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SSI Special Report

**Humanitarian Operations
and the Middle East:
The Hostility Factor**

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

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HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE HOSTILITY FACTOR

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Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

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FOREWORD


America's military leaders increasingly are deeply involved in the study of operations other than war. The military expects to be participating in more and more such operations, and is presently drafting doctrine to cover humanitarian support operations, domestic support, and peace keeping operations.

In the author's view, one aspect of humanitarian operations needs to be reexamined. While American diplomats and government officials may regard humanitarian relief operations as morally unassailable, others may not agree. In the Middle East, for example, increasing numbers of critics regard operations like PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE as power grabs, disguised as humanitarian ventures.

The study explores current positions expressed by the Arab and Iranian press and urges U.S. military and political leaders to become aware of these hostile perceptions. Unless effectively countered, violence against U.S. forces is quite likely.

The study suggests ways in which the United States may successfully address the growing hostility and concludes with a warning—even the best-intentioned humanitarian operations are potential quagmires, into which U.S. forces can easily be drawn.

This special report is issued as an addition to ongoing discussions concerning America's foreign policy and the role played by the military in the execution of our policy. The author will be pleased if this paper generates fruitful debate.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE is a Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1978. He is the author of the books, *The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Persian Gulf*, and the recently published *Chaos in a Vacuum: The Iran-Iraq War*. Additionally, he is author of the Strategic Studies Institute reports, *The Kurds and Their Agas: An Assessment of the Situation in Northern Iraq*, *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms*, and *Oil and the New World System: CENTCOM Rethinks Its Mission*; and coauthor of *Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East* and *Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War*.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE HOSTILITY FACTOR

Introduction.

Humanitarian operations, much praised in the West, are being regarded more and more cynically in the Middle East; PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE are coming to be seen as imperialist power grabs. Indeed, many Middle Easterners¹ profess to have seen all this before. The mandate system—implemented after World War I—supposedly was set up to protect area minorities. In fact, in the eyes of the Middle Easterners, the system was a cover for imperialism; it enabled Britain and France to take over the lands of the old Ottoman Empire and strip them of their wealth. Today, the United States is engaging in the same sort of tactic, in the opinion of a growing number.

Americans may find it hard to believe that U.S. aid to the Kurds and Somalis could be deprecated in this way; in fact, this is happening. U.S. military commanders should be aware of these hostile perceptions as they are the ones who will have to conduct the humanitarian operations of the future.²

When DESERT STORM erupted, Middle Easterners were of two minds on how to react. On the one hand, they were unhappy with Saddam Husayn because he had swallowed a neighbor state. In international politics this should not be done. It is particularly reprehensible for a state that professes Arab Nationalism—as does Iraq—to do this to a fellow Arab country.

Moreover, Kuwait had been a major job market for the primarily Arab underclasses. Palestinians, Egyptians—people from all over the Middle East—travelled, not only to Kuwait but throughout the Persian Gulf looking for work at salaries higher than they

could expect at home (if indeed there was any work at all for them there). Saddam's power grab ended all that.³

On the other hand, Muslims the world over—not just Arabs—deplored the decision of King Fahd to let coalition troops enter the Arabian peninsula, the site of the holy places of Mecca and Medina, and as such off-limits to non-Muslims.⁴ Nonetheless, Operation DESERT STORM occurred with such astonishing speed that coalition troops were in place before anyone had a chance to object.

It was assumed, however, that U.S. troops would depart after Saddam was defeated. In fact, the United States has remained, and kept a virtual troop presence in northern Iraq to look out for the safety of the Kurds. The United States, in effect, has created a de facto independent Kurdish entity in the northern Gulf area. To be sure, Washington policymakers do not make an issue of this. Nonetheless, the region clearly is not under Baghdad's control, and this disturbs many, particularly the Arabs, who feel that the Arab nation has been deprived.⁵

Widespread resentment was felt when the Kurds elected their own parliament. Resentment increased when they proposed that Iraq should become a federation, creating a northern Kurdish area and a southern Arab one. That the Kurds would publicly make such a proposal must mean that the United States approved of this, or so it was believed.

In the end, many have come to look on America's Iraq policy as contradictory. They cannot see how Washington can support an independent Kurdish entity and yet maintain, as it does, that it respects Iraq's territorial integrity. Rather, it appears that America's purpose in setting up a Kurdish area is to destabilize the country. America's insistence that this is not the case is, by many, simply not believed.

Furthermore, skeptics will hark back to the post-World War I mandate system to defend their view. Under the system worked out by the League of Nations, Britain (along with France and Italy) became the mentor for a number of Middle Eastern peoples, with the aim of preparing them for nationhood. One group for whom they performed this role was the Iraqis. At the time, London coveted the rich oil fields of northern Iraq, and thus used its position to wangle oil concessions from Baghdad. Today, the same rich oil region, around Kirkuk, is the area Washington has taken under its protection.⁶ So, to many Middle Easterners, this is what Operation PROVIDE COMFORT is about—oil, not humanitarian relief for the Kurds.

The "Truth" About Somalia.

As for Operation RESTORE HOPE, this too is viewed with suspicion. When former President Bush sent the Marines into the Horn of Africa, he spoke feelingly of the suffering there, of the starvation that was occurring.

As many area natives see it, however, Somalia is a geopolitical prize. Somalia guards the Bab al Mandab, one of three vital choke points in the Middle East (see Figure 1). Therefore, it is held, America intends to turn Somalia into a base from which to guard the passage of oil tankers to and from the Gulf.⁷

Additionally, the idea is growing that Sudan is America's next target.⁸ Sudan, an Islamic fundamentalist state, is one the world's more backward countries. Recently, the Western media began reporting about starvation in Sudan, and human rights violations by its government.⁹ Middle Easterners were quick to connect these reports with Somalia; they inferred that America was preparing another Somalia-type operation.




Figure 1. The Strategic Gulf.

With friendly governments installed in Sudan and Somalia, the theory goes, the United States would dominate all of the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the western approach to the Persian Gulf.

What About Bosnia?

Some Americans may dismiss this kind of theorizing as cynical, but Middle Easterners have a ready reply. Why, they ask, if the United States is so concerned about human rights, is it not doing anything for the Muslims in Bosnia, who are being cruelly oppressed by the Serbs? Indeed, Turkey, which is a Muslim country, tried to get the Americans to act in this area.

Turkey earlier had agreed to allow the United States to use Incirlik air base in southeastern Anatolia as a staging area for U.S. planes enforcing a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds.¹⁰ Turkey's former President Ozal suggested that America set up a similar zone to protect the Bosnians, who are ethnically related to the Turks.

However, the initial reaction of the United States—and its European allies—was to refuse.¹¹ This was seen, by the Turks—and also by many outside Turkey—as a double standard.¹² Later, when President Clinton agreed to airdrop supplies to the Bosnians, his offer was welcome—until the President announced that he would also drop supplies to the Serbs, to be even handed. When the Allies did finally impose a no-fly zone, it was perceived by many as coming woefully late.

What About Palestine?

Middle Easterners also are disturbed by America's behavior in regard to Israel. Just before he left office, President Bush ordered the bombing of targets around Baghdad, after the Iraqis had refused to relocate missiles in the southern part of their country. President

Bush justified his action on the basis that Saddam had defied the United Nations. But, even as U.S. planes were bombing the Iraqis, Washington maneuvered to keep the United Nations from imposing sanctions on Israel, which similarly was defying the world community.¹³

The Israelis had deported 415 Palestinians to southern Lebanon, accusing them of being terrorists linked to the Hamas group. The United Nations voted for their "immediate" return on grounds that this was a violation of international law. When the Israelis refused to implement the U.N. order, the Security Council moved to impose economic sanctions on Tel Aviv. However, the United States persuaded other members of the Council to forebear.¹⁴

This was very badly received by the Middle Easterners, especially as the Israelis launched a particularly brutal repression of Palestinians in the occupied territories after the latter had rioted over the deportations.¹⁵ Indeed, during this flare-up the death toll of Palestinians killed by Israelis since the commencement of the *intifadah* passed the 1000 mark.¹⁶

American policymakers claimed that sanctions would jeopardize the peace process. But most Middle Easterners have long ago written off the process.¹⁷ They did so when Bush agreed to release the first one billion dollars of a ten billion dollar loan guarantee to Israel.¹⁸ By doing so, Bush threw away his most valuable card for inducing Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians. Now, it is generally accepted that the Palestinian case is hopeless. Meanwhile, the recent exiles remain in limbo in southern Lebanon, and no humanitarian operation has been mounted to relieve them.

A Geo-political Analysis.

Some Middle Easterners tie American intervention in their area to the collapse of the Soviet Union: Washington is accused of being the "hegemon." Arabs in particular seem to fear that, since the United States no longer need be concerned about Soviet retaliation, it believes that it can do whatever it pleases. Hence, it has begun taking over the Soviet Union's old clients: Somalia and Iraq, after all, were Soviet satellites. What America is doing is pure power politics; humanitarianism has nothing to do with it—this is a sentiment one hears quite a bit from Middle Easterners.

One could argue that in fact the situation is just the reverse. Rather than taking over the Middle East, the United States is trying to relax its commitments in the area.² However, at the same time, Washington recognizes it cannot walk away from areas that will sink into chaos.

Washington has attempted to enlist the United Nations in managing disturbed regions like Somalia. However, its fellow Security Council members—along with Germany and Japan—are indisposed to get involved where they do not see that their interests are threatened. Thus, the United Nations acted readily in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (where there could be no doubt the interests of all the world's nations were at stake); it was much less eager to assist the Kurds, and only moved reluctantly to aid the Somalis.

This is where the United States has gotten into difficulty. Middle Easterners view the pattern of intervention that has developed with suspicion. Why, they ask, intervene in Kurdistan and Somalia—traditional bases of colonialism—and not in Bosnia, or indeed in Angola, or in Haiti? When U.S. policymakers respond that, after all, the United States can only do so much, the Middle Easterners scoff at this. They do not dispute that—in the

case of Somalia, at least—the situation was dire. What they object to is that the United States seems to be intervening only in areas that are connected to oil.

The United States could offset much of the Middle Easterners' hostility if it acted to resolve the disputes over Bosnia and Palestine. However, because of the circumstances surrounding these two crises, it appears unlikely the President will be able to achieve significant results in either case.

In the case of Bosnia, it appears that nothing short of armed intervention by U.S. troops will bring about a solution there. At a time when the United States is mobilizing to overhaul its domestic economy, the President almost certainly does not want to get involved in a war.

Correspondingly, the Palestinian problem is a prickly one to handle. The Israelis will have to make concessions to the Palestinians before the area is returned to calm. But, the Israelis are not in a mood to do this, and were President Clinton to try to force them, this probably would produce a major foreign policy fight with Israel's friends in the Congress, again complicating the passage of his economic reforms.

The President's situation was reflected in a recent press conference after Prime Minister Rabin's visit. Reporters asked him what, if anything, had been decided about the 415 Palestinian deportees? He said the matter had not been discussed. To Arabs, who had been anxiously awaiting the outcome of the conference, this was a great letdown. They had hoped the President would take a stand on this issue, at the very least they expected him to address it. Not to have even discussed it was seen as callousness.²¹

Idealism vs. Real Politik.

President Clinton clearly is facing a dilemma; however, his situation is not at all unique. The historian Edward Hallet Carr—writing about policymakers between the two World Wars—noted that diplomats of that period similarly were challenged. They could not set aside their old ways of acting, essentially those of power politics.²² America's President Wilson, on the other hand, had a vision of an ideal world that could come into being if states could stop focusing selfishly on their national interests.

In the end, of course, power politics won out. However, the triumph was masked in a rather devious manner. Britain and France proclaimed their adherence to Wilson's idealistic reforms, but applied them in such a way as to aggrandize themselves. The case of Britain's handling of Iraq is typical in this regard (see above). The memory of this sort of behavior is retained by Middle Easterners, particularly the intellectuals. It is this group that is most suspicious of operations like PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE, in which they see repeated some of the excesses of the old mandate system.²³

U.S. policymakers may not feel they have to take into account the opinions of Third World natives. Being convinced of the correctness of their actions, they may feel empowered to pursue their course. For the U.S. military, however, the sensitivities of the natives matter quite a lot. If Middle Easterners come to see the United States as a neo-colonialist power, they are likely to react violently. U.S. troops serving in the region will come under attack, and once this happens, matters will be hard to control.

In another study, the author suggested that human rights operations are potential quagmires, capable of drawing one in without hope of escape.²⁴ To date, nothing like this

has developed in the Middle East, largely because no one has been disposed to resist the United States—at least not very effectively. This could change, however, given the hostility that we have been discussing.

It may be that soon Middle Easterners will begin to behave as do the Serbs, and this will certainly be a challenge. Prudence would dictate that the United States not get involved militarily anywhere just now—not while we are trying to reshape our domestic economy. However, one cannot walk away from an area where one has vital interests.

The Coming Test.

Unfortunately for the United States, the showdown will probably come sooner than we would like. It does not seem possible that the peace process can be prolonged much past summer. This means that by then—if not before—Middle Easterners will know whether the negotiations will be productive or not.

It may be that Syria and Israel will achieve some sort of accommodation on the Golan Question. Damascus will get back the area, in return for a solid peace agreement, on the order of what Israel obtained from Cairo after the Camp David talks. This will effectively abstract Damascus from the Arab-Israeli struggle. With Damascus sidelined, the Palestinians will lose yet another supporter of their cause. Moreover, it will be difficult to extract additional concessions from Israel, which will argue that it has complied with U.N. Resolution 242 by trading land for peace—the case is closed.

The Clinton administration may be disposed to go along with this argument, even though it would mean disappointing the Palestinians. If this is the Administration's thinking, it is probably making a grave error. In the minds of most Middle Easterners, Palestine is a litmus test of America's attitude toward them. If the United States does

nothing substantive for the Palestinians, resentments that currently exist will become exacerbated. Inevitably they will build to where there will be an explosion.

This obviously is something that American military commanders must be concerned about, and begin to prepare for. At a minimum they ought to rethink their approach to humanitarian operations. Rather than looking on them as limited affairs, they might want to think of them as being open ended. Ideally, a humanitarian operation should be completed expeditiously. However, this may not always be possible and then the commander must be ready to take emergency measures. The commander's bottom line should be, what do I do, if this affair suddenly, and unexpectedly escalates?

At the same time there are other steps that can be taken:

- First of all, the U.S. military can begin exploiting the expertise it has acquired. America has taken on enough humanitarian operations that by now a pool of knowledgeable officers exists. These individuals should be brought to the staff and war colleges, where they can teach what they have learned as part of the regular curriculum.

- Along with this the military should try to retain its regional specialists. Such officers are ideally equipped to advise commanders conducting humanitarian operations. Many of them have spent years in areas of the Middle East where the operations are likely to take place. They can deftly and accurately assess popular sentiment. It would also be useful if the military developed a system to identify civilian experts, in and out of government, who could be temporarily assigned to units performing humanitarian operations, if uniformed specialists are not available.

- As always, effective intelligence will be essential for success. But in the case of humanitarian operations in the Middle East, tactical intelligence systems will be less

valuable than a network of native observers and the insight and intellect of knowledgeable commanders advised by knowledgeable staffs.

- Finally, military officers should be aware that the whole concept of human rights is based on Western liberal-democratic political theory, and not necessarily incorporated into other ideological systems. Those in Washington who advocate supporting human rights tend to see this as morally unassailable activity. However, as this study has tried to show, many peoples—at least in the Middle East—are highly suspicious of human rights as a concept.

Since it is the military that will have to deal directly with local hostility, commanders need to know how widespread it may be. Who is harboring these views? Is it merely a small group of intellectuals? Or is the hostility endemic throughout the community? Depending on the answers to these questions, commanders may have to reassess the nature of the operations they conduct.

ENDNOTES

1. The term Middle Easterner refers here mainly to Arabs and Iranians. It does not include Israelis for obvious reasons—the study is concerned with anger among groups that object to alleged U.S. favoritism toward the Jewish state. At the same time, the author has tried to avoid generalizing about specifically Muslim attitudes unless he felt safe ascribing to Muslims, as a whole, a particular sentiment. In one area of the study the term Middle Easterners is expanded to include Turks, and where that occurs the special condition is noted.

2. The study is based primarily on conversations with Middle Easterners both abroad and in the United States, and daily reading of *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)* bulletins. In abstracting comments from the bulletins, the author has focused on Arab and Iranian sources, and has for the most part omitted commentary by radical groups which might be expected to oppose U.S. policy. As a consequence it appears safe to say that the ideas expressed here are the dominant ones reported over the last few months in *FBIS*.

3. Before the Kuwait invasion, Iraq was one of the biggest markets for manual laborers, and indeed workers of all kinds, in the Middle East. Obviously it is no longer so. Kuwait and the other Arab monarchies in the Gulf virtually stopped accepting Arab guest laborers after DESERT STORM, apparently because they no longer trust them. Although not widely reported in the West there were significant demonstrations on behalf of Saddam at the time of the war.

4. Non-Muslims cannot visit Saudi Arabia unless invited by someone who is a citizen. At the same time, of course, persons not of the Muslim faith do work there, but usually such individuals are under contract, and their activities in the kingdom are severely circumscribed. Under no circumstances are any non-Muslims allowed to travel to the area around the holy cities. For Saudi unhappiness with Fahd's decision see, "Two Years After War, Many Saudis Behave As if It Never Occurred," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 13, 1993.

5. It is important to understand the attitude toward the Kurds that is prevalent throughout the Middle East. They are viewed as surrogates of the Israelis, and now they are perceived as our surrogates as well. Middle Easterners regard them as a reactionary element that has worked with traditional forces inside the Middle East, when they are not cooperating with out-of-area elements like the British. Arabs, Turks, and Iranians particularly suspect them because the Kurds have been used in the past to thwart the nationalist aspirations of these peoples. See Stephen C. Pelletiere, *The Kurds and Their Agas: An Assessment of the Situation in Northern Iraq*, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991.

6. Britain first sponsored and then withdrew its support for an independent Kurdistan. The leader, whom Whitehall had selected to head the new Kurdish state, proved intractable. Britain then arranged to have the Kurdish territory incorporated into the predominantly Arab state of Iraq. Britain could do this because, as the holder of the mandate for the newly created state, it effectively ran it through advisors behind the scenes. For discussion of the mandate system see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca, NY, 1952.

7. See "Reaction to U.S. Move Into Somalia Reported," ("Two distinct political groupings in Jordan, including the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, have come out strongly against American troop deployment in war torn Somalia...Both groups charged that the U.S. was seeking to further consolidate what they described as the American control of Arab oil wealth in the wake of the Gulf crisis.") Amman Jordan Times, December 7, 1992; "U.S. Accused of False Concern," ("Hence, the issue is not one of conscience....(but) control of oil resources.") Amman *AL-RAY* December 5, 1992; "Dispatch of U.S. Troops to Somalia Condemned," Tehran *IRNA*, December 4, 1992; "U.S. Efforts in 'Afro-American Horn' Viewed," (The real objective, however...is the desire of the U.S. Administration to seize control of the Horn of Africa.), Cairo *AL-AHRAR*, December 7, 1992; "Somali Islamic Movements, Motives of U.S. Viewed," ("Washington's military action in Somalia...is not purely a 'humanitarian' operation.... The U.S. invasion of Somalia proceeds from specific strategic and geopolitical facts and aims to achieve many things, notably stopping the spread of the Islamic trend in eastern Africa.") Beirut *AL-AHD*, December 18, 1992. One aspect of the commentators' case appears to be ill-grounded, that is their contention that the Bab is a geo-political prize. Portraying it as such is a relic of U.S.-Soviet cold war competition in the area. The physical characteristics of the choke point make control very difficult in the absence of a large force that would be disproportionate to its value. For years, U.S. Central Command planners exaggerated its importance to justify forces in the region.

8. See "Direct Threat Against Sudan," ("What increases our apprehension is a resolution adopted by a major UN committee yesterday at a time when U.S. forces are beginning to arrive in Somalia. This resolution accuses brotherly Sudan of adopting a scorched earth policy against rebels in the south of violating human rights....Indeed, a U.S. official went so far as to describe the situation in southern Sudan as similar to events in Somalia...") Amman *SAWT AL-SHA'B*, December 6, 1992; "Arafat on Palestinian Differences, Clinton," ("After what happened to Iraq, I [Arafat] asked who would be next, and after what happened to Libya I asked who would be the third, and after what happened to Somalia, I asked who would be the fourth?") Amman *AKHBAR AL-USBU'*, January 28, 1993; "Somali Islamic Movements, Motives of U.S. Viewed," ("Thus the west (sic) and the United States found that the best way to stop the spread of the Islamic movement in eastern Africa was to carry out an invasion....the aim is to besiege the Sudanese influence and control Somalia....") Beirut *AL-AHD* December 18, 1992; "Brotherhood Critical," ("Washington's ultimate objectives included a close monitoring of Sudan and Yemen, two other Arab countries whose relations with the U.S. remained strained.") Amman Jordan Times, 7 Dec 92, and "UN Human Rights Resolution Called

'Unjust,'" ("The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that [the resolution that was recently adopted by...the U.N. General Assembly] reflects the double standard policy exercised by certain world powers."), Khartoum *SUNA*, December 8, 1992; "U.S. Moves in Somalia Seen as 'Surprising,'" ("Somalia is probably the only region that gives the United States the excuse to intervene to reshape the political situation in the Horn of Africa and the entire center of Africa so it will be in line with the new U.S. policy in the post-cold war era."), Beirut, *AL-SAFIR*, December 3, 1992; "Ba'th Party Condemns U.S. Operation in Somalia," ("This is a new link in the chain of conspiracies led by the United States with the aim of occupying Arab territory under the cover and with the collusion of some Arab regimes.") Amman *SAWT AL-SHA'B*, December 9, 1992.

9. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, "U.S. Envoy Says More Food Medicine Needed in Sudan," ("Ambassador Don Petterson said the suffering in the southern part of Africa's largest nation was comparable to that of neighboring Somalia...He said Sudan needed an urgent infusion of humanitarian aid.") March 5, 1993, also "Sudan's Islamic Rulers Split on Links With West," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1993.

10. The Turks, who are predominantly Muslim, were initially quite hesitant to undertake this role. However, Ozal led them to go along, arguing that Turkey would be rewarded by the West. Subsequently, Turks rejected Ozal's party in an election which became a referendum on the base issue. Prime Minister Demiral, whose party defeated Ozal's, has continued to allow the Allies to use Incirlik, but it has been heavy sledding for much of the time. The fact is that the Turks—and particularly the Turkish military—do not like the Kurds. Turkey has a Kurdish minority of over 10 million, and has reason to fear that this group would like to break away from Turkey and form its own state.

11. Originally the United States expected the Europeans to take charge of any armed intervention. However, when the Europeans proved incapable of doing so, some elements of the Administration began exploring the possibility of setting up a United Nations' force that would carry out the Vance-Owens Agreement. Then the Bosnians rejected the agreement, causing the United States to back off. See "Aides Give Clinton Bosnia Peace Plan," *The New York Times*, February 9, 1993.

12. See "U.S. Measures Against Bosnia, Israel Urged," (...Washington uses double standards. It did nothing to attack Serbia...although Serbia has occupied three fourths of Bosnia.") Cairo, *AKHBAR AL-YAWM* January 16, 1993; "Limited Optimism on Clinton Bosnia Stand Noted," Cairo, *MENA*, February 8, 1993; "International Conspiracy Seen," (The Hindu crime [against the Uttar Pradesh mosque] exposes the major and manifest international conspiracy against the Muslims....This crime is not separate from the massacres and arrests carried out by Islam's enemies against Muslims in Burma, Bosnia-Hercegovina (sic), Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, Iraq, and elsewhere.") Tehran, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, December 7, 1992; "Clinton Urged To Change U.S. Foreign Policy," ("We accuse [the United States] of applying double standards... we fear the contradiction between the happiness, the singing, the joy and celebration in Washington, and the grief, the weeping and the funerals in Palestine, Iraq and other parts of the Arab

world.") London *AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI* January 22, 1993; "Iraqi Raids Show 'Law of Power, Not Power of Law'" ("As well as revealing the double standards, the raids also show that they are not proportionate to the nature and magnitude of the Iraqi acts, never mind their being carried out without the endorsement of the UN.") Cairo *AL-AHRAM*, January 23, 1993.

13. This decision by Bush to bomb Iraq appears to have significantly damaged U.S. prestige in the region, to judge from the press accounts in Middle Eastern journals. It was not just that the United States bombed the area around Baghdad, and in the process killed some Iraqi civilians; it was the specific circumstances under which the bombing was carried out that rankled many. Iraq had maintained that, as the no-fly zone was not voted on by the United Nations, it had no legality, and consequently Bush's demand that Saddam move missiles out of the south infringed on Iraq's sovereignty. This was an argument that many Middle Easterners accepted; Bush's counter-claim that America was acting under the authority of the original U.N. resolution which sanctioned DESERT STORM was not accepted. Rather, this was seen as a crude device whereby the United States could impose its will, something similar to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Anger against Bush and the United States really became intense, however, when a Tomahawk missile struck the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad during a conference of Islamic scholars. See "Human Rights Group Urges Decisive Stand on Iraq," ("The Arab Human Rights Organization today expressed regret at the renewed Western Alliance forces' attack on Iraq.") Cairo *MENA*, January 19, 1993; "Iraq Attacks Called 'Cover' for U.S. Policies," (The Arab Lawyers Federation today denounced Western attacks on Iraqi civilian and military targets..."), Cairo *MENA* January 19, 1993; "U.S. Double Standards on Iraq Condemned," Cairo *AKHBAR AL-YAWM*, January 16, 1993; "Engineers Send Funds to Rebuild Bombed Iraqi Plant," ("The Jordanian Engineers Association (JEA) Wednesday announced it was contributing JD 3,000 towards the reconstruction of the Iraqi engineering industrial plant which was raided by U.S. planes last Sunday.") Amman *Jordan Times*, January 21, 1993; "Commentary Criticizes Attack on Iraq," Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, January 14, 1993. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Strategy Deficit," (To make matters worse, for 1 billion Muslims around the world, the cases of Bosnia and Iraq are linked. They are struck—and increasingly outraged—by the evident determination by the West to punish Iraq for its transgressions and by the unwillingness of the west to respond to the massacres of Muslims in Bosnia.") *The Washington Post*, January 17, 1993, also Mamoun Fandy, "Clinton More Fulbright Than Rhodes?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 14, 1993, and "U.S. Policy Has Deepened Iraqi Bitterness," *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1993; also Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism—The Revolt of the Brooms*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

14. See *The Washington Post*, "U.S. Seeks Delay on U.N. Action Against Israel," January 23, 1993.

15. "UN Envoy Calls for Increased Pressure on Serbs," ("Kharrazi lashed out at the double standard attitude adopted by the Security Council on regional crises saying that the public opinion of the region was concerned about such an attitude. While the Zionist

regime and the Saudis were left alone to do whatever they wanted, Iraq was being subject to raids....") Tehran *IRNA* January 20, 1993; "Iraqi Raids Termed Violation of Pan-Arab Security," Tripoli *JANA*, January 18, 1993; "Dailies Denounce Strikes," Tehran *IRNA*, January 16, 1993; "Arab League Chief Says No-Fly Zone Illegal," Paris AFP, January 27, 1993; "Chief Negotiator Condemns Allied Bombing of Iraq," Jerusalem *Al-FAJR*, January 20, 1993; "President Terms Allied Raids Shameful Act," Tehran *IRNA*, January 14, 1993, and "U.S. Criticized for Crude Muscle Flexing," ("The air raids on Iraq by United States aircraft and its western allies were no more than an absolutely unjustified aggression and crude muscle flexing against a nation that had emerged bleeding from a destructive war...."), Jerusalem *Al-QUDS*, January 14, 1993.

16. See *The New York Times*, "Killing By Troops Up In Israeli Zones," ("Israeli and Palestinian monitoring groups say at least 15 children ages nine to 16 were among more than 70 Palestinians that have been fatally shot by soldiers since August....") February 7, 1993. The *intifadah* entered its fifth year last December.

17. See "IRNA Previews Christopher's Mideast Tour," ("American President Bill Clinton, who, during his election campaigns, made strong pro-Israeli statements, has followed words with action. He appointed former ambassador to the Zionist state Sam Lewis as head of policy planning at the State Department and Martin Indyk, who once worked for a pro-Israeli group, as his special advisor on the Middle East, shattering any hope of the White House playing an honest mediator between Arabs and Israel."), Tehran *IRNA* February 17, 1993.

18. The real fear of Middle Easterners is that, if Israel is not forced to backtrack on this round of expulsions, it will then step them up. Tel Aviv wants to incorporate hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews into Israel, and is expected to undertake mass expulsions of Palestinians to make room for these. It is also believed the loan guarantees are intended to finance settlements for the Russian Jews in the occupied territories—although the Israelis have denied this, and Washington has specifically forbade the use of the guarantees for this purpose. See "Israeli Obstacles Expected on Path to Peace," ("On the same day that Christopher concluded his tour, reports from Tel Aviv spoke about the establishment of a new settlement on the Golan. This was done when reports are saying that Israel is leaning toward focusing the peace talks on searching for a settlement with Syria. How can these conflicting reports be squared, especially after Israel has received the \$10 billion loan guarantees demanded from the previous administration?") Cairo *AL-JUMHURIYAH*, February 26, 1993.

19. See "Brotherhood Critical," ("Both the Brotherhood and the Liberal Unionists deplored the Arab handling of the Gulf crisis...which opened the way for the U.S. and its 'hegemonic, (sic) aggressive' forces to have a foothold in Somalia under the 'guise of humanitarian relief.'") Amman *Jordan Times*, December 7, 1993.; "Paper denounces 'U.S. Invasion' of Somalia," ("The newspaper *AL-THAWRAH* has denounced the U.S. military invasion of Somalia, which has been carried out due to the U.S. hegemony over the U.N. Security Council.") Baghdad *INA*, December 10, 1992; "U.S. 'Capitulation' to Israel Over

Deportees Seen" ("We admit that the United States alone is left with the crown of power, domination, and hegemony...."), Cairo *AL-AKHBAR*, December 15, 1992.

20. See Stephen C. Pelletiere, and Douglas V. Johnson, II, *Oil and the New World System—CENTCOM Rethinks Its Mission*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992. In regard to relaxing commitments in the area, we do not mean by this that Washington will entirely pull its forces out of the area. The United States will continue to require access to the Gulf, but with a major economic retrenchment underway at home, we are going to have to scale back our involvement with most Middle Eastern states.

21. See "Peace Talks on Mubarak-Clinton Agenda," *The Washington Post*, April 6, 1993.

22. Edward Hallet Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, Harper Torch Books, New York; 1939. This is one of the classics of international politics.

23. See "Oil companies await chance to reach Somalia's reserves," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 19, 1993. Also it was not lost on Middle Easterners that the countries who first supported PROVIDE COMFORT—the United States, Britain, France and the Netherlands—were all holders of the original oil concession in Iraq, which the Ba'ath Party nationalized.

24. Stephen C. Pelletiere, and Douglas V. Johnson, II, *Oil and the New World System*.