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Marine Corps Command and Control Doctrine-Where
Is It? Coming to a Base Near You

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Thesis: The United States Marine Corps Doctrine Division can only
approach Fleet Marine Force (FMF) expectations for timely and
accurate doctrine with increased organizational support, budget,
staffing, and decentralization of draft responsibilities. This
paper recommends the adoption of a Combat Development Process.

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MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE-WHERE IS IT?
COMING TO A BASE NEAR YOU

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**MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE-WHERE IS IT?
COMING TO A BASE NEAR YOU**

OUTLINE

Thesis: Doctrine Division can only approach Fleet Marine
Force (FMF) expectations for timely and accurate doctrine
with increased organizational support, budget, staffing, and
decentralization of draft responsibilities.

I.   THE "WINDS OF CHANGE"
     A.   National Military Strategy Upheaval
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MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE-WHERE IS IT? COMING TO A BASE NEAR YOU

Fifty-five years ago the development of amphibious doctrine and its subsequent validation in World War II ensured our independence as a separate service. From 1933 to 1934, Marine Corps schools were devoted to solving this doctrinal identity crisis.(8:80) Maintaining a robust and unique doctrine today is no less vital to the Marine Corps' survival as it was then. Many say we are in the midst of a doctrinal crisis again. However, our inability to produce, maintain, and update doctrine **quickly** characterizes the current dilemma. Presently, much of Marine Corps doctrine is intuitive and experiential, not codified in formally published documents. Our doctrine and its production apparatus appear to have atrophied over the last fifteen years. Publications remain in the production pipeline from several months to several years. On the surface, it would appear that those in charge of doctrine just are not doing their jobs. However, there are many more complex issues involved.

Several months ago we were tasked with finding Command and Control doctrine. FMFM 3, the command and control capstone document, answers this request. However, FMFM 3's

evolution indicates continued serious problems with producing **quality doctrine** in a **timely** fashion. Further, research exposes a gross ignorance in the Fleet Marine Force of the complexities involved in producing doctrine, exacerbating perceptions that doctrine production is stagnant. Simply stated, Doctrine Division can only approach FMF expectations for timely and accurate doctrine with increased organizational support, budget, staffing, and decentralization of draft responsibilities.

Many factors contribute to this state of affairs. These factors can be divided into those within the Marine Corps' control and those outside our control. Factors beyond our control are current changes in the focus of the national military strategy and the continuing impact of new technology on the battlefield. Those within our control are the turmoil and confusion within Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) resulting from numerous reorganizations, the most recent in preparation for transition to the Combat Development Process (CDP). This reorganization has left an ambiguous chain of command which still lacks the philosophical foundation, the CDP, to ensure unity of effort. Negative factors within Doctrine Division are an unrealistic table of organization, inadequate budget, draft responsibilities which exceed personnel capabilities, and lack of an effective prioritization system.

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Development of FMFM 3 illustrates all of these problems. We feel current system weaknesses should disappear with final transition to the CDP. However, it may be six months to a year before the transition is complete and operations are running smoothly. Yet, improvements can be made now to organizational support and Doctrine Division draft responsibilities. We recommend the following:

- Establishing an interim manually coordinated prioritization system across divisions;

- Improving communication and coordination across divisions;

- Speeding up transition to the Combat Development Process;

- Decentralizing authorship responsibilities; and

- Maximizing adoption of other service doctrine.

Suggestions such as closing Marine Corps Schools for a year so staff and students can write doctrine as done in 1933 would only address the symptom, not the illness. Our recommendations provide a long term cure ready for the challenges of the future.

THE "WINDS OF CHANGE"

National Military Strategy Upheaval

Currently evolving doctrine is being buffeted by the "winds of change" as the United States reevaluates its national military strategy. Roles and missions are being reviewed. "Jointness" is rapidly becoming the rule rather

than the exception. The services are more and more likely to be assigned non-traditional roles like the humanitarian operation in Somalia. Thus, the Marine Corps' niche in "the big picture" is changing just as the picture's landscape is changing.

Technology's Impact

Further complicating the production of doctrine is the rapid evolution of technology as we integrate new systems on the battlefield. Advances in communications, guided munitions, and navigation systems have sped up the pace of battle. The speed and plethora of information have inundated commanders and altered their approach to the battlefield, requiring innovative solutions to the information overload. Consequently, C4I2 systems and procedures are being developed to deal with the challenges of information collection and dissemination. However, military systems and planners have fallen outside the technological "OODA loop" and are scrambling to keep up with the pace of technological change.

So how do the evolving military strategy and technological explosion impact doctrine development in the Marine Corps? Simply, doctrine documents the tremendous amount of **rapid change** occurring. Recent conferences are exploring the emerging role of naval expeditionary forces where, "forward presence of U.S. forces will be useful in forestalling regional conflicts, in alleviating trouble

before it becomes a full-blown crisis." Furt. r, the
conferences have concluded, "naval expeditionary forces are
well-suited to this emerging security environment."(5:53-55)

Reactions to Strategic Flux

Validating these themes is the Navy and Marine Corps
White Paper "...From the Sea" which defines a new combined
vision for the two services. Two points are of interest.
First, command, control, and surveillance were listed as one
of the four key operational capabilities required to
successfully execute this **new direction** for the Navy and
Marine Corps. Secondly, a Naval Doctrine Command was
established emphasizing that, "Integration on the battlefield
starts with integration of doctrine and training."(13:22)
Further, it states that the new command will, "close the gap
between the air-land battle and amphibious warfare...."(13:
22) All of this has tremendous implications for the Marine
Corps' current doctrine, doctrine in development, and new
doctrine that will be required to assimilate all of this
change.

As such, FMFM 3 is an excellent example of doctrine
formed in strategic flux. In Chapter Four of the
Coordinating Draft of FMFM 3, Marine Corps command and
control methods are modeled after the Navy's Copernicus
structure and emphasize interoperability between the Marine
Corps and the Navy using principles in "...From the Sea."

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action officer submits the draft for several informal
editorial rewrites throughout the process incorporating

However, during conferences reviewing FMFM 3, legitimate concerns were raised regarding the Marine Corps' history of sustained operations ashore. The concerns were significant because the Navy's command and control structure differs from the Army's, and sustained operations ashore require extensive interface between the Marine Corps and the Army. The need for dual compatibility was not addressed in the publication. The omission was highlighted again by the Doctrinal Review Board who ordered revision of the chapter.(14:1) Thus, a shift in strategic role emphasis overshadowed the need to account for historical operational precedents.

MCCDC's IDENTITY CRISIS

Concepts Based Requirement System Version 3.0

Having considered factors beyond the Marine Corps' control, let us consider factors we do control. Doctrine is not created in a vacuum. In the Marine Corps, doctrine is actually just one of many endproducts of what was the concepts based requirement system (CBRS). Once again, Marine Corps Combat Development Command has overhauled the CBRS. Now the CBRS is only the front end of the newly adopted Marine Corps Combat Development Process. Thus, a full understanding of the Marine Corps' current shortfalls in doctrine requires understanding MCCDC's struggle with developing an efficient system and organizational structure.

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of the division's authorized personnel, are currently tackling these challenges.(14:1)

Appendix 1 illustrates the original CBRS depicted in the MAGTF Warfighting Center's Standing Operating Procedures of 1988. Obviously, this system was quite lengthy and unwieldy. Upon assuming duty as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Mundy appointed a Combat Development Planning Group to study the Marine Corps's system(s) for facilitating and integrating change in the Corps (procurement, training and education, doctrine, etc.). The CDP was the result of this study. This new process is the engine that will drive the integration of change into doctrine, training and education, organization, equipment, facilities, and support.(2:1) However, the CDP's lengthy development and adoption is one of many factors hindering efforts to correct doctrinal shortfalls.

The Combat Development Process Saga

Why is CDP development and adoption taking so long? Primarily, because the process which attempts to integrate planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and life cycle management into a single vehicle is extremely ambitious. The Marine Corps will field capabilities rather than independent pieces of equipment that previously lacked the doctrine, training, and organizational adjustments necessary to successfully field the equipment . A capability is a package consisting of **doctrine**, training and education, equipment, and organization. For example, the process will eliminate a situation where a machine gun requiring a two-man crew, new

are not options. What options are there?

ammunition, and increased range would hit the FMF without the new employment doctrine and tactics, the new table of organization, and any specialized equipment.(2:1) Obviously developing a capability is much more difficult than developing an individual piece of equipment or concept.

The comprehensiveness of the program has required the creation of new systems, new vocabulary, and most importantly, new ways of thinking. Now, every step of the process is being analyzed, reviewed, and reconfigured (inputs/outputs) as necessary. Information requirements, information flow, and elimination of redundancy are the focal points of the process. This analysis, review, and reorganization is extremely manpower and time intensive.

The process requires development of a new vocabulary and redefinition and clarification of the old Warfighting Center vocabulary. The Marine Corps wrangles with its own version of "political correctness" and consumes time debating semantics. However, MCCDC is in desperate need of a standard vocabulary when communicating across divisions, and therefore, must cope with this necessary evil.

Finally, resistance to change, whether vocabulary or methods, is endemic to the Marine Corps and its devotion to tradition. There are many who think the old way of doing things was just fine. Thus, the program must be taught, modified, and sold as it is developed. Changing old habits

Corps' best minds could examine doctrinal quandaries forwarded by Doctrine Division. We do not recommend that

and philosophies can be the greatest challenge of all.

The Mythological Hydra

Unfortunately, the key to making the process a success, a tracking system, is still under development. To better understand the importance of a tracking system, a general description of the process is helpful. Figure 1 outlines the process's basic architecture.(2:1)

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

*CMC PLANNING GUIDANCE *DEVELOP THE CONCEPT *ESTABLISH/ASSESS CAPABILITIES *DETERMINE THE REQUIREMENT	CONCEPT BASED REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM (CBRS)

*MEET THE REQUIREMENT
  -DOCTRINE   -EQUIPMENT
  -TRAINING   -EDUCATION
  -ORGANIZATION   -FAC/SUPPORT
	SOLUTION
	DEVELOPMENT
	SYSTEM (SDS)

*SUPPORT THE CAPABILITY
  -UPDATE   -REVIEW
  -MAINTAIN
	CAPABILITY
	SUPPORT
	SYSTEM (CSS)

Figure 1

Three systems comprise the process: a concepts based requirement system (CBRS), a solution development system (SDS), and a capability support system (CSS).

The CBRS is responsible for taking the Commandant's Planning Guidance, developing the necessary concepts to support the guidance, establishing and assessing capabilities

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to fulfill those concepts, and determining the deficiencies
in those capabilities. These deficiencies are forwarded as
requirements to the implementing divisions and commands
responsible for doctrine, training, education, organization,
equipment, facilities, and support. These implementing
divisions and commands produce the solution portion of the
process. The solution then passes on to the capability
support system once it is fulfilled where maintenance,
review, and update occur as necessary.(2:1)

For example, a new capability for special operations is
identified that requires a new piece of equipment.
Deficiencies are noted in concepts, doctrine, training, and
equipment. Each division receives a Requirement Needs
Statement to fulfill its portion of that capability
deficiency. This is where the tracking system is critical.
Concepts may have a total of five requirements, doctrine
three, training two, and requirements one. The tracking
system allows prioritization of capability deficiencies and
ensures the requirements needed to field that **capability** are
prioritized accordingly **across** divisions. Thus,
implementing divisions' products are Marine Corps'
established priorities and not individual division
priorities. Warfighting Development Integration Division is
the likely candidate to oversee the tracking system.

Frustrating the establishment of an automated tracking system is absence of the necessary computer hardware and software. Additionally, the types and frequencies of reports, as well as those of the data transfer process, have yet to be determined. Also, the exact nature of data analysis and assessment that would be performed by Integration Division is still evolving.

Currently, even a manual tracking system does not exist. Divisions prioritize and track their own requirements with minimal coordination among divisions to ensure unity of effort. Each division is like a separate head on the body of MCCDC. Comprehensive SOP's and appropriate orders delineating division responsibilities and liaison to mitigate tracking deficiencies also do not exist. A Marine Corps order establishing and detailing the CDP is scheduled to appear this summer. Until an effective tracking system, coordinating methods, and written orders exist, MCCDC will continue to operate like the mythological Hydra it currently resembles.

Ambiguous Command Relationships

Aggravating tracking deficiencies are ambiguous command relationships. Clearly established lines of communication and coordination, i. e., command relationships, are integral to effective and timely mission accomplishment. However, MCCDC's structure has suffered constant flux since MCCDC's

inception in 1988. Each reorganization has attempted to
rectify this debilitating characteristic. With each
reorganization, valuable time, effort, manpower, and
resources have been expended with no clear results.
This is true of MCCDC's current structure which still misses
the mark. Figure 2 on the following page outlines the
current structure.

MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND ORGANIZATION

```
                              CG MCCDC
   ┌──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┐
PRESIDENT                                                      MCB
  MCU                    DEPUTY CG MCCDC                     QUANTICO

   ┌──────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┐
REQUIREMENTS    WARFIGHTING     TRNG & ED      DOCTRINE    CONCEPTS & PLANS
 DIVISION       DEVELOPMENT     DIVISION       DIVISION       DIVISION
                INTEGRATION
                DIVISION

    MARINE CORPS      COALITION        STUDIES        WARGAMING
    PRES. TEAM           &                &               &
                     SPEC.WARF.       ANALYSIS       COMBAT SIM.
                     DIVISION         DIVISION        DIVISION
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
Figure 2

This structure's only benefit is providing divisions
direct input into the Commanding General and making his
influence more accessible. That is, if a division solicits
input or responses from the Fleet, these requests receive
more legitimacy and power by virtue of a lieutenant general's
signature. Yet, for tracking, coordinating, and

accounting purposes, this structure violates the basic premises of a chain of command. Integration Division, which will ultimately orchestrate all of the divisions' efforts, is **not** in their direct chain of command. Having a lateral position in the chain of command reduces the Integration Division's ability to effectively coordinate priorities and resolve conflicts. Also, this horizontal chain of command creates no single point of contact for the other two commands at Quantico. If Integration Division is to oversee the resolution of Marine Corps capability deficiencies, it must occupy a senior level in the chain of command to be optimally effective.

The development of FMFM 3 is a clear example of not understanding the CDP architecture and the coordination vital to making the process a success. During January of 1992, Doctrine Division was directed to make the Command and Control capstone document its next priority. Capstone documents lay the philosophical foundation for a particular topic and provide a comprehensive synopsis of that doctrinal area. Subsequent documents under the capstone document provide additional detailed information concerning tactics and techniques in that functional area.

However, before developing a capstone document, Doctrine Division required a description of the Marine Corps' ideas about command and control. Concepts and Plans Division,

however, was not focusing on that type of concept at that time. In fact, Concepts and Plans Division was reevaluating its mission following the Warfighting Center's disbandment in August 1992.(7:1) Thus, Doctrine Division had to spend one month developing a concept on its own. Now, eight months later, Concepts and Plans Division has caught up to Doctrine Division and is providing them with a concept for a manual nearing publication. Obviously, valuable time was consumed and duplication of effort occurred. Currently, divisions act to minimize current weaknesses via ad hoc coordination and further refinement of internal procedures.

A Concept Revolution

An example of one division's efforts is the focus of concept development, the foundation of the CDP. Concept focus has greatly shifted in the last six months. Prior to the reorganization, Concepts and Plans Branch primarily developed narrow concepts such as non-combatant evacuation operations with specific conditions from which operational plans and orders could be developed. Broad concepts from which warfighting tenets (such as those contained in FMFM 1) and the supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures could be developed were handled by Doctrine Division as required. Concurrently, rapid changes in the global environment and technological applications created a "concept vacuum." Because the Marine Corps misdirected Concepts and Plans Division's concept focus, the system was inefficient at

best and slowed doctrine production. However, in the last
six months a concept "revolution" has occurred within
Concepts and Plans Division and its personnel have done the
seemingly impossible: defined their role within the CBRS and
shored up the conceptual framework upon which the Marine
Corps is built.(7:1)

Figure 3 on the following page shows the result of their
work and organizes a workable conceptual framework of the
Marine Corps on which to base all peripheral operational
concepts like command and control. It covers the spectrum of
anticipated areas of operation: operational maneuver from the
sea (OMFTS), expeditionary operations, and sustained
operations ashore (SOA). Beneath these warfighting and
operational concepts fall the functional concepts, i. e., the
tools with which our warfighting and operational concepts are
built. Unfortunately, this codified conceptual framework has
only existed for a short time, and therefore, has had minimal
impact on the implementing divisions as exemplified by the
debate concerning sustained operations ashore in Chapter Four
of FMFM 3.

CBRS

```
            USMC OPS
          ┌─────┼─────┐
       OMFTS   EX OPS   SOA   ◄──────►   WARFIGHTING/OPERATIONAL
         │      │        │                     CONCEPTS
         ▼      │        │
        C2      ▼        ▼
           AVIATION      │          FUNCTIONAL CONCEPTS
           GROUND COMBAT │
              CSS        ▼
                             CAPABILITY IMPACTS


              MAA                    CAPABILITIES
       (MISSION AREA ANALYSES)       DEFICIENCIES
             MCMP                     OPPORTUNITIES
               │                      REQUIREMENTS
               ▼
        PRIORITIZED ASSIGNED
        IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS
```

Figure 3

DOCTRINE DIVISION DIFFICULTIES

Dependency

Obviously, the content and timeliness of concept
development impact Doctrine Division's ability to produce
doctrine in a **timely** and **efficient** fashion. Doctrine
Division is dependent upon the CBRS working. Doctrine is
driven by mission need statements (MNS) forwarded from
Requirements Division. Requirements Division develops MNS's
from Marine Corps Lessons Learned (MCCLS), fleet operational
needs statements (FONS), mission area analyses, CINC's list
of priorities, and the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP).
MNS's requiring development of a new publication or revision
of an old one generally take eighteen months to accomplish.

Currently, no published timeline outlining document development exists.

Creating a Publication

MNS's are directed to the appropriate section within Doctrine Division. The doctrine development process appears to have eleven basic steps as illustrated by Figure 4.

EVENT	BRANCH HEAD	SECTION HEAD	ACTION OFFICER	EDITOR	REMARKS
1. ASSIGNMENT	A	X			
2. POA&M	A	A	X	C	PURPOSE/SCOPE MILESTONES
3. GEN. OUTLINE	A*	A	X	C/R	
4. RESEARCH		C	X		AD HOC/CIV CONTRACTOR
5. DETAILED OUTLINE	A*	A	X	C/R	STAFFED BY MSG
6. COORD. DRAFT			X	C/R	
7. REVIEW	X*	X	X	C*	DRB/STAFFING
8. REWRITING			X	C/R*	
9. EDITING	A	A	X	X	
10. APPROVAL	X	X	X	X	SIGNED BY CG, MCCDC OR CMC
11. PRINTING/DISTRIB.			C	X	

X=ACTION   R=REVIEW   A=APPROVAL   C=COORDINATION   *=AS NECESSARY

Figure 4

First, the MNS is studied to determine whether correction or revision to an existing publication will suffice. If not, the Division calls for a new publication to be drafted and an action officer is assigned. In step two, the action officer drafts a plan of action and milestones. This document includes preliminary information on purpose and scope and projections for TAD budgeting, conference scheduling, and editor/illustrator coordination. Normally, an editor is assigned here to assist the action officer.

Steps three, four, and five include drafting a general outline, conducting research, and preparing a detailed outline after the plan of action and milestones have been approved. Research is continuous in the publication development and refinement process. The action officer may make use of a team or external agency like the Amphibious Warfare School to assist in the research effort. Staffing the detailed outline ensures that all interested parties find the proposed doctrinal solution appropriate in scope, approach, and organization. Staffing gives the FMF and other interested parties an opportunity to recommend additional topics for inclusion, a differing approach, or a change in direction or emphasis for the manual. Staffing may take anywhere from six to twelve months. Providing doctrinal input is not always a Fleet priority. This attitude results in delays and an extended staffing timeframe.

Steps six, seven, eight, and nine cover coordinating drafts, review, rewriting, and editing. The coordinating draft is the preliminary document for a new publication and is distributed to many FMF organizations and Landing Force Training Commands. The coordinating draft is also reviewed by the Commandant's Doctrinal Review Board (DRB). Results from the board form the basis for revisions before the draft is republished as a draft FMFM or OH. As developmental products, FMFM's and OH's are precursors to approved Service doctrinal publications and require a final validation by the FMF. Editing occurs throughout the entire process. The

action officer submits the draft for several informal editorial rewrites throughout the process incorporating recommendations concerning readability, format, and structure.

The final two steps involve approval, printing, and distribution. The CG, MCCDC, forwards doctrinal publications for the Assistant Commandant's and Commandant's approval. Upon approval, the publication is returned to the Publications Section for printing and distribution with HQMC.(9:4.21)

People, Money, Computers

Creating a publication is obviously an involved and laborious process. Compounding development difficulties are unrealistic staffing, insufficient budget, and software and hardware incompatibilities. Each doctrinal section generally has one action officer excluding occasional reservist augmentation. Thus, one officer may be responsible for producing as many as ten to fifteen publications, as well as reviewing all documents within that doctrinal area. Doctrine Division is responsible for 389 Marine Corps, Joint, and Allied publications. Currently, 89 of the 276 Marine Corps publications are in various stages of draft or revision. Additionally, Doctrine Division personnel are also responsible for a myriad of other tasks such as preparing the MCBUL 5600 series, the Publications Master Plan, and publication distribution lists.(9:4.25) Twenty-seven officers, two enlisted, and fourteen civilians, equaling 83%

of the division's authorized personnel, are currently
tackling these challenges.(14:1)

Doctrine Division also suffers from an inadequate
budget. Only 2.6% of MCCDC's budget is allocated for those
divisions that formerly comprised the Warfighting Center.
Doctrine Division receives 38% of that amount.(14:1) The
paucity of funds prevents Doctrine Division from using
external research agencies which would greatly save on
production time. The use of contractors on more tactical and
technical manuals has proven to cut production time as much
as one year, though at a cost. For example, the command and
control study cost $100,000.(14:1) Often, the savings in
time is deemed not worth the savings in money.

Finally, the editorial process suffers from computer
hardware and software incompatibilities.(14:1) The word
processor programs used by the Marine Corps are not
compatible with the civilian editors' programs. The Marine
Corps's old hardware does not make fixing the problem any
easier.

Thus, one to two years may pass from the time a doctrinal
need is identified until a publication is ready for
distribution. With the rapid pace of change today, doctrine
may be obsolete by the time it is approved. Thus, an
unresolvable paradox exists: rapid change dictates the need
for rapid production, but a complex environment, dwindling
funds, and inadequate numbers of personnel prevent rapid
production. Unfortunately, increasing money and personnel

are not options. What options are there?

RECOMMENDATIONS

Doing More with Less

We recommend a three-pronged approach to improving the
Marine Corps' ability to produce timely, accurate doctrine:
reducing the research and draft burden on Doctrine Division,
accelerating adoption of the CDP, and adjusting expectations.
Specifics concerning reduction of the research and draft
burden are as follows: decentralizing authorship
responsibilities, maximizing adoption of other service
doctrine, and shifting Doctrine Division's primary role to
capstone documents and validation of externally produced
documents. These recommendations allow pooling of scarce
resources and eliminating duplication, thus maximizing
resources. CDP adoption would improve unity of effort.
Adjusting expectations provides a reasonable environment to
set priorities.

First, appropriate Marine Schools can assume
responsibility for tactical or technical type manuals, as
schools should be on the cutting edge of innovation within
their areas of responsibility and test newly developed
equipment. Using schools would require much more interaction
between the Marine Corps University and Doctrine Division.
The schools would have a conduit for direct input into Marine
Corps doctrine. Advanced schools could validate doctrine on
a regular basis with each new class. Some of the Marine

Corps' best minds could examine doctrinal quandaries forwarded by Doctrine Division. We do not recommend that students write capstone publications, but that schools' resident talents be exploited to remove part of the research and initial draft burden.

Additionally, another way the Marine Corps can save more time and money is by adopting more Navy and Army doctrine. We already adopt some doctrine, but the area could possibly be exploited more. This is especially true with the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command and the emphasis on interoperability.

Lastly, we recommend that Doctrine Division act as a central review authority. All doctrine would still go through Doctrine Division for forwarding to the Commandant for approval and accounting purposes. Doctrine Division would produce the capstone documents which provide the foundation for all the supporting doctrinal publications. Decentralizing execution would allow Doctrine Division to focus more on reviewing doctrine, producing the large documents, and coordinating the prioritization of doctrinal needs.

Tying Up Loose Ends

Most importantly, however, the Marine Corps needs to move on with adoption of the Combat Development Process. Completed transition to the process would allow several administrative necessities to occur as follows: allowing development of comprehensive SOP's that define division roles

in the CDP, reviewing personnel and budget requirements, and establishing a knowledge base. Divisions need a blueprint to work from. Personnel realignment and budget reapportionment are vital.

Finally, the Marine Corps needs to realize that everything cannot be a priority and that we have neither the money nor the people to accomplish everything at once. Requirements need prioritization. Currently, Doctrine Division has twenty "priority" projects. This number is beyond their resources. Projects are started that later must sit while new "priorities" take over those resources. Why not sensibly prioritize initially and focus resources and energy accordingly, rather than spreading resources out and diminishing their effects? Scattered effort reemphasizes why a centralized agency controlling priorities is so vital.

Shutting down Marine Schools for a year to write doctrine would only provide a temporary solution. The simple truth is that the Marine Corps is in a period of transition and upheaval. However, the Marine Corps is continuously trying to modify itself without visualizing a true end state and how it plans to get there. The CDP is the right model for action in MCCDC and will produce results. Serious consideration and adoption of our recommendations would produce a lasting solution to a persistent problem. MCCDC may have finally learned "There is never enough time to do it right, but there is always enough time to do it over again."

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MLRP principles approved umbrella concept and long range objectives

MLRP — Concepts & Plans

CMC SIGNATURE

Doctrine — MAGTF Pro & Req — Assessment

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT — Concepts & Plans

CMC APPROVAL

Doctrine — MAGTF Pro & Req — Assessment

CONCEPT DEFINITION (UMBRELLA CONCEPT) — Concepts & Plans

BFMC
PMO

CMC APPROVAL

Service contribution to the National & Maritime Strategies

COMMANDANT'S GUIDANCE

THREAT ASSESSMENT — Plans & Concepts
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT — Plans & Concepts

NATIONAL STRATEGY — U.S. Govt
MILITARY STRATEGY — Cmdr-in-Chief/DOD
MARITIME STRATEGY — DON
USMC MISSION — U.S. Code
EXPECTATIONS
LIMITATIONS
CMC REQUIREMENTS

MODELLING & FLD EVALUATION / ALTERNATIVES — Assessment
PMO

PROPOSED CHANGES TO DOCTRINE — Doctrine
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TRAINING — Trng & Ed Ctr
PROPOSED CHANGES TO STRUCTURE — MAGTF Pro & Req
PROPOSED CHANGES TO MATERIEL — MAGTF Pro & Req

MAGTF Master Plan resolves deficiencies & enhancements

MMOP — Concepts & Plans

CMC

MMOP PROCESS — Concepts & Plans
MISSION AREA ANALYSIS — MAGTF Pro & Req

Doctrine — Assessment

UMBRELLA CONCEPT VALIDATION — Concepts & Plans
MISSION AREA CONCEPTS — MAGTF Pro & Req