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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

PART I

**COUPS D'ETAT: LESSONS OF THE PAST
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
AND A GUIDE FOR ACTION**

BY

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
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for information operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 1 Jan 84	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final: JANUARY 1984	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD, PART I, COUPS D'ETAT: LESSONS OF THE PAST, PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE, AND A GUIDE FOR ACTION			5. FUNDING NUMBERS C: NONE	
6. AUTHOR(S) W. Laqueur et al				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) CSIS 1800 K ST NW #400 Washington, DC 20006			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER NONE	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of the Director of Net Assessment Rm 3A930, The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 84-3926	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT Examines coups d'etat in the third world. 				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Soviet Union Third World Military Coups			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 286	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	

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PART I

COUPS D'ETAT: LESSONS OF THE PAST

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

AND A GUIDE FOR ACTION

Overall Summary

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

PART I

Overall Summary:

More Third World countries have turned towards the Soviet Union or realigned to the West as a result of coups d'etat than any other factor.

The present work deals with the why and how, and presents a systematic survey of coups during the last fifteen years: operational details, motivational background, their foreign dimensions and their internal effects. It investigates Soviet attitudes towards coups, as well as the degree and the specifics of Soviet involvement.

It then turns to the question of defending Third World regimes from coups and the general problem of an American coup policy. Indications are that military coups will continue in the years to come and their frequency may increase. U.S. vital interests in the Third World have been threatened by coups in the past and they will be further threatened in the future. A U.S. coup policy must consist of the ability to intervene to defeat coups when such intervention is in the American interest, (i.e., the existence of a counter-coup force). On the other hand, circumstances may arise in which it will be in the American interest to initiate coups -- for instance in cases in which the prevention of a coup has been unsuccessful and a hostile military take-over has already taken place. The various possibilities that have arisen in the past and are bound again to arise in the

future are discussed in this study which concludes with a number of proposals of both a general and specific nature.

The study was prepared under the guidance and with the collaboration of Professor Walter Laqueur, Professor Steven David and Mr. Philipp Borinski.

Military Coups in the Third World - the Soviet View

Soviet leaders and ideologists have ignored for many years the role of the army in the Third World, even though the military has played an increasingly important role in these parts. Seen in the Marxist-Leninist mirror, the army, unlike the working class or the peasantry or the bourgeoisie, was not a class - and therefore of no importance. It was only in the late 1960s that the Soviet leaders first began to accept that only the officer corps had the power in the Third World to intervene effectively at almost any time in the political process. During the early 1970s, comments on this "new phenomenon" were first made. However, to this very day there is noticeable reluctance to talk openly about this subject. Soviet experts prefer to call a spade - an agricultural implement. In other words, a study of the political role of Third World armies is likely to be called "Society and Power in the Third World" thus obfuscating its real contents. This may still be rooted in an ideological point of view, no satisfactory solution having yet been found to explain the political role of the military. But more likely it is connected with the situation inside the Soviet Union, the delicate question of the relationship between the Party and the Soviet army; since the Soviet army should be entirely subject to party and state control, it is embarrassing to deal with countries in which the opposite is the case. For somewhat similar reasons, the study of fascism has never been encouraged

in the Soviet Union.

During the last twenty years, the appraisal of Third World military coups in Soviet writings has undergone several radical changes. At one time, it was believed that the progressive colonels (such as Nasser) were the "wave of the future." But since then, in light of events in many other Third World countries, a more differentiated (and sceptical) approach has prevailed. Soviet observers still emphasize the role of the army as a modernizing force and as (potentially) a rallying point for the "patriotic forces." But it has been accepted that the military may turn against the local Communists and the Soviet Union especially, should they feel threatened by them.

The main causes of military coups in the Third World are in the view of Soviet analysts as follows: discontent with the ruling pro-Western ("imperialist") establishment; a chronic domestic crisis; discontent with the archaic reactionary character of the local regime; general incompetence of the civilian leadership.

But Soviet observers agree that these "objective" conditions almost always obtain. What specific circumstances are likely to trigger a coup? A threat to the autonomy of the army, and the danger that it may lose its relatively independent role is one such circumstances. Second, a lost war -- as happened in the Arab world after the 1948 war against Israel. Third, a prolonged civil war. Fourth, a chain reaction - the fact that an uprising in one country may trigger a coup in a neighboring nation. Fifth, the imposition on the army of measures of economic stringency; and sixth, ethnic divergencies in multi-

racial or multi-national societies. To this, "subjective" factors could be added such as, for instance, the sudden death of the dictator (Sekou Touré in 1984) or thwarted ambition, frustration on the part of officers who failed to get the expected promotion.

In what way are coups organized? Soviet authors differentiate between an uprising carried out by the army as a whole on the order of its supreme commander, and "mutinies" - a coup carried out by a group of officers with the intention of bringing down both the civilian leadership and to overthrow the supreme military command. From a military point of view this is, of course, a gross breach of military discipline. But since most of the "progressive" pro-Soviet coups were carried out by mutineers, Soviet commentators are showing considerable tolerance in this respect.

What kind of military leaders are likely to come to power as the result of coups? Soviet authors used to mention, above all, the senior officers of the old (colonial) school, conservative to the present order. But this species has more less disappeared and it no longer figures prominently in Soviet writing. Secondly, Soviet experts refer to "officers-adventurers" (putschists) who engage in a coup out of personal ambition, to enhance their own position or that of a small group of conspirators -- or putschists of a greater calibre "pocket-size Napoleons" -- who believe in their ability to head strong political movements, to lead their country out of the crisis and to lead it for an indefinite period.

Next, there is a "composite" type of military dictator, acting out of a mixture of all these motives-- personal and political ambition, resentment against the civilian leadership, but also out of the belief in having a public mission. Lastly, and from the Soviet point of view the most desirable, are the "revolutionary-democrats-in-uniform" (Nasser, Ne Win of Burma, Boumedienne the Syrian) military leaders. But Soviet analysts immediately add that typologies of such kind are, by necessity, tentative, and that the borderline between one "type" and another is by no means that clear in reality. According to Georgi Ilich Mirski, the leading Soviet expert on military uprisings, the coups are carried out usually in the hours before dawn on a Saturday or Sunday; the participation of parachute and/or tank forces is essential. The decisive issue is whether the rebels succeed in subduing the President's guard; if they succeed, communication between him and the administration is interrupted. If, within the first day, the commanders of the other garrisons, or their majority, join the new regime, the coup has succeeded.

More Third World countries have turned towards the USSR or realigned to the West as a result of coups d'etat than any other factor. Soviet gains as a result of coups include Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Ghana, Mali, Peru, Congo-Brazaville, Somalia, Libya, Sudan, Benin, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Grenada and Suriname. Soviet losses following successful or abortive coups include Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Chile and Equatorial Guinea.

The Soviets recognize that the narrow scope of the coup which accounts for so much of its success, can also bring about

its failure. As such, they protect Third World regimes in the short term through the placement of a "cocoon" of loyal East German and Cuban personnel. In the long term, the Soviets work to make Third World regimes coup-resistant through vanguard parties that transform the societies along Marxist-Leninist lines, and through close co-operation and penetration of Third World armies and police organizations.

The USSR has been very successful in protecting friendly Third World regimes from pro-Western coups. Since their setbacks in the 1960s, there have been no pro-Western coups (that have succeeded) against regimes protected by the USSR or its proxies. During the same time, there have been several successful pro-Soviet coups in the Third World including Benin, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Grenada and Suriname.

Moscow has also had some success in assisting or consolidating the coups of pro-USSR groups. The Soviet Union is suspected of contributing to the success of pro-Soviet coups in Ethiopia (1977), Afghanistan (1978 and 1979), South Yemen (1978) and Grenada (1979).

The greatest shortcoming of Soviet policy has been its overall inability to initiate coups. With the exception of South Yemen and Afghanistan (1979), the USSR has not played a central role in any of the coups that brought pro-Soviet regimes to power. Further, the Soviets were most probably involved in several failed coup attempts including those against Egypt's Sadat, Sudan's Numeiry, Somalia's Siad, Ethiopia's Mengistu, and Angola's Neto.

In response to these problems, the Soviets are taking steps to improve their coup-making abilities. They are making more of an effort to penetrate Third World armies, develop rival militias under their control and dominate indigenous intelligence organizations. South Yemen is an example of how the USSR can virtually control a Third World country by taking these and similar steps.

Soviet advantages over the United States in coup-related policies include the more effective use of proxies and the greater appeal (to some Third World leaders) of totalitarian systems over democracies.

The success of the USSR in preventing pro-Western coups has several implications for American policy. The United States must do more to stop Soviet influence before it can be established in Third World countries. Once Moscow gains a foothold, it will be increasingly difficult to dislodge the Soviet presence. The United States and its allies will also have to consider directly intervening in the Third World more than they have in the past. This will be necessary to reverse Soviet gains in the absence of a domestic coup option. Further, Washington must be prepared to entice existing Third World leaders to realign through measures that include the prompt guarantee of their political survival once they expel the Soviet "cocoon."

The United States must recognize and respond to Soviet strengths in dealing with coups. The USSR is well on its way to insuring that all Third World coups advance the Kremlin's

interests -- or they will not succeed. Given the central role played by coups in the East-West competition in the Third World, this would be a major setback to American interests.

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THIRD WORLD COUPS D'ETAT

No development has affected Soviet policy in the Third World as much as coups d'etat. Despite the attention lavished on revolutions, rebellions, insurgencies, and invasions the overwhelming number of countries in the Third World that have turned towards the USSR or realigned to the West have done so as a result of coups. This should not be surprising given the frequency of coups in the Third World and the propensity of the Soviets to exploit instability when it arises. What is surprising is the lack of analysis devoted to the question of the Soviet Union and Third World coups especially as it concerns Moscow's efforts to prevent the reversals of the past.

That the Soviet Union has gained and lost much in the Third World as a result of coups is beyond dispute. In terms of gains, the USSR recognizes that virtually the only way pro-Soviet governments come to power in the Third World is through violence and that the coup is the most frequent form of violent regime change among the developing states. Third World states that have turned to the Soviet Union following a coup include Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Ghana, Mali, Peru, Congo-Brazaville, Somalia, Libya, Sudan, Benin, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Suriname. The role of the coup in causing the alignment towards the USSR differs among these cases. but in each of them the new government placed in power by the coup resulted in an immediate or eventual tilt towards Moscow or an intensification of existing pro-Soviet ties.

The Soviets have also lost influence in the Third World as a result of coups. Formerly pro-USSR states that left Moscow's sphere of influence following actual or attempted coups include Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana, Mali, Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea. In the Indonesian and Sudanese cases, the Soviets lost their position due to successful counter-coups launched by the military. In the remaining countries, pro-Western leaders replaced heads of state sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

However one balances these gains and losses, it is clear that the coup d'etat has had a significant effect on the Soviet position in the Third World. By examining the background of Soviet policy towards Third World coups, their present policies towards coups, Soviet successes and failures, and how the Kremlin's policies and capabilities compare with those of the United States, much can be learned about the potential for the spread of Soviet influence among the developing states.

Background

Under Stalin and Khrushchev coups were not considered an important concern of Soviet policy. The Kremlin felt that in time, decolonization would bring pro-Soviet regimes to power with little or no assistance from Moscow. This belief in the inevitability of Soviet gains at first appeared to be borne out as independent leaders emerged in the Third World sympathetic to the USSR. During the mid-1950s and early 1960s the Kremlin welcomed several Third World leaders who adopted hostile policies towards the West and turned to Moscow for support. They included Sekou Toure of Guinea, Kwane Nkrumah of Ghana, Mobido Keita of

Mali, Gamal Nasser of Egypt, Ben Bella of Algeria, Ne Win of Burma, Adhmed Sukarno of Indonesia, and Fidel Castro of Cuba.

In the mid-1960s, however, Soviet optimism concerning the Third World faded as leaders friendly to Moscow became victims of coups. This first occurred in Algeria in June 1965. Since independence from France, President Ben Bella of Algeria had been engaged in a power struggle with Army Chief of Staff Colonel Boumedienne. Ben Bella's support came largely from local political leaders and their guerrilla forces while Boumedienne's strength stemmed from the regular army. When Ben Bella attempted to supplant the role of the army by creating a "people's militia" composed of guerilla troops loyal to him, Bomedienne struck. The coup proved successful with Boumedienne replacing Ben Bella as head of state. While the removal of Ben Bella did not result in Algeria adopting a pro-Western stance, the strength of its Soviet alignment was diminished and Moscow had lost one of its earliest and closest friends in the Third World.

Several months after the Soviet setback in Algeria, Moscow suffered another loss in Indonesia. President Sukarno had been moving Indonesia closer to the left since achieving independence from the Netherlands in 1949. By 1965, Sukarno openly embraced and received support from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. At the same time, he adopted a hostile policy toward the United States and the West in general. It is believed that Sukarno knew in advance and supported a Communist coup attempt against the army in September 1965. When the coup was swiftly and ruthlessly defeated by army forces under General Suharto, Sukarno's position was undermined. General Suharto

gradually assumed power until 1967 when Sukarno was formally removed from office. Under Suharto, Indonesia realigned away from the Soviet Union and adopted a pro-Western posture.

An especially disappointing reversal for the Soviet Union came with the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. As leader of Ghana since independence from Britain in 1957, Nkrumah pleased Moscow with his increasingly anti-colonial, anti-Western, and Pan-African policies. While Nkrumah's stature as an African and international political figure grew, however, he committed the fatal error of antagonizing his own armed forces. The Ghanaian military resented the growing corruption of Nkrumah's regime and the economic downturn caused by the drop in cacao prices and incompetent planning. Most of all, the British-trained army resented the challenge to their autonomy stemming from Nkrumah's establishment of the "President's Own Guard Regiment." This private force was detached from the army chain of command, made directly responsible only to Nkrumah, and received better equipment and pay than the regular army. Reacting to this situation, a military-police coup successfully overthrew Nkrumah in February 1966. Nkrumah was replaced with the National Liberation Council which realigned Ghana away from the Soviet Union and towards the West.

The Soviet Union suffered a fourth setback in the West African state of Mali. Under the leadership of Mobido Keita, Mali gradually transformed into the kind of "progressive" country the Kremlin likes to see emerge in the Third World. Keita severed ties with France (from which Mali received its independence in

1960), established a one-party state, proclaimed his commitment to socialist policies and made no secret of his pro-Soviet sentiments.

Ironically, the downfall of Keita began when he attempted to move Mali back towards the West. In 1967, Keita sought French assistance to cope with economic difficulties engulfing Mali. This move to France angered various elements in Mali prompting Keita to form a "People's Militia." As with Algeria and Ghana, the regular army of Mali came to resent the militia especially as it grew to three times its size. When several army officers were arrested by the militia in 1978, the army reacted by launching a successful coup. The new leadership reversed many of Keita's domestic and foreign policies removing Mali as a pro-Soviet state.

The loss of these countries upset and confused the Kremlin. Military coups were supposed to be an agent of change for socialism. The idea that coups could also reverse Soviet gains had not been considered by the Kremlin hierarchy. Following Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 and the various setbacks suffered by the USSR in the Third World, a debate emerged between the Soviet military and party as to how best to deal with coups which threatened Soviet gains.¹

The Soviet military argued that more had to be done to insure the loyalty of Third World armies. They asserted that the low level of development of most Third World states combined with the fragility of their political institutions made the military the most powerful element in Third World society. The importance of the military in the Third World is further heightened by their

tendency to seize power. As a Soviet authority of the Third World, G.I. Mirsky stated, following the coups of the 1960s, "(the) transfer of power to the military is no longer an exception but almost the rule."

The way to preserve Soviet gains in the Third World, according to the military analysts, was to insure that the militaries of the developing countries maintained the "correct" (i.e., pro-USSR) orientation. The reverses of the 1960s demonstrated that "progressive" regimes could fall victim to "reactionary" armies. Only by insuring that Third World armies do not follow a "reactionary" path can Moscow's gains be secured.

The Soviet military view on the central importance of Third World armies was reinforced by the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s when several rightist regimes were overthrown by leftist military coups. This occurred in Iraq, Congo (Brazaville), and Peru in 1968, Somalia in 1969, Dahomey (now Benin) in 1972, and Ethiopia in 1974. The coups again demonstrated that the prime determinant of a Third World country's political orientation was its military and that, if handled correctly, the military could act to improve significantly the position of the Soviet Union in the Third World. Thus to protect Soviet gains against pro-Western coups d'etat, and to increase the Kremlin's influence through pro-Soviet coups d'etat, the military was the crucial factor.

Civilian analysts disagreed with this view. While they accepted the importance of Third World armies in determining political alignment, they tended to downplay its central

significance. For the civilians, the lesson of the anti-Soviet coups of the 1960s had to do less with the military itself and more with the "unscientific" ideologies of the Third World. The civilian strategists were also much less optimistic than the military about the likelihood of Third World armies safeguarding "progressive" regimes as they moved towards socialism. They argued that all Third World armies, no matter how radical they might appear, were essentially bourgeois and would act in their class interests should a socialist regime challenge their privileged position.

The civilian analysts concluded that the Third World states needed a "vanguard party" to protect the integrity of "scientific socialism" and preserve Soviet influence. Such a party would be composed of "representatives of the proletariat, the peasantry, the progressive intelligensia, and the radical portion of the military." With a vanguard party in place, the masses would be mobilized and indoctrinated to support a pro-Soviet, socialist way of life. Moscow's position in the Third World would then not be at the mercy of a few individuals who might be overthrown or undergo a change of heart. As examples of what a vanguard party would accomplish, the Soviets could point to Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, and Mongolia. In none of these states is the Soviet position or the socialist way of life under threat. By spreading the effect of vanguard parties to other Third World countries, anti-Soviet coups and reversals would become a vestige of the past. Thus the establishment of vanguard parties was encouraged throughout the Third World.

The military-civilian dispute on emphasizing either Third World armies or vanguard parties continued until 1976-1977 when events gave the civilian position the upper hand. During this time both Egypt and Somalia abrogated their treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and Peru's leadership began to turn towards the West. At least in print, the Soviet military concurred with their civilian counterparts that the major reason for these setbacks lay in the absence of deep seated internal support for Moscow in these societies. Without such support, individual leaders were free to turn their back on the Soviet Union while bringing their states into the Western camp. At this point, the military agreed that the presence of a vanguard party was important in preserving Soviet gains in the Third World.

The apparent resolution of this dispute did not mean that the Soviet Union would now ignore the role of the military in the Third World. The power of Third World armies to undo Soviet supported regimes could not be overlooked. Moreover, the Kremlin had few illusions about the difficulties of establishing vanguard parties in the Third World. Moscow knew that Third World armies would likely perceive the influence of vanguard parties as a threat to their autonomy. Third world leaders would similarly resist the creation of vanguard parties, seeing them as a threat to their personal rule. Moreover, many Third World societies lacked the infrastructure in which vanguard parties could be effective. Finally, as experience demonstrated, vanguard parties proved difficult to establish and were no guarantee of Soviet success.

The Soviets therefore, still maintained a healthy skepticism concerning the utility of vanguard parties as a counter-coup measure in the Third World. Even where vanguard parties existed, civilian analysts conceded the "possibility of aberration and reversals." Consequently, while vanguard parties may offer the best hope to preserve Soviet influence in the Third World, they could not accomplish the task alone.

Soviet Policies Towards Coups

The reversals of the 1960s combined with general instability in the Third World convinced the Soviet Union to pursue a multi-faceted approach to coups d'etat. For the long term, Soviet policies reflect the civilian-military debate in emphasizing vanguard parties and gaining influence with Third World armies. Important as these policies are, the Kremlin recognizes that they take time to be effective. In the interim, the Soviets needed to devise ways of protecting their gains from hostile coups and perhaps to initiate or assist pro-Soviet coups in "reactionary" countries. They have attempted to accomplish this through short-term policies employing proxies and direct Soviet involvement.

Soviet policy towards vanguard parties in the 1980's has been mixed. On the one hand they continue to appreciate the potential of such parties transforming Third World societies into true Marxist-Leninist states that would be virtually coup-proof. On the other hand, the Soviets realize that the vast majority of third world states have not developed vanguard parties along Moscow's lines, and are not likely to do so. Moreover, as the Kremlin learned in Somalia in 1977, even a country with an

approved vanguard party established under the guidance of the Soviet Union can leave the USSR's fold.

The result is a policy that changes according to the conditions of the country where it is applied. The Kremlin focuses on countries which already have influential vanguard parties (e.g., Angola) or are so undeveloped that the creation of a vanguard party stands a good chance of transforming the society along Marxist-Leninist lines (e.g., South Yemen). In both situations, the Soviets have demonstrated flexibility in approving the type of vanguard parties established. Unlike the early 1960s when these parties had to be virtual copies of the Soviet Communist Party, the Kremlin is currently much less strict about the types of vanguard parties it supports.

In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union recognized six vanguard parties. They are the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Labor Party (MPLA-PT), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the Congolese Labor Party (PLT), the Benin People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB), the (South) Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The USSR has also occasionally considered the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) as a vanguard party although it remains under the full control of Ethiopian Prime Minister Mengistu. The New Jewel Movement of Grenada (prior to the American intervention), and the Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua have come close to earning Soviet recognition as vanguard parties.

Whether and to what extent these parties have played a role in preventing coups is difficult to ascertain. It is clear that

there have been no coups d'etat in any of those states where vanguard parties exist or are close to being formed. The only Soviet reversal among states with vanguard parties occurred in Grenada and required an American intervention to bring it about. While the Soviets are still not emphasizing the creation of vanguard parties everywhere, their record of apparent success in keeping countries in the Soviet orbit might induce them to view more favorably their establishment in other Third World states.

Complementing Soviet efforts to establish vanguard parties is a continuing emphasis on military assistance policies designed to gain influence among Third World armies. Central to these policies are Soviet efforts in the area of conventional arms transfers. Beginning in the mid-1950s the Soviets concluded arms deals with Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. By the 1960s the USSR expanded its list of major customers to include Somalia, South Yemen, India, Iraq, Algeria, Iran and the Sudan. The rise of Colonel Khadaffi and conflicts in Africa made Libya, Angola, and Ethiopia principal recipients of Soviet weaponry in the 1970s. Presently, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Algeria are the major Third World purchasers of Soviet arms.²

More impressive than the numbers of Third World countries receiving large amounts of Soviet weaponry is the magnitude of the arms transfers themselves. From 1955 to 1980, Soviet bloc countries supplied over \$51 billion of military aid to the Third World (excluding Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam), of which \$9.8 billion was provided by Eastern European countries. This compares with only \$28 billion of economic aid furnished during the same

period. By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the principal arms supplier to the the Third World. Supplementing this arms transfer effort, the Kremlin has trained some 52,000 Third World military personnel (up to 1980) in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries while placing approximately the same number of Soviet bloc military advisors in the Third World.³

The appeal of Soviet military assistance to Third World armies is clear. Due to its position as the world's leading producer of conventional arms, and its tendency to stockpile even old weapons, the USSR is able to transfer large amounts of arms without drawing on its own forces. This combined with their relatively streamlined arms control process enables them to send arms to Third World states, on the average, twice as quickly as the United States. The cost of these weapons is generally much less than their Western counterparts especially when the USSR includes (as it often does) a substantial discount. While the quality of Soviet arms, particularly jet fighters, is not always up to Western standards, this is often irrelevant to Third World forces who lack the training and expertise to fully exploit sophisticated weaponry. For most Third World conflicts, what is critical is whether relatively simple weapons such as small arms, artillery, surface to air missiles, and even tanks are available in sufficient numbers to overpower an adversary--not whether one's systems avionics are potentially superior to another's. Soviet military assistance is also welcome by Third World military leaders because along with weapons often come skilled proxies, As demonstrated in Angola and Ethiopia, the introduction

of several thousand well trained Cubans can make the difference between victory and defeat for Third World forces.

This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union would always be preferred over the United States as an arms supplier. American support and services are generally far superior to those of the USSR as Moscow apparently wants to keep its clients on a short leash. Furthermore, American advisors are usually better liked and more effective than their Soviet counterparts. The result is that the United States is usually preferable for the long-term structural development of Third World forces. Nevertheless, for a Third World army needing a quick infusion of weaponry, or an army in a country with a poor human rights record, the USSR might well be the supplier of choice.

Whether Soviet military assistance policies have affected the likelihood of coups overthrowing pro-Moscow governments in the Third World is impossible to prove. On an impressionistic level it is noteworthy that of the 15 major recipients of Soviet bloc military aid (those countries receiving over \$400 million of military assistance from the USSR and its allies), only in Indonesia was a pro-Soviet regime overthrown by a pro-Western coup d'etat.⁴ This is not to suggest that the Soviets have had unqualified success in influencing Third World armies. Clearly, the pro-Western realignments of Sadat, Numeiry, and Siad Barre could not have taken place in the face of determined opposition by their Soviet-trained and equipped armed forces. Still, the lack of anti-USSR coups among these states may indicate that in the absence of the existing leader changing his orientation, a

Soviet-backed army may be inhibited from launching an anti-Soviet coup d'etat.

One of the most important elements in Soviet policies towards the short-term threat (and opportunity) presented by coups is their use of proxies. To protect friendly Third World leaders from coups, the Soviet Union utilizes proxies to form a kind of "praetorian guard" around the Third World leadership. Just as the praetorian guard of the Roman Empire began as a special military unit designed to protect the Emperor and became a source of control over the regime it defended, so have the praetorian guards of the Soviet Union sought to become a significant extension of Moscow's power. While the Soviet use of proxies has not always succeeded in controlling Third World leaders, they have proven effective. By surrounding third world leaders with a "cocoon" of Cuban and East German "advisors," the Soviets have made the prospect of a successful coup against a friendly regime highly unlikely.

The "cocoon" strategy is effective for two reasons. First, the nature of most Third World states is such that the political orientation of a given country is determined by a single individual or a small group. It is relatively easy to defend this political elite with a small (i.e. no more than a few hundred soldiers), well trained military force. Furthermore, a coup d'etat by definition involves an attempt to seize power by a small group. Since the nature of this principal threat to Third World governments--and their pro-Soviet position--is so narrowly based, defenses against coups do not require a major effort.

It is not difficult to understand why the Soviets turned to the Cubans to assist them in protecting friendly Third World leaders from coups. The Cuban presence in Third World countries does not arouse the regional or American opposition that a Soviet involvement would engender. As a small Third World country, the Cubans do not threaten the sovereignty of other developing states as is done by the superpowers. Cuba is also free from the imperialist stigma that afflicts both the United States and (increasingly) the USSR. Furthermore, since most of the Cubans sent to Africa are black, they do not incur the racial animosity that so often accompanies a Soviet or American involvement. The Cubans are also good at what they do. While the Soviets are almost universally disliked for their boorish and clannish ways, Cuban advisors are generally praised for their easy-going manner and good relations with the host population. The Spanish speaking Cubans also have a language advantage over the Soviets in countries like Angola. Finally, Cuba's own revolutionary goals, desire to achieve great power status, and dependence on the USSR for economic and military support, make it a willing accomplice to Moscow's designs.

The Cubans have proven especially effective in training bodyguards and security personnel for the protection of Third World regimes. The Cubans began setting up special security formations for Third World leaders in the mid 1960s when they trained presidential guards to protect the regimes in Guinea and Congo-Brazaville. They subsequently became involved in the protection (either directly or indirectly) of Third World regimes in Libya, South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua.

In addition, the Cubans have trained the security forces of two of Africa's most murderous regimes: Idi Amin's Uganda and Macias Nguema's Equatorial Guinea. Their presence guarantees high quality protection for the regime by personnel who will not participate in any anti-Soviet plots. Moreover, by occupying such a sensitive role so vital to the heads of government, the Cubans are in a position to threaten (tacitly or otherwise) leaders who might wish to stray from Moscow's path. Whether they are protecting or defending the regime (or doing both simultaneously), the Cubans are well placed to insure that a pro-Soviet regime or its successor will remain friendly to the USSR.

The Cubans are also active in establishing Third World militias. These militias are trained, equipped, and sometimes led by Cuban personnel. The creation of these Cuban-dominated armies gives the Cubans (and their Soviet patrons) enormous influence over coup prone states. Since these militias are often stronger than the regular army which they are ostensibly supplementing, the Cubans control the most powerful institution in the state. They are consequently in the position to initiate or defend against coups without fear of significant internal opposition.

The Soviets must be particularly pleased with the progress of the Cuban-established militias. The Kremlin is well aware that its setbacks in the 1960s in Algeria, Ghana, and Mali were all largely due to the regular army intervening to prevent militias or other rival military forces from being established. If the Cubans succeed in developing ideologically "correct" militias without provoking the existing military establishment, the USSR

will have succeeded in overcoming one of its major early problems in attempting to prevent reversals in the Third World.

The Soviet use of East Germans in the Third World is also noteworthy. East Germany is the most competent and loyal of the Soviet satellites. East German strength in the Third World lies in their establishment and domination of the internal security apparatus in many developing countries. Much more active than the West Germans, the East Germans have taken the lead in penetrating and controlling the upper echelons of several Third World governments. The East German State Security Service (SSD) is especially active in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zambia, South Yemen, and Libya. Their responsibilities include the training of bodyguards, advising military and civilian agencies, and establishing secret police networks. Such activities place the East Germans in an ideal position to deter, prevent, and initiate coups.

The USSR's policies towards Third World coups also employ more direct uses of Soviet personnel. Defensively, Soviet military advisors deter coups in much the same ways as is done by Cuban and East German forces. Several hundred Soviet advisors currently supplement Cuban forces in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. While their numbers are relatively small, they are large enough to defeat most coup attempts and help make certain that the Cuban forces do not diverge too much from Soviet wishes. The large Soviet presence in Afghanistan serves both to suppress the ongoing revolt and to make certain that the regime is not overthrown by anti-Soviet elements. Most intriguing is the Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba whose existence caused so much

consternation in Washington and helped derail the SALT II treaty. Rather than presenting a direct threat to the United States or any other country in Latin America, the purpose of these three thousand troops is more likely the protection of Castro's regime (or a successor) from a coup d'etat.

The Soviets are also believed to have encouraged and assisted coups against pro-Western states. While definitive evidence is often lacking, there are several cases in which it appears the Soviets at least approved of coup attempts before they were actually undertaken. They include the attempts to overthrow President Numeiry of the Sudan in 1971, Colonel Mengistu's consolidation of power in Ethiopia in 1977, attempted coups in 1978 against President Siad Barre of Somali, President Rubayi Ali of South Yemen, and Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud of Afghanistan, and the attempt of Afghani President Nur Mohammed Taraki to overthrow Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin in 1979. The failure of Taraki's attempt led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 at which time the Soviets directly carried out a coup against the Amin regime.

Evaluating Soviet Policies Towards Coups

It is not an easy task to assess the effectiveness of Soviet policies in deterring and preventing coups. The lack of successful coups against pro-Soviet regimes is an indication of the Kremlin's success but, as is always the case with deterrence, is hardly proof that a specific policy is responsible. Suppression of actual coups is a more tangible demonstration of the effectiveness of Soviet policy, but it too has limitations. The

Soviets might conceal successful counter-coup actions so as not to give the impression they are keeping the regime in power. Moreover, even if successful, suppression of actual coup attempts reveals a failure of the Kremlin's policy to deter coups in the first place.

Evaluating Soviet policies of initiating coups against pro-Western regimes is no easier. For obvious reasons the Kremlin will seek to conceal its role in coup attempts. While they are often suspected of providing assistance to coup-makers or even being responsible for the coup itself, it is almost always impossible to prove Soviet involvement. In addition, many coups that result in pro-USSR governments are carried out with no Soviet involvement. As such, the success or failure of coups attempting to place "progressive" regimes in power can not in itself be a demonstration of the effectiveness of Moscow's policies.

The failure of the USSR to prevent coups against regimes in Moscow's orbit represents the most tangible measure of the effectiveness of Soviet policies. The Soviet Union can not conceal the overthrow of its clients especially when they are replaced by regimes adopting a pro-Western alignment. The Kremlin's reaction to the new government often serves as a good indicator of which coups they see as setbacks. Nevertheless, caution is required even in this area of assessment. As will be seen, the Soviet commitment to protecting friendly regimes from coups can be very weak, making their failure to defend certain regimes less significant than otherwise might be concluded.

Soviet Successes

These difficulties aside it is possible to make some judgements about the success and failure of Soviet policies toward coups. In terms of successes, the USSR appears to have done very well in protecting friendly regimes from coups. Since their reversals in the mid 1960s, the Kremlin has only lost two friendly regimes to coups d'etat. During the same time the West lost several states to pro-Soviet coups including Benin (1972), Ethiopia (1974-1977), Afghanistan (1978 and 1979), South Yemen (1978), Grenada (1979), and Suriname (1980).

The Soviet record is all the more impressive since neither of its "losses" can be construed as failures of Soviet counter-coup policy. The first setback occurred in Chile in 1973 when the regime of Salvador Allende was overthrown by a rightist military coup. Although the Soviets may have regretted the demise of the elected Marxist president, ties between Chile and the USSR were not very close and the Kremlin never took steps to deter or prevent the coup that resulted in Allende's downfall.

Nor is the second Soviet loss, the 1979 coup in Equatorial Guinea, quite the reversal it might otherwise appear. To be sure, the pro-Soviet regime of President Francisco Macias Nguema was overthrown by a coup d'etat in August 1979 by elements of the military who then realigned Equatorial Guinea with the West. Moreover, the new regime ended Soviet fishing rights off the coast of Equatorial Guinea, expelled some 200 Cuban advisors, and denied the Soviets access to a small base on the Gulf of Biafra which was used as a communications intelligence post and as a

staging area for the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa. Nevertheless, upon closer investigation, it is clear that the Soviets and the Cubans in Equatorial Guinea were not committed to the regime's survival.

There are several reasons to suspect the Soviets did not view the loss of Equatorial Guinea with much concern. First, Macias Nguema's regime was one of the most brutal in Africa. Although the Kremlin often overlooks human rights abuses, even it could not ignore a regime that murdered over 30,000 of its citizens and forced an additional 100,000 into exile. On strictly pragmatic grounds, backing such a government was bound to have costs elsewhere in Africa. In addition, there is no evidence that Soviet personnel or the 200 Cuban advisors stationed in Equatorial Guinea assisted Macias Nguema in his attempt to defeat the coup. This despite the fact that the coup attempt only succeeded after several weeks of fighting in which foreign involvement on the side of the existing regime could have proven decisive. Most significant, a key element in the success of the coup against Macias was the transport of rebel troops on the island of Malabo to the mainland. This transport was carried out by Soviet pilots (after a brief protest) using Macias's personal Antanov aircraft. It is inconceivable that the Soviets would have agreed to do this if they were truly interested in defending Nguema's regime.⁵

Although the coup resulted in the downfall of a pro-Soviet regime, Moscow's position was not irrevocably undermined. Soviet diplomats and advisors remained in the country as did a small group of Soviet pilots and mechanics who operated aircraft for

the new government. In 1981 the USSR signed agreements with Equatorial Guinea on cultural and scientific cooperation, and provided much needed relief aid to the African state. While Moscow's influence is nowhere near the level that existed with Macias, neither does the Kremlin have to justify to a skeptical world why it acted to defend such a pariah regime. Clearly, the USSR did not so much "lose" Equatorial Guinea to a pro-Western coup as they allowed an increasingly embarrassing liability to fall by the wayside.

In addition to their overall success in deterring coups, the USSR has also had success in assisting or consolidating the coups of groups sympathetic to its aims, while not directly engineering the coup itself. The rise to power of Colonel Mengistu in Ethiopia is a case in point. Mengistu first came to prominence as one of the members of the military council (called the Dergue) that overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974. Mengistu quickly stood out as one of the most anti-American and ambitious of the Ethiopian leaders. The Soviets, however, held back in fully supporting Mengistu for fear that his position was not secure. Mengistu allayed their doubts on February 3, 1977 when, in a bloody shoot-out in the Grand Palace, eight high officials of the Dergue were killed including the chairman. Mengistu then became leader of the Dergue and intensified Ethiopia's realignment away from the United States and to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet link to these events came about before and just after Mengistu's seizure of power. Prior to the 1977 coup, the Soviets concluded a secret arms agreement with Mengistu in

December 1976. The agreement strengthened Mengistu's influence and allowed him to reorganize the Dergue along Marxist-Leninist lines. Furthermore, perhaps as an incentive for Mengistu to act, the agreement reportedly contained conditions delaying the shipment of weapons to Ethiopia until Mengistu assumed power.

Less than 24 hours after Mengistu's coup, he met with the Soviet ambassador to Ethiopia, Anatoli Ratanov, and received a personal message of congratulations from Fidel Castro. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union and all the Eastern bloc countries sent messages of support to Mengistu. A major arms agreement and the dispatch of Cuban troops to Ethiopia followed in May. The speed of the Soviet bloc reaction to Mengistu's coup gave credence to reports that Mengistu had made secret contacts in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa with Soviet and Cuban diplomats to provide for immediate recognition and support once he became the undisputed leader of Ethiopia.

The Soviet Union also played a role in the successful coup which toppled the Afghani regime of Mohammed Daoud in April 1978. Although Daoud initially adopted a pro-Soviet line when he seized power in 1973, he gradually edged away from Moscow's influence toward a posture of authentic non-alignment. Opposing Daoud were two rival Marxist-Leninist factions called the Khalq and the Parcham. Following the assassination of a Parcham leader and a large Communist demonstration at his funeral, Daoud initiated an anti-Communist purge to protect his rule. His efforts, however, were inadequate to cope with the mounting Communist threat. Under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin, and with the support of the military, a successful coup was carried out against Daoud. The

new regime consisted of Nur Mohammed Taraki, a Khalq leader who became prime minister, Hafizullah Amin (the most radical of the group), became deputy premier and foreign minister; and Babrak Karmal, the leader of Parcham, who also assumed the post of deputy premier. They rapidly aligned Afghanistan to the USSR, concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in December 1978.

Although it is believed there was no direct Soviet participation in the coup, they were important to its success. American Ambassador Theodore Elliot argues that the Soviets convinced the Khalq and Parcham factions to join in a coalition in 1977 so as to be in a better position to launch a coup against Daoud. The Kremlin may have also provided secret assistance to the Afghan armed forces to prepare them for the coup. It is noteworthy that many of the key army and airforce officers who supported Amin's coup attempt were trained in the USSR. Following the overthrow of Daoud, the Soviets immediately recognized the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan indicating they knew and supported the political orientation of the new leadership. To make certain the Khalq-Parcham coalition would hold on to power, the Soviets sent hundreds of civilian advisers to the Afghan government and doubled its number of military advisers in Afghanistan to 700. A communications link between Moscow and the the Soviet military advisory group in the Afghan capital of Kabul was also established.

In Grenada, Cuban support helped consolidate a coup that placed another country in the pro-Soviet camp. As a small

Caribbean island with a population of about 100,000, Grenada attracted little attention until a coup overthrew Prime Minister Eric Gairy. The coup occurred after the erratic and increasingly repressive Gairy ordered the arrest of the leaders of a leftist group called the New Jewel Movement. Before the arrests could be carried out, a small group of New Jewel members seized the airport and radio station overwhelming Gairy's 200 man army in March 1979. Under the leadership of Maurice Bishop, Grenada moved sharply to the left, intensified its ties to Cuba and became a major irritant to the United States. It remained so until October 1983 when an even more radical Marxist-Leninist group overthrew and executed Bishop, This prompted an invasion by the United States which returned Grenada to the Western camp.

Cuba's importance in the Grenada affair lies in its protection of Bishop's regime, especially during the critical time immediately following the coup. With Gairy still alive (in the United States) and with only a handful of supporters, Bishop's hold on power was very tenuous. Castro's decision to send quickly arms and advisors to the Grenadian army and to set up anti-aircraft guns at the island's airport may very well have prevented a counter-coup. The time gained by the Cuban intervention allowed Bishop to consolidate his position and maintain power until the 1983 leftist coup.

The most direct and blatant success of Moscow's policy towards Third World coups is the overthrow of the Afghan government by Soviet troops in December 1979. Prior to the Soviet coup, events in Afghanistan were rapidly moving out of control. Under the direction of Deputy Premier Amin, radical policies of

land redistribution and anti-religious educational programs were carried out that eroded support for the Afghan government throughout the country. By March 1979 tribal revolts were occurring in more than half the country. At this time, Amin replaced the more moderate Taraki as prime minister and later took control of the Afghan armed forces.

The Soviets responded by increasing their military presence in Afghanistan to about 4,000 advisors and by attempting to moderate Amin's radical direction. For this latter aim, the Kremlin may have encouraged the more conservative Taraki (who held the post of president) to launch a coup against Amin in the hope that such an action would stem the tribal opposition. It is suggested that Taraki was told to do this when he stopped off in Moscow on September 10-11. Amin, however, acted first (perhaps because he was warned by one of Taraki's bodyguards) and Taraki was killed in the subsequent violence on September 16. Amin then assumed the sole leadership of the country.

Under Amin the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated sharply. His radical policies provoked an intensification of the tribal revolts while further narrowing the base of his support even in the Afghan army. Despite the precariousness of his position, he continued to refuse Soviet advice to moderate his actions. If he were allowed to continue in power, the Soviets faced the prospect of country-wide revolt that threatened to place a hostile Moslem state on its border.

By the end of 1979 the Soviets must have concluded that Amin must be overthrown in order for them to preserve a friendly

government in Afghanistan. Launching a coup against Amin would not, however, be an easy task. Large numbers of Afghan soldiers in the Kabul area remained loyal to Amir and the abortive September 16 coup made him suspicious of Soviet actions. Consequently, a coup initiated by pro-Soviet Afghan soldiers or through assassination did not stand a good chance of success. Only direct action by Soviet troops could be counted on to suppress the Afghan forces and protect the new regime.

It is not known how the Soviets overthrew Amin but much can be surmised. Before the Soviets implemented their coup against Amin they apparently attempted to persuade him to step down and provide a legal basis for the massive intervention of their troops that followed. It has been suggested that a high official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Lieutenant General Victor S. Paputin, was in charge of this mission. Amin apparently refused to either resign or provide a pretext for the Soviet invasion. Soviet MVD troops under Paputin then attacked Duralaman palace where Amin was staying and either purposely or accidentally killed the Afghan leader. In the fighting Paputin was also killed (or committed suicide for failing to gain Amin's resignation).

Following the coup, the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal (who had been in exile) as the new Afghan leader. Karmal dutifully invited the Soviet forces to intervene (embarrassingly, after they had already done so) and agreed to follow Soviet "suggestions" regarding the suppression of the insurgency. Thus, whatever the ultimate outcome of the Afghan affair might be, the Soviets did succeed in overthrowing a problem government and replacing it with one much more amenable to the Kremlin's view.

Perhaps the most effective example of Soviet policies towards coups in Third World states is South Yemen. Although the extent of Soviet domination of South Yemen is unprecedented in the Third World, the Kremlin's reaction to the 1978 coup attempt there bears further scrutiny as a demonstration of what the USSR can achieve under the right conditions.

South Yemen (officially called the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) achieved independence from Great Britain in 1967. It is desperately poor with virtually no natural resources and a population (in 1978) of approximately 1.6 million. Despite its lack of intrinsic importance, South Yemen has proven to be of concern due to its strategic location bordering on Saudi Arabia and overlooking the Bab el Mandeb Straits, through which 60 percent of Western Europe's oil passes.

In late August 1978, following a bizarre series of events, the newly installed leader of Southern Yemen, Hafez Ismail, successfully defended his government against the man he just deposed, Rubayi Ali. The roots of this coup-counter coup can be found in the involvement of the Soviet Union and its proxies in an internal political dispute in Southern Yemen.

In late 1977 the President of South Yemen, Rubayi Ali was challenged for the leadership of the country by Hafez Ismail, the head of South Yemen's sole political party, the National Front. Part of their conflict stemmed from disagreements over foreign policy. Ali sought to move South Yemen to a more neutralist posture while Ismail worked to intensify the existing pro-Soviet alignment. Ismail became especially incensed at Ali's planned

meeting with American representatives in June 1978. The two also clashed over a Soviet request to use Aden as a transit point for the passage of Soviet supplies and South Yemeni troops to assist the Ethiopians in their war with Eritrea. Ali wished to remain neutral in the war (in which most of the Arab states supported the Eritreans) while Ismail readily agreed to the Soviet request.

More fundamentally, the dispute revolved around who would lead South Yemen. Although Ali was the nominal head of state and retained the support of much of the army, Ismail had the backing of the Soviets and their proxies, both of whom dealt only with him. With their support, Ismail pushed for the establishment of a new "vanguard" party to be led by himself. Ali resisted such a move recognizing that the new party would effectively deprive him of power. The conflict reached a new level in May 1978 when Ismail arrested 150 army officers loyal to Ali and opposed Ismail's plan for a new party. Ali responded by sending an envoy to North Yemen to enlist the support of its leader, Ahmad al-Ghashmi against Ismail.

On June 24 the envoy was supposed to leave South Yemen carrying a briefcase filled with sensitive papers. Before leaving, however, the envoy was reportedly arrested by Ismail's men under the orders of the East Germans. A new messenger with a new briefcase was substituted who then took a private aircraft to the North Yemeni capital of Sana arriving on June 24. Once in Sana, the envoy went directly to the North Yemeni president's office. He shook hands with the president, took a seat in his private office, and then opened his briefcase--triggering an explosion which killed them both.

The murder of the North Yemeni president had immediate and drastic repercussions. Blaming South Yemen for the assassination, the new North Yemeni leaders broke relations between the two countries. Apparently, Ismail anticipated this reaction for he used it to put into motion a plan to frame Ali for the assassination. Using the break in relations as an excuse, Ismail called an emergency meeting of the South Yemeni Central Committee which operated under his direction. Realizing the meeting was stacked against him, Ali refused to attend and instead submitted a letter of resignation. The Central Committee voted 120-4 to adopt a resolution, "dismissing him (Ali) from the presidency of the state and all his other functions." In addition, the Central Committee formally accused Ali of plotting the murder of the North Yemeni president and ordered him to leave for Ethiopia.

At this point it appeared Ismail had launched a successful coup. Ali had been formally deposed and the leadership of South Yemen passed to his opposition. Not surprisingly, Ismail emerged as the the real power although titular authority rested with his associate, Nasser Muhammad. Aside from supporting Ismail, the new leaders were all known for their pro-Soviet views.

Before the new government could entrench itself, however, Ali acted. On June 26, Ali launched a counter-coup to regain his power. He mobilized loyal units in the armed forces and the Palace Guard in an attempt to arrest Ismail and his colleagues. For most Third World states, the support of the army and the Palace Guard would be tantamount to success. But in South Yemen, the situation was different. For months preceding the coup,

Cubans had been building up a "people's militia" under the control of Ismail. With 20,000 men it was equal in size, and superior in training and equipment to South Yemen's regular army. Augmenting the militia was an internal security force (called Tanzim) established and led by the East Germans. In addition, Cuban and Soviet advisors had been busily training and influencing the South Yemeni air force and navy.

As a result, the attempt of Ali and his supporters to re-establish control by force quickly encountered overwhelming resistance. Ismail's militia, backed by the navy and the air force, routed Ali's forces. The rapidity and efficiency of Ali's defeat have led many to suggest that there was direct Soviet and/or proxy participation in the counter-coup, particularly in the air strikes against the Presidential Palace.

Although sporadic fighting outside the capital continued for a few days, the battle for Aden was over in a matter of hours. With his forces defeated, Ali and some of his closest supporters were tried and executed the day of their attempted coup. A new even more pro-Soviet government was established in South Yemen.

Most observers did not appreciate the significance of the South Yemeni coup and counter-coup. Since South Yemen was already in the Soviet orbit, the intensification of their alignment did not appear to be cause for much concern. What many overlooked was the manner in which Ismail seized and retained power. The Soviets and their proxies had taken full control of South Yemen. Without having to incur the political and military costs of outside intervention, the Kremlin overthrew a leader it did not approve of, placed in power someone more to its liking, and protected its

choice from significant internal opposition. The prospect of a successful pro-Western coup in South Yemen or the realigning of an existing South Yemeni leader, is virtually non-existent.

Soviet Failures

The greatest failure of Soviet policy has been its general inability to initiate coups. With the exception of South Yemen and Afghanistan, it is not believed that the USSR played a central role in any of the coups that brought pro-Soviet regimes to power. This weakness is all the more striking due to suspicions that the Soviets have attempted to overthrow several unfriendly leaders but have not been able to do so. If the Soviets cannot initiate coups against regimes, their potential for enlarging their influence in the Third World and for preventing the defection of once friendly leaders, is severely diminished.

While the evidence is rarely conclusive, it appears that there has been at least indirect Soviet involvement in several failed coup attempts in the past decade. The common theme among these efforts is that they are directed at countries that were or are in the Soviet sphere of influence. The motivation for the coup attempts is either to remove a leader of a pro-Soviet regime who is showing signs of independence (Soviet desire to rid Afghanistan of Amin is an example of this), or to remove a leader who was once aligned with the USSR but rejected that alignment and turned to the West. The Soviets are suspected of playing a role in failed coup attempts against Sadat in Egypt, Numeiry in the Sudan, Siad Barre in Somalia, and (in cases of leaders who

remained allies of the USSR despite the efforts to remove them) Mengistu in Ethiopia, and Neto in Angola.

During his stormy relationship with the Soviet Union, Egypt's Anwar Sadat suspected Kremlin involvement in the planning of several coups directed against him. The most prominent threat developed soon after Sadat assumed power following the death of Nasser in September 1970. Opposing Sadat were a group of high Egyptian officials led by Vice President Ali Sabri and including the Ministers of the Interior, Information, Presidential Affairs, and Defense. According to Sadat, this formidable group planned to create a series of demonstrations and then seize power under the guise of defending the public order. Before they could carry out their plan, however, Sadat acted. With the support of the the commander of the Presidential Guard and the Chief of Staff, Sadat arrested 91 of the alleged conspirators, thus ending the threat of a coup.

No direct evidence ties the USSR with the alleged coup attempt but there are intriguing links. Ali Sabri had long been considered the Kremlin's contact in Cairo. He played an instrumental role in the 1955 arms deal with the USSR (via Czechoslovakia) and often led Egyptian delegations to Moscow. When Kosygin visited Egypt for Nasser's funeral, it was no surprise he met with Sabri before Sadat. The other high-ranking members of Sabri's group were also reputed to hold pro-USSR views causing Sadat to refer to them as the "Soviet agents." A suggestion that the Soviets were involved in the anti-Sadat operation came from one of the alleged coup-makers during the

trial when he said, "The Russians, in the opinion of Ali Sabri, could not possibly abandon the Egyptians to their fate. It was therefore imperative to involve them in the battle so they would support us (the conspirators) in it."

Whether or not the Soviets were involved, they moved quickly to shore up their position in the wake of the Sabri affair. Less than a week after the Sabri arrests were made, President Podgorny of the Soviet Union rushed to Cairo where he hastily concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Egypt. While the terms of the treaty strengthened the Egyptian-Soviet alignment, most analysts now view it as an almost desperate attempt to maintain the USSR's position in Egypt following the Sabri debacle.

From the time of the Sabri affair to Sadat's assassination, the Soviets were suspected of assisting a multiplicity of failed coup plots against the Egyptian leader. American intelligence reported a Kremlin sponsored attempt to overthrow Sadat when he ordered the expulsion of Soviet military advisors from Egypt in July 1972. Less than a year later, in April 1973, the Egyptian Communist Party reportedly attempted a coup that failed. Following this, a special committee was allegedly created (in March 1974) under the leadership of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko dedicated to the overthrow of Sadat. This committee supposedly aided student groups and leftists in their attempt to overthrow Sadat's regime in late 1974. In addition, Egyptian Prime Minister Majdou Salem reported that the KGB, working with Libyan intelligence and a secret political organization called the Egyptian Worker's Party, instigated riots in January 1977 with the hope of replacing the Egyptian government with a pro-

Communist regime. Finally, only a month before Sadat's assassination, officials of the Soviet embassy were expelled from Egypt and the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Society was closed due to alleged contacts between Soviet officials and opponents of Sadat's regime.

The failure of these alleged attempts and plots drove Sadat closer into the American sphere of influence. Following the October 1973 war, Sadat turned to the United States for Egypt's military supplies, abrogated the Egyptian-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation, signed the American sponsored Camp David accords, and generally became the most pro-Western Arab leader. While many factors led to Sadat's realignment, the perception that the Soviets continually backed coups against him undoubtedly contributed to the Egyptian leader's decision.

The Soviet Union has also been implicated in several coup attempts against President Jaafar-Al Numeiry of the Sudan. While a colonel in the Sudanese army, Numeiry himself seized power in a bloodless coup in May 1969. At first, Numeiry followed a moderately leftist course that included close cooperation with Sudanese Communists and overtures to the Soviet Union. Numeiry's relationship with the Sudanese Communist Party quickly soured, however, as he began to suspect them of plotting to overthrow him. To deal with the Communist threat, Numeiry called upon the Sudanese people to "crush" the Sudanese Communist Party and arrested 70 high level Communist officials in February 1971. The Communist Party apparatus (which had in fact been planning a

coup), reacted by accelerating their schedule. They launched their coup against Numeiry on July 19, 1971.

At first, the Communist coup appeared to be successful. Sudanese troops and armor quickly took control of the capital of Khartoum and placed Numeiry under arrest. The leaders of the coup announced their intention to "pursue a non-capitalist path for development," ended the ban on the Sudanese Communist Party, and welcomed the prompt recognition of the Soviet bloc countries. As it turned out, the revelation of their leftist sympathies proved the undoing of the conspirators as Sudan's (then) anti-Communist neighbors took action to defeat the coup.

Libya's Colonel Khadaffi acted first by ordering a BOAC civilian airliner carrying two of the coup's leaders (who were in Britain at the time of the attempt) to land in Libya. Khadaffi then placed the men in custody depriving the coup of their presence at a crucial time. Egypt's Sadat proved even more important in defeating the coup. After sending an Egyptian delegation to Sudan to insure Numeiry's safety (an act which probably saved the Sudanese President's life), Sadat arranged for a Sudanese brigade stationed on the Suez Canal to be quickly sent to Khartoum. Once in the Sudan the canal brigade linked up with Egyptian troops and an Egyptian armored force stationed near Khartoum. Together with loyalist Sudanese troops they succeeded in defeating the coup three days after it began. Most important, they restored Numeiry to power.

President Numeiry immediately accused the Soviet Union and its allies of complicity in the coup attempt. Although incontrovertible truth is lacking, there is much to support

Numeiry's assertion. With over one thousand Soviet military advisors in the Sudan, the Kremlin could scarcely have overlooked the Sudanese army's preparations for the coup. Reports of the Soviets interfering with the counter-coup effort, the immediate Soviet recognition of the new regime, and the known sympathy of Moscow for the Sudanese Communist Party lent additional credence to Numeiry's charges. Moreover, a Soviet defector who served as a KGB officer in the Sudan at the time of the coup attempt, Ilya Dzshirkvelov, claimed that the Kremlin supported the effort to overthrow Numeiry.

If the USSR assisted the coup attempt, their involvement proved a complete failure. Following his return to power, Numeiry recalled the Sudanese ambassador from the Soviet Union, expelled several Soviet diplomats, and began turning the Sudan away from the pro-Moscow drift that he had initiated two years earlier.

As Numeiry continued to intensify his pro-Western alignment, he charged the Soviet Union with supporting two further coup attempts against his regime. The first occurred on July 2, 1976 just after Numeiry returned from a trip to the United States and France. While Numeiry was still at the airport, it and several sites throughout Khartoum were attacked by approximately 2,000 rebels, most of them civilians. Sudanese troops from outside the capital defeated the coup attempt but only after many high officials of Numeiry's government were killed. Numeiry described the attempted coup as a "foreign invasion" despite the fact that most of the rebels were Sudanese. The coup-makers did, however, receive training, sophisticated weapons, and transport from

Libya. That fact plus the vaguely leftist orientation of the coup leadership indicates that Numeiry's suspicions of Soviet involvement might not be unfounded.

The second coup attempt occurred on February 2, 1977. On that day, soldiers of the Sudanese Air Defence Force occupied Juba airport in Southern Sudan for several hours until loyal Sudanese troops recaptured it. The motivation for the coup attempt--if indeed it was that--appeared to be local in nature involving the ongoing conflict between northern and southern Sudan. Nevertheless, Numeiry blamed a conspiracy of "foreign powers" for the Juba incident. According to Numeiry those "foreign powers" included Ethiopia, Libya and (indirectly) the Soviet Union.

Whether the Soviets were actively involved in these coup attempts, Numeiry reacted as if they were. Shortly after the Juba affair, the Sudanese President reorganized his cabinet, increasing the role of pro-Western officials. In May 1977, Numeiry expelled the remaining Soviet military advisors from the Sudan and intensified his country's pro-Western alignment. After Sudan supported the Camp David accords, the United States responded favorably to Sudan's military aid requests and replaced the USSR as Sudan's main arms supplier. At present, Sudan under Numeiry is considered to be one of the most anti-Soviet and pro-Western states in the Third World. If the USSR did in fact back these abortive coup attempts, they bear much of the responsibility for Numeiry's realignment.

Somalia's President Siad Barre suspected Soviet machinations against him with good reason. After eight years of extensive

Soviet support, the Kremlin chose to back Somalia's chief antagonist, Ethiopia, in the bitter conflict waged between the two countries. Rejecting Soviet pleas to form a "socialist federation" with the newly revolutionary government in Ethiopia, Siad decided instead to invade the Ethiopian-held territory of the Ogaden to bring it and its ethnic Somali population under his control. Siad launched his attack in the summer of 1977 in the hope of achieving a de facto victory before Soviet and Cuban help could arrive. Siad's effort failed, however, and he was forced to withdraw his Soviet-trained army from Ethiopia in March 1978, Less than a month later, elements of the Somali military initiated a coup against Siad. The Somali president easily suppressed the attempt with the assistance of his National Security Service and Presidential Guard.

Siad lost little time in declaring that the coup attempt against him was undertaken in the interests of the "new imperialists" (Siad's name for Cuba and the USSR). Siad's allegation is supported by the dissatisfaction among many elements of the Somali army concerning the break with the USSR and the pervasive influence exercised by the Kremlin within the Somali military. On the other hand, at least an equally strong case can be made that the motivations for the poorly conceived coup stemmed from domestic factors having to do with antagonism among Somali clans and general resentment towards the Siad regime in the wake of the Ethiopian debacle. In any event, after the coup Siad at first tried to placate the USSR and then, finding a newly receptive United States, realigned strongly to the West.

In Ethiopia, the South Yemenis, Cubans, and perhaps the Soviets were involved in an attempt to challenge the rule of Prime Minister Mengistu in the spring of 1978. This curious incident revolved around an Ethiopian Marxist, Negede Gobeze, whose ideological beliefs were considered to be more faithfully pro-Communist than those of Mengistu. The Soviets were particularly impressed with Negede because he appeared to be willing to establish a truly Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in Ethiopia--something Mengistu said he would do but has thus far resisted. The problem faced by the Soviets was that Negede was living in Europe and showed no signs of returning to Ethiopia so long as Mengistu (who opposed Negede) remained in power. In May 1978, however, Negede was secretly brought into Ethiopia on a South Yemeni passport apparently by the Cubans. When Mengistu learned of Negede's return, he reacted angrily. The Cuban ambassador with most of his staff and the South Yemeni charge d'affaires were ordered out of Ethiopia in June. The Soviet ambassador, who some claimed was also involved, returned to Moscow during the summer.

In a development remarkably similar to Egypt's Ali Sabri affair, the Soviets acted quickly to solidify their relations with Ethiopia. After a new ambassador arrived in Addis, the Soviets concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Ethiopia in November. Included in the treaty were commitments for large amounts of military and economic aid to be repaid under easy terms. Despite the unpleasantness of the Negede affair--or perhaps because of it--Mengistu appeared to be more in the Kremlin's grip than ever.

It is still not known if Negde Gobeze was brought into Ethiopia to replace Mengistu and what role, if any, was played by the Soviets in the operation. Nevertheless, it is significant that Soviet proxies would smuggle a major rival to Mengistu into Ethiopia who had he assumed power, would have established the vanguard party the Kremlin had been advocating. The discovery of Negede and the subsequent diplomatic expulsions were a setback at least for the Cubans and the South Yemenis, and probably for the Soviets as well. That this setback failed to remove Mengistu from the Soviet sphere of influence indicates the lack of options open to the Ethiopian leader at the time this occurred. Another failed attempt combined with American openness to the Mengistu regime might produce a different outcome.

One of the most intriguing cases of a failed coup attempt with possible Soviet support occurred in Angola against President Agostinho Neto. The coup began on May 27, 1977 when armored cars of the Angolan army crashed through the gates of the main prison in the capital city of Luanda. The assault on the prison freed many inmates including (it is believed) Nito Alves who had served as Minister of Internal Administration and as a member of the MPLA Central Committee until his arrest six days earlier. Along with the attack on the prison, Angolan army units also took control of the Luanda radio station and tried to take over the Presidential Palace. Although the coup had the support of high officials throughout the government and army, it lacked the momentum to achieve a quick victory. Several hours after it

began, loyal MPLA troops recaptured the radio station and soon suppressed the coup attempt.⁶

The first extraordinary aspect of this affair is that it appears that Cuban troops played a major role in defeating the coup. Monitoring of radio broadcasts from Luanda on the day of the coup revealed the presence of Spanish-speaking individuals at the station when the loyalist forces evicted the coup makers. Their presence has never been explained. Hints that the Cubans may have been involved include Castro's assertion a month prior to the coup attempt that Cuba "will aid Angola to every possible extent," and the fact that a week after the abortive coup Cuban Vice President Raul Castro arrived in Luanda for talks with Neto. None of this is conclusive and it should be pointed out that Neto denied any Cuban involvement. Nevertheless, many objective observers agree that there indeed was significant Cuban involvement in the suppression of the coup.

What makes the Cuban role even more extraordinary is the possibility that the coup they defeated was backed by the Soviet Union. The key to this assertion lies in the leader of the coup, Nito Alves. At first Alves strongly supported Neto and played a critical role in the Angolan president's bid for power. Neto rewarded Alves for his efforts by naming him Minister of Internal Administration which placed Alves in charge of the development of mass organizations and gave him control over the appointment of many senior officials. In time, however, Alves became disenchanted with Neto's refusal to appoint more blacks as opposed to mesticos (mixed race) to government positions. Alves also was critical of the overall performance of Neto's regime particularly in light of

widespread food shortages. Neto responded to the increasing attacks from Alves by condemning "factionalism" and arresting him on May 21. Alves' supporters launched their coup only six days later.

Several points support the assertion that the Soviets supported Alves' coup attempt. Moscow was never entirely comfortable with Neto's nationalistic leadership. In 1973, they tried to block Neto's rise to power by backing a more ideologically reliable rival. In the years since then, the Kremlin was reportedly upset that the MPLA could not reach some agreement with the opposition forces that would end Angola's costly and protracted civil war. The problems between Neto and the Soviets became obvious when, a week before the attempted coup, the Angolan leader was forced to declare publicly that he was not anti-Soviet.

Neto Alves and his colleagues, on the other hand, were closely linked with the Soviet Union. The Kremlin admired Alves' popularity with the masses, his dynamic black nationalist image, and his dedication to Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet fondness for Alves was not lost on Neto. It is noteworthy that a Soviet diplomat who established close ties with Alves was later expelled from Luanda in October 1976. Clearly, Neto feared that the Soviets saw in Alves the opportunity to place a less nationalistic and more pro-Moscow leader in Angola.

The Cuban suppression of the coup attempt remains a puzzle. The Cubans may have acted reflexively and in ignorance when the coup began. Especially if Soviet support for the Alves group was

muted and indirect, neither the Cubans or the Soviets may have been aware that a coup was being planned. In such a context, given the short time frame of the coup attempt, the Cuban behavior protecting the Neto regime from an attack of unknown origin is understandable. Alternatively, the Cubans may have known of Soviet involvement with Alves but, in a display of independence, chose to follow their assigned mission of defending the Neto regime. If this is the case, the role of Cubans as Soviet proxies needs reassessment.

Following the abortive coup both the USSR and the MPLA denied Soviet involvement. In a manner similar to the aftermath of the Ali Sabri affair in Egypt and the Negede Gezbede affair in Ethiopia, the USSR and the Angolan regime moved to cement their ties. A treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in October 1976 was ratified by both countries just a few months after the attempted coup. After Neto's death (following an operation in Moscow) the Soviet position in Angola remains secure.

Lessons and Conclusions

Several lessons emerge from this survey of Soviet policies towards Third World coups. First, Soviet policies are designed to meet both long- and short-term interests. For the long term, the Kremlin seeks to change the nature of friendly Third World societies so that they are less likely to experience coups. This is accomplished through the establishment of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties which institutionalize a pro-Soviet ethos throughout the society and the military. Until this stage is

reached, Soviet policies rely on a foreign (i.e., Soviet or proxy) presence to insure the loyalty of the Third World regime.

Second, the Soviets appear to have accepted the view that coups are a central feature of Third World life and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. They no longer believe change in the Third World must move in a socialist direction or that the only solution to the prospect of further coups is Marxist political development. Rather, they recognize the inherent fragility of Third World regimes and seek to use that fragility to their advantage.

Third, the Soviets have been much more successful in protecting friendly Third World regimes from coups, than they have in initiating coups against hostile regimes. The Soviet record of deterring or preventing "reactionary" coups in countries where they wish to maintain their influence is nothing short of remarkable. The Soviets have not, however, been able to intimidate existing leaders into keeping their pro-Moscow alignment when they have chosen to turn to the West. The failure of the USSR to overthrow Egypt's Sadat, Sudan's Numeiry, and Somalia's Siad Barre sends a message to other Third World leaders that it is possible to discard Soviet influence when it is no longer needed.

Nevertheless, one should not overestimate this area of Soviet weakness. As the Kremlin demonstrated in South Yemen and may be demonstrating in Angola and Ethiopia, pursuing a course independent of the Kremlin's desires is no easy task. The Soviets recognize that many Third World leaders will over time be attracted to the greater economic benefits offered by the West.

By surrounding these leaders with a "cocoon" of Cuban and East German "advisors," the Kremlin hopes to make it much more difficult for these leaders to realign. For this strategy to work, the Soviets must be able to credibly threaten the overthrow of unfriendly Third World regimes. If the Soviets are successful in adding a coup-making capability to their existing coup-protecting capability, their reversals in the Third World would be dramatically lessened.

Finally, the Soviet Union maintains several advantages over the United States with regard to coup-related policies. Soviet proxies are far superior to American proxies in defending Third World regimes from coups. The willingness of the Cubans and East Germans to deploy troops and advisors throughout the Third World, combined with the high-quality protection they provide, gives the USSR an unilateral edge over the United States. This is all the more true as the Cubans and East Germans expand their activities to include the establishment of militias and secret police organizations. As demonstrated by South Yemen, these kinds of policies can place a Third World country under the virtual control of the USSR without incurring the costs that a large Soviet presence would incur. The looser alliance structure in the West makes it highly unlikely that the United States will be able to utilize proxies with the worldwide effectiveness and obedience displayed by the Cubans and East Germans.

The USSR also maintains an advantage over the United States in the long term transformation of Third World countries to make them less susceptible to coups. Third World states can become

less coup prone either through totalitarianism or democracy. The appeal of totalitarianism lies in its ability to mobilize the population in support of the regime and to make the armed forces subservient to the wishes of the government (or the party). The realization of these aims helps insure that that the government in power will remain in power.

The democratic model advocated by the United States, however, can not guarantee the preservation of the existing leadership. Democracy, with its emphasis on popular participation and human rights, often threatens the leaders who might embrace it. Although a democratic form of government might be in the long-term interests of the country, this is scant comfort to a Third World leader who fears for his short-term loss of power. Consequently, when faced with the prospect of continued coups d'etat, many Third World leaders will choose the totalitarian approach that insures their hold on power over the democratic approach which threatens it.

Implications for American Policy

Soviet policies towards coups have profound implications for the United States. Of great importance is the need for Washington to recognize that once established, Soviet influence in Third World countries is becoming increasingly difficult to remove. Since the 1960s, no Third World state that has received Soviet or proxy assistance has been the victim of a pro-Western coup d'etat. (As described earlier, Equatorial Guinea might be an exception to this but for the fact that the USSR played a central role in the coup which toppled the allegedly pro-Soviet

government). Given the West's losses to coups during the same time period, this record is astounding. Since coups represent the principal form of extra-legal regime change in the Third World, and since coups have traditionally accounted for the greatest number of realignments to the West, the elimination of pro-American coups represents a severe setback for United States interests in the Third World.

The effectiveness of Soviet counter-coup policy also means that the United States must do more to stop Moscow's influence before it can be established in a Third World state. So long as pro-Soviet governments were vulnerable to pro-Western coups, the United States could view the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World with some complacency. If Soviet gains were inherently short lived, the fact that Moscow may have secured a foothold in a given Third World state would not be a cause for alarm. But now that a Soviet gain is protected by an infrastructure of Soviet and proxy personnel, and solidified with a vanguard party that seeks to institutionalize Moscow's influence, the United States can no longer afford to accept the establishment of pro-Soviet regimes with equanimity. Since virtually all Soviet gains come about through violence, the United States must do more to protect pro-Western governments from groups supported by Moscow before they can seize power and create a potentially irreversible Soviet bastion.

Another implication of Soviet success in preventing coups is that the United States and its allies will have to consider directly intervening in the Third World more than they have in the past. This is illustrated by the October 1983 American

invasion of Grenada. The presence of several hundred Cuban military advisors on a Caribbean island with an army of only a few hundred made a pro-Western coup d'etat a virtual impossibility. Further, the regimes of Maurice Bishop and his short lived successors showed no signs of moving towards a democracy or ending their dependence on Cuba. The central point of the Grenada operation, therefore, is that an outside intervention was the only way to reverse Soviet influence and establish democracy. As the Soviets continue to eliminate the coup d'etat as a means to restore Western influence, the necessity for direct intervention will therefore increase.

The Soviet failure to prevent some Third World leaders from turning to the West also should have an impact on American policy. If the West cannot regain Third World states through coups d'etat, it must concentrate on changing the minds of existing leaders. The American experiences with Sadat, Numeiry and Siad Barre are encouraging but no guarantee of future success. If the United States is to entice Third World leaders to realign it must do more to insure their short-term survival while meeting their long-term interests.

The United States must first be prepared to provide immediate personal protection for Third World leaders turning to the West. Many of these leaders relied upon Cuban bodyguards and East German dominated secret police to maintain themselves in power. With their former protectors now their antagonists, and without an organized internal security organization, newly realigned leaders will depend on the United States for their

survival. To meet this need the United States should be ready to provide American or allied personnel to protect the regime.

The United States must also rapidly transfer arms to the armed forces of the realigning country. With virtually all coups undertaken or backed by the military, it is necessary that the United States reassure the armed forces that it will fully replace the weapons no longer being provided by the USSR. Speed is of the essence. It will be far better for the United States to begin delivering weapons in a matter of weeks, even if just for symbolic purposes, then to wait months or years for more "appropriate" arms to be transferred. A major criticism of American arms transfer policy has been the slowness with which the United States delivers arms. By quickly re-supplying and retraining Third World armed forces, the United States will do much to mitigate this objection while diminishing the chances the military will undertake a coup d'etat.

Furthermore, the United States should be prepared to provide quick infusions of economic aid to newly realigned countries. An important reason for rejecting an alignment to the Soviet Union and turning to the West is the need for economic assistance, particularly food. If Washington can rapidly provide tangible benefits to a country that has realigned, the leader may get the popular support he needs to carry him through the dangerous transitional period. Again, speed is critical. It is preferable to supply visible economic aid quickly, than to delay months or years while comprehensive programs are developed.

Most important, the United States must recognize Soviet strengths in dealing with coups. The Soviets have made

significant progress in protecting friendly Third World regimes from coups and are developing more effective ways of initiating coups against uncooperative leaders. Their apparent goal is a Third World where all coups advance the Kremlin's interests. Given the central role played by coups d'etat in the East-West competition in the Third World, such an eventuality would be a major setback for the United States. Only by responding to this Soviet threat with a coup policy of its own, can the United States hope to compete effectively with the USSR in the Third World.

Notes

1. For more information concerning this debate see, Mark N. Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1982), pp. 52, 81-83, 89, 104, 107, 142-143.

2. Excluded from these recipients of Soviet arms are the Kremlin's allies in the Third World: Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea.

3. This figure does not count East Germans and Cubans on permanent duty.

4. For a chart of Soviet recipients of arms, see Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 74.

5. For a good account of the Soviet role in the Equatorial Guinea coup see, Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1979-1980, Ed. Colin Legum. (New York: Africana, 1979), especially p. B432.

6. For an account of this extraordinary affair see, Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, pp. B509-510.

DEFENDING THIRD WORLD REGIMES FROM COUPS D'ETAT

The uniqueness of coups d'etat, their wide range of motivations, and their ease of success in many Third World states have diverted attention away from efforts to generalize about defeating coup attempts when they do occur. This has been a critical omission as the suppression of coups is far from an impossible task. What is too often forgotten is that the narrow scope of a coup which accounts for so much of its success, can also bring about its failure. There are several ways this protection of Third World regimes can be accomplished.

The preferred method is for states to develop the institutions and sense of community necessary to remove the coup as an accepted means of resolving political disputes. Such a development is not impossible. The creation of a strong central party embodying the legitimizing symbolism of the revolution has enabled Mexico to reach a point where the prospect of a coup d'etat (formerly a frequent occurrence) has become extremely remote. In Venezuela, a skillful President dedicated to democratic principles (Betancourt), a successful counter-insurgency campaign and a cooperative military all combined to bring stability and the rule of law to a government that had been plagued by coups. Argentina is similarly attempting to end its coup-prone status under the dynamic leadership of President Alfonsin who is taking advantage of a discredited military and the desire of the people for democratic change.

While hopeful, these examples are not cause for optimism. The vast majority of Third World states are not heading in the

direction set by Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina. Levels of political participation remain low, institutions can not keep up with the demands they must confront, and legitimacy is still an elusive goal. Moreover, as seen in the Persian Gulf, the problems these states must confront are growing. Even where movement towards a greater sense of political community and democracy is in evidence, decades more of development will be needed before these countries will lose their vulnerability to coups.

Another way that regimes can diminish the threat of coups d'etat is to develop a totalitarian state on the Soviet model. It is noteworthy that Cuba, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and Vietnam have not experienced any coups since adopting a Marxist-Leninist form of government. By maintaining total control of political life through an extensive network of secret police, subordinating the military to party control, and keeping alive the potential threat of Soviet involvement should the regime be threatened, the likelihood of a coup is dramatically diminished.

Despite its anti-coup benefits, most Third World regimes are not likely to follow the Marxist-Leninist model. With decolonization largely over, the appeal of Communist ideology has decreased. The West has much more to offer in the increasingly important area of economic development. Moreover, the military (which still plays the dominant role in most Third World countries), fears the advent of Communist control as a threat to its own autonomy. Although direct Soviet involvement (e.g. Afghanistan) and Soviet proxy intervention (e.g. Angola and Ethiopia) will continue to draw desperate leaders into the USSR's sphere of influence, the Soviet model is unlikely to be

voluntarily emulated by the vast majority of the countries in the Third World.

Third World regimes can themselves take steps to guard against coups. These steps (many of which are described below) are helpful but, as the high number of successful coups d'etat demonstrate, they are often inadequate to cope with the threat. Furthermore, actions taken to curb the military's ability to launch a successful coup often impede its effectiveness in defending the state from external aggression. For example, during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 the leader of Syria kept his best troops in Damascus (away from the fighting), not for defense against the Israelis but to guard against a possible coup. Similarly, President Mobutu of Zaire refused to send paratroopers to halt an invasion from Katangese exiles in 1977, preferring to keep them in the capital. This weakening of military capability was also seen in Kenya in 1982 when President Daniel Moi dismissed virtually the entire air force for its alleged involvement in an attempted coup.

Finally, and most significant for the role of the United States, direct foreign intervention can play a decisive role in defending regimes against attempted coups. Although not a common occurrence, counter-coup efforts have succeeded in protecting regimes in the past while it is difficult to cite any examples of such overt foreign assistance failing to defeat a coup. This does not mean that the United States or any country can approach the task of launching an anti-coup action lightly. Clearly, counter-coup intervention by the United States would only be undertaken

under extraordinary circumstances. At the very least, the threatened regime would have to be important to American interests and convincing evidence would have to exist that those behind the coups would threaten these interests if they gained power. These criteria would cause the United States to overlook the vast majority of coups in the Third World. Nevertheless, the possibility of a situation arising requiring direct American action (most likely in the Persian Gulf) is far from remote. Moreover, there is much the United States can do to assist the counter-coup interventions of other countries in order to defend Third World regimes important to American interests but not vital enough to justify direct United States involvement.

Preparing to defeat coups in the Third World requires that American policy makers study the lessons of past foreign involvement in counter-coup actions. This is not to deny the uniqueness of each coup attempt or to imply that the means used to suppress a coup in one situation would necessarily succeed in another. Rather, it is to say that one can learn much about defeating coups occurring under certain conditions by focusing on cases of coup suppression occurring under similar conditions. Thus once clearly defined criteria are established for the type of coup attempt to be defeated and the manner in which the suppression of the coup is to be carried out, past coup attempts can be examined in order to develop policy-relevant suggestions to cope with future coup attempts.

Defending Third World Regimes From Internal Threats

The purpose of this section is to determine how attempted coups taking place in Third World states can be defeated by actions taken by foreign involvement to defend the existing regime. The criteria for the cases are that they be Third World states, attempted to defeat an actual coup attempt, and required direct foreign assistance for their counter-coup effort. These criteria are particularly well-suited for developing generalizations since they allow concentration on the actual suppression of coups while minimizing the impact of the differing contexts in which the coups take place. States managing to develop a sense of community to the point where coups no longer pose a major threat, or states which have put down coups without overt, direct foreign assistance will not be considered.

Before turning to the cases which meet these criteria, it is useful to consider briefly cases that do not, but nevertheless provide insights into counter-coup intervention. These cases include the British intervention in East Africa in 1964, the American and British interventions in the Middle East in 1958, the American intervention and subsequent involvement in the Dominican Republic in 1965-1966, the American involvement in Iran in 1953, and the American invasion of Grenada in 1983.

The series of mutinies that broke out among East African troops in January 1964 demonstrate the importance of outside intervention in defending Third World regimes from internal threats that are not strictly coups d'etat. The mutinies began in the East African country of Tanganyika (now called Tanzania). Two

battalions of Tanganyikan troops arrested members of the Tanganyikan cabinet, took some 50 British officers attached to the army as hostages, seized strategic points throughout the capital city of Dar es Salaam, and participated in the rioting that ensued. The President of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, escaped arrest since his location was not known to the mutineers.

The leaders of the mutiny took pains to declare they were not attempting to overthrow the government and, in fact, did not try to establish a rival regime. Rather, the motivation for the action appeared to be grievances concerning promotions, pay, and especially the privileged position of British officers in the Tanganyikan army (Tanganyika received independence from Great Britain in 1961). Within days of the mutiny, similar actions took place in Kenya and Uganda, apparently motivated by the same grievances.

The mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya were suppressed due to the prompt intervention of British troops. Acting in response to the request of the three East African governments (all former colonies of Great Britain), and drawing on the sizeable British garrison maintained in Kenya, the British were able to transport forces to the areas of conflict within hours of being asked to do so. Adding to the effectiveness of the British troops were the presence of an aircraft carrier and a destroyer (which fired blank charges at the mutineers). The British action and conciliatory political statements made by the beleaguered governments to their armies succeeded in breaking up the mutiny and restoring order. Following the British interven-

tion, steps were taken to meet the demands of the soldiers especially in regard to replacing British officers with Africans.

Although it remains a powerful example of the efficacy of prompt foreign action protecting friendly Third World regimes, the experience of the East African mutinies is not one of counter-coup intervention. The assertion by the insurgents and President Nyerere that no coup was intended was given credence by the almost apolitical course of the rebellion. This is not to suggest that the widespread disorders did not threaten the East African governments. If the mutinies persisted and if the rumors of Communist penetration of the troops had validity, the fall of one or more of the regimes may well have occurred. Thus the swift British intervention did not defeat an actual coup, but rather quieted an internal disturbance which could have developed into a coup.

American and British policy towards Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq in the tumultuous period of the summer of 1958 provides another example of the importance of foreign (but not exactly counter-coup) intervention in the survival of Third World regimes. The central event in the series of American and British interventions and non-interventions was the Iraqi coup of July 14, 1958. The coup ruthlessly removed the pro-Western government of Nuri as Said, replacing it with a radical regime headed by General Abdel Karim Kassem. Coming so soon after the merger of Syria and Egypt in February, the new regime's seizure of power caused alarm among its neighbors, the United States and Great Britain that a Nasser-backed, pro-Communist tide would soon engulf the Middle East.

Lebanon was particularly vulnerable to the effects of the Iraqi coup. Prior to the coup, Lebanon's delicate political structure was disrupted by Nasser's successes in the Middle East. By May 1958, a virtual civil war threatened the pro-Western government of President Camile Chamoun. Following a request by President Chamoun, the United States (which had pledged in the Eisenhower Doctrine to defend the Middle East from Communist and other threats), agreed to send arms to Lebanon and to move the Sixth Fleet closer to its shores. These efforts to bolster the Lebanese government and end the fighting proved ineffective as Lebanon slipped further into chaos. It became increasingly apparent that more forceful action by the United States would be needed to protect the Chamoun regime.

At this point the Iraqi coup occurred, removing any remaining inhibitions the United States had about direct intervention in Lebanon. Incorrectly seeing the demise of the Iraqi government as part of a pro-Nasser, Communist plot, the United States quickly landed some 14,000 troops in Lebanon. The purpose of the troops was to calm the Lebanese situation and, should the opportunity present itself, to assist and/or precipitate a coup in Iraq to restore the old regime. The first of these goals was met as the presence of the American troops enabled a compromise president to be elected, thus restoring peace and stability in Lebanon. The Iraqi counter-coup was never attempted, however, as there were no elements of the old order left in Baghdad to request outside assistance or serve as leaders of a new regime. With the Lebanese problem solved and the Iraqi problem beyond help, American troops left Lebanon in November.

The situation in Jordan contained many parallels to Lebanon. Before the Iraqi coup, Jordan's King Hussein, like Lebanon's President Chamoun, faced an internal challenge as a result of Nasser's growing influence. This internal threat worsened in the wake of the Iraqi coup prompting King Hussein to request troops from Great Britain. Acting in concert with the American intervention in Lebanon, the British rapidly transported paratroopers to Jordan. The British acted for much the same reasons as the United States did in Lebanon--to preserve a pro-Western government and keep alive the option of intervening in Iraq. Their action also produced similar results as they succeeded in preserving King Hussein in power but were unable to reverse the course of events in Iraq. Having accomplished what they could, the British left Jordan at the same time the United States withdrew from Lebanon.

The American and British interventions in Jordan and Lebanon, and the failure of both great powers to reverse the Iraqi coup, can not be considered as exercises in counter-coup policy. The American and British interventions were designed to stabilize a general situation of unrest. In neither Jordan nor Lebanon were there clear, concrete examples of attempted coups. Moreover, the decisions of the United States and Great Britain not to intervene in Iraq to reverse the Kassem coup can not be considered a failure of counter-coup intervention. No doubt, many outside counter-coup interventions are contemplated only to be rejected as unworkable. The purpose of this study, however, is to

focus on what happens to those counter-coup interventions which actually do occur.

American intervention and subsequent involvement in the Dominican Republic represents a third example of foreign action assisting the survival of a Third World regime but not against a coup d'etat. Understanding why this is so requires a brief background to the Dominican intervention. Since the early 1960s, American policy towards the Dominican Republic tried to prevent the emergence of a pro-Castro regime. Towards that end the United States at first supported the right-wing dictator Trujillo, and then (when it appeared Trujillo's rule might produce another Cuba), worked to get rid of him. In May 1961, perhaps with American assistance, Trujillo was assassinated. A little more than a year later, in December 1962, Juan Bosch was freely elected president of the Dominican Republic. Although not a Communist or a disciple of Castro, Bosch's leftist policies (land reform, toleration of radicals) caused him to lose favor with the United States. Not surprisingly, the United States did nothing to save Bosch when a military coup overthrew him in September 1963 and exiled him to Puerto Rico.

A new government under the command of Donald Reid Cabral emerged and quickly won the approval of the United States. The regime was challenged, however, in April 1965 when two army barracks sympathetic to Bosch seized the army chief of staff and declared their intention to overthrow the existing regime. What started out as an attempted coup soon became a full-fledged rebellion as the insurgents distributed arms to as many as 10,000 sympathizers (mostly lower-class civilians). The armed populace

and the rebellious troops together demanded the return of Bosch. The military, though, resisted their call out of the fear that Bosch would undercut their authority with a leftist militia. A major clash between the military and the insurgents began with the latter quickly gaining the upper hand.

It was at this point (April 28, 1965) that the United States intervened. The purpose of the intervention was to deny a military victory to the rebels which could lead to the creation of a pro-Cuban government. By May 9 over 20,000 American troops had arrived in the Dominican Republic. They succeeded in imposing a ceasefire and creating the conditions in which a provisional government could be established. Following this, acting under the authority of the Inter-American Peace Force (overwhelmingly made up of American troops), the United States stabilized the situation. Moreover, through the judicious use and threatened use of force, the United States prevented a series of military rebellions and plots from developing into coup attempts. Once it became clear that the Dominican Republic would not lapse into anarchy or Communism, U.S. forces were withdrawn.

The American intervention in the Dominican Republic was not a counter-coup action as defined by this study because its purpose and effect were not to defeat a coup d'etat against the existing regime. By the time the United States decided that it was going to intervene, the coup had long since been transformed into a full-scale rebellion with elements of a civil war. The American troops were not sent to protect the Dominican Republic from a coup attempt but to quiet an increasingly violent

situation. In this, they succeeded admirably. Because of the American intervention, leftist forces were not able to exploit the Dominican Republic's instability to establish a Communist regime and democracy was restored to a major Caribbean state.

Iran and Grenada represent two additional examples of American counter-coup actions--but not in the defense of the existing regime. In Iran (see the section on the United States and coups for a fuller treatment of this case) the U.S. and the British cooperated in overthrowing the existing prime minister, Muhammed Mossadegh. Both countries felt that the continuing instability in Iran exacerbated by oil negotiations with Great Britain and Mossadegh's leftist overtures, could create a situation in which a Communist government would assume power. Consequently, the CIA engineered a plan in which the Shah would order Mossadegh's removal while crowds of Iranians (many of whom were paid off) noisily expressed their approval of the dismissal in the streets of Teheran. The plan proved successful, with Mossadegh being forced from office in August 1953.

In a sense the Iranian episode demonstrated America's ability to protect a regime from a coup. Since the Shah was legally the supreme authority in Iran, Mossadegh's refusal to obey his order to resign was, in effect, a coup attempt by the prime minister. In supporting the Shah, the United States simply defended the legitimate ruler of Iran from an illegal attempt to take away his power.

Nevertheless, the essence of the United States effort in Iran was not the defense of an existing regime from a coup, but the overthrow of a government deemed hostile to American

interests. Legalities aside, Mossadegh had ruled Iran for two years when the CIA helped bring about his downfall. As such, the Iranian case is best understood in terms of successful coup initiation rather than coup defense.

The United States intervention in Grenada is a highly visible example of offensive American counter-coup capabilities. As a small Caribbean island with a population of about 100,000, Grenada attracted little attention until a coup replaced the erratic Prime Minister Eric Gairy with Maurice Bishop in March 1979. Under the leadership of Bishop, Grenada moved sharply to the left, intensified its ties with Cuba, and became a major irritant to the United States. It remained so until October 1983 when an even more radical Marxist-Leninist group overthrew and executed Bishop.

The United States decided to intervene militarily for several reasons. The chaos and bloodshed following the coup presented a potential threat to the over 500 American medical students studying in Grenada. The radicalism of the new regime threatened its neighbors causing the Organization of East Caribbean States (together with Jamaica and Barbados) to request American assistance to insure stability in the area. Moreover, Grenada presented an opportunity for the United States to reverse a perceived Cuban gain in the Caribbean--and to do so at an acceptable cost.

The American invasion of Grenada began on October 25. A force of 1800 Marines, 700 Army rangers, 1600 Army paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne, and some 50 Navy SEAL commandos quickly

subdued the mostly Cuban opposition and took over the island. Grenada's Governor General Sir Paul Scoon was placed in charge and promptly expelled all Libyan and Soviet diplomats, as well as most of the Cubans. After an initial increase of forces, the United States began withdrawing most of its troops from the island leaving a multi-national Caribbean force to provide basic policing duties.

As with Iran, it is possible to characterize American involvement in Grenada as a defensive action. Once Bishop was overthrown by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, it could be argued that legal authority reverted to Governor General Scoon. By responding to Scoon's request for assistance, the United States was merely protecting the legitimate government from Coard's coup attempt.

Grenada, however, is not an appropriate case for the study of defending regimes from coups. While Scoon may have been the legal authority in Grenada following Bishop's ouster, at no time did he wield any power. The American intervention can therefore not be seen as defending the existing regime from a coup attempt. Insofar as a regime existed at the time of the U.S. invasion it was the regime of Bernard Coard--which Washington overthrew. In a manner similar to Iran, Grenada is a case of coup initiation rather than coup defense.

CASES OF COUNTER-COUP INTERVENTION

The cases of counter-coup intervention selected for further study are: Ethiopia in 1960, Gabon in 1964, Sudan in 1971, Laos in 1973, South Yemen in 1978, Gambia in 1981, and a failed

attempt of foreign coup suppression in Syria in 1981. Each of these cases meet the criteria of coup-prone states attempting to defeat an actual coup attempt with the involvement of direct foreign assistance.

These cases were selected because they comprise the known universe of successful and unsuccessful counter-coup actions by outside states since World War II. It is impossible to determine with certainty if these cases represent all of the foreign counter-coup interventions, as some may have been overlooked while others might have been carried out covertly and never revealed. Obtaining reliable information about Soviet and Soviet bloc counter-coup interventions is especially difficult due to the secrecy surrounding such efforts. In any event, if the counter-coup cases considered in this study are not the complete universe, they represent a close approximation.

As will be seen, the cases included in this study collectively demonstrate the effectiveness of rapid foreign assistance in defending Third World regimes from coup attempts and the ability of those regimes to survive long after the foreign presence has departed. More important, each of the cases illustrates different ways in which foreign assistance has worked to defend regimes from past coups, and as such, have much to contribute to policy makers preparing for more critical threats in the future.

The examination and analysis of the cases of counter-coup intervention is divided into two broad parts. First, the facts of each case are summarized. This part includes a brief background

of the country, the political environment preceding the coup attempt, why the coup was initiated, who was behind it, the details of the actual attempt, the reaction of the existing government, and (most important) the role of foreign forces in trying to defeat the coup.

The second part considers the generalizations and lessons learned from the cases. It includes the various forms counter-coup intervention can take, when direct military intervention is required, what accounted for the success (and lone failure) of the counter-coup interventions, the importance of the mistakes made by the coup makers in the outcome of their efforts, and how Third World states can better defend themselves against coups.

Ethiopia, 1960

Ethiopia in 1960 appeared to be one of the more stable African states. Founded on a fertile plateau surrounded by desert and wasteland, Ethiopia's origins can be traced to thousands of years before Christ, making it the oldest black African state. Its leader, the Emperor Haile Selassie, had been in power since 1930 and enjoyed the continuing support of the aristocrats, the Ethiopian orthodox Church, and the military. Virtually untouched by the colonial powers and enjoying a close relationship with the United States, Ethiopia was an apparent exception to the fragility of its newly emerging neighbors.

Beneath its aura of stability, however, Ethiopia faced enormous difficulties. Its 20 million people (in 1960) were desperately poor and divided among a multiplicity of hostile religious and ethnic groups. Even more significant was the

growing resentment felt by a group of young, foreign educated Ethiopians to the near total control exercised by the Emperor. Led by two brothers (one a provincial governor and the other the commander of the Imperial Bodyguard), this group decided to overthrow Haile Selassie and the anachronistic system they believed he perpetuated.

The coup was launched on December 13, 1960 while the Emperor was on a state visit to West Africa and South America. It met with immediate success. Most of the Ethiopian leadership were lured to the Imperial Palace and subsequently placed in custody. Soon afterwards, Imperial Guard units fanned out to strategic points in Addis Ababa placing much of the capital under their control by the morning of December 14. On that day, the Crown Prince (and presumed successor to Haile Selassie) was forced to announce the proclamation of a new government.

The announcement proved premature. As the coup unfolded several high officials loyal to the Emperor who escaped the initial sweep planned to defeat the insurgents. Critical to the success of their counter-coup effort was the personal intervention of the Emperor and the prompt organization of an effective loyalist counter-attack. In both of these areas American assistance proved to be vital.

Haile Selassie learned of the coup attempt on December 14 while travelling in Brazil. How he learned so quickly (despite a telecommunications cutoff of Ethiopia by the rebels) is still unclear. Differing reports attribute responsibility to Israel, the United States, and Britain. In any event, the Emperor immediately left for home, stopping en route in Liberia on

December 15. In Liberia the United States placed an elaborate communications network at the Emperor's disposal, enabling him to speak directly to his generals in Ethiopia. This communications link proved invaluable by enabling the Emperor to personally control the military and providing him with the latest information on the progress of the counter-coup action.

Even with the Emperor's personal involvement the success of the counter-coup effort was far from assured. Key loyalist forces (especially in the air force) held off active support of Haile Selassie until they determined which side would emerge triumphant. At this critical point, the involvement of foreign assistance again proved crucial to the loyalist cause. While the air force pilots wasted critical time discussing what to do, General von Lindhal, a Swedish advisor to the Ethiopian air force, ordered the pilots in no uncertain terms to back the Emperor. His action paved the way for a massive transport operation which flew nearly 1000 Ethiopian troops to a base near the capital where they reinforced existing loyalist forces.

In the final attack on the rebel positions in the capital, foreign assistance again proved important. Following a request by the loyalist Ethiopian chief of staff, the United States agreed to assist in planning the assault against the coup makers. Aerial photographs of the rebel positions and telecommunications equipment were provided. In addition, an American advisor to the Ethiopian air force established a communications network between the loyalist army and air force permitting coordination of the assault. Even more important, when Ethiopian pilots again balked

at flying combat missions against the rebels, another American advisor taunted them into attacking, threatening to have Americans fly the planes. These and other actions prompted speculation that American pilots flew missions against the coup makers. Whatever the case, the American efforts resulted in the Ethiopian air force participating in the attack against the rebels, and it did so with such effectiveness that the Ethiopian chief of staff subsequently noted, "At least 75 per cent of the battle against the abortive coup d'etat was won by the air force."

The combined air and ground assault routed the rebel forces. Those who were not killed or captured fled into the countryside. Haile Selassie returned to Addis Abada where he received an enthusiastic welcome as he rode from the airport to the Imperial Palace. Riding ahead of the Emperor, sitting in an open jeep with the commander of the Ethiopian air force, was an American advisor.

Gabon, 1964

Located in western Africa with a population of 440,000 (in 1964) and an area of 102,240 square miles, Gabon is the smallest of countries in French equatorial Africa. Colonized by the French in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Gabon became self-governing in 1958 and achieved full independence (within the French Community) in 1960. Never a major power in Africa, Gabon's chief points of distinction have been its major deposits of strategic minerals (including maganese and uranium) and the fame it achieved as the site of Dr. Albert Schweitzer's hospital.

The first president of Gabon was Leon Mba who headed the Democratic Bloc Party. Mba's main opposition came from Jean-Hilaire Aubame, the leader of the rival Democratic and Social Union Party. One of the chief points of contention between the two parties involved the amount of influence France would continue to maintain in Gabon. Generally, Mba accepted the high number of important French officials in the Gabonese government while Aubame pushed for more "Africanization" of the regime and less economic dependence on France.

The two parties (which were of nearly equal strength) ruled Gabon as as a coalition. That arrangement broke down in February 1963 forcing Aubame into the opposition. Mba then consolidated his control by establishing a one-party state led by himself with only his followers allowed to stand for election.

The prospect of a meaningless election perpetuating the increasingly autocratic rule of Mba galvanized his opponents to action. On the night of February 17, 1964 (just six days before the proposed election), a group of army and police officers with at least the tacit support of Aubame took over the capital of Libreville without casualties. President Mba was arrested and imprisoned at a nearby army barrack. Aubame assumed the leadership of a hastily formed government.

At this point, the coup appeared to be a success. Without any bloodshed Mba's regime was overthrown and all potential Gabonese opposition neutralized. Life in Libreville carried on as usual with only the presence of armed guards at public buildings serving as an indication of the coup. For Gabon and much of the

rest of the world, the change in leadership had already become an accepted fact.

This was not the case, however, with the French. Perceiving the Gabonese coup as narrowly based and fearful of an anti-French government taking power in a country possessing strategic minerals, France decided to intervene to reverse the coup. On February 18, the first French troops (accompanied by African mercenaries) flew to the unguarded Libreville airport from bases in the Congo and Senegal. In Gabon, they reinforced the existing French garrison of 150 troops. Although the French later claimed they intervened only at the request of the Gabonese vice president, this appears to be untrue since at the time of the French action the vice president was campaigning in a remote part of Gabon.

Once in Gabon the French quickly entered the capital which fell without resistance. The next morning they launched a combined air (mostly for psychological effect) and ground attack on the army barracks bringing about their prompt surrender. Casualties were minimal with one French soldier and eighteen Gabonese reported killed. Realizing they were defeated, the Gabonese turned President Mba over to the French unharmed. He was restored to the presidency where he remained until his death (of natural causes) in 1967.

The Sudan, 1971

Comprising an area of nearly a million square miles, Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Its population of nearly 15 million (in 1971) is approximately two-thirds Arab (living mostly

in the north) and one third Negroid (living mostly in the South). Agriculture is the major industry with cotton the principal export. The Sudan achieved full independence in 1956 following a half century of joint British and Egyptian rule. After independence Sudan faced enormous problems including an ongoing civil war, a deteriorating economy, and continuing political instability.

Responding to these mounting difficulties a Sudanese colonel, Jaafar-al Numeiry, seized power in a bloodless coup in 1969. Lacking much education and politically inexperienced, Numeiry turned to the large, well-organized Sudanese Communist Party for assistance. Having long sought to rule the Sudan, the Communists were delighted to have the opportunity to join the government. At first, Numeiry and the Communists cooperated but gradually it became clear that the Communists aimed to supplant the Sudanese leader. Numeiry responded with a massive purge of the Communists including many high officials in his government.

Numeiry's actions hastened the Communists plans for a coup d'etat. Realizing they were running out of time, the Communists struck on July 19, 1971. Sudanese troops made up of elements of the Presidential Guard and the regular army entered Khartoum behind a column of tanks and rapidly seized control of the Sudanese capital. Numeiry and his supporters were placed under armed guard. In a few hours, without resistance or casualties, the two-year-old government of Numeiry had seemingly come to an end.

The good fortune of the insurgents began to change, however, when it became clear (through statements on domestic and foreign

policy) that the new government would follow a Communist orientation. In the Sudan itself, latent anti-Communist sentiment became aroused particularly among the traditionally conservative officer corps. This feeling of anti-Communism was shared by the leaders of Sudan's two largest neighbors--Libya's Muammar Khadaffi and Egypt's Anwar Sadat. Despite the apparently successful conclusion of the coup, these anti-Communist forces united in a de facto alliance to suppress the insurgents and reinstate Numeiry.

The Libyans acted first. After the apparent overthrow of the Numeiry government, two of the coup leaders based in Britain boarded a BOAC jetliner to return to the Sudan. When the jet entered Libyan air space it was ordered to land in Libya or be shot down. After the British pilot complied with the demand, Libyan security officials removed the two Sudanese from the aircraft, depriving the coup of its leadership at a most critical time.

Egypt played an even more important role in defeating the coup. As soon as Numeiry was placed into custody, Sadat sent an Egyptian delegation to Sudan to insure his safety. This gesture may very well have saved the president's life. Sadat then turned his attention to a Sudanese brigade stationed on the Suez Canal. Correctly concluding that the Egyptian-based Sudanese brigade would not have been included in the coup machinations, Sadat allowed the Sudanese defense minister (who was outside of Sudan at the time of the coup) to assume command of the Sudanese troops in Egypt. On July 22, just three days after the coup began, the

Egyptians airlifted portions of the brigade to a base near Khartoum.

The arrival of the canal brigade coincided with a counter-attack mounted by loyalist troops and tanks manned by Egyptian personnel stationed in Sudan. Encountering little resistance, the troops overcame the rebel forces in the capital. In the ensuing confusion, Numeiry escaped his guards and joined the loyalist forces. He then went on television and radio where he declared the coup defeated and reaffirmed his return to power. Under Numeiry's personal command the last remnants of the rebel forces surrendered or were killed. Once firmly back in power Numeiry launched a massive purge of the Communists and reoriented the Sudan to a more pro-Western stance.

Laos, 1973

With a population of about three million (in 1973) and an area of 91,428 square miles, Laos is one of the less powerful states in Southeast Asia. Rather than dominating events in the region, it has mostly reflected the prevailing tensions and conflicts. This was clearly the case in the early 1960s when Laotian politics was marked by a three-way struggle for power between neutralist, rightist, and Communist forces. The neutralists were led by Prince Souvanna Phouma and were primarily based in the administrative capital of Vientiane. The rightists included the bulk of the Royal Laotian Army while the leftists consisted of the Pathet Lao forces and some North Vietnamese troops. The conflict between the three groups was bitter, violent, and escalating.

Since 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union supported the neutralist cause in the hope that some form of coalition government would emerge and replace the dangerous chaos that was destabilizing the country. A provisional government under Souvanna Phouma was established in 1962 following a 14-nation conference in Geneva. The new regime could not, however, integrate the three forces, despite numerous attempts. With the North Vietnamese supporting the Pathet Lao and the United States backing the Laotian government, the Pathet Lao were able to achieve several significant victories. Heavy fighting lasted until February 1973, at which time a cease-fire was declared. Negotiations between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma were encouraging, raising the prospects of a peace agreement and a coalition government.

Not surprisingly, a coalition government was not a welcome prospect for all the participants. Right-wing military officers felt the prospective agreement gave too much power to the Communists. For these officers the only way to deny the Pathet Lao a victory in Laos was to derail the prospective agreement. Since the agreement had the backing of the government, only a coup could end the negotiations at this advanced stage.

The attempt to overthrow the regime of Prince Souvanna Phouma began in the early morning of August 19, 1973. Some 50 men equipped with small arms crossed the Mekong River from Thailand into Laos. They were led by General Thao Ma, a fanatic anti-Communist and one-time commander of the Laotian air force who had been exiled to Thailand following an unsuccessful coup attempt. Once in Thailand, General Ma and his followers met with other

insurgents on the outskirts of Vientiane, bringing their numbers up to several hundred.

Their plan was to create the impression of mass support for the coup attempt by a series of air and ground attacks on the capital. The insurgents believed that such attacks would unleash anti-government sentiment within the military and result in the downfall of Souvanna Phouma. To accomplish their objective, Ma and his men first overran the airport near Vientiane. Commandeering some of the aircraft, they proceeded to bomb and strafe army barracks in the vicinity. Simultaneously a separate group of insurgents rode to Vientiane in armored cars to launch the main thrust of the coup. In the capital they seized several key buildings, including the radio station and the national bank, and attempted to convince their former comrades to join the coup attempt.

Despite the haphazard nature of the coup attempt and its still small band of followers, the government of Souvanna Phouma was in real danger. No organized resistance to the coup had been formed. With the identity of the coup leaders a mystery and its chances for success unknown, the military leadership was not about to expose itself to retribution from a new government by attempting to suppress the insurgents. Some generals, believing that the rebels were backed by one of their colleagues, were seriously considering joining the coup attempt.

With the Laotian army wavering and the fate of Souvanna Phouma's government hanging in the balance, U.S. charge d'affaires John Gunther Dean took prompt and decisive action. Responding to a call from Souvanna Phouma that he was worried his

residence might be bombed, Dean personally escorted him to a secure hiding place in the home of a former U.S. ambassador. He then spent several hours driving around the capital assuring both the Pathet Lao delegates and the right-wing generals that the United States stood firmly behind the Souvanna Phouma government and would under no circumstances back the coup. This tactic proved especially effective in dealing with the rightist officers, who realized that their position in the Laotian army depended on the continued support of the United States.

Dean's intervention marked the beginning of the counter-coup and the downfall of the coup attempt. In Vientiane, Laotian army officers ordered their troops to expel the rebels, which they did with little resistance. At the same time, a large force of Laotian troops fought their way to the airport where they overran Ma's remaining forces. Ma's own troops, realizing their cause was lost, fired on the general's plane when it returned, forcing it to crash. Ma was pulled alive from the wreckage but was later executed en route to the hospital. Other insurgents met a similar fate or escaped back to Thailand. By noon of the same day that the coup was initiated, it was over. Souvanna Phouma, who later thanked Dean personally for saving his government, was more firmly in control than ever.

South Yemen, 1978¹

South Yemen (officially called the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) is a republic which achieved independence from Great Britain in 1967. It is desperately poor with virtually no natural resources and a population (in 1978) of approximately 1.6

million. Despite its lack of intrinsic importance, South Yemen has been of central concern due to the presence of Soviet and Eastern bloc advisors (in the Arab world's only Marxist state) and its strategic location bordering on Saudi Arabia and overlooking the Bab el Mandeb straits, through which passes 40 percent of Western Europe's oil.

In late August 1978, following a bizarre series of events, the newly installed leader of Southern Yemen, Hafez Ismail, successfully defended his government against the man he had just deposed, Rubayi Ali. At the heart of the issue in South Yemen was a power struggle between President Ali and the more pro-Soviet Ismail. In June 1978, Ali sent an envoy to the president of North Yemen to enlist his support against Ismail. Before leaving, however, the envoy was reportedly arrested by Ismail's men under the direction of the East Germans. A new messenger with a new briefcase was substituted. When Ismail's envoy met with the North Yemeni president, he opened the briefcase triggering an explosion which killed them both. Ismail immediately blamed Ali for the murder and used it as a pretense to depose the South Yemeni leader.

Before the new government could entrench itself, Ali launched a counter-coup to regain power. He mobilized loyal units in the armed forces and the palace guard in an attempt to arrest Ismail and his colleagues. For most Third World states, the support of the army and the palace guard would be tantamount to success. But in South Yemen the Cubans had been building up a "people's militia" under the control of Ismail which was stronger

than South Yemen's regular forces. Augmenting the militia was an internal security force (called Tanzim) which was established and led by the East Germans. Cuban and Soviet advisors had also been busily training and influencing the South Yemeni air force and navy.

Consequently, the attempt of Ali and his supporters to re-establish control was doomed. Ismail's militia, backed by the navy and the air force routed Ali's forces. The rapidity and efficiency of Ali's defeat have led to speculation that there was direct Soviet and/or proxy participation in the counter-coup, particularly in air strikes against the Presidential Palace.

Gambia, 1981

With an area of 4,000 square miles and a population of about 500,000 (in 1981), Gambia is one of the smallest and least populous states in Africa. Surrounded by its much larger neighbor Senegal, Gambia has not played a major political or economic role in Africa since achieving independence from Great Britain in 1965. However, Gambia is distinctive among African countries by virtue of its relatively stable political existence, lack of a standing army, and democratic form of government.

During the early 1980s, Gambia's reputation for democracy and stability began to wane. The government of President Dauda Kairoba faced mounting charges of corruption and nepotism. The already poor Gambian people were forced to endure greater hardship as a prolonged drought caused food shortages. Perhaps reacting to the worsening situation, members of a leftist Gambian political party, with suspected Libyan backing, attempted to

overthrow the president in October 1981. With the assistance of 150 paratroopers from Senegal, the coup attempt was defeated. Nevertheless, many of the insurgents and the conditions that spurred them to action remained a constant threat to the government.

The threat erupted on July 30, 1981, while President Dauda Kairoba was in England attending the wedding of Prince Charles. Several hundred insurgents stormed the capital city, closed off the border, shut off telecommunications, and distributed weapons from a captured armory to hundreds of criminals they released. Many hostages were taken, including foreigners and the president's wife and children.

The rebel forces included members of Gambia's paramilitary Field Force, which made up approximately one-third of Gambia's 900-man police force. Their apparent leader was an avowed Marxist and member of the Gambian Revolutionary Socialist Party, which had been banned in the wake of the failed October attempt against the government. According to its leader, the purpose of the coup was to establish "a dictatorship of the proletariat."

It first appeared the coup might succeed. The Gambian people enthusiastically welcomed the prospect of a new government as a possible solution to their economic plight. The Gambian police force was in disarray and lacked the strength to resist a determined effort. With the president out of the country there was no legitimate authority around which the disparate anti-coup forces could rally. The replacement of a pro-Western, democratic

African government with a regime backed by Libya appeared to be a real possibility.

It was in this context that Senegal intervened to quash the coup d'etat. Senegal justified its intervention by citing the request for assistance it received from President Dauda Kairoba (who flew to Senegal upon hearing of the coup), the mutual defense treaty between the two countries, and the Senegalese president's belief that the rebels were, "foreign trained and equipped." Whatever the justification, Senegal reacted quickly, sending troops to Gambia the very afternoon of the coup attempt. While the Senegalese could not wrest control of the capital from the rebels immediately, their prompt intervention prevented the quick victory sought by the insurgents. This delay provided the time necessary for the Gambian people--who were by this time angered by the looting and violence of the prisoners--to turn against the rebels they had initially supported.

After three days of fierce fighting the Senegalese troops, who now numbered over 1,000, forced the coup makers out of the capital city of Banjul. The president immediately returned to the capital from Senegal. The Senegalese forces continued to drive back the rebels although their progress was slowed due to strong resistance and their concern for the hostages. Finally, on August 5, the rebels were expelled from their last stronghold and fled into the bush. The hostages, perhaps with the help of British commandos, were rescued unharmed.

The cost of suppressing the coup attempt was high. Estimates of civilian dead ranged from 500 to 2,000. The Senegalese reported casualties of 236 wounded and ten dead. Despite its

cost, the success of the Senegalese action can hardly be questioned. President Dauda Kairoba was restored to power and close ties between Gambia and Senegal were resumed. In fact, in the wake of the coup attempt, President Dauda Kairoba opened negotiations with Senegal with the goal of eventually uniting the two countries. Of equal importance was the positive reaction to Senegal's action by its fellow African states. Rejecting the view that Senegal's intervention was interference in another country's internal affairs, expressions of support came from most African countries. Of special note was the approval expressed by Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, the Organization of African Unity Chairman and Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, and from the leader of Guinea-Bissau--the country to which the rebels turned for assistance.

Syria, 1961: The Counter-coup Intervention that Failed

Located in the heart of the Middle East, with a population of some six million (in 1961) and an area of 71,647 square miles, Syria has long been a pivotal country in the Arab world. In the decades following its independence from France in 1941, other Arab states and the great powers have vied for Syrian approval for their various plans and strategies. In part, this competition has been due to Syrian strength. As a major Arab state with a relatively strong army and a dynamic ideology emphasizing Arab nationalism, gaining Syrian support is an important step for any power seeking influence in the Middle East. In part also, the competition for Syrian approval reflects its weakness. Due to its chronic political instability, Syria has been particularly

vulnerable to the pressures and passing political currents of the Middle East.

It was this political instability in the latter part of 1957 and the beginning of 1958 that led the Syrian leadership to seek a union with Egypt. At this time, the leading party in Syria, the Ba'th, feared that growing Communist influence in their country would result in a pro-Soviet coup or an alignment with the hated West. By placing Syria under the charismatic leadership of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Ba'th leadership felt that the Communist threat would be neutralized and Syria would be placed at the vanguard of the Arab nationalist movement. For Nasser, the union of the two very different and non-contiguous states was premature at best, but as the leading advocate of pan-Arabism, he could not deny the Syrian request. Consequently, after ordering the Syrians to dissolve their political parties and to keep their army out of politics, Nasser agreed to the union of the two countries in February 1958.

Nasser's concerns about the viability of the union between the two countries was not ill-founded. The Syrians proved more difficult to govern than the Egyptians. The middle and upper classes in Syria were especially resentful of currency controls, increased taxes and nationalizations of major businesses that came with Egyptian rule. Equally important, the Syrian military did not like taking orders from Egyptians and opposed having their pay reduced to Egyptian levels. In sum, the Syrians were different from the Egyptians and did not like being relegated to second-class status in their own country.

In response to these concerns and increasing Egyptian repression, Syrian military officers began planning a coup in January 1961. At that time a small group of officers ranging from major to brigadier general initiated contacts with disgruntled business interests in Damascus. The businessmen were all too happy to declare their support to any action that would end Nasser's economic policies. The Syrian officers also received promise of asylum in Jordan should the coup fail.

The coup began in the early hours of September 28, 1961. From the Kataneh barracks just north of Damascus, 20 rebel tanks supported by two battalions of infantry seized the capital at dawn. Almost immediately and with virtually no resistance the Damascus radio, telegraph, post office, and Ministry of Defense fell to the rebels. Most important, the Syrian forces were able to overpower the Egyptian guard at the residence of Abdel Amer (the Nasser-appointed head of Syria), and placed him in their custody. The coup makers then demanded that Amer reverse some of Nasser's key policies. Amer asked for and received permission to telephone Nasser for instructions.

During the telephone conversation Nasser reportedly asked what opposition existed to the Syrian action. When told there were pro-Egyptian elements (many of them Egyptian military officers) in the Syrian cities of Aleppo and Latakia, Nasser felt the coup attempt could be defeated. He told Amer to stall the coup makers but not to give in to their demands. Since Damascus appeared to be firmly in rebel hands, Nasser, on the very day of the coup attempt, decided to send troops to the Syrian port of Latakia. The Egyptian merchant fleet was commandeered to serve

as troop transports and the air force was ordered to fly 2,000 paratroopers to Latakia. Once there, this force was to join with 5,000 Egyptian troops already stationed in Syria and pro-Egyptian Syrian troops to end the coup.

The counter-coup effort launched by Nasser turned out to be a complete failure. Syrian military units refused to obey orders issued by Nasser to suppress the coup. More important, Nasser's attempts to send his own forces into Syria proved a fiasco. Some 100-150 Egyptian troops were airlifted to Latakia where they briefly engaged Syrian forces. However, the outnumbered Egyptian troops were quickly surrounded, and captured. With little left to do Nasser suspended the remainder of the counter-coup operation and, in effect, allowed Syria to secede from the United Arab Republic. Approximately 50 deaths were reported for both sides.

The counter-coup operation failed for many reasons. Although Nasser acted quickly, events in Syria had already put the success of the action beyond anything but the most massive of interventions. Throughout the day of the coup the Syrian army consolidated its position. They controlled Damascus, most of the country's airports, and the port of Latakia. Since Egypt and Syria shared no common border, the control of airports and the port facilities made any large-scale intervention difficult to carry out. Nor were the Egyptian forces stationed in Syria of much help to Nasser. Since they intermingled with the more numerous Syrian troops, independent action by the Egyptians as a cohesive fighting unit was impossible. Inasmuch as the Syrian army controlled most of the U.A.R's armor in Syria, action by the

Egyptians would probably not have succeeded in reversing the coup even if it could have been undertaken.

Most important, although Nasser initiated his counter-coup operation at the time when the Syrian action was still considered a coup, by the time his troops arrived the coup had become a full-scale rebellion. The transformation of the coup into a rebellion had its roots in the fact that the United Arab Republic was a single state in name only. After years of second-class treatment and laws designed for Egyptians, much of the Syrian army and people were ready to withdraw from the union and resist foreign (i.e. Egyptian) efforts to prevent this secession. Whether they formed a majority or not is impossible to know and is not critical to this analysis. What is important is that the central element which defines a coup and allows for its suppression--the lack of participation by a significant number of the people and/or the military--was quickly lost. It was Nasser's recognition of the widespread support that the Syrian action produced and the consequently massive and protracted effort that he would have to undertake to defeat it which lay at the heart of the intervention's failure. As Nasser later said, "Unity is a popular will. It cannot be a military operation."

Following his cancellation of the counter-coup operation, Nasser gave up all claims to Syria as part of the United Arab Republic. A new government took power in Syria and promptly reversed many of Nasser's policies. Egypt and Syria exchanged bitter radio messages but no military action developed. The United States, happy at any development which hurt Nasser, promptly recognized the new government.

LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

As the case studies demonstrate, direct foreign involvement to defend regimes from coups d'etat can take several forms. First there is the direct intervention of foreign troops in response to a coup attempt. The French intervention in Gabon, the Senegalese intervention in Gambia, and the abortive Egyptian intervention in Syria are examples of this kind of effort. Although not precisely counter-coup operations, the British intervention in East Africa and the American interventions in the Dominican Republic and Grenada also demonstrate the effectiveness of foreign intervention in response to coups.

Another type of foreign counter-coup involvement is the use of foreign troops already deployed in a Third World country to put down coup attempts arising in that country. Cuban troops based in South Yemen almost certainly participated in the defeat of Rubayi Ali's coup attempt and Egyptian forces stationed in the Sudan reportedly played a critical role in defending President Numeiry from a leftist coup. A third way foreign involvement can help suppress coups lies in the influence military advisors can bring to bear on the armed forces they are assisting. American (and Swedish) advisors did much to provoke the Ethiopian military to defeat a coup by the Imperial Guard. The Soviet-Cuban trained "People's Militia," no doubt at the behest of their patrons, proved decisive in defeating the South Yemeni army's attempt to overthrow the newly installed president. Finally, as demonstrated by American charge d'affaire John Gunther Dean's role in foiling a right-wing coup attempt in Laos, diplomats can

play a key role in suppressing coups. This sort of counter-coup intervention is especially attractive since it is politically the least costly.

The case studies also illustrate indirect ways that foreign involvement has defended Third World regimes from coup attempts. In the Ethiopian and Sudanese cases, communication facilities provided by the United States and Libya respectively, allowed senior officials of the threatened regime to rally the military on their behalf. Since many coup attempts occur when the leader is out of the country, this type of assistance is important in enabling the head of state (or a representative) to communicate with supporters. Once this is done, the leader can reassert his authority and assist in the planning of the counter-coup. Providing transportation for foreign troops is another indirect way outside forces have helped to defeat coups. Many Third World states lack the logistical means to rapidly send troops to the site of the coup attempt. As demonstrated in the Egyptian airlift of Sudanese troops to Khartoum, such assistance can be crucial in defending a regime.

Given the multitude of ways states can assist other states in the suppression of coups, it is reasonable to question why the drastic action of direct military intervention is ever undertaken. After all, the consequences of failure for direct military intervention are visible, serious, and not easily forgotten by the new regime that emerges. Not surprisingly this step was only taken in three of the cases (one of which failed) while the other four counter-coup efforts relied on less risky actions.

The lesson of this study is that when direct military intervention was undertaken, it was because it remained the only choice available to save a threatened regime. The use of diplomats, military advisors, indirect assistance and so forth to assist a regime in suppressing a coup is acceptable so long as any or all of these policies are capable of accomplishing their purpose. In those cases where such policies are not available (e.g. no military advisors are present in the threatened country), or are not sufficient (e.g. foreign diplomatic pressure might not affect the coup makers), direct military intervention is required. In those cases where direct military intervention was employed--Gabon, Syrian, and Gambia--it is difficult to conceive of an alternative policy that had a reasonable chance of defending the regime from the coup attempts.

The success of six out of seven of the cases of foreign counter-coup efforts was due to several factors. In all of the cases the leader of the existing regime survived the coup attempt. Even in the most coup-prone of states, the leader retains some measure of legitimacy and commands some degree of loyalty over elements of the citizenry and military. If that leader (or an accepted successor) is not removed from the scene, doubts will linger as to whether the old order has indeed been destroyed. These doubts inhibit mass defections to the coup makers, depriving them of the "bandwagon" effect they so desperately need. In this atmosphere of confusion and indecision, a strong sign from the head of state or his representative that the regime is still in power (e.g. a radio broadcast), can

effectively mobilize latent support which could spell the difference between success and failure for a coup. The roles played by Ethiopia's Haile Selassie and Sudan's Jaafar Numeiry are a clear illustration of the importance of keeping the existing leadership alive in defeating coups.

Successful counter-coup interventions were also marked by the speed of their response. As all of the cases have demonstrated, the first few days--or even hours-- of a coup attempt are critical. It is during this time that supporters, opponents, and those who have not committed themselves determine which side has the balance of power in its favor. It was necessary to make clear at the earliest possible time that the backers of the coup had not achieved a de facto victory and that organized resistance in defense of the existing regime still remained. With all of the successful counter-coup efforts beginning as soon as the coup attempt became known and action often taken within hours of the threatened overthrow, the critical momentum necessary for a successful coup could not be achieved.

There were other factors contributing to the success of the foreign counter-coup efforts. In several of the cases (Sudan, Gabon and Gambia), there were tacit or formal agreements calling for foreign assistance in the event of a coup. These agreements facilitated and legitimized the interventions which followed coup attempts in those countries. In addition, many of the counter-coup actions were launched from states that had a detailed knowledge of the conditions of the country they were assisting. This knowledge was gained by previous colonial rule (France and

Gabon, perhaps Britain and Gambia), and prolonged military presence (the United States in Ethiopia, the Soviet Union and Cuba in South Yemen). Geographical proximity also played a role in successful counter-coup efforts. Most Third World states lack the logistical capability to project force over long distances. Only when they shared a border with the country undergoing a coup attempt was direct intervention a viable and effective policy choice (e.g. Egypt and the Sudan, Senegal and Gambia). Most important was the awareness of the outside state assisting the regime faced with a coup of the political loyalties of the coup backers. This knowledge changed what could have been paralysis and indecision to rapid and effective action.

The lone counter-coup attempt that failed also provides valuable lessons for future efforts. Tactically, the Egyptian action proved unable to reverse the Syrian coup because the Syrian control of airports and ports precluded a large-scale intervention of Egyptian troops. Moreover, the Egyptian troops already in Syria were unable to operate independently of the stronger Syrian armed forces. Even more significant was the transformation of the Syrian coup to a full-scale rebellion (involving much of the Syrian military) before the Egyptians could act. The lessons of this are clear: in order for military intervention to defeat a coup, it is necessary to insure access for intervening troops in the country where the coup is taking place. When forces are already deployed in the threatened state, they must be able to operate as a separate cohesive unit and with sufficient strength to overcome the troops backing the coup. When

a coup attempt succeeds in generating widespread support especially among the military, it ceases to be a coup, and the means necessary to defend the existing government become much more demanding and are less likely to succeed.

The cases in this study demonstrate an extraordinarily high rate of success of foreign involvement in defeating coups. While this success suggests that much can be done to defeat coups occurring in important Third World states, it does not mean that foreign involvement guarantees that regimes can be confidently protected from coups. In each of the successful cases mistakes were committed by the coup makers that made foreign action potentially effective and therefore attractive. These mistakes included: the failure to eliminate the existing leadership, the inability to neutralize opposition elements, leaving open points of access for an interventionary force, and prematurely proclaiming one's political leanings upon assuming power.

Where critical mistakes were not made, contemplated foreign intervention might not be carried out. This is demonstrated by the failure of the United States and Britain to intervene in Iraq in 1958. The absence of important mistakes by the coup makers can also result in foreign intervention failing to defend the regime, as seen by the abortive Egyptian effort in Syria. This is not to suggest that a coup attempt which fails to make mistakes is impossible to defeat. Rather it implies that suppressing such a coup would be more difficult and, consequently, less likely to provoke foreign intervention.

Finally, the case studies demonstrate ways that Third World regimes can prepare to protect themselves from attempted coups

d'etat. The military should be divided into separate--and to a certain extent--rival commands. Although this raises the danger that there will be more sources from which a coup can be initiated, the benefits of such a move will almost always outweigh the costs. The major weakness of "coup-prone" states lies in their narrow concentration of power. Insofar as this dangerous concentration can be alleviated by the presence of countervailing centers of power, the risk of a successful coup will be dramatically lessened. It requires no great feat of political evolution or development to divide the military into separate services. Saudi Arabia has successfully done so through the establishment of two distinct forces (the regular army and the National Guard) as well as a third unit (the Royal Guard) whose only function is to provide personal protection for the king. The effectiveness of dividing the armed forces was demonstrated by the suppression of the Imperial Guard's attempted coup in Ethiopia by the rival army and air force.

A Third World regime must also be able to quickly mobilize loyalist forces in the capital to deal with coup attempts. The successful counter-coups of Ethiopia and Sudan could not have taken place without the prompt dispatch of loyal troops to challenge the authority of the insurgents and then to overpower them. Deploying troops outside one's country that can be rushed home in case of emergency should also be considered. As the Sudanese case illustrates, troops that are stationed abroad are likely to be free from involvement in conspiratorial plots. Since most coups are backed by a relatively small number of forces, the

rapid transfer of loyalist troops from abroad can be decisive in suppressing a coup attempt. Similarly, coup-prone states should encourage the deployment of politically compatible foreign troops in their country. American forces stationed in the Dominican Republic proved critical in deterring several coups from 1965-1966. Pakistani or Jordanian troops (for example), could prove equally important in preventing coups in Saudi Arabia. Third World countries must also be sure that their own forces are kept satisfied with ample supplies of arms, high salaries, and control over their autonomy. As the high number of coups indicate, a discontented military is probably the single greatest danger to the survival of most Third World regimes.

In addition, the counter-coup effort should attempt to communicate to the insurgents exactly which side they are fighting for. A small group of officers intent on overthrowing a government will often seek and win the support of enlisted personnel by telling them they are defending the existing regime. This deception played a prominent part in the coup attempts in Ethiopia and Sudan. In both cases, mass defections of insurgents resulted when the loyalist forces communicated to them the anti-government goals of their commanders. Furthermore, the anti-coup effort should use aircraft and armor to suppress insurgents even when these weapons are tactically inappropriate, because of the psychological effect on the coup makers. As demonstrated in the Ethiopian, Sudanese, Gabonese, and South Yemeni coup attempts, the use of sophisticated arms against insurgent troops had a demoralizing impact disproportionate to its military effect.

Finally, the regimes wishing to survive coup attempts must provide for the protection of the leadership. As the cases demonstrate, the survival of the leaders of the incumbent regime is a critical element to the success of counter-coup efforts while the destruction of the leadership elite (as in Iraq in 1958), can preclude even the attempt to defend or restore the old government. At a minimum, Third World regimes should make extraordinary efforts to protect the head of state. However, since such efforts can never be a guarantee of safety, the identification of the regime should be broadened to include more than a single individual, and recognized procedures of succession should be agreed upon in advance. The Saudi network of several thousand princes, each with a place in the hierarchy of the Royal Family, is illustrative of this type of measure. While Third World leaders are often understandably reluctant to share even the appearance of power, these steps are usually in their interests as they ensure that a successful coup is not tantamount to assassination. Such measures also deter coups by making the possibility of outside intervention much more likely.

Notes

1. See the section on the Soviet Union and Coups for a more detailed examination of this case.

TOWARDS AN AMERICAN COUP POLICY

This section considers the adoption of a coup policy for the United States. In the first part, American interests in a coup policy are examined. Of special emphasis is the prevalence of coups in the Third World, their impact on American interests, and the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. The second part considers what an American coup policy would entail. It describes how the United States can defend Third World regimes from coups by helping Third World leaders develop their own counter-coup forces, assisting other countries to intervene to defeat coups, providing direct American assistance to suppress coups, and establishing an American counter-coup force. Policy recommendations for the United States in initiating coups are also considered.

American Interests in a Third World Coup Policy

It is in American interests to develop a policy to deal with coups d'etat in the Third World. The coup d'etat (defined as a sudden, forcible overthrow of a government by a small group) is the most common form of extra-legal regime change in the Third World. While exact figures are difficult to establish, it is generally agreed that since World War II there have been over one hundred successful and an approximately equal number of unsuccessful coups. Over two-thirds of the Third World states have experienced coup attempts.

Moreover, there are no signs that the prevalence of coups in the Third World will lessen in the foreseeable future. Conditions which have encouraged coups in the past remain prominent in Third World states. These conditions include lack of political

participation, weak public commitment to civilian institutions, absence of legitimacy, and few agreed-upon procedures for succession. In addition, Third World states often maintain armies which feel they have the right and capability to overthrow the government for a multiplicity of motivations ranging from revolutionary change to increased pay.

The result is that for most Third World states the coup d'etat becomes the principal cause of regime change. Launching a successful coup is reduced to a relatively simple task of neutralizing those few individuals who constitute the leadership of the country. Insofar as the United States has interests in the majority of Third World nations that are "coup prone," it must develop a policy that takes into account the critical role played by coups.

For vital Third World states, the United States has an obvious interest in being able to cope with coups. It is likely that in the coming decade a situation will arise in which a Third World state vital to American interests is threatened by a coup. If a vital ally of the United States was invaded by a neighboring state, Soviet proxy forces, or by the Soviets themselves, the U.S. would act in its defense. No less should be expected in the case of a coup d'etat which is a far more likely and dangerous threat to American interests.

No state better illustrates the need for an American counter-coup policy than does Saudi Arabia. As acknowledged by the Carter Doctrine, Saudi Arabia's huge oil reserves make the defense of its pro-Western regime a vital interest of the United

States. While the development of the U.S. Central Command has eased the potential threat to Saudi Arabia from regional or Soviet invasion, addressing the prospect of a coup d'etat against the Saudi monarchy requires much greater emphasis.

This is especially true given the large number of groups that might attempt an overthrow of the Saudi regime. Fundamentalist religious groups (such as those who seized the Grand Mosque in 1979) could again try to seize the government to change what they see as a drift into Western decadence. Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia might instigate a coup to produce a more activist anti-Israeli government. Conflict within the ruling elite of Saudi Arabia (i.e. between the Jiluwi and the Sudairi factions) could spread to the military precipitating a coup. In the military itself, officers unhappy with promotions, pay or corruption within the Saudi society might seek to overthrow the government. Internal ethnically-based conflict (similar to the Shi'ite uprisings in 1979) could create enough instability to prompt a military takeover--ostensibly to restore order. Should the price of oil fall rapidly, all of these threats would be exacerbated as groups attempt to retain their existing wealth. In the final analysis, whatever the cause and whatever the group, any successor regime in Saudi Arabia is likely to be more hostile to American interests than the present one.

Aside from Saudi Arabia, circumstances could make the defense of other Third World regimes of vital interest to the United States. Some regimes, while not ruling over crucial Third World states, might prove essential to meeting some important American interest. The regime of King Hussein in Jordan, for

example, could prove necessary to conclude a comprehensive Middle East treaty. If his regime were to be toppled by a coup composed of radical elements opposed to any Israeli-Arab settlement, the peace in the Middle East would be directly threatened. The prospect of nuclear proliferation could also focus American interests on the defense of a Third World regime. If American intelligence learned that Pakistan (for example) had a secret stockpile of nuclear weapons, the defense of the Pakistani regime against irrational or bellicose elements attempting a coup, would be in the vital interests of the United States.

In addition to developing a counter-coup policy to protect its closest interests, the United States should also be prepared to assist less than vital regimes to defend themselves from coups. There are several reasons why this is so. First, many countries in the Third World (such as Zaire), though not vital to the United States, contain needed raw materials. If they fell under hostile control, Western economic and national security interests would suffer even if, in the long run, alternative sources of supplies could be developed.

Further, countries which in themselves are not crucial to the United States may border on countries which are. This places them in a position to undermine their neighbor's security either through armed invasion or internal subversion. Both of these threats are made much more difficult--and often impossible--for Third World countries when there is no common frontier. Thus while it is clear the United States has no vital interests in

North Yemen, the defection of that country to anti-Western forces could have a profound impact on Saudi Arabia.

The superpower competition for the Third World is another compelling reason for the United States to have a coup policy. More Third World countries have turned towards the Soviet Union or realigned to the West as a result of coups d'etat than any other factor. Countries that aligned to the Soviet Union following coups include Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Ghana, Mali, Peru, Congo-Brazzaville, Somalia, Libya, Sudan, Benin, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Suriname. Countries realigning to the West following successful or aborted coups include Indonesia, Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Chile, and Equatorial Guinea.

Especially ominous is the potential of the Soviet Union to initiate or support coups occurring in important Third World states. There is little doubt that the United States would respond aggressively to a direct Soviet invasion of Saudi Arabia or even a Soviet proxy attack on that country. If a pro-Soviet clique assumed power, however, and (over time) requested Moscow's assistance, it is not at all clear how or if the United States would react. For the Soviets, therefore, exploiting pro-Moscow coups to undermine the American position in the Third World is a far more prudent and less risky course of action than backing an armed attack.

Coups which are likely to result in pro-Soviet regimes pose a threat to American interests even if they do not occur in vital Third World states. If the Soviet Union can maintain influence in enough countries they will be able to control regional security

to the point where anti-Soviet governments and alignments towards the West will become increasingly rare. With one "non-vital" country after another falling into the Soviet sphere of influence, the United States will be perceived as lacking the will and capability to protect its friends. Such a perception can not help but have an impact on more crucial Third World countries. The probable result will be an accomodation to Soviet designs and a dangerous lessening of American influence throughout the Third World.

Nor can the United States be complacent that in time the Soviets will be expelled from Third World countries where their influence was established through coups. Recognizing the importance of coups in the Third World, the Soviets have developed an impressive ability to insure that coups will not occur in friendly states and, if a coup hostile to Soviet interests is attempted, that it will be defeated. In part, this Soviet capability rests on the Marxist-Leninist system it imposes on many of its Third World allies. By dramatically increasing political participation among the masses (under the direction of the party) and placing the military under political control, Marxism-Leninism eliminates two of the most important factors in making a regime susceptible to coups. The effectiveness of this approach is already evident in such Soviet allies as Cuba and Vietnam, while Ethiopia and Nicaragua are on the path of achieving similar "coup proof" status.

Ideally, American efforts to promote democracy among its allies should produce similar results. But it is much more

difficult to induce Third World regimes to move towards democracy (which often jeopardizes their own survival) than it is to have them safeguard their rule through a totalitarian form of government. Further, the Soviets have demonstrated a superior will and capability to influence the nature of regimes which align with it than has the United States.

The Soviets are also in a good position to defend and/or deter Third World regimes from actual or planned coup attempts. The thousands of Cuban troops loyal to the Soviet Union based in Angola and Ethiopia make a successful anti-Soviet coup in those countries difficult to carry out. On a smaller but equally effective scale, the hundreds of Cuban military "advisors" in Nicaragua could easily overwhelm an indigenous coup attempt that might seek to replace the present pro-Soviet regime with one more friendly to the West. Seen in this context, the purpose of the Soviet brigade "discovered" in Cuba in 1979 was probably not to threaten Latin American nations but to provide protection for Castro (or an approved successor) from a coup d'etat.

In addition to military advisors and troops, the Soviets have utilized proxies to provide personal protection for Third World political leaders. By surrounding Third World leaders with a "cocoon" of Cuban and East German guards, the Soviets have made the prospect of a successful coup (and realignments to the West) highly unlikely. Generally, the Cubans concentrate on providing bodyguards for individual Third World leaders. Their presence guarantees high-quality protection for the regime by personnel who will not participate in any anti-Soviet plots.

The East German strength lies in their domination of the internal security apparatus in many Third World countries. Much more active than their Western counterparts, the East Germans have taken the lead in penetrating and controlling the upper echelons of several Third World governments. The East German State Security Service (SSD) is especially active in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen and Libya. Their responsibilities include the training of bodyguards, advising both military and civilian intelligence agencies, and establishing secret police networks. Such activities enable the East Germans to be in an ideal position to deter and prevent coups.¹

The lesson of Soviet counter-coup policy is clear: the time to stop Moscow's influence is before a pro-Soviet government is in place. As Grenada demonstrated, reversing such a Soviet (or Cuban) gain may require direct American intervention which is not likely for the vast majority of Third World states. Defending friendly regimes from pro-Soviet attempts to overthrow them will never be easy. But it will be ever so much more difficult to reduce or eliminate Soviet influence once it is established.

There also exists a moral rationale for the United States to be concerned about less than vital Third World states. In terms of military power this is and will probably remain a bipolar world. The United States and the Soviet Union are often the only two states that can directly or indirectly meet security challenges far from their borders. By refusing to defend worthy Third World regimes simply because they do not safeguard vital American interests, the United States condemns much of the world

to a way of life it justifiably rejects for itself. Such a policy would be an abdication of America's role as a great power and a violation of its most deeply held values.

Finally, a coup policy for the United States requires the consideration of assisting or initiating coups against unfriendly governments. Clearly, such actions would only be undertaken in extreme circumstances. Nevertheless, just as the protection of American interests may require defending friendly Third World regimes from coups, so may they also require the overthrow of unfriendly regimes.

In some cases, the United States might seek to remove a hostile government that has gained the power to seriously threaten American interests. For example, if Libya acquired nuclear arms the overthrow of the Khadaffi regime would become an American priority. In other cases the failure to defend a vital regime from a coup might prompt American action to overthrow the new leadership. If, for example, the U.S. failed to defend the Saudi monarchy from a fundamentalist coup, the United States might seek to remove the new government if it adopted policies unacceptable to the West. As Grenada has shown, the coming to power of an anti-American regime in the U.S. sphere of influence which jeopardizes the safety of American citizens, can prompt American action to remove it.

Towards An American Coup Policy

An American coup policy would be composed of several parts. They include assisting Third World leaders to protect themselves from coups, helping other countries intervene to defeat coups,

involving American personnel in the coup suppression, and the intervention of an American counter-coup force to reverse coups occurring in very important Third World states. Finally, an American coup policy must consider ways of initiating coups against hostile Third World regimes.

Assisting Third World Leaders to Protect Themselves From Coups

The preferred method for the United States in dealing with Third World coups is to move Third World leaders in the direction of fundamental reform. While the prospects of achieving democracy are not encouraging, actions can be taken to lessen the likelihood of coup attempts in Third World countries through the development of greater political stability. Such actions include eliminating large gaps between the rich and the poor, establishing institutions to allow larger numbers of people to participate in politics, limiting the extent of corruption, halting human rights abuses, inculcating a civic ethic in the military, and broadening the base of support for the government.

The United States (more specifically, the Pentagon) should reform its training and military assistance program so that Third World forces can better protect their regime from coups. The effectiveness of an indigenous counter-coup force will of course vary from country to country, but it must be remembered that such a force can be decisive in stopping coups. The narrow scope of a coup which accounts for so much of its success can, if resisted promptly and correctly, also bring about its failure. It must be remembered that a pro-Western country can often be safeguarded by

protecting the leader and some key points in the capital--a far from impossible task.

An effective counter-coup force requires between 500-1,000 men. Their training would be similar to regular basic training with an added emphasis on small weapons, detonating and defusing explosives, urban warfare, small unit fighting, high mobility necessitating low levels of protection, and the use of armored cars (the Whale APC is especially appropriate). Only the most loyal, motivated, and fit personnel should be selected for training. Given the demands of the force, a 50 percent attrition rate should be expected. The best among the elite protection unit ought to be trained as personal bodyguards. The cost to train and equip a counter-coup force of some 500 men would be approximately \$5 million.

Supplementing the counter-coup force, the United States should assist Third World countries in establishing an intelligence network. American personnel should not collect information themselves, but they can help develop the infrastructure necessary for rudimentary intelligence organizations. The East Germans have had a good deal of success in this area among pro-Soviet Third World regimes.

Recommendations for the Pentagon

Specific recommendations for Pentagon personnel assisting Third World regimes to better protect themselves against coups include the following:

o Selecting the Right People for the Job

The Pentagon should exercise care in choosing personnel to send to Third World countries. The advisors should be trained professionals with a thorough knowledge of the area to which they are being sent. They ought to be stable individuals who know how to behave in sensitive situations and in different cultures.

o The Advisory Program

Before the program is established, two or three advisors should survey the country for a few months. Information to be collected should answer questions such as who are the domestic and foreign enemies of the regime, which elements of the armed forces are loyal and which elements are questionable, who makes up the political elite, and to what degree the regime is supported by the population.

The preliminary team should prepare a report for the Third World leader. The report would include what units and equipment are needed for an effective counter-coup force.

Once an advisory team is sent to a Third World country, it should stay out of internal politics. The advisory team should not advise the leader on political issues, cooperate with non-governmental groups, or contact potential successors. While other U.S. personnel might engage in these activities, it is imperative the advisory team restrict themselves to the counter-coup mission for which they were brought into the country.

Much of the success of the advisory team depends on their ability to understand the Third World society in which they are operating. The symbolic and psychological nature of their mission should not be overlooked. They must be adept at working with people and understanding what intangible elements work to keep the regime in power.

The advisory group must adapt their tactics to the local situation. There is no one way to establish a counter-coup force. Rather, each country will present unique demands requiring different approaches.

The advisory group should keep a low profile. An American presence can be provocative to some Third World groups especially if it appears to be overbearing or in control. A small group of behind-the-scenes individuals is vastly preferable to a highly visible unit that appears to be in control.

The advisory group should also prepare the Third World forces to do the job themselves. The Americans will not be able to remain in the Third World country indefinitely. Nor will proxy forces on the order of Cubans or East Germans be available for long-term protection of pro-American regimes. Given this, the indigneous forces must not be allowed to rely too much on external assistance.

o Mistakes to Avoid

The United States should not take on an advisory program if the Third World leadership will not do what is necessary to make the program a success. If the minimal manpower and equipment requirements of the preliminary

report are not met, the United States is better served by not involving itself at all rather than committing itself to half a job.

The United States should avoid protecting regimes that rule against the wishes of large segments of their populations or their armed forces. A counter-coup force is only effective against small, narrowly based threats. It should not and can not be used to impose a regime on a society or military that seeks to overthrow it. This does not mean that the United States must only protect popular governments. Rather, where widespread and mobilized opposition to a regime exists, outside assistance (especially from the United States) will not be effective in the long term in keeping that government in power.

American personnel must not apply American solutions to Third World problems. As a large and sophisticated society the United States is often not an appropriate model to learn from in dealing with the Third World. American advisors must demonstrate that they are capable of handling the small and unique difficulties encountered in Third World situations and are not too "advanced" to apply their skills to less developed countries.

Assisting Other Countries to Defeat Coups

The second element of an American counter-coup policy calls for the United States to provide assistance to countries willing to intervene to defend friendly Third World regimes from attempted coups. Implementing this policy requires that the

United States be prepared to help its European allies suppress anti-Western coups in their former colonies. As demonstrated by the French in Gabon and the British in East Africa, European countries can successfully intervene in their former colonies to defend existing regimes. Because of their knowledge of the local conditions and the ties they maintain with their former colonies, European countries are often best suited to launch a counter-coup action.

When such an action is in American interests, the United States should be ready to provide quick logistical support to transport troops. Although not a counter-coup operation, the American supply of transport aircraft to the French and Belgians in Zaire in 1978, enabled those forces to preserve a pro-Western government from a leftist backed insurgency and thus demonstrated the importance of prompt U.S. assistance. Rather than waiting for a crisis to develop, the United States should have contingency plans with European allies to provide needed support for important Third World regimes that might require external assistance to remain in power. Such American support could focus on providing assistance to the newly developed rapid deployment forces in Britain and France.

The United States ought also to encourage the formation of regional pacts whereby neighboring pro-Western states would agree in advance to defend each other's regimes in the event of a coup. These pacts could work within existing regional organizations (e.g. ASEAN in Southeast Asia or the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Persian Gulf), or could be independent of any existing

international framework. Neighboring states are often in the best position to intervene directly to prevent a coup from succeeding. Their geographical proximity facilitates the logistics of intervention and since they are acting within their region a certain legitimacy would accompany their counter-coup effort. Ideally, these regional allies should act on their own either through formal agreement (such as existed between Senegal and Gambia) or through an immediate interest in defeating a common threat (such as the Libyan and Egyptian action in defense of Numeiry). As with the Europeans, the United States should be prepared to offer logistical and other assistance when it is requested. This is especially important for Third World states with the will but not the capability to assist a neighboring regime.

In addition, the United States should emulate the Soviet use of proxies to carry out tasks that are important but politically inappropriate for a superpower. While the looser alliance relationships of the United States are not likely to produce a proxy with the general utility and effectiveness of the Cubans, pro-American proxies in the Third World are not impossible to develop. In particular, the use of Moroccans, Pakistanis, South Koreans, Egyptians, and Jordanians should be considered. These countries should be trained, armed, and provided logistical support so that they could quickly send a counter-coup force to defend regimes the United States judges to be worthy of protection and needing of outside assistance to survive.

While the recent refusal of Congress to fund a Jordanian strike force is cause for concern, it need not foreclose similar

efforts in this area. Future proposals must concentrate on developing forces whose size and weaponry make it clear they are designed for counter-coup missions and could contribute little to wider conflicts. A lightly armed force of some 1,000 soldiers with rapid transport capability and no armor should pose little concern to well equipped regional enemies. Once the purpose and limited capabilities of these forces are made clear to Congress and potential opponents of these units, their opposition should lessen.

Direct American Assistance to Third World Leaders Confronting Coups

Assisting and encouraging allies to defeat coups is in the American interest, but it is not enough. The United States can not depend on others to act in every case where a Third World regime needs protection. West European and Third World states will defend other regimes from coups only when they judge it to be in their interests to do so. The United States can not order other countries to intervene nor would it want to be placed in the position where such intervention would take place only in exchange for major political or economic concessions.

Moreover, given the necessity to act quickly, the United States can not afford to waste time persuading reluctant governments to take action. Thus, where a third party is willing and able to intervene to defeat a coup in a pro-Western state, the preferred American policy is to assist that effort rather than acting alone. Where outside help is not forthcoming or is of doubtful effectiveness for a Third World regime that is deserving

of American support, the United States ought to be prepared to act directly to suppress the coup.

Specifically, the United States should train its diplomatic and military personnel for coup contingencies, prepare in advance the use of secure communications facilities, and upgrade its intelligence of Third World countries. For vital Third World states, the United States ought to be able to intervene with its own specially trained counter-coup force.

The first line of defense against attempted coups will often be diplomatic personnel. Clear lines of command should be established in advance from Washington to the embassy so that American diplomats will know quickly whether they should support, suppress, or remain neutral in the event of a coup. United States diplomatic personnel must be prepared to rapidly inform crucial individuals (e.g. military commanders, political leaders) of the American position regarding the coup attempt. American diplomats should be prepared to take other actions (such as protecting officials with claims to legitimacy) which might help defeat the coup. If the orientation of the conspirators is clearly anti-American, prompt effective counter-coup action along the lines of John Gunther Dean's actions in Laos and the recent effort by Ambassador Edwin Corr to defeat a coup in Bolivia (June 1984) ought to be followed. The indecisiveness characterizing the Ethiopian coup should at all costs be avoided.

As with diplomatic officials, American military advisors should prepare themselves for the possibility of an anti-Western coup attempt in the country where they are stationed. They ought

to be familiar with the different levels of participation that might be required of them if such a coup attempt arises. These levels of participation range from complete neutrality, to persuading friendly forces to defend the existing regime, to direct participation in the suppression of the coup. While advising Third World military forces, American advisors should note which officers would likely support U.S. efforts to defeat a coup and which officers would not. The American role played in Ethiopia in assisting the loyalist forces and the Soviet role played in South Yemen in advising (and perhaps directly participating) in the successful counter-coup, are examples of the effective use of foreign military advisors defeating coups d'etat hostile to their interests.

By providing secure and effective communications equipment to members of a regime confronted with an attempted coup, the United States can play a crucial role in defending that regime. Since many coup attempts occur when a leader is out of the country, it is essential that he be able to communicate with supporters to reassert authority and to assist in the planning of the counter-coup. Coups were defeated in Ethiopia and Sudan in part due to communications equipment made available to the Emperor Haile Selassie (in Liberia) and the Sudanese defense minister (in Libya). While these measures were improvised, the United States should prepare in advance for the need for communications in pro-Western Third World countries facing coups. These preparations should include placing sophisticated communications equipment in secure adjacent territories or on

off-shore ships. Moreover, jamming equipment to disrupt insurgent broadcasts should also be ready for use.

If the United States is to effectively assist efforts to defeat coups, it needs to have reliable intelligence on the countries under threat. Once a coup attempt is initiated, it is necessary for the United States to be able to identify the political leanings of its leaders. As demonstrated by all of the foreign counter-coup efforts, a precondition for successful outside action to suppress coups was the rapidity of response. The quickness of the response in turn depended on the knowledge that the success of the coup would be inimical to the intervening state's interests. Such knowledge will not always be readily discernible, making intelligence about opposition groups and their supporters essential.

Furthermore, intelligence about the political dynamics of Third World states is needed once an anti-coup operation is launched or even considered. Which individuals need protection and which need detention, the viability of a regime once foreign assistance is withdrawn, and whether the regime is worth saving in the first place, are all questions that can be answered only with good intelligence. Therefore, the United States must improve its intelligence capabilities (especially in the area of human intelligence) and establish closer ties with allied intelligence agencies in this area.

An American Counter-Coup Force

Most important, the United States must be prepared to intervene directly with its own troops to defeat an ongoing coup

attempt. This type of action would be undertaken only in the most extreme circumstances. Only very important regimes that could not be defended from anti-American forces in any other way would provoke this response. Preparation for direct intervention requires that the United States develop a counter-coup force (although it need not bear that title).

It must be noted that the United States already has the military capability for an effective counter-coup force. The newly created U.S. Central Command (formerly the Rapid Deployment Force) has the manpower and transport capability to intervene quickly to prevent a coup virtually anywhere in the world. Moreover, secret commando units under the direction of the Joint Special Operations Command clearly have an anti-coup capability. The use of these units in Grenada to protect the governor general, Sir Paul Scoon, indicates their ability to protect regimes from coups. Also in Grenada, the performance of 82nd Airborne, Rangers, Marines, and the SEALs demonstrated that the United States has at least the potential for a coup making or coup defending force.

But there is more to a counter-coup force than equipment and personnel. While it is necessary to have forces capable of rescuing American citizens, assisting counter-insurgency efforts, and fighting terrorism, these actions should not be confused with defending a regime from a coup. In recognition of the unique threat posed by coups, forces must be created that are designed and trained specifically for coup suppression and not simply be a smaller part of a rapid deployment force or a broadly defined secret commando unit.

Essential to this force's effectiveness is speed. Any delay in sending in troops could result in the success of the coup attempt. This could change the mission of the intervention from defense of the existing regime to the much more difficult and politically sensitive one of overthrowing an "established" government. Consequently, it is far preferable to send several hundred troops within twelve hours than to wait a week--at which point it may be too late--and send an armored division.

Sending American troops to a Third World capital in the midst of an ongoing coup is no easy task. Ideally, American troops should already be deployed in the country facing a coup. Since this is often not politically possible or even desirable (the presence of U.S. troops in a Third World country could instigate the coup they are supposed to guard against), the United States must be prepared to rapidly transport forces to the scene of the conflict. Accomplishing this requires that the United States deploy a counter-coup force near vital "coup prone" states (e.g. in the Persian Gulf), either in neighboring countries or on American ships off-shore. Since it could not depend on the availability of airfields, the counter-coup force should be prepared to make use of helicopters, VSTOL aircraft, and parachute landings. Preparations for gaining access to local bases and for using prepositioned equipment should be made in advance of any coup attempt. As soon as feasible, loyalist forces from the regime under attack and troops from neighboring states ought to be incorporated into the counter-coup operation, if only

for symbolic purposes. Once the coup is defeated, American forces should promptly depart.

The counter-coup force should also prepare in advance the justification of its intervention. The question of legitimacy is certain to arise from any action undertaken to suppress a coup. The crossing of international borders, especially by the superpowers, remains a highly visible and controversial act. This is particularly true for the United States which must justify any such action to what would be (at least in part) a hostile domestic constituency. The key to preserving a measure of legitimacy, and thus forestalling some of the international and domestic opposition, lies in making clear that the intervention has come about due to the request of the existing government. Thus it is essential that high ranking government officials in addition to the head of state be identified in advance, provided with protection, and instructed as to how best to request American assistance in time of crisis. This type of a request should precede an intervention but, as demonstrated in the Gabon and Grenada cases, official sanctions even after the intervention takes place can mitigate much of the opposition to it.

Furthermore, the United States should conclude secret or public agreements with important Third World regimes pledging American assistance if they are threatened by coups. This type of agreement helped justify the French intervention in Gabon and the Senegalese intervention in Gambia. Knowledge of such an agreement would deter many coup attempts from taking place and facilitate American intervention to suppress those coups that are attempted.

The counter-coup policy proposed in this study would not be opposed by American public opinion. Since World War II, the American people have not been against direct United States involvement *per se*, but rather to American involvement that is protracted and for ambiguous ends. Any counter-coup intervention undertaken by the United States would be swift (a few days at most), and for interests broadly recognized as vital. Neither would the argument that this kind of policy is an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of others be very convincing. In response to such assertions it would be emphasized that a counter-coup policy is designed not to impose a government against the wishes of its people, but to defend an existing regime from the illegal actions of a few.

This is not to suggest that a counter-coup policy would be without problems. Gaining European and Third World cooperation will not be easy in many cases. As the Israeli objections to the Jordanian strike force illustrate, the development of Third World counter-coup forces can antagonize existing regional rivalries. The necessity to decide quickly on whether to intervene in ambiguous situations will always be difficult. Moreover, maintaining a counter-coup force carries with it the danger that it might be misused. Nevertheless, while these problems suggest caution in developing a counter-coup policy, they do not mean such a policy should not be developed.

Initiating Coups

The prevalence of coups and the ease with which they are carried out in many Third World states requires that an American

coup policy consider initiating coups against regimes that threaten the interests of the United States. The United States is believed to have initiated and/or supported coups against regimes in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), South Vietnam (1963), Cambodia (1970), and Chile (1973).² Several lessons emerge from these cases of coup initiation which are of use to American policy makers.

In determining which Third World regimes are vulnerable to an American-sponsored coup, the most important factor is the military. A successful American backed coup requires the support or at least the non-interference of the indigenous military forces in the coup attempt. It is virtually impossible to launch a successful coup against a regime that commands the broad support of its armed forces. Overthrowing such a regime requires an outright invasion similar to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.

It is also difficult to overthrow a popular regime especially if it is replaced by a government that does not enjoy the support of the people. No military wants to devote most of its efforts to repressing the people. While a coup against a regime that can mobilize popular support might succeed in the short term, in the long term the continual need for repression is likely to provoke another coup by the armed forces. Moreover, American domestic opinion and international censure would almost always make the costs of U.S. support for such an action outweigh any benefits.

In avoiding involvement with coups against popular regimes, American policy makers should be careful not to confuse the

appearance of popular support with a reality that might be very different. As the Iran (1953) episode illustrated, Prime Minister Mossadegh had little trouble filling the streets with demonstrators proclaiming their unswerving loyalty to his regime. And yet, with a small bit of encouragement from the CIA, the Mossadegh government was overthrown and the streets were once again filled with demonstrators, only this time they proclaimed their support of the Shah.

Clearly, a certain percentage of the population will back whomever is in power, making it important to distinguish between regimes that have truly earned the support of the people and those that can simply mobilize crowds. For many Third World countries, political participation has simply not progressed to the point where popular opposition will be an important factor in preventing a coup. Consequently, while the attitudes of the people might be relevant, generally the position of the military is the most crucial factor in determining whether a U.S. backed coup will be successful.

Once the United States decides to assist or initiate a coup against a Third World regime there are several different approaches it can use. For countries dependent on the U.S. for support and where the military on its own wishes to overthrow the regime, American participation can be kept quite limited. As demonstrated by the overthrow of Diem in South Vietnam (1963), the United States can play a critical role in the success of a coup simply by distancing itself from the existing regime,

supporting the plans of the coup makers, and indicating it will back a successor government.

A more active role for the United States will be required where the indigenous military is not at the point of launching a coup. In some cases, the U.S. can help bring about a coup by assisting in its planning and execution. In Iran (1953), British and American intelligence played a central role in the overthrow of Mossadegh by convincing the Shah to demand his dismissal and by paying off crowds of Iranians to declare their support of the new regime. These actions would not have proved successful if the Shah did not already command the support of the military and large segments of the people. Nevertheless, without the American (and British) actions to initiate the coup, the Shah might never have been restored to power.

In cases where the military is not loyal to the regime, but is not yet at the point of launching a coup, American policy makers can consider the creation of a "coup climate" to provoke the armed forces to action. In Guatemala (1953) the United States sponsored a symbolic invasion by Guatemalan exiles, conducted strafing attacks on the Guatemalan military, and created confusion and dissension through radio broadcasts declaring that a major military attack was underway. These actions succeeded in creating a "coup climate" that persuaded the Guatemalan military that a coup was in their interests and that it would succeed. The result was the overthrow of the leftist regime of Jacobo Arbenz and its replacement by a pro-American (albeit brutal) government.

This type of approach was also used in Chile from 1970 to 1973. Following a bungled attempt to prevent Allende from assuming

power, the United States drastically cut bilateral and multilateral aid to Chile. At the same time, American military assistance was increased to the Chilean armed forces. The United States thus helped exacerbate much of the anti-Allende sentiment in Chile while maintaining direct and close contact with the Chilean military. Although the 1973 coup removing Allende probably had no direct American assistance, the U.S. role in establishing the conditions in which coup planning could flourish and the clear indications of American support for a post-Allende government, indicate the United States role was more than that of a dispassionate observer.

Where the military is incapable or unwilling to launch a coup, but is not loyal to the regime, the United States can introduce its own "coup makers" into the armed forces. This apparently was done in connection with the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1970. Anti-Sihanouk Cambodian mercenaries were allegedly introduced into the Cambodian military where they helped topple Sihanouk's government. Necessary for this type of operation are anti-government exiles and at least the cooperation of indigenous military officers.

As with counter-coup operations, initiating coups against unfriendly Third World regimes works best when dealing with "coup prone" states. It is these countries -- where meaningful political participation is weak, governmental legitimacy is lacking, there is very little commitment to civilian institutions, the politically relevant population is confined to a small group and the military has a history of intervening in politics -- that coup initiation has the best chances of success.

Regimes that can mobilize broad based popular support, have the active backing of their military, and have attained a high degree of legitimacy are not likely candidates for an American-sponsored coup. As discussed elsewhere,³ the USSR is attempting to transform several Third World states into totalitarian societies characterized by many of these "coup proof" qualities which may place them out of the reach of an American-backed coup operation.

In confronting an uncertain future, American policy makers can be certain of two truths. First, the coup d'etat will remain the most common form of extra-legal regime change in the Third World. Second, the United States (and its allies) will continue to maintain vital interests in the Third World. Given this situation, the United States has little choice but to develop a policy to cope with the threat to its interests posed by coups d'etat. The difficulties inherent in developing this type of policy are clearly great, but they pale in comparison with the risks incurred by failing to address this critical issue.

Notes

1. For more on USSR policy on coups see the section "Soviet Attitudes to Third World Coups."

2. Although the U.S. military overthrew the regime in Grenada, it does not fit into this typology since the Grenada action was not a military coup.

3. See the section "Soviet Attitudes to Third World Coups."

The American Role in Initiating and Assisting Coups in the Third World

The purpose of this study is to determine how the United States can initiate or assist coups against Third World regimes. The study examines American interests in such a policy, case studies of past American-backed coups, lessons from the case studies, and policy recommendations. In addition, the ethics and acceptability of such a policy are considered.

American Interests in Supporting Coups

The United States should be prepared to support coups in the Third World because situations may arise when the defense of critical American interests requires the overthrow of certain Third World regimes. There are two basic ways such situations may come about. First, existing pro-Western regimes that safeguard highly important American interests might be replaced by hostile governments that threaten those interests. If the Saudi regime were overthrown by fundamentalist or pro-Soviet groups that sought to deny the West adequate supplies of petroleum at reasonable prices, for example, it might be well in the American interest to back a coup against the new leadership. Similarly, the United States might wish to act against hostile, new regimes emerging in states such as Egypt, Jordan, Thailand, Kenya, and El Salvador. By assisting Third World states to restore pro-American governments, the United States can better preserve its influence in the Third World while deterring coups against friendly regimes.

The United States might also wish to overthrow existing hostile regimes if their behavior threatens important American interests. Anti-American regimes that sponsor terrorist activities especially in crucial areas such as the Persian Gulf, might well become targets of an American backed coup effort. The prospect of nuclear proliferation presents another motivation for American supported coups. If Khadaffi gained possession of nuclear weapons, the overthrow of his regime would become an urgent necessity.

Whether one approves or not, coups are and are likely to remain a fact of political life in the Third World. Moreover, the United States is likely to continue to maintain critical interests whose existence will be determined by the nature of Third World regimes. Given this, the United States must be prepared to initiate coups against certain Third World regimes in extraordinary circumstances.

Case Studies

Preparing to initiate coups in the Third World requires that United States policy makers study the lessons of past American involvement in overthrowing Third World regimes. As with defending regimes against coups, this is not meant to deny the uniqueness of each situation or to imply that the means used to successfully initiate a coup in one situation would necessarily succeed in another. Rather, it is to say that one can learn much about initiating coups by focusing on cases of coup initiation occurring under similar conditions.

The cases selected for this study are Cambodia (1970), Guatemala (1954), Iran (1953), Chile (1970-1973), and South Vietnam (1963). These cases were selected because they met two basic criteria. In each of the cases the role of the United States proved critical to the success of the coup attempt. If the United States had not become involved, the coup either would not have been attempted or would not have succeeded. In addition, all of the cases occurred in "coup prone" countries, i.e. where coups or the threat of coups were a major feature of political life. The lessons they provide are consequently limited to those states of the the Third World which are also "coup prone."

The cases included in this study collectively demonstrate the effectiveness of American support in overthrowing unfriendly Third World regimes. The cases illustrate a range of different ways in which American involvement in past coups has worked to topple regimes and thus have much to contribute to policy makers preparing for more serious threats to American interests in the future.

Cambodia¹

Norodom Sihanouk dominated Cambodia for three decades. He became King in 1941, played an important role in Cambodia's independence from the French in 1953, and assumed the office of chief of state in 1960. Sihanouk ruled Cambodia until March 1970 when he was overthrown by an anti-Communist group of military officers. It is strongly alleged that the United States knew about, helped organize, and directly supported the successful coup.

The opportunity for the coup first developed in January 1970 when Sihanouk left the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh for a two-month vacation on the French Riviera. Sihanouk travelled to France every two years to "take the cure" for a variety of maladies. His departure left the government in the hands of the chairman of the National Assembly, Cheng Heng (who became the head of state), Prime Minister Lon Nol, and First Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak. Sihanouk trusted these men despite their opposition to him over economic policies, corruption, and the Cambodian leader's inability to remove North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops from Cambodian territory.

In early March demonstrations against the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia were organized by the government. In the countryside, villagers protested the North Vietnamese occupation. In the capital, the embassies of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government were attacked by thousands of young Cambodians. Following the riots, the Cambodian parliament voted to reaffirm their country's neutrality and defense of its territory. To that end, the parliament voted an expansion of the Cambodian army which had been kept small due to Sihanouk's fear of a coup. In addition, Prime Minister Lon Nol demanded in a meeting with Vietnamese officials that they withdraw their troops from the sanctuaries. Not surprisingly, they refused.

Responding to the Vietnamese refusal, Lon Nol gave permission for a South Vietnamese task force to cross the Cambodian border to attack the sanctuaries. The next day, March 18, the Cambodian parliament formally deposed Sihanouk in a

unanimous vote. The parliament named Cheng Heng as interim head of state although the real power passed to Lon Nol. In mid-April, responding to a Cambodian request, the United States agreed to provide military aid to the new regime. Initially, the United States provided 3,000 captured AK-47 rifles to Lon Nol. With time, American aid increased as the United States viewed the Lon Nol regime as the only obstacle to complete Vietnamese control of Cambodia. Lon Nol remained in power, supporting American interests (including the April attack on North Vietnamese sanctuaries by American and South Vietnamese troops), until the Khmer Rouge brought about his downfall five years later.

There are essentially two versions of the American role in the Sihanouk coup. Kissinger in his memoirs argues that the United States government "neither encouraged Sihanouk's overthrow nor knew about it in advance. We did not even grasp its significance for many weeks." Kissinger's description of the coup as a total surprise might be accurate since Washington had no CIA personnel in Phnom Penh and there were no American military or economic assistance programs since 1963. Moreover, at the time of the coup, the United States was preoccupied with its own domestic difficulties and the ongoing developments in Laos. For Kissinger, Sihanouk's rule, while flawed, was still in the American interest. As he wrote, "From the American point of view, the precarious political balance in neutral Cambodia under Sihanouk's skillful, if unpredictable tutelage, was the best attainable situation."

The responsibility for the success of the coup, according to Kissinger, lay not with the United States but with Sihanouk himself. The Cambodian prince first did not return immediately in early March to cope with an obviously deteriorating situation. Kissinger speculates that the reason he did not go to Phnom Penh was his wife's desire to visit their children who were students in Prague and Peking. Moreover, when Sihanouk finally did leave Paris on March 13, he travelled not to Cambodia but to Moscow. There he spent five days discussing military aid despite the ongoing developments in Cambodia and President Podgorny's pleas for him to return home. Prince Sihanouk then travelled to Peking to assess the situation, at which time he was informed (by the Soviets) that he had been deposed.

Kissinger claims Sihanouk made another crucial error in Peking when he forcefully turned to North Vietnam and against the United States. On March 20, two days after he was overthrown, Sihanouk blamed the CIA for the coup, defended the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, and threatened to destroy the new government which he characterized as being "stooges of the American imperialists." By so closely identifying himself with Hanoi, Sihanouk forced the United States to support the new Cambodian regime. It was now no longer a question of tolerating the neutralist prince in power; at this point if Sihanouk resumed his leadership all of Cambodia could very well become a North Vietnamese sanctuary. It is in this context that the United States agreed to provide assistance to the Lon Nol government.

Another view of the Cambodian coup is presented by Seymour Hersh. Hersh argues that the United States knew about and

supported the coup against Sihanouk because of the Cambodian leader's opposition to an American invasion of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries and his insistence that the United States withdraw from South Vietnam. If one believes Hersh's account, the United States sought the overthrow of Sihanouk for several years and played a crucial role in the March 1970 coup.

The key to the American success lay in the use of anti-Communist Cambodians based in Thailand and in Cambodia itself. A group of Cambodian mercenaries based in Thailand called the Khmer Serei, and Cambodian bandits called the Khmer Kampuchean Krom worked closely with the Green Berets. Both groups were anti-Communist, willing to work for pay, and bitter opponents of the Sihanouk regime. Since they were ethnic Cambodians, they could easily infiltrate Cambodian society and the United States would be able to deny responsibility for any actions they took.

The United States may have used the anti-Communist Cambodians in several plots against the Sihanouk government. According to Hersh, in late 1968 a Lon Nol representative sought the commitment of American support following the overthrow of Sihanouk. The United States allegedly responded by offering to directly support the coup. The plan, code named, "Dirty Tricks" called for the use of Khmer Kampuchean Krom mercenaries to infiltrate the Cambodian army before the coup to provide military support. In addition, the plan included a request for an American-trained assassination team disguised as Vietcong to kill the prince. Once this had been accomplished, Lon Nol would declare a state of national emergency and request American

assistance allowing the United States to launch an attack on the sanctuaries. The plan was approved in late February or early March 1969.

Lon Nol agreed to the plan with some modifications. He rejected the idea of assassinating Sihanouk, fearing the public disorder it would produce. He suggested instead that the coup take place when the prince was out of the country and, once he had overthrown the Cambodian leader, Washington would support his new regime. The U.S. agreed to do so with the caveat that such support would appear to be "reluctant" so as to deal with international criticism. Lon Nol then asked for Khmer Kampuchean Krom troops to be placed in the Cambodian army.

According to Hersh, a secret Special Forces unit called Project Gamma also played a role in the Sihanouk ouster. This unit used members of the Khmer Serei and the Khmer Kampuchean Krom in Cambodia to conduct operations against the Sihanouk regime. Reportedly, a month before the coup, an American Green Beret officer was told that Sihanouk would be overthrown in an operation involving the Khmer Serei.

Whatever the exact details of the coup, Lon Nol successfully overthrew Prince Sihanouk in March 1970. Both Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese stated (in secret and in public) that the United States was behind the coup. If the United States and Lon Nol went to the considerable trouble to place the anti-Sihanouk groups into the Cambodian armed forces, one can surmise that the role they played in the coup was an important one. In any event, Lon Nol remained in power until 1975 when the murderous Pol Pot regime replaced him.

Guatemala²

The successful coup that overthrew President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in June 1954 is significant for several reasons. It marked the first time an allegedly pro-Communist government was replaced by a pro-Western regime. It demonstrated the ability of the CIA to remove an unfriendly leader through the skillful mix of public and private actions. Finally, it helped persuade American policy makers to attempt to duplicate their success in Guatemala by initiating coups elsewhere. For these and other reasons, the lessons of the Guatemala operation are important in understanding America's policies toward Third World coups.

For much of its history Guatemala has been led by authoritarian rulers governing in the interests of the land-based aristocracy. This pattern of right-wing repressive rule was broken in 1944 when two military officers launched a successful coup against the existing leadership. The two officers, Major Francisco Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz, formed a temporary junta and announced that the first free elections in Guatemala's history would be held shortly. In the elections, the officers backed a popular teacher, Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo for the presidency. Arevalo easily won the election and assumed the presidency in March 1945. He served out his full time in office, proving to be a well-intentioned but not too effective reformist leader.

The two major contenders for Arevalo's office were the coup makers of 1944--Arbenz and Arana. Arevalo named Arbenz Minister of Defense and Arana chief of staff placing both individuals in

positions of power. Of the two, Arana was the more conservative and probably more popular than Arbenz. In 1949, a year before the election to choose a new president, Arana was murdered. While conclusive proof is lacking, many have linked Arbenz to the assassination. In any event, with Arana out of the way, Arbenz was easily elected president in November 1950.

As president, Arbenz aroused the concern of the United States in two areas. First, although Arbenz was not a member of the Communist party, Washington suspected him of Communist sympathies. Arbenz's goals of accelerating Arevalo's reforms and ending the dominance of Western corporations in Guatemala's economy aroused American policy makers' suspicions. Furthermore, the Communists proved to be an important supporter of Arbenz. The Communist party helped in his campaign for president and was part of his four-party coalition in Congress. While no members of the Communist party actually held any cabinet posts, seven or eight Communists occupied important sub-cabinet positions. Communists proved especially important in Arbenz's land reform program and in mobilizing popular support for his programs among urban unions. That Arbenz's wife had close ties with Communists and leftists further heightened American suspicions.

The second (and related) area of American concern had to do with protecting the position of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala. With an over \$120 million investment, United Fruit controlled much of the Guatemalan economy and was virtually a state within a state. In June 1953 Arbenz issued an agrarian reform bill designed to reduce United Fruit's power. The bill

called for the government to expropriate uncultivated sections of large farms and to compensate their former owners on the basis of their declared taxable worth. Since United Fruit had hundreds of thousands of acres of uncultivated land in Guatemala (in part to guard against plant diseases), and since United Fruit had deliberately claimed less value for its lands to avoid paying taxes, it vigorously opposed these measures. Exacerbating the situation were zealous peasants (often provoked by Communists) who seized lands without due process of law. While Arbenz made some effort to curb these excesses, he did not take a determined stand against them.

Guatemala therefore presented a strategic and economic threat to American interests. Strategically, the United States did not want to see a Communist-controlled government in Central America. Such a government would be a threat to the Panama Canal (800 miles away) and to other Central American regimes. Economically, Washington did not take kindly to Arbenz's actions against United Fruit. In part this was due to a skillful campaign waged by United Fruit to convince the American people and government that Arbenz was indeed a Communist threat. More to the point, the United States did not want to establish the example of Third World states expropriating the assets of American corporations with impunity. Consequently, in August 1953, the United States government officially and secretly decided to topple the Arbenz regime.

Overthrowing Arbenz presented some difficulties. Although Guatemalan exiles existed, they were far too few in number to mount a successful invasion even with American support. Provoking

domestic unrest was also inadequate as Arbenz had some support from the lower classes. This left the Guatemalan military as the focus of the American coup effort.

American policy makers had good reason to suspect the loyalty of the Guatemalan armed forces. Unlike revolutionary regimes that existed in Vietnam and were to emerge in Cuba, Arbenz did not create a new army loyal to his government. Rather, the Guatemalan military remained largely outside of Arbenz's influence. Moreover, the military resented Arbenz. They were fearful of his leftist policies, concerned that he might supplant them with a "people's" militia, and never forgave him for his alleged complicity in the murder of Major Arana.

This is not to suggest that the military was disloyal. Many in the military were committed to the democratic experiment taking place in Guatemala. Others did not want to be put in the position of having to suppress angry supporters of Arbenz should he be overthrown. Most important, high-ranking officers did not want to commit themselves to the toppling of the Arbenz regime unless they were sure they could succeed. As such, CIA attempts to bribe officers to launch a coup proved unsuccessful.

The task for American coup makers was clear. They had to undermine the loyalty of the Guatemalan military, convince key officers that a coup was in their interests, and make certain that such a coup would succeed. Moreover, given international and domestic (American) concerns, the overthrow of Arbenz would have to appear to be a Guatemalan affair.

The American plan to overthrow Arbenz began with propaganda and diplomatic actions designed to create the proper atmosphere for the coup. The United States Information Agency planted stories in foreign newspapers charging the Arbenz regime with being run by Communists. Similar stories (many inspired by the United Fruit Company) appeared in American news sources. In March 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles succeeded in getting a resolution passed by the Organization of American States stating that the domination of any American state by Communists would constitute a "threat to the hemisphere" to be dealt with under the provisions of existing treaties. Dulles was referring to the 1947 Rio Treaty which gave the OAS authority to intervene if two-thirds of its member states agreed that the independence of an American country was threatened, whether or not an armed attack took place.

The United States planned to convince the Guatemalan military to overthrow Arbenz through several actions. First, Guatemala was to be invaded by a force of exiles and mercenaries based in Honduras. This force was recruited, trained and equipped by the CIA. Leading the group was Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, a former Guatemalan army officer and avowed opponent of Arbenz. As with his troops, Armas was chosen and paid for by the the CIA. In addition to the the land invasion, the CIA arranged for American pilots to bomb and strafe targets in Guatemala. Finally, radio transmitters were established within and around Guatemala (including one in the American embassy) to provide "progress reports" of the attacking force. All was in place awaiting a suitable provocation for the attacks to begin.

The provocation arose on May 15, 1954 when the Swedish freighter Alfhem arrived in Guatemala with arms from Czechoslovakia. Arbenz justified the shipment on the grounds that with the United States refusing to sell it weapons since 1948, he had the right to purchase arms elsewhere. The United States government thought otherwise. They saw the weapons as positive proof of the Communist influence in Arbenz's government. With these arms, it was argued, Guatemala could threaten the Canal Zone. Equally ominous, the weapons could be used to form a people's militia in Guatemala thus preventing a coup d'etat by the regular army. Significantly, when the Guatemalan military demanded that Arbenz reject the formation of a people's militia in the wake of the arms deliveries, he refused. It was in this context that the American National Security Council agreed on May 17 to begin the invasion of Guatemala the next month.

On June 18 the American-backed coup attempt began. Following CIA orders, Armas led his ragtag army of some 400 men into Guatemala. Armas, who first met his "troops" only five days earlier, advanced only six miles into Guatemala and after occupying a few border towns, stopped on July 20. Along with Arbenz's "invasion," American fighter planes and cargo aircraft bombed and strafed the capital of Guatemala, military barracks, and oil reserves. The planes also dropped leaflets (signed by the "National Liberation Forces") calling on Arbenz to surrender. Adding to the sense of panic created by these actions was the constant outpouring of disinformation from the American radio transmitters. Reports of major battles, peasants joining Armas'

army, and fighting taking place throughout the country filled the Guatemalan radio. At the same time, efforts by Arbenz to dispel the rumors were jammed.

The attacks encountered virtually no Guatemalan resistance. The 6,000-man army and 3,000-man police force were placed on alert by Arbenz but were held in reserve. No doubt, Arbenz had serious doubts about their willingness to challenge Armas. Guatemala's antiquated air force was similarly grounded allowing the CIA pilots complete freedom of the skies. Nor were the Guatemalan people rushing to Arbenz's defense. Whether because of the continuing radio reports talking of an imminent rebel victory or because of a lack of commitment to Arbenz (or both), the masses never rallied to the Guatemalan leader's side.

The end of Arbenz's reign came quickly. On June 25, in a last desperate attempt to defend his regime, Arbenz ordered the military to distribute weapons to people's organizations and political parties loyal to him. The army, however, refused to carry out his orders. Instead, the army chief of staff, Colonel Diaz, demanded that Arbenz resign from office. Without the support of the army or any other armed group, Arbenz had little choice. On June 27, he turned his power over to Diaz and his fellow officers and left the country. The United States later forced the removal of the Diaz junta eventually replacing it with Castillo Armas in July. The coup had succeeded with a minimum of casualties.

There are several reasons why the coup proved successful. Arbenz's support among the Guatemalan people was never very deep. The upper classes resented his policies of agrarian reform, the

middle class distrusted his policies of internal repression, and the Church remained suspicious of his Communist connections. While the poor liked Arbenz they were too insecure to mount any efforts on his behalf. Most important, the military was not loyal to Arbenz. The Guatemalan president never transformed the military into an extension of his power. Arbenz preferred to work with the Communists and the unions who in the end did nothing for him.

The effectiveness of the American plan is not surprising. From the beginning, the plan was designed not to topple the Guatemalan leader by force, but to provoke his own wavering army to do so. The invasion and the air raids were less military actions than they were exercises in psychological persuasion. They worked because Arbenz had no armed force to defend him. Despite the appearances of an outside invasion, the threat to Arbenz always rested with his own military. Once he lost their nominal loyalty, he was finished. For other leaders of Third World countries with loyal armies, militias, or mobilized populations, the essentially symbolic provocations of the American-backed forces would almost certainly not meet with the success they enjoyed in Guatemala.

Iran³

One of the first and most important of the American-initiated coups was the 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran. Using no more than a half-dozen men and spending under a million dollars, the CIA managed to restore the Shah to power, help preserve the pro-Western alignment of Iran

for the next 25 years, and perhaps lay the basis for the virulent anti-Americanism that was to follow in the 1980s. While the advisability and implications of the CIA involvement are still hotly debated, no one doubts the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation itself.

American interest in Iran, especially after World War II, stemmed from its strategic location in the Persian Gulf and oil wealth. This interest was forcefully demonstrated when in one of the first United States-Soviet Union confrontations of the Cold War, Washington forced Soviet troops to withdraw from northern Iran. Thereafter, the themes of Soviet encroachment, Iranian oil, and domestic instability were to dominate American concern for Iran up through the present.

The incident that gave rise to the CIA operation developed out of the desire of the Iranian government to gain a bigger share of the British petroleum concern (the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or AIOC) operating in Iran. Beginning in 1948, the Iranians demanded a greater percentage of the profits and control of the company than they had been given. The British, however, were adamant in their refusal. With an oil glut, and extensive deposits elsewhere in the Middle East, the British felt they could continue to refuse Iranian demands and, if necessary, close down their Iranian operations. For the Iranians, the issue quickly became one of national pride as they met British intransigence by escalating their demands to include nationalization.

One of the most ardent proponents of nationalizing AIOC was Muhammed Mossadegh. A charismatic nationalist who was not pro-Communist, Mossadegh was instrumental in getting the Iranian parliament (the Majlis) to vote for nationalization in April 1951. His efforts forced the young Shah to appoint him Prime Minister. Under Mossadegh the stalemate in the oil negotiations became a national obsession. Internal unrest spread throughout the cities as mobs of Iranians (many of them Communists) took to the streets.

Using the domestic chaos as an excuse, Mossadegh expanded his powers at the expense of the Shah and the parliament. In July 1952, he demanded dictatorial powers for six months and control of the military. When the Shah refused, Mossadegh resigned provoking mass rioting. Unable to control the pro-Mossadegh forces, the Shah reluctantly reappointed him on his terms. In October 1952, Mossadegh dissolved the now ineffectual parliament and in January 1953, he extended his near absolute powers for another six months. In effect, by supplanting the Shah, Mossadegh had engineered a coup d'etat, albeit a superficially legal one.

The United States viewed events in Iran with growing concern. On the one hand the United States was sympathetic to the Iranian position on the oil negotiations. Washington believed that Iran had a rightful claim to more than what the British were offering. Moreover, the United States was not totally hostile to Mossadegh. Especially under the Truman Administration, Mossadegh was seen as a nationalist reformer who might be able to stabilize Iran.

Nevertheless, the lack of American leverage on Britain and the escalating chaos in Iran proved critical in convincing Washington that Mossadegh must go. Despite the American tilt to Iran on the oil issue, the United States was not going to jeopardize its alliance with Great Britain by forcing it to make concessions it was not prepared to offer. With Britain refusing to compromise, the oil stalemate and the instability it engendered were likely to continue for the foreseeable future--a situation that American policy makers did not like.

Especially under the Eisenhower Administration, the United States feared that the growing instability would produce a Communist government in Iran. In part, this fear stemmed from Mossadegh's pro-Soviet overtures and growing Tudeh support of his regime. Mostly, however, American policy makers believed that Mossadegh was not sophisticated enough to resist Communist control of his government. They felt that in time the Communists would seize power, kill the Shah, and either rid themselves of Mossadegh or reduce him to a figurehead.

The idea of instigating a coup to overthrow Mossadegh apparently originated with Great Britain. After some initial consultations the British sent a delegation to Washington in February to confer with officials of the newly elected Eisenhower Administration. Both countries agreed that if the army and the people would support the Shah, removing Mossadegh from power would be feasible. They placed Kermit Roosevelt, a CIA official, in charge of the coup operation.

The plan worked out by Roosevelt and his associates called for the Shah to leave for a remote part of Iran. He would leave

behind an order removing Mossadegh from office and replacing him with Fazollah Zahedi, a Shah loyalist and former army officer popular with the military. In addition, \$100,000 in Iranian currency was to be distributed among Teheran's poor (by two Iranian agents) to insure their support of the Shah. Roosevelt spelled out the outlines of the plan to the Shah in August 1953. When the Shah learned the operation had the full support of Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower, he agreed to cooperate.

The attempt to unseat Mossadegh began in early August when Colonel Nasiri of the Imperial Palace Guard presented the Prime Minister with the Shah's order for his dismissal. Instead of leaving office, Mossadegh (who had been tipped off as to what would happen) declared that a coup attempt was taking place and arrested Nasiri and some of his supporters. Mossadegh also ordered the arrest of Zahedi who was in hiding. When news of the attempted "coup" was broadcast, Teheran was thrown into chaos. Communist mobs shouted anti-American slogans and tore down the statues of the Shah and his father. The Tudeh warned Mossadegh's regime to break relations with the United States and there were suggestions that the Shah would be deposed. Believing all was lost, the Shah travelled to Italy for what looked like a long exile.

At this point, the counter-coup took place. The American ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson demanded that Mossadegh order the police and soldiers to protect American citizens in Iran. This resulted in the Communists being removed from the streets by

soldiers yelling pro-Shah and anti-Mossadegh slogans. The following day, crowds organized by the CIA and paid for with the \$100,000 took to the streets of Teheran where they attacked various government buildings. Shouts of "long live America," and support for the Shah now filled the air. While Roosevelt was with Zahedi in the latter's basement, the mobs burst in and carried the new Prime Minister to a tank which carried him through Teheran. Crowds of cheering people lined the streets, welcoming the new government. Whether they were different crowds who had appeared just a few days ago chanting pro-Communist slogans or had just changed their minds was not clear. What was clear was that Mossadegh had lost and the Shah (and his American supporters) had won.

Perhaps the most significant result of the August events was the enhancement of the Shah's power. Before the coup/counter-coup, the Shah was a rather weak figure constrained by the parliament and the prime minister. After the coup, with the support of the United States, the Shah emerged as the preeminent political figure in Iran. As for Mossadegh and his supporters, the Shah mercifully let them off with light prison sentences (although one individual was executed). The Communists, however, were bitterly suppressed by the Shah until they faded into near political obscurity.

Three points are especially noteworthy about the CIA operation in Iran. First, it is not certain that American actions to overthrow Mossadegh were illegal. At the time of these events, the Shah was the supreme legal authority in Iran. When Mossadegh disobeyed the Shah's lawful order to resign from his position as

prime minister, he in effect launched a coup against Iran's government. Seen in this light, the United States was simply restoring the legitimate authority of Iran against an illegal attempt to supplant it.

Second, while the CIA proved crucial to the success of the operation, it was merely assisting forces that were already present in Iranian society. The CIA could not have brought about the return of the Shah if he did not command widespread support among the Iranian people and, more importantly, the Iranian army. It was the combination of this support with the growing dissatisfaction with Mossadegh that allowed the CIA to be so effective.

Finally, the Iranian episode reveals the dangers of mistaking popular participation for effective popular involvement. If the power of the Shah had not been restored, historians might very well have argued that the "will of the people" kept Mossadegh in power. The rapid disappearance or changing of minds of the Iranian mobs indicates that the key determinant of popular support in at least some cases is not loyalty but the desire to be on the winning side.

Chile⁵

One of the most controversial attempts by the United States government to overthrow a foreign regime occurred in Chile in the fall of 1970. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger mobilized overt and covert capabilities of the United States to prevent the ascension to power of Salvador Allende, a democratically elected individual with strong Communist ties.

Although the initial American-backed efforts failed, the overthrow of Allende three years later in a military coup was at least indirectly related to the earlier United States involvement and to ongoing American policies towards Chile.

At the time of these events, the United States maintained important but not vital interests in Chile. Economically, Chile was significant as a leading producer of copper and as host to several large American multinational corporations including Anaconda, Kennecott Copper, and ITT. Strategically, Chile contained two secret NSA facilities monitoring Soviet nuclear tests, missile firings, and submarine activity. Most important, Chile's position as a major Latin American state bordering Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and the Pacific Ocean gave it geopolitical significance.

Threatening these interests was the prospect of Allende becoming president of Chile. As the founder of the Socialist Party of Chile, and as an advocate of land reform, nationalization of major industries and close ties with Communist countries, Allende frightened American policy makers. To Kissinger, the election of Allende meant either the establishment of an irreversible Marxist-Leninist dictatorship on the continent of South America, or, if Allende submitted to future elections, the decline of American and foreign resistance to the emergence of Communist governments in the Third World. Added to these concerns was Nixon's desire to please his corporate friends by not allowing an individual who advocated the expropriation of American property to assume power.

Believing that Allende had little chance to win the election, the United States did very little to affect its outcome. Under the auspices of the high level "40" Committee, anti-Allende stories were placed in the Chilean media and American corporations provided some money to Allende's opponents. With so little attention focused on Chile, it came as quite a shock when Allende won a 36.7 percent plurality of the vote in a three man race. As the leading vote gainer, Allende became the favorite to be selected in a runoff election to be held by the Chilean Congress on October 24. Suddenly, the Nixon Administration confronted the probability of a Marxist heading Chile in less than two months.

The Nixon Administration responded with a two-track plan designed to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. The more benign Track I provided for a continuation of anti-Allende stories in the press, the bribing of Chilean Congressmen to get them to vote against Allende, and exploring the likelihood of the Chilean military launching a coup against Allende. Track I also briefly explored the possibility of allowing the existing president of Chile, Eduardo Frei, to succeed himself through political machinations, but this was abandoned when Frei expressed no interest. Although of course secret, Track I was implemented under the auspices of the 40 Committee and the U.S. ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry.

Track II emerged after a meeting between the president of Pepsi Cola, a prominent Chilean publisher and President Nixon on September 15. Following the meeting, Nixon ordered the head of the CIA, Richard Helms, to launch a major effort to get rid of

Allende. Helms was to work secretly, bypassing both the 40 Committee and Ambassador Korry.

Just what Track II entailed is in considerable dispute. Kissinger maintains that it was simply an informal probe kept secret so that it could not be scuttled by the State Department. In time, Kissinger maintains, Track I and II merged as both plans sought to manipulate military assistance to persuade the Chilean armed forces to intervene to provoke new elections. When it became clear that such intervention was not forthcoming, Kissinger asserts he called off all coup backing on October 15.

Critics of Kissinger argue otherwise. They assert that Track II was a specific plan to encourage and assist the Chilean military to overthrow Allende in what was, in essence, an American coup using Chilean surrogates. The American-supported plan called for the Chilean military to kidnap the Commander in Chief of the Chilean armed forces, General Rene Schneider. The kidnapping was to have eliminated a key opponent of Chilean military intervention and create the kind of crisis that would justify a military coup. This creation of a coup climate was alluded to in a CIA cable on October 19 which stated: "It still appears that (the proposed) coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be their [the Chilean military] claim to a coup to save Chile from Communism."⁵

The United States contacted two groups of Chilean military officers in connection with the plot to kidnap General Schneider.

The first group was led by a General Viaux. It consisted of right-wing extremists and generally unreliable elements united in their hatred of Allende. The second group under General Valenzuela was deemed more promising. This group was cultivated by a U.S. military attache, Colonel Wimert, who thought he was working for the Pentagon but in fact was under the authority of the CIA. Both generals were given money and the Valenzuela group were also provided some arms.

At this point, accounts of American involvement in Chile again diverge. Kissinger maintains that once the CIA reported that the prospects of a military coup were not encouraging, he and Nixon ordered all U.S. involvement terminated. That the CIA continued to work with the Valenzuela group was either a misunderstanding or a disobeying of orders. Kissinger's critics argue that the United States continued to support the Valenzuela group after October 15 and encouraged them to kidnap Schneider as per the original plan. Kissinger and Nixon's assertions that they ordered the CIA to halt their activities were simply not true.

In any event, Valenzuela's group, with the apparent assistance from some of Viaux's men, tried unsuccessfully to kidnap Schneider on October 19 and on October 20. On October 22, Schneider was murdered, probably by Viaux's men. Whether Viaux was acting under American direction, or, what is more likely, acting on his own, is still uncertain. What is clear is that the assassination did not facilitate a coup against Allende. Instead of creating a coup climate, the murder of General Schneider made the Chilean people and military more determined than ever to prevent the disruption of the political process. Allende won the

election in the Congress on October 24 and was inaugurated on November 3.

Following Allende's election the CIA continued its efforts to create a coup climate in Chile. President Nixon ordered the end to private investment guarantees to American firms doing business in Chile, the pressuring of international lending institutions to limit funds for Chile, and the drastic reduction of American aid. In addition, the CIA continued to try to persuade the military to launch a coup against Allende. It is noteworthy that the United States provided relatively large amounts of aid to the Chilean military after Allende became president, thus facilitating American-Chilean contacts in the armed forces. Finally, the CIA collected information that could be used in the event of a coup including people to be protected and arrested, government buildings to be occupied and Allende's probable reaction.

Allende was overthrown by elements of the Chilean military in September 1973. During the course of the coup he was either killed or committed suicide. While there is no evidence that the United States was directly involved in the coup or in Allende's death, Washington bore some responsibility. The continuing anti-Allende actions and the knowledge that the United States government would support a successor regime, could not have helped but contribute to the coup climate sought but not achieved three years earlier.

Vietnam⁶

One of the major escalations of American involvement in Vietnam came about in the fall of 1963 when Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown in a military coup. Although the United States did not directly participate in Diem's ouster and subsequent murder, the coup would not likely have been attempted without the support of Washington. The Diem episode is a clear illustration of how the United States can remove an unwanted leader without directly committing American personnel or prestige.

American dissatisfaction with Diem and his brother, Nhu, stemmed from widespread protests against their increasingly autocratic and repressive rule. In the spring of 1963, large-scale Buddhist demonstrations galvanized popular support against the Diem regime. These demonstrations, and their violent suppression, were hurting the war effort against the Viet Cong. Concerned American officials tried to get Diem to reform but the South Vietnamese leader resisted the American suggestions. This prompted a debate among American policy makers about what to do with the Diem regime given the worsening situation.

The debate revolved around those who supported the Diem regime as the best the United States could hope for, and those who believed Washington should advocate a coup d'etat to bring about a government with more popular support. In general, the military and the CIA favored working with Diem while the State Department and the White House Staff pushed for a coup. Central to the discussions was which path would enhance the overall war effort. In the end, a compromise was reached. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, was instructed to inform

Diem than he must get rid of his brother (who was perceived as the more repressive of the two) or the United States would suspend military and economic support.

The South Vietnamese generals were also dismayed by domestic unrest produced by the Diem regime. At the height of the Buddhist disturbances in August, high ranking South Vietnamese officers contacted a CIA official to ask if the United States would support a military coup against Diem. They especially wanted the United States to suspend aid to Diem as a signal of American good faith. The request heightened the debate between the pro- and anti-coup forces in Washington with the result that no clear signal was given to the generals. At the end of August the coup was called off in part due to there being too many Diem loyalists in Saigon, but also due to the inability of the United States to provide a clear signal of backing to the generals.

As the domestic situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with Diem showing no signs of reforming his ways, the United States moved closer toward encouraging a coup d'etat. In early September, President Kennedy declared in a television interview that the South Vietnamese government could gain popular support, "with change in policy and perhaps with personnel." At about the same time, the U.S. government decided to continue to withhold existing economic aid for the Diem regime and to suspend new aid contracts.

Not surprisingly, the generals saw these signals as American encouragement for a coup d'etat. In early October, contacts with the generals and the CIA in Saigon resumed. Again, Washington had

difficulties in deciding what to do. While there was now greater American support for a coup, there was also concern, notably by President Kennedy, that the United States not be implicated in a coup attempt especially if it failed. It was finally agreed to tell the generals (through the CIA) that the United States would neither advocate nor attempt to foil a coup. The U.S. went on to say that it would be willing to review the plans of the conspirators and would support a successor regime.

By late October the American dispute about whether to support a coup worsened. General Harkins, an advisor to the South Vietnamese government and a supporter of the Diem regime was against any coup. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge felt a coup could serve American interests and there was little the U.S. could do to stop a coup even if it tried. The confusion among American officials was transferred to the Vietnamese. On October 22 General Harkins met with one of the principal South Vietnamese conspirators, a general, who felt the U.S. was attempting to dissuade them from launching a coup. Only after the South Vietnamese general met with a CIA official and Lodge did he become convinced the U.S. did indeed support a coup. Perhaps reflecting lack of confidence in American support, the Vietnamese generals refused to be specific about the timing of the coup or to provide Lodge with plans for the operation as he requested.

Just prior to the coup, the White House issued final instructions to Lodge. It stated that Lodge was wrong to argue he could not stop the coup; if he felt the coup would fail he should persuade the generals not to attempt it at least until their prospects for success had improved. If the coup did take place

the U.S. should at least retain the appearance of neutrality. However, if the coup were attempted, the U.S. should try to make certain it succeeded.

The coup began on the morning of November 1, 1963. With most of Diem's supporters safely isolated outside of Saigon, key installations in the capital city were quickly taken by the coup makers. Only the palace guard offered significant resistance and they were hopelessly outnumbered. In the afternoon, Diem telephoned Lodge in a desperate attempt to ascertain where the United States stood. Lodge would not give a clear response, preferring only to inquire about Diem's safety. Realizing that the U.S. would not help him, Diem and his brother escaped through an underground tunnel. They were captured the following morning and killed while in custody.

The United States was informed of the coup only after it was under way. Nevertheless, Washington played an important role in its success. The United States encouraged the coup effort, promised support to a successor government and sought to assist the South Vietnamese generals in their planning. Moreover, the cutoff of economic aid to the Diem regime both weakened the existing government and provided support for the coup makers. For better or for worse, the overthrow of the Diem regime could not have taken place without the ongoing approval of the United States.

Lessons From the Case Studies

The case studies illustrate a wide range of American involvement in the overthrow of Third World regimes. In South

Vietnam, the American role was limited to indicating to the coup makers that the United States would not interfere with their efforts and would support a successor regime. Such encouragement proved decisive because the United States maintained a high degree of influence in South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese military had already decided to topple the Diem regime. Given these conditions, the United States was able to play a central role in the success of the coup while actually doing and risking very little.

In Iran, the United States escalated its involvement to include helping to plan the coup and assisting in its execution. Iran was ready for a coup in the sense that the Shah commanded a great deal of support among the military and the people. Nevertheless, as in many Third World states, potential coup makers needed help and encouragement before they would launch a coup. By devising an operational plan for the potential conspirators and by insuring a degree of domestic support for the coup, the United States (and Britain) played a decisive role in the subsequent overthrow of Mossadegh. This illustrates that even where domestic forces might wish to overthrow an existing regime, it may still be necessary for the United States to take an active role in organizing and implementing the coup effort.

A third way the United States has worked to overthrow Third World governments is the creation of a "coup climate" to provoke an otherwise reluctant military to topple the existing regime. In Guatemala, the United States mounted a symbolic invasion (composed of Guatemalan exiles), used American pilots and planes

to strafe Guatemalan military positions, and carried out a media campaign of disinformation to sow dissension and confusion among the Guatemalan people. The purpose of these actions was achieved when the Guatemalan military overthrew the leftist Arbenz regime and replaced it with a pro-American (albeit brutal) government.

The United States also attempted to create a coup climate in Chile to induce the Chilean military to overthrow Allende. The American effort failed at first, because the Chilean armed forces were not prepared to deny Allende the right to assume the office to which he was elected. Moreover, the indirect American involvement in the plot to kidnap the Chilean commander in chief, served to mobilize support behind Allende rather than provoking an attempt to remove him.

The ultimate success of the U.S. effort to create a coup climate only came after several years of Allende's rule. By withholding bilateral economic aid, and preventing multilateral institutions from assisting Chile, the United States contributed to the overall deterioration of the Chilean economy. Equally important, by increasing assistance to the Chilean military and maintaining contacts with the Chilean officers, the United States was in a position to encourage the coup that eventually took place.

Finally, the United States has overthrown Third World regimes through the introduction of coup makers into the military itself. In Cambodia, the United States allegedly placed anti-Sihanouk mercenaries into the Cambodian army where they played a critical role in the coup that ensued. In effect, the removal of Sihanouk was (if reports are correct) an American coup using

Cambodian proxies. The operation succeeded because of the support of key members of the indigenous military and the non-interference of the remaining forces.

The case studies also demonstrate the importance of cooperation among the various American agencies involved with backing the coups. Guatemala proved to be a success largely because the CIA, the State Department and the business community worked relatively harmoniously with one another. The overthrow of Diem in South Vietnam almost failed because the Pentagon, the CIA, and the White House could not agree on the desirability of the coup and thus sent conflicting signals to the coup makers. A coup operation is delicate and dangerous enough without having to endure the further burden of a lack of agreement from those ostensibly backing the effort.

Secrecy was essential to all of the American backed coup efforts. Although suspicions and allegations of American involvement surrounded each of the coups, the United States was never directly linked to any of the operations. More important, details of American involvement did not surface prior to the actual coups.

All of the cases demonstrated the importance of not initiating or assisting a coup against the wishes of the military and the people. In each of the cases, the Third World armed forces either actively supported the coup effort or remained neutral. The one exception to this occurred in Chile in 1970 and resulted in the failure to prevent Allende from assuming power. Similarly, the people of the Third World countries either

welcomed the new regime or were indifferent to its coming to power. Only in Iran did substantial protests develop but they did not represent any large segment of the population as revealed by their quick disappearance once counter-demonstrations were organized.

The cases also illustrated that regimes installed with the help of the United States are not doomed to be overthrown by anti-American elements. Guatemala and Chile have maintained pro-Western ties since the initial American involvement helped overthrow unfriendly governments. The Shah of Iran was replaced by a hostile regime--but only after twenty-five years in which he essentially backed Western interests in a critical area of the world. The loss of pro-Western governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia occurred not because of the American-backed coups but rather due to the ongoing politico/military situation in Southeast Asia.

Policy Recommendations

As long as the United States has important and vital interests that are dependent on the nature of Third World regimes, a policy of initiating and/or assisting coups against certain governments in extraordinary situations is a necessity. Such a policy should be guided by the following considerations:

- o The range of involvement demanded of the United States in backing coups depends on the level of American influence in the Third World country and the desire of the indigenous military to overthrow the existing regime. Where American influence is strong and the armed forces seek to remove the

incumbent government, very little is required of the United States. Where American influence is weak and the military is not ready to launch a coup, the United States will have to play a greater role.

- o Such a role could involve creating a "coup climate" to provoke the military to act. Exacerbating economic difficulties, highlighting the possibility of a Communist takeover (and thus raising fears in the military of their role being supplanted), attacking the armed forces directly, and making clear that the United States would support a successor regime are all ways to induce an otherwise undecided military to act.
- o In certain situations the United States should consider introducing anti-government elements directly into the military. Together with existing opponents to the regime, they can make up the "critical mass" necessary for a successful coup.
- o As few agencies and individuals as possible should be involved in the coup effort. Those that are involved should support the goal of a successful coup and cooperate towards that end. Giving mixed signals to potential coup makers or failing to coordinate the coup effort will make a risky enterprise that much more difficult.
- o Secrecy is essential to any American-backed coup operation. If the operation cannot be handled covertly, it should not be carried out at all.
- o American-backed coups are not likely to succeed against regimes which command the active support of their armed

forces. The military is the most important institution in many Third World states. While a coup may initially succeed against a regime that has the backing of the armed forces, such a regime will not be able to survive for long without a major and ongoing American commitment.

- o Similarly, the United States should be cautious about backing coups against regimes which enjoy the support of the people. The narrow scope of a coup might allow it initial success in taking power but it is not likely that the new regime could long remain in office against the wishes of the governed. Such a regime is bound to cause problems both domestically in the United States and in the country of its rule. American policy makers should, however, be careful to distinguish between regimes which can simply force demonstrations of support and those which are truly backed by the people.
- o Finally, the United States should not initiate or assist a coup unless groups already exist who are willing to act to overthrow the government. American policy makers must build on substantial existing anti-government feeling if the coup is to be successful. Overthrowing regimes without such indigenous assistance requires not a coup but an invasion (e.g. the Soviet removal of the Amin regime in Afghanistan and the United States toppling of the Coard regime in Grenada are examples of invasions to replace governments--not coups).

The Advisability and Ethics of an American-Backed Coup Policy

Supporting a coup against a Third World regime will never be easy to justify for the United States. No matter what the provocation, there are norms against interfering in the internal affairs of another state, violating a country's sovereignty, and removing its government. Especially for a democracy such as the United States which prides itself on its commitment to human rights and the moral superiority of its international behavior, initiating coups will often be a difficult and repugnant policy.

And yet, there is no reason to believe that such a policy is always wrong and would never be accepted by the American people. There is a real possibility that vital American interests will require the overthrow of Third World regimes in the future. The prospect of irrational individuals gaining control over nuclear weapons or using the power of the state to inflict terrorism against Western interests, will mitigate the reluctance of many to assist others to rid the world of these destabilizing elements. If the interests to be safeguarded are clearly critical, and the coup effort brief, an American policy can enlist domestic support.

Most important, an effective American coup policy can not be an immoral one. Legitimate regimes that truly command the support of their people are virtually immune from coups. An American policy that sought to overthrow such regimes would (in the long term at least) be foolish and counter-productive. It is only those governments that rule by force and whose overthrow would cause little regret in their own countries, that should be considered as possible targets for an American coup effort. As

such, to be successful, an American coup policy must also take into account the hopes and desires of the Third World peoples. A pragmatic policy must also be an ethical one.

Notes

1. This section draws principally from: Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, (New Jersey: Summit Books), 1983, pp. 184-202, and Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little Brown), 1979, especially pp. 457-468.

2. The principal source for this account is: Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, (New York: Doubleday), 1982.

3. For two good accounts of the American role in the Iranian coup see: Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, New York, 1979; and Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1980.

4. For a concise and rather unfriendly treatment of this episode see, Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, (New York: Summit Books,) 1983, pp. 258-297. For a more sympathetic account see, Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little Brown), 1979, pp. 653-670.

5. Hersh, p. 288.

6. The best account of American involvement in the Diem coup can be found in, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam: The Senator Gravel Edition, Volume II, (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 201-276.

MILITARY COUPS WORLD-WIDE, 1969-1983:

THE HOW AND WHY, CAUSES OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

Introduction

In the eighties, at a time when most Third World nations celebrate the 25th anniversary of the transition from colonial rule to independence, the military coup d'etat is by far the most common version of political change in the LDCs. Where a lack of constitutional tradition, institutionalization and political self-control combines with an abundance of political demands and material expectations, the political system is little respected and overtaxed at the same time. Constitutional arrangements for political succession thus enjoy little legitimacy and incumbents find themselves in the unenviable position of being constantly subject to being overthrown by a competing elite. The army, legally excluded from politics but constantly tempted to intervene inside this "praetorian system,"¹ is the most likely candidate for the exercise of a coup d'etat. Only the maintenance of a strictly apolitical professional ethos could restrain it -- the Reichswehr in the Weimar Republic never attempted a coup d'etat. Lacking this ethos, Third World armies tend to become inexorably politicized and, more often than not, beholden to some oppositional elite and/or the political ambition of one or several of its leaders.

Because of its very unconstitutionality and the characteristic violence of the military dictatorships, the coup d'etat meets mostly with rejection in Western democracies. The indigenous population, on the other hand, may well accept

military infringement upon civilian rule in return for the promise, made by every coup leader, to save it from civilian injustice, indifference and incompetence widespread in the Third World. So-called "reform coups" that actually make a serious effort to deliver on this promise often embark on some vaguely defined "national socialism," invariably generating suspicions of Soviet behind-the-scenes involvement among some in the West. Others will praise this "progressive" turn of events and forget about yesterday's condemnation. In judging military coups d'etat in the Third World according to Western patterns ("left" vs. "right"), Western views about these events tend to be unrealistic.

This paper suggests that Third World military coups can be explained with reference to the imperfections of Third World politics as exemplified by the concept of the praetorian society. They also have to be assessed against the background of the history, political culture and economic possibilities of the individual country and region in question. Otherwise contradictory attitudes, misplaced moral judgements, and generally speaking, mirror imaging will prevail. As in the Roman Empire of the third century A.D., the military coup d'etat in the contemporary Third World may have become an ordinary method in the affairs of state. It should not be viewed as an aberration from some norm conceived of in terms of Western concepts and preferences. Few Third World countries correspond to such norms at present, nor are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future.

What "Causes" Coups D'etat?

The study of military coups straddles the subfields of the study of political revolution and the study of civilian supremacy over the military. Most Western students of the military coup d'etat have been concerned with causality and prediction,² thus conforming to the dominant tendency in contemporary political science. This approach has been no more useful in the realm of theory than in practical day-to-day political assessment.

The notion of impersonal, quantifiable causes in the form of observable variables correlating to the explanandum, is inapplicable in explaining an event such as the military coup. Like few other political developments the coup is the direct result of conscious human action; human motives form not only the intervening, but the critical variable. An action that requires the actor's willingness to put his life at risk cannot be reduced to a mere reaction to external stimuli, as should be intuitively obvious. In the words of one observer, the instigators of military coups d'etat are "instigators of their own behavior."³ The political and personal motives of the actor(s) along with such crucial factors as the presence of will, capability, opportunity, and a conducive public opinion as well as the international situation ought to receive primary attention in explaining why a particular coup did or did not take place. Definitive correlations between military-sociological (e.g., corporate grievances), political or even the most general economic and sociological indicators and incidences of coups d'etat, have not been found. In any case, they fail to explain

why a coup d'etat rather than an urban riot resulted from these conditions, or, as remains often enough the case, why it failed to result.

If under almost identical socio-economic and military-sociological conditions the incidence of coups d'etat is high in Thailand but absent in Malaysia, or equally high across much of Black Africa and Latin America despite considerably divergent conditions, there can be no "scientific mode" of explanation. The frequent lack of an intuitively or logically necessary connection between cause and effect becomes particularly damaging when explaining such action-dependent events as military coups in which the only necessary connection is that between the willingness and capability of the actor and the outcome he wishes to effect. His motives, then, may derive from such a wide range of grievances and perceived problems (among which, to be sure, corporate grievances will often rank very prominently) that listing or abstracting them becomes a worthless exercise. In the aggregate they explain everything in general, but nothing in particular.⁵

In the pursuit of theory it is more promising to ask why in a few Third World countries, which according to most quantifiable indicators are not much different from their coup-prone counterparts, military coups have been consistently absent for the past several decades. The reasons why would-be coup leaders refrain from acting (or do not come to power in the first place) will explain the incidence of coups d'etat by referring to the absence rather than the presence of certain factors. The soundness of this approach is increased by the fact that the number of Third

World countries spared from coups over the past few decades is conspicuously small, so that the need for explanation is intuitively greater.

Common sense shows that legitimacy and the apolitical ethos of military professionalism that often goes with it, and civilian penetration of the armed forces (as in the case of party controls over the military in Communist regimes) represent the crucial variables in this context. One observer has stressed that "of several potential bases for civilian control of the military, the strongest comes through the legitimacy and effectiveness of government organs."⁶ Governments that are merely popular, owing for example to economic prosperity or military victory under their rule, seldom succumb to coups. But this is not to confirm correlational explanations using economic or other quantifiable indicators as the independent variable. The crucial factor is the intervening one of popularity. Or, negatively put, it is the absence of a public opinion conducive to a coup that is critical. This may be due to economic well-being, but might well be founded in a variety of other reasons -- the civilian leader's charisma for example. The presence of a charismatic as well as politically irreproachable leader represents in the Third World an almost fail-safe insurance against military coups d'etat.⁷ Preferably he has led his country into independence so that the public associates or even credits him with the achievement of its most cherished common good, lending outright legitimacy in the Weberian sense to his charisma. The military coup now becomes unfeasible due to a lack of public and internal military support.

Only glaring political ineptitude or corruption on the part of the leader can put this into question. This was the case with Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, 1966. Yet the equally ineffective Sekou Toure of Guinea never had to crush a coup attempt during his reign, let alone resign in the face of one, thanks to his popular image as Guinea's charismatic founder of independence. How to explain in any other way that only hours after his recent death Guinea's armed forces took over, as if they had been waiting for this event all along but never dared to bring it on themselves?

No theoretical model can explain why coups happen; they merely explain why they are possible in most countries and demonstrate why they are most unlikely in others. Any realistic approach to this issue must focus on the psychology and behavior of the actor(s). For this reason the emphasis in the following will be on the coup leaders, their aims and ambitions. "Odd coups," which occurred despite strong regime legitimacy or precautionary measures, will be pointed out. The international dimension (foreign involvement, re-alignment and international repercussions in general following the coup) will be stressed.

How To Define A Coup D'etat For Our Purposes?

All regime disturbances involving armed forces are included as military coups in the following, whether they succeeded or failed to seize sovereign state power from an established sovereign government, or to shift this power exclusively to an executive side dominated by the military. In case of failure (which may occur as early as the conspiratorial stage), the intent to succeed in the above sense must be reasonably clear,

for conspiracies may be fabricated by the regime. Excluded are military mutinies, rebellions and uprisings whose intent is not political or is merely secessionist.

Coups d'etat thus defined will be classified by the political effect they brought on (or intended to bring on) in their wake.⁸ Differentiation will be made between "pronunciamentos" that change little or nothing except for the human make-up of the government, "restorative coups" that attempt to return the political regime (i.e., order) to a stage already overcome, "reform coups" that try to advance the political regime, and "revolutionary coups" that try to change the material- and value-related structure of the whole society.⁹ As to the second scheme (not always applicable), it will be differentiated between "reactionary-rightist" coups that thwart a "leftist" political development, "reactionary leftist" coups that do so to an "anti-leftist" political development, "progressive-leftist" coups that embark on a socialist political-economic course, and "progressive-capitalist" coups that promote a more enlightened free-market approach.

Incidence and Chronology of Coups d'etat (1969-83)

Statistics (L.)/A

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Unsuccessful</u>	<u>Countries</u>
0	1	Angola, Bahrein, Burma, Dominica, Egypt, Gambia, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Saudi-Arabia, Spain, Tunisia, Tanzania, UAE (Abu Dhabi), Yemen/South, Zambia
0	2	Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malagasy Republic, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Zaire
0	3	Dominican Republic
0	4	Congo, Iraq, Mali
1	0	Burundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Korea/South, Lesotho, Poland, Rwanda, Syria, Turkey
1	1	Chile, El Salvador, Mauretania, Pakistan, Peru
1	2	Niger, Portugal, Seychelles
1	3	Guinea-Equatorial
1	4	Chad, Somalia
1	5	Liberia
1	6	Libya, Sudan
2	0	Guatemala, Comoro Islands, Uruguay
2	1	Nigeria, Grenada
2	2	Ecuador, Uganda
2	3	Argentina, Yemen/North
2	4	Central African Republic (previously Empire)
2	5	Benin

Statistics (L.)/A (Continued)

Successful	Unsuccessful	Countries
3	0	Honduras
3	1	Thailand
3	2	Ethiopia
3	4	Bangladesh
3	5	Surinam
4	0	Upper Volta
4	1	Afghanistan
4	4	Ghana
9	11	Bolivia
<hr/>		
83	+	133
		=
		coups in 73 countries, of which 3 non-LDC*

*Namely, Greece, Poland and Spain; Portugal and Cyprus are considered LDCs as are the oil-rich Third World countries (since political development in the present context is the critical variable).

Statistics (1.)/B

<u>Year</u>	<u>Successful coups</u>	<u>Unsuccessful coups</u>
1969	5 Benin, Bolivia, Libya,	4 Central African Republic, Liberia, Libya, Mali
1970	5 Cambodia, Bolivia (2), Lesotho, Syria	2 Iraq, Liberia
1971	4 Argentina, Bolivia, Thailand, Uganda	12 Argentina, Bolivia, Chad, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan
1972	4 Benin, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras	10 Benin, Bolivia, Chad, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Somalia
1973	5 Afghanistan, Chile, Greece, Ruanda, Uruguay	11 Benin, Bolivia (2), Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Liberia, UAE (Abu Dhabi)
1974	8 Cyprus, Ethiopia (3), Nigeria, Portugal, Upper Volta, Yemen/North	8 Afghanistan, Bolivia (3), Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Uganda (2)
1975	7 Bangladesh (2), Chad, Comoro Islands, Hondu- ras, Nigeria, Peru	16 Argentina, Bangladesh Benin (2), Ecuador, Libya (3), Malagasy Republic (2), Mozambique, Niger, Portugal (2), Sudan, Zaire
1976	5 Argentina, Burundi, Ecuador, Thailand, Uruguay	10 Bangladesh, Burma, Central Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Sudan, Tunisia
1977	4 Pakistan Seychelles, Thailand, Yemen/North	9 Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan
1978	7 Afghanistan, Bolivia (2) 11 Comoro Islands, Ghana, Honduras, Mauretania	Congo, Dominican Republic, Libya, Mali, Nicaragua, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen/North (2), Yemen/South, Zaire
1979	9 Afghanistan (2), Bolivia, Central African Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Equatorial, Korea/ South, El Salvador	6 Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Iraq

Statistics (L.)/B (Continued)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Successful coups</u>	<u>Unsuccessful coups</u>
1980	8 Bolivia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Surinam (2), Volta	6 Iran, Jamaica, Libya, Pakistan, Surinam, Zambia
1981	4 Bolivia, Central African Republic, Ghana, Poland	20 Bahrein, Bangladesh, Bolivia (3), Dominica, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Equatorial, Liberia (2), Mauretania, Seychelles, Spain, Sudan, Surinam (2), Thailand, Yemen/North
1982	4 Bangladesh, Guatemala, Surinam, Upper Volta	6 Ghana, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Surinam (2)
1983*	4 Grenada, Guatemala, Nigeria, Upper Volta	2 Guinea-Equatorial, Tanzania

	83	+ 133 = 216

*The second half of 1983 is not completely covered here.

Factual Survey of 216 Coups, 1969-83

(A) EUROPE

A/1. Cyprus

- 1) Successful coup on July 15, 1974; of restorative/reactionary-rightist character.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the National Guard (10,000 men under 650 active mainland-Greek officers) against heavy resistance by forces loyal to President Makarios, above all the Presidential body guards "Efedrikon Soma;" success secured by July 16.
 - b) Motivational background: the heavily irredendist National Guard (going back to guerrilla organization EOKA which had been fighting for "enosis" with Greece) disliked President Makarios' position in favor of continued Cypriot independence, his (very feeble) attempts to accommodate the Turkish minority, and his efforts, supported by fairly strong leftist groups, to improve relations with the Communist bloc.

The immediate cause of the coup was Makarios' ultimatum to the Greek government on July 3 to withdraw its officers on the island, as well as his recent efforts to create loyal security forces ("Efedrikon Soma" et al.).

- c) Foreign dimension: the coup happened with "the agreement or at least knowledge of the government in Athens." It triggered directly the Turkish invasion of Cyprus of July 20, 1974, and, via that, the collapse of the Greek military junta. Cyprus has been effectively partitioned ever since. NATO's southern flank suffers.
- d) Internal effects: the coup leaders proclaimed the former EOKA guerrilla Nicos Sampson President of Cyprus on the very day of the coup, with President Makarios having escaped to the British troops. Eight days later, in the face of the Turkish invasion and upheaval on the Greek mainland, the moderate Glafkos Kleridis became the interim President pending the return of Makarios (on December 7), effectively nullifying the coup's intended effects in a matter of days.

A/2. Greece

1. Successful coup on November 25, 1973; a de-facto "pronunciamento."
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by a group of "national-revolutionary" officers against the military

junta (civilian facade) of President Papadopoulos; swift and bloodless overthrow.

- b) Motivational background: the Army support on which the Papadopoulos regime depended had been melting away due to increasing dissension and the quick erosion of its remaining legitimacy, highlighted by the student riots at the Athens Polytechnic in November, 1973, and the government's response (34 dead, almost 1000 injured, declaration of martial law). The new junta justified the coup by reference to the economic incompetence and tyrannical aspirations of its predecessors, yet in view of its even more pronounced incompetence and failure to change anything, maintaining Army rule in a proto-revolutionary situation appeared to be the decisive motive behind the coup.
- c) Foreign dimension: the coup installed a government that embarked on a distinctly more hostile course vis-a-vis Turkey as well as an aggressive "enosis" policy towards the Cyprus problem, leading in the longer term to the 1974-events on Cyprus and the weakening of NATO's southern flank.
- d) Internal effects: General Phaidon Gizikis took over and proved utterly unable in the following months to rectify any of the problems with which he had justified his coup.

A/3. Poland

- 1) Successful coup on December 13, 1981; restorative/reactionary.
 - a) Operational detail: coup (i.e., unconstitutional⁹ declaration of martial law -- "stan wojenny" --) executed by the Polish Armed Forces under General Wojciech Jaruzelski; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: fear of the Solidarity movement, whose political ambitions had been growing rapidly, coupled with the Party's inability to stem the tide of widespread democratic demands in general, and the impending economic-financial collapse in particular. With the Party's legitimacy down to zero and a democratic revolution in the making, only the Army was left to save the political status quo as well as set effectively about the country's economic plight.
 - c) Foreign dimension: Soviet advance knowledge and support, if not engineering of the Polish coup may be assumed; the threat of the disruption of the USSR's strategic corridor to the West, as well as delegitimization of the Brezhnev Doctrine, was looming large. The international repercussions were

tremendous. Most important were a further deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations as the U.S. reacted harshly with economic sanctions and sharp rhetoric, and simultaneous strains on the cohesion of the Western Alliance as the European allies proved not prepared to allow the Polish events to finally disrupt detente and East-West trade.

- d) Internal effects: most noteworthy were the outlawing of Solidarity, the prevention or at least delay of political-economic collapse, and the precedent set at a time of increasing militarization of all Communist regimes (especially the USSR) of a military takeover in a socialist one-party system.

A/4. Portugal

- 1) Successful coup on April 25, 1974; revolutionary/progressive-leftist.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the socially reformist to revolutionary Armed Forces Movement (MFA), whose core consisted of about 200 lower-to-middle rank officers and NCOs, supported even by the non-revolutionary majority in Portugal's Armed Forces which was represented by General de Spínola, the figurehead of the coup. The real leaders were the MFA activists Colonel Vasco Gonçalves and Major Otelho de Carvalho, with Spínola lending the necessary reputation and prestige. Coup met with little resistance from the Caetano regime (3 dead, 45 injured) and succeeded swiftly, first in destroying the old regime's mainstays, the secret police (DGS) and the senior officer corps, then in ending political repression -- 132 political prisoners were immediately released -- and setting the country on a radically new course.
 - b) Motivational background: except for the most senior officers, who were attacking Caetano from the right, virtually all of Portugal's Armed Forces supported the coup. Motives were mixed. The majority of officers were motivated by frustration over the unwinnable war in Africa and distinct dislike of the government's recruiting policies, which allowed university-educated conscripts to join their officer corps with little training, thus undermining their professional homogeneity. For a minority of officers, who ironically were those very junior officers whom the regime had been drafting into the Army from universities in order to preclude their possible revolutionary activity in civilian society, it was a matter of genuine revolutionary intent. Their consciousness had been raised by the revolutionary ferment at the universities and the war experience in Africa. Deemed safest in uniform thousands of miles

away from home, under the leadership of a few like-minded middle-rank and senior officers, they instead undermined the whole Army and thus shifted the locus of revolution from civilian to military society. Far from complicating a popular revolution, this only resulted in a more efficient way of toppling the Caetano regime.

- c) Foreign dimension: Portugal's overseas colonies owe their swift release into independence in 1974/75 directly to this cataclysmic coup. Moreover, the initially leftist leaders of post-Caetano Portugal actively favored the Marxist national liberation movements in their former colonies, resulting in socialist governments in all of them after the Portuguese withdrawal. This had the well-known consequence of Soviet-Cuban intervention on the side of the Marxist government in the Angolan civil war which is often described as the traumatic experience of the neo-conservative, post-detente U.S. foreign policy establishment.

In the NATO context, the coming to power of leftist officers in Portugal led temporarily to doubts about this strategically important country's reliability or even continued cooperation on the Western side; by late 1976, however, when the radical socialists in Portugal had finally lost out (see below), the continuation of Portugal's role in the Western Alliance was favorably settled as well.

- d) Internal effects: after a comparatively moderate interlude under General Spínola in July 1974, the more extreme forces of the Armed Forces Movement took over officially as well. Colonel Gonçalves became the prime minister, with Spínola remaining in his post as (figurehead) President. Socialist and Communists were represented in the new government, which increasingly steered in a pro-Communist direction. Faced with this turn of events, Spínola stepped down in September, to be superseded by General Francisco Gomes. The provisional government was to stay in power until the announced date of a general election of April 25, 1975 (a year after the coup). The post-revolutionary situation remained highly charged, with the ruling leftist officers confronting opposition from rightist counter-revolutionaries to democratic socialists such as the leader of the PSP, Mario Soares.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup on March 11, 1975; restorative/-reactionary-rightist.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by conservative officers and politicians under the leadership of erstwhile President Spínola; swiftly suppressed by the overwhelmingly loyal Armed Forces, who incur one

fatality. Spinola escaped to Brazil, the involved officers arrested and expelled from the Army.

- b) Motivational background: Spinola cited dictatorial tendencies of the ruling junta as reason for the coup attempt. The real motive appears to have been the outrage felt by the older officers at the ongoing transformation of the Army into a militarily undisciplined agent of revolution as well as class-related, counter-revolutionary aspirations.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the MFA tightened its rule. A "revolutionary council" replaced both the junta and the "state council" as highest government organs, pending the upcoming general election. Agrarian reform and nationalization of industry accelerated. In the coming months Portugal experienced unparalleled domestic political upheaval, resulting largely from the contradiction between a pro-Communist official line and the democratic-socialist, pluralist mood of a majority of the population that the election of April 25 had revealed (only 12.5% Communist, yet 38% Socialist).
- 3) Unsuccessful coup on November 25, 1975; restorative/-reactionary-leftist.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the leftist, pro-Communist military faction in the revolutionary council with the help of some supportive military units. Quickly crushed (five dead and numerous wounded). The leaders, Generals Othelo Carvalho and Carlos Fabiao, were degraded and expelled from the revolutionary council.
 - b) Motivational background: the pro-Communist officers wanted to accelerate the revolutionary progress and at the same time preempt further gains in the influence of the moderate faction in the revolutionary council, which by that time was clearly on the rise.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: from late 1975/early 1976 on, Portugal was clearly moving in a direction that culminated in the appointment in July 1976, of Mario Soares as prime minister. This event signalled a curtailment of the revolutionary council's power, as well as the country's return to peaceful and regulated domestic conditions.

A/5. Spain

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on February 23, 1982; restorative/-reactionary-rightist.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by 200 men of the "Guardia Civil" under the leadership of Colonel Antonio Molina, who held the government and parliamentary representatives prisoner for 16 hours, in conjunction with an armored division under General Jaime del Bosch in Valencia. Having given up, the coup leader, Colonel Molina and his followers from the Guardia Civil were arrested in a swift and bloodless crushing of the coup. The King's loyalty to the constitution proved decisive in preventing the spread of coup sentiment in the Army.
 - b) Motivational background: the longing in Army circles for a return to Fascist rule had been reinforced by the apparent inability of the civilian government to come to grips with the Basque terrorist menace, which had been underscored by recent intense terrorist action.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the failed putsch attempt highlighted mass support for the Spanish democracy as hundreds of thousands demonstrated for democracy and against the coup four days later.

A/6. Turkey

- 1) Successful coup on September 12, 1980; no classification.
 - a) Operational detail coup executed by the entire Turkish Armed Forces. Swift and bloodless removal of the Demirel government. Immediate imposition of more stringent restrictions under already existing martial law.
 - b) Motivational background: clearly to put an end to the rampant, country-wide terrorism that was approaching civil war dimensions and making a mockery of internal government. Hence the coup cannot be classified in political terms; it must be seen as an almost unavoidable emergency measure: a last resort in an effort to restore civil order after the civilian government had failed.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the military succeeded in the following months in cutting down drastically country-wide terrorism, at the expense of the suspension of

political rights and individual liberties. These are only now being slowly re-introduced. The Turkish junta has also been charged with human rights violations in its fight against terrorism.

(B) CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN BASIN

B/1. Dominica

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on December 19, 1981; restorative/-reactionary-rightist.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by a dozen gunmen who tried to storm the small nation's police headquarters and failed, leaving three of them dead and nine wounded. Apparently they came from the country's "Army" -- the Army's C-in-C General Frederick Newton was subsequently arrested -- and were trying to free the erstwhile prime minister, Patrick John, who had been arrested 10 months before under charges of putsch attempt.
 - b) Motivational background: see under (a); while the conservative party was in power, the coup's intent was clearly not to bring on a leftward development.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: state of emergency declared, 80 persons arrested.

B/2. Dominican Republic

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on June 30, 1971; restorative/-reactionary-rightist.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the influential right-wing leader in the 1965 civil war, General (ret.) Elias Wessin y Wessin. He was "caught red-handed while attempting to mount the coup, and was sent into exile with the concurrence of the Armed Forces chiefs."
 - b) Motivational background: The Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic had had a long history of intervention in politics, and the moderately conservative president, Joaquin Balaguer, was by then only in feeble control of the military, achieving this goal mainly by playing military factions off against each other. While this factionalism saved him from this coup as well, it could not prevent the attempt. General Wessin, the old hack in the fight against the leftists (which by 1971 was still being waged in the

form of a secret terrorist campaign by Army and police elements against the official leftist party, the PRD), probably felt the time had come for official terrorism against them and opted for a coup since Balaguer, who was heading a coalition government that included the PRD, would not be persuaded.

- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the failure of the coup attempt obviously emboldened President Balaguer in his effort to finish the rightist terrorist campaign against the Left. Soon thereafter he replaced the chief of the national police, disbanded the terrorist elements, and thus achieved his goal. His control over the military in general strengthened considerably over the following years.
- 2) Unsuccessful coup on May 16, 1978; restorative/-reactionary-rightist.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by national police units during the counting of the ballots in a general election that, as had become clear at this stage, would bring into power the PRD candidate for the Presidency, Antonio Guzman. The police units allowed the counting to proceed after they realized that other Armed Forces support was not forthcoming. Balaguer was back in control the following day and able to assure the orderly transfer of power to Guzman.
 - b) Motivational background: the PRD was still an anathema to many in a police force that had spent the better part of the last 15 years combatting it.
 - c) Foreign dimension: suspecting that President Balaguer himself was instrumental in stopping the counting, a threat by the U.S. State Department to cut off aid and a storm of international criticism in general, came upon Balaguer, who did everything in his power to make the election proceed correctly.
 - d) Internal effects: the Dominican Republic inaugurated its first leftist government.
- 3) Unsuccessful coup on September 30, 1979; restorative/-reactionary-rightist.

No further detail available. Basically a re-enactment of previous attempts; crushed by increasingly loyal Armed Forces.

B/3. El Salvador

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on March 25, 1972; revolutionary/-reactionary-leftist.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by left-wing officers after a presidential election failed to bring to power the moderately leftist candidate, Jose Napoleon Duarte. The winner in the election, Colonel Arturo Molina, barely survived this attempt, in the course of which over 100 people lost their lives.
 - b) Motivational background: the failure of the leftist party in the election provided the immediate cause of the coup attempt. In the larger context, it is important to note the extreme polarization of Salvadorian politics at the time, aggravated by the economic hardship brought on by the recent war with Honduras (influx of refugees, export problems due to closure of the Honduras border) in conjunction with the slump in coffee and cotton prices after 1968.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: these cannot be overestimated, since due to this failed coup, dissident military officers have since chosen the alternative route of becoming involved in the left-wing guerrilla movements as well as right-wing death squads which plague El Salvador's internal as well as external situation today.

- 2) Successful coup on October 15, 1979; reformist/progressive-capitalist.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by a sizeable group of young Army officers under the leadership of colonels Adolfo Arnaldo Majano and Jaime Abdul Gutierrez against the military dictatorship of General Carlos Humberto Romero; swift and bloodless with little resistance.
 - b) Motivational background: clearly to preempt a popular insurrection (a la Nicaragua) as internal repression and incompetence steered El Salvador dangerously close to it. The new junta under the aforementioned colonels labeled itself "revolutionary" and promised major socio-economic reforms as well as sweeping political improvements (a general amnesty, free elections, freedom for trade unions and respect for human rights).
 - c) Foreign dimension: if not actively engineered by it, the U.S. did welcome the coup, and without its affirmative attitude it might not have taken place. Nicaragua having fallen, and General Romero having nevertheless refused to democratize his country (he

balked at U.S. insistence to hold elections as early as possible), the U.S. saw no alternative, given the imperative of preventing a repeat performance of leftist rebels in the wake of Nicaragua.

- d) Internal effects: far reaching. The leftist insurgents in El Salvador realized that the new moderate junta, welcomed by all the country's factions (Church, Christian Democrat-led left-of-center coalition) but themselves, represented a more serious enemy and might, if politically and economically successful, dry up their sources of support. They thus decided to step up their activities, thereby provoking the government into renewed repression. They have been increasingly successful in using such tactics ever since. The country's few but rich capitalists did not help matters, sending their capital abroad instead of using it to support the junta's developmental program at home.

B/4. Grenada

- 1) Successful coup on March 13, 1979; reformist/ progressive-leftist.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed, with the help of armed force; by the "new jewel movement" (under the leftist-socialist lawyer Maurice Bishop) against the dictatorial government of Prime Minister Eric Gairy; swift and bloodless. Gairy had flown to New York the night before. Having been warned of the coup, his praetorian guard, the 500-strong Grenada Defense Forces saw no reason to fight and followed Gairy's deputy in an order to lay down arms.
- b) Motivational background: May be found in Gairy's demi-despotic rule over an overcrowded island plagued with underemployment, and his recently increasing recourse to violence in combating the opposition which this unfavorable politico-economic situation continued to spawn (large demonstrations on the occasion of the 1977 OAS meeting on Grenada were suppressed with gunfire). Gairy, the mystic who believed in the necessity of a concerted global effort against UFOs and his ability to fend off political enemies with "love waves," saw his rule finished off by his most determined left-wing opponent, the 34-year old Bishop. Bishop might still have held a grudge against Gairy personally as well, owing to his father's death in violent riots in 1974 when Eric Gairy was overseeing the country's transition to independence.
- c) Foreign dimension: it is not clear whether Cuba had encouraged Bishop in his coup. Shortly after the coup

Bishop began building up his own armed militia, with Cuban help as people then feared and now seems certain.

- d) Internal effects: the "revolutionary government" of Maurice Bishop started to make sincere efforts at "prosperity, education and liberation," yet subsequently did not get very far. However, the improvement over Gairy's rule turned out to be marked.
- 2) Unsuccessful coup on October 16, 1979; restorative/-reactionary-rightist.

Not many further details available. Grenada reported "the uncovering of a conspiracy with numerous arrests." Counter-revolutionary attempts against the Bishop regime may be assumed. Involvement of Eric Gairy or the U.S. remains unclear.

- 3) Successful coup on October 20, 1983; revolutionary/-reactionary-leftist.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Grenada's Army under the leadership of "General" Hudson Austin and Bishop's deputy Bernard Coard, who put Bishop under house arrest after his return from a trip to Czechoslovakia and, after the latter managed to escape and bring the populace over to his side, arrested him and shot many of his followers.
- b) Motivational background: the extreme leftists in Bishop's regime disliked his efforts to normalize relations with the U.S. and legitimize his four-year rule through elections.
- c) Foreign dimension: Cuban collusion in the coup is hard to prove and unlikely. Cuba was on Bishop's side and Cubans on the island reportedly warned Coard and Austin against doing anything against Bishop's rule. The international repercussions of the coup were tremendous. As the U.S. was not prepared to put up with a further drift to the left on the strategically important -- and Cuban infiltrated -- island, it mounted a full-blown invasion within days after the coup. The implications of the U.S. action are well known and need not be related here.
- d) Internal effects: none, since the successful coup brought in a regime that survived only a few days.

B/5. Guatemala

- 1) Successful coup on March 23, 1982; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army together with the rightist "National Liberation Front" against the government of General Romero Lucas Garcia; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: this coup, shifting political power from one junta to another, was meant to shore up the popular legitimacy of the regime.
 - c) Foreign dimension: U.S. involvement is unlikely. Nine months later the U.S. lifted the arms embargo.
 - d) Internal effects: few. The new junta (Generals Rios Montt and Maldonado Schaab and Colonel Francisco Gordillo, a close friend of General Guevara tightened the dictatorship.

- 2) Successful coup on August 8, 1983; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army against the government of Rios Montt; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: similar to the previous change of juntas. The leaders of this coup may have entertained a more sincere intent to promote democracy -- only 3 months before, the highest ranked General of the Army, Jose Vielman, having demanded parliamentary elections, had been dismissed from service.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no major foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the new junta under defense minister Oscar Mejia Victores lifted some dictatorial restrictions but was determined to intensify the fight against the guerrillas.

B/6. Honduras

- 1) Successful coup on December 4, 1972; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army under the leadership of General Osvaldo Lopez Arellano against the government of President Ramon Ernesto Cruz; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: the new junta cited "condoning of corruption" on the part of Ramon Cruz as reason for the coup. Yet frequent change of government is an integral part of Honduras' political scene -- Cruz headed the 124th since independence in 1828.

- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: Arellano dissolved the parliament, charged a "defense council" with the highest political responsibility.
- 2) Successful coup on April 22, 1975; pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army against the junta of President (General) Arellano; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: the coup leaders cited Arellano's involvement in a corruption affair with the U.S. company "United Brands Company" as reason for their coup.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the coup brought into office President Colonel Juan Alberto Castro, who continued his predecessors' agrarian reform and promised to combat corruption. He also nationalized the banana industry.
- 3) Successful coup on August 7, 1978; pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army under the governing "Superior Council of National Defense" (established by Arellano; see above against President Castro); swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: corruption charges against Castro (involvement in a \$30,000,000 a year operation smuggling cocaine from Colombia to the U.S.A.) are cited in justification of this coup.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the new junta (General Policarpo Garcia and Lieutenant-Colonels Domingo Alvarez and Amilcar Rodriguez) continued his reforms and promised more. It also pledged respect of human rights.

B/7. Jamaica

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on June 24, 1980; restorative/reactionary
- a) Operational detail: coup never executed, but reportedly planned by one Charles Johnson, the leader of a non-

existent party, the "Jamaica United Front"; he had been announcing his coup openly all over Jamaica and was arrested with 26 military and two non-military supporters. Subsequently Prime Minister Michael Manley accused the opposition Jamaica Labour party, which he was facing in an upcoming general election, of involvement in the abortive coup.

- b) Motivational background: obscure. Since the whole coup showed traces of deliberately intended failure, the suspicion arose that Manley, who in the elections four years ago had already benefitted from timely plot allegations, was behind this one as well.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions. If the coup attempt was sincere, Manley's Cuban connection (via his minister of national security, Dudley Thompson, and the Moonex Company) may have provided a motive.
- d) Internal effects: none.

B/8. Nicaragua

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on August 28, 1978; (intended) pronunciamiento
 - a) Operational detail: coup planned by elements of President Somoza's National Guard and discovered at the conspiratorial stage, leading to the arrests of 85 members of this force, including 12 senior officers. Most had remained loyal.
 - b) Motivational background: parts of the National Guard were distraught at the show of weakness by Somoza in the face of Eden Pastora's recent occupation of the National Palace (the guerrilla leader had got away, with all his demands fulfilled). Afraid that Somoza might step down, they wanted to preempt any other possibility but their succeeding him.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: this coup attempt must be seen in the larger context of the agony of the Somoza regime.

(C) LATIN AMERICA

C/L. Argentina

- 1) Successful coup on March 23, 1971; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the ruling junta of three C-in-Cs against their own boss, President (General) R.N. Levingston; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: a tense domestic security situation (riots especially in Cordoba) and grave economic problems provided the backdrop to this coup. Also, Levingston had been trying to achieve greater personal independence from the military junta.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the new President over the same junta, General Alejandro Lanusse, relaxed the grip over the country. He readmitted parties and began cooperation with the Peronist trade unions, announced general elections for 1973 and sensationally, met Chile's Allende.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup on October 8, 1971; (intended) pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup attempted by elements of the ruling junta under the deposed General Levingston against President Lanusse; swiftly crushed without casualties, yet with numerous arrests.
 - b) Motivational background: for the taste of some in the junta Lanusse had been steering to far to the "left." Immediately before this attempt he had specified the date for the general election (March 25, 1973).
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: none. Lanusse did not deviate from his moderately authoritarian, "left-of-center" line because of this attempt, whose perpetrators, however, would have been forced to follow the same line by Argentina's disastrous socio-economic situation. Harsh measures to combat it had never yet worked in the Argentinian environment of low governmental authority.

- 3) Unsuccessful coup on December 18, 1975; restorative/reactionary.

- a) Operational detail: coup attempted by a handful of Air Force officers under Brigadier Jesus Orlando Capellini against the regime of President Mrs. Peron. With the Army under General Jorge Videla remaining neutral and shifting responsibility for putting down the attempt to "responsible institutions," the few rebels, having seized one air base and Buenos Aires airport, were able to extend their support in the Air Force in a matter of hours. Mrs. Peron reacted by retiring the leadership of this branch and starting negotiations with the rebels, who however, would yield only if she resigned. She called in a few warplanes from the still overwhelmingly loyal Air Force, which destroyed two of the rebel planes on the ground. After the threat of a general strike, the coup leaders gave up.
 - b) Motivational background: was provided by the inept regime of Mrs. Peron, which the majority of the Armed Forces did not join in attacking only because, as one senior general put it in the aftermath of the coup attempt, "the government was not worth losing the life of one soldier, either attacking or defending it." Their neutrality was clearly benevolent, foreshadowing their successful coup three months later.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: this coup was a sign, delivered by elements from the nationalist far right, of the waning legitimacy of Mrs. Peron's rule with all but the Peronist faction on the country's political spectrum. At a time when impeachment proceedings were initiated against her on the civilian side (the lower house), this coup attempt was the prelude to the death-blow finally delivered to her regime by the military three months later.
- 4) Successful coup on March 24, 1976; no classification.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the whole Argentinian Armed Forces against the government of Mrs. Peron; swift and bloodless deposition of the President, who was interned along with her cabinet.
 - b) Motivational background: as in the case of Turkey/1980, this coup represented an emergency measure to stave off the economic collapse and civil war which Argentina was the approaching under Mrs. Peron's government (400% inflation from August 1975 to August 1976, 900 dead at the hands of terrorists in 1975 alone). No political classification is possible. The Armed Forces justified their coup publicly by charging "embezzlement of public funds" by Mrs. Peron.

- c) Foreign dimension: no major foreign implications or repercussions. Relations with Chile deteriorated under the junta (but mainly due to the "Beagle Channel" dispute).
 - d) Internal effects: the junta under General Videla (also: Admiral Emilio Massera and Air Force brigadier Orlando Agostini) suspended political liberties (especially right to strike) and instituted a strictly authoritarian rule. In its fight against leftist terrorism it committed atrocities. On the economic front, it could boast marked improvements by 1978, which, however, have subsequently been shown to have been less than solid (current debt crisis and renewed "stagflation" at home in the wake of the latest global recession).
- 5) Unsuccessful coup on September 29, 1979; (intended) pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup (more a rebellion) attempted by General Luciano Menendez and his deputy, General Jorge Maradona, the C-in-Cs of Cordoba military district, against C-in-C Army, General Roberto Viola. Since the Army held the de facto power in the state, this rebellion qualifies as a coup with political intent. Viola foiled the attempt by relieving the two coup leaders of their duties after these had refused to accept dismissal.
 - b) Motivational background: the coup leaders claimed that Viola was being too soft on the guerrillas. Personal motives may have played the decisive role.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: none.

C/2. Bolivia

- 1) Successful coup on September 26, 1969; pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the politically powerful General Ovando Candia against the Barrientos regime (whose head, President Barrientos, had died in a helicopter accident four months before); swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: confronted with the weak government of Barrientos' vice president, Ovando wanted to strike before someone else did. He had Uria arrested on the day of the coup.

- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: Ovando nationalized the Gulf Oil Company. Expelled four left-wing priests, continued to hunt down guerrillas and dismissed two leftist members of his cabinet.
- 2) Successful coup on October 4, 1970; pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the right-wing C-in-C of the Bolivian Army, General Rogelio Miranda, who called upon President Ovando to resign. Thereupon Miranda himself stepped back in favor of a three-man junta under General Efraim Guachalla.
 - b) Motivational background: the backdrop to this coup is provided by bloody disputes between "left"-and "right" wing groups in this impoverished country (especially in the mining town of Oruru) but personal ambition may have been at the core of it.
 - c) Foreign dimension: No apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: none, the coup was undone in a matter of days.
- 3) Successful coup on October 7, 1970; reformist/progressive.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the moderately leftist General Juan Jose Torres against the junta of General Guachalla. Using a blend of threats and demagoguery, Torres had gained the allegiance of the better part of the Armed Forces, the miners, and peasants' organizations, and the left-wing students. On October 7 Torres proclaimed himself president and overcame some resistance from the old junta by strafing the presidential palace with a few Mustang fighter planes.
 - b) Motivational background: Torres, who labelled himself a "revolutionary President," wanted to bring into power a full-blown leftist-nationalist philosophy after one year of frustrated expectations under Ovando (he himself had been dismissed from his post as C-in-C of the Armed Forces in July). The latest, avowedly reactionary coup triggered his quick action.
 - c) Foreign dimension: Torres displayed open hostility to the U.S.A. and normalized relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In respect to both internal and external affairs, his model was Peru ("peruanista").

d) Internal effects: Torres announced "a popular, nationalist government resting on four pillars -- the peasant farmers, the workers, the students and the armed forces." Among other things, he nationalized many industries and set free Che Guevara's arrested comrades (among them Regis Debray). He formed a "people's parliament" composed only of leftist members, in response to pressure from extreme leftists and the trade unions. By March, 1971, the last moderates in his cabinet were removed.

4) Unsuccessful coup in January 1971; restorative/reactionary.

Not much detail available. Out of political motives, a few right-wing officers attempted to oust General Torres.

5) Successful coup on August 22, 1971; restorative/reactionary.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by the bulk of the Army under Colonel Hugo Banzer against the Torres regime and decisively finished after two days of heavy fighting (126 dead, several hundred wounded). Torres' ill-armed supporters and students trying to resist the coup were overwhelmed by crack Army units (including a ranger battalion) and the (up to then pro-Torres) Air Force.

b) Motivational background: the leftist character of the Torres regime, and signs of radicalization: the "people's parliament's" demands for increased restrictions on foreign investment, for resuming diplomatic relations with Cuba and for the creation of a "people's army" to neutralize the regular Army. This demand, which Torres himself did not support, and Torres' own efforts to build a base of loyal NCOs in the Army may have prompted the coup (the people's militia was to be discussed in the parliament on September 7).

c) Foreign dimension: the change of regimes in Bolivia led to rapprochement with the U.S. Many Soviet diplomats were forced to leave the country in April, 1972.

d) Internal effects: Banzer stopped the country's drift leftward, yet tried hard not to antagonize the progressive social forces he depended upon economically (especially the tin miners); in March, 1972, he introduced social security insurance for the peasants. He pursued an "integrationist" policy, aware of Torres' continuing popularity.

6) Unsuccessful coup in December, 1972; reformist/progressive.

Not much detail available. The coup attempt was staged by supporters in the Air Force of Torres and Barrientos, at El

Alto air base near La Paz. It was crushed, and the Chief of Staff dismissed.

- 7) Unsuccessful coup in May, 1973; (intended) pronunciamiento.

After a rightist-extremist former interior minister to Banzer had re-entered the country from exile and died at the hands of the police, the rightist elements in the Armed Forces protested and Banzer, thinking a coup in the making, relieved all C-in-Cs from their commands and assumed the supreme command himself. The whole affair remains obscure.

- 8) Unsuccessful coup in August 1973; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No further detail available. The Banzer government reported the crushing of a rightist-extremist coup attempt, possibly a repeat performance of the previous one.

- 9) Unsuccessful coup in January, 1974; reformist/progressive.

The Tarapaca armored regiment, led by barrientistas and followers of Torres, seized the presidential palace in La Paz while Banzer was in the south of the country. They were persuaded to give up, but as a consequence of this challenge to his rule, Banzer a month later fired his civilian-military cabinet in favor of a purely military one.

- 10) Unsuccessful coup in June, 1974; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No details available. The government reported that a coup attempt had failed in La Paz.

- 11) Unsuccessful coup on November 7, 1974; reformist-progressive-leftist.

a) Operational detail: coup attempt executed by left-wing officers and politicians against Banzer. Banzer needed troops to put it down and declared a state of emergency.

b) Motivational background: with the legacy of Torres and Barrientos remaining in the form of a strong undercurrent of sympathy in large parts of the Army and "body politic," and the unstable socio-economic situation always providing sufficient reason for a coup, this attempt represented another, more serious challenge from the left to Banzer's shaky regime.

c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.

d) Internal effects: Banzer tightened his rule. he suspended all political parties, removed the union and corporate leaders from their posts and put off indefinitely the general elections planned for 1975.

12) Successful coup on July 21, 1978; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by rivals of Banzer in the Armed Forces who rallied around General Juan Pereda. Swift and bloodless removal of Banzer from power and to the post of ambassador to Argentina.
- b) Motivational background: was mixed. Fellow officers were thinking Banzer had stayed on too long, in a country that had had more presidents than its 153 years of independence. Also, the rigged elections two weeks before were supposed to bring Pereda, whom Banzer himself had proposed as his successor, into office, but instead met with the verdict of the supreme election court that they were invalid. In order to preempt any further complications Pereda's faction in the Army staged the coup.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
- d) Internal effects: Pereda installed an all-military government with less popular legitimacy than Banzer's, who had some personal popularity with the country's indios. His appeal in the Armed Forces remained lukewarm, also due to this air force officer's personality. In the coming months his government proved unable to grapple with the country's deteriorating economic situation.

13) Successful coup on November 24, 1978; reformist/progressive.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army Chief of Staff, General David Padilla, and a group of younger, reform-minded officers (some of whom were barrientistas or Torres followers, veterans of the 1974 coup attempts); swift and bloodless removal from power of General Pereda.
- b) Motivational background: Pereda had made himself suspect of Banzer-like ambitions to stay in power for an unduly long time by his appointment of an all-military cabinet and simultaneous announcement that new elections (after the rigged ones of mid-1978) would be postponed until 1980 at the earliest. This in conjunction with a certain constitution-mindedness on the part of the coup leaders, coupled with Pereda's lack of economic success and unwillingness to implement any reforms, provoked the coup.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
- d) Internal effects: the new junta held general elections

half a year after coming to power. The important effect of this coup is that Bolivia in August, 1979, for the first time, after 15 years of military dictatorship, got a civilian government (the compromise candidate for President, Walter Guevara Arze).

- 14) Unsuccessful coup on October 11, 1979, restorative-/reactionary.

Not much detail available. It is reported that a military rebellion in Trinidad, Dep. Beni -- probably foreshadowing the full-scale coup three weeks later -- fails.

- 15) Successful coup on November 1, 1979; restorative-/reactionary.

In a well-planned, and bloodless military takeover, Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch from the rightist faction in the Armed Forces deposed President Arze and proclaimed himself president in order to prevent the elections which were to be held in 1980 to clarify the inconclusive situation following the 1979 vote. His two weeks in power took a toll of 200 lives. He was forced to resign on November 16 under pressure from other Army factions and the trade unions, and gave way to another civilian president and first woman at Bolivia's political top, Lidia Gueiler Tejada.

- 16) Successful coup on July 17/18, 1980; restorative-/reactionary.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Bolivian Armed Forces, having started in Trinidad and immediately spread to La Paz. Swift and bloodless turnover of Mrs. Tejada's interim presidency, yet heavy resistance from the unions, who call a general strike, and the tin miners, who turn militant. The Armed Forces break this resistance in a matter of days.

b) Motivational background: The 1980 elections, finally held on June 29, had been won by the leftist ex-President Siles Zuazo, who should have been confirmed by the Congress on August 6. To prevent this, and to stop "Democratism, Communism, Castroism and Anarchism," the Bolivian Armed Forces pulled this coup.

c) Foreign dimension: This coup isolated Bolivia internationally. The U.S. cut diplomatic relations, in view of the sudden and violent interruption of a hopeful new beginning with civilian government; the 10th General Assembly of the OAS condemned the coup. Most countries decide to freeze their bilateral aid, and Amnesty International and other international organizations charge Bolivia with human rights violations and sundry other wrongdoings such as involvement in international drug traffic. However, on

February 17, 1981, Peru became the first member of the Andes Pact to recognize diplomatically the Bolivian junta.

- d) Internal effects: the new junta, comprised of the three C-in-Cs (Luis Garcia Tejada, Walde Bernai and Ramiro Terrazas), distinguished itself by political and economic incompetence. The state of the economy remained precarious. Foreign debts of \$3.2 billion portended trouble.
- 17) 3 unsuccessful coups in the spring and summer of 1981; (intended) pronunciamientos.
 - 18) These attempted coups -- by Generals Alberto Natusch Busch, Hugo Banzer and Lucio Anez Rivero, respectively -- resulted in the gradual erosion of President Garcia Tejada's backing by the military.
 - 19) Successful coup on August 4, 1981; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Bolivian Armed Forces against the crumbling regime of General Garcia; swift and bloodless replacement of the old junta with a new junta of three new C-in-Cs with Army C-in-C General Celso Torrelio Villa at the top.
 - b) Motivational background: to maintain army rule.
 - c) Foreign dimension: the U.S. resumed diplomatic relations with Bolivia in early November, 1981.
 - d) Internal effects: Protest demonstrations, riots and general strikes. After a year of domestic upheaval, the army leaders saw no way out but to yield and return political responsibility to a popularly legitimized civilian government. In early October 1982, the leftist Siles Zuazo reaped the fruit of his electoral victory two years ago and became, after 18 years of almost uninterrupted military rule, president of a democratic Bolivia.

C/3. Chile

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on June 29, 1973; restorative/reactionary.
 - a) Operational detail: the "four-tank coup", executed by the 2nd tank regiment, which tried to seize the presidential palace in Santiago with fewer than 100 men. 22 people were killed before the rebels surrendered to the police. The fascist organization "Patria y Libertad," five leaders of which took refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy after the attempt, probably had foreknowledge.

- b) Motivational background: foreshadowing the anti-Allende coup less than three months later, this coup was an expression of growing discontent within the Armed Forces which President Allende's policies were increasingly generating. The justification (of sorts) of the coup leaders -- a few young officers -- was to liberate one captain Rocha Aros from imprisonment in the defense ministry.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: left-wing forces in the country rallied around Allende and, through acceptance of moderate wage increases, helped in his efforts to get the economic situation under control. The Army leadership, however, became even more reserved towards his regime and refused to cooperate with him politically (by filling cabinet posts with senior officers so as to restore public confidence, as Allende had wanted).
- 2) Successful coup on September 11, 1973; restorative-/reactionary.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Chilean Armed Forces (in rare political agreement between the three service branches) against the leftist regime of President Allende, and was of great consequence for Latin America's subsequent political development. Armed civilians put up resistance around and inside the presidential palace, which the Army needed to storm; isolated resistance lingered on outside Santiago until mid-October. Up to that date, according to vastly differing estimates, between 450 civilians and 40 soldiers/policemen (junta version), and altogether 2500 people (some Western sources estimate) died in the coup.
 - b) Motivational background: counter-revolutionary. The trucking companies and the retailers had been boycotting the Allende regime to the point of near economic paralysis. Allende's expropriation and inflationary redistribution policies had spawned this hostile attitude of the middle and upper classes. Violence by leftist extremists (mainly against property and during demonstrations) counter-balanced the bourgeois boycott, with Allende, devoid of military support, helplessly caught in the middle. The military justified its action as an "emergency measure".
 - c) Foreign dimension: The repercussions of this watershed event were tremendous: Chile re-entered the mold of Latin American military dictatorships, thus ridding

itself of an enforced international isolation (which, interestingly enough, even the Soviet bloc had been reluctant to remedy). Allende's downfall united the international New Left, (and socialist movement in general) in outraged rejection and condemnation of alleged U.S. support of the coup.

- c) Internal effects: the junta under General Augusto Pinochet instituted a strict dictatorial rule (10,000 political prisoners in August 1974) and a monetarist economic policy. Politically, it proved remarkably stable for several years.

C/4. Ecuador

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on March 31, 1971; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. Ecuador reported the crushing of a military putsch, whose leaders were reportedly court-martialed.

- 2) Successful coup on February 16, 1972; pronunciamiento.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Armed Forces against President Jose Velasco Ibarra, whom the coup leaders swiftly and bloodlessly turned out of office and put on a plane for Panama.

b) Motivational background: The removal and subsequent reinstatement of Velasco by the Army (4 times since 1944) had already become something of a game in Ecuadorian politics, or played out of sheer caprice, it seems, since neither of the two parties to it had fixed political persuasions but rather kept vacillating from left to right and right to left. Velasco had dominated Ecuadorian politics since 1944 and the Army (which in 1972 happened to be rightist) may have decided it was finally time for Velasco (who in 1972 happened to be leftist) to go. Velasco favored a left-wing alliance in the coming elections, antagonized the U.S. over the issue of fishing rights and met Allende and Castro.

c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions. The new junta constantly quarrelled with the U.S.

d) Internal effects: the new junta was sharply right-wing (for the time being) and promised the usual socio-economic reforms. General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara became President.

- 3) Unsuccessful coup on September 1, 1975; (intended) pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by parts of the Armed Forces under the leadership of their chief of staff, General Raoul Gonzales Alvear, and some civilian politicians, among whom there were partisans of ex-president Velasco. After some bloody fighting, in which 18 people lost their lives, forces loyal to Lara succeeded in suppressing the putsch. 350 oppositional officers and politicians were subsequently arrested; Alvear escaped into the Chilean Embassy.
 - b) Motivational background: The erratic, personalist character of Ecuadorian politics and civilian-military alignments applied to this affair. The coup leaders may have wanted a return to civilian rule, but their political persuasion was impossible to establish on a left-right scale. Alvear's escape to the Chileans and the coup leaders' support for a pro-American, anti-OECD oil policy might indicate a conservative persuasion, but "Personalismo" appears to have been the decisive factor.
 - c) Foreign dimension: the coup leaders seem to have drawn encouragement from the recent coup in Peru, in which a slightly less leftist, but basically equally undefinable military faction had taken over. Otherwise no major foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the coup further destabilized Lara's rule and thus foreshadowed his deposition a year later.
- 4) Successful coup on January 11, 1976, pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Armed Forces against the ruling junta of General Lara, and bolstered by a simultaneous military uprising; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: Lara, feeling pressured to speed up the return to civilian rule, announced his plans to this effect and was promptly overthrown by another military faction which wanted to maintain military rule.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the new junta met with the same opposition -- civilian politicians and trade unions -- that had been exerting pressure on Lara. It therefore included some civilians in its cabinet, which was headed by President (Vice Admiral) Poveda Burbano. The junta delivered the usual promises to fight corruption, improve life and return the country to civilian rule by 1977.

C/5. Peru

1) Successful coup on August 29, 1975; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by sections of the Armed Forces under Prime Minister and Defense Minister General Francisco Morales Bermudez against President General Juan Velasco Alvarado; swift and bloodless change at the top.
- b) Motivational background: is to be found in a personal rivalry within the ruling military junta. Velasco was partly incapacitated by illness and was displaying erratic behavior as well as tendencies toward arbitrary rule while Morales, the next most powerful man, was actually in charge. Morales, accusing Velasco of a "cult of personality," put an end to this state of affairs by placing himself at the top. No ideological differences were involved.
- c) Foreign dimension: the coup took place while the foreign ministers of the "bloc-free" states were gathered in Lima and delivering Laudationes to the "Peruvian model" of their hosts. While the new junta was intrinsically neither more leftist nor more rightist than its predecessor -- the coup, in a somewhat bewildered foreign press coverage, was seen at the time as a setback to both the leftist and conservatives within the ruling junta -- it did in fact represent a severe setback to the pro-Soviet faction around General Juan Graham, a regular visitor to Cuba.
- d) Internal effects: in the longer term, the new junta did indeed move closer to the political center. This, however, may have happened anyway, as unworkable socialist experiments would have had to give way to a pragmatic line under any faction.

2) Unsuccessful coup in July, 1976; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. In a difficult economic situation and with the usual inter-military squabbles continuing, a putsch attempt was reported.

C/6. Suriname

1) Successful coup on February 28, 1980; de facto pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the NCO and rank-and-file element in the country's 800-man "Army" against the civilian government of Henck Arron.

Despite resistance by the police, due to which ten people were killed and several dozen wounded, the soldiers quickly gained control of the capital, Paramaribo.

- b) Motivational background: corporate grievances. The soldiers were denied pay raises and a Dutch-style soldiers' trade union, and some of their spokesmen had been beaten and jailed by police.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the NCOs who led the coup (Lieutenant Michael van Rey and the Sergeants Horb, Neede and Sital) formed an eight-man national military council and a civilian administration under it. They made the usual promises for reform.
- 2) Unsuccessful coup on May 05, 1980; (intended) pronunciamento.
- Not much detail available. The leader of the 300 mercenaries attempting this coup, the ex-sergeant Fritz Ormkerk, was fatally wounded in the course of the event.
- 3) Successful coup August 13-16, 1980; pronunciamento.
- The powerful national military council headed by master Sergeant Daisy Bouterse, pushed the figurehead president Johan Ferrier out of office and replaced him with the head of the civilian administration, Prime Minister Henck Chin A Sen; simultaneously the council abolished the constitution and dissolved the parliament. Some Cuban sympathizers in the NCO corps were arrested.
- 4) Two unsuccessful coups in mid-March, 1981; (intended) pronunciamentos.
- Not much detail available. Both coups, pulled off by participants in the "sergeants' coup" of February 1980, were motivated by Bouterse's increasing personal power, less by his comic-opera (but intensely cruel) policy line. His latest fad was a socialist "positive neutrality."
- 6) Successful coup on February 4, 1982; pronunciamento.
- Bouterse (by now Lieutenant Colonel) removed Henck Chin A Sen because of "ineptitude" and took over the two posts of President and Prime Minister. Subsequently he reinforced his "leftist" course.
- 7) Unsuccessful coup on March 11, 1982; (intended) pronunciamento.

"Rightist officers" tried to overthrow Bouterse. Their two leaders, master Sergeant Wilfried Hawker and Lieutenant Samad Surin Rambocos, were executed.

- 8) Unsuccessful coup on December 8, 1982; no classification.

This coup attempt may have been fabricated by Bouterse in order to get rid of the political opposition. He eliminated the centers of the opposition and declared a state of emergency in order, as he alleges, to prevent a coup. He had 15 "conspirators" executed. The Netherlands thereupon cancelled talks about economic aid as well as all military deliveries. Four months later Libya concluded a cooperation treaty with the Bouterse regime, which condemned the U.S. and proclaimed solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada.

C/7. Uruguay

- 1) Successful coup in late June, 1973; restorative/reactionary.

- a) Operational detail: coup, i.e., elimination of the legislative branch of government and of the trade unions, executed by the military government of President Juan Maria Bordaberry (which keeps factories and banks occupied by Army units and whose backing is provided by the predominantly conservative Army faction around two strongmen, General Estaban Cristi and Colonel Nestor Bolentini). The dissolution of the unions happened in response to a general strike called to protest the dissolution of parliament.
- b) Motivational background: this coup completed the takeover of power in Uruguay by the Army which had started with the Army's sole responsibility in fighting the Tupamaros which it was given in September, 1971. Bordaberry's model became increasingly that of the Brazilian military dictatorship. The immediate cause of the coup was the parliament's refusal to divest a leftist Senator, Enrique Erro, of his parliamentary immunity, which the Bordaberry regime had demanded by reason of his alleged involvement with the Tupamaros.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
- d) Internal effects: far-reaching. Uruguay, once considered the only stable democracy in South America, completed its turn to military dictatorship. The next coup underscored this development.

- 2) Successful coup on June 12, 1976; pronunciamiento.

Through this coup the Armed Forces capped their ascent to full power in Uruguay. They deposed President Bordaberry

and replaced him with a state council ("consejo de la nacion") which elected the jurist Aparicio Mendez president.

D/1. Bahrein

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on December 16, 1981; revolutionary-/reactionary.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by followers of the Iranian Islamic revolution on the island, among whom there were some members of the armed forces/police. Ca. 70 people arrested in quick suppression of the attempt.
 - b) Motivational background: revolutionary in an Islamic fundamentalist sense.
 - c) Foreign dimension: the government of Bahrein accused Iran of engineering the coup and expelled one Iranian diplomat. To safeguard itself against further such attempts, Bahrein signed a security pact with Saudi-Arabia a few days after the coup.
 - d) Internal effects: none.

D/2. Egypt

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in November, 1972.

Little is known about this coup, which was quashed at the conspiratorial stage. After a couple of junior officers tried to intercept President Sadat, a perhaps related, perhaps unrelated conspiracy at an air force base involving 24 officers was detected. These officers and some senior military figures, including the chief of military intelligence, were then arrested. The motivational background may have been a blend of Libyan-style Islamic fundamentalism and radical Nasserism.

D/3. Iraq

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on January 20, 1970; (intended) pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by a group of officers and civilians under the leadership of Hardan al-Tikriti against the regime of President al-Bakr. Swiftly suppressed, with 44 conspirators executed in the following days. Hardan was murdered in Kuwait a year later.
 - b) Motivational background: complex. Hardan al-Tikriti belonged to the ruling "Tikriti-gang" in the Baath

party, but even this ruling clique (whose members all came from the same town, Tikrit) had always been riven by severe internal rivalries. Hardan particularly minded the rise to power of his rival, today's Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The coup leaders rejected the official peace plans with the Kurds. Their coup came conveniently to get rid of them and proceed smoothly with these plans. While the coup was not a fabrication, the official announcement of the peace plans only days after the coup and the unusually harsh summary execution of 44 people indicate that the regime utilized the coup to wipe out an irksome opposition.

- c) Foreign dimension: The regime's charges of CIA involvement were nonsense. There was an Iranian connection. Iran was interested in keeping the Kurdish troubles of its neighbor alive and supported the coup leaders. It had 3,000 machine guns smuggled across the border.
- d) Internal effects: the government was able to sign the peace treaty with the Kurds, which led to a long period of quiet after nine years of virtual war. Saddam Hussein continued his ascent.

2) Unsuccessful coup in July, 1971; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. The coup attempt itself, by Army and Air Force officers, was not very serious, but the regime's response was -- several officers were arrested and shot in what looked like another official exploitation of a feeble putsch attempt so as to eliminate oppositional figures. The regime claimed an imaginary "British Connection" to strengthen its "anti-imperialist" posture.

3) Unsuccessful coup on June 30, 1973; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: this serious coup was executed by the chief of Iraq's secret police, Colonel Nazim Kazzar, with the support of rebel units from Baghdad's main garrison. Failing in their attempt to seize power, the conspirators kidnapped the ministers of defense and interior and set off with them towards the Iranian border. Pursued and cornered by Army troops, they surrendered after some fighting in which the defense minister died.
- b) Motivational background: It was mainly again a matter of rivalries within the Tikriti clique, this time over the growing military influence in the "revolutionary command council," the ruling body. Colonel Kazzar was against it. He was also pro-Iranian and anti-Soviet, particularly regarding the growing presence of Soviet military advisers. His alternative political program,

taken up after the coup by the regime itself, was meant to win support in the Armed Forces.

- c) Foreign dimension: Kuwait and Iran were favoring this coup, but it is not known whether either of them also lent substantive support.
 - d) Internal effects: since this serious challenge the "Tikritis" have stuck together, and no further pronouncements have taken place. This may also be due to the extremely harsh measures taken in the aftermath of the 1973 coup. 22 plotters, including Mazar himself, were executed, al-Bakr was endowed with dictatorial powers, and the secret police (which, embarrassingly, had failed to get wind of the plotting taking place in their ranks), the Baath party and the Armed Forces were thoroughly purged.
- 4) Unsuccessful coup on July 26, 1979; (intended) pronouncement.
- a) Operational detail: coup attempted by the hard-line, senior military faction in the "revolutionary command council" under the leadership of the first deputy Prime Minister, Adnan al-Hamdani, against President Saddam Hussein and his moderate, more civilian-minded faction. The radical civilian faction, sympathetic to the Communists or Communist itself, had already been eliminated by Saddam Hussein. The putsch attempt was quickly crushed with 30-40 people arrested, 22 of whom to be subsequently court-martialed and shot. Adnan, of course, was among them.
 - b) Motivational background: most probably fears of "civilianization" under the new President Saddam Hussein, who, as opposed to al-Bakr, was not a General or military man. For the senior military and civilian plotters at the upper levels of the Baath party it was above all another "good old-fashioned struggle for personal power" (Economist). This coup attempt remains both in its operational detail and motivational background singularly unclear. The coup was a consequence of the still insecure hold on power of the new President, Saddam Hussein, which in Iraqi politics predictably led to a violent challenge from the rivals.
 - c) Foreign dimension: while in the wake of the coup rumors abounded all over the Middle East that the event was contrived by, alternatively: Egypt together with Israel and the U.S.A.; Syria; Libya; Syria together with Libya; Saudi Arabia; Iran; and the Soviet Union, it seems clear that they were all incorrect. Subsequent developments indicate that the Iranian connection is still the most likely one. Proof of any foreign implication is impossible to obtain. The coup affected

Iraq's newly gained reputation for internal stability and thus its new prestige in the Arab world.

- d) Internal effects: Saddam Hussein declared an amnesty in mid-August, 1979 (except for terrorism, espionage and conspiracy). Since this attempt there have been no more major challenges to his rule.

D/4. Iran

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on July 10, 1980; restorative/reactionary.

Not much detail available. Under supervision by the revolutionary judge Chalcali, the uncovering of a putsch attempt resulted in the arrests of over 600 persons, civilian and military, of whom 60 were executed in the following weeks. Obviously this was an attempt by adherents of the old Shah regime to undo the "Islamic revolution."

D/5. Jordan

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in November, 1972; inner-Arab rivalries.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by the acting commander of a Jordanian armoured unit, his unit and a few Air Force pilots with their planes. Behind them were Palestinian guerrillas, who persuaded the officers with bribes to pull the coup off and "financed" it. Only one rebel plane got off into action before the conspiracy was discovered and quashed; it hit the royal palace with rocket fire and slightly wounded King Hussein. About 300 military and civilian personnel were subsequently arrested.

b) Motivational background: money for the implicated military, and hatred of Hussein, as well as revenge for the defeat in the 1970 civil war, for the Palestinians.

c) Foreign dimension: except for the PLO, no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.

d) Internal effects: none.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup in late May, 1977.

Very little is known about this attempt, which is officially denied by Jordan. The military plotters' undoing was the complete lack of international support for them -- the Soviet Union, whom they had asked for help, reportedly tipped Hussein off, leading to the timely arrest of the conspirators!

D/6. Libya

- 1) Successful coup on September 1, 1969; revolutionary.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by a group of young officers under the leadership of the Colonels Abu Shweirib and Muammar al-Kadhafi, who enjoyed the support of virtually the whole Army. Swift and bloodless deposition of King Idris, who left for exile.
 - b) Motivational background: at the beginning not revolutionary, but merely reformist. There was the Nasserist example, which, despite recently liberalized monarchist rule, let such rule appear out of date. Most officers had been discussing their revolutionary takeover for several years. Later, as Kadhafi crystallized as the real leader of the coup, it became clear that his motive had always been to start an Islamic "socialist" revolution.
 - c) Foreign dimension: the new regime immediately closed the British and American military bases and adopted a policy of "non-alignment" but whole-hearted devotion to the Pan-Arabic cause, the results of which (in the form of failed unifications with Egypt, Syria et. al) are well known. Libya under Kadhafi became the world's leading active supporter of international terrorism. In the West, only France maintained somewhat friendly relations with his regime until Kadhafi began to turn to the Soviet Union for arms. He remains the leading international maverick.
 - d) Internal effects: Kadhafi soon set out to change Libya into an Islamic-fundamentalist, "socialist" society. In fact he established a charismatic one-man rule supported by the Army and part of the population. Substantively this rule is distinguished only by Islamic fundamentalism and a moderately statist (but by no means socialist) economic course; the fundamentalism does not go nearly as far as in Khomeini's Iran.
- 2) Unsuccessful coup in December, 1969; restorative-/reactionary.

Not much detail available. In an apparent attempt to hold up or even reverse the Islamic revolution, the civilian ministers of defense and the interior in the first, also largely civilian cabinet tried this coup with the support of some Army officials and the armed Sanusi tribes. Kadhafi's response was quite mild, in keeping with his still precarious position: he retired the persons involved (ca. 100 officers) and disarmed the tribes.
- 3) Three unsuccessful coups in March, July and August, 1975; (intended) pronunciamientos of reactionary character.

4) These three coup attempts -- a joint declaration by 39 officers who were immediately put in jail, a planned coup by the chief of military transport and six comrades of the Benghazi garrison, and -- most serious of the three -- a coup attempt involving the commander of the Republican Guard and about half of the members of the politically ruling body, the "revolutionary command council," respectively -- were all prompted by increasing wariness in Libya's officer corps at the country's isolation in the Arab world and the growing military ties to the Soviet Union. These challenges to Kadhafi's rule and in particular, total domination of the Armed Forces, though quickly suppressed in each instance, induced the leader to tighten his internal rule. In response to the April coup, he had the first death sentences implemented in Libya since 1954 by having 22 officers shot. Ever since, Kadhafi has taken recourse to official killing at home and illegal killing abroad in his fight against domestic opposition, whose main source throughout the seventies was the Army.

5) Unsuccessful coup in January 1978; (intended) pronunciamiento.

By this coup the chief of Libya's security and military intelligence service, Kadhafi's close friend Captain Muhammad Idris al-Sharif, who had already planned the Kadhafi-inspired coup attempts in Morocco, Sudan and Saudi Arabia turned against his own chief. Kadhafi accused him of having been "turned" by the Saudis to overthrow him and had his former friend as well as about 100 officers and men of the 7th armored brigade (Uqba bin Naf'i airbase south of Tripoli) arrested. More persons were arrested at the base at Benghazi.

6) Unsuccessful coup on August 6, 1980; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. According to unconfirmed reports, a putsch against Kadhafi by military units failed at Tobruk.

D/7. Morocco

1) Unsuccessful coup on July 10, 1971; reformist/progressive.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by some 1400 military cadets under the leadership of five of the thirteen serving Generals of the Moroccan Army, among whom was the minister of the royal military household, General Muhammad Medbouh. They attacked at the King's birthday party at the palace at Skhirate, where, among other, the whole diplomatic corps was gathered. Loyal troops and many of the cadets themselves, who had been

misinformed about the purpose of the operation, prevented the success of the attack. Nevertheless, at one moment the King and all his ministers, the interior ministry and the radio station were in the hands of the rebels, and after the suppression of the attempt about 250 people were dead, including four loyal Generals, one minister, the Belgian ambassador, close to 100 other party guests and over 150 rebels. It was a near miss and one of the bloodiest coups in this survey. The surviving coup leaders were shot immediately afterwards, and over 1000 other officers and men involved in the attempt were given sentences from one year to life.

- b) Motivational background: although the civilian political opposition was not a party to the coup, the motive of the Generals was to put an end to the archaic rule by a monarchic court in Morocco. In this they had been encouraged and secretly supported by Libya, who nonetheless seems to have misunderstood that what it was supporting was Morocco's socialist revolution. Personal motives of the power-hungry Generals played an equally important role. Pan-Arabic nationalism exerted some appeal as well.
- c) Foreign dimension: the Libyan connection has already been mentioned.
- d) Internal effects: with only four Generals left alive and in their commands after the coup and subsequent purges, King Hassan appointed General Muhammad Oufkir, minister of defense and chief of staff and endowed him with complete control over the military and the administration.

2) Unsuccessful coup on August 16, 1972; reformist/progressive.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by some Air Force officers who tried to shoot down the King on his flight back from a holiday in France and, that having miscarried, strafed the officials waiting for Hassan at Rabat airport, the King's palace, and numerous other targets in Rabat. The Army prevented the spread of coup sentiment by immediately occupying the Air Force base at Kenitra. Oufkir thereupon committed suicide -- he, who had the King's full confidence, had himself been the coup leader.
- b) Motivational background: similar to the coup a year before, but this time with more of a "leftist" tinge: the young Air Force officers were followers of Kadhafi's Islamic-nationalist revolution.
- c) Foreign dimension: Libyan involvement in this coup attempt is almost certain.

- d) Internal effects: King Hassan has prevented further coup attempts since 1972 by making himself the protagonist of the more important nationalist/Pan-Arabic driving force behind the coups he so narrowly survived. His situation in 1973 was desperate: his regime's legitimacy and support by a decimated Army leadership was zero. His standing power since then may be attributed in part to his pan-Arabic, later "Greater Morocco" policies.

D/8. Saudi Arabia

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in July, 1977; revolutionary.

The government failed in a plot to overthrow the Saudi regime, which had been contrived by Libya and involved small parts of the Saudi Armed Forces.

D/9. Syria

- 1) Successful coup on November 13, 1970; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the defense minister Hafez al-Assad, a Lieutenant-General, whose troops took over the radio station and newspaper offices in Damascus and arrested Dr. Atassi, the head of the ruling Baath party, and this party's strongman, General Jadid. Relatively swift and bloodless.
- b) Motivational background: intra-Baath party rivalries. The more radical civilian wing seemed to be gaining in power, a development which Assad, the leader of the more moderate military wing, was determined to prevent. A coup was easy at that time because the government of Atassi was discredited by its disastrous military expedition on behalf of the Palestinians in the Jordanian civil war; thus the Army did nothing to hinder Assad, who as the former C-in-C Air Force could count whole-heartedly only on this latter branch (in his capacity Assad had withheld air support in the expedition into Jordan, largely accounting for the military disaster). His Alawite background is also important.
- c) Foreign dimension: Assad's takeover got Khadafi's blessing. His first prominent statement after seizing power held out the prospect of Syria's joining the then planned federation of Egypt, Sudan and Libya.
- d) Internal effects: with Assad's coming to power the Alawite clique of the Baath party representing only 11% of the population) assumed full power, virtually usurping the high command positions of Armed Forces and

intelligence services. This ethnic factor, however, did not by itself explain the coup. The Alawites had been influential in the Armed Forces before, and political groups always have an ethnic underpinning in Syria because it is thought that one can trust only those who are blood-and community-related.

A "conspiracy" half-a-year after Assad's coup served to get rid of the most important rivals in the Baath party. Numerous persons were imprisoned, and one General Hafis and the founder of the Baath party, Michel Aflak, were among three other leaders of the "conspiracy" sentenced to death in absentia.

D/10. Tunisia

1) Unsuccessful coup in August, 1976.

- a) Operational detail: coup attempted by 27 members of the Armed Forces. Swift and bloodless suppression at the conspiratorial stage, with 22 arrests and five escapes.
- b) Motivational background: "leftist", moderately fundamentalist and pan-Arabic sentiments have marked Tunisia's so-called second generation of officers, who had not fought with Bourgiba in the war of independence but were promoted only afterwards. These sentiments were reinforced by the disappointment felt when Tunisia declined to participate in the 1967 war, and by neighboring Libya's Islamic revolution.
- c) Foreign dimension: Libyan involvement may be assumed, but cannot be documented.
- d) Internal effects: Bourgiba replaced the commanders of southern units with loyal officers from the capital. Henceforth he increasingly favored and relied upon the "third generation" officers, who had been trained in French and American military academies and generally shared a pro-Western attitude.

D/11. United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi)

1) Unsuccessful coup in March, 1973; no classification.

No details available. Abu Dhabi reports that a military putsch was prevented.

D/12. Yemen/North (Arab Republic of)

1) Successful coup on June 13, 1974; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi in the wake of the resignation, suggested by the president, of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Hadschari and his replacement by the former minister of economics, Hassan Makki. Swift and bloodless overthrow not only of the government, but of the president himself.
- b) Motivational background: to be found in the bewildering tribal rivalries that mark North Yemen's "politics." The coup leaders were anti-Soviet, in contrast to the previous government's guarded pro-Soviet attitude in the field of economic and military cooperation. Due to the country's nearly complete material dependence on Saudi Arabia this aspect is negligible. They also exhibited some Islamic fundamentalist tendencies, reflecting the religious preference of 99% of the country's population.
- c) Foreign dimension: due to the coup leader's anti-Soviet orientation, the Saudis swallowed this coup which avowedly intended to strengthen the central government against the northern tribes, who represented the strongest reservoir of Saudi influence; yet this strengthening never occurred. Hamdi seriously pursued a policy of reunification with South Yemen, which caused real concern in Saudi Arabia at first, but then fitted into Saudi designs as the latter itself initiated a policy of reconciliation with South Yemen in the hope of weakening its Soviet connection (by 1976).
- d) Internal effects: few if any.

2) Successful coup on October 11, 1977; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the chief of staff of the Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad al-Ghashmi, against the Hamdi regime. Hamdi had been genuinely popular but his power base consisted of only few key officers. Hamdi and his friends were killed by the plotters, the former, according to the plotters' version, in a "house of ill repute."
- b) Motivational background: On the part of Ghashmi, political ambition coupled with tribal enmities. The northern tribes, who rejected Hamdi's nationalist reunification policies toward South Yemen, supported but did not contrive the coup.

c) Foreign dimension: by October, 1977, the Saudis had decided that Hamdi was being too nationalistic and bent on reunification. While direct Saudi participation in the coup cannot be proved, their support is clear: Ghashmi received \$10 million/month from the Saudis while he planned the coup. Once in power he pursued the Saudi line with respect to both South Yemen and the tribes, while Saudi aid expanded. The timing of the coup is illustrative: Hamdi was about to leave for reunification talks in Aden within 48 hours.

d) Internal effects: through purges, nepotism and the exploitation of tribal rivalries, Ghashmi was able to solidify his power. He was killed by a booby-trapped briefcase in June, 1978, which an envoy from South Yemen unwittingly brought into his office as a gift from the anti-Ghashmi faction of South Yemen.

3) Unsuccessful coup in April, 1978; (intended) pronouncement of restorative character.

This coup was an attempt by the last remaining influential member of the Hamdi regime to regain power. About to be thrown out of the ruling circles by Ghashmi after all, he launched a revolt with his paratroop brigade, but Major Abdullah Abdul Alem, the rebel in question, was unable to resist the tanks and heavy artillery with which the new regime immediately thwarted him; he escaped across the border into South Yemen.

4) Unsuccessful coup on October 15, 1978; (intended) pronouncement of restorative character.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by major military units (e.g., the first and fifth infantry brigades and the military police) as well as civilian conspirators in the capital. The coup attempt was directed and commanded on the spot by supporters of Hamdi and infiltrators from Major Abdul Alem/South Yemen. It came very near to success, finally crushed only through the arrest of a key conspirator whose disappearance led to a communication breakdown between the rebel units, and through the loyalty of the armored units and the Air Force. 7000 people were arrested, many of whom were subsequently executed.

b) Motivational background: the determination on the part of the South Yemenite regime (and the Hamdi supporters linked to it) to remove the Ghashmi government with its pro-Saudi/pro-Western outlook fully explains this coup.

c) Foreign dimension: Libya reportedly supplied the coup leaders with \$2,000,000 and explosives. The critical South Yemeni connection has been mentioned. Owing to this second failed attempt to overthrow the

conservative Ghashmi regime from within, South Yemen from this coup on tried the alternative route of invasion, leading to the war between North and South Yemen that began on February 20, 1979.

- d) Internal effects: North Yemen under Ghashmi strengthened its ties to Saudi Arabia and the West. China, which began economic development projects and sundry economic aid programs in North Yemen, profited from this development. By 1979/80 fewer than 100 Soviet military advisers were left in the Arab Republic.
- 5) Unsuccessful coup in August, 1981; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No details available. This putsch attempt against President Saleh (Ghashmi's successor after his murder) most probably represented a last attempt by Hamdi sympathizers and South Yemeni infiltrators to overturn the pro-Saudi regime in North Yemen before the beginning of reconciliation talks between the two Yemens in November, 1981. Thereafter, however, South Yemen kept supporting the "national democratic front," which had long turned from a political organization of Hamdi followers into a pro-Communist guerrilla organization under complete South Yemeni control.

D/13. Yemen/South (Democratic People's Republic of)

- 1) Successful coup on June 24, 1978; internal struggle for power.
 - a) Operational detail: This most confusing coup of this survey actually consisted of two coups. The comparatively moderate President of South Yemen at the time, Rubayya Ali, was preparing a coup in Aden in order to restore his fast-deteriorating position against the prevalent ultra-left wing of the ruling party, the UPONF. To this end he conspired with the North Yemen leader Ghashmi, who payed for this with his life. On June 24th, a coup got underway in Aden, but it is still unclear whether it was Ali's coup or a preemptive coup by his opponent, the general secretary of the UPONF, Abdul Fatah Ismail. At any rate, the latter's forces soon prevailed, if only after very heavy fighting between the Army troops loyal to Ali and the popular militia as well as select Army forces, which obeyed Ismail. Ismail had Rubayyah Ali shot immediately afterwards and assumed the presidency himself.
 - b) Motivational background: the Communist ruling party UPONF contrived the coup, with which it wanted to achieve complete rule over the Armed Forces and all

other social elements that did not go along with its pro-Soviet line. It already had subverted the Army with party loyalists, but Ali's plans necessitated a coup.

- c) Foreign dimension: at the time of the coup, Cuban and Ethiopian troops (the latter sent immediately prior to it) and Soviet officers were already present in the country. To what extent this Soviet connection was necessary to bolster the Party's counter-coup is not known. These forces participated in hunting down Army forces remaining loyal to the Ali regime for months after the coup. They filled gaps left by defections and mass desertions in the South Yemenite Army.
- d) Internal effects: under the new extreme left regime, South Yemen fell out with much of the Arab world except for Libya and Iran, and suffered internally from its isolation (especially with respect to Saudi Arabi). The Communist bloc has tried to fill the gap.

BLACK AFRICA

E/L. Angola

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in late May, 1977; (intended) pronunciamiento of possibly restorative character.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by parts of the Angolan Army along with some senior political figures under the leadership of an Army regional political commissar, Jose van Dunem, and a former interior minister, Nito Alves. Suppressed after heavy fighting lasting for two days, in which, among other, six government officials were killed. Hundreds were arrested after the misfired coup.
 - b) Motivational background: The coup leaders opposed too Marxist and pro-Soviet a line, as personal and power-related: President Neto was extremely unpopular with the Army and even most of the population except the Luanda workers and, of course, the Cuban garrison. The coup was a challenge to his rule and the Cubans.
 - c) Foreign dimension: The coup involved so many Army units on the side of the rebels that it could be put down only with massive help of Cuban troops.
 - d) Internal effects: Neto increased Army representation on the MPLA Congress Central Committee and its all-important political Committee, but for the country at large he reasserted his authority by mass arrests and a re-emphasis on Party dominance.

E/2. Benin (formerly Dahomey)

1) Successful coup on December 10, 1969; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by one of the two principal strongmen of the country, Colonel Kouandete, against the civilian regime of Dr. Emil Zinsou put in place by his rival, Colonel Alley, a year ago. Swift and bloodless.
- b) Motivational background: is to be found mainly in the personal rivalry between Kouandete and Alley. Alley had repeatedly tried to assassinate Kouandete, for which the civilian government had passed too mild a sentence (10 years in prison) in the opinion of Kouandete's supporters. Thus the government of Dr. Zinsou got caught in an internal Army feud.
- c) Foreign dimension: Nigeria is reported to have supported Alley's assassination attempts against Kouandete, possibly because with his backing, the regime of Dr. Zinsou had been aiding the Biafran rebels.
- d) Internal effects: Kouandete re-admitted into the country the politicians Maga, Apithy and Ahomadegbe, who had been exiled in the early-to-mid sixties. These men, formerly rivals, installed a triumvirate shortly afterwards, with Kouandete's blessing.

2) Unsuccessful coup in February, 1972; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. The leaders of this failed putsch, six officers, were sentenced to death in April 1972. The appalling unrest, disunity and general disobedience under the aforementioned triumvirate may have provided the motive for this attempt.

3) Successful coup on October 26, 1972; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army under the leadership of the deputy chief of staff, Major Mathieu Kerekou; swift and bloodless removal of President Ahomadegbe.
- b) Motivational background: with this coup Major Kerekou reacted to the internal situation under the civilian government of Ahomadegbey. He also belonged loosely to the Kouandete faction, whose power he may have wanted to re-assert.

c) Foreign dimension: Kerekou pursued a somewhat anti-French policy from the beginning. During his unparalleled 12 years in power since the 1972-coup, Kerekou steadily moved away from France and toward the Soviet bloc and Libya. He even converted to Islam while visiting Kadhafi.

d) Internal effects: in late 1974 Kerekou officially adopted a Marxist-Leninist, anti-imperialist ideology for his country and simultaneously renamed it Benin.

4) Unsuccessful coup in May, 1973; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. Colonel Alley was imprisoned because of conspiracy plans, which he may or may not have entertained.

5) Unsuccessful coup on January 21, 1975; (intended) pronunciamiento of restorative character.

Not much detail available. The failed putsch was headed by former President Zinsou, who along with six other figures was executed two months later. The economic lot of Benin's three million people had not improved over the pre-Kerekou era despite promises to the contrary, a fact which may have prompted the coup. Labor minister Assogba was also involved.

6) Unsuccessful coup in mid-October, 1975; (intended) pronunciamiento of restorative character.

Not much detail available. The failed putsch was to reinstate a Zinsou-style government and allegedly received support from neighboring Togo. It happened at a time when Kerekou had begun to act upon his "socialist" rhetoric, for example nationalizing the foreign oil companies.

7) Unsuccessful coup on January 16, 1977; (intended) pronunciamiento.

a) Operational detail: this bizarre coup, more an invasion, was executed by a plane-load of airborne soldiers, some of whom with "pale complexion," against the airport of Cotonou and subsequently the presidential palace. These "mercenaries in the pay of international imperialism," Kerekou later charged, had been the tool of an alliance of hostile states -- Togo, Gabon, Morocco, with France lending financial and logistical help -- to overthrow his regime. Moroccan involvement appears least absurd, since Kerekou had been supporting the POLISARIO position in the war of the Spanish Sahara. Since the only thing known for certain about this coup is the fact of intermittent shooting at the airport, the whole affair may well have been no more than an Army-Gendarmerie quarrel.

E/3. Burundi

- 1) Successful coup on November 1, 1976; pronunciamiento.

By this coup the head of state Burundi for 10 years, Colonel Nkombero, was overthrown by a group of officers under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Bagaza, who immediately promised to "clean up" Burundi's internal situation. The all-important characteristic of this situation, the repressive rule by a minority tribe, the Tutsi, over a majority, the Hutu, remained unchanged by this coup.

E/4. Central African Republic (formerly Empire)

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on April 14, 1969; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Little detail available. One Colonel Banza rose against Bokassa's increasingly arbitrary rule, who, as in later attempts, survived with the aid of France, a former colonial master with important uranium mining interests in the country.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup sometime in 1973; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No further detail available. Possibly a repeat performance of the previous coup.

- 3) Unsuccessful coup in November, 1974; (intended) pronunciamiento.

This time the gendarmerie attempted a putsch, which was prevented at the conspiratorial stage.

- 4) Unsuccessful coup on February 3, 1976; no classification.

This coup took the form of an assassination attempt against Bokassa, the motives behind which remain obscure. The eight people involved, among whom there were some officers and foreigners, were subsequently sentenced to death.

- 5) Successful coup on September 20/21, 1979; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup planned and executed by the French government. After Emperor Bokassa had left for a trip to Libya, 1000 French troops landed in the country from neighboring Chad and Gabon and from France itself to install a figurehead, Mr. David Dacko, as Bokassa's successor. The coup had been well planned and worked swiftly and without bloodshed.

- b) Motivational background: Bokassa's rule had become too arbitrary and cruel for France.

- c) Foreign dimension: the coup was openly "made in France." It produced an embarrassment for France in its aftermath as Bokassa sought refuge in France, claiming his rights as a French citizen. France detained him at the Evreux air base and managed to persuade Ivory Coast to grant Bokassa "humanitarian asylum."
 - d) Internal effects: the coup freed the country from Bokassa's bloody personal dictatorship. The Bokassa administration remained in office.
- 6) Successful coup on September 1, 1981; reformist/progressive.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the country's 1800-man Army under General Andre Kolingba against the regime of David Dacko; swift and bloodless.
 - b) Motivational background: the Army was disconcerted at Dacko's inability to grapple with the economic situation and his unwillingness to accommodate the opposition led by Ange Patasse, resulting in widespread guerrilla activity in the countryside. France, equally disconcerted, had curtailed its aid, resulting in the government's inability to meet obligations. The general strike that was in the making in response may have prompted the coup.
 - c) Foreign dimension: Kolingba had made sure of French acquiescence. The Libyan threat looming from a 12,000-man occupation force in Chad underscored the need for the Central African Republic to tackle its problems which the coup intended to solve. (It is assumed that the French failure to prop up Dacko's regime with her 1300 troops in the country exasperated her civilian-ruled allies in the region -- the ambassadors from Niger, Mali, Senegal, Cameroon and Gabon besieged the Elysee the next day -- but the mistaken impression that the coup was Libyan-made may have been behind this reaction. France would not allow Libyan destabilization efforts in the region, as her subsequent support of the regime in Chad showed.)
 - d) Internal effects: Kolingba installed a military government that proved less incompetent than Dacko's in combating the disastrous economic state of things. He was less successful in his efforts to reconcile the opposition. Patasse and his "Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLCP)" conspired against him in early March of 1982 (with the tepid help of two "generals"), inducing Kolingba to prohibit this organization.

E/5. Chad

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in August, 1971; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. The government of President Ngarta Tombalbaye announced the uncovering of a conspiracy involving some officers and accused Libya of interference.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup sometime in 1972; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No more detail available. As in the previous coup, the motivational background is represented by the widespread discontent stemming from the perennial civil war with the FROLINAT in the Muslim North and from the disastrous, drought-aggravated economic situation.

- 3) Unsuccessful coup in June, 1973; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No more detail available. The C-in-C Army was arrested after this failed plot.

- 4) Successful coup on April 13, 1975; pronunciamiento.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army of 2500 men under the leadership of the acting chief of staff, brigadier Mbailu Noel Odingar. Tombalbaye was killed during the coup, which swiftly achieved its goal without further bloodshed.

b) Motivational background: is to be found in Tombalbaye's inability to do anything about the civil war and economic problems. This attempt succeeded after previous ones had failed. Tombalbaye managed to stay in power for 15 years. He had recently become erratic (trying to reintroduce old tribal rites). His fast-declining fortunes in war explained this coup.

c) Foreign dimension: French collusion, alleged by FROLINAT, cannot be proved. The French had merely followed Odingar's call to keep out of the whole affair, leaving their troop contingent on the northern front in the face of FROLINAT.

d) Internal effects: the military government under General Malloum (arrested in June, 1973, as C-in-C Army) proved as unable as Tombalbaye to bring the war under control.

- 5) Unsuccessful coup on April 2, 1977; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No further detail available. Chad reported that a putsch attempt against General Malloum's regime had been crushed

and that the following day four FROLINAT members were executed for their part in an assassination attempt.

E/6. Comoro Islands

- 1) Successful coup on August 3, 1975; revolutionary /reactionary leftist.
 - a) Operational detail: This coup, occurring a month after independence from France, saw the principal opposition leader, Ali Soilih, make use of a mercenary force under Bob Denard to topple the government of President Ahmad Abdallah. Swift and without much bloodshed.
 - b) Motivational background: Soilih was driven by nationalism, meaning the reconquest from France of the island of Mayotte, and by vague but rather violent ideas about a "cultural revolution." It was easy enough to overthrow a government only one month old.
 - c) Foreign dimension: France recognized Soilih's regime despite the coup, little suspecting what would follow. The major international contacts of the regime were to be with Libya, China and, substantively more important though rhetorically less enthusiastic, Tanzania and much of the Arab world.
 - d) Internal effects: Soilih's cultural revolution was to eradicate the past and succeeded in smashing virtually all "relics" of civilization on the island (civil service, telephones, typewriters, etc.). Within six months his economic policies resulted in famine, staved off only by international emergency aid. His quickly established "Army" of more than 10,000 kept the islands in a constant state of terror, leading to a mass exodus of refugees. Foreign aid was used solely to equip the "Army" and pay mercenaries. By 1978 the situation had become untenable.
- 2) Successful coup on May 13, 1978; reformist/progressive.
 - a) Operational detail: this coup, probably the most bizarre of the survey, was again pulled off by Bob Denard, this time in alliance with Ahmad Abdallah whom he had toppled three years before. Leading 50 mercenaries ashore from a French-registered trawler, all of them armed merely with sawn-off shotguns and hand grenades, Denard overthrew the government of Ali Soilih in a matter of hours against minimal resistance (three presidential guards killed, one mercenary wounded in the arm). He then had the whole coup re-enacted for a French TV team that happened to be on the island, made Soilih take part in this re-enactment, and

had him shot afterwards. French viewers, were not shown this final scene, however.

- b) Motivational background: to put an end to the chaos on the islands. Denard was paid by Comoro exiles and possibly by the French government, but he may have acted partly on his own account. He felt a sentimental attachment to these islands and after the coup became defense minister in the new regime, even converting to Islam.
- c) Foreign dimension: France was possibly involved in the preparation and support of the coup, but no proof is available.
- d) Internal effects: the Comoro Islands got a regime -- headed in co-presidency by Ahmad Abdallah and Muhammad Ahmad -- that introduced relative normalcy and "humanism" into the islands. Bob Denard, ironically at the beginning largely responsible for safeguarding this change for the better, left the islands again in September; a white mercenary at the top of an African Army had become an embarrassment. French goodwill led to slow material improvements on the Comoros.

E/7. Congo-Brazzaville

- 1) unsuccessful coup on February 22, 1972; revolutionary /reactionary.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by Lieutenant Ange Diawarra, who was leading an insurrectionary movement against the moderately leftist President Ngouabi. Swiftly suppressed without undue bloodshed, among those arrested were prominent members of Ngouabi's government. Diawarra escaped and was hunted down and killed in 1973.
 - b) Motivational background: a mixture of tribal and political factors. Ngouabi represented the North, getting support in the Army from Mbochi Kouyou soldiers; Diawarra was a Lari from the Center, whose opposition was increasing at the time. Politically there was the contradiction between the extreme leftist tendency in Congo's "politics" of former President Masseмба-Debat, which Diawarra stood for, and the more moderate tendency that had emerged the winner from the 1968-69 turmoil, which was Ngouabi's own.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions. Ngouabi was still cultivating the ties established in the mid-sixties with the Soviet Union and the PRC.

- d) Internal effects: none.
- 2) Unsuccessful coup on April 24, 1973; revolutionary /reactionary.
- A repeat performance of the previous coup.
- 3) Unsuccessful coup on March 13, 1977.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by left-wing followers of Massemba-Debat and apolitical but violently inclined officers led by Major Earthelemy Kikadidi against Ngouabi's moderate regime. They succeeded in killing Ngouabi but their attempt nonetheless misfired due to Koujou predominance in the Army.
- b) Motivational background: see under coup number 1. The immediate cause of the attempt was an announcement by Ngouabi declaring his intent to liberalize and broaden his government.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions. Ngouabi's successor government included one figure, vice-president Denis Sassou, who was strongly in favour of increasing cooperation with the USSR.
- d) Internal effects: a junior officer with a Ngouabi-style political persuasion, J. Yhombi-Opango, took over and had Massemba-Debat executed (and 10 others, including Kikadidi). Yhombi was a northerner. Sassou's radically pro-Soviet inclinations were counterbalanced by his pragmatic orientation, which even allowed links to the U.S. and France to grow.
- 4) Unsuccessful coup in August, 1978; (intended) pronunciamiento.
- No details available. This "major conspiracy to overthrow the government" involved, according to the ruling party CMP, some officers and a Frenchman, a Ghanaian and an individual with three nationalities -- Ghanaian, Togolese and Zarois.

E/8. Ethiopia

- 1) Successful coup in mid-February, 1974; reformist /progressive.
- a) Operational detail: this coup, in the form of a country-wide military rebellion, was executed by the junior officer and NCO corps of the Ethiopian Army, with the senior officer corps joining in once the success was clear. It took 48 hours for all of the

Armed Forces to join the rebellion, and they subsequently occupied all major towns, roads, seaports and airfields in the country. Their demands were fulfilled by Emperor Haile Selassie: a change of government ousting Prime Minister Aklilu Habtewold, an announcement of constitutional reform, an end to corruption, and a pay raise for the soldiers. The whole affair went without bloodshed.

- b) Motivational background: corporate grievances reflected in the demand for a pay raise, and general political grievances stemming from the regime's poor performance and popular unrest. Recently raised prices represented the immediate cause of the coup.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the regime fulfilled the soldiers' demands but subsequently proved unable to improve its performance. The socioeconomic situation remained precarious. The Armed Forces, having shown their muscle, gained fast in influence in the coming months through the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (AFCC).
- 2) Successful coup on September 12, 1974; reformist /progressive.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee, which deposed Emperor Selassie in a swift and bloodless coup.
 - b) Motivational background: to put an end to the Emperor's rule over Ethiopia, and to install a Republic and initiate political reforms. This was the least common denominator among the otherwise vastly different conceptions of the 81 members (including privates and NCOs) on the Armed Forces Committee. The dominating concept for the time being was General Aman Andom's, the chief of the AFCC and temporary successor of Selassie as head of state, representing a moderately reformist line.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the formal change of regimes in Addis Ababa brought into the open the revolutionary ferment having accumulated in the country over decades. Students and trade unions put forward leftist demands, e.g., for a "people's republic." Military rule, though avowedly reformist, met with popular suspicion especially in the cities. The Eritrean Liberation Front re-emerged.

3) Successful coup on November 23, 1974; pronunciamento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by a rival faction of General Aman on the ruling Provisional Military Administrative Council or Dirgue (the successor body of the AFCC). In an eruption of intro-factional violence, Aman and 59 other members of the Dirgue, former ministers, civilian officials, and so forth were killed. Brigadier Teferi Bante, a pragmatist like Aman, became the new head of state. The real strongman was Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, despite his official post as "leader of the revolution" not of obvious leftist persuasion. The bloodbath continued, soon affecting suspected monarchists and Eritreans all over the country.

- b) Motivational background: the lack of a clear political motive is reflected by the lack of a pattern in the killings, which rooted out a "random sample" of the ruling military cliques. Rivalry for power was the most important motive: Aman and Mengistu had been rivals and Mengistu, having prevailed, killed a variety of potential rivals together with Aman. The only substantive cleavage among the ruling military concerned the policy towards the Eritrea problem; Aman was soft on the issue, Mengistu a hard-liner who objected to the slightest trace of separatism. This also explains why Mengistu had Aman, an Eritrean, killed.

- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. The full-scale civil war into which the anti-guerrilla campaign developed proved beyond Addis Ababa's military capabilities and, moreover, engaged it in military conflict with neighboring Somalia. The Soviets and Cubans, perceiving potential military dependency, extended military support to the point of outright military presence and intervention, at the cost of their former ally Somalia, who after the 1977 war returned to the Western camp. Ethiopia has since become a de facto military satellite of the USSR and Cuba.

- d) Internal effects: the Bante-Mengistu regime slowly adopted "socialist" economic and social policies, reinforcing this course over the following years but achieving less and less success. Its legitimacy with the population, especially the "progressive" parts of the trade unions and students, remains scant. More important is its nationalism; this led to the Eritrean disaster.

- 4) Unsuccessful coup in latter half of July, 1976; reformist /progressive pro-Western.
- a) Operational detail: coup allegedly attempted by one Major Sissay Habte, the moderate number three on the ruling Dirgue, and eight other highly placed officers, most of whom came from the Gojam province, known for its anti-regime attitude. Having detected the plot, Mengistu had all nine of them shot and carried out a shake-up in the Armed Forces.
 - b) Motivational background: the coup happened at a time when ideological differences, rather than merely power rivalries, were acquiring some significance in the ruling junta. By 1976 Mengistu had turned "Marxist-Leninist" and anti-American, with considerable opposition, however, remaining to this course (the U.S. had been Ethiopia's most important ally and arms supplier well into the post-Selassie period).
 - c) Foreign dimension: no probable foreign implications or repercussions. Ethiopia was becoming another theater of the East-West conflict with this coup accelerating its drift to the Eastern bloc.
 - d) Internal effects: none.
- 5) Unsuccessful coup in early February, 1977; reformist/progressive pro-Western.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the pro-Western, anti-Mengistu faction on the Dirgue, which had been successful since December, 1976, in cutting Mengistu's unlimited powers. Their attempt to seize full power failed, although they managed to shoot Bante and five other followers of Mengistu. Mengistu emerged the winner in a genuine gun battle within the Dirgue and thereafter threatened to arm the people in an effort to save his position. He appointed himself president as Bante's successor. The whole affair remains somewhat unclear.
 - b) Motivational background: Mengistu was seen to establish a personal dictatorship.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. With Mengistu safely in power, Soviet-Cuban influence grew even more, with Soviet advisors present to the ruling junta since 1978.
 - d) Internal effects: this coup attempt established Mengistu and his line as the sole power in Ethiopia, decisively propped up by the Soviet-Cuban presence.

E/9. Gambia

1) Unsuccessful coup on July 30, 1981; revolutionary /reactionary.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by about a third of the country's Army, the 500-man "field force," the part which the coup leader, Kukoi Samba Sanyang, the radical chief of the country's banned Communist party, had managed to win over. At first the coup seemed to be succeeding. The rebels, having seized the radio station and the presidential palace with 30 hostages, including the president's wife and eight of his children, as well as several West European embassies with 70 hostages, thought themselves winners. They also opened the prisons, unleashing many criminals into a two-day orgy of looting. But neighboring Senegal intervened immediately, and Britain, where Gambia's President, Sir Dawda Jawara, was on a state visit, sent SAS units to free the European hostages. In a matter of days the fighting between the Senegalese intervention force of 2000 soldiers, the SAS, and loyal parts of the Gambian field force on the one hand, and the armed supporters of the coup on the other had the predictable result: 800 rebels were killed, 200 more cramped into overcrowded cells where 30 of them suffocated. A particularly bloody coup.

b) Motivational background: revolutionary; partly foreign-inspired. The temporary absence of the country's respected president provided the opportunity for a coup. Sanyang is reported to have attempted his first coup in October 1980, but gave up early; ever since, a small Senegalese troop contingent has been stationed in Gambia.

c) Foreign dimension: The following facts emerged: Libya had been training 200 Gambian guerrillas since 1980, for which reason Gambia broke off diplomatic relations in late October, 1980; Cuba was the place to which Sanyang fled after this failed coup; the weapons and vehicles used by the rebels were of Soviet origin, which may have been more than accidental; the vehicles (60 Lada four-wheel-drive) had arrived on a Soviet boat four days prior to the attempt and been picked up immediately by the rebels. Only Senegal openly accused the Soviet Union of direct involvement. For months after the attempt, Senegal took over the care for Gambia's national security with its troop contingent. As a direct consequence of the coup, Gambia entered a confederation with her larger neighbor in which, as a first measure, both sides intended to establish a common (i.e., Senegalese) Army, later to be followed by an economic and monetary union.

- a) Internal effects: in May 1982, Jawara reconfirmed his tenure by a 72% vote in general elections. The most important effect of this coup was the formation of "Senegambia," in which both members remain sovereign states but in fact unify many political functions, which for the vastly inferior Gambia means a de facto decrease in sovereignty.

E/10. Ghana

- 1) Successful coup on January 13, 1972; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the country's Armed Forces under the coup leader, Lt.-Colonel Mike Acheampong, against the civilian government of Prime Minister Dr. Kofi Busia. Swift and bloodless deposition of Busia while he was in London for medical care.
 - b) Motivational background: ever since Kwame Nkrumah's overthrow by the Army in 1966, Ghana's Armed Forces were deeply involved in politics. This time they overturned a conservative government after it had proved unable to deal with the country's manifold economic and political problems, charging dictatorial tendencies on the part of Dr. Busia. Ghana's Armed Forces represented the most respected and efficient organization in the country (taking pride in their descent from the famous Gold Coast Regiment of the erstwhile Royal West African Frontier Force), feeling little inhibition to determine their country's political affairs. Normally the public welcomed their coups.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions. The trade deficit stemming from the slump in world cocoa prices at that time accounted for most of the politico-economic problems inspiring this coup.
 - d) Internal effects: the coup leaders formed a "national redemption council" and tried clumsily to cope with the internal situation.
- 2) Unsuccessful coup in November, 1972; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. A small group of politically ambitious junior officers and NCOs mounted a putsch attempt, as a result of which eight of them were sentenced to death.
- 3) Successful coup on July 5, 1978; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Ghanaian Armed

Forces under the leadership of the new Army commander, Major-General Odarty Wellington, against the ruling junta of General Acheampong; swift and bloodless takeover, with Acheampong being placed in detention.

- b) Motivational background: again to be found in widespread popular discontent at the country's deteriorating politico-economic situation, especially at government proposals as to the establishment of a non-political, corporate-like "union government."
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the new government promised a return to civilian rule by 1979. It followed a cautious approach in dealing with the country's problems and political groups. General Fred Akuffo became president of Ghana.
- 4) Unsuccessful coup on May 15, 1979; reformist/progressive.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by flight-lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and a group of young airmen against General Akuffo's regime. Rawlings went off for a tour of Armed Forces bases to obtain support for a coup and, that having miscarried, boldly arrested a few senior officers. Having been arrested, he managed to transform his court-martial into a brilliant plea, loudly supported by his youthful fans waiting outside, for a wholesale purge of the country's senior officer class.
 - b) Motivational background: a desire on the part of imaginative junior officer "to clean the stables." He was acting partly to foster his own account, partly in the tradition of the Ghanaian Armed Forces to interfere in politics out of a feeling of obligation.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications.
 - d) Internal effects: Rawling's second -- and successful -- coup came barely three weeks later.
- 5) Successful coup on June 3, 1979; reformist/progressive.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Jerry Rawlings after being freed from prison by men from the 5th infantry battalion. Along with other junior officers and NCOs he took over the battalion and, with the support of air force units, conducted a classical military coup. The infantry and airmen first overwhelmed an armored reconnaissance unit trying to suppress the attempt in Accra and, having seized a radio station, engaged the C-in-C Army, General

Wellington, in a competition of announcements on the airwaves. After one hour he seized Wellington's station, shooting him and arresting or killing several dozen other senior figures all over Accra. The Army rank and file and officer corps up to colonel level either supported the coup enthusiastically or, in the case of the less junior officers, adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Both Akuffo and his predecessor Acheampong were killed in the coup.

- b) Motivational background: Rawlings feared that without a purge the new civilian leaders, obsequiously thankful to their military benefactors, would allow the junta members to retire with all their ill-gained booty.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions for Rawling's half-Scottish descent.
 - d) Internal effects: After an interim period of three months of military rule -- during which the elections were held on schedule on June 18 -- Rawlings handed power back over to the civilians. Hilla Limann became president. Rawlings bluntly warned him that if he and his government gave themselves up to corruption again, they "would be overthrown."
- 6) Unsuccessful coup in early March, 1981; reformist/progressive.

Lieutenant Effa-Dartey tried to overthrow the regime. This attempt was quickly crushed. Effa-Dartey landed in prison.

- 7) Successful coup on December 31, 1981; reformist /progressive.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Rawlings, who counted on continued support among the NCO and rank-and-file element in the Armed Forces and made sure of acquiescence of all but the most senior officers, announced the deposition of Limann's government on the evening radio broadcast. Rawling's popularity inside and outside the Armed Forces was such that this coup represented a low-risk enterprise. No bloodshed.
 - b) Motivational background: Rawlings had grown impatient at Limann's disregard for his warning two years ago. Looking upon himself more as the charismatic savior, he deemed it necessary not only to remove the civilian government but also to deny any civilians another chance.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. Rawlings resumed diplomatic relations with Libya, which the previous government had broken a year before on charges of subversive activities by Libyan diplomats.

- d) Internal effects: Rawlings did not know how to extricate his country from economic chaos. His "holy war" against corruption achieved some modest success, and "people's defense committees" set up in towns, villages, offices and factories alleviated some emergencies. In the longer term however, he and his interim government, the "provisional national defense council," proved powerless.
- 8) Unsuccessful coup on November 23, 1982; (intended) pronunciamento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by a key associate of Rawling's, Sergeant Akata-Pore. He and a few hundred supporters from the Army tried to storm the governmental headquarters at Gondar barracks and the Accra radio station, using heavy weapons such as mortars. Repulsed after little bloodshed.
- b) Motivational background: is to be found in the dissension within the Rawling's junta about the best way to combat the economic chaos. A month before such a conflict of opinions between Rawlings and Akata-Pore (or rather, a civilian advisor to Rawlings and the sergeant; Rawlings even in government tried to stay above quarrels) had almost turned violent. Akata-Pore's somewhat leftist persuasion accounted for his substantive differences with Rawlings. He was the secretary of the "people's defense committee" and was in charge of organizing country-wide support for Rawling's "revolution."
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
- d) Internal effects: the criticism of Rawlings inside the Armed Forces found its expression in two more feeble putsch attempts on February 27 and June 19, 1983.

E/11. Guinea-Bissau

- 1) Successful coup on November 14, 1980; pronunciamento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed, with the backing of large parts of the Army, by the Prime Minister and former C-in-C Army, Major Joao Bernardo Vieira, against his President, Luiz Cabral. Swift and nearly bloodless.
- b) Motivational background: this was primarily a revolt by the blacks in the newly independent country against the ruling half-castes dominating the country's only party, the African Independence Party (PAIGC). It was furthermore an effort to prevent the merger of Guinea-

Bissau with the neighboring but half-caste islands of Cape Verde, which Cabral was planning for the very near future. Thirdly, the coup sprang from personal fears on the part of Major Vieira that his role in the ruling hierarchy was about to be curtailed by a new constitution greatly increasing the power of the president vis-a-vis the prime minister. Vieira justified his coup with charges of "massacres" by the previous regime (500 political murders alleged) and the usual charges of corruption.

- c) Foreign dimension: Guinea's Sekou Toure immediately welcomed the coup that promised to move Guinea-Bissau closer to his country than to (formerly preferred) Senegal. The Cuban-Soviet connection was not intensified by Vieira, but de-emphasized. He denied the Soviets a naval base in September, 1981. Cuban and East German advisers stayed on, however. Vieira predictably ceased relations with Cape Verde (The Libyan involvement in this coup, sometimes alleged, cannot be substantiated.)
- d) Internal effects: in sum, Vieira removed all half-castes from positions of power and instituted a purely black rule over Guinea-Bissau.

E/12. Guinea-Equatorial

- 1) Successful coup on August 5, 1979; reformist/progressive.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed, with the backing of the Army, by defense minister Colonel Teodoro Nguema against the dictatorial regime of his uncle, Francisco Macias.
 - b) Motivational background: Macias' rule had led to an atrocious state of affairs in the former Spanish colony. In the eleven years since independence in 1968, about 50,000 people had died at the hands of the regime, and 100,000 had fled the country. By 1979 the whole educated class was gone, the economy nearing total breakdown, and the infrastructure, including even the medical, no longer existed.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. As a consequence of the coup, the virtual international isolation under Macias -- relations had been maintained only with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and France -- was lifted. Spain was asked for help (it sent 600 advisors).
 - d) Internal effects: a military council under Colonel Nguema took charge and promised reforms.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup on April 10, 1981; restorative /reactionary.

Not much detail available. Followers of Macias mounted a coup, which was crushed. A number of officers and officials were arrested.

- 3) Unsuccessful coup in September, 1981; restorative /reactionary.

This coup was planned by several officers, adherents of Marcias, who had been trained in the USSR and may have been instigated by it. Colonel Nguema anticipated the coup and called Spain for help. The coup did not take place.

- 4) Unsuccessful coup in early May, 1983; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No more detail available. The military under the leadership of vice-president Carmelo Owano attempted a coup against Colonel Nguema, which failed owing to the loyal police and Army elements that had stayed aloof. Several hundred soldiers subsequently went to prison.

E/13. Ivory Coast

- 1) Unsuccessful coup sometime in 1971; (intended) pronunciamiento.

This middle-level conspiracy in the Army was detected at an early stage. Seven officers ranking from lieutenant to major were subsequently executed. Most probably, their motive was a mixture of boredom and frustration with service conditions.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup on June 28, 1973; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Another would - be pronunciamiento out of frustration on the part of bored officers. Seven of them were executed.

E/14. Kenya

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on August 1, 1982; reformist/progressive.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by 2000 members of the country's 2500-man air force, allied with student radicals and dissident politicians, possibly under the leadership of the erstwhile vice-president Oginga Odinga. The coup failed because the Army did not join in but defended the government quarters and re-took the radio station seized by the rebels. The bloody fighting and looting on August 1 took the lives of 300

persons. 3000 persons were arrested, among them virtually the whole air force. The coup was initially planned for August 8, when President Moi would have been absent at an OAU meeting in Libya, but for unknown reasons took place a week earlier.

- b) Motivational background: this coup attempt is unusual. Kenya had for decades been ruled by Kenyatta, who had died only recently; Moi was not yet well emplaced, his legitimacy scant in comparison to Kenyatta's. Most probably the coup leaders were motivated to action by Moi's unimaginative policies in the face of severe economic problems and their own inability to voice their opposition due to Kenya's one-party system. The coup option seemed the only one left and, moreover, presented itself due to widespread sympathy in an air force that proved itself permeated by romantic leftist attitudes.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications.
- d) Internal effects: president Moi took the unusual step of dissolving the whole air force. He reacted harshly, leveling death sentences and long prison terms.

E/15. Lesotho

- 1) Successful coup on January 30, 1970; restorative/reactionary.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the ruling prime minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, and the paramilitary Police Mobile Unit under loyal British officers against the winner of a general election, the leader of the radical, pan-African Congress Party Ntsu Mokehle. Swift and bloodless at the start, with Mokehle and 80 supporters quickly arrested. But isolated resistance and anti-coup revolts continued until April, 1970. The arrest of Lesotho's king, Moshoeshoe II., by Jonathan (under charges of having unconstitutionally utilized his influence to help the Congress Party gain votes) and subsequent suspension of the constitution gave this coup the classic touch.
 - b) Motivational background: Chief Jonathan was supporter of Lesotho's South African connection which isolated the country in Black Africa. Mokehle's determination to counter this policy prompted Jonathan's coup.
 - c) Foreign dimension: South Africa reportedly advised against the coup. British officers in the police mobile unit represented an odd leftover from the colonial days and had developed a personal loyalty to "Chief" Jonathan.

d) Internal effects: insignificant.

E/16. Liberia

- 1) Unsuccessful coup sometime in 1969; (intended) pronunciamento.

No further details available. Liberian politics is, and was then, marked by the dichotomy between the traditionally privileged Americo-Liberians and the indigenous population. By 1969 the latter had found a forceful representation in the country's regular Army, the "Liberian National Guard." Although the coastal aristocracy of Americo-Liberians had by then formed a counterweight in the form of a citizen's militia, the Guard remained stronger and developed political ambitions, underpinned by a pronounced professional pride. This coup, coming to the open only through the arrest of a few retired senior officers, was an expression of these ambitions.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup sometime in 1970; (intended) pronunciamento.

No further details available. A repeat performance of the previous attempt.

- 3) Unsuccessful coup sometime in 1973; (intended) pronunciamento.

Two Lieutenant-Colonels failed in planning a coup d'etat and were arrested.

- 4) Successful coup on April 12, 1980; reformist/progressive.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by the indigenous rank-and-file/NCO element in the Guard, under the leadership of master sergeant Samuel Doe, against the oligarchy that had ruled the country. In a well-planned coup, Doe toppled Tolbert's government, killing the president and some of his ministers. Otherwise swift and bloodless, with the largely Americo-Liberian officer corps of the Guard offering no resistance.

b) Motivational background: the antagonism between an oligarchy of the descendants of U.S. slaves and an indigenous population of ca. 1.5 million had been aggravated by economic problems.

c) Foreign dimension: Libya was the first to recognize Doe's regime, but had nothing to do with the coup itself. In the following months Doe maintained friendly relations with the U.S. while pretending a fundamental foreign policy shift towards the Soviet Union and its allies. In March, 1981, Doe had many

Soviet diplomats expelled; in early April he asked for and received U.S. military advisors (100 of them). In May he ordered the Libyan "people's bureau" in the Liberian capital shut down, ending his initially very friendly relations with Kadhafi's regime. For whatever reasons, Doe's "Communist connection" was probably never meant seriously.

- d) Internal effects: Doe and the "people's redemption council" started out with boisterous announcements of thorough-going reform and change. But the economy showed no signs of improvement. Doe maintained the Army's loyalty through a doubling of salaries for all ranks. Altogether his rule proved capricious, in keeping with the "youthful" composition of his government, which apart from a few experienced leftovers from the Tolbert regime included mainly 25-year old colonels and brigadiers.
- 5) Unsuccessful coup on June 6, 1981; (intended) pronouncement of possibly restorative character.
- No further details available. 30 military men are sentenced to death for their part in a conspiracy to overthrow Doe.
- 6) Unsuccessful coup on August 9, 1981; revolutionary-/reactionary.
- a) Operational detail: coup attempted by Doe's deputy, the 29-year old Major-General Thomas Weh Syen, five other members of the people's redemption council and a witch doctor, who reportedly were planning to assassinate Doe. Swiftly and bloodlessly crushed at the conspiratorial stage, with all plotters arrested and subsequently executed.
- b) Motivational background: rivalries within the ruling junta stemming from the conflict between Doe's moderate rule and his opponents' revolutionary intent.
- c) Foreign dimension: this coup was master-minded by Libya. Driven by revenge and his quest for revolutionary mischief-making, Kadhafi provided the rebels with intelligence and \$3 million.
- d) Internal effects: Doe had some opponents killed and fired some ministers.

E/17. Malagasy Republic

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in January, 1975; (intended) pronouncement.

Not much detail available. The country was drifting to the left, with the center politician General G. Ramanantsoa giving way to his leftist interior minister, gendarmerie colonel R. Ratsimandrava. This coup by "dissident officers" may have been an expression of objection in Army circles, underpinned by tribal animosities against the ruling Merina group, to which both Ramanantsoa and his successor belonged. The coup was abortive.

2) Unsuccessful coup on February 11, 1975.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by followers of the erstwhile, anti-leftist President Tsiranana. The plotters killed the leftist, newly installed, President Ratsimandrava, but in four days of fighting had to surrender to the loyal Army.

b) Motivational background: anti-leftist in conjunction with the intent to maintain Merina (plateau tribe) predominance against the coastal tribes. Ratsimandrava was a non-aristocratic Merina, and the trend was clearly pointing towards a change of power to the coast.

c) Foreign dimension: this coup paved the way for the coming to power of a leftist - coastal regime in the country.

d) Internal effects: after a brief interlude under General G. Andriamahazo (a coastal moderate), a naval officer took over, D. Ratsiraka. His policy was one of "Malagasy revolutionary socialism" and "local democracy," but in fact amounted to a left-wing military dictatorship.

E/18. Mali

1) Unsuccessful coup sometime in 1969; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. Mali reported the arrest of dissident army officers allegedly engaged in a conspiracy. They may have been supporters of the recently overthrown Keita, Mali's popular and radical president for eight years.

2) Unsuccessful coup in early April, 1971; (intended) pronunciamiento.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by a member of the ruling junta, Captain Diakite, who along with Lieutenant Traore, had overthrown Keita in 1968 and who now turned against Traore. He failed and along with a co-conspirator of senior rank was sentenced to a long prison term.

- b) Motivational background: Diakite represented the far rightist, francophile faction on the ruling junta, with whose views Traore did not always agree.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions. Keita's ties to the Communist world were not entirely severed by Traore.
 - d) Internal effects: none.
- 3) Unsuccessful coup in late April, 1976; (intended) pronunciamiento.
- No further details available. Mali reported the thwarting of a putsch attempt.
- 4) Unsuccessful coup on February 28, 1978; (intended) pronunciamiento.
- Not much detail available. Due to strong dissent within the ruling junta, the potential for pronunciamientos is always present. Power rivalries are decisive. One such rivalry escalated into a coup attempt by senior junta members. Traore had his chief of security, defense minister and foreign minister arrested. The defense minister, Doukara, was subsequently executed.

E/19. Mauritania

- 1) Successful coup on July 10, 1978; pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Army chief of staff, Lt.-Colonel Mustapha Ould Muhammad Salek, with the backing of the Army against the civilian government of President Ould Daddah. Swift and bloodless deposition of the president and replacement by a junta of 18 officers.
 - b) Motivational background: the Moorish officer corps of the Mauritanian Army was tired of the war against the (fellow-Moorish) POLISARIO.
 - c) Foreign dimension: Morocco by virtue of her strong military presence was the de facto power in Mauritania. It was not prepared to allow Mauritania to join the pro-POLISARIO front of Algeria and Libya. While successful in the narrow domestic context, the coup leaders had obviously been oblivious to the fact that international implications and repercussions would undo the desired effect of the coup. (However, in early August, 1979, the junta succeeded in concluding a peace treaty with the POLISARIO, dispensing with its share of the former Spanish Sahara, which was immediately taken over by Morocco.)

- 2) Unsuccessful coup on March 16, 1981; restorative.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by pro-Moroccan officers (with some Army support), who tried in vain to storm the presidential palace in Nouakchott. Several persons died in quick suppression of the attempt by loyal Army forces.
 - b) Motivational background: related to the POLISARIO war.
 - c) Foreign dimension: Moroccan involvement likely but cannot be proved.
 - d) Internal effects: None except for the executions of four coup leaders and the usual cabinet re-shuffles.

E/20. Mozambique

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in December, 1975; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. In the internal turmoil after independence, a group of soldiers staged a coup attempt and failed. They possibly objected to Samora Machel's pro-Communist line to convert Mozambique into a "people's republic."

E/21. Niger

- 1) Successful coup on April 14, 1974; pronunciamiento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the country's Army under the leadership of Lt.-Colonel S. Kountche against the regime of the president for 14 years, Hamani Diori; swift and bloodless takeover.
 - b) Motivational background: the unusual overthrow of another charismatic founder of independence, who so far had ridden out all unrest, happened mainly on account of the severe drought that was plaguing the southern Sahara at this time and destabilizing governments everywhere. The Army, nationalist as it was, also disliked Diori's generosity towards the French, who could exploit Niger's main asset, its uranium. Diori's project to utilize the Army for agricultural emergency work provided a final motive.
 - c) Foreign dimension: Niger's defense pact with Libya was distinctly unpopular, especially within the Army.
 - d) Internal effects: an 11 member supreme military council assumed power. Niger under Kountche has done

relatively well, overcoming the disastrous effects of the drought in a reasonably short time and tackling the exploitation of its mineral reserves.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup in July, 1975; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. The vice-president of the ruling council, Major Sani, attempted to substitute himself for Kountche; he was imprisoned.

- 3) Unsuccessful coup on March 4, 1976; (intended) pronunciamiento.

A Hausa Army major, charging Jerma domination of the Army, headed a putsch attempt and failed. He and six others were subsequently executed. Support from Libya for this coup is nearly certain.

E/22. Nigeria

- 1) Successful coup on July 29, 1975; pronunciamiento.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by the ruling supreme military council against its own leader, General Y. Gowon. While the leader was absent, at an OAU meeting in Kampala/Uganda, even his own bodyguard under Colonel Josef Undam Garba acquiesced in the decision to replace him. The coup was swift and bloodless. After his return and a formal declaration of his loyalty, Gowon was allowed to stay as a free man.

b) Motivational background: Gowon's indecisive and ineffective personality made him an easy target. It also provided the reason for his deposition, which was officially justified by accusations of "official neglect and lack of discipline."

c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions. The new leaders were equally pro-Western, reassuring the West immediately about capital invested in the country.

d) Internal effects: the appearance of political change produced by this coup helped to shore up the popular legitimacy of the ten-year military rule after Gowon's ineffectiveness had endangered it. General Murtala Muhammad took over from Gowon.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup on February 13, 1976; (intended) pronunciamiento.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by Colonel Dimka of the Army's physical training corps with the support of some infantry units in Lagos against General Muhammad's

regime. Dimka succeeded in killing Muhammad and some other members of the government and in spreading coup sentiment to the 2nd infantry division in Ibadan (west) and to Kano in the north. But he failed to rally any sizeable number of troops from Nigeria's fairly large Armed Forces to his cause. He and his fellow rebels surrendered on the same day. About a month later Dimka and 36 other senior military figures were publicly executed.

- b) Motivational background: Possibly a mixture of tribal unrest in an ethnically extremely unstable Army and objection to a mild drift to the left under Muhammad. A desire to re-install Gowon may have played a role. During the coup Dimka tried to get in touch with Gowon in London, where he was in exile. After the coup the Nigerian government demanded from London that he be surrendered.
 - c) Foreign dimension: regime charges of CIA involvement in the murder of Muhammad are untrue.
 - d) Internal effects: this coup and the subsequent executions severely tested the internal unity of Nigeria's Armed Forces and thus the state. Apart from some lingering unrest and conspiracy rumours, the Armed Forces stood the test. They decided, however, to return power to a civilian government by 1979.
- 3) Successful coup on December 31, 1983; pronouncement.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by General Muhammad Buhari with the backing of the whole Armed Forces against the civilian government (in power since 1979) of President Shagari, in which Buhari himself had been the minister of oil and energy. Swift and bloodless takeover, with Shagari placed under house arrest.
 - b) Motivational background: The Nigerian military charged corruption and a disastrous economic situation. The drop in oil prices had brought on severe economic problems. The military used to being in power and only out of it, for three years again intervened in politics.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions, except for the crucial role played by the international oil price.
 - d) Internal effects: Buhari appointed a supreme military council.

E/23. Ruanda

- 1) Successful coup on July 5, 1973; pronunciamento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the National Guard (the Army) against the civilian government of President Kayibanda. Swift and bloodless deposition and arrest of the president, who enjoyed popularity as a warrior for independence and the "father of the nation."
 - b) Motivational background: the young Hutu officers in the Army thought Mr. Kayibanda too soft on the hated Tutsi, whom they had been massacring for years. Kayibanda had kept some Tutsi in positions of importance.
 - c) Foreign dimension: except for the fact that in neighboring Burundi the Tutsi were killing the Hutu, this coup had no international implications or repercussions.
 - d) Internal effects: the head of the new junta, General Habyarimana, instituted an all-Hutu rule.

E/24. Sierra Leone

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on March 23, 1971; (intended) pronunciamento.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed by the commander of the one-battalion Army, brigadier John Bangurah, who rallied the staff to his side -- except for the one battalion -- and consequently failed. The battalion commander, Colonel Sam King, easily crushed the attempt with his unit and thus saved the country's civilian prime minister, Mr. Siaka Stevens. Bangurah was arrested and shot along with three colleagues.
 - b) Motivational background: parts of the Army objected to Sierra Leone's growing Guineaian connection, which had already led to a Guineaian troop presence in the country of over 1200 men. They were the only soldiers Stevens could rely upon, since attempts on his life had emanated from a deeply divided Sierran Army. Stevens openly admitted as much when one month before this coup he explained the signing of a defense pact with Guinea by the fact that "there is a terrible rift in our armed forces." Serious socioeconomic problems played a minor role in the coup.
 - c) Foreign dimension: the increasing influence on Sierran affairs of Guinea's Sekou Toure explains this coup, after which Guinea soon withdrew its troops from Sierran soil.

d) Internal effects: Stevens now felt safe enough to proclaim Sierra Leone a republic with him as first president. His longstanding plans to that effect had been shelved by deep domestic dissension.

2) Unsuccessful coup in July, 1974; (intended) pronunciamento.

Not much detail available. Former cabinet ministers and a few officers tried a coup, failed, and were executed.

E/25. Somalia

1) Successful coup on October 21, 1969; pronunciamento.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by parts of the Armed Forces under the leadership of General Mohamed Riyad against the civilian government of Prime Minister Mahammed Egal; swift and bloodless. The civilian government was arrested.

b) Motivational background: general domestic discontent. The opportunity for a takeover presented itself in the vacancy at the top left by the recently assassinated -- and during his time quite strong and popular -- President Shermarke. He had been buried the day before the coup.

c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. In the longer term, a repercussion of this coup was the more belligerent line Somalia took under the new junta with respect to her perennial border disputes with neighbors. Shermarke had achieved a detente on the issue with Ethiopia, Kenya and France.

d) Internal effects: a "revolutionary council" of soldiers and policemen took over power in Somalia and renamed this state "Somali Democratic Republic." Siyad Barre soon became President.

2) Unsuccessful coup in May, 1971; restorative.

Not much detail available. Somalia, cultivating her new friendship with the Communist states, reported a coup attempt led by the vice-president and the defense minister to "kindle a civil war" and "reintroduce capitalism." The attempt failed.

3) Unsuccessful coup on May 5, 1972; (intended) pronunciamento.

Not much detail available. This putsch attempt against President Barre was led by several officers, the most prominent among them being the former deputy chairman of the revolutionary council, General Mohammed Ainarsche Guedi. Having failed, they were sentenced to death. They may have

been driven by Barre's increasingly pro-Soviet line, but power rivalries are the more likely motivation.

4) Unsuccessful coup on April 9, 1973; (intended) pronunciamiento.

a) Operational detail: coup executed by a group of Army officers from the north against President Barre. Radio Mogadishu went off the air for an hour or two, but then came back with the news that the coup was crushed. The leaders of this feeble attempt were publicly executed.

b) Motivational background: The coup happened either to forestall a return to the Soviet connection or to accelerate such a return. The anti-Soviet background is more likely, since the officers came from the northern tribes, which had always disliked Barre's pro-Soviet stance. A month before the coup Barre had 80 of these officers executed. Traditional clan and tribal feuds connected to Somalia's north-south dualism played a role.

c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. Barre's Soviet-trained and personally recruited National Security Service -- a 20,000-man plain-clothes secret police unit -- may have detected the coup at an early stage. The internal effects of Barre's erstwhile alliance with the Soviets are crucial in explaining this coup.

d) Internal effects: None.

5) Unsuccessful coup in mid-February, 1982; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. In the larger context of ongoing mutinies and rebellions by northern troops and guerrillas in a re-opened tribal conflict between the north and the south, a number of Army officers revolted in Mogadishu because of the recent execution of 11 high officers on charges of collusion with guerrillas. The revolt, possibly supported by the Ethiopia, was quickly crushed.

E/26. Sudan

1) Successful coup on May 25, 1969; reformist "progressive."

a) Operational detail: coup executed by a group of radical nationalist as well as some pro-Communist colonels and majors, led by Colonel Jaafar Muhammad al-Nemeiri, against the civilian regime of Mr. Mahgoub; swift and bloodless.

- b) Motivational background: the Army had greatly expanded in the sixties and therefore contained a large number of "progressive" middle-rank officers who were not part of the civilian elite. Many were Nasserist. The relatively civilized and tolerant character of the civilian government did not deter the colonels.
 - c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. The new junta adopted a virulently anti-Western and enthusiastically pro-Soviet line, expressing itself at once by an intense arms-buying relationship. Sudan also acted on its new Pan-Arabic line, joining the planned federation with Egypt and Libya and sending a brigade of infantry to the Suez Canal after the 1967 War.
 - d) Internal effects: far-reaching. Foreign banks and private businessness were soon nationalized but Numeiri's regime proved to be equally anti-Communist and anti-rightist) despite the Soviet connection of the early years. By 1972 Numeiri had secured his rule against both the Right and the Left. He became president, abolishing the "revolutionary command council" instituted after the "May revolution," and declared the "Sudanese Socialist Union" the only party.
- 2) Unsuccessful coup on July 19, 1971; revolutionary-/reactionary
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Communist Party members in the Sudanese Army under the leadership of Major Hachim el Atta, who had just been fired from Numeiri's government for his links to the Communists. The coup got off to a good start, succeeding first in imprisoning Numeiri and then receiving the support of the Communist Party leadership. The Communists controlled Khartoum for three days; the prospective head of state, Colonel Babakir el Nour, was on his way from exile in London. During this flight the fortunes changed. Kadhafi forced down the British airliner, had Nour along with his companion, Major Hamadallah, removed from the plane to be handed over to Numeiri. Also, Egyptian and Egypt-stationed Sudanese forces flew in and joined loyal Sudanese troops in the effort to recover Numeiri's power.
 - b) Motivational background: Numeiri's internal anti-Communist policy. Having been supported by the large Sudanese Communist Party in seizing and holding on to power two years ago, Numeiri then made himself unpopular with the Communists by establishing a Nasserist "socialist" party and by his plans to enter a federation with Egypt and Libya to which they strongly objected. The coup was almost successful, since

Numeiri's personal power base was close to non-existent.

- c) Foreign dimension: while the violent purge of Communists in the wake of the coup led to tensions with the Eastern bloc, Soviet involvement in the coup is unlikely. In the Arab world, only Iraq -- violently opposed to the Arab Federation -- welcomed the Communist coup in Sudan. The bizarre involvement of Libya and Britain, respectively -- the latter protested against the "outrageous" action by Colonel Kadhafi -- has been mentioned.
 - d) Internal effects: Numeiri progressively moderated his rule. A referendum in October, 1971 confirmed him as President. To accommodate the black south, Sudan even declined to join the Federation of Arab Republics after all, which was as it turned out, short-lived.
- 3) Unsuccessful coup in early September, 1975; restorative/reactionary.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Islamic-fundamentalist officers acting on behalf of the exiled opposition, which was supported by Libya. The coup was crushed in a record 102 minutes. 185 officers were arrested; 19 were executed.
 - b) Motivational background: unyielding political and personal hostility on the part of the exiled opposition figures, who retained closet support in the Sudanese Army.
 - c) Foreign dimension: this coup was supported by Libya, providing money and bases for the Sudanese opposition. Numeiri charged Kadhafi with direct instigation of this coup.
 - d) Internal effects: Numeiri strengthened the trust he had enjoyed with the southern blacks ever since he stepped back from Pan-Arabic projects and managed to treat rather fairly, for the first time ever, this traditionally repressed racial/religious minority.
- 4) Unsuccessful coup on July 2, 1976; restorative/reactionary.
- a) Operational detail: this bloody coup was executed by an invasion force of some 1500 "revolutionary volunteers" (Sudanese exiles, but mainly other North Africans) who, once in Khartoum, were joined by mutineers from the Sudanese Army. The invasion force was assembled, (heavily) equipped, trained and indoctrinated in Libya and then moved on unknown desert routes into Sudan, to arrive in Khartoum, in accordance with a meticulous coup plan, just when Numeiri landed at the airport

returning from a trip to the U.S. and France. Numeiri, however, arrived an hour earlier, enabling him to escape the initial attack. Nevertheless, the invaders managed to occupy Khartoum and disarm many military and police units. But Numeiri was meanwhile able to coordinate the counterstroke by the overwhelmingly loyal Army troops from outside Khartoum. Egyptian and Egypt-stationed Sudanese forces were promptly flown in. It took 36 hours of fierce street fighting to recapture Khartoum and crush the coup; 700 to 1200 persons died and the city was left a shambles.

- b) Motivational background: identical to coup number 3, with Libya representing the critical player.
 - c) Foreign dimension: this coup was not an internal affair but an act of war on the part of Libya with, possible Soviet foreknowledge (as Numeiri charged after the coup). Its repercussions were tremendous. Sudan, perceiving itself surrounded by hostile, Soviet-inspired states (Libya and also Ethiopia), decided to fully rejoin the conservative Arab camp. It concluded a defense pact with Egypt, broke relations with Libya and expelled the last Soviet advisors from the country.
 - d) Internal effects: Numeiri had 98 coup leaders executed. The re-introduction of archaic Islamic law, served to keep the Muslim north tranquil but worked against Numeiri's regime in the south.
- 5) Unsuccessful coup in February 1977; revolutionary (with a strong secessionist element).
- a) Operational detail: coup (more a rebellion) executed by 28 southern officers, whose plot to seize control of the most important southern town, Juba, kill the representatives of the central government and proclaim a "revolutionary regime" was crushed at an early stage by the arrest of the officers. But one company of rebellious southern Air Force troops acted and took Juba airport, to be killed to the last man in the re-taking by government troops.
 - b) Motivational background: revolutionary but mainly secessionist. The best the rebels could hope for was a victory in the south; the spread of their particular kind of coup sentiment to the conservative Muslim north was impossible. The coup was caused by the reappearance of unrest in the south due to Numeiri's efforts at accommodation of the Islamic Right.
 - c) Foreign dimension: Ethiopian involvement cannot be proved but is quite likely. Numeiri sought rapprochement with potential supporters of the South, readmitting an expelled Soviet ambassador, resuming

diplomatic relations with Libya (February, 1978) and tried to overcome hostility toward Ethiopia.

d) Internal effects: none.

- 6) Unsuccessful coup in January 1978; (intended) pronunciamento.

Not much detail available. Probably driven by hostility to Numeiri's national reconciliation policies and in particular to Egyptian and Saudi influence in the country, five officers and 12 NCOs attempted to overthrow the regime, but were caught at the conspiratorial stage and arrested. They represented but the "tip of an iceberg" in the Sudanese Army.

- 7) Unsuccessful coup in mid-March, 1981; (intended) pronunciamento.

Not much detail available. Five Army officers tried a putsch and failed. Numeiri subsequently accused the Soviet Union and Syria of having fomented the coup.

E/27. Tanzania

- 1) Unsuccessful coup at the beginning of January 1983; (intended) pronunciamento.

Not much detail available. Under the leadership of 19 Army officers from the Haya tribe, mutinous soldiers attempted a coup but were quickly suppressed by loyal soldiers of President Nyerere. The economic malaise -- Tanzania is virtually bankrupt -- provides the background. In the wake of this coup Tanzania closed itself off to neighboring countries and Nyere adopted a distinctly harsh domestic policy line; over 1000 "economic saboteurs" were arrested in the following months.

E/28. Uganda

- 1) Successful coup on January 25, 1971; pronunciamento.
- a) Operational detail: coup executed by parts of the Army under the leadership of C-in-C Army, General Idi Amin, against the civilian regime of Dr. Milton Apollo Obote, who was abroad. After some hours of bloody fighting, Amin prevailed. Arrested ministers and other detainees were released soon after the coup, except for two key figures of the old regime.
- b) Motivational background: Most probably to be found in personal motives. Ugandan tribal feuds made the coup possible -- the largest Ugandan tribe, the Buganda,

supported Amin's move -- but for Amin himself it was more a matter of personal hostility to Dr. Obote and the fear that Obote might fire him. The coup may have occurred to Amin at the spur of the moment.

- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications. The most important repercussion in the short run was the immediate transformation of what was a close friendship between Obote's Uganda and Nyerere's Tanzania into open hostility. Obote took exile in Tanzania.
- d) Internal effects: none at the beginning. Idi Amin eventually established the terror regime that made his name known world-wide as a synonym for arbitrary rule by terror.

2) Unsuccessful coup on March 24, 1974; (intended) pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by brigadier Charles Arube who told the Malire mechanised regiment that Kampala had been invaded and that they would have to surround the capital and its most important buildings. The soldiers believed and did what he said, having just four days earlier been sent to Entebbe airport to foil a hijacking. There was also coup sentiment in the regiment. After some fighting with troops loyal to Amin, the coup was put down, and General Arube shot himself.
- b) Motivational background: Amin was purging members of the Lugbara tribe, well represented in the Malire regiment. Arube perceived his position and even life to be in danger. It was the time for General Amin's arbitrary personnel shake-ups throughout Uganda's ruling "bureaucracy," which often resulted in death to those concerned.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
- d) Internal effects: none.

3) Unsuccessful coup in November 1974; (intended) pronunciamiento.

No further details available. Kampala reported the failure of a military putsch, probably driven by personal fear on the part of some senior officer.

4) Successful coup on May 10, 1980; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by supporters in the Army of the just-deposed Army Chief of Staff Brigadier Oyite Ojok, who could count on a 10,000-man private

army. These supporters sat in the parliament's "military commission", and made sure of success by immediately co-opting all the Army's battalion commanders into the commission and re-labelling it the "presidential commission." The coup went swiftly and without bloodshed.

- b) Motivational background: the coup was meant to pave the way for Milton Obote (who from Tanzania was opposing the Binaisa regime then in power) to return to power. Brigadier Ojok was a well-known supporter of his.
- c) Foreign dimension: while Tanzania was still providing exile for Obote and did nothing with its 10,000 troops in Uganda to defend Mr. Binaisa, both these facts should not be misconstrued as indicating a Tanzanian hand in this coup. Tanzania was sick and tired of trying to regulate Uganda's chaotic "politics." Nyerere was reacting to Ugandan internal developments, always by resigning himself to whatever new situation was facing him. He withdrew the 10,000 soldiers from Uganda in mid-1981, when Obote had become president.
- d) Internal effects: Obote in mid-December 1980 finally achieved his goal of returning to power. He became president and established dictatorial rule, but proved unable to remedy Uganda's chaotic internal situation.

E/29. Upper Volta

- 1) Successful coup on February 8, 1974; pronunciamiento.
 - a) Operational detail: Upper Volta, a "relaxed sort of place," (Economist) is also quite prone to coups d'etat. This one was executed by the General in the country's presidential office, S. Lamiozana, on the urging of a group of younger officers. He dissolved parliament and the constitution and banned all political activity after his prime minister, G. Oedraogo refused to step down.
 - b) Motivational background: power rivalries in a mixed civilian-military government plus substantive differences about the best approach to fight the drought and its disastrous economic ramifications.
 - c) Foreign dimension: none.
 - d) Internal effects: the young officers behind this coup formed the effective power base in Upper Volta, with Lamizana remaining the well-meaning and quite popular head of state. In the coming years power devolved back to the civilians who, with Lamizana still at the top, had their rule confirmed in the general elections of

1978. By 1978 Upper Volta was the only country in Africa where the public was allowed to walk freely on the presidential grounds and where bodyguards waved visitors casually in the direction of President Lamizana's office.

2) Successful coup on November 25, 1980; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the military under the leadership of the regimental commander Colonel Saye Zerbo, whose regiment stationed in the capital, Ouagadougou, was instrumental. Swift and bloodless overthrow of President Lamizana's regime.
- b) Motivational background: the Army was disconcerted at the country's deteriorating economic situation -- the consequences of the draught were still being felt -- and at a sequence of strikes generated by it.
- c) Foreign dimension: just prior to the coup Lamizana complained about "power-hungry politicians" whose ambitions were being manipulated by Libya. To what extent Libya was actually behind this coup cannot be established.
- d) Internal effects: Colonel Zerbo took over as president and defense minister.

3) Successful coup on November 7, 1982; pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. Zerbo was toppled by an Army doctor, Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, in a swift and bloodless coup, with the disastrous economic situation again providing the motivational background. The new president showed inclinations toward a re-establishment of civilian rule in Upper Volta's government, dissolving the "people's redemption council" soon after the coup. He also made Captain Thomas Sankara prime minister.

4) Successful coup on August 5, 1983; pronunciamiento.

Sankara took over, put Mr. Ouedraogo under house arrest and formed a "national revolution council." His government was mixed civilian-military. (Since then Sankara has survived another coup which ended the series of successful coups in Upper Volta.)

E/30. Zaire

- 1) Unsuccessful coup in August/September, 1975; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. Mobutu's regime arrested, convicted and sentenced to death three former generals, one colonel and one major for attempting to overthrow the government. Power rivalries at the highest level may be surmised behind this coup.

- 2) Unsuccessful coup in February, 1978; (intended) pronunciamento.


No further details available. Mobutu had dismissed the chief of staff of the Army and some 35 senior officers for their poor performance in the Shaba invasion of March, 1977. Out of resentment, these officers attempted this coup, which was detected early. In March 1978, eight were executed.

E/31. Zambia

- 1) Unsuccessful coup on October 27, 1980;

- a) Operational detail: coup executed under the leadership of a number of senior officers, businessmen, lawyers and former politicians -- all of them enemies of Kaunda's -- by a gang of 200 armed men, mainly recruited from dissidents from Zaire's Shaba province. By accident this gang was discovered by police a day before the coup was to take place. In the ensuing gun battle two rebels were killed, the rest taken prisoner. Kaunda imposed a curfew and arrested the civilian and military coup leaders.
- b) Motivational background: is to be found in Kaunda's increasing erratic one-party rule, and the negative effects this rule had on the economy. The coup leaders expressed genuine and widespread popular discontent with the way the economy was run.
- c) Foreign dimension: Kaunda accused South Africa of involvement in the conspiracy to overthrow him. The feeble circumstantial evidence which came to light seems to support his claim, but it still appears far-fetched in view of the amateurish character of the coup.
- d) Internal effects: insignificant.

Map 1: Overview of current military involvements by foreign powers on the territories of African states (supplementing and putting into perspective the previous section on Black Africa):



source: *Economist* September 19, 1981, p 44.

(F) CENTRAL ASIA

E/L. Afghanistan

1) Successful coup on July 17, 1973; leftist.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by parts of the Armed Forces led by 20 young Army and Air Force officers of leftist persuasion acquired during training in the Soviet Union. They overthrew the monarchy during the King's absence. It took a few deaths -- the Army chief of staff, the commander of the Kabul garrison, the air force commander and a few other high officers -- to ensure no resistance would emanate from potentially loyal Armed Forces elements. The coup leaders constituted themselves in the "Central Committee of the Revolution," which invited the former Prime Minister Muhammad Daud, the King's brother-in-law, to become (a figurehead) president. Daud thus entered history as a coup leader, but was brought in after the coup was done. He was popular with both the Armed Services and the civilians.
- b) Motivational background: the coup leaders were acting from genuine discontent with the pace of the country's development. The Army officers who went along with them were disenchanted with a lack of promotion in an Army whose top posts were regularly filled with the King's favorites. Such nepotism, meant to keep the Army loyal, kept the senior ranks happy, but made the rest all the more dangerous. All senior officers were drawn from one clan (Muhammadzai), aggravating service-related frustration with clan-related hostility.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications except for the training background of the young coup leaders. Daud pursued a precarious policy of neutrality between the Soviet Union and Iran as well as India. Soviet influence gradually increased thereafter.
- d) Internal effects: Daud managed to grow out of his figurehead status to wield the effective power over Afghanistan, introduced some socioeconomic reforms and improved living standards. The young Soviet-trained officers behind the coup that brought him into power kept giving him trouble for substituting too pragmatic a line for the hoped - for socialist revolution. Altogether, with respect to corruption, nepotism and administrative competence, the improvement over the monarchy was marked.

2) Unsuccessful coup in June 1974; leftist.

Not much detail available. The clique of leftist Soviet-trained officers attempted a putsch to overthrow Daud. 200 of them were arrested in the suppression of the coup at the conspiratorial stage, and were convicted in August.

3) Successful coup on April 27, 1978; leftist

a) Operational detail: coup executed mainly by armor and air force units led by those Soviet-trained officers -- now members of the Afghan Communist Party -- who in junior ranks had pulled off the 1973 coup. Soviet training influence was greatest in the armor and air force branches. In a bloody coup -- casualty estimates range from 400 to 5000 killed, but there were even estimates in five figures -- fighting went on between the revolutionary tank units and two infantry divisions loyal to Daud as well as his presidential guard of 1800 soldiers. Outside Kabul the Jalabad garrison resisted. Since the loyal units were virtually wiped out, the highest casualty estimates may well be the most accurate. Daud and his family were killed in the coup, and many of his ministers executed.

b) Motivational background: the radical Soviet-trained officers had been pushed aside by Daud over the years. Daud in addition had passed a new constitution depriving the military formally of most of its influence. These actions caused deep resentment among the radical Army and Air Force officers. But it took Daud's violent prosecution of prominent Communists immediately before the coup to trigger the event itself. A week before, friends of Daud's had shot dead the Communist leader Mir Akbar Khyber. After protest demonstrations Daud had the other leader of the Communist Party, Noor Muhammad Taraki, arrested along with seven followers.

c) Foreign dimension: Soviet involvement in this coup, or even Soviet blessing of it, cannot be proved. However, Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased exponentially with this coup. A treaty of friendship was concluded in December.

d) Internal effects: Taraki, the recently arrested Marxist, became President, with the real power mainly held by a "revolutionary command council" under coup leader and defense minister Kadir. Despite ideological closeness, civilian-military divisions were pre-programmed by the new political set-up. Taraki tried to groom a Moscow-oriented "people's democratic party" as a counterweight. He had General Kadir arrested in August 1978 for treason and intent to overthrow the government. Tribal resistance to the new Marxist

government represented an even greater challenge. In late 1978 the Islamic-inspired guerrilla war against the regime in Kabul, which subsequently has proved critical for Afghanistan's internal as well as external affairs began in earnest.

4) Successful coup on September 16, 1979; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Prime Minister and General Secretary of the CP, Hafizullah Amin, who was the country's strongman with a large power base in the Army (he was also defense minister). Summoned to his office after having dismissed people without authorization during Taraki's absence on a trip to Moscow, Amin was fired upon on his way. This set off a fierce gun battle at and in the presidential palace. Amin emerged the winner; Taraki died from his wounds a few days later.
- b) Motivational background: is to be found in Amin's thirst for complete power. He seized upon the opportunity that presented itself -- or that he had prepared during Taraki's absence -- at the presidential palace.
- c) Foreign dimension: Soviet involvement in bringing Amin to power is hard to prove. A hardliner like Amin was the Soviet Union's best option given its overriding desire to see the guerrilla war in Afghanistan, which was destabilizing its southern frontier, ended. Amin immediately proved himself even more pro-Soviet than his predecessor.
- d) Internal effects: dissidents of all sorts flocked to the guerrillas, whose fast-increasing activities put in question the functional value, from a Soviet point of view, of Amin's regime.

5) Successful coup on December 27, 1979; no classification.

This "coup" actually represented the replacement of Amin with Babrak Karmal during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There was a real threat of the regime's disintegration in the face of internal opposition and the guerrillas. The details of the Soviet invasion need not be related here.

F/2. Bangladesh

- 1) Successful coup on August 15, 1975; pronunciamiento of reactionary-rightist character.
 - a) Operational detail: coup executed against Prime Minister Sheikh Mujib by a colonel and six majors of

the Bangladesh Army with 200 men. They encircled the presidential palace in Dacca and killed Mujib and his family. The senior leadership of the Armed Forces approved of the coup, without having been involved in its planning and execution. Those involved came from the tank regimen in Dacca.

- b) Motivational background: the Army was fiercely opposed to Mujib's plans to make his own paramilitary party-army, the Rakkhi Bahini, into a well-equipped fighting force superior to the regular Army in numbers and equipment. It was equally opposed to India's role in training it as envisaged by Mujib. Feeling challenged, and true to their anti-Indian/anti-Soviet attitude, the officers decided to overthrow Mujib. The country's disastrous economic situation and Mujib's tendencies toward authoritarian rule are less important in explaining this coup.
 - c) Foreign dimension: this coup temporarily destroyed Bangladesh's Indian-Soviet connection and substituted a Western affiliation as well as good relations with China and the Arab world.
 - d) Internal effects: the new president installed by the coup leaders, Mujib's minister of commerce Mushtaq Ahmed, instantly dissolved the Rakkhi Bahini and established a pro-Islamic policy line. Propped up by the Army's only two tank regiments which were still controlling Dacca, he failed to purge the Army Mujib supporters and pro-Indian/pro-Soviet elements.
- 2) Successful coup between the 3rd and 7th November, 1975; pronouncement.
- a) Operational detail: this coup actually consisted of two coups and one mutiny. First the Mujib-follower brigadier Khalid Musharaf, with the help of some of the Mujib supporters in the Army, toppled Ahmed and send the leaders of the coup that had brought him into power into exile. He appointed the old judge Muhammed Sayem as new President and rehabilitated Mujib. Then a full-scale mutiny of the Army rank-and-file, who were not prepared to follow a pro-Indian regime, that was bolstered by five Indian divisions moved into position close to the border and toppled Musharaf in turn. He died at the hands of extreme leftist mutineers. Finally General Zia Rahman, the Army chief of staff deposed by Musharaf, having been reinstated by one of the extreme leftist mutiny leaders of colonel rank, brought the affair to a conclusion. On November 7th he appointed himself C-in-C Armed Forces and, with the pro-Mujib faction rooted out by the mutiny and the rightist/pro-Islamic party to the mutiny on his side, forced the extreme leftist elements of the mutiny

underground. He then introduced martial law. Thus ended this confusing coup which, in a series of unforeseen developments and at the cost of several hundred lives in only five days, left everything as before.

- b) Motivational background: The pro-Indian/anti-Indian, or, pro-Mujib/socialist//anti-Mujib/Islamic-rightist dichotomy within the Bangladesh armed forces explains this confusing coup. The extreme leftist element in it was related to neither one of these two factional directions but came in on Zia's side because it seemed the lesser evil.
- c) Foreign dimension: India and the Soviet Union represented the preference of one party, and the West and conservative Arab Islamic world the preference of the other; the extreme leftists were oriented towards the PRC. Zia once in power started to normalize relations with Pakistan, exchanging ambassadors, and allowed relations with India to deteriorate markedly.
- d) Internal effects: none to speak of. The Mujib followers in the Armed Forces were crushed; the extreme leftists inside and outside the Army, having been sent underground, remained the greatest danger to Zia Rahman's regime.

3) Unsuccessful coup on December 23, 1975; pronunciamiento.

Zia apparently succeeded in dissuading the junior tank officers that had led the August-coup against Mujib and were still ringed round Dacca with their tanks, from turning upon him. A few of them had been running amok all over Dacca with their tanks without finding the palace. The two tank units were persuaded to return to their depot at Bogra 100 miles away.

4) Unsuccessful coup in April/May, 1976; (intended) pronunciamiento.

A repeat performance of the previous coup attempt. Four exiled majors from the two tank regiments of the August coup returned to their units at Bogra and immediately demanded a share of power and the transformation of Bangladesh into an Islamic Republic (they had been in exile in Libya). Zia would not yield to these fundamentalist demands and tried hard, with success, to regain control over the two units. He then fired Air Vice-Marshal Tawab, who had supported the demands, and had the more deeply implicated of the two regiments, the Bengal Lancers, disbanded.

5) Unsuccessful coup on September 30/October 1977.

- a) Operational detail: This coup was executed by the last remaining serious opposition faction within the Armed Forces, the extreme leftists from the JSD. Encouraged by the attempt at Bogra, a few hundred rebels tried to seize radio stations and the airport in Dacca while shooting randomly at soldiers and civilians. It was all over in one hour, with between 100 and 200 rebels and some 25 soldiers killed in the fighting.
- b) Motivational background: revolutionary-leftist. The rebels acted because of the precedent at Bogra two days before and because the whole government's attention was being absorbed by an unrelated highjacking drama at Dacca airport. They were particularly embittered at the execution of their leader, Colonel Abu Taher (who had freed Zia in the November 1975-counter-counter coup).
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications.
- d) Internal effects: with this coup the power of the extreme leftists in the Armed Forces received a severe blow.

6) Unsuccessful coup on May 30, 1981; (intended) pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by individual officers under the leadership of General Manzoor at Chittagong, where Zia was to meet his traitorous friend Manzoor. Manzoor's henchmen killed Zia Rahman but then the revolt collapsed. The credit must go to the overwhelmingly loyal Armed Forces -- astonishing in view of their faction-ridden past and the fact of Zia's death -- and to the acting President Abdus Sattar, who skillfully arranged for a show of all-party solidarity against the rebels. Manzoor and some co-conspirators managed to flee but were pursued and killed by security forces.
- b) Motivational background: frustration on the part of the ambitious Manzoor and a few comrades. Manzoor, long a rival of Zia's for power, had been passed over for the post of C-in-C Army. He seized the opportunity of Zia's visit to Chittagong for a coup.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications or repercussions.
- d) Internal effects: far-reaching, since with Zia's death his unmatched integrational power on the Armed Forces was gone. Abdus Sattar, who handled so well the political

crisis in the wake of Zia's assassination, became the next President through general elections.

7) Successful coup on March 24, 1982; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by Bangladesh's Armed Forces under the leadership of longtime C-in-C Army, General Ershad, against the civilian government of President Sattur; swift and bloodless.
- b) Motivational background: civilian government that kept refusing the military a role in it supplied the reason for this coup.
- c) Foreign dimension: no apparent foreign implications.
- d) Internal effects: General Ershad imposed martial law.

F/3. Pakistan

1) Successful coup on July 5, 1977; no classification.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by the Pakistani Armed Forces under the leadership of the C-in-C Army, General Zia ul-Haq, against the civilian government of prime minister Bhutto; swift and bloodless removal of the government and replacement by a four-man military council of the three C-in-Cs under Zia.
- b) Motivational background: violent rioting, civil disobedience and the threat of outright civil war from the deadlocked quarrel between Bhutto and the opposition prompted this coup -- an emergency measure in view of the threat of civil war.
- c) Foreign dimension: Zia tried to improve relations with India and Afghanistan.
- d) Internal effects: Zia imposed martial law but failed to return power to civilians as promised. The internal situation remained unstable.

2) Unsuccessful coup on March 18, 1980; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. The retired General Tajammal Hussain along with a few other officers were arrested for planning a coup. General discontent permeated the senior ranks of the Pakistani Army.

F/4. Seychelles

1) Successful coup on June 4, 1977; pronunciamiento.

- a) Operational detail: coup executed by armed supporters, some of whom had received training in Tanzania, of the leftist vice-president and opposition party leader, Albert Rene, against the government of President James Mancham. The rebels succeeded in swiftly seizing the few firearms present on the islands from the police and, with one casualty on each side, overthrew the government. Mancham was abroad at the time.
- b) Motivational background: a power rivalry between the two major politicians on the islands.
- c) Foreign dimension: the pseudo-leftist Rene keeps the strategically important islands neutral except for his Tanzanian connection
- d) Internal effects: in spite of socialist slogans, little changed on the tourist-dependent and essentially Westernized islands.

2) Unsuccessful coup on November 25, 1981.

This invasion by South African mercenaries under Michael Hoare failed, because with Tanzanian help, Rene had built up a security force that proved more than a match for the mercenaries, if only because of superior numbers. Most mercenaries escaped to South Africa aboard a Boeing 707. Rene accused former President James Mancham of instigating the coup with South African and Kenyan complicity. While South Africa may have been behind this coup attempt, it is hard to see what might have motivated it.

3) Unsuccessful coup on August 18, 1982; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. Part of the "army" of the Seychelles tried a coup, which Rene put down; heavy fighting took seven lives. Before giving up, the rebels appealed to Britain and South Africa for help. 239 hostages were freed unharmed.

(G) EAST ASIA/OCEANIA

G/L. Burma

1) Unsuccessful coup in July 1976; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Not much detail available. Out of discontent with the way things were going in the campaign against Communist guerrillas, young officers attempted a putsch, which failed.

G/2. Cambodia

- 1) Successful coup on March 18, 1970; pronunciamiento.

This is the well-known coup that brought Lon Nol to power in Cambodia. A swift and bloodless coup.

G/3. South Korea

- 1) Successful coup on December 12, 1979; restorative-/reactionary rightist.

This coup is not generally considered a coup, but an internal Army quarrel. The Army's security chief, General Chun, overthrew the martial law commander, General Chung. Chun, a follower of the late President Park's authoritarian ideals, laid the foundation for his eventual takeover as South Korea's president. Chun had Chung shot because the latter supported the civilian President Choi in the quest for a relaxation of the system. Chun then replaced the martial law regime with officers loyal to his line. Choi all but disappeared from the scene, and Chun took effective power.

G/4. Thailand

- 1) Successful coup on November 17, 1971; restorative.

Field Marshal Thanom dissolved the leftovers of civilian rule, the constitution and parliament. Thus the democratic experiment begun in 1968 under military supervision collapsed. Thanom took these measures in order to have a free hand in fighting the Communist insurgencies.

- 2) Successful coup on October 16, 1976; restorative.

With this coup the military again crushed democratic new beginning in order to clamp down on Communists and restore internal order. The latter had been shaken by student demonstrations protecting the return to Thailand of former junta chief Thanom. This escalated into street battles with police and rightist counter-demonstrators. The military abolished the civilian government of Seni Pramot and re-introduced martial law. Within a few weeks 4000 people were rounded up under the tightened anti-Communist act. Fear of Communist Vietnam, a military superpower in comparison, contributed to the coup.

- 3) Successful coup on October 20, 1977; pronunciamiento.

With this coup Thailand's military de facto rulers turned out of office the civilian prime minister they had put there

a year ago because he was too right-wing. Thanin was alienating neighbors with whom the Thai military wanted to improve relations. The military put themselves directly in charge and promised liberalization and a return to civilian rule while toning down anti-Communism.

4) Unsuccessful coup on April 1981; (intended) pronunciamiento.

Thailand's economic difficulties accounted for this nearly successful coup by one general against another. General San's "young Turks" attempted to overthrow General Prem, who, after heavy fighting and the King's open endorsement, managed to stay in power. Upon the King's taking sides, most of the Army decided to remain loyal except for the commander of Bangkok's military district who invoked "duress." For a few days Thailand had two governments claiming to be in power, both military.

CONCLUSION

Over the past 15 years, the most common version by far of the coup d'etat has remained the pronunciamiento, followed by the restorative coup. Failures generally outweigh successes by between 1.5-2:1. Geographically the respective frequencies of success/failure are quite evenly distributed world-wide.

As to the issue of foreign involvement, Libya's prominent role is striking. This country is the champion in meddling in other countries' military coups d'etat. But it has proved unsuccessful: of 12 instances of Libyan involvement (almost one-third of all the instances of foreign involvement), only one case was successful: the forcing down of a civilian airliner to help another regime (Sudan/1971).

The Soviet Union has been involved in cases of which four turned out successfully (Afghanistan twice, Poland, South Yemen). Iran, Cuba, Ethiopia and France follow, as does the U.S. This factual survey shows the heterogeneity of the causes of military coups d'etat. While it has always been understood that there are

no monocausal explanations of coups, the survey shows that the variety of factors involved is such, and the cultural differences between the environments in which they occur are so large, that efforts at conceptualization are bound to be problematic. Political value concepts have been chosen in this survey to classify coups d'etat -- "reactionary-rightist" instead of "system maintenance"; reference is made to "motives" rather than "causes."

A topic of great and growing importance has not been covered in this survey, namely, the techniques of keeping military regimes in power and the degree of foreign involvement in this process. There have been no successful coups against Communist military regimes. The subject has been dealt with elsewhere in the framework of the present study.

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
(i.e. material support)

SUCCESSFUL

UNSUCCESSFUL

a) Pronunciamento:

Greece (1973)
Guatemala (1982;83)
Honduras (1972;75;78)
Argentina (1971)
Bolivia (1969;70;78;81)
Ecuador (1972;76)
Peru (1975)
Suriname (1980;80;82)
Uruguay (1976)
Syria (1970)
Yemen/North (1974;77)
Benin (1969;72)
Burundi (1976)
Central African
 Republic (1979)
Chad (1975)
Ethiopia (1974)
Ghana (1972;78)
Guinea-Bissau (1980)
Mauritania (1978)
Niger (1974)
Nigeria (1975;83)
Rwanda (1973)
Somalia (1969)
Uganda (1971;80)
Upper Volta (1974;80;
 82;83)
Afghanistan (1979)
Bangladesh (1975;82)
Seychelles (1977)
Thailand (1977)

TOTAL = 47 altogether

Nicaragua (1978)
Argentina (1971;79)
Bolivia (1973;73;74;
 81;81;81)
Ecuador (1971;75)
Peru (1976)
Suriname (1980;81;81;
 82)
Iraq (1970;71;73;79)
Libya (1978;80)
Yemen/North (1978;78;
 81)
Angola (1977)
Benin (1972;73;75;75;
 77)
Central African
 Republic (1969;73;
 74)
Chad (1971;72;73;77)
Congo-Belgian (1978)
Ghana (1972;82)
Guinea-Equatorial (1983)
Ivory Coast (1971;73)
Liberia (1969;70;73;
 81)
Mali (1969;71;76;78)
Niger (1975;76)
Nigeria (1976)
Sierra Leone (1971;74)
Somalia (1972;78;82)
Sudan (1978;81)
Tanzania (1983)
Uganda (1974;74)
Zaire (1975;78)
Bangladesh (1975;76;81)
Pakistan (1980)
Seychelles (1982)
Burma (1976)
Thailand (1981)

TOTAL = 74 altogether

Iran (Iraq/1970; unsuccessful.
Possibly Iraq/1979; unsuccessful)
Saudi Arabia (Yemen/North/1977;
successful)
Yemen/South (Yemen/North/1978;81;
both successful)
Libya (Yemen/North/1978; unsuccessful.
Liberia/1981; unsuccessful.
Niger/1976; unsuccessful.)
SYRIA (possibly Sudan/1981;
unsuccessful)
Ethiopia (possibly Somalia/1982;
unsuccessful)
Guinea (Sierra Leone/1971; successful
foiling coup)
France (Central African Republic/
1979; successful)
Cuba (Angola/1977; successful foiling
coup)
Soviet Union (possibly Sudan/1981;
unsuccessful. Possibly Afghanistan/
1979; successful)

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
(i.e. material support)

UNSUCCESSFUL

SUCCESSFUL

U.S.A. (possibly Cambodia/1970; successful)

Libya (1975;75;75)
Malagasy Republic (1975)
Mozambique (1975)

TOTAL = 5 altogether

TOTAL = 2 altogether

none

Mauritania (1981)
Somalia (1971)

TOTAL = 2 altogether

Libya (Sudan/1975;76; both unsuccessful)
U.S.A. (Dominican Republic/1978; successful
foiling coup. Possibly Chile/1973;
successful)

South Africa (possibly Seychelles/1981;
unsuccessful)

Portugal (1975)
Spain (1982)
Dominica (1981)
Dominican Republic (1971;78;
79)

Grenada (1979)
Jamaica (1980)
Argentina (1975)
Bolivia (1971;79)
Chile (1973)
Iran (1980)
Libya (1969)
Malagasy Republic (1975)
Sudan (1975;76)
Seychelles (1981)

TOTAL = 18 altogether

TOTAL = 10 altogether

Soviet Union (possibly Poland/1981;
successful. Possibly Guinea-Equatorial/
1981; unsuccessful)

Portugal (1975)
Guinea-Equatorial (1981;81)

TOTAL = 3 altogether

TOTAL = 1 altogether

none

Zambia (1980)

TOTAL = 1 altogether

Restorative/
progressive-pro-Western:

none

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
(i.e. material support)

UNSUCCESSFUL

SUCCESSFUL

France (possibly Comoro Islands/1978; successful)
Libya (possibly Morocco/1971; unsuccessful)

Morocco (1971)
 Ethiopia (1976;77)
 Ghana (1979)

El Salvador (1979)
 Bolivia (1978)
 Central African Republic (1981)
 Comoro Islands (1978)
 Ethiopia (1974;74)
 Ghana (1979;81)
 Guinea-Equatorial (1979)
 Liberia (1980)

TOTAL = 4 altogether

TOTAL = 10 altogether

Libya (Morocco/1972; unsuccessful.
 Possibly Tunisia/1976; unsuccessful)

Bolivia (1972;74;74)
 Morocco (1972)
 Tunisia (1976)
 Ghana (1981)
 Kenya (1982)

Grenada (1979)
 Bolivia (1970)
 Sudan (1969)
 Afghanistan (1973)

TOTAL = 7 altogether

TOTAL = 4 altogether

Ethiopia (possibly Sudan/1977; unsuccessful)

Sudan (1977)

none

TOTAL = 1 altogether

Soviet Union (possibly Yemen/South/1978; successful.
 Possibly Gambia/1981; unsuccessful)
Cuba (possibly Grenada/1983; successful.
 Yemen/South/1978; successful)
Iran (Bahrein/1981; unsuccessful)
Ethiopia (Yemen/South/1978; successful)
Libya (Gambia/1981; unsuccessful.
 Liberia/1981; unsuccessful.
 Sudan/1971; successfully foiling coup)

El Salvador (1972)
 Bahrein (1981)
 Jordan (1972;77)
 Congo-Belgian (1972;73;77)
 Gambia (1981)
 Liberia (1981)
 Sudan (1971)
 Afghanistan (1974)
 Bangladesh (1977)

Grenada (1983)
 Yemen/South (1978)
 Comoro Islands (1975)

TOTAL = 12 altogether

TOTAL = 3 altogether

g) Reformist/
 progressive:

j) Revolutionary/
 reactionary-leftist:

h) Leftist:
 (in the broadest
 sense)

i) Revolutionary:

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT
(i.e. material support)

CLASSIFICATION

SUCCESSFUL

UNSUCCESSFUL

k) Revolutionary/
progressive-leftist:

Portugal (1974)
Libya (1969)
Afghanistan (1978)

Saudi Arabia (1977)

Libya (Saudi Arabia/1977; unsuccessful)

TOTAL = 3 altogether

TOTAL = 1 altogether

l) No classification:

Turkey (1980)
Argentina (1976)
Afghanistan (1979)
Pakistan (1977)

Suriname (1982)
Egypt (1972)
UAE/Abu Dhabi (1973)
Central African Republic
(1976)

Soviet Union (Afghanistan/1979; successful)

TOTAL = 4 altogether

TOTAL = 4 altogether

GRAND
TOTAL = 83 altogether

GRAND
TOTAL = 133 altogether

Foreign involvement by 12 states:

U.S.A.
France
South Africa
Soviet Union
Cuba
Ethiopia
Yemen/South
Syria
Saudi Arabia
Guinea
Libya
Iran

Involved in 39 instances.