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
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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ORGANIZING FOR EFFECTIVE JOINT WARFARE:
A DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES JOINT DOCTRINE

by

Jesse J. Kelso

Commander U.S. Navy



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.


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Signature: *Jesse J. Kelso*

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Paper directed by
Colonel Paul Nell, U.S. Army
Faculty Member, Strategy and Operations Division


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Using organizational concepts embodied in existing joint doctrine, this paper deduces rational criteria for selecting the organizational form of a joint force. The purpose is to explicitly state these criteria in doctrine to provide staff officers with commonly accepted bases for determining command relations. Weights are assigned to doctrinal statements concerning goals of command organization. The characteristics of the organizational forms discussed in joint doctrine are then evaluated to determine how they accomplish organizational goals. Criteria for selecting organizational form are then derived by deducing operational conditions which might favor particular goals of command organization. The validity of existing joint doctrine regarding principles of war and organization is assumed. No attempt is made to provide criteria for joint force composition. This paper should be of interest to persons concerned with U.S. military organization and policy, doctrine development, and command relations. It concludes that criteria for selecting the organizational form of a joint force can be deduced from existing doctrine, but acknowledges that use of a different analytical framework could yield different criteria. Recommendations are made to revise area boundaries to avoid seams at key geo-strategic features such as the littoral, to reassign service aviation functions to avoid institutionalized functional component command variants, and to permanently assign Navy operating forces to the established operational chain of command.

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ORGANIZING FOR EFFECTIVE JOINT WARFARE:
A DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THESIS: Rational criteria for selecting the organizational form of a joint force can be deduced from generally accepted concepts embodied in the existing joint doctrine of U.S. Armed Forces. These criteria should be explicitly stated in joint doctrine.

Joint Doctrine describes the aims (ends) of command organization, and explicitly provides for alternative forms of organization (means) available to the establishing authority. The processes (ways) for selecting the organizational means to achieve the organizational ends are often political and rarely consistent in relation to operational factors. As a consequence, organizational structure may often restrain rather than facilitate operational success. This prompted one organizational science scholar to observe that the military and naval history of the United States is "an epic of valiant men whose heroic efforts were misorganized."¹ This paper uses an analytical framework to deduce criteria from joint doctrine for use in rational processes (ways) for linking organizational structure (means) with organizational aims (ends) when establishing a joint operating force. The intention is to encourage doctrine developers to seek agreement on criteria for selecting the form of organization to be used so that operational planners do not have to negotiate

agreement between commanders each time a new plan is developed, or worse, create command relations that are so nebulous that no one will object.

After providing some brief background on how joint doctrine is developed, the framework that will be used to analyze that doctrine is explained in Chapter II. The analysis of joint doctrine and deduction of criteria for selecting the organizational form of a joint force is in the next two chapters followed by conclusions and recommendations.

One provision of the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act) was to require the development of Joint Doctrine to provide authoritative guidance to commanders conducting joint operations. It further specified that joint doctrine had precedence over service doctrine. Congressional oversight monitoring compliance with the Act created a great deal of pressure to show visible progress toward implementation. As a result, there was a flurry of activity between 1987 and 1990, when numerous joint doctrine publications were produced. The Army was particularly active in acting as lead agent on many of the publications, and initially many of the publications were merely dressed up Army-Air Force publications. The Army and Air Force both had pet doctrinal projects (JFACC, FOFA, etc.), which they were eager to promote under the auspices of the Joint Staff, and the Joint Staff Doctrine Shop in J-7 was eager to show progress on their tracking charts. The Navy was slow to understand the significance of joint doctrine, even with alarms

being sounded by the Marine Corps, who arguably had the best doctrine of any of the services, but realized that without the Navy involved, that they were outnumbered and understaffed.² In the rush to initiate projects, many publications were developed simultaneously by different lead agents before the basic and operational level doctrine was developed. Reviewers were overwhelmed with the sheer volume of new publications, as well as with unreasonably short suspense dates which sometimes barely exceeded the response time of the Pentagon mail rooms in distributing review copies. The inevitable result was inconsistencies in doctrine from one publication to another. Sometimes these inconsistencies were inadvertent, but at other times they were intentional on the part of the lead agent. They had no obligation to be limited by another lead agent's work which was still not officially approved by the Joint Staff, so competing concepts often appeared in different draft joint doctrine publications. The lead agents for operational and higher level publications were in particularly advantageous positions since they could propose concepts which could actually invalidate concepts being promoted in subordinate publications. Of course, everyone with the possible exception of the Navy understood what was going on, and intense controversy began to develop over the content and wording of the operational level publications, particularly Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Fortunately, the Persian Gulf War forced a temporary armistice in the "Doctrine Publication Wars".

CHAPTER II

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF JOINT DOCTRINE

Any framework for analyzing joint doctrine today must account for the fact that there may be conflicting guidance from one publication to another and for the fact that some of the most important doctrine has not achieved final approval. There is a hierarchy of publications that parallels the levels of war. I have inserted other JCS guidance as appropriate:¹

- (1) Department of Defense Directives
- (2) Basic National Defense Doctrine (Joint Pub 0-1)
- (3) Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Joint Pub 0-2)
- (4) Joint Warfare for The US Armed Forces (Joint Pub 1)
- (5) JCS Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts²
- (6) Keystone Doctrine
- (7) Supporting operational level doctrine
- (8) Tactics, techniques, and procedures

For any given publication there are several stages of development in the process of accomplishing approval.³ Initial Drafts and Final Drafts are still undergoing staffing by the services and combatant commands and, for purposes of this analysis, will not be considered to be authoritative. Approved Joint Publications, Proposed Final Publications and Test Publications will be considered to be essentially authoritative, and in cases of conflicting guidance will take precedence according to currency.

For example, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (JOINT PUB 0-2) has not been updated since 1986 and, although it is an approved publication, might not be considered as doctrinally current as a proposed final publication revision on the same subject.

In the analysis that follows a great deal of emphasis will be given to the meaning of words. Although it may appear that I am splitting hairs, doctrine cannot enhance interoperability if different users interpret it differently. The use and meanings attached to certain terms is often the essence of joint doctrine. For example, a doctrine of centralized control and decentralized execution is useless if there is not substantial agreement on the distinction between controlling an operation and executing it, and the distinction between direction and control. Indeed, in the "doctrine publication wars" battles are most frequently fought over wording and definitions, and Joint Pub 1-01, the DoD Dictionary is probably the most important publication for the doctrine developers.

Proving the existence of, or establishing precedent is also extremely important in the joint doctrine approval process. There are basically two types of precedent, historical and doctrinal. Historical precedent is rather difficult to prove since one must first achieve substantial agreement that an operation was successful and then achieve agreement on why it was successful. Doctrinal precedent is not quite as difficult since it can be established by systematically inserting doctrinal concepts in proposed publications, in expectation that the

publication will be approved by the Joint Staff. I like to compare this process to planting seeds. Individual doctrinal statements, innocuous by themselves, planted in widely separated locations can be "germinated" by shedding light on them at an appropriate time after the publications are approved. They can then be used to promote the more comprehensive doctrine which they support, but which may not be supported by a particular service. Since Joint Doctrine takes precedence over service doctrine, it is incumbent on the services to recognize these "seeds" before they are approved in joint doctrine or realize only too late that they have been out-staffed.

In keeping with the emphasis on semantics and precedence discussed above, this paper will attempt to analyze the language of Joint Doctrine as it applies to joint force organization. The analysis will be based on the identification of "descriptors",⁴ which are words that ascribe varying degrees of authoritativeness to different doctrinal statements. In reviewing basic and operational level Joint Doctrine, I have identified five levels of authoritativeness:

- I. Prescriptive⁵--characterized by phrases such as "will, must, or shall [take some specified action]".
- II. Normative--characterized by phrases such as "should, normally, usually, most often, [take some specified action]".
- III. Accepted--characterized by phrases such as "is essential" or "a fundamental, primary, or key consideration" or "will, must, or shall consider".

IV. Allowable--characterized by such phrases as 'may, can, or could [take some specified action]' or 'is, may, can, or could be authorized'.

V. Conditional--characterized by such phrases as 'may, can, or could [take some specified action] when or but...'. It should be noted that doctrinal statements with such weak wording and with caveats attached often indicate that the statement was subjected to a great deal of compromise and may have limited support.

Although I am sure that there are many who might question the arbitrary way in which I have classified the five levels of authoritativeness, I believe that anyone who studies Joint Doctrine will conclude that there are in fact varying degrees of authoritativeness. If this is true, then some doctrinal statements will carry more weight as precedents than others and a system for assigning weights to statements can be used to assess the impact that doctrine will have on particular areas in the future. This paper will use this analytical framework to develop a proposal for more definitive guidance on the criteria for organizing a joint force.

CHAPTER III

GOALS OF COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

Who cares about organization or command relations? This may sound like a strange question, but I think that many senior and mid-grade officers believe that on-scene tactical commanders will get the job done regardless of how the force is organized at the operational level as long as tasking is clear, and sufficient, adequately supported forces are available. This is particularly true of navy officers accustomed to the overlapping functional responsibility inherent in the Navy's Composite Warfare Commander Doctrine.¹ In reality, poorly designed organization does cause problems at the tactical level, but the myth that organizational relationships don't matter survives because these problems are ameliorated by informal, habitual relationships² and are resolved as they occur, usually through intense coordination on a command communications network. One wonders how much more effective we might be if these problems were resolved ahead of time, during the planning process.

Unfortunately, many flag officers do not like to get involved in resolving command relations problems since it risks bringing them in conflict with other flag officers with whom they are supposed to be cooperating to achieve the mission. Everyone would really prefer that those senior and mid-grade officers on their staffs (usually in J-5) somehow develop an organization with command relations that will satisfy everyone. The dilemma

for these staff officers is that the organizational relationships that are optimal for the mission often require someone to relinquish some authority to someone else. Relinquishing authority and responsibility is contrary to the very nature of anyone who has been trained to be a leader and has spent years aspiring to greater responsibility. Not only the flag officer, but most of his staff will actively seek to increase not decrease the scope of his authority and responsibility. No one wants to appeal the decision to higher authority and indeed higher authority usually doesn't want to be forced to choose between two of his subordinate commanders. Unless someone takes a courageous stand, the result is often a compromise that results in less than optimal, often vague command relations.

For those who really think that these sort of decisions at this level don't matter much to the success of an operation, I would recommend reviewing the history of the Solomons Campaign³ and the Battle of Leyte Gulf.⁴ Compromises that were made to overcome disagreements between flag officers on how the forces were to be organized had a profound effect not only on the effectiveness of the operations but in some cases even on timing.⁵

Today, as a result of enhanced civilian oversight in the Department of Defense and other events that have occurred since World War II, flag officers are less willing to openly debate command relations as they did in the past. If it were not for policy improvements and established doctrine, our ability to

resolve command relations would be worse now than in the past, and therein lies the solution to the staff officers' dilemma. It is easier to develop commonly accepted precepts for effective organization in the hypothetical realm of doctrine than it is in the process of planning a real operation. Disagreements can be reduced to rational decisions involving fundamental differences over organizational concepts rather than political decisions involving the real world distribution of authority.

Because organizational structure and relationships form the basis of the command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) structure, the logistic concept, and of course, the concept of operation, doctrine for command relations is fundamental to almost every aspect of the operation.

If this is true, why would so many officers not appreciate the importance of command relations? I believe the answer lies in the past failure of doctrine and training, particularly in the Navy, to create an appreciation of operational art and the importance of the operational level of war earlier in officers' career.

If organizational structure is so important to operational success and really does deserve more of our attention, then what should our goals be in designing better organizational structures and command relations? There is no shortage of doctrinal guidance regarding the objectives to be considered in organizing a joint force, but there is little if any guidance on how to select the means to achieve these objectives, and that is type of

proposed guidance that I intend to be the product of this analysis. As a starting point, I have attempted to consolidate the most significant organizational objectives into a manageable number of overall organizational goals, and to identify conflicting goals where they occur.

FLEXIBILITY. Joint Pub 0-1 emphasizes a level I requirement for sufficient flexibility in the organizational framework of the joint force to adjust to changing operational requirements, particularly from phase to phase within the course of a military operation.⁶ This goal would correspond to the "maneuver" principle of war. Joint Pub 0-2 has a similar level II prescription.⁷

OBJECTIVE. Joint Pub 0-1 contains level III guidance to assign authority only to those having responsibility for the outcome.⁸ Joint Pub 0-2 emphasizes a strong level III requirement to establish command organizations that focus on objectives and mission accomplishment.⁹ To achieve this focus, it further prescribes level II provisions of:

- Unity of effort
- Centralized direction
- Decentralized execution
- Common Doctrine, and
- Interoperability.

Although these five objectives have been enshrined in doctrine for many years, I believe that they may be redundant in some cases, and may not have commonly understood meaning in others.

Centralized direction is simply a means to achieve unity of effort and common doctrine is a soft form of centralized direction. Joint Pub 1-02, the DoD Dictionary, does not define direction, but under "directive" it refers to communication in which a plan or policy is ordered into effect. This is consistent with the traditional management functions of planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, and controlling. Joint Pub 0-2 says that centralized direction is essential for controlling and coordinating.¹⁰ This statement is true in the sense that subordinates must receive direction prior to any attempts to coordinate or control the execution of the directed action. Unfortunately, many readers have inferred a prescription for centralized control from this wording, in spite of the next sentence which indicates that decentralized execution is essential to control the detailed action of a large number of units.

Many researchers have documented the persistent folklore among "defense reorganizers" that centralization improves control.¹¹ Every reorganization scheme since 1947 has attempted to "make the Secretary of Defense the civilian official with unquestioned authority and control over all elements of the Department of Defense at all levels" [emphasis added].¹² The actual experience has been that as centralization has increased control has decreased, and frustrated officials make further proposals for more complete centralization. Ironically, as the staffs of upper echelons increase, the authority of non-accountable staff

personnel increases. Senior officials and commanders in their attempts to centralize their control over accountable line subordinates far exceed their capability to manage the span of control they create as they add to their staff. Most organizational experts have long recognized that the best way to enhance control in a large organization is to delegate authority to people who have responsibility for results and then hold them accountable--in other words: 'decentralization'.¹³

Interestingly enough, all the services' (with the possible exception of the Air Force) lower level doctrine emphasis decentralized control. The result is a conflict between the two concepts when they collide at the operational level.

Decentralized execution is also not defined and does not seem to be a meaningful term unless it is equated with decentralized control. Over the years the military has modified the concept of control from that conceived by the classical management theorist, Henri Fayol. It has evolved from a concept of comparing results to standards and providing feedback, to one of improving execution by 'further implementing direction from above'.¹⁴ Another words, direction is now considered that which is received ahead of time, while as occurring direction during execution is thought of as control. If execution is merely the action itself, rather than the control of the action, then how could it not be decentralized? Decentralized execution and interoperability are means to achieve the goal of flexibility.

Joint Pub 0-2 also contains a level I requirement for force

organization to be based on mission, but indicates that organization based on this guidance must be consistence with other guidance in that section of the publication and with the method of command specified by the establishing authority.¹⁵

Combining all the guidance relevant to the principle of objective as it relates to organization and lending more authoritativeness to the more current Joint Pub 0-1, I derive an overall level II emphasis on designing organizations that focus on objectives.

UNITY OF EFFORT. Since I have indicated that two other objectives, centralized direction and common doctrine, can be considered subsets of unity of effort, it is appropriate to elevate it from being an objective to being a level II goal. Unity of command could also be considered to be a means to achieve this goal, but should not be considered a prerequisite, since successful coalition operations often require unity of effort to be achieved without a supreme allied commander. Joint Pub 0-1 has level III guidance not to separate responsibility for planning and execution between different commanders.¹⁶ It also has level III guidance to balance unity of effort with subordinate freedom of action (Flexibility), implying a possible conflict in actions necessary to achieve these two goals.¹⁷

SIMPLICITY. Joint Pub 0-1 level III guidelines prescribe a clear-cut operational chain of command and indicates that the shorter it is, the more responsive it will be (also a means to Flexibility). It also prescribes an effectively small span of control to minimize the complexities of coordinating the effort

as a whole (also a means to unity of effort).¹⁸ Joint Pub 0-2 and the CJCS A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts both contain level II guidance to maintain the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations and to allow them to function as they were designed.¹⁹ Although complex operations may require flexible organizational structure, the commander must be careful not to disrupt established administrative and logistics structures and trained teams that take a long time to reestablish. In this respect, actions to achieve the goal of Flexibility may conflict with the goal of Simplicity.

INITIATIVE. Joint Pub 0-1 contains level III guidance to delegate authority for decision to the lowest competent level.²⁰ This corresponds to the 'offensive' principle of war. The intent is that subordinate commanders should be able to maintain the initiative and freedom of action by being free to exploit opportunities as soon as they occur rather than waiting for permission.

Based on the levels of authoritativeness and frequency of reference in basic level doctrine, I have inferred the following priorities among the organizational design goals:

- (1) Flexibility (level I)
- (2) Objective (strong level II)
- (3) Unity of Effort (level II)
- (4) Simplicity (level III)
- (5) Initiative (weak level III)

Doctrine acknowledges that different organizational characteristics will be better in different phases of an operation (part of the requirement for flexibility), so these priorities are only valid for the major operation or campaign as a whole and will not necessarily hold true for any particular phase considered in isolation. These priorities are also skewed toward the implementation phase since all other phases (readiness, execution, mobilization, deployment, and support) exist to support implementation.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES AND SELECTION CRITERIA

One of the basic tenants on which the national security structure is based is the organization of DoD into separate administrative and operational chains of commands.¹ At the first echelon below the national command authority, the combatant commands form the operational chains and the services form the administrative chains. However, it is customary to double-hat commanders at the second echelon by assigning them both operational and administrative duties. The Navy, in contrast to the other services, splits the operational and administrative chain again at the third echelon. For operating forces below the third echelon the relationship between the administrative and the operational chain has not been standardized. In some cases it has been combined all the down to the lowest level unit, in other cases it is separate except at the lowest level unit. The intent of this separation of the chain of command is to free the operational commander of routine administrative, technical direction, and support burdens that might compete with the commander's operational responsibilities for time and attention. The problem that this division of responsibility has caused in the past has been that it violated the concept of unity of command since operational units were permanently assigned under the command of administrative commanders, and did not change operational command to the combatant commander until execution.

Most of the operational unit's time was scheduled meeting the requirements of the administrative commander and only a small portion was allocated to the operational commander. Part of the justification for the priority given to the administrative requirements was that operational commands were often not constituted until a few months prior to a deployment in order to give sufficient flexibility to the administrative commander in scheduling his assets. Although not optimal, the Navy's ability to consistently and effectively employ ad hoc organizations as its basic operational units would seem to dispute the conclusions of some researchers, who blame past joint operational failures on 'ad hocism' rather than poor interoperability due lack of commonality in equipment, training, and doctrine.²

The recent trend has been to permanently assign operating forces to operational commanders. The permanent assignment of all operating forces to combatant commanders was mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and there are indications that the Navy may increasingly assign permanent command responsibilities to operational commanders and relegate the administrative chain of command to support functions. If done, this would accomplish the goal of relieving the operational commander of routine support functions without violating the principle of unity of command.

The first decision in designing joint forces is the choice between using the permanently established operational chain of command or a more ad hoc organization tailored to the mission. Previously, particularly for the Navy, this decision only made a

significant difference at the second echelon (theater service component commander) because all operating forces below this level were essentially task organized anyway since they were normally permanently assigned to an administrative commander. However, as indicated above, recent trends strengthening the operational chain of command will lend more significance to this initial decision. Established organizations provide stability, continuity, economy, and facilitate long range planning. Tailored organizations provide more specific focus on the mission, increased flexibility, and tend to be simpler and more responsive. They usually achieve all of the goals of effective organization better than established organization with the possible exception of unity of effort.

This does not mean that the advantages mentioned for established organizations are not important. Obviously, we cannot do without them, but we must remember that doctrine focuses on operations not on administration. If we were optimizing organization for administrative functions such as planning, transportation, training, etc., we would probably not assign such a high priority to flexibility as compared to stability, continuity and economy. In fact Joint Pub 0-1 indicates that flexibility is primarily required to adjust from phase to phase of a military action. It also specifically prescribes a centrally directed administrative organization for deployment and its coordination.³ Logically, the phases of readiness, execution, mobilization, and deployment all are more

amenable to direction through established organizations. Furthermore, in the realm of strategic nuclear warfare, where the transition from execution to implementation must occur as fast and efficiently as possible there is no time to form ad hoc organizations and flexibility is normally not required nor desired.

The implementation phase, to which all other phases lead, is where the most flexibility is required, and where the ultimate military objectives are accomplished. Most doctrine and theories of warfare focus on the implementation phase where friction and the fog of war are most prevalent and organizational relationships become more critical. In this environment, the superior flexibility of ad hoc, less complex, task oriented organizations enhance the probability of achieving the mission.

The second decision in designing joint force organization is whether to organize on a functional or an area basis. Although Joint Pub 0-2 list several purposes for either functional or area based organization,⁴ these purposes can be placed into overall categories of centralizing control to optimize efficiency (economy of force) with functional organization, and decentralizing control to optimize effectiveness (objective) with area organizations. In general, efficiency will tend to be emphasized in longer duration, higher level of effort actions such as dominate readiness, mobilization, major deployments, cumulative effect operations and strategies of attrition. Effectiveness will tend to be emphasized in shorter duration,

lower level of effort, actions such as implementation of contingency operations, sequential operations and strategies of annihilation. Even in the implementation phase of a long war of attrition, the emphasis may be more on effectiveness since a decisive defeat, however rare, may rapidly convert what was previously thought to be a war of attrition to one of annihilation. In general, the flexibility, the focus on objectives, the unity of effort within the area of operation, and the simplicity of less complex coordination requirements make the decentralized control of area-based organizations more advantageous in the implementation phase of conventional warfare. This is also true for the final stages of deployment execution for receiving commands in the theater who will organize the provided forces in preparation for the implementation phase.⁵ Most exceptions to this general rule involve operations in which time is extremely critical, the resources required have extremely limited availability, or the operation is not predictable enough to confine it to any identifiable area. Counter-terrorism contingency operations are a good example. Because the forces required are highly specialized, their availability might be limited to one dedicated joint force for world-wide employment. Normally there would not be time to establish an ad hoc organization in the area of the operation, particularly if it is within another area commander's area of responsibility. In this case efficient use of available forces and time is emphasized, and a joint special operations task force would be organized

based on its function.

If the decision is made to base operational organization on function, one must then select the function or set of functions on which to base the organization. The military services are organized according to certain primary and collateral functions. If Joint Force organization is based on the assignment of service functions as prescribed in DoD instruction 5100.1 then it is a 'service component organization'. Although all joint forces have service components for administrative support, they may or may not be part of the operational organization. If the organization is based on any assignment of functions other than that prescribed for the services in DoD instruction 5100.1, then it is a 'functional component organization'. Reasons for deviating from assigned service functions might be the unique nature of the operation, the small size of the joint force, and the need for only minimal administrative support due to the short duration of an operation. In general, if it is normally necessary to create a specific type of functional component organization for routine operations, then it probably indicates that the service functions may need to be reassigned. The evolving doctrine concerning the routine use of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is a good example of this and I will make specific recommendations related to this in Chapter VI.

If the decision is made to organize based on area, then the boundaries of the area must be identified and must not overlap the area of any adjacent area commander.⁶ It should be

understood that forms of organization are essentially limitations imposed by the establishing authority. An area commander is limited by area of responsibility but not normally by function. In fact, he is responsible for all military activities in his assigned area, unless specifically exempted (exemptions would normally be specified by function). A functional commander is limited by function assigned, but may also be limited by area of operation. This would still be considered organization based on function since the commander is assigned authority over a function, rather than over all military functions in an area. A functional commander's area of operation may overlap with an area commander's area of responsibility,⁷ and this is one reason why organization based on function does not provide simplicity and unity of command to the same extent as organization based on area. In assigning areas of responsibility (AORs) to area commanders, Joint Pub 0-1 indicates a level II prescription to avoid dividing key geo-strategic areas or features.⁸ If littoral areas are considered key geo-strategic areas, then the assignment of AORs in the Unified Command Plan probably needs to be revised. The AOR boundary at the Straits of Hormuz was a well-known source of coordination problems until it was moved seaward. A boundary in proximity to the Straits of Gibraltar is also probably not optimal. Although this boundary has not caused problems recently, historically Gibraltar has definitely been considered geo-strategically significant. Within theaters, it has been the practice to delineate subordinate unified commands,

organized on an area basis, with a boundary at the water line. The host country then must deal with one U.S. commander for combined defense of his land territory and another for defense of his territorial waters. This violation of the concept of unity of command has become increasingly problematic as almost all the nations of the world now claim and recognize 12 nautical mile (NM) territorial seas and 200 NM exclusive economic zones. For those who would predict that seaward boundaries would cause coordination problems for naval missions such as theater anti-submarine warfare (ASW), I would argue that mid-ocean boundaries between numbered fleet commanders have rarely been a problem. I have made specific recommendations regarding boundaries of area commands in Chapter VI.

The factors discussed above which should be considered when selecting among organizational alternatives cover the factors listed in Joint Pub 0-2⁹, but with greater specificity and attribute more significance to some than to others. For example, the only effect that enemy forces would have on organizational design would be indirect to the extent that enemy force capability might affect the duration of the operation or the ability to predict the area of the operation. Enemy force capability, in addition to affecting the nature of the mission, may affect the boundaries of area commands. For example, if the mission is to conduct offensive operations, it may be desirable for a theater commander to limit a subordinate area commander whose mission is mutual defense to inside the host country's

territorial waters. The theater commander would then be free to assign other commanders to conduct offensive operations without involving the host country. On the other hand, if the mission is mutual defense, the subordinate's area might be expanded out to the exclusive economic zone or further. The sequence of the recommended organizational design decision process is illustrated in Appendix I.

Imagine how the outcome of the Battle of Leyte Gulf may have been different if these principles had been used. One commander would have been responsible for all operations within the area (perhaps within 200 NM of the Philippine Islands). Command of naval forces would not have been split between Nimitz and MacArthur, nor between Spruance and Halsey. Perhaps the war could have been shortened by a more decisive victory. Even if it had not significantly changed the outcome, at least the debates over who was responsible for what, would have occurred before rather than after the fact!

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Existing guidance relevant to organizational design appears to have been designed to be intentionally vague in order to offer the operational commander as much latitude as possible in selecting among the various options. In spite of this, the guidance has often been ignored, either through ignorance, or because of parochial concerns. This paper proposes more specific guidance (in Appendix I) in the hope that it will generate discussion that will lead to commonly accepted guidelines for organizational design.

The specific interpretations that I have developed in this paper are the product of my particular analytical framework and assume the validity of existing doctrine. Other analyses, or revisions to existing doctrine may lead to different conclusions. The intention is that more of the battles over command relations should occur during the doctrinal development process rather than having to be established from the ground up during the development of each individual operations plan, when they may not receive the attention they deserve. Since joint doctrine is not directive in nature, this should not unduly restrict the options available to joint commanders, but would only cause them to carefully consider departures from previously approved guidelines, and hopefully lead to organizational structures that more efficiently and effectively achieve the mission.

CHAPTER VI

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: More specific guidance should be incorporated into joint doctrine concerning criteria for selecting different organizational structures for joint forces and determining command relations.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Since JFACC has become a standard departure from the service functions as assigned in DoD instruction 5100.1, then the assigned service functions should be modified so that service components would normally be able to perform the functions that now require the creation of a JFACC. Although outside the scope of this paper, the following changes would facilitate the simplification of joint force command relations:

- The Army should have its own organic close air support capability using the most capable platform available, whether fixed or rotary wing.

- The Air Force should be required to develop, as a primary function, long range air interdiction capability which could be embarked on and employed from aircraft carriers if required.

RECOMMENDATION 3: In order to preclude placing key geo-strategic features, particularly littoral regions in proximity to area commanders' boundaries, the number of unified commands organized based on area should be reduced to three:

- A 'Western Command' with eastern boundaries in the mid-

Atlantic and western boundary in the eastern Pacific, to include responsibility for sea, air, and land-based defense of the continental United States and Canada, assigned military operations in North and South America and adjacent waters, and maintaining forces ready to deploy to the other two theaters when required.

- A "Central Command" with an eastern boundary in the mid-Indian Ocean and a western boundary in the mid-Atlantic, responsible for assigned military operations in Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, and adjacent waters.


- A "Pacific Command" with boundaries in the eastern Pacific and mid Indian Oceans, responsible for assigned military operations in South (including India) and East Asia, and adjacent waters, and for defense of United States territory in the Pacific not contiguous to the North American continent.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Subordinate Unified Commands organized on an area basis should include contiguous territorial seas and exclusive economic zones in their area of responsibility.

RECOMMENDATION 5: Navy operating forces and "Immediate Senior In Command" (ISIC) responsibilities currently assigned to the administrative chain of command should be permanently assigned to the established operational chain of command.

APPENDIX I

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN DECISION PROCESS



NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization (New York: Hibbert Printing Co., 1953), p. 1.

2. Based on inside information to which the author had access while assigned to the staff of Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet during the period in which the Commander, Admiral David Jeremiah, was an active participant in molding the Navy's policy for Joint Doctrine.

CHAPTER II

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publications System, Joint Doctrine, and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, Joint Pub 1-01, (Washington: 1992), p. IV-1.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, (Washington: 1992), provides guidance from the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to lead agents of various operational level joint publications (including Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0), see p. ii.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publications System, Joint Doctrine, and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, Joint Pub 1-01, (Washington: 1992) chapter III pp 3-10.

4. The idea for this type of analysis is a modified version of methodology used in Henry C. Bartlett's, and G. Paul Holman, Jr's. "Strategy As a Guide to Force Planning", Naval War College Review, Vol XLI, No. 4, Sequence 324, Autumn 1988, pp. 15-26.

5. Although some may object to the idea of doctrine being prescriptive, I am using the American Heritage Dictionary definition: "sanctioned or authorized by long standing custom" rather more restrictive definitions that imply a direction or regulation.

CHAPTER III

1. For more information see U.S. Navy Department, Composite Warfare Commander's Manual, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, (Washington: 1985). Subordinate functional commanders are given autonomous authority and if conflicting taskings are issued by these functional commanders, the Composite Warfare Commander uses "command override".
2. Michael J. Barron, "Operational Level Command: Who Is in Charge?", Unpublished SAMS Monogram, (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1988) p. 25.
3. Frank O. Hough, et al, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations: Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, (Washington, DC: 1958) pp. 235-262; John Miller, Jr, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, United States Army in World War II, (Washington, DC: 1949) pp. 1-21.
4. Hanson W. Baldwin, Seafights and Shipwrecks, (New York: Hanover House, 1955), pp. 134-182.
5. Barron, "Operational Level Command: Who Is in Charge?", also contains an excellent discussion of the importance of command relations in the French Campaign of 1940 and the Allied Campaign in Burma in 1944.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Basic National Defense Doctrine Joint Pub 0-1, (Proposed Final Pub), (Washington: 1991), p. IV-18.
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 0-2, (Washington: 1986), para 3-11.
8. Basic National Defense Doctrine, para 22, p. IV-26.
9. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), para 3-3.
10. *ibid.*
11. John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Forces, (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD: 1964), p. 194.
12. New York Times, December 6, 1960, p. 1
13. Ries, PP. 195-196; and Brown, Chapters 11-16.

14. Brown, pp. 123-131.
15. Uniformed Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), para. 3-11.
16. Basic National Defense Doctrine, p. IV-26, para. 22.
17. *ibid.*, p. IV-19, para (3).
18. *ibid.* p. IV-25, para. a. and b.
19. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), p. 3-8, para 3-10; and A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, p. 9.
20. Basic National Defense Doctrine, p. IV-26, para. 22.e.

CHAPTER IV

1. Basic National Defense Doctrine, chapter 11, pp. 3-5, particularly para. 21.
2. Theodore A. Duck, "An End to Ad Hocism in the Joint Warfare Arena: A Recommended Solution", Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1987, pp.18-19.
3. Basic National Defense Doctrine, p. IV-18 and p. IV-20.
4. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), p. 3-4, para 3-8a; p. 3-6 para 3-9a.
5. Michael J. Barron, "C3 on the AirLand Battlefield: Striking a Balance Between Communications Means and Information Needs", Unpublished SAMS Monograph, (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1988), p. 30; and Paul D. Hughes, "Mercury's Dilemma: C3I and the Operational Level of War", Unpublished SAMS Monogram, (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1988), p. 16 and p. 29; and William G. Pierce, "Span of Control and The Operational Commander: Is it More Than Just a Number?", Unpublished SAMS Monogram, (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1991), pp. 28-30.
6. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), para. 3-8.
7. *ibid.* para. 3-9.
8. Basic National Defense Doctrine, p. III-39, para. 13a.
9. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), para. 3-7.

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AOR	Area Of Operation
CWC	Composite Warfare Commander
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
DoD	Department of Defense
FOFA	Follow-On Forces Attack
ISIC	Immediate Senior In Command
J-5	Staff Code for the Strategy and Policy Division of a joint staff
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander