [Ref. 63]. The following analytical concept is used to evaluate the overall impact of this reduction-in-force on the demographic composition of the military.

B. ANALYTICAL CONCEPT

Because of their reliability, force end-strength data available at the beginning of a fiscal year serve as a reference point. At the start of a fiscal year, force demographics--such as racial composition, gender characteristics, and occupational mix--are tabulated and recorded by various offices within DoD. By utilizing these reference points as periods of observation, changes within demographic areas of interest may be calculated over a specified time period (usually one year). Over the span of one year, the total enlisted force will change as a result of force reduction initiatives, reenlistments, accessions, and separations. Changes observed over the time period can be considered as "growth" within the system (with positive

numbers indicating increases, and negative numbers decreases). This change in the total system size can then be evaluated in relation to the change realized within a specific demographic group over the same time period. If the specific demographic group declines faster than the total force, then that group's proportion of the total enlisted force must decline.

Table 10 shows enlisted end-strength and racial representation for the years 1990 to 1992. During the two-year period

TABLE 10. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP AND FORCE END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, 1990-92

Racial/ Ethnic Group	1990	1991	1992	Change 1990-1992
White	67.4	67.4	67.4	0.0
Black	23.1	22.9	22.8	-0.8
Other	9.5	9.8	10.3	+0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0
End-strength (numbers in 000)	1,732	1,681	1,520	-212
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) report of 16 Feb 1993				

analyzed, white representation remained constant at 67.4 percent of force end-strength. The proportion of "other" minorities in the total enlisted force increased by 0.8 percentage points. At the same time, the black proportion of the total enlisted force declined by 0.8 percentage points.

During 1991, total enlisted force end-strength declined by 3 percent from the 1990 level. Whites declined at the same rate as their percent of the total end-strength, and therefore accounted for the same proportion of the total enlisted force. Blacks declined by a slightly higher rate, 4.1 percent. As a result, their representation in the total enlisted force declined by 0.2 percentage points. In contrast, "other" minorities showed a growth rate of 0.12 percent during the year and realized a slight increase of approximately 0.3 percentage points in their proportion of the force.

During 1992, total enlisted force end-strength declined by 9.6 percent from the 1991 level. Once again, the white segment declined at approximately the same level as the total enlisted force and their proportion remained about the same over the one-year period. Blacks, on the other hand, experienced a 16.2 percent decline in end-strength and their proportion of the entire force dropped to 22.3 percent. This is a total decline in the black proportion of the total enlisted force over the two-year period of 0.6 percentage points. The decline realized by "other" minorities, was approximately 4.9 percent, less than that of the force as a whole; and their proportion of the force therefore increased to 10.3 percent.

An effort was made to determine if representation differences exist between service men and women. Tables 11 and 12 show representation and end-strength by gender and

race. As seen here, from 1990 to 1992, blacks were the only racial group among male enlisted members that had a decline in overall representation. Black men, as a proportion of all enlisted men in the military, dropped by 0.9 percentage points. This occurred because black men experienced a higher

TABLE 11. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MALE ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP WITH MALE END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, 1990-1992

Racial/Ethnic Group	1990	1991	1992	Change 1990 - 1992
White	68.6	68.6	68.7	+0.1
Black	21.8	21.5	20.9	-0.9
Other	9.6	9.9	10.4	+0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0
Male enlisted end-strength (numbers in 000)	1,544	1,498	1,348	-196
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) report of 16 Feb 1993				

rate of decline during the period than did enlisted men as a whole. Although both black and white women were somewhat less represented in the enlisted force, the decline for black women was somewhat greater than that of their white counterparts. As shown in Table 12, the proportion of black women among all enlisted women declined by 0.5 percentage points.

It is interesting to observe that the representation of "other" minorities--both male and female--increased by approximately 1 percentage point during the period. The

TABLE 12. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALE ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP WITH FEMALE END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, 1990-1992

Racial/Ethnic Group	1990	1991	1992	Change 1990 - 1992
White	57.5	57.2	57.1	-0.4
Black	34.2	34.2	33.7	-0.5
Other	8.3	8.6	9.2	+1.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0
Enlisted Female End-Strength (numbers in 000s)	189	182	172	-196
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), report of 16 Feb 1993				

percentage change in the active-duty enlisted force and gender categories during the 1990-1992 period are summarized below in Table 13. As seen here, the rate of decline for women was slightly higher than the overall rate from 1990 to 1991. On the other hand, during the 1991 to 1992 period, the rate for women declined by just 5.5 percent, compared with a rate of 9.6 percent for the force as a whole.

From 1990 to 1991, the number of black men in the military declined by 4.2 percent. In comparison, the number of white men fell by 2.9 percent during the same period. (This was equivalent to the decline for all men in the force.) "Other" minority men experienced a slight decrease of 0.2 percent. During this same one-year period, the number of black women fell by 3.7 percent. This approximates the reduction for women as a whole in the force. At the same time, the number

of white women declined by 4.0 percent; and "other" minority women realized an increase of 0.6 percent.

TABLE 13. PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN END-STRENGTH FOR THE TOTAL FORCE, BY GENDER AND FISCAL YEAR PERIODS, 1990-1992

Period	Total Force	Male	Female
1990 - 1991	-3.0	-2.9	-3.5
1991 - 1992	-9.6	-10.1	-5.5

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) report of 16 Feb 1993

When segmented by race, it is seen that black men realized a decline of 12.6 percent over the one-year period ending in 1992. The representation of white men within the force declined by 10.0 percent. This is approximately equal to the percentage reduction in the total male end-strength. "Other" minority men declined by 5.4 percent. This is why the "other" minority share of the total end-strength actually increased during the period, as shown in Table 11.

In the one-year period ending in 1992, both black and white women experienced a relative decline in their respective totals. Black women declined by 7.0 percent. White women declined by 5.7 percent. "Other" minority women continued to experience growth; and, as a result, this group's share of total female end-strength increased by 1.3 percentage points, as shown in Table 12.

These calculations serve to demonstrate that, while the minority proportion of the enlisted force has remained fairly constant, the black proportion of the total force is declining. The evidence obtained from this two-year period suggests that the drawdown has, so far, disproportionately affected blacks compared with other racial groups in the enlisted population.

If these trends continue, at the completion of the drawdown, black representation in the military could be considerably lower than it was in 1989, when blacks constituted 23 percent of the total enlisted force. In the next section, some speculation is offered concerning the future of blacks in the military.

C. BLACK REPRESENTATION AFTER THE DRAWDOWN

The military is a major provider of jobs, training, and socioeconomic mobility for black members of society. Due to the lack of employment opportunities in the civilian labor market, it has been suggested that the military may serve as "an employer of last resort" for many black youths. As of December 1992, the unemployment rate for black male youths, aged 16 to 19, was 42.2 percent. White men of the same age faced an unemployment rate of 17.2 percent. Over the same timeframe, the unemployment rate for black women, aged 16 to 19, was 36.5 percent, while that of white women was 15.1 percent [Ref. 64]. With little opportunity for

civilian employment, black youths will most likely continue to view the military as an attractive employment alternative.

Although the proportion of blacks in the U.S. population continues to grow, other minorities enjoy the highest annual growth rate of any segment of the population. Since 1970, the "other races" segment of the national population has been growing at four-times the rate of blacks, and eight-times faster than that of whites [Ref. 65].

The major selection criteria used to accept or reject individuals for military service are educational attainment and AFQT scores. Although black education levels and AFQT scores are rising, they are not increasing at a pace that will allow blacks to gain much ground on "other" minorities during enlistment screening. Based on current quality standards in use, the lower AFQT scores attained by blacks, on average, could lead to further erosion of the share they currently enjoy within the enlisted ranks.

In 1988, 57 percent of the black population lived in central cities or metropolitan areas. This was more than double that of the white segment, which was 27 percent [Ref. 66]. In 1991, the military services reported that recruiting resources were being targeted toward areas where a higher percentage of military-age youth resided. Such areas include the Southwest, West, and South. The areas of expansion were found to have greater proportions of other minorities (mainly persons of hispanic origin) than blacks.

At the same time, markets with high applicant rejection rates were targeted for closure. This change of policy led to the closure of recruiting offices in many urban areas, where blacks tend to be concentrated. The reduction of recruiters in inner-city areas probably had an important impact on the drop in black recruits during the early 1990s.

The number and proportion of recruits who score in AFQT Category IV have been on the decline. In fact, the proportion of Category IV recruits has fallen from 22.3 percent in 1980 to 6.4 percent in 1989. Less than one percent of the 1992 cohort was classified as being in Category IV. At the same time, it should be noted that the AFQT mean score for blacks, aged 18 to 23 in the general population, falls within Category IV. In comparison, the AFQT mean score for white women, like that of their male counterparts, is above the 50th percentile. The services are in the process of removing barriers that restrict women from serving in combat-related occupations. If such barriers are removed, and women are attracted to military service at a greater rate than presently realized, it is possible that black men attaining a score in AFQT Category IV will all but disappear and those in AFQT Category IIIB will become the new "marginally qualified" recruit [Ref. 67].

This conclusion was drawn in a recent study of the military's "newly unqualified" population for the Department of Education. Just looking at the force downsizing--without considering the possible effects of admitting more highly-

qualified women--it was predicted that black youths may be denied enlistment at a rate three times greater than that of other youths within the general population. Further, the study predicted that AFQT Category IV individuals could be denied enlistment altogether, and AFQT Category IIIB individuals could make up 72 percent of the newly unqualified. [Ref. 68]

Table 14 provides some insight as to the quality and accession levels desired by the services in future years. Based on the small growth in accessions and the high quality standards desired, barring any major policy changes, it seems highly probable that the black share within the active-duty military will continue to decline.

Applicants are defined as those individuals who arrive at a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) or Mobile Examining Team (MET) site for ASVAB testing. In recent years, fewer individuals have been taking the AFQT. As one analyst observes, recruiters often conduct prescreening on condensed versions of the AFQT within their offices. This prescreening procedure operates to discourage many lower-aptitude or marginally-qualified people from applying for enlistment and taking the formal examination. [Ref. 69]

The Army and Navy have reported a drop in quality among new recruits during the first six months of fiscal 1993. For

TABLE 14. PROJECTIONS FOR THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF NEW RECRUITS, FISCAL 1993-99

DoD Totals	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Numbers in 000s							
NPS	216.8	182.0	193.2	201.9	221.2	214.0	214.1
PS	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Total	218.8	184.0	195.2	205.9	225.2	218.0	218.1
Percent of total accessions							
NHSDG	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.7	4.0	3.9	3.9
NPS HSDG	96.1	96.1	96.0	96.3	96.0	96.1	96.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Percent of total accessions							
NPS HSDG (I-III A)	64.1	65.8	66.2	66.2	64.9	65.3	65.1
NPS HSDG (III B)	31.0	29.5	28.9	29.1	30.0	29.9	30.1
NPS HSDG (IV)	.9	.8	.9	.9	1.0	.9	.9
Total	96.1	96.1	96.1	96.1	96.1	96.1	100.0
Abbreviations: HSDG=high school diploma holder; NHSDG=non-high school diploma holder, including persons with alternative of equivalency diplomas); NPS=non-prior service, PS=persons with prior service, I-III A=Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Category I-III A; III B=AFQT Category III B; IV=AFQT Category IV. Totals may not add due to rounding. Figures shown are POM (Program Objective Memoranda) submissions from FY 1993-1999. 1994-99 forecast of total NPS HSDG accessions abulated from individual Service's POM.							

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) Active Force Enlisted Accession Analysis Fy 1980-99 Report dated 5 Nov 1992.

all services combined, approximately 94 percent of all new recruits possessed a high school diploma, compared with 99 percent during the first six months of the previous year.

The proportion of "high quality" recruits (those who possess a high school diploma and have an AFQT score in Categories I - III A) also declined slightly--falling from 62 percent during the first six months of 1992 to about 60 percent a year later.

The number of black recruits increased by 24,000; however, the proportion of blacks remained consistent with the 1992 (first six months) level at 14 percent. [Ref. 70]

Dwindling resources for recruiting and lessened interest in service among youth have been cited as possible reasons for the decline. Based on the 1992 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey, approximately 27 percent of men aged 16 to 21 would "definitely" or "probably" enlist in one of the armed services. This was down slightly from 29 percent in 1991. In 1989, 53 percent of black men between the ages of 16 and 22 said they were likely to enlist in the military. In 1990, that number had decreased to 44 percent; and by 1992, it was down to 37 percent. The propensity of women (16 to 22 years old) to enlist has remained virtually unchanged since 1990 at 11 percent. [Ref. 71]

The services have voiced concern that reduced recruiting budgets have not allowed them to get out the message they are still "hiring." The military's advertising budgets have been slashed considerably in recent years. For example, the Army's 1993 budget for print, radio, television, and billboards is \$22.5 million. This figure is 38 percent below the amount budgeted during the previous year. In 1990, the Army had an advertising budget of \$65 million, almost triple the amount in 1993. [Ref. 72]

Potential problems looming on the horizon for military manpower planners include proposed national service programs

and pay freezes. Although the details of various national service proposals vary, some observers are worried that the monetary benefits offered for two years of community service may compete with the military's current enlistment incentives, such as the Montgomery G.I. Bill [Ref. 73]. Not only will national service vie for the same labor pool, it may prove attractive to persons desiring college or further training (i.e., the higher-quality individual). At the same time, Al From, president of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), has suggested that a DLC-backed program of national service be viewed as an "upward-mobility track" for disadvantaged youth when the military is downsized [Ref. 74]. A program designed to steer youngsters into jobs or college could be especially important with the shrinkage of the military.

The Clinton Administration has proposed to give no pay raise to federal workers (including members of the military) in 1994 and to limit raises between 1995 and 1997 to 1.5 percentage points less than the rise in the Employer Cost Index. Based on forecasts by the Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Association, the potential exists for the pay disparity between military and civilian wages to increase from a present level of 11.7 percent to about 19.9 percent by 1997 [Ref. 75]. With this loss of earnings potential, the military may find added difficulty in attaining the desired numbers and quality of new recruits in future years.

In conclusion, if present trends follow course, it is likely that black representation within the All-Volunteer Force will continue to decline from pre-drawdown levels. However, coupled with the uncertainties presented by the military reorganization and future difficulties in recruiting, it is also possible that the decline in black representation may not be as severe as presently indicated.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

This study presents information on the post-Cold War military drawdown and its effects on blacks within the enlisted force. It is found that black representation declined within the military's enlisted ranks from 1990 through 1992. Since the introduction of the all-volunteer military in 1973, blacks have enlisted in the military at a rate that has exceeded their proportion in the national population. Economic factors have been identified as a major influence in the attraction of black youths to military service.

With the Cold War at an end, the United States has determined that its military forces can be substantially reduced. Black youths were a major source of military manpower during the Cold War build-up of the force, and they are likely to experience a decline in their level of representation as the military shrinks. Major causes of the decline in black representation are higher entry standards, changes in recruiting practices, and the introduction of various force-reduction policies that may be particularly unfavorable to blacks as a whole.

The primary selection criteria used to accept or reject individuals for military service are educational attainment

(high school graduation) and AFQT scores. Of all racial groups in the U.S., blacks generally receive the lowest scores on the AFQT. Although black education levels and achievement test scores are rising nationally, they are not increasing at a pace that will establish parity with other racial groups in the near future.

Since 1975, a higher percentage of black youths entering military service for the first time have possessed a high school diploma as compared to their white counterparts. At the same time, a relatively large proportion of these black high school graduates have attained scores that place them in AFQT Category IV.

The number and proportion of military recruits who score in AFQT Category IV are on the decline. In addition to "quality floors" established by Congress, the services seek to limit their intake of AFQT Category IV personnel whenever possible. In 1981, individuals scoring in Category IV made up 21 percent of all new recruits. By 1992, the proportion of AFQT Category IV recruits had declined to less than 1 percent.

Black "high-quality" accessions (high school graduates with an AFQT test score in Categories I-III A) have increased since 1980. However, the percentage of black high-quality accessions still remains considerably below that of whites and new recruits as a whole. Since 1989, the proportion of black high quality accessions has increased by 16 percentage points. This increase in quality was borne mostly at the expense of

blacks in Category IV, whose recruitment declined by 13.5 percentage points over the same period.

The primary method of force reduction during the defense drawdown has been through the control of accessions and, to a lesser extent, the use of voluntary separation programs (the VSI and SSB). Since 1989, the proportion of blacks within each year's class of new recruits has declined, while that of whites has remained fairly stable, and that of "other" minorities has increased. In 1989, the last year before the drawdown officially commenced, blacks represented 21.4 percent of all new recruits. By 1992, the black percentage was down to 16.4 percent, the lowest level observed since the end of the draft. In 1991, the services reported that recruiting stations in areas of low return, namely urban areas, were being closed. With blacks living predominantly in these areas, the likelihood increases that many will lose contact with military recruiters. Also, recruiting resources were moved to new territories--the Southwest, West, and South--due to a shift in youth population demographics. These new areas are proportionately less populated by blacks, which may also contribute to a continuing decline in black representation among new recruits.

The services have used voluntary separation programs based on monetary incentives to encourage excess personnel to leave the military prior to their eligibility for retirement. In 1992, blacks accounted for 31 percent of all enlisted SSB and

VSI participants, a level much higher than that group's proportion of the enlisted force, which was 22.3 percent. During 1993, blacks are expected to constitute 23.2 percent of total voluntary separation participants.

In 1992 and 1993, personnel who had AFQT scores in Category IV (when they originally entered the military) accounted for approximately 6.9 percent of the active-duty enlisted force. Approximately 16 percent of these personnel were black. Of the black enlisted members taking advantage of the VSI or SSB program, 39.3 percent were classified as being in AFQT Category IV in 1992 and 18.6 percent in 1993.

The minority proportion of the enlisted force has remained fairly stable during the early years of the downsizing; however, the black proportion of the total force has been declining. Officials within DoD have stated on various occasions that the racial proportions of the total force are not expected to change as a result of drawdown policies. Based on the findings in this study, clearly, the drawdown has disproportionately affected blacks compared with other racial groups in the enlisted population.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The military serves as a major provider of jobs and training opportunities for America's youth. Facing high unemployment rates and socioeconomic disadvantage in the

larger society, black teenagers have turned to the military in large numbers for the many benefits it offers.

Not everyone will be affected equally by the defense drawdown. Some members of the society may suffer or profit to a greater extent than others. Because entry into the military is tied largely to educational achievement, groups in society that have the least educational opportunities--whether segmented by race, socioeconomic status, or geographic region--are most likely to become the military's "newly unqualified."

It is not completely clear how the drawdown will affect black youth. Although military-aged blacks continue to be represented in the armed forces above the level of their proportion in the general population, many who may have once received training and employment opportunities in the military will likely find that those opportunities are no longer available. Those who, under previous circumstances, would have been allowed entry into military service, may therefore face the prospect of reduced socioeconomic opportunities.

Military manpower planners should be aware that black representation within the enlisted force will probably decline as long as entry standards remain at their present level or increase. This poses a potential problem for young blacks and for the nation as a whole, because the military has long-served as an important, positive influence on the lives of many black young men and women.

Further studies of personnel quality measures and enlistment standards may prove beneficial. Such studies could aid the military in assessing its qualitative needs as well as improve the cost-effectiveness of recruiting and force management.

The military's standards for screening applicants have not hampered the participation of blacks in the AVF of the past 20 years; but, as the force has contracted, enlistment criteria have risen, and many otherwise-qualified blacks have been turned away. The AFQT has been found to be an effective predictor of personnel performance. During the defense downsizing, it may also be an impediment to black enlistments; and in the absence of alternative selection criteria, the participation of blacks in the military could continue to fall with each passing year.

APPENDIX A. 1992 VSI AND SSB PARTICIPANTS

TOTAL LOSSES FY92
VS.
SSB/VSI TAKERS (FY 92)
AS OF 9/30/92
TOTAL
ENLISTED

	FY9209		SSB			VSI			NEITHER		
	# FY2009	% FY2009	# TAKER	% NEW TAKER	% COL. TAKER	# TAKER	% NEW TAKER	% COL. TAKER	# TAKER	% NEW TAKER	% COL. TAKER
RACE											
WHITE	265,947	73.0	23,416	8.8048	61,7462	2,673	1,0051	77,5007	239,858	90,1902	74,2247
BLACK	77,968	21.4	12,157	15.5923	32,0571	585	.7503	16,9614	65,226	83,6574	20,1844
OTHER	20,608	5.7	2,350	11.4033	6,1968	191	.9268	5,5378	18,067	87,6498	5,5909
TOTAL	364,523	100.0	37,923	10.4035	100,0000	3,449	.9462	100,0000	323,151	88,6504	100,0000
RACE-ETHNIC											
WHITE	255,512	70.1	22,590	8.8411	59,5681	2,608	1.0207	75,6161	230,314	90,1382	71,2713
BLACK	77,349	21.2	12,072	15.6072	31,8329	580	.7498	16,8165	64,697	83,6430	20,0207
HISPANIC	17,667	4.8	1,638	9.2715	4,3193	124	.7019	3,5952	15,905	90,0266	4,9218
AMER INDIAN/ALSK NAT	2,694	.7	261	9.6882	.6882	20	.7424	.5799	2,413	89,5494	.7467
ASIAN/PACFC ISLAND	6,105	1.7	583	9.5495	1,5373	61	.9982	1,7686	5,461	89,4513	1,6899
OTHER	5,196	1.4	779	14.9823	2,0542	56	1.0778	1,6237	4,361	83,9299	1,3495
TOTAL	364,523	100.0	37,923	10.4035	100,0000	3,449	.9462	100,0000	323,151	88,6504	100,0000
SEX											
MALE	324,230	88.9	33,464	10.3211	88,2420	2,982	.9197	86,4598	287,784	88,7592	89,0556
FEMALE	40,293	11.1	4,459	11.0664	11,7580	467	1.1590	13,5402	35,367	87,7746	10,9444
TOTAL	364,523	100.0	37,923	10.4035	100,0000	3,449	.9462	100,0000	323,151	88,6504	100,0000
RAIK											
RD1	33,037	9.1	23	.0696	.0606	0	.0000	.0000	33,034	99,9304	10,2163
RD2	23,789	6.5	26	.1093	.0486	2	.0084	.0580	23,761	99,8823	7,3529
RD3	44,022	12.1	52	.1181	.1371	1	.0023	.0290	43,969	99,8796	13,6063
RD4	139,451	38.3	7,896	5.6622	20,8211	189	.1355	5,4798	131,366	94,2023	40,6516
RD5	70,171	19.3	22,303	31.7838	58,8113	1,811	2.5808	52,5080	66,057	65,6354	14,2525
RD6	25,402	7.0	6,477	25.4980	17,0793	1,102	4.3382	31,9513	17,823	70,1638	5,5154
RD7	17,968	4.9	1,137	6.3279	2,9982	336	1.8700	9,7420	16,495	91,8021	5,1044
RD8	7,186	2.0	9	.1252	.0237	7	.0974	.2030	7,170	99,7773	2,2188
RD9	3,497	1.0	0	.0000	.0000	1	.0286	.0290	3,496	99,9714	1,0818
TOTAL ENLISTED	364,523	100.0	37,923	10.4035	100,0000	3,449	.9462	100,0000	323,151	88,6504	100,0000

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 92
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY MENTAL CATEGORY

MENTLCAT	VSI											
	MALE								FEMALE			
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	612	17.0142	100	2.7801	41	1.1398	753	20.9341	64	1.7793	23	0.6394
CAT V	1	0.0278	0	0	1	0.0278	2	0.0556	0	0	0	0
CAT IV C	20	0.5560	33	0.9174	8	0.2224	61	1.6959	0	0	5	0.1390
CAT IV B	32	0.8896	45	1.2510	18	0.5004	95	2.6411	3	0.0834	6	0.1668
CAT IV A	183	5.0876	105	2.9191	36	1.0008	324	9.0075	19	0.5282	16	0.4448
CAT III B	467	12.9830	124	3.4473	40	1.1120	631	17.5424	91	2.5299	42	1.1676
CAT III A	318	8.8407	37	1.0286	22	0.6116	377	10.4810	53	1.4735	20	0.5560
CAT II	663	18.4320	43	1.1954	16	0.4448	722	20.0723	83	2.3075	11	0.3058
CAT I	147	4.0867	2	0.0556	3	0.0834	152	4.2257	2	0.0538	2	0.0556
TOTAL	2443	67.9177	489	13.5947	185	5.1432	3117	86.6555	334	9.2855	125	3.4751

(CONTINUED)

MENTLCAT	VSI											
	FEMALE						TOTAL					
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	2	0.0556	89	2.4743	676	18.7934	123	3.4195	43	1.1954	842	23.4084
CAT V	0	0	0	0	1	0.0278	0	0	1	0.0278	2	0.0556
CAT IV C	0	0	5	0.1390	20	0.5560	38	1.0564	8	0.2224	66	1.8491
CAT IV B	2	0.0556	11	0.3058	35	0.9730	51	1.4178	20	0.5560	106	2.9469
CAT IV A	3	0.0834	38	1.0564	202	5.6158	121	3.3639	39	1.0842	262	7.2639
CAT III B	9	0.2502	142	3.9477	558	15.5129	166	4.6150	49	1.3622	773	21.4901
CAT III A	1	0.0278	74	2.0573	371	10.3142	57	1.5847	23	0.6394	451	12.5382
CAT II	4	0.1112	98	2.7245	746	20.7395	54	1.5013	20	0.5560	820	22.7968
CAT I	0	0	23	0.6394	168	4.6706	4	0.1112	3	0.0834	175	4.8652
TOTAL	21	0.5838	480	13.3445	2777	77.2032	614	17.0698	206	5.7270	3597	100.0000

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 92
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY MENTAL CATEGORY

MENTLCAT	SSB											
	MALE						FEMALE					
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	2633	6.7247	1076	2.7481	262	0.6692	397	10.1420	212	0.5415	144	0.3678
CAT V	13	0.0332	19	0.0485	2	0.0051	34	0.0868	0	0	8	0.0204
CAT IV C	220	0.5619	817	2.0866	134	0.3422	1171	2.9908	9	0.0230	64	0.1635
CAT IV B	517	1.3204	1085	2.7711	236	0.6027	1838	4.6943	23	0.0587	109	0.2784
CAT IV A	2019	5.1566	2528	6.4566	482	1.2310	5029	12.8442	143	0.3652	384	0.9807
CAT III B	5752	14.6907	3305	8.4410	626	1.5988	9683	24.7306	704	1.7980	93	2.3778
CAT III A	3918	10.0661	1029	2.6281	253	0.6462	5200	13.2809	489	1.2489	302	0.7713
CAT II	580	1.4814	672	1.7163	192	0.4904	666	1.7025	665	1.6984	165	0.4214
CAT I	842	2.1505	32	0.0817	27	0.0690	901	2.3012	76	0.1941	9	0.0230
TOTAL	21716	55.4630	10563	26.9781	2214	5.6546	34493	88.0957	2321	5.9279	2116	5.4043

(CONTINUED)

MENTLCAT	SSB											
	FEMALE				TOTAL							
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	16	0.0409	372	0.9501	2845	7.2662	1220	3.1159	278	0.7100	4343	11.0921
CAT V	2	0.0051	10	0.0255	13	0.0332	27	0.0690	4	0.0102	44	0.1124
CAT IV C	4	0.0102	77	0.1967	229	0.5849	88	2.2501	138	0.3525	1248	3.1874
CAT IV B	9	0.0230	141	0.3601	540	1.3792	1194	3.0495	245	0.6257	1979	5.0544
CAT IV A	33	0.0843	560	1.4302	2162	5.5218	2912	7.4373	515	1.3153	5589	14.2744
CAT III B	84	0.2145	1719	4.3904	6456	16.4887	4236	10.8188	710	1.8134	11402	29.1209
CAT III A	43	0.1098	834	2.1301	4407	11.2556	1331	3.3994	296	0.7560	6034	15.4109
CAT II	31	0.0792	861	2.1990	6467	16.5168	837	2.1377	223	0.5695	7527	19.2241
CAT I	2	0.0051	87	0.2222	918	2.3446	41	0.1047	29	0.0741	988	2.5234
TOTAL	224	0.5721	4661	11.9043	24037	61.3909	12679	32.3824	2438	6.2267	39154	100.0000

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 92
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY PRIMARY OCCUPATION

OCC	VSI													
	MALE								FEMALE					
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
10	390	10.8424	124	3.4473	28	0.7784	542	15.0681	14	0.3892	9	0.2502		
11	344	9.5635	29	0.8062	14	0.3892	387	10.7590	30	0.8340	0	0.0000		
12	164	4.5594	39	1.0842	10	0.2780	213	5.9216	17	0.4726	9	0.2502		
13	39	1.0842	17	0.4726	6	0.1668	62	1.7237	13	0.3614	7	0.1946		
14	9	2.5299	15	0.4170	9	0.2502	115	3.1971	13	0.3614	3	0.0834		
15	396	11.0092	133	3.6975	42	1.1676	571	15.8743	176	4.8930	80	2.2241		
16	670	18.6266	73	2.0295	41	1.1398	784	21.7959	34	0.9452	5	0.1390		
17	139	3.8643	20	0.5560	12	0.3336	171	4.7540	9	0.2502	1	0.0278		
18	203	5.6436	38	1.0564	23	0.6394	264	7.3394	27	0.7506	11	0.3058		
19	7	0.1946	1	0.0278	0	0.0000	8	0.2224	1	0.0278	0	0.0000		
TOTAL	2443	67.9177	489	13.5947	185	5.1432	3117	86.6555	334	9.2855	125	3.4751		

(CONTINUED)

OCC	VSI													
	FEMALE				TOTAL									
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL			
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
10	0	0.0000	23	0.6394	404	11.2316	133	3.6975	28	0.7784	565	15.7075		
11	0	0.0000	30	0.8340	374	10.3976	29	0.8062	14	0.3892	417	11.5930		
12	0	0.0000	26	0.7228	181	5.0320	48	1.3344	10	0.2780	239	6.6444		
13	2	0.0556	22	0.6116	52	1.4456	24	0.6672	8	0.2224	84	2.3353		
14	1	0.0278	17	0.4726	104	2.8913	18	0.5004	10	0.2780	132	3.6697		
15	13	0.3614	269	7.4785	572	15.9021	213	5.9216	55	1.5291	840	23.3528		
16	1	0.0278	40	1.1120	704	19.5719	78	2.1685	42	1.1676	824	22.9080		
17	0	0.0000	10	0.2780	148	4.1145	21	0.5838	12	0.3336	181	5.0320		
18	4	0.1112	42	1.1676	230	6.3942	49	1.3622	27	0.7506	306	8.5071		
19	0	0.0000	1	0.0278	8	0.2224	1	0.0278	0	0.0000	9	0.2502		
TOTAL	2	0.0056	480	13.3445	2777	77.2032	614	17.0698	206	5.7270	3597	100.0000		

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 92
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY PRIMARY OCCUPATION

OCC	SSB											
	MALE						FEMALE					
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
10	4187	10.6937	2192	5.5984	496	1.2668	6875	17.5589	631	0.1609	1051	0.2682
11	2293	5.8564	451	1.1519	139	0.3550	2883	7.3632	113	0.2886	25	0.0639
12	1426	3.6420	1115	2.8477	206	0.5261	2747	7.0159	162	0.4138	207	0.5287
13	369	0.9424	371	0.9475	75	0.1916	815	2.0815	126	0.3218	144	0.3678
14	682	1.7418	369	0.9424	87	0.2222	1138	2.9065	77	0.1967	64	0.1635
15	3161	8.0732	2567	6.5562	464	1.1851	6192	15.8145	1218	3.1108	1220	3.1159
16	6109	15.6025	1787	4.5640	435	1.1101	8331	21.2775	251	0.6411	102	0.2605
17	1228	3.1363	358	0.9143	82	0.2094	1668	4.2601	52	0.1328	25	0.0639
18	2191	5.5959	1343	3.4300	226	0.5772	3760	9.6031	254	0.6487	222	0.5670
19	68	0.1737	10	0.0255	4	0.0102	82	0.2094	5	0.0128	2	0.0051
UNK	21	0.0051	0	0	0	0	21	0.0051	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	21716	55.4630	10563	26.9781	2214	5.6546	34493	88.0957	2321	5.9279	2116	5.4043

(CONTINUED)

OCC	SSB											
	FEMALE				TOTAL							
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
10	71	0.0179	175	0.4470	4250	10.8546	2297	5.8666	503	1.2847	7050	18.0058
11	61	0.0153	144	0.3678	2406	6.1450	476	1.2157	145	0.3703	3027	7.7310
12	121	0.0306	381	0.9731	1588	4.0558	1322	3.3764	218	0.5568	3128	7.9890
13	20	0.0511	290	0.7407	495	1.2642	515	1.3153	95	0.2426	1105	2.8222
14	121	0.0306	153	0.3908	759	1.9385	433	1.1059	99	0.2528	1291	3.2972
15	126	0.3218	2564	6.5485	4379	11.1840	3787	9.6721	590	1.5069	8756	22.3630
16	141	0.0358	367	0.9373	6360	16.2436	1889	4.8245	449	1.1468	8698	22.2148
17	11	0.0026	78	0.1992	1280	3.2691	383	0.9782	83	0.2120	1746	4.4593
18	26	0.0664	502	1.2821	2445	6.2446	1565	3.9970	252	0.6436	4262	10.8852
19	0	0	7	0.0179	73	0.1864	12	0.0306	4	0.0102	89	0.2273
UNK	0	0	0	0	21	0.0051	0	0	0	0	21	0.0051
TOTAL	224	0.5721	4661	11.9043	24037	61.3909	12679	32.3824	2438	6.2267	39154	100.0000

APPENDIX B. 1993 VSI AND SSB PARTICIPANTS

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 93
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY PRIMARY OCCUPATION

OCC	SSB											
	MALE						FEMALE					
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
10	802	6.6308	257	2.1248	61	0.5043	1120	9.2600	101	0.0827	41	0.0331
11	1558	12.8814	169	1.3973	49	0.4051	1776	14.6838	123	1.0169	12	0.0992
12	432	3.5717	151	1.2484	28	0.2315	611	5.0517	84	0.6945	76	0.6284
13	97	0.8020	66	0.5457	12	0.0992	175	1.4469	47	0.3886	32	0.2646
14	165	1.3642	46	0.3803	16	0.1323	227	1.8768	23	0.1902	10	0.0827
15	1086	8.9789	727	6.0107	136	1.1244	1949	16.1141	506	4.1835	395	3.2658
16	2157	17.8338	505	4.1753	147	1.2154	2809	23.2245	119	0.9839	27	0.2232
17	479	3.9603	142	1.1740	32	0.2646	653	5.3989	29	0.2398	11	0.0909
18	674	5.5726	291	2.4060	47	0.3886	1012	8.3671	89	0.7358	57	0.4713
19	15	0.1240	2	0.0165	1	0.0083	18	0.1488	1	0.0083	0	0
TOTAL	7465	61.7197	2356	19.4791	529	4.3737	10350	85.5726	1031	8.5242	624	5.1592

(CONTINUED)

OCC	SSB											
	FEMALE				TOTAL							
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
10	1	0.0083	15	0.1240	812	6.7135	261	2.1579	62	0.5126	1135	9.3840
11	1	0.0083	136	1.1244	1681	13.8983	181	1.4965	50	0.4134	1912	15.8082
12	9	0.0744	169	1.3973	516	4.2662	227	1.8768	37	0.3059	780	6.4489
13	5	0.0413	84	0.6945	144	1.1906	98	0.8103	17	0.1406	259	2.1414
14	0	0	33	0.2728	188	1.5544	56	0.4630	16	0.1323	260	2.1496
15	62	0.5126	963	7.9620	1592	13.1625	1122	9.2766	198	1.6370	2912	24.0761
16	4	0.0331	150	1.2402	2276	18.8177	532	4.3985	151	1.2484	2959	24.4647
17	3	0.0248	43	0.3555	508	4.2001	153	1.2650	35	0.2894	696	5.7544
18	5	0.0413	151	1.2484	763	6.3084	348	2.8772	52	0.4299	1163	9.6155
19	0	0	1	0.0083	16	0.1323	2	0.0165	1	0.0083	19	0.1571
TOTAL	90	0.7441	1745	14.4274	8496	70.2439	2980	24.6383	619	5.1178	12095	100.0000

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 93
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY PRIMARY OCCUPATION

OCC	VSI											
	MALE						FEMALE					
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
10	101	6.1064	19	1.1487	01	01	120	7.2551	01	01	11	0.0605
11	195	11.7896	11	0.6651	61	0.3628	212	12.8174	26	1.5719	01	01
12	31	1.8742	8	0.4837	11	0.0605	40	2.4184	11	0.6651	4	0.2418
13	4	0.2418	0	0	1	0.0605	5	0.3023	6	0.3628	0	0
14	33	1.9952	11	0.6651	4	0.2418	48	2.9021	5	0.3023	1	0.0605
15	224	13.5429	40	2.4184	15	0.9069	279	16.8682	134	8.1016	33	1.9952
16	356	21.5236	31	1.8742	17	1.0278	404	24.4256	12	0.7255	2	0.1209
17	84	5.0786	9	0.5441	4	0.2418	97	5.8646	12	0.7255	0	0
18	111	6.7110	23	1.3906	3	0.1814	137	8.2830	27	1.6324	1	0.0605
19	4	0.2418	0	0	0	0	4	0.2418	2	0.1209	0	0
TOTAL	1143	69.1052	152	9.1898	51	3.0834	1346	81.3785	235	14.2080	52	3.1439

(CONTINUED)

OCC	VSI											
	FEMALE				TOTAL							
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
10	0	0	1	0.0605	101	6.1064	20	1.2092	0	0	121	7.3156
11	0	0	26	1.5719	221	13.3615	11	0.6651	6	0.3628	238	14.3894
12	2	0.1209	17	1.0278	42	2.5393	12	0.7255	3	0.1814	57	3.4462
13	0	0	6	0.3628	10	0.6046	0	0	1	0.0605	11	0.6651
14	0	0	6	0.3628	38	2.2975	12	0.7255	4	0.2418	54	3.2648
15	16	0.9674	183	11.0641	358	21.6445	73	4.4135	31	1.8742	462	27.9323
16	1	0.0605	15	0.9069	368	22.2491	33	1.9952	18	1.0883	419	25.3325
17	0	0	12	0.7255	96	5.8041	9	0.5441	4	0.2418	109	6.5901
18	2	0.1209	40	2.4184	138	8.3434	34	2.0556	5	0.3023	177	10.7013
19	0	0	2	0.1209	6	0.3628	0	0	0	0	6	0.3628
TOTAL	2	1.2696	308	18.6215	1378	83.3132	204	12.3337	72	4.3531	1654	100.0000

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 93
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY MENTAL CATEGORY

MENTLCAT	SSB											
	MALE						FEMALE					
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	628	5.1922	138	1.1410	53	0.4382	819	6.7714	72	0.5953	24	0.1984
ICAT V	1	0.0083	0	0	0	0	1	0.0083	1	0.0083	2	0.0165
ICAT IV C	12	0.0992	30	0.2480	7	0.0579	49	0.4051	0	0	4	0.0331
ICAT IV B	35	0.2894	59	0.4878	14	0.1158	108	0.8929	2	0.0165	3	0.0248
ICAT IV A	40	0.3154	390	3.2245	6	0.0504	456	3.7422	52	0.4299	60	0.4961
ICAT III B	187	1.5490	1037	8.5738	199	1.6453	3113	25.7131	288	2.3811	30	0.2486
ICAT III A	1470	12.1538	405	3.3485	93	0.7689	1968	16.2712	225	1.8603	158	1.3063
ICAT II	2590	21.4138	28	0.2323	93	0.7689	2961	24.5060	326	2.6953	67	0.5539
ICAT I	454	3.7536	16	0.1323	9	0.0744	479	3.9603	65	0.5374	5	0.0413
TOTAL	7465	61.7197	2356	19.4791	529	4.3737	10350	85.5726	1031	8.5242	624	5.1592

(CONTINUED)

MENTLCAT	SSB											
	FEMALE				TOTAL							
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	6	0.0496	102	0.8433	700	5.7875	162	1.3394	59	0.4878	92	0.7617
ICAT V	0	0	3	0.0248	2	0.0165	2	0.0165	0	0	4	0.0331
ICAT IV C	1	0.0083	5	0.0413	12	0.0992	34	0.2811	8	0.0661	54	0.4465
ICAT IV B	1	0.0083	6	0.0496	37	0.3059	62	0.5126	15	0.1240	114	0.9425
ICAT IV A	6	0.0496	118	0.9756	453	3.7453	450	3.7205	67	0.5539	970	8.0198
ICAT III B	42	0.3473	63	0.5217	2162	17.8752	1338	11.0624	24	0.1992	374	3.0930
ICAT III A	17	0.1406	400	3.3072	1695	14.0141	563	4.6548	110	0.9095	2368	19.5783
ICAT II	16	0.1323	409	3.3816	2916	24.1091	348	2.8772	109	0.9012	3373	27.8876
ICAT I	1	0.0083	7	0.0587	519	4.2910	2	0.0173	10	0.0827	550	4.5473
TOTAL	90	0.7441	1745	14.4274	8496	70.2439	2980	24.6383	619	5.1178	12095	100.0000

ACTIVE DUTY VSI/SSB PARTICIPANTS
ENLISTED PERSONNEL
FISCAL YEAR 93
FREQUENCY OF RACE BY SEX BY MENTAL CATEGORY

MENTLCAT	VSI											
	MALE						FEMALE					
	WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	193	11.6687	14	0.8464	81	0.4837	215	12.9988	26	1.5719	4	0.2418
ICAT IV C	1	0.0605	4	0.2418	0	0	5	0.3023	1	0.0605	0	0
ICAT IV B	6	0.3628	2	0.1209	0	0	8	0.4837	0	0	0	0
ICAT IV A	65	3.9299	27	1.6324	2	0.1209	94	5.6832	15	0.9069	10	0.6046
ICAT III B	245	14.8126	66	3.9903	19	1.1487	330	19.9516	60	3.6276	20	1.2092
ICAT III A	188	11.3664	17	1.0278	12	0.7255	217	13.1197	43	2.5998	9	0.5441
ICAT II	372	22.4909	21	1.2696	10	0.6046	403	24.3652	70	4.2322	8	0.4837
ICAT I	73	4.4135	1	0.0605	0	0	74	4.4740	20	1.2092	1	0.0605
TOTAL	1143	69.1052	152	9.1898	51	3.0834	1346	81.3785	235	14.2080	52	3.1439

(CONTINUED)

MENTLCAT	VSI											
	FEMALE				TOTAL							
	OTHER		TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		OTHER		TOTAL	
	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%	0	%
UNKNOWN	1	0.0605	3	1.8742	219	13.2406	18	1.0883	9	0.5441	246	14.8730
ICAT IV C	0	0	1	0.0605	2	0.1209	4	0.2418	0	0	6	0.3628
ICAT IV B	1	0.0605	1	0.0605	6	0.3628	2	0.1209	1	0.0605	9	0.5441
ICAT IV A	0	0	25	1.5115	80	4.8368	37	2.2370	2	0.1209	119	7.1947
ICAT III B	14	0.8464	94	5.6832	305	18.4401	86	5.1995	33	1.9952	424	25.6348
ICAT III A	5	0.3023	57	3.4462	231	13.9661	26	1.5719	17	1.0278	274	16.5659
ICAT II	0	0	78	4.7158	442	26.7231	29	1.7533	10	0.6046	481	29.0810
ICAT I	0	0	2	0.1209	93	5.6227	2	0.1209	0	0	95	5.7437
TOTAL	2	0.1209	308	18.6215	1378	83.3132	204	12.3337	72	4.3531	1654	100.0000

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