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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Neotraditionalism and the Military: the Challenge of Reform in
Communist Systems

by

Brenda Jones Vallance, Major, USAF
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, UCLA
1992

282 pages

The Soviet military leaderships' abusive form of neotraditionalism, represented by the absence of any concept of a legal order, was the basis of the factional breakdown of the military during the Gorbachev era. Without a legal recourse to protect themselves, Soviet military members were completely dependent on their superiors. The result of the leaderships' absolute power was a dysfunctional organization in which senior officers used their power arbitrarily to fulfill personal interests.

Gorbachev's attempts to form a legal state directly challenged the absolute power of the military leaders. By protecting individual rights, the legal state would end the senior officers' unlimited authority. Recognizing this threat to their personal power, the senior leadership allied with like-minded individuals and groups and used their resources to establish their own forum to engender support for their position. However, the junior military officers welcomed the legal state as a method by which they could achieve personal career satisfaction while also improving the overall organization. Therefore, they

supported the reforms suggested by Gorbachev and saw Yeltsin as their champion in the reform effort.

As a result of their domination by the Soviet Union, the Eastern European militaries suffered similar abuses of power. The rapidity of the events of 1989, however, precluded a concerted effort by their leadership to sustain their control. Without a heroic image on which to fall back, these militaries were able to form new national defenses and end the abuses of their neotraditional system.

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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Neotraditionalism and the Military:
the Challenge of Reform in Communist Systems

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science

by


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
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Neotraditionalism and the Military:
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Professor Richard D. Anderson, Jr., Chair

The Soviet military leaderships' abusive form of neotraditionalism, represented by the absence of any concept of a legal order, was the basis of the factional breakdown of the military during the Gorbachev era. No orders were illegal in the Soviet military, and subordinates were committed to fulfill all their commanders' orders, despite the negative consequences these acts could have on themselves and the organization. Without a legal recourse to protect themselves, Soviet military members were completely dependent on their superiors. The result of the leaderships' absolute power was a dysfunctional organization in which senior officers used their power arbitrarily to fulfill personal interests.

Gorbachev's reform program, in attempting to include the Soviet population in governing by forming a legal state, directly challenged the absolute power of the military leaders. The legal state would end the senior officers' unlimited authority by protecting individual rights and delineating legal from illegal. Recognizing this threat to their power, the senior leadership allied with like-minded individuals and groups and used their resources to establish their own forum to engender support for their position.

The junior military officers welcomed the legal state as a method by which they could achieve personal career satisfaction while also improving the overall organization. These individuals believed that professionalization of the military would end their superiors' control and that departyization would deny the leadership the tool they used to both reinforce and oversee their maintenance of power.

As a result of their domination by the Soviet Union, the Eastern European militaries suffered similar abuses of power. The rapidity of the events of 1989, however, precluded a concerted effort by their leadership to sustain their control of the organizations. Without a heroic image on which to fall back, these militaries were able to form new national defenses and end the abuses of their neotraditional system.

CHAPTER 1

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND THE SOVIET MILITARY

The coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 caught many Western analysts off guard, and revealed and emphasized the split that had long been in existence in the military. When the military resisted the coup leaders' efforts to reinforce their seizure of power through the use of military force, this split came to the forefront. The participation of Marshal Yazov, the Minister of Defense, in the coup did not assure the military's allegiance to the coup leaders and their goal of arresting the changes in the country brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev's six years of economic and political reform. To the contrary, many military officers purposefully resisted the coup leaders' use of forces under their command, and some junior and middle level officers proclaimed their support for the coup resistance movement, with some units even actively defending the person they viewed as most representative of democratic reform, Boris Yeltsin.

The source of the military's factional breakdown, one side resisting reform and consisting primarily of senior military officers symbolically led by Yazov, and the other made up chiefly of junior and middle level officers who

supported reform, can be traced to the military's neotraditionalism. This neotraditionalism is symbolized by one specific issue: the concept of an illegal order. Unlike other modern militaries which maintain professionalism by limiting officers' actions through legal mechanisms, there were no illegal orders in the Soviet military. This ensured absolute authority and control by the commander and denied subordinates individual legal rights. The absence of rule-bound behavior allowed the senior leadership to appropriate the organization for their own purposes. The absolute power they held over their subordinates was exercised by their exclusive right to issue orders, and the assurance that these orders, whatever they might entail, would be followed unquestioningly.

Gorbachev's reform policies directly challenged the absolute authority of the senior military leaders. In his attempts to overcome the stagnation of the Brezhnev era, Gorbachev challenged the Soviet population to participate more actively in the country's economic and political spheres. Rather than pushing his countrymen simply to work harder and produce more, the tactic commonly used by his predecessors, Gorbachev chose instead to include the population in debate and decision making. In doing so, he attempted to assure citizens that they had a vested interest in improving the state of the nation by building a legal

state in which citizens actually possessed legal rights, to include a voice in the governing process.

These changes were a direct challenge to the military leaders' absolute authority. Their subordinates, previously bound by the requirement to follow all orders, whatever their nature, now would live within a state which protected the individual's rights and delineated legal from illegal. Protected by these rights, subordinates could question their superiors' authority, would not be expected to fulfill illegal orders, and could act with the knowledge that their individual actions would be protected within the legal state.

The senior military leadership recognized that the legal state would end their absolute authority and fought the Gorbachev reforms in an effort to maintain their control. Younger officers, however, saw these reforms as the means by which they would end their absolute subordination and total dependence on their superiors. These officers were generally frustrated personally and professionally by the manifestations of their superiors' absolute authority. As officers they were powerless in their attempts to command or demand respect from their subordinates. Maintaining a professional, highly skilled military was impossible in the face of the demands placed on them by their superiors. Personal careers were subject to their superiors' capriciousness and young officers' lives and lifestyles reflected their lack of rights. All this, these officers

believed, would change if a legal state was formed, and their support for reform and its leaders reflected this belief.

Neotraditionalism and the Soviet Military

Militaries, to include the military of the Soviet Union, are by their nature neotraditional. Jowitt explains neotraditionalism as a combination of modern and traditional features in one organization, with the modern being subordinated to the traditional.¹ The neotraditional organization's legitimacy is based on a traditional command-obedience hierarchy, with the ability to accomplish tasks serving as its legitimizing mechanism.² This task performance is an extension of Weber's characterization of charismatic leaders who maintain power through "...miracles, through victories and other successes, that is, through the welfare of the governed."³ The existence of the combat task is significant because it provides the rallying point which assures that, through this special mission, the organization maintains both a special status separate from the rest of society and an exclusivity of membership, with the privileges

¹Ken Jowitt, "Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime," Soviet Studies, Vol. 35: 3, (July 1983) 277.

²Ibid., 284. Jowitt says that the Communist Party's legitimacy is based on the performance of a social combat task, which may be defined as a compelling task with the goal of transforming society. See Jowitt, 285.

³Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 296.

such membership entails based on the organization's special status. Task performance contrasts with the modern concept of legitimacy, which is based on the idea of legal and rule-bound behavior. Modern militaries which exist within a legal state, however, possess neotraditional characteristics but maintain a professional standard because they are bound by the legal rules and individual rights as outlined within the state. Authority may be abused by superiors, but authority is never absolute and subordinates are protected from following illegal orders.

As defined by Jowitt in his analysis of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the corruption of neotraditionalism occurs when there is a loss of organizational integrity. In the absence of a social combat task the organization becomes routinized and susceptible to corruption. As routinization occurs, members begin to "...equate their particular interests with general organizational interests."⁴ In doing so, organizational competence and integrity may be compromised, but, in the end, the members' belief systems are such that actions and choices which to the outside observer would appear to be counterproductive to the organization are rational to the individual, who also believes they are rational for the organization. In the Soviet military, that no order was illegal and officers were expected to obey their superiors

⁴Jowitt, 284.

without the protection of individual rights meant that senior officers' positions of absolute authority allowed them to transform the military into an organization they could use to fulfill their personal interests.

The result of corrupted neotraditionalism is an inability to sustain an effective impersonal bureaucratic system. What takes its place is a system which emphasizes political loyalty and rewards that loyalty "...systematically with career opportunities, special distributions, and other favors that officials in communist societies are uniquely able to dispense,"⁵ i.e., a personalistic system of organization. Privileges are distributed based on political power and control, rather than economic wealth.⁶ The result of this relationship and pattern of authority is "...institutionalized clientelism;...citizen dependence on social institutions and their leaders."⁷ The patron-client mechanism, along with the leaderships' other means of control, are an accepted method of operation, and individual attitudes are shaped by the internalization of corrupted practices.

⁵Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) 6.

⁶See Victor V. Magagna, "Consumers of Privilege: A Political Analysis of Class, Consumption and Socialism," Polity, Vol. 21: 4 (Summer 1989) 720. In this article, Magagna explains that this is the result of the absence of real private property and corresponds to a lack of value for money income. As a result, allocations are based on political, not economic power.

⁷Walder, 8.

In the case of the Soviet military, the senior leadership adopted the belief in a control system to the extent that they viewed the entire military in terms of their dominance within a command-obedience structure. The concept of "militarized socialism," to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, placed the military in a position of partnership with the Communist Party and provided the senior military leadership with a further means and rationale for sustaining their neotraditional practices. Militarized socialism encompassed the social combat task of the military by providing for a glorification of the military (through its reliance on tradition and the heroic accomplishments of the organization) and an emphasis on patriotism and civic duty.

In contrast to the senior officers, junior officers viewed personalistic practices as detrimental to the organization and their personal welfare. That personal attitudes about the military could differ within the Soviet officer corps had never before been important to analysis of the institution's behavior. Western analysts have usually viewed militaries, including the Soviet armed forces, as monolithic organizations whose command-administrative system ensured a certain organizational cohesiveness. But the split within the Soviet military indicates the need to understand the impact that abuses of power can have on an organization. The military leaders' absolute power resulted in differing attitudes toward the organization. Gorbachev's reform

movement, and the environmental changes it produced, provided the opening for the representatives of these opposing attitudes to engage in public debate.

How can neotraditionalism be identified as the source of factionalism? If neotraditionalism is the reason for the differences between the two groups, the central issue of debate should be legal and individual rights versus leadership authority, and personalism and personalistic practices in place of rational organizational behavior. Those defending neotraditionalism should resort to defenses which justify their power positions. In the Soviet military this defense should emphasize the heroic and traditional role of the military in society, an argument used in an attempt to sustain the senior leaderships' power base. Secrecy is also an important tool of isolating the military leadership from its critics. Neotraditional leaders' arguments should demonstrate that they view their personal interests as synonymous with the organization's interests, with the leaders' power resulting not from personal chicanery or selfishness, but as the product of their selflessness in helping to meet organizational goals.

Those seeking to end the personalistic nature of the military should emphasize the role of individual rights in the military of a law-based society and should criticize the personal gain obtained by neotraditional leaders through their autocratic power. They should seek to end the

neotraditional practices which they view as personally harmful and inefficient and detrimental to the organization's professionalism. The significance of neotraditionalism as an explanation of the military's factionalism is not the pervasiveness of neotraditional practices within the Soviet Armed Forces, but rather how the two sides present the issues being debated. How do they differ in their interpretation of the organization's goals and interests, and how can these differences be explained? This study will examine these issues in order to demonstrate the role of neotraditionalism in explaining the factionalization of the military.

Before turning to the discussion of neotraditionalism in the Soviet military, it is useful to understand the shortcomings of literature on the military and political organizations in explaining the events surrounding the Soviet military's factional breakdown. This literature explains a military's response to change by using two approaches; the first is that the organization is monolithic, consisting of like-minded individuals, and the second, that rational organizations socialize their members and provide incentives which ensure they place organizational goals above their own and work toward organization cohesion. The Soviet case fits into neither explanation. A review of the literature on Soviet civil-military relations demonstrates how this literature focused on issues which, although vital to understanding civil-military relations, provided few clues

into the differences in attitudes found within the ranks of the military. Finally, this chapter will define further the concept of neotraditionalism in relation to the Gorbachev reforms as an explanation for the factionalization of the military and the source of attitude differences within the officer corps.

The Military as a Monolithic Organization

Every organization faces tension between the goals of the organization and the goals of individuals in the organization. Successful organizations must resolve these tensions. In the early examinations of the military as an institution, which included the works of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, the authors viewed the military as a homogeneous organization and therefore without internal tensions. Huntington defined the professional military officer corps as an organization possessing a corporate identity, a monopoly on the expertise associated with military affairs, and a sense of responsibility to the state and its defense.⁸ Members of the officer corps possess a military ethic which Huntington describes as "conservative realism." This ethic is "...pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of

⁸Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 8-18.

the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative."⁹

Although they may be characterized as "conservative realists," military members are continually faced with conflict between their traditional concept of the military and the need to maintain a modern fighting force. In his discussion of the military professional, Morris Janowitz notes that

The dependence of the military on the status quo - whether that status quo is industrial capitalism or communism - reinforces traditionalism. Traditional attitudes are institutionalized by the requirements for military organization and planning. When war-making becomes more technical, the military requires years of preparation and advance thinking. Sudden developments are resisted as disruptive, for it takes years to translate ideas into weapon systems.¹⁰

Based on Janowitz's observation, all militaries are faced with the need to maintain a modern approach to war fighting while also subordinating change to the traditional command structure of the organization. Their homogeneity helps accommodate these opposing pressures.

A similar observation has been made about the Soviet military. According to Kolkowicz, "...while the military is

⁹Ibid., 79.

¹⁰Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, (New York: The Free Press, 1971, 22-3.

progressively more given to technocratic/managerial ways and values, it continues to retain the morale-building and corporate self-identification derived from the more traditional, heroic, and revolutionary values and symbols of the armed forces."¹¹ For Kolkowicz, the Soviet military possesses an internal contradiction. It is an organization built on modern, technocratic measures, yet relying on traditional methods of organizational purpose and identity, but still possessing homogeneity derived from its corporateness.

The picture of the military which emerges from the work of Huntington and Janowitz is one which portrays a military as an organization monolithic in character, manned by like-minded individuals who share the same basic view of the organization's goals and values. This one-dimensional view was again used by Huntington in his analysis of the military in politically changing societies. For Huntington, the reason militaries frequently come to power in third world countries is because the military is the sole cohesive institution and force amid the disorder caused by citizens' demands for increased political participation.¹²

¹¹Roman Kolkowicz, "Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist (Hegemonial) Systems," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1982) 246.

¹²Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) 223-233.

The factional breakdown of the Soviet military and its members' differing attitudes toward reform illustrate the problem of using the one-dimensional approach for analysis. Nothing that the Soviet military did in relation to Gorbachev's reforms was done with a single voice reflecting the institution as a whole. Rather, from as early as 1987, the military was consumed by internal debates over the meaning of reform and the methods by which reform would and should be applied to the organization. The debates over reform clearly indicated that some military members were concerned about the need to change the organization's standard operating procedures in order to maintain a modern military force, while other members were just as clearly fighting to maintain the status quo built on a neotraditional organizational structure. How its members differed in their definition of the organization's appropriate blend of modern and traditional factors, and therefore their basic definitions of the identity and goals of the organization, constituted the basis of the factional split within the military over its reform.

To understand the factional breakdown of the military, it is necessary to understand the attitudes of the individuals making up these factions. In his analysis of the attempted coup in Sri Lanka in 1962, Horowitz found that the officers' attitudes toward the changes in political and social circumstances in the country played a significant role

in their participation in the coup.¹³ These officers were not acting to protect corporate interests, which Nordlinger argues is the explanation for why military coups happen.¹⁴ Nor did their actions reflect those of a monolithic organization, just as the factions within the Soviet military indicate that its reactions to Gorbachev's reforms were not those of a monolithic organization.

Rational Organizations and the Neotraditional Military

Conservative realist attitudes are not enough to guarantee organization cohesion. In order to understand this lack of cohesion, we must understand why these different attitudes among individual members of the organization would exist. Typically, individuals voluntarily belong to an organization. Should they no longer agree with the organization's policies, they may choose to "exit," to cut all ties with the organization.¹⁵ Once a member of the organization, however, the individual will be provided incentives to remain a member and contribute to the cooperative effort necessary to sustain the organization. These incentives may be specific, such as material gain or

¹³Donald L. Rowitz, Coup Theories and Officers' Motives, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) 163-4.

¹⁴Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977) 63-87.

¹⁵Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) 21-29.

non-material such as the pride of workmanship attained through participation in the organization's production. Non-personal incentives, which include the associational attractiveness and social compatibility gained by being a part of the organization are also important to maintaining membership. Organizations also use more persuasive methods in their attempts to assure the socialization of their members.¹⁶

Eventually, the organization replaces individually autonomous behavior with rule-bound behavior.

Solutions are found in the socialization of agents to an ethic of administrative duty and autonomy. The classical bureaucrat acts in a manner appropriate to a position, rather than in accord with personal preferences and can be trusted to do so, even in the face of considerable temptation to do something else.¹⁷

As a result, "[i]nstitutions define individual, group, and societal identities, what it means to belong to a specific collective."¹⁸ A significant role in defining the organization's moral code, for assuring that the organization is a cooperative system in which its members possess loyalty

¹⁶Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) 142-157.

¹⁷James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, (New York: The Free Press, 1989) 119.

¹⁸Ibid., 17.

and a willingness to subordinate individual interests to the organization is played by the executive.¹⁹

As long as the executive is successful in maintaining the organization's moral code, differences within the organization and its members may be successfully resolved without threatening the organization itself. However, there are times when this task will be particularly difficult for the executive. Environmental changes may reduce the ability of leaders to provide incentives for participation in the organization. Changing threats may alter the power within the organization, since power "...is based on the ability to cope with the threats most important to the organization."²⁰ While such threats may be rare, they represent problems or constraints for the organization which are impossible to ignore and result in changes in influence within the organization. "Change comes about when those presently out of power are able to articulate a new set of strategies which are more consonant with present environmental contingencies and are able to generate sufficient support for implementation within the organization."²¹

In such a situation, the leadership of the organization may fail for a number of reasons, the most important of which

¹⁹Barnard, 279.

²⁰Donald Chisholm, "Organizational Adaptation to Environmental Change," IGS Working Paper No. 86-1 (March 1986) 24.

²¹Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, (Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing, Inc., 1981) 339.

is that it fails to recognize the threat and act accordingly. This failure can be attributed to a number of executive shortcomings.

Perhaps frequently the leader believes his personal morality and that of his organization are identical when they are not. Perhaps he is ignorant of the codes in the organization that are necessary by reason of the environment, which he fails to see objectively. Perhaps he mistakes a purely personal motive for an organization purpose. In these cases, the facts destroy his responsibility, his leadership fails, he no longer can create, he is trapped between the incompatibility of purpose and environment, insincerity rots his influence.²²

Leaders play a vital role in maintaining the cooperative atmosphere of the organization, and the military, along with other institutions, can only be considered monolithic when the challenges of change are successfully met by its leadership. However, these periods of change are exactly the times when leaders' power may prove inadequate to successfully maintain a cooperative organization and will result in leaders' power being challenged by others within the organization.

Gorbachev's reform movement presented a threat to the military with which the leadership was unable to cope. In

²²Barnard, 283. Barnard states further, "But until that happens - as perhaps it inevitable does in time to all leaders, since established organizations often seem to outgrow their leaders - until that happens, the creation of organization morality is the spirit that overcomes the centrifugal forces of individual interests or motives."

contrast to March and Olsen's belief that the institution defines individual group and societal identities, in the Soviet military a small, powerful group defined the organization. The threat this group now faced was not only an internal challenge of its authority, but also a challenge to the institution as they defined it. The personalistic organization and its leaders were being challenged by reformers who sought to transform it into a rational organization.

Soviet Civil-Military Relations

Political science literature dealing with politics and the Soviet military has traditionally focused on the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership of the government. Although this relationship occasionally has been marked by differences over policy actions, the acceptance of militarized socialism by the military and civilian leaders meant that they shared a common view of the goals of Soviet society. By focusing on the broad question of civil-military relations, however, the literature missed the point of the neotraditional processes within the military and the resulting relationships of subordination. In this literature, which focuses on the senior leadership as the decision makers, junior officers are seen as passive participants. At the time, this view was appropriate, but Gorbachev's reforms introduced the new issue of rule-bound

behavior and the issue of such behavior divided the ranks of the military.

The central argument in the literature on Soviet civil-military relations is whether the party and military were organizations who were at conflict or consensus with each other. There are three primary models of Soviet civil-military relations.²³ Early work on the subject was accomplished by Roman Kolkowicz, who is associated with the first model, or what may be appropriately labeled the conflict model. In his book The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Kolkowicz asserts that the party-military relationship is conflict-prone because of the politicization of the military which results from party control. This control, achieved through a system of political officers which parallels the military hierarchy but serves to oversee the indoctrination of the ranks and reports to the party leadership, is specifically aimed at countering the full professionalization of the military. The party's attempt to achieve and maintain party control, however, is in conflict with the military's own interest in remaining outside of political involvement, and ultimately results in military

²³To state that there are simply three models of the relationship is not an attempt to ignore the fact that there are a number of variations and applications of these models. However, the three broad models discussed here address the three general perspectives taken when examining Soviet civil-military relations. In their recent examination of the issue, Gustafson and Colton also discuss these three primary perspectives. See Timothy Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

inefficiency.²⁴ Thus, the party and military are seen as naturally at odds over their general interests and find themselves in a conflict-ridden relationship.

Kolkowicz's model was criticized by William Odom, the author of the second model of Soviet civil-military relations. As a response to Kolkowicz's conflict model, Odom asserted that in fact the opposite situation is true, i.e., the party and military were in consensus when addressing organizational goals and interests.. According to Odom, "[d]isputes over issues of military policy are normal, but they cut across the military-civilian boundary to become intraparty disputes. In this analysis, marshals and generals are party executants."²⁵

Just as Kolkowicz ignored the existence of common party and military goals and values, Odom ignored the potential for conflict between the organizations over how best to pursue these goals and act in accordance with their interpretation of organizational values and personal power interests. As a result of the shortcomings of these two models, Colton suggested a third model of Soviet civil-military relations

²⁴Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) 12.

²⁵William E. Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," Problems of Communism, Vol. 39 (May-June 1990) 69. In discussing this consensus model in 1973, Odom writes that both the party and the military reflect an ambivalence toward economic reform, a general agreement on the need to repress intellectual dissent, a concern about liberalization in Eastern Europe, and ambivalence toward the value of de-Stalinization. William E. Odom, "The Party Connection," Problems of Communism, Vol. 22, (September-October 1973) 16-7.

which viewed the military as a limited participant in Soviet policy decisions. According to Colton, the military's influence and participation in decision making varies according to the issue area. Issues that may be considered confined to the military itself, such as promotions and disciplinary issues, are dominated by the military. In contrast, societal issues requiring political bargaining or the use of force for their resolution reflect little or no direct military participation.²⁶ As Colton explains,

The scope of military participation in politics is narrowest when confined to internal military matters of intense concern only to army officers and usually capable of resolution within the boundaries of the military establishment. Of rather broader scope are what can be termed institutional issues. These bear directly upon officers' ideological self-image, material well-being, status, and professional concerns but can be decided only with the participation of civilian elites outside the military.... Intermediate issues touch in some way on the interests of some army officials but are of primary concern to other specialized segments of society. Societal issues are the broadest of all, affecting all citizens and dealing with the basic goals and needs of society as a whole.²⁷

²⁶Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) 63-9. This model is also associated with Thane Gustafson, Dale Herspring and Condoleeza Rice. In their most recent work on the subject, Colton and Gustafson argue that this model is still applicable during the Gorbachev years, although Gustafson notes that the expansion of roles and missions for the military since the 1960s have also affected the influence of the military and therefore its relationship to the civilian leadership. See Thane Gustafson, "Conclusions: Toward a Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?" in Colton and Gustafson, 351-7.

²⁷Ibid., 233.

For Colton, the type of issue determines the potential for interaction and therefore for conflict between the party and the military.

In addition to these three models, there are a number of other significant evaluations of Soviet civil-military relations. In a more recent work, Kolkowicz states that the military increased its influence during the Brezhnev era. As a result, relations between the party and the military became increasingly interdependent, with the military actually serving a key role in maintaining party power. Kolkowicz believes that a regime crisis could result in the party's further reliance on the military in its efforts to retain political hegemony, in which case the military could become the dominant element in the relationship.²⁸ Finally, in a recent article evaluating the current situation in the Soviet Union, Odom suggests that his earlier model of civil-military relations, which stated that the two parties operate from a position of consensus, may now be transitioning to a conflict model because of the threat the Gorbachev reforms present to the military.²⁹

Two notes must be made about the models of Soviet civil-military relations. First, these models focus their analysis

²⁸Roman Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post-Hegemonial Synthesis," in Kolkowicz and Korbonski, 129-30.

²⁹Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," 69-71.

on the highest levels of political and military decision making. In the absence of conflict and the struggles for political power which such conflict creates, there was no reason to look below the senior leadership in attempting to explain how the party and military work. This justifies Herspring's analysis of military policy based on an examination of the top military leadership.³⁰ While it is true that under status quo circumstances leadership analysis can provide critical clues for understanding the workings of an organization, it is argued here that environmental change and its effect on a neotraditional organization presents situations which can only be explained by understanding the political action as defined by individual attitudes within the organization itself.

Second, these models fail to recognize the importance of control in the military. The command-obedience structure of the military assures a top to bottom flow of information and precludes the opposite. The control of the senior leadership, exercised through the always-legal basis of orders, ensured this control was maintained, and, as Meyer recently wrote, the presence of party organizations within the military reinforced this organizational and power

³⁰In introducing his study, Herspring states that "[i]t is therefore the thesis of this book that focusing on individual decision makers - in this case in the military - can serve as an important window into the evolution of Soviet politics." Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command 1967-1989, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 7.

structure.³¹ In this way the democratic centralism of the party extended to the military through the principle of centralism and this sustained the absolute control of the senior officers and ensured the dependency of subordinates on their commander. Gorbachev's reforms demonstrated the military's neotraditionalism and, by providing an open forum for debate, exposed the leaderships' personalistic practices and these practices affect on the organization, its membership and society in general.

The Soviet Military and the Rules of the Game

In the literature on rational organizations discussed above, members are socialized through a system of incentives and the organization's leaders act to meet the challenges of a changing environment. Socialization produces the acceptance of rule-bound behavior. In corrupted neotraditional organizations such as the Soviet military, there is no organizational basis for the socialization of members. Rather, members are simply subjected to penalties. In the Soviet military, junior officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers were just supposed to obey their superiors. Again, this is illustrated most clearly by the fact that there were no illegal orders in the Soviet military. "A superior's order is law to his subordinates.

³¹Stephen M. Meyer, "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed," International Security, Vol. 16: 3, (Winter 1991/1992) fn.14, 12.

An order must be carried out unquestioningly, precisely, and promptly."³² As one reformer observed, "...an order is law. Even criminal orders, which run counter to law, have to be carried out under the Regulations."³³ Failure to obey one's superior was an act of insubordination and would be punished immediately in order to restore order to the unit.³⁴ Even if a serviceman tried to complain about his commander's orders, there was no chance to do so. As Urazhtsev explains, "...in accordance with the Army Regulations, a complaint lodged against a commanding officer is to be looked into by the commanding officer himself."³⁵ These procedures ensure absolute control by the commander, and a total lack of rights by his subordinates.

The neotraditional organization of the Soviet military was bound together by the power of the senior leadership. In Barnard's description of executive shortcomings, the executive loses influence because he is ignorant of the codes of the organization as shaped by the environment. But in the case of the Soviet military, the leadership both defined and

³²General Major S.N. Kozlov, ed., The Officer's Handbook, [Spravochik ofitsera], (Moscow: Military Publishing House, Ministry of Defense, USSR, 1971), trans. by the DGIS Multilingual Section, Translation Bureau, Secretary of State Department, Ottawa, Canada. English edition published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1971, 168.

³³Vadim Volkov, interview with Vitaly Urazhtsev "A 'shield' without a sword," New Times, No. 32 (7-13 August 1990) 18. Urazhtsev is a People's Deputy of the Russian Federation and organizer of the Shchit (Shield) military trade union, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

³⁴Kozlov, 168.

³⁵Volkov, 18.

knowingly abused the codes of the organization. They used the resources available to the organization to command others to do what they wanted. And there was no way that the senior officers themselves could break the rules because no order they issued would ever be illegal. Jowitt believed that the pervasiveness of such practices would effectively preclude the introduction of Western liberalism, i.e., rule-bound governance, within Soviet institutions.³⁶

Why then did the Soviet military break apart? By changing the rules of game, Gorbachev provided the opportunity for the reformist officers within the military to fight neotraditionalism. "When...there is a sense of isolation, of alienation, action may be shaped by criteria of conflict and disaffection."³⁷ By the time that Gorbachev introduced his reform programs, the junior and middle level officers of the Soviet military had already become alienated from the organization by the senior leaderships' personalistic command-administrative style. Gorbachev's programs provided the occasion for these officers to openly question the control and leadership style of the senior leaders'.

Power follows from situations in which there is conflict. Conflict is produced to the extent that there exists

³⁶Jowitt, 290-1.

³⁷Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, Torchbook Edition, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1966) 211.

interdependence among organizational subunits, a condition of resource scarcity, and disagreements concerning goals, preferences, the technology of the organization, or the connections between actions and preferences. These conditions produce decision situations in which the use of power and politics is more likely.³⁸

The environmental changes introduced by Gorbachev resulted in organization conflict marked by the use of power and politics by the two factions within the military. As stated by March and Olsen, "...some of the more significant struggles in human history and contemporary society revolve around the formation and reformation of major rule systems, the core economic and political institutions of society."³⁹

The changes introduced by Gorbachev's reform programs constituted profound environmental changes which directly contradicted the military leaderships' attitudes toward the organization. The Soviet military reflected the neotraditional characterization which Janowitz saw as the combination of modern and traditional elements in a single organization, as discussed already. The senior military leadership possessed a neotraditional attitude toward the organization which had been corrupted by their absolute authority, and had defined the organizational ethos to parallel this corrupt attitude.

³⁸Pfeffer, 96.

³⁹March and Olsen, 37.

The systemic changes introduced by Gorbachev directly challenged the neotraditionalism of the senior military leaders. Gorbachev's reform policies, when viewed on a timeline, became increasingly politicized as he faced opposition to change from middle-level bureaucrats. His course of action was to emphasize the role of the individual in governing, laying the groundwork for inclusion of the masses in a law-based society, as the Soviets called it. This course of reform, along with the policy of openness which allowed the two military factions to debate the issues in the Soviet media, was seen by the senior military leaders as a direct attack on their power and on their concept of the military, and their efforts to defend their position filled major Soviet journals and newspapers beginning in 1987.

While the neotraditionalists, as the senior military leaders will be referred to in this study, were challenged by Gorbachev's reforms, these same reforms inspired military members to seek changes within the organization. The "liberalizers" or "reformist" groups were primarily populated by junior and middle level officers who no longer accepted the neotraditionalists' practices. They viewed these practices as harmful to the organization and to their own personal careers and lives. In the face of the leaderships' absolute power, they compared their relationships of dependence to conditions of slavery, in which innovation, initiative, personal pride and motivation were drained by the

exploitation of their superiors. They summarized their situation with the phrases "those with the right, have more rights" and "those who command, get what they want."⁴⁰

Gorbachev's emphasis on the individual in society and his or her role in forming a law-based government provided these reformers with the power to fight the neotraditionalists by providing them the possibility of legal rights and therefore protection from the personalistic rule of the neotraditionalists. By changing the basis of command-subordinate relationships from extreme personal dependence to impersonal bureaucratic relationships based on performance they believed they could improve both their own welfare and the organization's ability to perform its task of defending the nation.

This battle was further aided by the demilitarization of society.⁴¹ Militarized socialism, born out of historic experience and the party's own militaristic tendencies, had placed the military in a position of power over the civilian population, which it exercised by overseeing an extensive training and socialization program for young people and by maintaining a conscript military and a reserve system. This

⁴⁰See for example "Pis'ma marshalu," [Letters to the Marshal] Ogonek, No. 1 (January 1990), 3-4, for the use of these Russian phrases to characterize the situation of dependence in the military.

⁴¹David Holloway uses this term to characterize the de-emphasis of military needs and ideals in Soviet society. See David Holloway, "State, Society, and Military under Gorbachev," International Security, Vol. 14: 3 (Winter 1989/1990) 8.

ensured a ready supply of combat-trained personnel which could be extracted from a civilian population socialized within the confines of the dependency relationships dominant in the Soviet political system. The military was also an important socialization agent for the state, and its task of defending the nation against its enemies (read the capitalist states, specifically Western Europe and especially the United States) and counterrevolution (read anything outside of the Communist Party's control) meant its social combat task was not simply defense. When Gorbachev adopted the policy of "new thinking," he downgraded the role of the military in executing the state's policies. His rapprochement with the West, his arms control agreements, and his policy of glasnost, which opened the military to criticism by the civilian population, all de-emphasized the role the military had come to play in the Soviet Union. Such a de-emphasis marked the end of militarized socialism, which in turn marked the end of the military's social combat task. These changes constituted dramatic rule changes for both Soviet society and the military as an organization.

Mechanisms of Control in the Soviet Military

The mechanisms of control used by the senior military leadership had been built in the early days of the Soviet military and distorted throughout its history, with the Brezhnev era of stagnation allowing much of this distortion.

The Officer's Handbook, a guide for the Soviet military officer published in 1971 and written by a number of leading military writers, outlines the organizational principles by which the senior military leadership maintained the command-obedience relationship through which they exercised power and control over the organization and its members.

These organizational principles include:

1. the principle of one-man command or edinonachalie, which provides the commander with absolute authority. He is "...the absolute master of the forces entrusted to him." His ability to command is assured by the Party, and he "...exploits the force of Party influence on the troops in order to improve the standard of combat and political training and the strengthening of military discipline."⁴² This principle ensures the "top downwards" procedures necessary for executing the principle of centralism.

2. the principle of centralism, which is exercised by "...supervision of the execution of duties from the top downwards,"⁴³ and

⁴²Kozlov, 8-9.

⁴³Ibid., 8.

parallels the party's concept of democratic centralism.

These principles are augmented by emphasizing compulsory military service for all Soviet citizens, and the need for strict subordination of individuals to the organization and its leaders in order to accomplish organizational goals.⁴⁴ These principles are guided by the military's most important political principle, the principle of Party leadership.

For a Soviet officer of the late 1960s and early 1970s, these principles must have been particularly important. The military had just weathered the attacks of the Khrushchev era, in which they saw basic doctrine questioned. The principles outlined by Kozlov's volume illustrated the means by which these officers, the generals, admirals and marshals of the 1980s, would exercise their power, and these principles in turn facilitated the abuse of power by these same neotraditionalists.

When Gorbachev introduced his economic and political reform programs, he also encouraged organizations and society in general to participate in criticism and self-criticism in an effort to pinpoint problems and improve performance. When the military reformers along with their civilian counterparts examined the military, their criticism was aimed at the neotraditionalists' mechanisms of power, the requirement to

⁴⁴Ibid., 10.

fulfill all orders whatever their nature, backed up by the organizational principles discussed above. These principles formed the bases of the senior military leaderships' absolute power.

The leadership was not willing to abandon their control mechanisms without a fight, however, and they used their power and organizational control to fight against the changes proposed by the military reformers. As a result, neotraditionalism became the basis for maintaining the status quo in the face of systemic change (the position of the neotraditionalists), and also as a source for instituting change with the goal of ending this corruption and reforming the organization to obtain the symbiotic and synergistic goals of organizational efficiency and personal satisfaction (the cause and position of the reformers/liberalizers). The arguments and debates between these two groups focused on the principles discussed above and the neotraditionalists' absolute control which manifested from these principles. In their fight to end the senior leaders' abuse of power, the reformers singled out two important issues for debate: the need to transform the military into a smaller, volunteer-based force, and the need to remove the power of the party from the military through departyization. The reformers also attacked the principle of edinonachalie, which they viewed as a principle which through its application allowed abuses by the commander. They also rejected the heroic image of the

military which the neotraditionalists hoped to reinvigorate because it provided the reason for their inordinate control. The heroic image was a product of militarized socialism, and was the rationale used by the senior military leadership to justify why they should possess such power in society and over the military.

Alternative Reasons for Resisting Reform

Before turning to the discussion of the primary issues debated by the neotraditionalists and reformers, it is important to review possible alternatives to the neotraditional explanation offered by this study. The first alternative explanation is that the military members opposed to Gorbachev's reforms based their opposition on the fact that these reforms included a cut in the defense budget which they deemed unacceptable, and, conversely, that the modernizers supported this cut because they hoped it would draw attention to the need for a professional military in which personnel issues, and hence personal gain, would be central to the manning concept. However, a cut in the defense budget did not occur until after the debates over reform were well underway. In fact, Gorbachev increased defense spending by 3% during the early years of his regime.⁴⁵

⁴⁵US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China - 1986, Part 12, (Washington: GPO, 1988) 27; US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China - 1987, Part 13, (Washington: GPO) 1989, 23.

It was only in 1989 that Gorbachev announced plans for reducing the budget in the following years. According to an interview with General Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff, this cut was to amount to 14.27% over 1990-1.⁴⁶ One Defense Intelligence Agency analyst believes that these figures actually reflect an end to the growth of defense spending, rather than an actual decrease in defense spending.⁴⁷ And according to one Soviet analyst, despite the announced cuts of 1990-1, military budget outlays actually increased during 1991.⁴⁸ In any case, defense expenditures throughout the Gorbachev period remained above the level of 1985, the year in which Gorbachev became General Secretary.⁴⁹

It is also important to note that the debates over reform did not center on budget issues as related to military

⁴⁶General Major Filatov, interview with General of the Army M.A. Moiseev in "Vooruzhinnye sily: perestroika, problemy, zamysly" [The armed forces" restructuring, problems, plans] Voenno-istoricheskyy zhurnal, No. 2 (1990) 5, (JPRS-UMA-90-013).

⁴⁷Estimating Soviet economic growth and expenditures is always a contentious issue, as can be seen by the special hearing held before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1990. In his testimony at the hearing, Mr. William T. Lee presented his estimates, derived from a computation method differing from those used by CIA and DIA analysts at large. This data, corroborated by several "benchmarks," has led Mr. Lee to estimate that the growth in defense spending in 1980-88 was approximately 7.2% rather than the 3% estimated by the rest of the intelligence community. If correct, Gorbachev's cut of 14.2% would simply reflect an end to this growth rate. See Mr. William T. Lee, "Trends in Soviet Military Outlays and Economic Priorities: 1970-1988," in US. Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Estimating the Size and Growth of the Soviet Economy, (Washington: GPO, 1991) 120, 164.

⁴⁸Sergei Rogov, "Kakoi budet voennaia reforma?" [What will military reform be like?] Kommunist, No. 6 (April 1991) 94.

⁴⁹US Department of Defense, Military Forces in Transition - 1991, (US Government Printing Office, 1991) 20.

efficiency or effectiveness, but rather on issues of control and the maintenance of the command-obedience structure of the military at a time when these very issues were being challenged by Gorbachev's policies. As discussed above, 1987 marked the beginning of media and citizen attention on the military and reform, although some articles were printed in the media in 1986 discussing the military and perestroika. In addition, Gorbachev's increasingly radical political policies engendered a like increase in the amount and heated temperament of the debates. Gorbachev's reform initiatives during this time emphasized the individual and his or her role in governing. The individualism stressed by Gorbachev, the idea of individual freedom and rights and the social contract concept of a government responsive to the individual, with the effect of these ideas on the military structure and the militarized Soviet society were the issues being debated during this time period.

It has also been suggested that the military leaders, in their opposition to Gorbachev's reforms, were actually concerned for maintaining order within a nation whose national and regional differences were activated by these reforms. In fact, individual military leaders probably did consider the civil unrest created by the new openness a challenge to government stability. However, there are two important issues to consider when viewing this concern as an explanation for the military's opposition to change. First,

as noted by Marshal Akhromeev in his article in Krasnaia zvezda, the military in the Soviet Union is committed to the party to use force if necessary to quell popular unrest. The important point in this is that there may very well be officers who would consider such action against civilians distasteful, but who would consider their oath sacred enough to fulfill such an obligation.

In discussing this issue, Akhromeev states that

[i]n April 1989 the decisions of party organs, in such matters and on military questions, were binding for all of us. Then they were for military commanders (and not only for them) decisions of a higher organ of authority, decisions of the leaders of the governments of republics and the state....And any serviceman,...took an oath to fulfill the decisions and orders of the government of the USSR. For servicemen, and even more so for commanders, it is unthinkable to not fulfill decisions and orders....Generals and officers will be in the position, under any of the most difficult circumstances, to fulfill their duty if since youth they are trained to act unquestioningly. On this is the basis of military service.⁵⁰

In a military in which there is no such thing as an illegal order, the control exercised by superiors, to include commanders, is absolute.

Second, the major use of Ministry of Defense troops against civilians occurred in Tbilisi in April 1989, long

⁵⁰Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, "Napadki na vooruzhennie sili SSSR. Pochemu?" [Fault-finding in the armed forces of the USSR. Why?] Krasnaia zvezda, 8 April 1990, 4.

after the debates over military reform were already heated. This point is confusing to many outside observers, because they think of the Soviets as a government constantly using force against their population. What is important to note, however, is that the form of this force is usually that of the Ministry of Interior troops, and not the Ministry of Defense. Both wear uniforms and have a "military" appearance, and although high-ranking officers of the military may be placed in charge of Ministry of Interior troops, the troops themselves are not the same as the Ministry of Defense, a point which is sometimes confusing for Western observers.

Comparing the Soviet and East European Militaries

The East European militaries are said to be copies of the Soviet military. If this is the case, why did the East Europeans accept political and economic reforms so readily in 1989? Why didn't they too break down into factions? Why was there no effort by the senior military leadership to maintain their control over the organizations by defending their heroic images?

A comparison of the militaries of Eastern Europe with the Soviet military will demonstrate several important points about their reaction to change. First, the major corrupting factor was in fact removed when the Soviets ended their domination of the region. In contrast to the case of the

Soviet Union, the heroic image of the East European militaries was replaced by a new one provided by nationalism. As this study will demonstrate, in the absence of a strong heroic image, these military organizations were able to redefine their social combat task by redirecting their efforts into constituting national militaries with the combat task of defending their newly independent countries. By doing so, they revitalized the combat task, ending the damage and corruption of neotraditionalism which the Soviet military experienced.

This does not mean that the former Warsaw Pact members were not divided by neotraditionalism. As this study was being written, information continued to indicate that these militaries face the difficult task of ending neotraditionalism without completely disbanding their militaries and starting over. Neotraditionalism did exist within the military leadership, but by ending the control mechanisms used by the neotraditionalists, an action facilitated by the end of Soviet dominance, these practices could be replaced by rule-bound behavior. The development of new national defense doctrines, i.e., a new combat task, has helped drain the existing neotraditionalists of their remaining power, but reform in these militaries still faces challenges from the neotraditionalists.

Summary

The Soviet military's split into two factions can not be explained by the literature on Soviet civil-military relations or by the literature on rational organizations. To understand and explain this split, it is necessary to focus on the differing attitudes of the factional members. Neotraditionalism accounted for these factional differences. The personalistic power of the military leaders, gained through their possession of absolute authority demonstrated by the requirement to obey all orders, exercised through the control mechanisms available to them, was seen by the reformers as harmful to the organization and to their personal career ambitions. Depoliticization and professionalization of the armed forces were issues used by the reformers to end the control of neotraditionalists.

The East European militaries faced similar tensions. Soviet dominance of the military was seen as the source of neotraditionalist tendencies. With the end of this dominance, these militaries could invoke the new combat task of building national defense in their effort to end neotraditionalism. The absence of a nationally significant heroic image also prevented neotraditional resistance to the changes instituted by the peaceful revolutions of 1989.

The remainder of this study will examine neotraditionalism as an explanation for the factional splits

in the Soviet military. The following chapter discusses militarized socialism and the demilitarization of Soviet society brought about by Gorbachev's reforms. Understanding militarized socialism is central to understanding the importance of the heroic image used by the neotraditionalists in exercising and perpetuating their personalistic power. Chapter three is a discussion of neotraditionalism as it operated within the Soviet military. The examples of neotraditionalism discussed in this chapter illustrate the power possessed by the senior leadership. The heroic image as used by the neotraditionalists is discussed in chapter four. This chapter also illustrates the neotraditionalists' access to resources which they used to counter the liberalizers' attempts at military reform. Chapter five discusses two issues central to the liberalizers' reform efforts, depoliticization and professionalization of the military. Finally, chapter six compares and contrasts the experiences of the Soviet military with those of the East European militaries undergoing reform after the tumultuous changes of 1989.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF GORBACHEV'S REFORMS AND THE BASIS OF THE MILITARY FACTIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Gorbachev's policies in light of prior regimes and further, to compare and contrast these policies with the military's legacy. Rooted in the nation's heritage and shaped by the military's role as the partner of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this legacy is referred to here as "militarized socialism." The concept of militarized socialism is important because it served both as a source for the military leaderships' power and as a rationale for the defense of this power.

The political changes introduced by Gorbachev challenged the neotraditionalists of the military, made up primarily of the senior leadership, who saw the military in a position of control over Soviet citizens and in turn exercised this control over every aspect of their military subordinates' lives. Simultaneously, the reforms garnered widespread support among those in the military and like-minded civilians, who sought to reinstitute impersonal bureaucratic methods within the organization and build a more efficient

and effective fighting force by making fundamental changes in the military's structure. This reform group consisted primarily of junior and middle level officers and officers with technical or legal backgrounds.

Viewed along a timeline (see the Appendix for a chronology depicting the events surrounding Gorbachev's reforms and changes in the military), Gorbachev's reforms were at first accommodated by the leadership of the military, or the neotraditionalists as they are called here. Some neotraditionalists may have believed the early reforms were even necessary to insure the technological capabilities of the services, faced with a Western threat increasingly dedicated to fielding high-technology weapons such as precision munitions, the stealth aircraft and the Strategic Defense Initiative. As Gorbachev's reforms became increasingly political, however, the traditionalists viewed them as a threat to the military, i.e., to their corrupted perception of what the Soviet military should be.

This perception was rooted in the traditional role of the armed forces in Soviet society. The Soviet regime always was very dependent on the military. Its history was filled with challenges which could only be met through the military's assistance: the need to survive the Civil War and foreign intervention; the threat presented by Nazi aggression; the necessity of spreading Soviet power and influence in Central Asia and maintaining influence in

Eastern Europe. All of these events were victories for the Soviet military and its leadership, and served to justify the respect and demands it extracted from Soviet society.

The following historical discussion also explains the sources of the political and military leaders' distrust of the general population and the common soldier. This distrust translated into the formation of distinct strata of elite and powerful decision makers and followers. Political leaders refused to include the masses in governing. Military leaders concentrated power in their hands through mechanisms of control and expected the lower ranks of officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers to strictly follow orders and execute their commands.

The Military and Soviet Society

Before examining the impact of Gorbachev's reform program on the military, it is necessary to understand the evolution of the military as an institution in Soviet society. Unlike other Soviet institutions, the military's important role in the birth and formation of a new socialist society, along with its possession of a value system which strongly parallels that of the Communist Party, has enabled it to lay strong claims to a special position in society, and through that position also to make demands on society accepted by the political leadership.

The preeminent position of the Soviet military as a heroic institution can be traced to the Soviet regime's earliest years. Soldiers played an important role in the Russian revolutionary movement even prior to 1917. During the Russo-Japanese War (1905) revolutionary groups succeeded on a limited basis in organizing troops involved in the war and stationed in Siberia, the Far East and port cities.¹ By 1917, revolutionary groups had placed additional emphasis on politicizing the troops, and the garrisoning of replacement troops in major cities such as Moscow and Petrograd provided them access to masses of discontented peasant soldiers who were concerned about their welfare and eager to return to their villages.² As Trotsky notes in his discussion of the critical days of the February revolution, "[T]he revolutionary pressure of the workers on the barracks fell in with the existing revolutionary movement of the soldiers to the streets. During the day these two mighty currents united to wash out clean and carry away the walls, the roof, and later the whole groundwork of the old structure."³ Only a

¹Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) 49.

²Ibid., 120.

³Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. 1. trans by Max Eastman (New York: Anchor Foundation, 1961) 125.

short time later, the soldiers again would play a role in bringing the Bolsheviks to power.⁴

Despite the army's role in their victory, early efforts at politicizing the army became a central concern of the Bolsheviks after their victory of 1917. Commissars were immediately sent to oversee the actions of the officer corps in an attempt to prevent treason by a group who had previously sworn their loyalty to the tsar.⁵ The "military specialists," as these officers were called, were seen as class enemies of the proletariat and could not be trusted by the Bolsheviks, resulting in a need for a political check on their actions. At the same time, the Bolsheviks faced the on-going Civil War in the country, and therefore needed the military to defeat challengers to their power. The solution was to employ the military specialists, checked by party representatives (commissars), while also calling upon party members to serve in the army. As a result of this action, military service soon became a gauge of party loyalty.⁶

The average soldier too became a target of Bolshevik politicization. For the Bolsheviks, who described themselves as the vanguard of the proletariat and sought to build the first workers' state, the peasant composition of the army was

⁴For an example of the important role played by soldiers in the October (Bolshevik) Revolution, see Trotsky, 181-3.

⁵Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) 27.

⁶Ibid., 38-9.

a clear threat.⁷ The peasant revolts occurring in Russia simultaneous to the revolutionary activity of 1917 were primarily attempts to gain more land and not ideologically based attempts, i.e., pro-Bolshevik, to overthrow the existing government. Having witnessed the havoc that the continually revolting peasantry had wreaked on the Russian political and social structure, the Bolsheviks were immediately wary of the middle peasants, who they viewed as a non-proletarian or even anti-proletarian group.

Poor peasants were assumed to be in favor of class warfare and the Soviet state; wealthy peasants or kulaks were placed in the enemy camp as rural equivalents of the urban bourgeoisie. The middle peasants in a quintessential fashion represented the entire peasantry and in fact made up the overwhelming majority of peasants, according to Bolshevik criteria. These peasants were part proletarian because by and large they worked their own land and lived without exploiting their poorer countrymen. But they often hired labor or equipment. Because these peasants had a foot in two worlds, their political behavior seemed highly unpredictable to the Bolsheviks.⁸

Added to this was the Bolshevik dislike of the traditional organization of the peasant village.⁹

⁷Trotsky states that "no fewer than eight million peasants were united in companies and squadrons" as a result of World War I. Trotsky, Vol. 1, 170.

⁸von Hagen, 48.

⁹Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution: 1917-1932, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 75.

Despite these concerns, Lenin's government was in the midst of a Civil War and in need of a socialist army to defeat the threats to its existence. But there were not enough Bolsheviks to man the military, and recognizing the reality of the situation, the Bolsheviks were forced to turn to the peasantry to man the newly formed Red Army. Peasant soldiers, serving alongside the few representatives of the proletariat and the party, commanded primarily by former tsarist officers, who in turn were checked by commissars, made up the ranks of the army. As a result, "[t]he various elements thus utilized in the construction of the Red Army were not only heterogeneous, but often definitely antagonistic to each other."¹⁰

The Civil War remained a credible threat to the Bolshevik regime, and it was imperative that the Red Army maintain the capability to counter this threat. To do so, military members were given priorities in housing and food supply to ensure their loyalty. During this period the soldiers began to see "...themselves and their families as a new privileged stratum in the postrevolutionary social order."¹¹ At the same time, party members believed that it was necessary to educate and politicize the soldiers to assure that the peasant in the ranks was politically reliable. Educational programs were

¹⁰Dimitri Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army, (1944; Westport, CN: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1981) 42.

¹¹von Hagen, 78.

begun, and special access to party membership was allowed for military members, signaling that the army was to play an important role in providing political and social support to the new regime.¹² Distrust of the peasantry never waned, however, and resulted in the party's decision to use the army, with its emphasis on order and discipline, as an important socializing tool in their attempt to control the countryside.

Formerly illiterate peasants returned home from the army with the rudiments of a general education and a taste of urban culture. Their gratitude toward the army bolstered their loyalty to the state that the army defended. Furthermore, the army's leaders promised that their particular school of military service trained administrative cadres for the great task of "building socialism" in a country that was also desperately wanting in loyal agents who knew the ropes of local administration, especially in rural areas to which the soldiers would return after they completed their service. Indeed, the army was a respectable, if not the best, school of socialism in the Soviet Republic.¹³

Through the military, the Bolsheviks could build the socialist society they wanted. As Jones explains in her sociological study of the military, the army's institutional structure, with its already established emphasis on discipline, provided

¹²Ibid., 87. See especially von Hagen, Chapter 2, for a discussion of the Civil War and its role in establishing the military in the Soviet Union as a builder of socialist society.

¹³Ibid., 252. According to van Hagen, the Frunze reforms placed an increasing emphasis on discipline in the army and that "the militarization drive had as its goal the shaping of a strictly regulated environment in which the soldiers obeyed their superiors without question." 250.

an atmosphere in which young soldiers could be isolated from their traditional, peasant values and the new socialist values, to include the preferred patterns of behavior, could be instilled. "The armed forces became, then, not just a 'school for reservists,' but a 'school for life' as well."¹⁴

Stalin's ascendance to power reinforced the role of the military in Soviet society. As noted by Cohen, Bolshevism had always had a "martial strain"¹⁵ which had been reinforced by the Bolshevik experiences of revolution and civil war. Stalin, in turn, added to state militarism in his interpretation of the class struggle. According to Stalin, "...as socialism draws nearer, the resistance of its internal enemies, and thus the class struggle, will intensify,"¹⁶ requiring greater attempts to mobilize the population. These concerns fueled Stalin's industrialization and collectivization programs, and these efforts, along with the general militarization of Soviet society, "...led directly to the Red Army's gain in authority, professional freedom, and socioeconomic standing and to the circumspection with which Stalin now treated the officer corps, for he was determined

¹⁴Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: a Sociology of the Soviet Military, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985) 38.

¹⁵Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) 313.

¹⁶Ibid., 316.

that nothing should be allowed to interfere with the efficiency of military processes."¹⁷

Despite Stalin's militaristic attitude, the military did not escape the purges of the 1930s. Those officers executed or exiled included Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, the commander of the Army, and a number of military district commanders. The purges extended to the navy and air force, devastating the ranks of the officer corps and leaving the services poorly prepared to fight the coming world war.¹⁸ World War II, however, brought renewed emphasis on the importance of the military in Soviet society. With calls to defend the Motherland, Stalin again placed the military in a preeminent position, and the victories of the war, added to the images of the Bolshevik revolution and Civil War, created a truly heroic image for the Soviet military.

By the beginning of the Khrushchev regime, the military had established its leading position alongside the Communist

¹⁷Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military, 56.

¹⁸A discussion of the Stalin purges of the military is included in Chapter 7, "Assault on the Army" in Robert Conquest The Great Terror (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1968) As noted by Colonel Viktor Alksnis, one of the leaders of the Soyuz movement thought by some to have ties to the August 1991 coup leaders, his grandfather, the Army Commander and Chief of the Air Force, was executed in July 1938. Yuri Teplyakov, interview with Col. Alksnis in "New Arms for the Army! Ban the CPSU!" Moscow News, No. 6 (February 10-17, 1991) 7. This action in turn led to the arrest of the Commander's brother, Yan Yanovich Alksnis (rank unknown) who had been a former tsarist officer and later a theoretician at the General Staff Academy. See Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs, trans. by Thomas P. Whitney (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1982) 90-1.

Party in Soviet society. Many military and civilian leaders must have seen the military reforms attempted by Khrushchev after 1960, which included attempts to cut the number of conventional forces and introduce a new strategic doctrine, as a direct challenge to the institution.

Even Khrushchev's reform of the officer corps was viewed by many as a threat to "the rights and prerogatives of the commanders by its egalitarian intent...."¹⁹ For an organization based on the concept of *edinonachalie* (translated as one-man command or unity of command)²⁰ in which control is a key concept, such actions engendered widespread resentment. *Edinonachalie* is an idea "founded on Party principles" which not only establishes the commander as the party representative and executor within the military, but also establishes him as "...the absolute master of the forces entrusted to him, who bears full responsibility for all aspects of the life and activities of the subunit, unit, ship, formation, or establishment, for the state of the

¹⁹Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military, 199.

²⁰*Edinonachalie* was introduced as a replacement for dual-command used immediately after the Revolution. Dual-command was in essence a way of controlling military specialists by having political commissars exercise veto authority over these politically unreliable officers. As the need for military effectiveness increased, the dual-command system was seen as counterproductive, and *edinonachalie* was introduced in 1922. See von Hagen, 164-5. *Edinonachalie* not only provides a basis for complete control by the officer over his subordinates, but also is defined by the idea that the commander bears full responsibility for his subordinates' actions, which frequently leads the commander to cover-up transgressions in order to preclude disciplinary action against himself. See Richard D. Anderson, Jr. "Neotraditionalism and the Question of the Political Quiescence of the Soviet Military" (unpublished paper) 7-8.

combat and political training of its personnel, its fighting efficiency and combat readiness."²¹

Khrushchev's removal from power saved the military from instituting many of the changes suggested by him, thus preserving the values central to the military. The concepts of control and discipline remained unchallenged. It also presented the opportunity for the military to renew the heroic image they had obtained. Once again the military was the socializer of young people, the fighter of both external antagonists and internal class enemies, the "personification of Soviet patriotism" and nationalism.²² General Secretary Brezhnev, among other Soviet political leaders, was receptive to the military's propagation of pro-military values.²³ And during the "era of stagnation," as the Brezhnev period has since come to be called, the military as an organization remained unchallenged by other political actors, able to perpetuate an ethos built upon a heroic image tied to historical circumstances and a party leadership whose ideals closely paralleled those of the military leaders'. As a result of the military gains made under Brezhnev, the period

²¹Kozlov, 9.

²²Pravda, 22 June 1968, 1, quoted in Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority 231.

²³Colton, 213.

of the last half of the 1960s and until the mid-1970s has been referred to as the "golden era" by one Soviet analyst.²⁴

This brief history of the Soviet military shows that Soviet "militarism" was "a secondary aspect of Soviet statism."²⁵ Not only was the military seen as the primary helpmate of the party for establishing socialism in the country, it was also an organization whose values in large measure mirrored those of the predominate political entity, i.e., the Communist Party. To be more exact, the "militarized socialism" of the Soviet Union "...was the result of an interpenetration of militarist and socialist values, and among its elements were a bellicist world view and the predominance of national security values and military interests in the economic and cultural life of the country."²⁶

The result of the military ethos was an inordinate emphasis on control from above, as one would expect from organizations whose bases are a command-obedience structure.²⁷ Such an ethos permeated the action of the military and party toward Soviet citizens, often coloring the manner of

²⁴Jeremy Azreal, The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-1986, RAND/R-3521-AF (June 1987) 2-3.

²⁵Holloway, 8.

²⁶von Hagen, 331. The term "militarized socialism" is used by von Hagen.

²⁷As noted by Dale Herspring, "[t]he qualities and leadership skills demanded of Party cadres and officer cadres are strikingly similar." Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds. Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978) 2.

accomplishing tasks, such as collectivization, which Bukharin described as the "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry."²⁸ In other words, there was a harshness and imperiousness associated with those who "commanded" and who saw a clear status distinction between superiors and subordinates. Another important facet of the military ethos was that the command-obedience structure presupposed a certain distrust of subordinates, i.e., they "obeyed" and were incapable of "commanding." This too was reflected in Bukharin's statement about the peasantry both in terms of the military's and the party's view of the Soviet peasantry as politically untrustworthy and incapable. The common soldier was seen as having origins in the countryside.

Peasant conscripts obeyed officers who usually came from working-class or peasant backgrounds but viewed themselves primarily in light of their career status; thus peasant soldiers resembled peasant citizens in their decidedly inferior position in the proletarian dictatorship, in the one case in relation to the officers, in the other in relation to proletarians and the white-collar bureaucrats. Frunze, in his very revealing remarks on discipline in the army, drew an analogy between the officer corps and the rank-and-file troops, on the one hand, and the vanguard Communist Party and the rest of society, on the other hand. In other words, by virtue of the soldiers' relative lack of political maturity and wisdom, they were expected to obey officers in the same way that the

²⁸Cohen, 306.

mass of Soviet society should follow the lead of the Communist Party.²⁹

The attitude reflected in the above quote was still pervasive among senior leaders of the military in the Gorbachev era.

The Party's Legacy to Gorbachev and Regime Legitimacy

What emerged from both the party's and the military's relationship with the Soviet citizen was that these organizations distrusted the people and their participation in government and political activities and decision making. This distrust was translated into institutional legitimacy based on charismatic impersonalism, rather than on legal-rational methods.³⁰ It was expressed through emphasizing the concept of the collective [kollektiv] as a means of subordinating the individual,³¹ a concept aided by militarized socialism. Maintaining legitimacy in a system which distrusted the individual required an alternative emphasis on task-achieving bureaucracies.³² Stalin's collectivization and industrialization programs were executed as acts meant to mobilize the population in the building of the new socialist state, and also consolidated the party's power by establishing

²⁹von Hagen, 330.

³⁰Jowitt, 277.

³¹Ibid., 283.

³²T.H. Rigby, "A Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power and Policy in the Soviet Union," in Rigby, Brown and Reddaway, eds. Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR, (London: Macmillan, 1983), 18-25.

a central planning apparatus and by placing a middle stratum of party representatives in the bureaucracy. Again, these acts insured regime authority through performance while also excluding the average citizen from political participation. In addition, Stalin's success in building a "cult of personality" around Lenin, to which he tied his own political personae, provided a charismatic legacy for the party.

Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev sought to extend regime legitimacy by partially involving the middle stratum of Soviet society. Rejecting Stalinist-style coercion, the two leaders increased their consultation with experts, leading the population to believe that through these actions better decisions could be made. However, this limited widening of participation still ensured the party maintained control through a political legitimacy based on performance, but a performance which became increasingly difficult to sustain without fundamental economic reform. The era of stagnation associated with the Brezhnev regime illustrated the spent legacy of a fundamentally charismatic, neotraditional political system.

There has been much discussion by political scientists and economists over what the primary objective of Gorbachev's reforms truly was. By the time of Gorbachev's ascendancy the Soviet Union was in clear economic straits. Its declining economic growth rates meant the military's portion of the budgetary pie was becoming an increasing burden. And as the

military pushed for greater technological capabilities for their weapon systems, the Soviet economy was simply unable to respond. In his early days in power, Gorbachev's reforms appeared to be directed only at making superficial reforms in an effort to spur on economic performance.

According to CIA and DIA estimates, the annual growth rates of real GNP averaged 1.9% from 1981 to 1985.³³ This dismal economic performance made it difficult for the Soviets to keep up with technological innovations, and, as stated above, even the military was probably concerned about the situation. During the time that Marshal Ogarkov served as Chief of the General Staff, he had demonstrated his concern over the country's economic capabilities and "...understood both the interrelationship between political and military factors and how their careful management could work to benefit the country's national security...."³⁴ Ogarkov's willingness to negotiate arms control measures illustrated his interest in arresting the West's technological advantage, thereby providing the opportunity for the Soviets to increase their own high-technology conventional weapons capabilities,³⁵ and reflecting the argument of Soviet military journals that "scientific-technological competition [had] become the most

³³Allocation of Resources - 1986, Table 1, 12.

³⁴Herspring, xi.

³⁵Ibid., 219-20.

dynamic factor in military competition in general.³⁶ As a result of these concerns, the military at all levels supported Gorbachev's early economic restructuring effort

...precisely because it responded to the military's long-standing concerns. Perestroika promised to deliver what the military needed: a modern economy, capable of producing the requisite quantity and quality of high-tech weaponry, and a healthy society, able to produce educated, fit, and motivated citizens to man the new weapons.³⁷

Indeed, Gorbachev is reported to have "...gone out of his way to assure the military publicly that Soviet security would not be sacrificed for economic reform."³⁸

Until 1986-1987, the party and the military possessed a common objective in keeping the people out of governing. By 1987, however, little had changed economically in the Soviet Union. Despite attempts to increase productivity by openly battling alcoholism and absenteeism, economic output had not increased. During the early Gorbachev years (1986-1988), GNP

³⁶Sergei Zamascikov, Gorbachev and the Military, RAND/P-7410 (January 1988) 3.

³⁷Ilana Kass and Fred Clark Boli, "The Soviet Military: Back to the Future?" The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 3: 3 (September 1990) 390.

³⁸Ellen Jones, "Social Change and Civil-Military Relations," in Colton and Gustafson, 269. As examples of this policy Jones cites Gorbachev's report at the 11 June 1985 conference on scientific and technical policy in Kommunist, No. 9 (1985), 13-33 and Gorbachev's speech at a meeting with the Dnepropetrovsk Foundry collective in Aktivno deistvovat, ne teriat vremeni, (Moscow, 1985), fn. 94, 269.

growth is estimated to have been 2.3%.³⁹ (As illustrated in Table 1 below, tentative estimates of GNP growth were 1.4% for 1989,⁴⁰ and official statistics indicated a fall of 1.0% in GNP in the first quarter of 1990.⁴¹) As a result of this poor performance, Gorbachev's reform process took on an increasingly political and radical character. As Hewitt writes, Gorbachev's frustration with the Soviet bureaucracy, which he saw as the primary culprits blocking his reform efforts, led him to commit increasingly to a political reform based on the idea that "...grass-roots pressure [would] weaken bureaucratic opposition."⁴²

The Formation of a Legal State

Faced with the prospect of entrenched bureaucrats fighting for their survival, Gorbachev turned to the tactic of openness in the hope of breaking down the barriers to reform. Increasingly, Gorbachev noted that the system itself was in crisis and in need of reform. This systemic crisis was not simply economic, but also

³⁹US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Soviet Economy in 1988: Gorbachev Changes Course, (14 April 1989) Table B-4, 41, cited in Robert Campbell "Resource Stringency and Civil-Military Resource Allocation" in Colton and Gustafson, 129.

⁴⁰Estimating the Size and Growth, 46.

⁴¹"Soviet Economic Performance During the First Quarter of 1990: The Decision to Postpone Reform Further Aggravates the Rapidly Deteriorating Economic Situation," PlanEcon Reports, Vol. 6: 16 (20 April 1990) 1.

⁴²Ed A. Hewitt, "Economic Reform in the Wake of the XIX Party Conference," PlanEcon Reports, Vol. 6: 29 (22 July 1988) 3.

Table 1. USSR: GNP Growth, 1966-1990

year	% growth in GNP
1966-70	5.2
1971-75	4.5
1976-80	2.2
1981-85	1.9
1986	3.4
1987	1.5
1988	1.6
1989	1.4
1990	- 1.0*

*estimated for first quarter

Sources: US Congress, National Security Economic Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, The Soviet Economy in 1988: Gorbachev Changes Course (14 April 1989) Figure 1, 2.

Allocation of Resources - 1986, 12.

Estimating the Size and Growth of the Soviet Economy, 46.

"Soviet Economic Performance During the First Half of 1988: Eager to Boost Quantity and Quality of Production, Mr. Gorbachev Instead Unleashes Inflation" PlanEcon Report Vol. 4: 32-33 (19 August 1988) 14.

"Soviet Economic Performance During the First Quarter of 1990: The Decision to Postpone Reform Further Aggravates the Rapidly Deteriorating Economic Structure" PlanEcon Report Vol. 6: 16 (20 April 1990) 1.

a crisis of confidence, a sort of creeping demoralization at all levels. It found expression, as Gorbachev has told us, in increasing drunkenness, crime, drug-taking and corruption. Corruption took the form not only of senior party officials (especially in some republics) blatantly feathering their own nests, but extended right through society, and was linked with a growing gap between supply and demand: low-paid shop assistants could supplement their meager income through bribes.⁴³

Gorbachev faced the challenge of activating society and returning the party "to a political role, instead of a basically bureaucratic-administrative one."⁴⁴ In his 1987 book, Gorbachev wrote that

[p]erestroika means mass initiative. It is the comprehensive development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of initiative and creative endeavor, improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism and self-criticism in all spheres of our society. It is utmost respect for the individual and consideration for personal dignity.⁴⁵

The activation of society meant a turn toward emphasis on the individual and individual rights. Only the individual, through his or her actions, work ethic, and concern for social and political responsibility, could help

⁴³Alec Nove, "What's Happening in Moscow?" Symposium Notes in The National Interest, No. 8 (Summer 1987) 14.

⁴⁴Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon, (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1988) 134.

⁴⁵Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (New York: Harper and Row, 1987) 34.

in forcing through the changes Gorbachev sought and which he believed necessary to restructure and revitalize the nation. Only by making the government responsive to its citizens would individual actions make a difference. From this belief grew an increasing attention to the relationship between government and the governed, citizens' rights and state obligations, and the concept of a law-based society. Gorbachev's focus on these themes intensified as he faced opposition and his reform programs faltered, and the result was an expanded campaign to reform the political system.

This campaign was reaffirmed in Gorbachev's address to the 19th Party Conference in June-July 1988. Under the title "Reform of the Political System Is the Most Important Guarantee of the Irreversibility of Restructuring" Gorbachev addressed the tasks necessary to fulfill the restructuring program. These entailed the inclusion of the citizenry "...in the administration of the country, not just in words, but in actual fact," the pursuit of mechanisms through which peoples' interests may be identified and realized, and the strengthening of "socialist legality and law and order" to ensure that personal rights and freedoms are protected and "bureaucratism and formalism" are effectively countered.⁴⁶ Excess centralization was also addressed as a problem which

⁴⁶"Gorbachev's Report," Current Soviet Policies X: The Documentary Record of the 19th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (Columbus, OH: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press: 1988) 11-2.

denied the citizens their rights and ability to participate in the government's administration tasks. Gorbachev called for a "...struggle for an apparatus of a new type, one that is based on a high level of professionalism, is able to use up-to-date information technology, is democratically controlled by the people and is capable of advancing economic and social progress."⁴⁷

The sum of these statements and policies was Gorbachev's concept of a legal state, i.e., the building of a legal-rational system of legitimacy to replace the charismatic traditional legitimacy of the socialist state. For restructuring to be successful, it had to "wake up" the people and "...make them truly active and concerned, to ensure that everyone feels as if he is the master of the country, of his enterprise, office or institute...."⁴⁸ For the neotraditional military, however, in which change and innovation are subordinated to the command-obedience structure, the activation of society and the elaboration of individual rights and freedoms were a direct challenge. In fact, the military initially reacted to the Gorbachev political reforms by ignoring them, acting as though these changes were not applicable to the military setting, which stressed order, discipline, and command obedience. The military viewed perestroika "...as something that applied to

⁴⁷Ibid., 17.

⁴⁸Gorbachev, 29.

the rest of society, but not to them. But at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum Gorbachev explicitly made clear that the process included the military as well."⁴⁹

Gorbachev's warning focused media and citizen attention on the progress of perestroika in the military. The result of these actions, when combined with the openness in which problems of society were now discussed and debated, was a situation in which the military neotraditionalists found themselves defending their concept of the military, while the liberalizers within the military saw the opportunity to institute changes within the institution in the hopes of improving both personal conditions and military performance.

For the neotraditionalists, whose primary concern was maintaining the system of command-obedience, individual rights and freedoms had no place in the military. They viewed Gorbachev's democratization efforts as synonymous to demilitarization of society, and a challenge to their own concept of the institution's values. They were eager to defend the military's role as a control mechanism through which the people were socialized and indoctrinated, a significant reason for maintaining a large, conscript army with its political organs and strict one-man command procedures. Control could also be assured by reaffirming the heroic image of the military, in the belief that if the

⁴⁹F. Stephen Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66: 5 (Summer 1988) 1009.

military members and the population could be reminded of the significance of the military in the socialist state, if its mission of defending the state could be thrust again into the prominence it deserved, the attacks on the military and the restructuring these attacks called for would cease. Their belief was that the Soviet military members (and their civilian counterparts who also campaigned for change in the institution) would realize that the role of the individual was anathema to the Soviet military ethos.

To this end, the military neotraditionalists became engaged in a debate with the liberalizers in the military, the citizenry and the media while also attempting to counter reform efforts. As an example, in 1988 the Ministry of Defense issued an order "banning collective complaints." As one officer asks, "How can the Minister support the process of democratization in the army and at the same time issue an order repeating that of the early 1970s (stagnation period) banning collective complaints?"⁵⁰ The following chapters of this study will cover the topics of this debate, examining in turn the debates over the configuration of the military, the existence of party organs within the organization, and the use of the heroic image to defend the institution.

⁵⁰Major Victor Semashko, "Army Must be Law-Governed," Moscow News, No. 16 (April 23-30, 1989) 12.

Control and Dependence in a Command System

The superiors of the Soviet military, as in any military organization in which civilian control is negligible, are the senior military officers. Dominated by Soviet Army officers, the personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, labeled by one analyst the "brain trust" of the Soviet military in deciding military policy,⁵¹ constituted the unquestioned authority within the Soviet military. They were the unquestioned authority, until Gorbachev's activation of society through his emphasis on the role and rights of the individual. Prior to Gorbachev's changes, however, these officers were assured absolute obedience from their military subordinates and the civilian population in general. The historical tradition of the military in Soviet society, as discussed in this chapter, provided this assurance as long as the military ethos it engendered could be perpetuated with the support of the civilian leadership. This ethos was influenced by the "era of stagnation" in which bureaucratization and the routinization of the heroic combat task had occurred, and during which many of the senior officers had advanced in their careers.

The military ethos became ingrained in the attitudes of these leaders and colored their definition of what the Soviet

⁵¹Kenneth M. Currie, The Soviet General Staff: Its Impact on Military Professionalism and National Security Decisionmaking, diss., George Washington University, 1987, 6-18.

military should be, how it should operate, and what its goals were. It was undoubtedly their sincere belief that it was necessary to maintain this ethos through training and indoctrinating young people, both within the military and in the civilian population at large. In doing so, the neotraditional military ethos became a "unifying doctrine" for the military, and, as Selznick so clearly states, "in order to preserve its special interpretation the subgroup presses for the extension of that interpretation to the entire organization so that the special content may be institutionalized."⁵²

Gorbachev recognized the routinization of the party's combat task and called for an end to the old ways of governing. He also recognized the difficulty of overcoming the old ways of thinking.

The greatest difficulty in our restructuring effort lies in our thinking, which has been molded over the past years. Everyone, from General Secretary to worker, has to alter this thinking. And this is understandable, for many of us were formed as individuals and lived in conditions when the old order existed. We have to overcome our own conservatism.⁵³

It was as if Gorbachev was speaking directly to the "brain trust." Although his message did not appeal to these

⁵²Selznick, 256.

⁵³Gorbachev, 65.

leaders, there was another group within the military to whom it did appeal. Younger officers, less socialized to the military ethos of their older superiors and in some cases better educated and technically oriented, found reason to believe that the changes Gorbachev suggested would be better for the organization. Frustrated over the corruption of the institution by neotraditionalism, the concept of democratization and the idea of individual rights represented ideas which directly challenged the military leadership's control mechanisms, and their negative manifestations, exercised within the military.

These reformers or liberalizers, as they are addressed in this study, were not new to the Soviet military. Ogarkov had set the stage for their efforts, although he was less concerned with internal personnel changes and concentrated instead on technology in weapons capabilities. However, the idea was the same: undertake change in order to establish and maintain an effective, efficient and modern military force able to defend the country. The new reformers also wanted this, and recognized that the neotraditional military ethos had become a roadblock to the accomplishment of this task.

Gorbachev's reforms were almost immediately seen by this group as a means of "cleaning-up" the military so that it could achieve this goal. At the same time, individual service members would gain, perhaps both professionally and personally, which would in turn lead to their better

performance within the organization. But the reformers, just like Gorbachev, had yet to conquer an entrenched bureaucracy in the form of the senior officers. The differences between the attitudes and beliefs of the two groups, one believing the perpetuation of the military ethos of control and dependence necessary, the other convinced of the need to modernize the military and end the authoritarian practices embodied in the old ethos, each believing their attitudes reflected what was best for the organization, would provide the basis for extensive debate over the organization's fate. A closer look at neotraditionalism in the military will aid in understanding the issues of this debate.

Summary and Conclusion

The Soviet military existed within a social and political system possessing a strong military ethos. This military ethos evolved with the history of the regime, faced with internal and external threats to their existence. These threats could only be defeated by maintaining a strong military arm, with a trustworthy leadership who shared the value system and goals of the Communist Party. As the helpmate of the Communist Party, the military was seen as an important instrument of socialization and indoctrination of a population which was largely distrusted by both organizations.. The result of the party-military partnership was militarized socialism which emphasized the role of the

military in society and accepted the military leaderships' dominance over the organization as a method of assuring control.

The heroic image which evolved from militarized socialism both colored the military leaderships' perception of the organization and their role in it, and served as a rationale for their behavior. The heroic image emphasized concepts of self-sacrifice, discipline and obedience. This image, the leaders believed, also placed the military in a position "above" society. The officer corps served the party and its appointed leaders in the military, and were expected to execute orders unquestioningly. And the heroic victories of the military, according to the senior officers, demonstrated that their leadership had ensured the survival of the regime and the nation.

By emphasizing these concepts, the senior officers could argue that the military was exempt from Gorbachev's reform efforts. The concept of individual rights emphasized by Gorbachev could not coexist with the military leaderships' extreme definitions of self-sacrifice, discipline and obedience. The conflict between these two elements resulted in the factional breakdown of the military. The corruption of militarized socialism brought about by the senior officer corps' interpretation of the concept and its application within the military provided the liberalizers with valuable arguments illustrating the need for reform, as shown in the

following chapter. On the other hand, militarized socialism and the heroic image were major counterarguments against reform, and, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, were used extensively by the senior leadership in their battle to retain control over the military.

CHAPTER 3

THE CORRUPTION OF A NEOTRADITIONAL ORGANIZATION

In his discussion of the Soviet Communist Party, Jowitt explains that in failing to sustain the charismatic role of the party, i.e., the vanguard role of transforming society, it has failed to sustain a social combat task and has instead undergone a routinization of the combat task. The result of this routinization is corruption which is expressed "...in the central place of 'heroic' and 'booty' orientations in the Soviet political economy, the centrality of *blat* in social transactions, the 'arithmetical' conception of the Soviet industrial economy, the secretive quality of Soviet political life and the organization of socio-political life around the *kollektiv*."¹

Several of these corrupted practices were present in the military prior to the coup of 1991 and their existence played a significant role in the debates over reform in the Armed Forces. These practices demonstrate the extent of the leaderships' personal power and the methods by which this power was exercised throughout the military. This chapter will discuss the corrupted practices prevalent in the

¹Jowitt, 278.

military, to include patronage and its closely associated partner, protectionism, and secrecy, privileges and *blat*. The next chapter provides an extensive discussion of the 'heroic' orientation of the military and the use of this concept by the neotraditionalists in their efforts to defend their view of the institution. The existence of the corrupted practices discussed in this chapter was accepted by many members of the military, particularly the senior leadership. Their attitude, and the attitude they apparently hoped to imbue in all officers, was the acceptance of corruption, although they saw it not as corruption, but as the routinized and correct way of doing business. Not all officers held this view, however, and glasnost provided the public opening to expose the shortfalls of the organization, an action which the liberalizers believed would allow for the reforms necessary to shape the military into an effective, efficient and modern fighting force. Those who possessed modernizing, or what the Soviets frequently referred to as liberalizing attitudes hoped to break from the neotraditional attitudes held and perpetuated by the senior leadership.

Patronage and Protectionism

The existence of patronage systems within the Soviet military and the use of patrons to further one's career through promotions and the allocation of desirable assignments and positions has been well documented by Western

analysts.² Senior commanders and patrons are also known to use their power to protect others from punishment or negative actions which could be detrimental to their career. Although both topics have been discussed in the Soviet media in the past, Gorbachev's policy of glasnost provided the basis for a wider and more heated discussion of the subject, to include a debate over the reasons that such practices exist in the first place.

Articles containing complaints about patronage and protectionism discussed the problem of members receiving promotions despite their performance record. As Colonel V. Seledkin wrote in 1986, family ties insure not only promotions, as in the case of Senior Lieutenant Rogalski, but also provide job opportunities in areas near their patron or relative. In Rogalski's case, this protection occurred because "...the father of the Senior Lieutenant serves on the staff of the Central Group of Forces."³ Patronage also protects officers from deserved punishment, such as Captain

²Herspring's study of the senior military leadership uses analysis of individuals in power positions in the General Staff and Ministry of Defense in an attempt to better understand how patronage works within the closed bureaucracy of the military. Hersping, 18. John Willerton discusses the importance of patronage networks, to include those associated with the military-industrial complex, in formulating and executing policy during the Brezhnev era. See John P. Willerton, Jr., "Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev Era," Soviet Studies, Vol. 39: 2 (April 1987). Anderson's analysis of the crisis in Poland documents the patron-client relationship between political and military leaders and the effect of this relationship on policy making. See Richard D. Anderson, Jr., "Soviet Decision-Making and Poland," Problems of Communism, Vol. 31 (March-April 1982).

³Colonel V. Seledkin, "Kak ne podarit' rodnomu cheloveku!..." [How not to be obliged to relatives!...] Krasnaia zvezda, 12 December 1986, 2.

G. Melentev who was convicted eight times for drunkenness and dereliction of duty but was able to use his patronage connections to protect himself.⁴

The problem of patronage in the promotion system was discussed again in a roundtable format conducted by Krasnaia zvezda in April, 1990. During the discussion, Senior Lieutenant G. Zakirov, a commander of a tank company, complained that an officer in his unit was being considered for promotion even though he didn't deserve it. Although the subject was brought up at the unit party meeting, the matter was not resolved as it should have been. "And how did it all end? [asked Zakirov]. A general arrived, applied his power where needed, and the negligent comrade was promoted. Such is democratization...."⁵ The same action "from above" [sverkhu] allowed a party secretary to be appointed to the unit commanded by Major V. Ivashchenko.⁶

In the January 1990 issue of Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, the journal of the military party organization, the issue of protectionism was the topic of discussion in an interview with General Colonel V.F. Arapov, first deputy

⁴Colonel A. Petrenko, "Preodolenie" [Overcoming] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 17 (September 1988) 69, (JPRS-UMA-89-003). In subsequent references to the same articles from this journal, the journal title is abbreviated KVS.

⁵Lieutenant Colonel I. Kosenko, "Kto zhe khoziain v partiinom dome?" [Who is the master in the party house?] Krasnaia Zvezda, 20 April 1990, 2. In subsequent references to the same articles from this newspaper, the newspaper title is abbreviated KZ.

⁶Petrenko, "Preodolenie" KVS, No. 17 (1988) 71.

chief of the Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate. According to Arapov, the Soviet military was then actively involved in fighting protectionism, but in an interesting twist to the issue, Arapov proceeded to state that protectionism has been around since tsarist days, and that in fact it is not illogical for commanders to want to help good officers in their career progression. When asked about the existence of military dynasties, Arapov replied that in fact they do exist but that in the times of the Russian military they were seen as "the flower and pride of the nation, bearing the spirit and best tradition of Russian officers," implying that this is the way they should be viewed in today's military.⁷ Further, Arapov did not agree that some officers attempt to cover up shortcomings of others in an effort to ensure their promotion. Arapov's entire interview leaves the impression that protectionism is non-existent, and

⁷Arapov's discussion of military dynasties echoes that found in a series of articles published in Krasnaia zvezda in 1977 on the same subject. Published under the emblem of the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and the rubric "Voennye dinastii na sluzhbe Rodine" [Military dynasties in the service of the Motherland], these articles stressed the honor and historical tradition which such dynasties demonstrate and perpetuate. See for example Lieutenant Colonel V. Bodanovskii, "Nasledstvo starovo Nikolozza" [The legacy of the elder Nikoloz], Krasnaia zvezda, 26 June 1977, 2; Colonel B. Liapkalo, "Dokuchaevy, otets i syn" [The Dokuchaevs, father and son], Krasnaia zvezda, 10 July 1977, 2; D. Isakov, "Oni vyshli iz Revoliutsii" [They came from the Revolution], Krasnaia zvezda, 22 September 1977, 4; Colonel A. Sgibnev, "Estafeta muzhestva" [Passing on manhood], Krasnaia zvezda, 7 November 1977, 2.

that the protectionism which does exist is beneficial to the military because of the dynastic traditions which it builds.⁸

As can be imagined, the reaction to the views expressed by Arapov in his interview were tremendous. The "Letters to the Editor" sections of several subsequent issues of Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil were filled with letters expressing outrage at Arapov's statements. One letter related a story about Lieutenant Colonel S.G. Uborevich as an example to counter Arapov's claims. According to the fourteen servicemen who signed the letter, Uborevich was "systematically drunk, even during work time" and was continually rude with his subordinates. The party organization which accepted his application for party membership apparently knew that it was "...needed by this person as a springboard in directing his career" but accepted him, despite the fact that his record was filled with infractions. Despite the fact that he was continually in trouble, "...each time after the ordered reprimand Uborevich was transferred with promotion to a new place of service. This was done because he is the grandson of the distinguished Soviet commander, Hero of the Civil War commander first rank Uborevich, Ieronim Petrovich."⁹

⁸General Major N. Koshelev, interview with General Colonel V.F. Arapov "Proteksionizm: 'privedenie' ili real'nost?" [Protectionism: 'apparition' or reality?] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 1 (January 1990) 22-36, (JPRS-UMA-90-014).

⁹"Bol'she vzyskanii - vyshe dolzhnost'?" [The greater the reprimand - the higher the promotion?] Letter to the Editor, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 8 (April 1990) 84, (JPRS-UMA-90-021).

In other letters, readers noted that it was not rare for incompetent officers to be promoted through protectionist mechanisms. These mechanisms were viable because organizations such as the Officers Assembly, newly created in 1989 as an attempt to provide democratic methods of administration in the military, were powerless to stop such practices because they could not overturn commanders' decisions. According to one letter, the problems of patronage and protectionism were closely related to another problem. "The fact is that it is frequently easier to get rid of a careless officer by recommending him...for a higher post in another unit."¹⁰ Again, incompetency was rewarded! One frustrated reader contended that "true fighters for perestroika" are not in leading positions in the military because "...protectionism does not reward them, seeing them as its adversaries." As a result, the officer corps had broken down into castes [kastam] of those who have patrons and those who do not.¹¹ Officers serving in remote garrisons, and who therefore lacked the protection of patrons were not promoted, through no fault of their own.¹²

¹⁰"Tak vse zhe - 'privedenie' ili real'nost?" [So is it an 'apparition' or reality?] Letters to the Editor, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 13 (July 1990) 10, (JPRS-UMA-90-025).

¹¹Ibid., 13.

¹²Ibid., 14.

The readers also questioned the procedures for making assignments, suggesting again that patrons oversee the assigning of their clients into desirable duties or locations. Based on this procedure, the son of General Major N. Savchuk finished the Lvov Higher Military-Patriotic School and yet has never been reassigned outside of the district.¹³ Letters in military journals and newspapers constantly lament the poor locations in which some officers seem to be stuck, while others are never transferred out of the Moscow area. As an example, Senior Lieutenant V. Sheshko reported to Krasnaia zvezda that in the Western Ukraine, another relatively desirable assignment location, officers "...serve, not being replaced, for 10-12 years. They hold on to position, apartment, all of which are controlled by the father-commanders [ottsam-komandiram]...."¹⁴

Even the highest ranks of the military experience the effects of patronage and protectionism. In a letter by Colonel V.A. Martirosian and signed by forty-seven members of the Congress of People's Deputies, Martirosian states that

[T]he armed forces are ridden by corruption and protectionism. Access to posts allowing promotion to the rank of General and higher is open primarily to sons of the military bosses....Key positions in the country's armed forces are often occupied by inadequately

¹³Ibid., 16.

¹⁴Senior Lieutenant V. Sheshko, "Srok sluzhby ne ustanovlen..." [The term of service is not established...] Krasnaia zvezda, 13 October 1989, 2.

competent people nominated because they are patronized by the Party apparat. It is useless to expect fair treatment or justice from them.¹⁵

As Major V.N. Lopatin, one of the earliest military reform leaders, so aptly notes, "[t]here is a sad anecdote: why can't the son of a general become a marshal? Because the marshal has his own son."¹⁶

Blat and Forced Labor

Blat is translated as "protection" or "pull."¹⁷ It is a reciprocal relationship in which goods or favors are obtained through the exchange of similar influence, goods or favors. It has become a prevalent way of doing business in the Soviet Union, used to obtain everything from theater tickets or scarce consumer goods to machinery and car repairs. And it frequently involves the use of one's official position and the privileges and power associated with it to effect personal gain. In the military, *blat* and its use by those in an official capacity has become another topic of debate.

An extreme case of *blat* was discussed by a Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil correspondent. According to Major

¹⁵Colonel V.A. Martirosian, "Military top brass must not grab power!" Moscow News, No. 38 (September 30 - October 7, 1990) 7.

¹⁶Major V.N. Lopatin, in "Kakaia armia nam nuzhna" [What kind of army do we need] Ogonek, No. 9 (February 1990) 29.

¹⁷A.I. Smirnitsky, ed. Russian-English Dictionary (Moscow: "Soviet Encyclopedia" Publishing House, 1971) 50.

Lavrentev, Lieutenant Colonel V. Gorskii used his position to oversee the assigning of new conscripts. "In one word, for the designated price or by means of patronage he filled many 'orders,' dealing with displaced conscripts and servicemen." Parents obtained good assignments for their sons by giving Gorskii champagne, money (up to 150 rubles), candy and books. Worse yet, even outside inspectors were "bought off" by Gorskii by providing them vodka, cognac and other rare or desirable goods. In fact, according to Gorskii's letter to the party organization investigating his actions, he "sometimes acted under the full tacit approval of senior chiefs." In spite of his abhorrent activities, Gorskii received only light punishment, leaving the impression that his protectors, perhaps bought off by his profits, had stepped in again.¹⁸

Closely related to such phenomena is the practice of using servicemen's labor to obtain goods or services for the unit.¹⁹ Although such action does not entail personal gain for the commander, many liberalizers viewed it as a misuse of personnel and a hindrance in guaranteeing unit readiness.

¹⁸Major S. Lavrentev, "Tainy n-skovo dvora" [Secrets of an unnamed household] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 19 (October 1989) 45-8, (JPRS-UMA-90-001).

¹⁹See for example the comments by Colonel O. Bel'kov in "Armiia i obshchestvo: esli sniat' polozolotu..." [The army and society: if the gilt is taken away...] Sovietskii vojn, No. 1 (January 1990) 7, and Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov, "V lichnykh tseliakh..." [For personal goals...] Krasnaia zvezda, 4 January 1987, 2; and Major V. Mukhin, "Lopata...vmesto avtomata?" [A shovel in place of a machine gun?] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 1 (January 1990) 37-39, (JPRS-UMA-90-016).

When soldiers are serving at construction sites, gathering the harvest or waiting tables at the regional party headquarters, they are not training and maintaining their own military equipment.

The military is often seen as a cheap source of labor by local party and administrative organizations. One officer complained that ten percent of the servicemen in his battalion were "dead souls" [mertvye dushi] because they are serving as chauffeurs in the commandant's office or the club.²⁰ Another goes so far as to complain that the use of the military by other government departments allows the departments to "...cover up their own inaction with the heroic labor of soldiers and officers."²¹ The result of the misuse of military forces often is the need for officers to work exceptionally long hours in order to make up for the loss of manpower.²²

The use, or many would contend misuse, of troops is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the organization of the construction troops. These troops often have been assigned to this duty because they speak Russian poorly or have been guilty of some infraction. The construction

²⁰Mukhin, "Lopata...", KVS, No. 1 (1990) 37-8.

²¹See the comments of Doctor of Philosophy F. Minushev in "Armiia i obshchestvo: esli sniat' polozolotu..." Sovetskii vojn, 6.

²²"v Konstitutsii-odno, v zhizni-drugoe?" [In the Constitution its one thing, but in life its another?] Letters to the Editor, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 2 (January 1990) 8, (JPRS-UMA-90-014).

troops, which served under the Ministry of Defense until after the coup of 1991, were a form of forced labor used by the government to fulfill major building projects and other duties throughout the country. Colonel L. Nechuk stated that in 1989 "...more than 300 thousand military construction workers are detached to enterprises of twenty Union and Republic ministries and departments which have no relation to providing the security of the country."²³ These troops worked in various jobs to include washing dishes and cleaning the auditorium at the Moscow Higher Party School, to working for the USSR Ministry of Hydroconstruction.²⁴ The construction troops were not covered by military regulations and therefore had no rights as individuals. Their extreme working conditions led to many abuses and approximately forty percent of all disciplinary offenses occurred in construction troop units.²⁵

There are many who believed that the existence of military construction workers was immoral and harmed the prestige of the Armed Forces. The system has been equated to a form of slavery and as an outgrowth of an economic barracks mentality. Formed in 1955, the construction battalions

²³Colonel L. Nechuk, "V bespravnom polozhenii" Krasnaia zvezda, 22 November 1989, 2.

²⁴Major M. Sirtlanov, "Prodolzhaem temu: Darmovaia rabsila?" [To continue a theme: parasitic slavery?] Krasnaia zvezda, 21 January 1990, 4.

²⁵Nechuk, "V bespravnom" KZ, 22 November 1989, 2.

[stroibat] were considered by some to be a replacement for the forced labor provided by the GULAG system prior to its dismantling.²⁶ However, the neotraditionalists argued that these troops were serving society in fulfilling work requirements. In a debate over the functions of the army, General Varennikov stated that, while functions such as construction are not really the duty of the army, in the end the army is a part of the people and "...can not be detached from its cares, from its problems and from its misfortunes."²⁷ A similar sentiment was offered by Marshal Akhromeev in his open letter to the editor of Ogonek, V.A. Korotich, in which he said that the army is not simply the defender of national security, but also "a true helper of the people" by aiding in construction, agricultural tasks and other projects.²⁸ These military leaders saw no reason to be concerned about the negative effects of such practices, believing instead that it was absolutely proper to use the forced labor of these conscripts.

²⁶Leonid Nikitinskii and Mikhail Pasternak, "'Shtrafnoi' batal'on" [A 'penal' battalion] Komsomolskaia pravda, 7 January 1990, 2.

²⁷Army General V. Varennikov, "Prednaznachenie sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil" [The purpose of the Soviet armed forces] debate under the title "Funktsii armii: dialektika razvitiia," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 18 (September 1989) 23 (FBIS-SOV-89-237-A).

²⁸Akhromeev, "Napadki na vooryzhennye sily SSSR. Pochemu?" KZ, 8 April 1990, 2.

Edinonachalie, Privileges and Dedovshchina

The attitude of senior military leaders who view as appropriate the use of soldiers as forced labor brings into question the role of the commander in his relations with subordinates. If the senior military leadership possesses an attitude which reflects disdain for their subordinates and the soldiers' rights as individuals, is this attitude expressed in turn at a lower level of command? How do commanders at lower levels interpret and execute the command-obedience structure of the military? Important to this issue is the role of edinonachalie²⁹ (one-man command) as it is seen by those who issue orders and oversee the performance of their military units.

Edinonachalie became the method by which some commanders adopted authoritarian measures and attitudes in dealing with troops. The use of troops to perform tasks personally beneficial to the commander is not unusual. Captain Riabov used the servicemen in his construction troop unit to build a swimming pool, ostensibly to be used as a way to boost troop morale. Instead, however, "the pool was used not for the

²⁹According to Colonel N. Beliakov, the most recent edition of the Military Encyclopedia dictionary states that edinonachalie "is the principle of military leadership by which commanders [superiors] have full administrative authority in relations toward subordinates, have full responsibility for all parts of life and activities of the troops. It is expressed in the right of commanders to personally make decisions, issue orders, regulations and to guarantee they are fulfilled." Colonel N. Beliakov "Imet' pravo..." [To have the right...] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 6 (March 1990) 27, (JPRS-UMA-90-014).

individual rank and file [soldier], but for a small circle of individuals - close acquaintances of Riabov and people 'needed' [nuzhnykh] by him."³⁰ In another case, Colonel N. Petukov created his own "estate" [votchina] by using unit funds and the unit personnel as a free "work force" [rabochaia sila] to repair his apartment. "He appropriated the gas stove and curtains, which belonged to the unit."³¹ As if this was not enough, the same Colonel "...had about himself such a manner, this man of great authority and the trust of the people, as if, pardon the expression, he was an 'unrestrained prince' [raspoiasavshiviisia kniazhek]." He was able to act in this manner because he had "a few defenders" at the division headquarters who served as his protectors.³² In another case, the battalion commander was involved in a number of irregular activities, to include acting against regulations by getting his wife a job in the same unit.³³

Such actions by commanders illustrate the impunity which the concept of edinonachalie gives them. Some believe that "[S]ervicemen, second only to prisoners, are the biggest part

³⁰Colonel N. Fedosiev, "Mutil vody" [Troubled waters] Krasnaia zvezda, 2 April 1989, 2.

³¹Petrenko "Preodolenie," KVS, No. 17 (1988) 67.

³²Ibid., 67-8.

³³Major I. Vakhnov, "Neugodnyi sekretar'" [Unsuitable secretary] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 16 (August 1989) 38, (JPRS-UMA-90-004).

of the USSR citizens deprived of rights,"³⁴ while at the same time commanders have the right to do anything they want. According to one military officer, "after the war [edinonachalie] came to be supplanted by the cult of subordination and rule by fiat. Legality, regulations and the servicemen's rights were violated. Any respect and concern for man was out of the question...."³⁵ This interpretation of edinonachalie has resulted in the subordinates' complete dependence on his superior for promotions, vacations and any other action involving the military member. Semashko states that "I know cases where superiors have made use of the mental wards of hospitals to 'pacify' subordinates who disagreed with them. I don't want to give specific names (I have them), the most important thing is that such disgraceful practices have taken place...."³⁶ In many situations, edinonachalie has become "[t]he absolutization of rights and 'forgetfulness' [zabyvchivost'], the conscious ignoring by commanders of their obligations in relations with subordinates resulting in authority out of control and begins to function outside of the law."³⁷

³⁴Major Pavel Ventur, "There Should Be No Military Cliques" XX Century and Peace, No. 11 (1988) 2.

³⁵Semashko "Army Must Be Law-Governed" MN, 23-30 April 1989, 12.

³⁶Ibid., 12.

³⁷Beliakov, "Imet' pravo..." KVS, No. 6 (1990) 28. Original all in bold.

Recent articles on military privileges highlight the consequences of the superior attitude possessed by military leaders. Expensive dachas with swimming pools and imported furnishings, along with the use of military aircraft for personal reasons are among the privileges of senior military leaders.³⁸ While hundreds of thousands of rubles are spent on building dachas for the military leaders, lower ranking officers and warrant officers face a shortage of housing, being forced to live with their families in inadequate facilities which lack basic amenities. Worse yet, often housing for the entire family is unavailable, and officers are forced to send their families to live with relatives while they search for adequate housing. When families can remain intact, they still face problems in the fact that care facilities for children and schools are housed in dilapidated and even dangerous buildings.³⁹

In discussing the abuse of privileges by Soviet military leaders, People's Deputy Ella Pamfilov, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Privileges and Advantages, said that "[g]randness has flourished among generals...."⁴⁰ Further, according to Pamfilov, it is the

³⁸Gleb Pyanykh, "How Nice To Be A General" Moscow News, No. 1, 7 January 1990, 8-9. Major V. Alexandrin, "Aviapeus v lichnykh tseliakh" [Using aircraft for personal goals] Krasnaia zvezda, 7 June 1987, 2.

³⁹See Ibid., and Vladimir Sergeev, "Dachnye privilegii pri svete glasnosti" [Dacha privileges in light of glasnost] Ogonek, No. 13 (March 1990) 18.

⁴⁰Tatiana Lekhto, "How to abolish privileges," New Times, No. 24, (18-24 June 1991) 17. In this article, Pamfilova complains that the Supreme

generals and their style of life which are actually undermining the prestige of the military. As a member of the new elite, the military leaders have taken advantage of the "state feeding trough" in the past.⁴¹

In the same article, People's Deputy Colonel Aleksandr Tsalko complains about the misuse of military aircraft by the leadership. According to Tsalko, specially equipped command and control aircraft are used not for the purposes for which they were designed, but rather to carry commanders and members of the military council to conferences and meetings. When occupied in such missions, the aircraft do not carry combat crews, and therefore could not be used if needed to ensure continuous troop control. This also means that the deputy left in charge while the commander is absent is without a means of controlling his troops and area of responsibility, a situation for which the aircraft were specifically designed. Tsalko points out that, while commanders misuse the aircraft assigned to other purposes, Aeroflot, the national airline of the Soviet Union, has

Soviet's committee on privileges, of which she is the secretary, has no power to inspect the "untouchable" government departments involved in the use of privileges. She also believes that the Soviet system "...has engendered clans of officialdom. There are such clans in the party, trade union and government apparatus. A person who gets into such a clan finds himself under the protection of executive power, which ensures a comfortable living for him, his children and even grandchildren." Ibid., 17.

⁴¹Ibid., 17.

insufficient fuel and must cancel flights.⁴² Again, the abuse of power and control over the military has allowed the leadership to satisfy its interests at the expense of the organization.

Although many citizens believe that privileges for the military are deserved,⁴³ their support is largely based on the more moderate privileges associated with the average officer, and not with the luxurious privileges of senior officers which the Soviet citizen was unaware of until the recent media coverage exposed the practices. That the senior military leadership possesses such privileges is seen by many as another example of the abuse of rights by these all-powerful leaders. In his investigation of privileges, one author compares the princely attitude and living style of senior leaders to the tsarist style of the Romanovs and draws the conclusion that "...privileges are a vice of the system in which the benefits of many leaders are received not 'for work' but 'for their position'."⁴⁴

⁴²Ibid., 17. Tsalko also relates that military aircraft reportedly have been used by military leaders for such jobs as transporting furniture for their relatives.

⁴³According to a telephone poll within the Moscow area by Moscow News, in which, on a five point scale, military privileges were rated as 4.1 (largely deserved) respondents stated that "...military officers who had to rough it as they moved from place to place have surely earned a good flat and some privileges in old age." Moscow News, No. 27, 10-17 July 1988, 10.

⁴⁴N.P. Pankov, "Smelo my v 'liuks' poidem..." [Bravely we go to the 'deluxe'...] Literaturnaia gazeta, No. 20, 22 May 1991, 6.

The attitude of superiors has been labeled a "camp-barracks Stalinist model" of practices.⁴⁵ This attitude leads commanders and superiors to act as if they are "absolute" [polnovlasti] in making decisions. In the view of some liberalizers, the root of military privileges lies in the Stalinist period with privileges the product of the absolutist attitude of the leaders which this period fostered. The existence of privileges has turned "...into something trite: rights belong to those who have more rights."⁴⁶

As another example of the control wielded by commanders, "[K]nowing that promotions entirely depend on the personal relationship with the commander, many officers do not look after the interests of work, but about the best means to live with the commander in 'harmony' [ladakh]."⁴⁷ In a strange twist to the workings of protectionism discussed above, edinonachalie provides the commander with so much power that "...ignoring the established order, service officials appropriate the right to hold the conferment of promotions for a month, two months, a half a year or more. They are not

⁴⁵See the comments by Professor B. Sapunov in "Armiia i obshchestvo...", Sovetskii Voin, No. 1 (1990) 5.

⁴⁶Sergeev, "Dachnye privilegii," Ogonek, No. 13 (1990) 19.

⁴⁷Lieutenant Colonel N. Khudenko, "Vopros reshen. Bystro kharakteristiku..." [The question is decided. Quickly write a reference...] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 6 (March 1990) 34 (JPRS-UMA-90-021).

made to bear disciplinary or material responsibility for this."⁴⁸

Some commanders use harsh forms of punishment to reinforce their position of authority. As reported in one account of the use of harsh disciplinary measures, "[S]ome commanders say, with no embarrassment, 'The most important thing is that subordinates fear me, and that they respect authority.'"⁴⁹ One of the most extreme examples of the authoritarian attitude of superiors is *dedovshchina*, or what is euphemistically labeled "non-regulation relations." *Dedovshchina*, derived from the Russian word *ded* which means grandfather or old man, is a system of control through the hazing of new recruits. As new conscripts enter the service at six month intervals, the experienced soldiers exercise their superiority based on time in service by making the new conscripts wait on them, perform degrading or physically difficult work, and, worse yet, by beating and physically abusing them. According to Marshal Akhromeev, the phenomenon of *dedovshchina* only became widespread in the army in the last 15-20 years.⁵⁰ *Dedovshchina* was noted as a problem in

⁴⁸General Major L. Ivashov, "Ogradit' ot poshiagatel'nostv" [To guard against encroachment] Krasnaia zvezda, 5 October 1990, 2.

⁴⁹Captain Lieutenant V. Dandikin, "Disttsiplinarnaia 'panatseia'" [A disciplinary 'panacea'] Krasnaia zvezda, 11 November 1988, 2.

⁵⁰Stanislav Kosterin, interview with Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeev "Armiia i perestroika" [The Army and perestroika] Sovetskaia rossia, No. 12, 14 January 1989, 3. *Dedovshchina* was reportedly a problem before the last 15-20 years. Akhromeev's comment may be based on the idea that it is only in the last 15-20 years that *dedovshchina* reached an unacceptable level in both numbers and level of violence.

Afghanistan, with desertions of 200-300 soldiers blamed in part on the bullying of young soldiers by the older ones.⁵¹ In recent years, dedovshchina has taken a decidedly ethnic turn and is particularly pronounced in the already difficult environment of the construction troops.⁵² Of those convicted for crimes in 1989, one-fourth of those committed offenses associated with non-regulation relations.⁵³ The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers has reported that 3,900 recruits lost their lives in 1989 as a result of hazing and related suicides, all of which could be blamed on senior soldiers and the humiliating actions of officers.⁵⁴

The open discussion of dedovshchina brought about by Gorbachev's policy of glasnost led military leaders to commit themselves to stop the phenomenon, but the problem continued and was reportedly one of the leading reasons for personnel being absent without leave (AWOL), with 350 soldiers leaving

⁵¹Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, (London: Macmillan Press, 1988) 213. Mr. Urban was a correspondent for the Independent.

⁵²Major V. Mukhin, "Neustavnye otnosheniia: chto budet zavtra?" [Non-regulation relations: what will happen tomorrow?] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 1 (January 1991) 12-3, (JPRS-UMA-91-015). See also the interview with General Major Justice V. Parfenov, who believes that the ethnic overtone of dedovshchina emerged in 1988. Interview by Captain Second Rank S. Tupchenko, "Zakon protiv 'dedovshchiny'" [A law against 'dedovshchina'] Krasnaia zvezda, 13 October 1989, 2.

⁵³General Major Justice A. Ukolov, "Prigovor 'dedovshchine'" [The verdict on 'dedovshchina'] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 18 (September 1989) 62, (JPRS-UMA-90-003).

⁵⁴Gennady Zhavoronkov, "Save and Protect" Moscow News, No. 30, 5-12 August 1990, 11.

their units in 1990 as a result of dedovshchina.⁵⁵ A group of deserters in Moscow blamed their decision to leave their units without authorization on the dedovshchina they had experienced.⁵⁶

Despite their commitment to halt the practice of dedovshchina in the military, senior military leaders often note that it is a problem which should be blamed on society in general, and not on the conditions of military service. In discussing the phenomenon in an interview which appeared in Moscow News, General of the Army Ivan Tretyak, Commander in Chief of the Air Defense Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense, stated that

[T]oday much is being written to combat the problem of cruelty to young soldiers on the part of second-year servicemen. But you must understand that if such things happen it is not the army that is guilty, it is rather a reflection of the education the young men are getting in the conventional, pre-army environment. I can assure you there was no cruelty in the army before the 60s. And that's exactly what you and I must think about. This is awful for us and that's why we react so painfully to each case. The army was always a sample of purity to human relations, a model of friendship among people who are involved in doing a common and, I stress, a very hard job.⁵⁷

⁵⁵Lieutenant Colonel V. Zubin, "Pravo na zashchity" [The right to a defense] Krasnaia zvezda, 27 November 1990, 2.

⁵⁶Alexander Fyodorov, "Deserters Leave Army Hell" Moscow News, No. 27, 7-14 July 1991, 2.

⁵⁷Yuri Teplyakov, "Reliable Defence First and Foremost" Moscow News, No. 8, 28 February - 6 March 1988, 12. See also "Basic Focus" in the Air

These sentiments were echoed by General Major Justice V. Parfenov in an interview discussing dedovshchina published in Krasnaia zvezda, in which he stated that "There is one thing to say...the army is a part of the people. What is found in society will also be found in the army."⁵⁸ Lieutenant Colonel V. Sergeyev said that, when discussing the problem of dedovshchina in the military, it should be kept in mind that "...the army and its functions have been created by society, and that it is society that generates the main positive and negative phenomena in the army since it is but a copy of society, its integral part."⁵⁹ Another officer suggests that the young soldiers are themselves to a certain extent responsible for dedovshchina. Young conscripts enter the army viewing dedovshchina as an inevitable occurrence which they accept and do not try to combat. They fail to complain about their treatment, refuse to turn to the proper authorities, such as the commander or legal officer, to halt the activities, but instead accept it to a point, then go AWOL and turn to public organizations to tell their story of hazing and poor treatment while in the military.⁶⁰

Force Times, 13 November 1989, 15-6, for a discussion of dedovshchina by a unit commander who sees the problem as one embedded in Soviet society.

⁵⁸Captain Second Rank S. Tupchenko, "Zakon protiv 'dedovshchiny'" [A law against 'dedovshchina'] Krasnaia zvezda, 13 October 1989, 2.

⁵⁹Lieutenant Colonel V. Sergeyev in roundtable discussion, "Army and Society," XX Century and Peace, No. 9 (1988) 24.

⁶⁰Zubin, "Pravo na zashchity" KZ, 27 November 1990, 2.

Placing the blame for dedovshchina on society ignores the fact that through their attitude of superiority and their authoritarian form of leadership, the source of which is primarily the system of edinonachalie, commanders and leaders foster and at times actively participate in dedovshchina. Dedovshchina is in essence a system of control, through which each level's dependence on the next higher level superior is exercised.⁶¹ According to one military official, in 60% of the cases, the primary motive for dedovshchina is to subordinate the younger conscript to the older soldier's influence.⁶² In such a system, "[T]he senior chief is the master (in the 'lordly' sense of the word) over a subordinate. He could do as he liked with a soldier and with a young officer. Trample on human dignity, humiliate and insult, not having any legal responsibility in the process...."⁶³ The result of the system is "...legalized slavery, very convenient for the brass who's accustomed to having others do its dirty work."⁶⁴

⁶¹Jones, 130. The view of dedovshchina as a control mechanism is also shared by a number of Soviets. See N. Chistyakov and V. Maslov, "Persuasion and compulsion in the struggle against legal violations in the army and navy" Voyennaya mysl', No. 5 (1973), cited in Jones, 130.

⁶²Ukolov, "Prigovor 'dedovshchine'," KVS, No. 18 (1989) 64.

⁶³Colonel Valeriy Ochirov "Ochirov on Need for Strong Military" JPMRS-UMA-91-004, 1 February 1991, 3.

⁶⁴L. Saraskin, in roundtable discussion "Army and Society," XX Century and Peace, No. 9 (1988) 24.

Another feature of edinsonachalie is that the commander is responsible not only for the welfare of his subordinates, but also for all actions of his subordinates, to include actions which are illegal or for which punishment could be invoked. Called the "vertical stroke," minor transgressions by subordinates result in punishment up the chain of command in an effort to ensure that any and all superiors are forced to take responsibility for all incidents. This punishment, according to Anderson, is both expected and accepted by the officer corps. "Soviet officers' acceptance of the appropriateness of the vertical stroke complements a perception that performance of even the best unit depends entirely on the presence of the commander."⁶⁵

The practice of the vertical stroke leads commanders to conceal incidents of dedovshchina. Commanders may cover up AWOLs or acts of dedovshchina, or may execute their own private investigations into illegal acts in the hope of finding the guilty party so they will not have to report the incident, saving themselves from the punishment which would result.⁶⁶ It is also easier to simply ignore the situation, again with the hope that the situation will resolve itself or go unnoticed. In one discussion of the subject, a regimental commander reported that 24% of the military members

⁶⁵Anderson, "Neotraditionalism," 8-9

⁶⁶See for example Colonel Justice L. Smertin, "Polnomochiia na rozysk" [The power to search] Krasnaia zvezda, 3 January 1990, 2.

questioned about dedovshchina responded that the violent incidents are not stopped by the officers, and that the offenders are not punished.⁶⁷

As another result of the principle of edinonachalie, lower ranking officers and warrant officers who are not commanders and yet work directly with the young conscripts have little or no power or responsibility and turn to dedovshchina to enforce their limited authority. As a result, physical force becomes the only means used by a sergeant or junior officer to keep his many subordinates in line.⁶⁸ In either case, thirty-two percent of the soldiers questioned about problems in the military

...stated that officers and warrant officers themselves did not set an example in their observance of the requirements of laws, regulations, and orders, in moral norms, and allow rudeness, foul language, and the humiliation of personal dignity in their interaction with subordinates. Analysis of material of criminal matters shows (of one-third of those convicted to one degree or another) that the violation of regulatory rules on relationships was furthered by incorrect actions or inaction by officers.⁶⁹

⁶⁷Lieutenant Colonel V. Glushko, in roundtable discussion led by Colonel N.N. Beliakov, "Vooruzhennyye sily v sovetskom pravovom gosudarstve" [The military in a soviet legal state] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 3 (February 1989) 26, (JPRS-UMA-89-011).

⁶⁸Interview with Khanyutin, "Discharged...?" MN, No. 50, (1990), 14.

⁶⁹Ukolov, "Prigovor 'dedovshchine'," KVS, No. 18, (1989), 65.

Increasing the authority and influence of young officers and non-commissioned officers, along with improvements in training and educating personnel, could help to eliminate problems such as dedovshchina.

As a result of the bankrupting policy of edinonachalie, as mentioned previously, only senior commanders exercise real power not only in their relations with their subordinates, but also in relation to performing military duties. As an example, "[T]oday a ship cannot leave its base, if there is no senior commander onboard...." This is the result of the concern that one needs to "ensure himself against responsibility" [zastrahovat' sebia ot otvetstvennosti].⁷⁰ At the same time, the senior military leadership who are in control are able to act without limits, issuing orders continuously and without regard for their impact on those who must oversee their execution. Commanders, then, are saddled with fulfilling vast numbers of orders dealing with even the most minute details, a task made more difficult by the fact that these orders are often contradictory. The top-down nature of edinonachalie ensures that the commander has no other choice but to try to make sense of the situation his superiors create through their actions.

⁷⁰Captain Third Rank P. Ishchenko, "Kto khoziain na korable" [Who is the boss on the ship] Krasnaia zvezda, 1 December 1988, 1. In his personal account of his experiences in the Soviet army, the Soviet defector Viktor Suvorov notes the problem of the officer's lack of rights and its impact on his ability to command. See Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982) Chapter 8, and especially 255-8.

The Liberalizers and Reform

The product of the corruption of the military is an organization which can no longer fulfill its heroic task of defending the nation. This result was illustrated clearly in the military's unfortunate experiences in Afghanistan, in which trust between officers and soldiers was questioned and military performance on the battlefield was generally poor. Having recognized the poor state of the organization, Gorbachev's reform policies and program of openness provided the opportunity for reformers within the military to press the need to end corrupted traditional practices in order to return the military to a more desirable state.

In his address to the Second Congress of People's Deputies, Vladimir Lopatin, a reserve Major having left the active army apparently as a result of pressures placed on him by superiors unhappy with his reformist positions, said that

[t]he present state of the Armed Forces is in profound contradiction with changes in the world. They are lagging behind the perestroyka processes in the country, and they do not match up to their original nature, to the predestination of a socialist army - being in fact a cheap labor force - or to the lofty importance of the Army for the defense of the fatherland....⁷¹

⁷¹"Vladimir Lopatin," FBIS-SOV-89-245, 22 December 1989, 42.

Only reform of the military through the ending of neotraditional practices would return it to a position of respect and strength.

To this end, the liberalizers attacked the mechanisms which assured military leaders and commanders their control over the organization and their subordinates. Tired of the disarray in their units, reform-minded officers blamed these control mechanisms and their benefactors for the poor state of the military. This disarray

...is to their 'credit' [zasluga], those who were promoted thanks to a patron, connections, or even open intrigues and abuses. It is they who brought into the army collective characteristics not peculiar to our army - rudeness, swaggering, and self-interest. Moreover, it is their fault, that in the past years one-man command is directly interpreted as one-man authority [edinovlastie], and in turn in all-permissiveness that not only in the lower ranks of the officer pyramid, but even in the highest spheres, the initiative is suppressed, and people objecting were exposed to persecution.⁷²

As can be seen from the above quote, the principle of edinonachalie (one-man command) is seen as a primary contributor to the corruption of the military. According to one officer, the principle of one-man management has been transformed into the principle of absolute power. The result of this power is the formation of "military cliques,"

⁷²Petrenko, "Preodolenie," KVS, No. 17, (1988) 69.

military dynasties "bound by service, family and protectionist ties."⁷³

Those who are in subordinate positions, outside of the military cliques and without sufficient patronage to protect their interests, and those sincerely interested in performing their jobs as military professionals are continually frustrated by the control which the top commanders possess. This control has been labeled a "mechanism of non-freedom" [mekhanizm nesvobody]. Within this mechanism

is found the principle of dependence: for twenty-five years an officer can go anywhere, you can make him do what you please. If he wants to rise in service, to get promoted, a position, an apartment, subordinate yourself unquestioningly. Remember the manual - point one: the commander is always right; point two: if the commander is not right refer to point one.⁷⁴

According to this same author, there is tacit recognition among military members that the military would collapse without dedovshchina. In summarizing the situation in the military, Colonel Smirnov states simply "[h]ere there are no relations between people with their cares and interests, there are only relations between superiors and subordinates."⁷⁵

⁷³Major Ventur, "There Should Be," 3.

⁷⁴Colonel Smirnov in "Kakaya armia nam nuzhna" [What kind of army we need] Ogonek, No. 9 (February 1990) 29.

⁷⁵Ibid., 29.

The result of the authoritarian attitude of commanders is their total denial of subordinates' individual rights. As noted by one author, servicemen are bound to follow the orders of their superiors, a subtle reference to the fact that there is no such thing as an unlawful order under the concept of edinsonachalie.⁷⁶ Subordinates are themselves the victims of questionable actions by their superiors, and also find their own rights are ignored and violated. While commanders are free to do anything they want, to include participating in acts of questionable legality (and sometimes blatant illegality) their subordinates have no rights at all. As examples,

Servicemen do not have the right: to change profession, to change the place of work or to be dismissed by his own wish; to be occupied in cooperative and individual activity for pay; in

⁷⁶In his defense of General I.N. Rodionov, the general in charge of the military in Tbilisi during the April 1989 civil disturbance which resulted in a number of civilian deaths, Marshal Akhromeev notes that until the Congress of Peoples' Deputies took power into their hands in May 1989, the military was bound to follow the orders of the government (higher organs of authority). Again, because there is no such thing as an illegal order, and because edinsonachalie assures complete subordination to the higher ranking authority, all orders will be executed despite any question individuals may have about their apparent legality. Akhromeev states this simply, "For servicemen, and even more so for commanders, it is unthinkable to not fulfill decisions and orders. This was clear for General Colonel I.N. Rodionov." Marshal S. Akhromeev, "Napadki na vooruzhinnye sily SSSR. Pochemu?" [Faultfinding in the armed forces of the USSR. Why?] Krasnaia zvezda, 8 April 1990, 4. In relating an incident involving questionable orders issued in Afghanistan, Soviet correspondent Gennady Bocharov notes that the Military Code of 1937 included a paragraph stating that a soldier was not obligated to obey an order clearly criminal in nature. "Now, however, there was no such stipulation in the Military Code...." Gennady Bocharov Russian Roulette: Afghanistan Through Russian Eyes trans. by Alyona Kojevnikov (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990) 77.

compensation of material loss, received as a result of injury or personal trauma in the performance of duties of military service; to appeal to the court illegal actions of military officials; to a yearly vacation (military conscripts) etc.⁷⁷

Without rights or social protection, servicemen work within what has been labeled a system of slavery. This legalized system of slavery is seen as "...a form of forced labour, [a] labour army functioning exclusively through coercion," with *dedovshchina* defined as "[v]iolence [as] a means of self-organization by soldiers under army bondage."⁷⁸ Even when laws do exist for the protection of the individual, they are often "...overgrown with instructions and regulations enabling military officials to turn them into what the people aptly described as a 'pointer' - it points wherever you turn it."⁷⁹

Under such circumstances, it is easy to understand why the most absurd accusations against the senior military officer corps are seen by their subordinates and the civilian population as believable. As an example, General Major Agulfaz Gasymov, the Military Commissar for the Azerian Republic was asked to comment on the following.

⁷⁷Beliakov, "Imet' pravo...", *KVS*, No. 6 (March 1990) 29. Original all in bold.

⁷⁸Interview with Khanyutin, "Discharged...?" *MN*, No. 50, (1990), 14.

⁷⁹Semashko, "Army Must Be Law-Governed" *MN*, No. 16, (1989) 12.

Recently rumors have been circulating to the effect that due to a shortage of women in some territories where soldiers are serving medical preparations which reduce passion have been mixed into the food of soldiers without their knowledge, and that this has led to serious tragedy when these soldiers return to civilian life. Is this true?⁸⁰

Naturally, the General denied such practices, and stated that the only thing put into soldiers food was Vitamin C whenever there is concern about the vitamin deficiency.⁸¹ Despite the almost humorous nature of this discussion, it is sad to think that people would believe that their lives could be controlled to such an extent that even their sexual drive would not be exempt from the neotraditionalists' control.

The countering of the corrupt practices of superiors, i.e., the abuse of individuals and denial of individual rights, became a central cause for the liberalizers. In a survey of 267 officers, sergeants and soldiers conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion of Servicemen of the Main Political Directorate, 68% responded that social and legal protection of service members was an issue that required urgent discussion. Other issues requiring discussion included the problem of realizing the principle of social justice in the army (64%) and "deepening the process

⁸⁰"Military Commissar on Draft, Ethnic Conflicts," JPRS-UMA-90-001, 4 January 1990, 15.

⁸¹Ibid., 15.

of democratization in the Armed Forces" (56%).⁸² By 1990, large numbers of officers had joined the early reformers in voicing their opinion about the existing system which allowed such corruption to flourish. According to one survey, 60% of the officers who responded noted that violations of social justice occurred in the relations between commanders and their subordinates in the army. Fifty percent stated that they were dissatisfied with the promotion system, and 50% to 80% of the officers were not satisfied with living conditions in their units. Finally, "[m]ore than 60 percent of the questioned officers link their own lack of social protection with receiving from immediate superiors orders and instructions, contradicting the requirements of law and statutory norms."⁸³

For the liberalizers, the establishment of a legal state had particular meaning for individual rights. These rights should include not only universally recognized rights and freedoms, such as the freedom to work and rest, but also should allow the individual to "...believe that the mechanism for political authority, economic and spiritual life would guarantee that his opinion will count in matters of the

⁸²Colonel V. Deinikin and Lieutenant R. Nadeev, "Nadezhdy opravdali" [Our hopes are justified] *Krasnaia zvezda*, 14 June 1989, 2. Other issues and their importance included the need for military reform (59%), increasing the prestige of the army in society (58%), and improving the material security of servicemen (56%).

⁸³Beliakov, "Imet' pravo...", *KVS*, No. 6, (1990) 29. Original all in bold.

collective and society."⁸⁴ Such a system would halt the violation of rights by those who took advantage of their position,⁸⁵ effectively ending "...a one-sided notion of law as a coercive force."⁸⁶ For the reformers, a legal state based on the concept of individual rights served not only to affirm "the humanistic principles of socialism," but also served as a "...practical instrument of securing and defending freedom, honor and personal dignity, and in the struggle with bureaucratism, regionalism and departmentalism, a form of realizing socialist popular authority [narodovlasti]."⁸⁷ Without raising the role of the individual and "...having not expanded the limits of democratization, we can not raise the quality of military and political readiness to a new level."⁸⁸

To those interested in changing the situation in the military through democratization and glasnost, existing military organizations were insufficient. The Officers Assembly, established in 1989 based on the Assembly concept used by the tsars, was suppose to serve as a forum for

⁸⁴Colonel Justice V. Prishchep in Colonel N. Beliakov "Vooruzhenye sily v sovetskom provom gosudarstve," KVS, No. 3, (1990) 21.

⁸⁵Colonel Justice V. Dzuba in Ibid., 20.

⁸⁶Colonel L. Nechauk, interview with General Lieutenant Justice B. Popov in "Zakon est' zakon" [The law is the law] Krasnaia zvezda, 7 February 1989, 2.

⁸⁷Ibid., 2.

⁸⁸General Major N.A. Grebenkin in roundtable discussion by Colonel Ia. Ren'kas, "Pressa i armia" [The press and the army] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 13 (July 1990) 22, (JPRS-UMA-90-025).

voicing opinions on restructuring and for providing a separate and relatively independent channel for executing reforms. However, it soon became apparent that the leadership of the military intended the Assembly to be another form of controlling the officer corps. In his account of the Assembly, Combined Unit Commander Colonel A. Tsalko states:

It was organized in the spirit of the good old traditions: they carefully selected and instructed the delegates and did everything so that the real leaders of military garrisons, who express the opinion of the majority, did not come to Moscow. The day before the officers assembly they gave documents and valuable gifts and had the next military rank conferred on them - - in general, they were won over [zadobrili]. Naturally, there was the correct atmosphere in the hall.⁸⁹

As Colonel Martirosian noted at the Assembly meeting, speeches were presented according to a list made in advance, and officers were not allowed to speak from the floor. An absence of microphones in the hall circumvented any attempts by participants to take the floor in an effort to express their opinions on issues being discussed. "Finally," Martirosian asked, "why do all the commanders in chiefs, all the marshals, sit in the presidium? If we are for democratization in our army, we need to have the most

⁸⁹Colonel A. Tsalko in "Kakaia armia nam nuzhna" [What kind of army do we need] Ogonek, No. 9 (February 1990) 29.

respected people, and not the people with positions sitting there."⁹⁰ The result of such procedures, according to Lieutenant Colonel K. Kharchenko, head of the political department of an aviation regiment, is that

[e]verything is done by order from above [sverkhu] and the assembly acts in the framework of the old structure....If you want, this is a clear illustration of adapting the old system to new conditions, the labor of authority, trying to drive the old content into the new forms.⁹¹

The reformers would have to work outside of official military organizations to accomplish change, something they had already begun to do. One step was to establish their own organizations for the purpose of pursuing protection and rights for the individual soldier and officer. The Shchit [Shield] Union, the first attempt at organizing a separate trade union for the military, was established with the primary goal of providing social protection for servicemen, reservists and their families. Other parts of its program included its dedication to reforming the Armed Forces along with a resolve to assist in writing legislation for this purpose. It also sought to expose corruption and protectionism in the military and pursue the departyization

⁹⁰"Vasha pozitsiia, tovarishchi deputaty?" [Your position, comrade deputies?] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 2 (January 1990) 61, (JPRS-UMA-90-009).

⁹¹Lieutenant Colonel K. Kharchenko in "Kakaia armia nam nuzhna" Ogonek, No. 9 (February 1990) 29.

of the Armed Forces.⁹² According to one report, "[t]he Union believes that the relations existing in the army cannot be justified, that they favour bureaucracy, protectionism, corruption, arbitrariness, and only imitate perestroika without really implementing it."⁹³ In an interview with Colonel (Reserve) Vitali Urazhtsev, it was reported that the original plans for Shchit were laid in 1982. By early 1990 it reportedly had approximately 10,000 members, although many members protected their identity, presumably to preclude adverse impacts on their military careers.⁹⁴ In the summer of 1990, its membership included ten People's Deputies of the USSR and eight People's Deputies of the Russian Federation.⁹⁵

Even as Shchit was being organized, military personnel were pursuing reform in two other ways. The first of these was through active participation in the newly competitive election process. Although some military members campaigned based on a conservative platform, others actively campaigned on platforms emphasizing change and reform. In the Moscow elections, twenty-two military officers campaigned on the

⁹²"'Shchit' Program," JPRS-UMA-91-012, 3 May 1991, 8-9.

⁹³"Shield-Informals In The Army," Moscow News, No. 44, 5-12 November 1989, 2.

⁹⁴Mikhail Sokolov, "Shli soldaty" [The soldiers left] Sobesednik, No. 40 (October 1990) 6.

⁹⁵Volkov, 18.

left slate associated with the Democratic Platform.⁹⁶ In the city of Yaroslavl, forty-four year old Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Podziruk, who ran on a platform which advocated military reform and which included a transition to a volunteer, professional force, successfully challenged General Boris Snetkov, then Commander of Soviet Forces in Germany, who ran on a status-quo platform.⁹⁷

Other ways that the liberalizers pursued reform were through their words and deeds. By deeds, I am referring to the actions of military members in elected bodies. The liberalizing attitudes of the young reformers are clearly portrayed by their voting patterns in the Russian Legislature in 1989. According to Argumenti i fakti, over 50% of the junior and middle level commanders voted with the Democratic Russia reformist group, while over 75% of the senior commanders voted with the Communist Party.⁹⁸ The reformers also sought to pass legislation which they believed would further the cause of establishing an impersonal military and protecting individual rights. They argued for departyization of the military through the rejection of Article 6 of the Constitution, which established the Communist Party as the

⁹⁶Timothy J. Colton, "The Politics of Democratization: The Moscow Election of 1990," Soviet Economy, Vol. 6: 4 (October-December 1990) 311.

⁹⁷Robert G. Kaiser, Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumphs and His Failures, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) 265.

⁹⁸"Narod i nomenklatura-ediny," Argumenti i fakti, No. 29, 21 July 1990, 2, cited in Meyer, 29.

leader of the state, and they sought to restructure the military on a professional basis, two issues which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5 of this study. Further, they countered the senior leaderships' concept of the military by writing their own draft legislation for military reform.

Finally, the liberalizers were perhaps most active in their vocal attack on the old way of doing business in the military. They eagerly took advantage of glasnost to present their case to an interested public, as the anecdotal information used in this chapter illustrates. The themes of their discussions were always similar, to illustrate the abuses of the senior leadership and the effect these abuses had on both the individual service member and the overall military's ability to function. They sought to remove the commanders' power over the legal system. This was important because, as Doctor of Legal Science A. Koblikov pointed out, the military procuracy served not only as defender of the servicemen but as the defender of the interests of the government. As such,

it is necessary to realistically guarantee, so that procurators, magistrates, judges are independent from pressures of the party, soviet organs and commands and subordinate only to the law. But today procurators or the members of military tribunals get military rank, apartments, sanatorium holidays dependent on the command, and I think we can only

speaking relatively about the true independence of justice.⁹⁹

They also attacked the Soviet military leadership over its policy of secrecy on military matters. Such secrecy is viewed by many as a natural development of the administrative-command system which "...raised the apparatus of power above society" and "provided the necessary legal conditions for license and for giving the top levels a free hand in restricting formal legal competence in assigning the strictest responsibility to the lower levels in secrecy matters."¹⁰⁰ This secrecy in turn empowers the military leaders by allowing them a monopoly of information which, according to some reformers, they use as a shield in their efforts to protect the organization against pressure for reform.¹⁰¹ The leaderships' information monopoly ensures that "'state interests' are protected not from external threats but from Soviet citizens."¹⁰²

In practice, the policy of secrecy has been taken to extremes. Maps are left with "blank spots" [belykh piaten]

⁹⁹Beliakov, discussion by A. Koblikov in "Vooruzhenye sily v sovetskom pravom gosudarstve," KVS, No. 3, (1989) 28.

¹⁰⁰V. Rubanov, "From the 'Cult of Secrecy' to the Information Culture" [Ot kul'ta sekretnosti - k informatsionnoi kul'ture] Kommunist, No. 3 (1988), trans. by Arlo Schultz in The Soviet Review, Vol. 30: 5 (September-October 1989) 30.

¹⁰¹Yeltsin, 252.

¹⁰²Ibid., 25.

that are whole cities kept secret from the population.¹⁰³ As a number of critics have noted, Soviet citizens only receive information about their own military by reading about it in Western sources!¹⁰⁴ In fact, information unavailable to Soviet citizens is disclosed to foreigners for the purpose of arms control talks, and foreign specialists are allowed access to military facilities for the purpose of inspection while Soviet journalists themselves are denied access to like facilities.¹⁰⁵

The policy of secrecy is not limited to national security, but extends to even lower levels in the military. For example, unit level party organizations do not have access to details of the overall party budget. This was made clear to two junior officers who volunteered to investigate the matter for their unit party organization. Having written a letter asking for details of the CPSU budget, the officers were accused of spreading Shield documents and of supporting the Democratic Platform. Rather than risk posting to a

¹⁰³Major V. Zubin, "Raskroem karty?" [Should we reveal maps?] interview with General Major A.I. Losev, Krasnaia zvezda, 22 July 1989, 3. Losev is head of the Topographic Service of the Armed Forces.

¹⁰⁴See for example Viktor Loshak, "Who Controls the Army After All?" Moscow News, No. 45, 18-25 November, 1990, 5. One of the most famous discussions of this phenomenon is found in Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" International Affairs, No. 4 (April 1989) 31-2.

¹⁰⁵Rubanov, 24.

remote location as punishment for their deed, the officers resigned from the army.¹⁰⁶

The reformers point to the issue of secrecy as another example of the extreme and corrupted control exercised by military leaders. They believe the issue illustrates both the military's hesitancy to reform and its resistance to recognizing the rights of the individual as proclaimed in Gorbachev's policy of democratization.¹⁰⁷ Overall, by emphasizing the need to end corruption, the reformers highlighted their belief that the military had become an organization in which the higher ranking officers controlled everything to such an extent that they were able to act above the law, while their subordinates were entirely dependent on this small and despotic group for everything in their lives. The result of such an extreme relationship was a dysfunctional organization.

Summary and Conclusion

The Soviet military, faced with the Gorbachev reforms which emphasized openness and the role of the individual in society, broke into two distinct factions over these reforms. For the neoneotraditionalists, reform challenged their

¹⁰⁶Captain Andrei Filippov and Senior Lieutenant Sergei Pushkin, "Not To Be Brainwashed," Moscow News, No. 23, 17-24 June 1990, 15.

¹⁰⁷"Vladimir Lopatin," FBIS-SOV-89-245, 22 December 1989, 42. These points were made by Lopatin in his address to the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

control over the organization, a control which seemed appropriate to them because its basis was the command-administrative system and the militarized socialism emerging from that system. For the military leadership, the power and control provided to them by this system was the accepted "rules of the game." Their use of the military for personal gain, as illustrated by patronage, protectionism, edinsonachalie and the other symbols of personal power discussed in this chapter, was simply an example of their control over the organization and again was seen by them as justified by their positions. But this was a corrupted perspective of the institution and their position of control in it, which in turn led to the general corruption of the military.

This corruption was seen by the reformers as unacceptable. It not only damaged the military, but also denied them rights as individuals. What emerged was a vicious circle. Without rights, officers could not perform their functions and maintain a professional force. And in the absence of a professional force, corruption persisted and the military could not function as a fighting force. As illustrated by the data in this chapter, those particularly frustrated by this conundrum were the young officers,¹⁰⁸ and

¹⁰⁸v.N. Lopatin clearly notes differences in attitudes which result from generational differences. He states, "Yes, there no doubt is a division between the leaders from the highest military echelon and executors of orders. Take just the age of our chief army leaders. Of thirty deputy ministers of defense only one is younger than 60 and eleven are older than 66. They are older, for example, than me by more than thirty years - this is already two different generations. Many of them came to these

those with technical and special higher education, such as lawyers. Blaming the state of the military on the Stalinist system and the era of stagnation, these people saw Gorbachev's reforms as the means by which the military could re-establish its professional footing while also satisfying their own professional standards. As played out in the Soviet press, both factions believed their efforts were for the best of the organization, but the debate between the two groups illustrated fundamental differences in their attitudes toward the military and institutional values.

positions in the most stagnant years, when, as nowhere else, protectionism and nepotism thrived." From "Kakaiia armiia nam nuzhna" [What kind of army do we need] Ogonek, No. 9 (February 1990) 29.

CHAPTER 4

THE LEADERSHIPS' RESPONSE TO REFORM: DEFENDING THE HEROIC IMAGE

The military had come under an attack of criticism by both civilians and its own members. The reformers' criticisms, detailed in the open press, provided new insight into the corrupted nature of the military as molded by its leadership. Hampered by patronage and protectionism and frustrated by the poor work atmosphere, all of which were caused and essentially perpetuated by the superior attitude of the military leaders toward their subordinates, the military reformers recognized Gorbachev's emphasis on the individual as a basis for the legal state as a means by which the ills of the military could be overcome. Gorbachev's policies were meant to include the individual in governing through the mobilization of the population. This inclusion also would result in another form of mobilization - the neotraditionalists would be mobilized out of their power positions.

Reforming the military, however, would not be easy, as Gorbachev found in his own efforts. During Minister of Defense Yazov's confirmation hearing before the Supreme Soviet in 1988, Gorbachev admitted that restructuring the

armed forces to that point had been a slow and difficult job. He noted that one of the major problems within the armed forces was the "...system by which generals gave posts and favors to their friends and protégés..."¹ Even the Politburo as a whole participated in criticizing the military by citing the political and military "formalism" by which it trained new recruits.²

Having gotten used to thinking of the organization, and themselves, as "above" society, the military leaders apparently viewed reform as meant for the rest of society, with the military exempt from change. As the criticism of the military grew more heated, and as the debate over military reform enveloped more issues and larger parts of society, the military leadership increased its efforts to defend itself by using the heroic image of the military, another important element in neotraditionalism.

The heroic image of the military provided legitimacy for the organization to make demands on society and to elicit respect from citizens by providing a special image and role for the organization. By reinforcing this heroic image, which was also under attack by the reformers, the military leaders hoped to return the military to a position "above" reform and thereby validate their concept of the

¹Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev Discloses Details of Defense Council," Radio Liberty, Vol. 1: 37 (15 September 1989) 12.

²"Red Army Ordered by Moscow to Tighten Discipline, Shape Up," Washington Times, 17 October 1988, 9.

organization, an act which would also ensure their own positions of control. The leaders' use of the heroic image, whose message invoked the glorious and heroic tradition of the military and linked it to the family and national tradition, was intended as a message to military members. Through the heroic image, the leadership admonished servicemen to continue their selflessness by continuing to sacrifice themselves to the organization and its leadership. Their resort to the heroic image argument should not be viewed as a last-ditch effort by these leaders. Rather, the heroic image was likely perceived by them as an argument whose validity, in the tradition of militarized socialism, could hardly be questioned.

This message was delivered through a variety of media available to the powerful military leaders. Articles appeared in military journals and newspapers, all of which were intended to carry the words used by political officers for training and educating military members. The senior military leaders also used their resources to begin a new conservative newspaper meant to serve as a conduit for their arguments. Allied with authors such as Alexander Prokhanov and Karem Rash, senior officers delivered their messages to the ranks of the military.³ This chapter will continue with

³In his review of the military's participation in the August coup, Simon Kordonsky writes, "In the Soviet armed forces the structure of the state and its invariable qualities are highlighted because they are fixed in manuals and do not allow any deviation from the rigid system of ranks and positions. This structure, which allows the military to regard the civilian population as profane, is guarded by such authors as Prokhanov, Karem Rash and other bards of the Soviet Armed Forces." Simon

the examination of the neotraditional characteristics of the military by discussing the heroic image as debated by the liberalizers and the neotraditionalists. The majority of the chapter will concentrate on the neotraditionalists' efforts to shore up and defend the heroic image of the institution in an attempt to persuade officers to maintain the status quo and ensure the neotraditionalists' right to retain their power.

Gorbachev's Reforms and the Attack on the Heroic Image

As discussed in the previous chapter, the military became the object of criticism by at least 1987, when Gorbachev warned its leaders that it was not exempt from the changes Soviet society was then undergoing. One Soviet analyst believes that the Rust affair of May 1987, when Mathias Rust landed his small, rented airplane in the middle of Red Square with no challenge from the Soviet air defense forces, opened the door to further criticism of the military.⁴ This incident, which critics noted as a failure of the military to succeed in its job of defending the nation, led Yeltsin to accuse the air defense leadership of "bureaucratism, nepotism, personal capriciousness, and

Kordonsky, "Where was the Army?" New Times, No. 36, (10-16 September 1991) 12. The argument presented here is that the military sees not only the civilian population, but also those within the military who seek reform, as "profane."

⁴Larrabee, 1008.

cliquishness,"⁵ themes from the last chapter already familiar to the reader.

The changing international environment contributed to the bases for criticizing the military. The Soviet military's combat task of protecting the nation had been grounded in the experiences of the Civil War and World War I. As discussed in Chapter 2, the result of this process was "militarized socialism." The Stalin years and the experiences of World War II added to this concept, which in turn was emphasized further during the Brezhnev era of stagnation. This militarized socialism was played out in the military education and training of young children, who spent many hours of their school time drilling, learning about weapons, and reciting stories glorifying the victories of the Soviet military in World War II.⁶ With the advent of Gorbachev's reform program, however, the demilitarization of society began, and with it, a change in relations between the Soviet Union and other countries.

Gorbachev began by noting that Soviet foreign and security policy were political responsibilities, for which

⁵"Po zakonam vysokoi otvestvennosti," Krasnaia zvezda, 17 June 1987, quoted in Larrabee, 1010.

⁶Colonel Dremkov, in his complaint about those who attack the military and its traditions, tells about a letter he received on the theme of military socialization and training of young people: "A certain Dvoretiskii literally screams: 'I experienced all the charm of these military-patriotic measures on my own skin. In the first grade, in 1969, they forced us to walk in a line and yell the song of 'the young tankmen'. Even 20 years later, one still remembers with hatred 'military-patriotic measures' in the first grade.'" Sovetskii voin, No. 1 (January 1990) 4-5.

political and not military solutions should be found.⁷ His policy of reasonable sufficiency challenged the military's traditional concept of strength based on an overpowering military force. Gorbachev also entered into a new round of arms control measures, resulting in the signing of agreements to destroy intermediate-range nuclear weapons and actually allowing for inspection of Soviet military facilities for verification purposes, thus overcoming a roadblock in previous US-Soviet arms control negotiations. In 1988, he made a unilateral gesture toward greater US and Soviet arms control and diplomatic cooperation by announcing a cut of 500,000 Soviet troops.

These are only a few of the actions taken by Gorbachev which changed the international environment. In another act particularly important to Western governments, he announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan⁸ while also apparently rejecting the use of force as a means of controlling areas of Soviet interest. By word and deed,

⁷Gorbachev, 141. Gorbachev states that "The only way to security is through political decisions and disarmament."

⁸The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan also caused controversy within the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev's policy of openness allowed the subject to be more widely discussed in the media. What emerged from this openness was widespread condemnation of the Afghanistan invasion and concern for the fate of the "Afghantsi," veterans of the war. In his book on the Afghanistan war, Artem Borovik summarizes the meaning of the invasion for the Soviet people: "In Afghanistan we bombed not only rebel troops and caravans, but also our ideals. This war was the basis for reevaluating our values. Indeed in Afghanistan the ancient morality of the nation was in flagrant contradiction with the policy of the government. This could not go on any longer." Artem Borovik, Afganistan eshche raz pro voynu [Afghanistan: one more time about the war] (Moscow: International Relations, 1990) 17.

Gorbachev in essence gave the East European nations the signal which meant they were free to determine their own systems of government, ending the Soviet control over the region which the Brezhnev Doctrine had ensured.

Observed and discussed openly by Soviet citizens, Gorbachev's actions led many to question the "siege mentality" which was a part of militarized socialism. Where once the Soviets worried about being encircled by imperialist aggressors, now they found Western countries willing to discuss nuclear disarmament and build a McDonalds restaurant in downtown Moscow! As militarized socialism began to break down, "the very foundations of the 'besieged fortress' mentality [had] been undermined." As the same author noted in 1990, "[n]ot only is the 'enemy image' disappearing, but also the concept of confrontation between our society and the rest of the world....[T]he overwhelming majority of the Soviet population today perceive no real military threat and see no need for [defense] spending on the present level."⁹ As one participant in a roundtable discussion about the army and society stated,

If the army task is to strengthen our defence, then I would like to know who is threatening us. Who is the potential enemy whose image they're aiming at? Maybe the army as before adheres to the notorious thesis about the 'enemy's encirclement,' and considers everything

⁹Yuri Levada and Alexei Levinson, "Man With a Rifle: Pros and Cons," Moscow News, No. 36 (16-23 September 1990) 8-9.

is beyond our borders? The image-of-an-enemy-just-in-case, so to speak...? To my mind, it is difficult for the army to enter into an honest and open dialogue with society because it is in deep moral discomfort, to say the least. Instead of striving for purification and improvement, it is defending itself against any criticism.¹⁰

The conclusion of the authors of one article, like so many others voicing their concern about the military under perestroika, was that the army's prestige and social role needed to be reviewed by Soviet society, in fact "...the army must be able to serve society in a different way."¹¹

The Soviet Military Leadership Responds

As the Soviet military came under increasing criticism from Soviet citizens and military liberalizers, the senior military leadership found it necessary to protect their perception of the military by using the resources available to them in fighting back with an aggressive campaign intended to restore the heroic image of the military. The attempt to reinforce the idea that a significant threat to the Soviet Union still existed in the form of Western imperialism played a significant role in this campaign.

This idea is clearly presented by one participant in a roundtable discussion when he states, "[i]t's impossible not

¹⁰L. Saraskina in Roundtable "Army and Society" XX Century and Peace, No. 9 (1988) 19.

¹¹Ibid., 8-9.

to see that there are very influential forces in the West who continue to count on weapons in world politics....Today as before, military threat comes from the adventurist, militaristic policy of imperialist circles."¹² In the same discussion, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kokorin voiced a similar sentiment when he said that "...it is a reality that there are forces working for war. There are forces who, while speaking about new thinking, are clinging to SDI. Which of you sitting here rejects the fact of their existence?"¹³

Military leaders used the existence of Western military technology such as spy satellites and the stealth [nevidimka] bomber to demonstrate the continuing threat posed by the West.¹⁴ The approach of the neotraditionalists' is demonstrated in the words of General Colonel G.A. Stefanovski, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate, when he stated:

Today it is important not to fall into the error, the essence of which is the spent thesis that imperialism has changed, regenerated itself in the military plane, has become peace-loving. One would have to be completely blind not to see that with one hand imperialism is making peace-loving signs, but with the other it is signing orders for new

¹²General Major N. Chaldymov in Ibid., 19.

¹³Lieutenant Colonel A. Kokorin in Ibid., 21.

¹⁴"Utverzhdenie narodovlastiia," [Affirmation of the peoples' authority] interview with Admiral of the Fleet A. Sorokin, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 1 (January 1989) 10, (JPRS-UMA-89-010).

consignments of deadly weapons on
military programs.¹⁵

Again, the purpose of such discussion was to highlight the importance of the defense mission of the Soviet military and to demonstrate that this mission had not changed, that in fact it was as important as ever and therefore required the military to retain its importance and priority in Soviet society. Underlying this message to the public is one directly targeted at the officer corps, i.e., officers must maintain the discipline and obedience required by an organization still faced with an external threat.

The second theme in the leaderships' campaign was an attempt to remind the population of its links to the military. By doing so, the leadership hoped to demonstrate that the military could not be correctly singled out from the rest of society when assigning blame for its failures. This theme repeated again and again the same message: the army is part of society. It is found in such statements as "[t]he army, as noted as the Congress of People's Deputies - is the child of the Soviet people, and deserves all-around support."¹⁶

¹⁵General Colonel G.A. Stefanovskii, "Ot formalizma - k realiam zhizni," [From formalism - to real life], Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 12 (June 1990) 11, (JPRS-UMA-90-021).

¹⁶General Major V. Mal'kov, "Myslit' realistichno" [To think realistically] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 20 (October 1989) 44, (JPRS-UMA-90-006).

Closely linked with this message is the idea that the military is a part of Soviet history and tradition. As noted in Chapter 2, militarized socialism was embedded in the use of history and the military experiences of the nation. The struggles and victories of the nation, led by the armed forces, were an important part of the political culture built by the Communist Party. The importance of this theme to the Soviet military leadership can not be ignored. Indeed, as Hough notes, "[t]he ideology, the sense of national pride, the tradition of sacrifice - all of these not only drive the Soviet leaders, but they provide themes that can be used to appeal for support among the broader population...."¹⁷

The importance of history and tradition to the military is clearly presented in the material published by the military itself. As stated in a Soviet volume on military psychology

Revolutionary and military (combat) traditions are the leading ones among all traditions of the army and navy as a whole as well as of each military collective. Born in the class struggles of the revolutions, the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, they burn as an undying flame in our days, finding and contributing to the need of the younger generation to touch with their hearts the heroic events from the history of our people and its army. They bring those times closer and examine the people who amazed the world by the strength of their love for the Motherland, their valor and

¹⁷Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 13.

courage, and take from them the sacred flame of love for the Fatherland and their lessons of courage.¹⁸

Marshal Akhromeev used this same theme of history and tradition in his open letter to the editor of Ogonek (Korotich), who he blamed for unfairly criticizing the military. He noted that the military serves to protect the values of the nation. "What are these values?" Akhromeev asked. "They are love for the Motherland, devotion to her flag, courage, honor, dignity."¹⁹ Important to the debate over the military, according to Akhromeev, is history and tradition. "One other thing that has a direct relation to the army and navy - our relation to our past. The Armed Forces are the children of the people and the state and at the same time their defender."²⁰

All of these themes are used in a series of articles by Karem Rash in the military journal Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal which serves as the mouthpiece of the General Staff. The articles, under the title "The Army and Culture," are a series which appeared in seven issues of the journal. This

¹⁸V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotochkin, and K.K. Platonov, eds. Voennaia psikhologiya [Military Psychology] (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense Military Publishing House, 1972) 335, trans. and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force.

¹⁹Marshal S.F. Akhromeev, "Kakie vooruzhennye sily nuzhny sovetskomu soiuзу," [What kind of armed forces does the soviet union need] Ogonek, No. 50 (December 1989) 8.

²⁰Ibid., 7.

series and its length are unprecedented for this journal, illustrating the significance of the content and message for the General Staff. A series of this length must have been not only approved, but also actively endorsed by the General Staff, and its message therefore must have strongly reflected the current sentiments of the senior ranking officers in the armed forces. Rash is a leading pedagogue in the Soviet Union, serving as a member of the executive committee of the Children's Fund of the USSR and on the soviet of the Cultural Fund of the USSR, for which he heads the committee on the Lyceum²¹ program and leads the effort to create a council on "The Armed Forces and Culture."

The importance of Rash's work to the senior military leadership is made clear by the unprecedented publication of such a lengthy article and was further demonstrated in the introduction to the condensed version of the article published in Nash sovremennik in May 1990. The biographical introduction to this work noted "[t]he work of Rash 'Army and Culture,' was an event in the spiritual life of the army and navy and immediately became a reference book for officers."²² According to one letter to the editor in the journal XX Century and Peace, military editors instructed their staffs

²¹Rash's effort was aimed at reestablishing a school program in the Soviet Union based on the traditional Russian Lyceum format, which combined schooling with additional attention to military training.

²²Karem Rash, "Armiia i kul'tura," [The army and culture] Nash sovremennik, No. 5 (May 1990) 100.

that "...all officers must study the [Rash] article" and even implied that the senior military leaders had issued a similar order to officers at large.²³ This act can only be interpreted as an attempt by the neotraditionalists to halt military reform (and the loss of neotraditional power that would result) by reinforcing the indoctrination of officers in the neotraditionalists' perception of the military. Rash's importance to the military leadership was also demonstrated by the fact that he was a speaker at the first all-army Officers Assembly held in December 1989.²⁴

Rash and the military leadership also possessed strong connections to another writer, Alexander Prokhanov. Prokhanov serves as the editor of Den', a newspaper known for its conservative views. This newspaper, according to one of its past editorial board members, is an attempt to build a new center of Russian nationalism out of the communist center and as such, spreads the concepts of imperialism and Russian nationalism.²⁵ According to another leading newspaper, Den'

²³Captain Valery Dragun, "Militarism and Culture," Letter to the Editor, XX Century and Peace, No. 12 (1989) 13.

²⁴"Ofiterskoe sobranie," [The Officer Assembly] Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 3 (March 1990) 67.

²⁵S. Pybas, "Pochemu ia vyshel iz redkollegii gazeta 'Den'," [Why I left the editorial board of the newspaper Den'] Rossia, No. 40, 9-15 October 1991, 12. The questionable character of the newspaper and its editor (Prokhanov was linked to the Zavidiai firm, which was apparently indirectly involved in loaning the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party 3 million rubles interest-free) led the Russian Ministry of Press and Mass Information to withhold its official registration after the coup attempt. See the interview with M.A. Fedotov, head of the RSFSR Ministry of Press and Mass Information in "Zashchita poltoranina," [The Poltoranin defense] Rossiskaia gazeta, No. 1 (October 1991) 5. Poltoranin is Yeltsin's information minister and press

is actually funded by the Ministry of Defense, although it claims to be a literary newspaper. At its founding, the newspaper was supplied with furniture, "powerful computers" and a place in which to operate from by Minister of Defense Yazov and General of the Army Varennikov. The entire operation was reportedly veiled in secrecy.²⁶

In the final twist to the tale of the military leaders' activities, Rash is also a writer for Den'. It was in this newspaper that Rash published his famous "Conservative Manifesto," actually under the title of "We are free conservatives" [Svobodnye konservatory - my] which indicted all those against the conservative program and labelled them as "leftists," and foreshadowed the proclamations made by the putsch participants in August, 1991. This conservative program is defined by its dedication to patriotism and Russian nationalism and tradition. In the end, for Rash and all those dedicated to the conservative manifesto, all democrats are "leftists" with the goal of destroying the Union.²⁷

The military leaderships' relationship to Den' and its two key members Rash and Prokhanov illustrates the importance

spokesman. According to Den', it was eventually registered by the Ministry. "Tablo," [Notes] Den', 10 October 1991, 1.

²⁶Sergei Kiselev, "'Den' zakryt, vse ushli na putch," [Den' is closed, everyone has gone to the putsch] Literaturnaia gazeta, No. 34, 28 August 1991, 3.

²⁷Sabor, "Nashi pravye" Literaturnaia gazeta, 6.

they placed on using these mechanisms in their fight to maintain absolute authority. For this reason, the Rash series will be discussed at length in the following pages in order to demonstrate the approach used by the senior leadership.

Throughout the series Rash discusses the meaning and significance of the military in Soviet society. He also recognizes that there are a number of problems facing Soviet society and the military. He begins his discussion by establishing the historic and heroic role of the military in Russian and Soviet society. He does this first by invoking the memory of the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin. Pushkin attended the Tsar's Lyceum and actually began actively writing and publishing during his lyceum days. In his early works, influenced by this educational setting, Pushkin often idealized the military officer by portraying his dedication to the defense of Russia, and the honor, loyalty and duty embodied in the officer as the most noble traits that exist in mankind. It is this image that Rash is attempting to portray and defend in his articles, and which he uses in his attempt to convince military members that their sacrifices should continue. To this end, Rash continually refers to the need to return to a lyceum-type of educational system in order to properly inculcate the virtues of the officer into modern Soviet youth and society as a whole. This argument is meant as a rationale for why the

military officer should remain content with the status quo rather than seeking to reform the organization.

In his first article, Rash establishes the meaning of culture for the Soviet people. Again, he invokes the strong traditions found not in Soviet history, but in Russian history, which he believes is filled with the honor of defending one's homeland. To Rash, culture is patriotism and internationalism. It is a loyalty to one's mother and father, to one's birthplace and fatherland. It is "...truthfulness and civility, kindness and fearlessness...and even compassion...."²⁸ According to Rash, tradition is a precise, honorable and Russian word which is the foundation for culture.²⁹ Rash's primary theme in this article is that the Soviet army preserves the precious tradition of the Russian army and the officer corps.³⁰ There are two important conclusions to be gained through this argument. The first is that the army is a part of the political culture which extends beyond the period of Communist Party dominance. The second conclusion is that Russian nationalism is an important element in the army's history and therefore must be kept in mind by those who seek

²⁸Karem Rash, "Armiia i kultura," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, Vol. 2 (February 1989) 9. Future references to Rash's articles will include the volume number (all were published in 1989) and page reference.

²⁹Rash, Vol. 2, 8.

³⁰Rash, Vol. 2, 13.

to criticize the military. Both themes are discussed extensively by Rash in his work.

For Rash, tradition is memory, and memory is the "...air of culture and soul of the army."³¹ Rash then states an argument central to the neotraditionalists' concept of the military and frequently used in their defense of their perception of the institution, that the army is the flesh and blood of Soviet tradition.³² It is this idea, Rash believes, which must be remembered when addressing subjects such as Afghanistan. Why is this so important? Because in today's world, Rash explains, it is possible that these traditions have not been handed from father to son. In fact, there are a number of things which hamper today's youth from understanding tradition. For example, there is too much familiarity in modern Soviet society. To put it into a recognizable English idiom, "familiarity breeds contempt" rather than respect, and this familiarity is a danger in Soviet society.³³ The message in this discussion reflects the neotraditionalists' concern for perpetuating the current system of discipline and obedience.

Rash contends that all of Soviet society needs restructuring, by which he means a readjustment of values to reflect the importance of history, tradition, and the

³¹Rash, Vol. 2, 13.

³²Rash, Vol. 2, 15.

³³Rash, Vol. 2, 5.

military.³⁴ There is, above all else, a need to remember and salute heroes and the heroism of the Russian and Soviet soldier, because such heroism is the embodiment of culture and tradition. This memory is particularly important when one considers the treatment of heroes returning from Afghanistan. When Heroes of the Soviet Union Ruslan Aushev, V.S. Kot, V.E. Pavlov and A.E. Sliusar' arrived in Moscow there was no one there to meet them. Compare this, Rash notes with an almost underlying disgust, to the arrival of an Italian singer, who was met by reporters fighting to be the first to interview him.³⁵ Rash's point in this discussion is that there is something wrong with Soviet society when it fails to honor those who are its true heroes. He is asking, essentially, "where are our priorities?" His concern is that this type of behavior, pervasive in Soviet society, is setting a bad example for Soviet youth. They are turning away from their Motherland because they have inherited an undisciplined attitude from society. Young people do not need leisure time and television entertainment.

³⁴In his argument to restore society's values, even the Russian language needs to be rescued from the misuse it suffers, caused by consumer jargon [potrebitel'skii zhargon] and truncated television speech, among other things. Rash, Vol. 2, 8.

³⁵Throughout the series, Rash invokes the memory of great Russian generals such as Suvorov and Zhukov in an attempt to convince the military officer of his position separate from the rest of society. Rash, Vol. 2, 11. Rash relates a similar incident involving the death of Hero of the Soviet Union N.P. Kamanin, a General Colonel who led a detachment of cosmonauts. His obituary was not signed by the leaders of the government. In comparison, obituaries for a singer and an actress, people Rash considers of lesser stature in society than the General Colonel, were signed by the heads of government. Vol. 2, 12.

What they need to be healthy, according to Rash, "...is order, strictness, truth, brotherly kindness and help."³⁶ These are precisely the attributes which can be found in the military. Today's military officers understand their difficult mission and the need for discipline. It is the armed forces which is the embodiment of the country's tradition and culture and the country as a whole needs to recognize and remember this wealth of tradition, Rash contends.³⁷ Again, this provides the reason why Soviet society, and not the military, is the element in need of reform.

In his second article in the series, Rash discusses further the ideas of culture and tradition which he introduced in the preceding article. He begins this article with the statement "[l]ove toward one's army, loyalty to its traditions, is the most important feature of a healthy nation."³⁸ He then turns to a discussion of the importance of the family and the media in properly educating Soviet youth about the military and its honorable tradition. The army is important, he says, because it brings together all of the intellectual and productive power of the Fatherland.³⁹

³⁶Rash, Vol. 2, 13.

³⁷Rash, Vol. 2, 13-4.

³⁸Rash, Vol. 3, 3.

³⁹Rash, Vol 3, 3.

Rash explains that the military and its officers exhibit the most admired of human characteristics, possessing high moral and ethical standards. Military readiness is an important part of maintaining these standards, and must be displayed by both the military and society as a whole. He asserts that it is the responsibility of the press and television to maintain high moral and ethical standards in society by reminding the people of their heritage and traditions.⁴⁰ Rash even asserts that the military's (and society's) high standards are endangered by the lack of institutes and organizations which study military music!⁴¹

Today's Russian society lacks order and discipline according to the author.⁴² It is discipline which gives birth to freedom, and "without discipline there is no freedom. Disorder is chaos. Chaos is oppression. Disorder is slavery." But, notes Rash, "[t]he army is discipline."⁴³ It is important to understand this idea and to realize that the picture Rash is presenting is one in which military officers are of the highest prestige. But, as Rash explains, the officer corps can only fulfill its duties by being contented and fulfilled within their families because it is the family

⁴⁰Rash, Vol. 3, 6.

⁴¹Rash, Vol. 3, 7.

⁴²Rash, as so many other Russians in Soviet society, sees Russia as both the dominant force in and the prototypical culture for Soviet society.

⁴³Rash, Vol. 3, 7.

which provides a fortress against the world. Again, Soviet society is failing to maintain a strong family atmosphere. Families are too small and the number of abortions and orphans are too high, indicating a certain bankruptcy in the traditional, healthy concept of the Russian family and its meaning in society.⁴⁴

Rash concludes this section of the series by stating that Soviet society perhaps takes the military and its sacrifices too much for granted. This is too bad, according to the author, because only a strong and wise army can guarantee peace, and the protection such an army provides is even more significant during a time of change such as perestroika. Here Rash invokes the concepts of Russian Orthodoxy and ancient Russia, claiming the army is the backbone of these historical elements in an attempt to further define the significance of the army. The army embodies tradition in its protection of the state, and this is why the people are indebted to the army,⁴⁵ and why the role of the officer must continue unchanged by reform measures.

The last four parts of Rash's series build on the themes presented in the first two articles. Again their content concentrates on the Soviet Armed Forces, its role in Russian history, and the honor, tradition and discipline embodied in its ranks, particularly within the officer corps. In the

⁴⁴Rash, Vol. 3, 7-8.

⁴⁵Rash, Vol. 3, 10.

third article, Rash is particularly angered by the concept of mass culture which he believes is dangerous because it fails to perpetuate the traditions in Russian life. He is especially angered by leisure time spent with electronic amusement (TV. and radio) that, he believes, is not the sign of culture but of a "machine civilization" [mashinnaia tsivilizatsiia]. Such means of amusement breed stupidity, such as occurred during the period of stagnation "...which required for itself not only national recognition, but also laurels, and halos,"⁴⁶ i.e., false aggrandizement. Rash seems to imply that the officer corps should remain above mass culture, an idea which explains why the reformist ideas present in the media are not applicable to the military, i.e., the military is "above" these ideas.

The neotraditional message is one which emphasizes selflessness and self-sacrifice, used to convince officers that they should continue these actions because they serve society. Rash delivers this message through his discussion of the historical tradition of the military and heroism. Rash believes that all of Soviet society is indebted to the military, its sacrifices and losses incurred in the protection and defense of society. Indeed, Rash says, these losses were not in vain and society should ensure that the mothers of those lost in Afghanistan know that their sons

⁴⁶Rash, Vol. 4, 3.

died for the fatherland.⁴⁷ This is also why it is wrong that during the ten years Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, few articles appeared discussing the traditions of the military, its courage and honor. The tradition of the Soviet Army is based in a thousand years of Russian military tradition and the people should be proud of their military forces. Rash purposefully uses the name "Russian" [ruskii] and states that hopefully the people are "worthy" [dostoini] of this name.⁴⁸

Rash again asserts that Russia's great fatherland traditions are demonstrated when the army lives as one with the people.⁴⁹ There can be no love greater than that which is sacrificed for others. This is why all Soviets are called to serve the fatherland. A mercenary army, bought for its services, would be an injustice to society.⁵⁰ Such an army

⁴⁷Rash, Vol. 4, 5.

⁴⁸Rash, Vol. 4, 5. Rash explains that the veterans of Afghanistan consider themselves "...not only 'internationalists' [internatsionalisti], but above all 'patriots' [patrioti]. They were serving their country and should be treated with admiration and good will. He then returns to his attack of the movie industry by stating that it is difficult for the people to respect the army, the dignity of the soldier, the bearing, manners and military spirit of the soldier, when films portray a rude, slovenly image of the soldier. Again, such portraits are false and have a negative affect on relations between the military and society. In fact, Rash claims, researchers understand that the soldier's will and spirit are directly affected by his pride for his people and his country. Rash claims that the Soviets should not be disgusted with the bourgeois practice of indoctrinating their soldiers in a certain pride associated with the idea of a "victorious nation" [pobedonosnaia natsiia]. Rather, he states, the Soviets have always been inspired by love of the homeland. Even the enemy in Afghanistan can testify that the Russian soldier is the best in the world. Vol. 4, 6-7.

⁴⁹Rash, Vol. 4, 7.

⁵⁰Rash, Vol. 4, 7.

would not be a part of the historical traditions of Russia. Rather, an army is to be admired. As Lenin explained, an army exists for the protection of the revolution. "The army is a defender and not a burden to the people. The army is indissoluble with the people." And the might of the army is the officer corps. This is even recognized by other countries, who value their armies not according to salaries or equipment, but by the qualities of the officers.⁵¹

Rash believes that only by understanding these concepts and the thousand year tradition of the army can one address what needs to be done to improve both society and the army. The young soldiers who served in and returned from Afghanistan are the best to be found among today's Soviet young people. They, and the officers of the army, are the ones who have sacrificed and they are the ones who should lead the restructuring of Soviet society. Rather than ridiculing or criticizing the military, which again is counter to the great traditions of Russia and her military heritage, Soviet society should step back and be led by the military.⁵² He concludes this segment of the series by stating that the success of perestroika is dependent on rebuilding the correlation between discipline, will and honor

⁵¹Rash, Vol. 4, 8.

⁵²As a part of Rash's emphasis on ancient Russia and her historical traditions, he includes a guided tour of Moscow in his discussion, pointing out memorials and historical sites and tying their significance to the military memories and heritage which are a part of her military culture. Rash, Vol. 4, 9.

and must be accomplished by considering society's traditions and history.⁵³ This correlation is obviously meant to impress upon military officers their subordination to their superiors.

In the next two sections of the series, Rash continues his discussion of the military and its historical Russian tradition. He turns particularly to the issue of socialization and the education of young people in the Soviet Union. He is especially concerned with the role the pedagogue plays in the proper upbringing of the nation's youth. His portrait of the armed forces takes on an almost holy image, drawing a parallel between the ancient role of the church as an important instrument for alarming the people to danger, and the military, whose role it is to guard and protect the traditions of the people. Again, this responsibility simply can not be bought. Rather, it is one, similar to priestly duty, for which army officers possess a special calling.⁵⁴

Implicit in this discussion is the idea that Soviet society and its youth, not the military, need the fixes addressed by reform. The military should maintain the status quo of discipline and obedience because these are the exemplary values which should be copied by others. This is why the army should set the example for the rest of society.

⁵³Rash, Vol. 4, 12-3.

⁵⁴Rash, Vol. 5, 3-4.

For Rash, the army is like a school. It teaches what is important in Russian history and culture. The officer is a pedagogue and, Rash believes, is a good example for all teachers to follow. Children in Soviet society need to be taught about Russian history. Their educators should not use an "assembly line" [konveir] approach to education, but rather should have the attitudes of the army and should stress in school the relationship between Soviet society and the military.⁵⁵

Through his discussion, Rash validates Bolshevism as an element of military heritage. This also provides the justification for militarized socialism and the principles of centralism and edinonachalie adapted from Bolshevism. No one could provide a better example of the true meaning of Bolshevism than Zhukov. He was truly a hero of the people and all those who have served the country, including the "Afghanists," who Rash asserts are truly the children of Zhukov.⁵⁶ It is Zhukov who should be used as an example for

⁵⁵Rash, Vol. 5, 9. The family is also important in the upbringing of children. The father sets the example and is the basis for the family. He perpetuates the heritage of his nation. In what is an interesting digression from his discussion on the family, Rash states that one danger to Soviet pedagogy is that there are too many female teachers. Vol. 5, 10. In this section Rash also discusses the importance of military traditions, drawing a parallel between the memorials to the nation's culture and the traditions within the military and noting that both must be protected and perpetuated. He admonishes young soldiers to show proper respect for military traditions, and asserts that it is necessary for the nation to rebuild important Russian military monuments in order to return the military to its position of national honor. Rash, Vol. 5, 6-7.

⁵⁶Rash, Vol. 7, 3.

the children of the Soviet Union. Again, pedagogues and their role in the socialization of young people are of the most importance in maintaining the standards of historic Russia. The revolution occurred so that children could study and improve themselves. These are the children of the future officer corps and the proper upbringing of these children is the most important job in the country. "The pedagogue is the central figure in school, just as the officer is in the army and the navy."⁵⁷

Again, Russia and its history, according to the author, are enveloped in traditions, and tradition is remembering. Remembering, in turn, is the air (the thing which keeps traditions alive) of the human spirit, of school, the army and the family.⁵⁸ The media and television play an important role in perpetuating these traditions and in providing the proper examples for the education of young people. This is important because, again, Russians must understand their traditions in order to properly understand and respect their military.

Rash's theme in the sixth part of the series is the role the military plays as the preeminent element in society. Again, this echoes the ideas of militarized socialism and sets the military above society and therefore above reform.

⁵⁷Rash, Vol. 7, 7. The pedagogue should set the example for his students, understanding and respecting Russian history and the military tradition, especially its officer corps. Vol. 7, 8.

⁵⁸Rash, Vol. 7, 9.

Rash turns to the subjects of Stalin, Trotsky and the GULAG. He believes that both Stalin and Trotsky were in essence criminals, responsible for the bad things in Soviet society, such as the prison (GULAG) system. His purpose in this discussion is to compare these two people, one could interpret them as "negative" elements in Soviet society, to the hero Zhukov. He explains that from 1925 to 1941 there was essentially no officer corps in the Soviet army. In fact, he explains that Stalin destroyed the officer corps in an arbitrary manner, punishing those who had faithfully served their country. But fortunately, there continued to be people like Zhukov, who maintained their standards and who were willing to serve.⁵⁹ By 1943, Zhukov was able to effectively lead the battle against Nazi Germany. The Victory Parade in Red Square was really Zhukov's parade, and Rash claims that Zhukov's star had even eclipsed Stalin's, giving rise to the man who would save Russia from her enemies and even, eventually, from Stalinism.⁶⁰

The discussion in this section of the series is an indictment of Stalin and Trotsky, and an indictment of Soviet society in that these people were a part and product of Soviet society. In contrast, it is a speech supporting the rehabilitation of Zhukov, based on the idea that Zhukov was a product of everything good in society as found in the army.

⁵⁹Rash, Vol. 8, 7-9.

⁶⁰Rash, Vol. 8, 6.

It was Zhukov who rescued the people and society. Heroes such as Frunze, Muromets and Zhukov, i.e., people who fight for the country and what they believe, are the true heroes of Russia, and this needs to be remembered by society.⁶¹

In the final section of the series, Rash continues his discussion of the importance of the military and the education of young people. He condemns the belief, popular especially among youth in Soviet society at the time, that Western ideas and ways are good. He returns to the proud tradition of the army which he contends shows the military "...demonstrates the very highest citizen valor and purity."⁶² What is important to Rash in this discussion is that a professional army deters such citizen qualities, and he points out that a mercenary army is the antithesis of the idealism which is "true culture" [podlinnaia kul'tura].⁶³ Again, Rash contends "[i]n the end we can fulfill our internationalists duty only by having preserved loyalty to our national traditions. Officers must be the guardian of memories...."⁶⁴ Rash briefly discusses the formation of the Officers Assembly, which he contends was introduced "...as a saving measure against 'overheating' [perekalivaniia]" and notes that it is meant to gauge the feelings of the officer

⁶¹Rash, Vol. 8, 11-3.

⁶²Rash, Vol. 9, 7.

⁶³Rash, Vol. 9, 13.

⁶⁴Rash, Vol. 9, 11.

corps, and to promote their work and help with the task of indoctrination.⁶⁵

Rash makes two interesting points in this final section of the article. The first is made during his discussion about his experiences in working with orphans and young people. In lamenting the absence of tradition and culture in their lives, which occurs because no one is there to teach them about such things, he notes that these young people are left to their own devices and become "self-directed" [samoupravlenie]. Most importantly, Rash notes, such self-direction "does not exist in nature" where one experiences rather "cooperative (or collective) direction" [so-upravlenie].⁶⁶ The emphasis placed on this point, with the bold lettering of the word for cooperative direction, undoubtedly is an attempt to stress the role of socialization as a method by which a mass of individuals is formed into a collective identity (the "kollektiv" in common Soviet discourse) which shares a common history and cultural traditions. It is also meant as a warning to servicemembers to obey their commanders rather than take personal initiative or individually outspoken positions on issues such as reform.

The second particularly interesting point made by Rash in this section is his highly nationalistic discussion of the "true Russians" [pravorossy]. This ancient word, according

⁶⁵Rash, Vol. 9, 6.

⁶⁶Rash, Vol. 9, 3.

to Rash, is derived from the word "true" [priamoi] and "...meant 'pure' [chisty], 'just' [pravednyi], 'truthful' [pravdivyi], 'right' [pravyi]" and is applied to the three ethnic groups of Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians.⁶⁷ It is this group, those who are Orthodox,⁶⁸ whose history and tradition are those about which Rash speaks so extensively. And it is this group who make up the majority of the officer corps, and therefore are the target of Rash's message.

These articles must be seen as a response to the wave of criticism aimed at the military, and as an attempt to shore up the military by reinforcing its image within society, but even more so among its own members. They are full of emotion, and seek to remind the Soviet officer of the good, honorable and heroic tradition embodied in the Soviet armed forces. Rash is basically saying that although there may be some problems with the military, it is Soviet society which has lost its direction and requires restructuring. The Soviet people need to remember their historical traditions and the pride they derive from these traditions. And of course, at the center of these traditions and what has provided the basis of Soviet values and has protected these values through the centuries is the army.

⁶⁷Rash, Vol. 9, 4.

⁶⁸Rash, Vol. 9, *passim*, see especially 4-6. Rash uses the ancient word for Orthodoxy, pravoslavnyi, which can also be translated as "true Slav."

Rash's article could be interpreted as another conservative, old-fashioned diatribe in defense of the armed force. He is obviously stating simply "do not blame the military for the problems in our society, blame yourselves!" Yet, to stop at this simple interpretation of Rash's presentation fails to consider the deeper indignation he is voicing and ignores for whom he is voicing these concerns. Rash is incensed that some military reformers, and those in the media whose role he states is to support and defend the values of society, attack or ridicule the military and its leaders. Why would this evoke such an emotional reaction from the author? Because he, as the spokesman of the senior members of the officer corps whose concerns he is voicing, interprets such attacks as assaults on their basic values and their concept of the military as an organization. These officers are portraying the acts of serving one's country, defending one's people, as the most holy sacrifice one can make, and this is why officers should continue to make such sacrifices, including the ultimate sacrifice of obeying their leaders no matter what changes society is undergoing. This point is illustrated by Rash's use of historical, traditional and religious allegories to envelope his presentation.

Rash is reflecting the opinion of the senior officer corps, who believe that the country exists today because of the sacrifices of the military. Such sacrifices can be seen throughout the history of Russia, and this is what makes the

Russian people and its culture the one which has withstood attacks by enemies through hundreds of centuries, not just the decades since 1917. Rash's use of the ancient terms "Rus," "pravorossy" and "pravoslavnyi" is meant to invoke not just history, but the deeper meaning of a people whose roots are based on a strong and proud ancient tradition, molded in large part by the military experiences of these people. In this context, Rash's article is akin to Russian chauvinism, yet according to Rash this would be acceptable and correct because it is the Russian officer corps which has bought all of Russia (and therefore all people of the Soviet Union) its freedom, glory and international standing by sacrificing their lives. Similarly, Rash's references to historical figures are not a superficial attempt to remind the population of their heritage. Rash invokes these heroes purposefully because they are the nation's and the military's ethos. Who can be more revered in Russian and Soviet society than the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin? Who else could rival the unforgettable image of Stalin as the leader of a victorious nation in World War II and since discredited by Gorbachev's reform policies, than the man who actually fought and won the war, Zhukov? These heroes are not mere men, products of Russian society, but saviors and the soul of society.

Similarly, Rash's use of religious symbols and references are attempts to emphasize the meaning of serving

in the military. Military service, he asserts, is similar to priestly service. What could be more pure, more self-sacrificing than such service? Icons and cathedrals exist as tributes to great battles, victories and military leaders. They exist to remind the people of the sacrifices made to secure their culture and way of life. How could anyone attack such revered and holy ideas? Only an officer or citizen who has lost control, whose values are bankrupt would do such a thing. And this is why Rash and the senior officer corps is incensed by attacks on the military. Through Rash, the military leadership is saying that when you attack the military, you attack what is true, good and above reproach in Soviet society. When you attack the military, you are demonstrating that you have lost those values, based in your traditions and heritage, which we are, and have been through history, fighting to protect and maintain. When you attack the military, you are attacking your culture's best, the true ethos of your society. Such attacks are unwarranted, almost blasphemous, and even more, they are misplaced because they are a symptom and not a cure for what needs to be done in today's Soviet society. The military, Rash is asserting, has remained true to the people, and the reformers need to remember this. This is why the military's leaders respond with indignation to such attacks and this indignation is, according to Rash, correctly felt.

The message that he delivered for the senior military leadership was one that attempted to both defend and bolster the military's heroic image. What is important about this message is that, if successfully delivered, it would have ensured the neotraditionalists continued control over the organization. By saying that the officer corps is a leading element in society, it also implies that the leaders of the officer corps are logically above reproach. How could a Soviet officer question the integrity and mission of a hero such as Zhukov? And, based on the same logic, how can the leadership of the senior officer corps, equivalent to Zhukov's position, be attacked by its subordinates? The logic of such an argument is clear: we are justified in our power and its use in controlling the organization, and history and tradition obligates you, the military officer, to continue your subordination and obedience to our command positions.

The Senior Leadership and Its Allies

The senior military leadership, realizing the factional breakdown of its own organization, had turned to tactics which were both within their means and readily accessible in their attempt to defeat their attackers. The first of these was to publicize their message, one which would find some support within society and serve as a lesson to the officer corps, in the media in which they had ready access. Rash's

message is filled with ideas mirroring militarized socialism and Russian nationalism. Both of these concepts are characterized by the control which they signify; militarized socialism provides for military dominance of society, and nationalism signifies the Russian dominance of the nation. In the Soviet Union, each is assured through the centralization of the state, which has historically guaranteed that this control remains unquestioned.⁶⁹

For the Soviet military leadership, the next logical tactic in their attempts to maintain the status quo was to ally with other groups who also sought to ensure control through the continued centralization of the state and the dominance of Russian (or at least Slavic) nationalism. The primary group established for these purposes and serving as a challenge to Gorbachev's reforms is the group Soyuz, translated as Union. This group was founded in the fall of 1989 by Lieutenant Colonel (and People's Deputy) Viktor

⁶⁹Even before the Union Treaty, the power of the generals gained by the principles of centralism and unity of command had been challenged. This was done by Gorbachev when he issued a decree in June 1991 on the "military councils" [voennye sovety]. The councils had already been in existence for 33 years, but Gorbachev's decree placed the councils, responsible for coordinating civil-military relations, under the administrative command of political leaders of the territories under which the military units fell. The chain of command for the military councils was then placed within the country's political administrative chain of command, with Gorbachev as the President of the USSR the ultimate political authority over the councils. Before this decree, the councils ultimately reported to the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. See "Voennye sovety: novye usloviia - novaia rol'" [The military councils: new condition - new role] Krasnaia zvezda, 2 July 1991, 1. This action must have been seen by the neotraditionalists as a direct attack on their authority and control, with the Union Treaty the final coup de grace in this attack.

Alksnis. By December 1990, the date of the 28th Party Congress, Soyuz had grown in membership and claimed 478 members in the 2,250 member Congress of People's Deputies.⁷⁰ The basic idea behind the group is "...all-state centrism." According to its founder, Soyuz "...should save the Union as a state. If we don't stop the perilous degradation we'll be plunged into civil war. A nation-wide salvation committee is the way to do it."⁷¹ Although he states that the group is not interested in ideological debate and actually favors reform of the country, Alksnis maintains that the primary interest of the group is to retain a strong, central state. The concern about the disintegration of the union had also been voiced by military leaders in their discussions of the Gorbachev reforms.⁷² According to Colonel Nikolai Petrushenko, another founding member of Soyuz who is also a People's Deputy, "Soyuz's tactics toward Gorbachev are to push him to resolute and tough measures with the aim of preserving the union." Petrushenko states further, "[t]he No. 1 opponent of Soyuz is Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin."⁷³

⁷⁰John-Thor Dahlburg, "Gorbachev 'Irresolute,' Soviet Rightists Charge," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1990, A4.

⁷¹Teplyakov, "New Arms for the Army!" MN, No. 6 (1991) 7.

⁷²See for example General Colonel I. Rodionov, "What Must Happen?" Moscow News, No. 33 (26 August - 2 September 1990) 6.

⁷³Elizabeth Shogren, "Kremlin's Rightist Tilt Can Be Linked to Soyuz," The Los Angeles Times, 26 February 1991, H6.

The clearest illustration of their concern was voiced by Soyuz in its protests over the Union Treaty, initiated by Gorbachev as an attempt to de-centralize the state by providing power to the republics. This treaty, according to Soyuz, was handled in an anti-constitutional manner when it was proposed that it be forwarded to the republics for approval before being discussed by the Supreme Soviet.⁷⁴ Soyuz opposed the treaty because it had "...a confederative nature and [would] lead to the state's disintegration."⁷⁵ A strong, centralized state would ensure the military's continued cohesiveness and provide the basis for the senior military leadership's control over the institution. Clearly, it was in their interest to ally with a group promoting these ideas and to actively resist any policies of de-centralization which could jeopardize their power.

Soyuz was not alone in its approach to the changes in the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet newspaper Literaturnaia gazeta, in February, 1991, a conference of "social-political" and "national-patriotic" groups such as "Unity" [Edinstvo] and "Fatherland" [Otechestvo] met along with party leaders and deputies of the group Soyuz (26 groups in total were supposedly in attendance) to form a unified front in an effort to re-establish a centralized government

⁷⁴"Soyuz Group Issues Statement on Union Treaty," FBIS-SOV-91-112, 11 June 1991, 40.

⁷⁵"Soyuz Group To Demand Vote on Union Treaty," FBIS-SOV-91-136, 16 July 1991, 50.

and put a halt to the changes occurring in the country. In April, the leaders of Soyuz called for putting an end to the activities of all political parties, disbanding the most radical parties and establishing control over the press, radio and television. They called for a return to a market system, but their ideal model for such a system was the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime of Pinochet's Chile.⁷⁶

The person selected to oversee the united front formed in February was an individual already familiar to the reader, Alexander Prokhanov. Prokhanov is known as a "prolific writer on military themes" who had enjoyed the patronage of the military's Main Political Administration."⁷⁷ Prokhanov had written an article in 1990 defending the army against criticism and stating that its attackers were trying to destroy the army as "...the last bulwark of centralism, the last receptacle of the people."⁷⁸ Prokhanov's position on the military is clearly indicated by the following passage from the article.

Only the army in the condition of civil chaos will in strength save them [the nation's citizens], to preserve a catalyst for future actions, to defend

⁷⁶Aleksandr Sabov, "Nashi pravye," [Our rights] Literaturnaia gazeta, No. 34, 28 August 1991, 3, 6.

⁷⁷Bruce D. Porter, "The Military Abroad: Internal Consequences of External Expansion," in Soldiers and the Soviet State, ed. by Gustafson and Colton, 326.

⁷⁸Alexander Prokhanov, "Zametki konservatora," [Notes of a conservative] Nash Sovremennik, No. 5 (1990) 95.

their values and what is sacred, so that when misfortune passes, they can be returned to life. The army should be prepared for this role, to realize it, to stop attending only to military matters, and directly insert itself in the social-political process, declaring to the people that it is ready to fulfill the saving, national mission.⁷⁹

It is this type of position which undoubtedly earned Prokhanov the chairmanship of the Writers' Union council to the Officers Assembly⁸⁰ and served as the basis of cooperation between the military leadership and the newspaper Den'.

The Liberalizers' Response

The efforts of the senior military leaders, especially Rash's series of articles, did not go unnoticed by the reformers of the army and society. These people immediately denounced such efforts as militaristic and inappropriate, based on the changes in foreign and domestic policy then being executed in the country. As one young officer noted, Rash's militarism was inappropriate for the contemporary world in which force and violence were no longer seen as a means for solving international political problems.⁸¹

⁷⁹Ibid., 97.

⁸⁰See Valeri Danilov, "Pena," [Foam] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 8 (April 1990) 77, which discusses the formation of this council at the initiative of the Writers' Union, (JPRS-UMA-90-022).

⁸¹Dragun, "Militarism and Culture," XX Century and Peace, No. 12 (1989) 13.

A major critique of Rash's articles was published by Ogonek. It noted that Rash glorified the military while also ignoring the loss of lives and material wealth brought about by the military.⁸² The author also questions officers' abilities to serve as the ideal for pedagogues, when their specialty is military tactics and associated skills, and not things needed by young people in school. Further, Rash shows that he is a Stalinist, and an admirer of emperors, tsars and all-powerful rulers who control the population and events in their countries. The critique questions the idea that the military is the educator of young people, and states that this is not the military's function. In the end, according to Ogonek, Rash is simply an example of "militaristic thinking" [militaristskye myshlenie]. Such thinking is dangerous and illustrates that the domestic militarists are troubled by events in the Soviet Union. "Before, economic, political and social life were subordinated to militarism." Now however, the militarists, contrary to their opinion that the military is being discredited, are being confronted with the fact that "times change and the military should be exclusively an instrument of state policy."⁸³

A similar indictment of Rash and the militaristic position he represented was made after his speech at the 1st

⁸²Nikolai Andreev, "Obyknovennyi rashizm," [The usual Rashism] Ogonek, No. 8 (February 1990) 8.

⁸³Ibid., 9.

all-army Officers Assembly. According to Major V.N. Lopatin, "...the high command staff of the Armed Forces is trying to ideologize the concept of the impossibility of transferring the army to the channel of ordinary democratic change."⁸⁴ Lopatin contends that this was the point of Rash's speech to the assembly, in which he compared officers "to pedigreed dogs" [c porodistymi sobakami] who live by orders. In Lopatin's interpretation of the analogy, the point of this comparison was a form of reprimand to the officers:

Don't think to criticize your commander, because only a toady or a mob can dare such criticism, but a real soldier or citizen would never subject to doubt the correctness of his commander's actions.⁸⁵

Such a proclamation, according to Lopatin, turns everything "from toe to head and it appears that a servile psychology of submission demonstrates a pledge of the confirmation of order."⁸⁶

Discussing the same matter again in August, Lopatin states that "[s]imilar appeals to replace the army's democratization with its 'militarization' and to continue to suffer the arbitrariness and serfdom in the Armed Forces go against the majority of the personnel and society, linked to

⁸⁴"Kakaia armia nam nuzhna," Ogonek, No. 9 (February 1990) 29.

⁸⁵Ibid., 29.

⁸⁶Ibid., 29.

the army in thousands of ways."⁸⁷ The situation of increased militarism in the face of democratization called for a careful evaluation of the army to find out the truth about its capabilities and in order to properly diagnose its problems, followed by a decision on the course of treatment necessary to heal the army's ills. Finally, as Lopatin states,

Essentially, there are two conflicting tendencies in the Soviet Armed Forces: democratic vs. totalitarian tendencies. To talk about a 'monolithic unity' would be wishful thinking. There is no unanimity either horizontally or vertically. There are some generals (the minority so far) who share our views and support a radical reform and taking the army out from under the party's control. But the strongest democratic sentiment is among the middle and junior officers.⁸⁸

Summary and Conclusion

The senior leadership reacted to the criticisms of the military, which they viewed as an open attack on the institution and their control over it, by turning to the heroic image of the military in the hope that this would reassert their absolute authority and halt the threats to that control. Their use of the heroic image in appealing to their military subordinates and the general Soviet population was not simply "the use of trite ideological rhetoric and

⁸⁷Vladimir Lopatin, "Whose Side Will Be (sic) the Army On?" Letters to the Editor, Moscow News, No. 32, 19-26 August 1990, 10.

⁸⁸Ibid., 10.

patriotic appeals to gain support for its position..." which constituted "years of bureaucratic conditioning."⁸⁹ Rather, the meaning of their efforts reflects something much deeper than just bureaucratic conditioning. It reflects their attempts to maintain absolute authority and their rightful control over the organization on which they believed the nation depended. They promulgated this message by taking advantage of the control mechanisms which they still possessed, in the form of money and influence. However, these efforts drew additional criticisms from the reformers, and the position of the senior leadership was labeled as a return to "militaristic thinking" which was seen as identical to the militarized socialism which served as a source for many of the country's problems.

The two sides in the military had clearly established their positions and demonstrated the tactics they would use to fight the battle. For the senior military leaders, who sought to maintain their control over the military, control provided access to media coverage of their position, to money to facilitate the spread of this position, and to like-minded organizations and individuals who were both willing and dedicated to fighting for their common interests. Only the splits within the military hampered their use of total control over it.

⁸⁹Kerry L. Hines and Susan E. Springer, "The Soviet Army to the Year 2000," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 3: 2 (June 1990) 239.

For the liberalizers, the battle to break the control of the generals and return the military to a professional position in the state was facilitated by the current atmosphere in the Soviet Union. Openness provided a forum for debate over military issues and ensured that their side would be heard. In addition, the positions of the young officers were shared by a number of people in important positions, along with a large portion of the population, who saw the leaderships' absolute authority as anathema to a professional military, and a holdover of the Stalinist authoritarian command system. Their complaints and criticisms were not about the heroism of the military, its importance in Russian and Soviet tradition, or the role of the military as an important part of state policy. Rather, the concerns this group voiced were about the misuse of nationalism and military heroism by the leadership as a means for their continuing control of the institution, a control which they believed was actually harmful to the military.

CHAPTER 5

THE DEBATES OVER REFORM: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND DEPARTYIZATION OF THE MILITARY

The differences between the liberalizers and the neotraditionalists over military reform were clearly advanced over the two issues of professionalization of the military, i.e., ending the conscript system and going to a career, volunteer force, and the departyization of the military, i.e., removing the Communist Party organizations from military units and ending the parallel Party structure in the military administered by the Main Political Directorate. The two sides verbalized their differing concepts of the military through the debates over these two issues.

The neotraditionalists clung to the status quo in their attempt to maintain their positions of control over the organization, which were facilitated by maintaining a pliable, conscript army in which soldiers learned to accept a position of obedience. Professionalization would require the military to entice people into becoming officers and to offer incentives for them to continue service. It would signal the end of the leaderships' ability and right to dictate every aspect of a serviceman's life.

The existence of the party organizations within the military were also elements of neotraditional control. They served to educate and indoctrinate military members into the militarized socialism which included the heroic image of the military and assured inculcation of the superior-subordinate relationship. In addition, the party organizations provided a reinforcing mechanism for the commander in his role as the sole possessor of authority in the military unit. Both of these roles were used by the senior leadership in their propagation of the articles by Karem Rash, a supporter of the neotraditionalists discussed in the previous chapter. Political educators were instructed to lead discussions based on the ideas contained in the Rash series, with the hope that the message of obedience and subordination contained in these articles would be absorbed and accepted by more junior officers. In the absence of the political organs, these messages of the senior leaders could not be delivered. Departyization would take away the voice of these leaders.

On the other side of the debate, the liberalizers saw the conscript army as an inefficient fighting force whose members possessed no legal rights. Service members were not motivated to serve or perform well, and the continual rotation of conscripts prevented service personnel from achieving the level of expertise needed to ensure the military was effective with modern, high-technology weaponry. The party organizations, too, were seen as detrimental to the

military's ability to perform its mission. They consumed inordinate amounts of time in their indoctrination and propagandizing efforts. They were also seen as accomplices in the commander's frequent misuse of edinsonachalie.

This chapter will examine the debates between the two sides over these two issues. As will be demonstrated, the two sides' positions on these issues echo the arguments discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. For the senior military leadership, the heroic image of the military played an important part in their defense of universal military service, the continued existence of party organizations in the armed forces and their maintenance of absolute power. For the reformers, the abuses of control performed by the leadership were facilitated by universal military service and the presence of party organizations. Therefore, ending these two phenomena would be a decisive step in their attempt to return personal pride to their profession and to build an effective and efficient military organization.

The Debate Over Professionalization of the Military¹

The debate over the structure of the military, as stated by Hines and Springer, was not simply "...a confrontation between hawks and doves. Rather, the primary issues appear to be more concerned with the special status and role of the military within Soviet society and present a good example of Gorbachev's avowed aim of stimulating reform simultaneously from above and below."² However, it must also be seen as a debate between two groups who possessed vastly different

¹The debates over the reform of the military have also included arguments over the national form the military should take, and some reformers have suggested that a territorial militia would better serve the interests of security. The most familiar proponent of this formation is Lieutenant Colonel Savinkin, whose article in Moscow New caused quite a controversy among both military reformers and the traditionalists of the armed forces. According to Savinkin, the new territorial militia system would make it possible "...to do away with the over-centralized and cumbersome administrative-command control system. It could be replaced with a flexible control structure based on scientific analysis, automation and elements of public control and self-management. The direct linkage between the armed forces and all strata of Soviet society would be strengthened." Savinkin also contends that this is the type of professional force which Lenin had intended to introduce as the best system for the country. See Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Savinkin, "What Kind of Armed Forces Do We Need?" Moscow News, No. 45, 13-20 November 1988, 6. Savinkin's suggested system has been widely rejected by the senior military leaders, who see it "...as unsuited to the complexities of modern warfare; as divorced from the country's real military needs; as likely to lower military preparedness and disrupt the local economies; and as undermining the goal of social integration in a multinational state." Holloway, 17. General of the Army Varennikov "...stressed that the main argument against these proposals...is the continued Western threat, which can be countered only by a united Soviet Armed Forces. It would be more complicated and more expensive for national armies to accomplish this task." General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, "From the History of the Creation and Training of National Military Formations," Voyennaya mysl', No. 2 (1990) 12-13, cited in Robert L. Arnett and Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Restructuring the Armed Forces: The Current Soviet Debate," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Vol. 3: 2 (June 1990) 204-5. As the reader will note, these arguments closely parallel those used by the neotraditionalists in arguing against the professionalization of the military.

²Hines and Springer, 243.

attitudes toward the organization, reflected in their different interpretations of the relationship between society and the military. The Soviet military has been based on a conscript army since its earliest days and, as Ellen Jones points out, the idea of conscription predates the Bolshevik Revolution.³ At various times, some groups, particularly university students, earned an exemption from military service.⁴ Party and military leadership have both emphasized the importance of military service as a patriotic duty of Soviet citizens, and their arguments against organizing a volunteer force reflect this belief. This patriotic duty includes not only defending the country against aggression, but also preventing counter-revolution in the USSR and aiding in the building of socialism in other countries, a task which is defined as the "internationalist" duty of Soviet citizens.⁵

The belief that the nation still faces external threats, an argument which was discussed in relation to the military's heroic image in Chapter 4, was one aspect of Soviet

³Jones, 33.

⁴For a time, university students were exempted from service. This policy ended with the events in Afghanistan, only to be controversially reversed again under Gorbachev.

⁵See for example Colonel P. Skorodenko, "V tseliakh zashchity sotsializma" [For the purposes of defending socialism] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 19 (October 1989), 19-20, in which he states that the military is committed to fighting a counter-revolution, to fighting the exploitative classes, and to aiding other countries in building socialism, a purpose for which Soviet troops were used in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

patriotism. In his interview in Sovetskaia rossia, Marshal Akhromeev again points to the US and Western threat to the USSR. According to Akhromeev, "[t]he present leaders of the administration of the USA and the Pentagon month after month repeat, that they are carrying out relations toward the Soviet Union by a policy of strength."⁶ He argues that the presence of US forces in foreign countries illustrates the continuing aggressive nature of the country, and therefore the threat to the Soviet Union. "Using these very military formations, the USA carries out a policy of strength in relations toward the Soviet Union...."⁷ Because of this threat, all citizens should be prepared to defend their homeland [Rodina]. For this reason the emergence of "volunteers for pay" [volonterov na zarplate] is unacceptable and even serves as a breach of social justice.⁸ The idea that all citizens are obligated to defend the country has been used by some in their efforts to discredit the actions already taken, i.e., the deferment of students granted in 1989. In his discussion of the deferments, General Boyko

⁶Stanislav Konsterin, interview with Marshal S.F. Akhromeev in "Armiia i perestroika," [The army and perestroika] Sovetskaia rossia, No. 12, 14 January 1989, 1. Akhromeev made a similar argument in his open letter to the editor of Ogonek in which he stated that the history of the USSR is filled with constant threats of war, that the US and its NATO allies are still a threat to the country, and that unlike the US and Great Britain who are separated by from their enemies, the Soviet Union must be constantly ready to fight because its enemies are close in proximity. See Marshal S.F. Akhromeev, "Kakie vooruzhennnye sily nuzhny sovetskomu soizu" Ogonek, No. 50 (December 1990) 6-7.

⁷Ibid., 3.

⁸Ibid., 3.

argues that the action favors city over rural youth. The point implicit in this argument is that the rural population will carry the military burden if such actions are continued in an effort to reform the services.⁹

Closely linked to the argument of citizen obligation and patriotic duty is the argument that historically a conscript army is both the traditional formation, and the formation demonstrated to have been most effective. This theme is reflected in the comments of General Major V. Chepurnoi, Chief of the General Staff Directorate, who says

[i]t is obvious that we need to see we can not blindly copy the experiments of other armies, whether or not they are good. It is necessary to consider the state's capabilities, and our own historical experience, which, it seems, convinces me that in our conditions it would be entirely unreasonable to deviate from the principle of universal military service.¹⁰

This historical experience is discussed by General Igor Sergeyev, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Sergeyev states that the various military formations tried prior to World War II, to include a volunteer army, militia-based, territorial and national forces, were not sufficient to meet the threat. "But we won the war when the

⁹"LtGen Boyko, 'Alarmed' at Current Trends" JPRS-UMA-91-002, 14 January 1991, 4.

¹⁰General Major V. Chepurnoi, "Kakaaia armia nam nyzhna?" Krasnaia zvezda, 16 May 1991, 2.

defence of the Motherland was declared to be the sacred duty and obligation of everyone. Therefore, many see universal military service as the symbol of our army." As a result, generals "...are reluctant to part with this corner-stone of society."¹¹

Military training by serving in the armed forces also is viewed as fulfilling two critical functions. First, it ensures the presence of a large, reserve force which can be mobilized when necessary without the need for initial military training. This point is important to those who continue to see the Soviet Union as encircled by threatening enemies. This idea is shown by the statement of General Major V. Nikitin who remarks, "[t]he army is built on the principle of operational-strategic necessity. Besides this, we prepare the reserves. Indeed, the defense of the state is a matter for all people. Such a point is written in the Constitution...."¹²

Second, the military is seen as an instrument of socialization for young people. This point is made repeatedly by senior military officers. According to Rear Admiral M. Kulak,

¹¹Yuri Teplyakov, interview with General Igor Sergeyev in "We've Broken the Habit of Disarming Ourselves..." Moscow News, Nos. 8-9, 11-18 March 1990, 11.

¹²"Armiia na poroge reformy," [The army on the threshold of reform] Literaturnaia gazeta, 7 March 1990, 10.

Our Armed Forces up till now were the only structure in which in the basis the first serious stage of a person becoming a citizen was accomplished. Despite all of their deficiencies the army and navy strengthened the awareness of young people of such categories as patriotism, belief in the Fatherland, striving to protect it from foreign encroachment, developing what is necessary for such a task. Can we believe that an army, made upon the basis of volunteering, will be able to accomplish these functions?¹³

One officer states that "[g]oing to a mercenary army [naemnaia armia] we take from the army one of its important features - to raise and educate young people, the future members of our society."¹⁴ In a final twist to the argument, Akhromeev points out that the military not only serves as a socialization mechanism, it also provides young people with skills and the ability to pursue a profession.

Every year hundreds of thousands of young men go into the reserves. They return having received in their time of service specialties in truck driving, mechanics, signals, electronics, and other specialties, of which there is a shortage in the civilian economy. The army and navy temper young people physically and morally.¹⁵

¹³Rear Admiral M. Kulak, "Vmesto prizyva - verbovka?" [In the place of a call-up - a recruitment?] Krasnaia zvezda, 11 November 1990, 2.

¹⁴"Chelovek v voennoi forme," [A person in military dress] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 10 (May 1990) 24, (JPRS-UMA-90-024).

¹⁵Kosterin, "Armia i perestroika," Sovetskaia rossiia, No. 12 (1988), 3.

The idea behind militarized socialism is that it pervades society. By retaining a conscript force, it can be assured that militarized socialism is kept alive within society through the "tempering" young citizens receive during their military service.

Finally, one of the most familiar arguments against a professional army is its expense. Akhromeev has noted repeatedly that due to the economic situation of the Soviet Union, it is not capable of accommodating the higher wages and living conditions which would be required for recruiting a volunteer force.¹⁶ Lieutenant Colonel A. Papakin summarizes the argument in an interesting way when he says,

[a] mercenary army will require construction not only of comfortable housing in place of barracks for soldiers, but also many other objects....Are we ready for this? In my opinion, no. Indeed at this time we can not provide housing even for officers and warrant officers.¹⁷

There is an interesting logic to this argument. Implicitly, these individuals are stating that conscripts can live in poor conditions and be paid meager wages. That is acceptable because they are conscripts. But to get people to volunteer, you must end the poor treatment which is an accepted part of universal military service. In one case the soldier must be

¹⁶See Akhromeev, "Kakie vooruzhennye sily," Ogonek, No. 50, (1989), 6-7.

¹⁷"Chelovek v voennoi forme" KVS, No. 10, (1990), 24.

treated decently, as a human being whose needs are met; in the other he may be treated as a slave, whose needs are ignored!

According to Arnett and Fitzgerald, those who resist professionalization of the military are the senior military leadership. This group includes names already familiar to the reader from prior discussion about the neotraditionalists. It includes Marshal Akhromeev, Marshal Yazov, General Varennikov, General Snetkov (Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Group of Forces, Germany), General Lizichev (Chief of the Main Political Directorate), Admiral V. Chernavin, and General Colonel B. Gromov (then Commander of the Kiev Military District).¹⁸ These are precisely the people whose power and control over the organization would be threatened by such a change. Unstated in their arguments, but implicit in many of their statements especially about the expense of a professional force, is the idea that such a force would have to be administered in a legal, structured manner in order to entice people to pursue military careers. Promotions and assignments would be based on merit rather than influence and patronage, and the rights of the commander as allowed by the principle of edinsonachalie would be restricted by the fact that the individuals within the organization would also have rights and legal status.

¹⁸Arnett and Fitzgerald provide an excellent in-depth discussion of the arguments of those resisting professionalization. See Arnett and Fitzgerald, 200.

In contrast to the senior leadership, the liberalizers see reform of the military as a necessary condition for improving the condition of the institution. These reforms will also increase officers' status in society and provide personal satisfaction to the officers, who have seen their living and working conditions erode significantly during the Gorbachev era. Such changes will also increase the appeal of the military as a profession, ensuring a steady and more highly educated and motivated stream of volunteers entering the service. The reformers have used these arguments, along with others intended to directly counter the arguments of the neotraditionalists, to gain support for the professionalization of the military.

One of the major arguments used by the reformers is centered on the functions of the army. This argument rejects the belief that the army should be used in fulfilling jobs important to society, but outside of the army's sphere of expertise. Harvesting crops is seen as something which consumes valuable training time and deters the military's ability to professionally prepare for and execute its war fighting mission, an argument similar to many of those discussed in Chapter 3. Such tasks are indicative of the lack of rights within the military and the belief that forces can be used as "slave labor." In addition to tasks meant to aid Soviet society, the army also is forced to provide its own resources "...to erect houses, schools, and pre-school

facilities, provide military installations with municipal services, and build access roads."¹⁹ As one officer points out, "[t]he army needs to take care of its own matters."²⁰ Based on this argument, construction troops should not be part of the military, and transports and troops should not be diverted to harvesting crops. The army should not be a "labor army" [trudovaia armia] in an attempt to transform society into a barracks system.²¹

The result of these tasks is that military personnel spend too much time doing things other than training, and as a result lag in professionalism and have shortcomings in their military training, both of which are accepted by the neotraditionalist leaders of the organization.²² Even worse, such a lack of training and experience results in dangerous conditions and sometimes life-threatening situations. According to Colonel A.V. Tsalko, the commander of a combined-arms unit, "[a]pproximately four thousand servicemen die every year in the army from the unskilled handling [of equipment] and other causes. And this is in peacetime."²³

¹⁹"LtGen Boyko," JPRS-UMA-91-002, 5.

²⁰Colonel O. Bel'kov, "Funktsii armii: dialektika razvitiia" [Functions of the army: the dialectic of development] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 19 (October 1989) 14.

²¹Ibid., 15-6.

²²Major V. Matiash, "Takie vot professionaly..." [So these are professionals...] Krasnaia zvezda, 17 May 1990, 2.

²³"Kakaa armia nam nyzhna?" Ogonek, No. 9, (1990), 30.

The socialization of young people is another function which is viewed as outside the army's area of responsibility.

As Colton writes,

[t]he army is seen as a school of life, inculcating politically desirable attitudes in a general sense, but also as exposing soldiers to specific points of party ideology. What is more, the internalization of civic virtue is seen ultimately as indispensable to military success. It has been a central point of Soviet military theory since the Civil War that in the modern world it is moral and political superiority which ultimately determine the outcome of armed conflicts.²⁴

Colonel Bel'kov points out however, "[i]t is not that the army is a school for society, but that society is a school for the army." In addition, he argues that "...army education (the army school) does not appear to be a compulsory condition for becoming a citizen, nor a compulsory prerequisite of a normal functioning society."²⁵ Further, patriotism is not tied only to the army and in fact other institutions associated with young peoples' upbringing and socialization also are patriotic.²⁶ Not only is the army not the sole body of patriotism but, according to one critic, the argument that a volunteer army is against the nature and purpose of the country and society is also nonsense because

²⁴Colton, *Commissars*, 71. Italics in original.

²⁵Bel'kov, "Funktsii armii," *KVS*, No. 19, (1989), 16.

²⁶Ibid., 17.

the nature of the army is determined by the society, the state and its policies.²⁷

The current conscript army has been criticized by the reformers for being manned by unskilled soldiers who can not deal with the sophisticated and technologically advanced weaponry of a modern military. According to Lopatin, "...37 per cent of all conscripts have only a poor knowledge of Russian, 45 per cent of them suffer from some form of mental disorders, and many are ex-convicts."²⁸ If this is the case, officers and non-commissioned officers face a tremendous challenge in training and commanding such a problem-laden military. In fact, many of these young soldiers do not want to be in the military, and even some of those who go to military schools do so because they do not know what else to do, and as a result are not the best personnel to man the armed forces.²⁹ The constant stream of unskilled conscripts is undoubtedly a contributing factor in the death rate of soldiers during training, as noted by Colonel Tsalko. Their inability to handle advanced equipment has also contributed to accidents within the military. A commission investigating the burning and sinking of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets in 1989 concluded that the catastrophe occurred

²⁷"Kakaiia armia nam nuzhna?" [What kind of army do we need?] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 9 (May 1990) 36, (JPRS-UMA-90-013).

²⁸Lopatin, "Whose Side" Moscow News, No. 32, (1990), 10.

²⁹Lieutenant Colonel Justice L.M. Polokhov in "Pis'ma marshalu," [Letters to the marshal] Ogonek, No. 1 (January 1990) 4.

because "[s]uch equipment can not be mastered by conscript soldiers in such a short time."³⁰

Based on these arguments, the reformers call for a professional military which will be mobile and technically equipped and manned by personnel dedicated to their profession.³¹ A system of "voluntary hiring" [verbodki] is seen as a means to ensure a more democratic and effective military. "An army consisting of professionals, having served from 4 to 10 years, is better prepared for resolving the most complex combat training tasks than an army where its ranks are frequently renewed."³² Such an army will improve officers' initiative and innovation. It will strengthen the authority of junior commanders and improve morale, both of which contributed to the military's problems in Afghanistan.³³ In a discussion on the professional army, Bogdanov states the reformers' argument;

I'm convinced a whole number of objective reasons shows that we need a professional army. The present level of technical equipment in the armed forces is so high that perhaps in five years only soldiers with engineering degrees will be able to serve. Professionals are needed,

³⁰Tsalko, "Kakia armia?" Ogonek, No. 9, (1990), 30,

³¹Polokhov, "Pis'ma marsha'u," Ogonek, No. 1, (1990), 4.

³²General Lieutenant V. Serebriannikov (ret), "Kakia armia nam nuzhna?" KVS, No. 9 (May 1990) 34-6.

³³See for example Urban's discussion of the undermining of NCO authority, the morale problems and associated crimes, and the resulting stress placed on the junior officer corps in Afghanistan. Urban, 213-4.

otherwise senseless material losses will be colossally high. A soldier spends two years learning how to break equipment and not how to use it effectively.³⁴

The reformers also argue that the cost of a professional army will not be as high as some officers have stated. By cutting back the overall size of the military and manning it with dedicated personnel capable of maintaining equipment and motivated to do so, expenses can be cut in some areas. Money can also be saved by removing the duplicative and manpower intensive party organs in the military, a topic that will be discussed in detail below. The result of all these measures, according to the reformers, is that a highly skilled and motivated army can be obtained for negligible additional budget outlays.³⁵ As Meyer notes, the position on the cost of a volunteer force held by many junior and middle level officers has been supported by senior officers from the

³⁴R. Bogdanov in roundtable discussion "Army and Society" XX Century and Peace, No. 9, (1988), 22.

³⁵There are a number of articles discussing the costs of transitioning to a volunteer force. See, for example, Captain Third Rank A. Antoshkin "Naemnaia armia dorozhe ili deshevle?" [Is a hired army more or less expensive?] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 9 (May 1990) 38-42, (JPRS-UMA-90-013). This position is also voiced by Lieutenant Colonel Anatoly Yuryev when he states that "[t]he military do not count on additional expenditures by the country, but see the reserves which can appear as a result of intradepartmental reforms that will ultimately lead to improvements in the armed forces." See the letter from Yuryev in "On Alexei Arbatov's Article 'How Much Defense Is Sufficient?'" Letter to the Editors, International Affairs, No. 8 (August 1989) 138.

Military Finance Institute "...despite the official Ministry of Defense position."³⁶

In organizing a professional military force, the junior and middle level officers see an opportunity to achieve two goals simultaneously. As professionals dedicated to their organization and career choice, they see the possibility of transforming an out-dated, problem-laden, inefficient military into a highly respected, modern and capable organization. As one officer says,

[w]e will gain in the political and moral situation, in combat expertise and combat capability. We will gain from reductions of expenditures which are now necessary but will become unnecessary. We will gain in the sense that professionals will not break so much very expensive equipment, as today's soldiers are doing. We can continue for a long time, and this is necessary.³⁷

Emphasis on mission accomplishment and merit will replace the personal-based system of rewards which currently characterizes the organization's administration, as has been noted by a number of critics of the current system.

Who is afraid of a professional army? Apparently, an officer who is satisfied with the existing situation when payment of his labour and promotion depend on anything but the combat

³⁶Meyer, 11. Meyer cites the work of S. Yermakov and S. Vikulov, "Skol'ko stoit professionalizatsiia?" Krasnaia zvezda, 5 December 1990, 2, as an example of this support.

³⁷Yuryev, "On Alexei Arbatov's Article," International Affairs, No. 8, (1989), 139.

readiness of his unit. Fear of the unprofessional reflects itself in ingratiating bosses, whitewashing and noisy campaigns. Someone takes possession of material means and "exploits" the soldiers.³⁸

In achieving this transformation, they also see a gain in both their own welfare, through increased wages, respect in society and self-satisfaction. Both goals, they believe, can only be achieved by abandoning the "barracks mentality" prevalent among the senior leadership and replacing it with an emphasis on the individual to support innovation and initiative.³⁹

Two key supporters of the professional military concept are civilians, yet their opinion on the subject is important to the military reformers and provides some clue as to why military personnel would support these "democrats" in their actions. The first of these is Eduard Shevardnadze, former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs. Shevardnadze writes,

[w]e need a professional army, and for a professional army a democratic society is necessary, one where a citizen in uniform knows himself to be an individual living a decent life in all respects - social, material and spiritual. We need a different training system that will

³⁸A. Pleshchev, "The Army Needs Professionals," Letters to the Editor, XX Century and Peace, No. 4 (1989) 11.

³⁹These ideas are clearly voiced by those who responded to Akhromeev's letter to Korotich, the editor of Ogonek. For further details on these ideas see "Pis'ma marshalu" [Letters to the Marshal] Ogonek, No. 1 (January 1990), and "Prodozhaem razgovor" [Continuing the discussion] Ogonek, No. 23 (May 1990).

produce a cast of mind not cramped by authoritarian regulations.⁴⁰

Higher spending is not the only thing that will happen with a transition to a professional system, according to Shevardnadze. It will also mean a transition to "a 'natural selection' process, resulting in a loss of status and rank for some, but a higher level of competency and professionalism overall."⁴¹ Through this statement, Shevardnadze demonstrates his understanding of what lies behind the senior military leaderships' arguments against professionalization, i.e., the acknowledgment that instituting a professional system would also end their inordinate dominance and control of the military.

The second important figure supporting a professional force is Boris Yeltsin. In his comments about the Politburo members of 1989, Yeltsin discussed Defense Minister Yazov's difficult confirmation process. Yeltsin described Yazov as a "hundred-percent product of the old military machine" unable to visualize or institute the changes needed in the military in order to solve "the problems of national defense." Yeltsin believed Yazov probably longed "...in his heart of hearts, to conscript every single adult for permanent

⁴⁰Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, trans. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 150.

⁴¹Ibid., 151.

military service."⁴² For Yeltsin, the solution to such ingrained attitudes, and the way to ensure that the military remained an open institution "...in which they are not above society but serve society and are subordinate to parliament" was by transforming the military into a professional, volunteer organization.⁴³

Such a position earned Yeltsin the support of a large number of junior and middle level officers, demonstrated in the military vote cast for his successful Russian Presidency bid. Krasnaia zvezda correspondents reporting on the military voting patterns in six regions of the republic reported that Yeltsin won the military vote in Kamchatka and Sverdlovsk, and ran second in the other reported areas.⁴⁴ This

⁴²Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain, (New York: Summit Books, 1990) trans. by Michael Glenny, 151.

⁴³Ibid., 253. Emphasis in original.

⁴⁴Captain Second Rank V. Urban, "Rossiia: vybor sdelan..." [Russia: the choice is made...] Krasnaia zvezda, 14 June 1991, 1. Undoubtedly, under the continuing conditions of neotraditionalism, some servicemembers may have been concerned about possible repercussions, and cast their vote accordingly. The vote count for the military was reported as follows: Kamchatka - Yeltsin 39.9%, Ryzhkov 33.8%; Sverdlovsk - Yeltsin 44.7%, Ryzhkov 16.6%; Severmorsk - Yeltsin 28.4%, Ryzhkov 33.5%; Chita - Yeltsin-Rutskoi 29.9%, Ryzhkov-Gromov 51.6%; Leningrad - Yeltsin 26.9%, Ryzhkov 38.5%; and, Kaliningrad - Yeltsin 27.5%, Ryzhkov 32.4%. Khabarovsk did not report their military vote separately from the general vote. Yeltsin won the election with approximately 60% of the general vote, with his closest rival, Ryzhkov, failing to win a majority in any major city. Serge Schmemmann, "Yeltsin Is Handily Elected Leader of Russian Republic In Setback For Communists," New York Times, 14 June 1991, A1. The voting results for the military reported above obviously did not indicate support at the level of 60%. It is possible that Krasnaia zvezda did not report military districts in which Yeltsin received an overwhelming majority or again, that there were attempts to influence the military vote. The possibility that military members were closely monitored and that information adverse to Yeltsin's campaign was used by senior military leaders to influence their subordinates' votes can not be ruled out.

military support became an important factor in the failed coup attempt of August 1991.

The Debate Over Departyization of the Military

The role of the Communist Party organization within the military has been a subject of debate among Western Sovietologists for many years. As discussed in Chapter 1, three positions on the subject have been suggested. The earliest work, accomplished by Kolkowicz, views the party-military organs as attempts to impose a check on the military and its leadership which is counter to the professionalism of the services. Thus, the party-military organs are seen as intrusive, having a negative effect on the military officer corps' attempts to distance itself from politics. Odom, on the other hand, views the military and the party as having similar interests, and therefore the party-military organs should not be sources of friction, but rather additional tools which can be used by the senior officer corps to accomplish what are essentially common goals. Colton believes that the party-military organs serve as "...conductors of existing party policy...." At the same time, political officers "...also transmit military opinions as to what party policy ought to be."⁴⁵ As a result of this arrangement, the military is able to dominate issues within its own domain, while it also remains outside of issues which

⁴⁵Colton, Commissars, 197.

relate to society in general and are seen as the domain of the political leadership.

The differences in these views would seem to be extreme, but as Stephen Meyer recently stated, they are not irreconcilable. In fact, the party-military organs were able to act as control mechanisms for the leadership and as supporters of military interests. "The more general point is that Communist Party organs in every institution - factories, schools, research laboratories - succeeded in blocking political input from below while communicating the political message from above."⁴⁶ The party-military organs are instruments of control. They are used by the military leadership, whose appointments are made through the party's *nomenklatura* system and thus reflect political approval,⁴⁷ to assure that their control, which they presumably exercise in coordination with the party leadership, is maintained.

Gorbachev's reform program provided the opportunity for true democratizers to try to change the party and its methods of operation, thereby challenging the old ways of administration and raising the idea that advancement should

⁴⁶Meyer, fn. 14, 12.

⁴⁷According to the Scotts, officers are assigned based on a *nomenklatura* list of positions once they are graduates of the military academies. "In general, *nomenklatura* lists are subject to approval by the Communist Party before final appointments are made." Through the Soviet systems of military education and *nomenklatura*, the political reliability of the higher officer corps is assured, and officers failing to receive higher military education and obtain *nomenklatura* will not progress into the higher ranks of the military. See Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979) 352-3.

be based not on concepts such as *nomenklatura*, but on individual initiative and merit. Applied to the military, such concepts directly challenged the control which the senior leadership possessed, and led them to actively resist the departyization of the military in an effort to maintain the party-military organs as an important element in their overall system of control.

As a result of the *nomenklatura* system and the ethos of militarized socialism, which preached that the military was the party's assistant in building socialism, the party influence was greater in the military than in other political institutions. Prior to 1989, when the party's influence was lowered with discussion over the need to repeal Article 6 of the Constitution which provided for the party's dominance of society, a reported 79.3 % of the officers and warrant officers were members of the Communist Party.⁴⁸ The importance of the party in the military is clearly stated in the Soviet publication The Officer's Handbook. As outlined by the 1961 Party Program,

[t]he Party devotes unremitting attention to the enhancement of its organizing and supervisory influence over the entire life and activities of the Army, Air Force, and Navy and the rallying of Armed Forces personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, to strengthening the unity of the Armed Forces and the people, to the education

⁴⁸"Politorgan i pervichaia," [The political organs and the primary party organization] Krasnaia zvezda, 23 September 1988, 2.

of military personnel in a spirit of courage, gallantry, heroism, and military cooperation with the armies of other socialist countries, and readiness at any moment to defend the Land of the Soviets, home of the builders of communism.⁴⁹

To ensure the predominance of the party, one of the principles of a military officer includes possession of a "scientific character" and commitment to the Communist Party.

This principle requires all commanders to conduct training so that their subordinates have a clear idea of their sacred duties as defenders of the Motherland, and understand the lofty meaning of military service. For this it is essential that knowledge and skills be formed on the basis of a profound conviction in the rightness of our cause, blended with personal responsibility for the defense of the Motherland.⁵⁰

The party is also an important part of edinonachalie. One-man command (or unity of command as it is sometimes called) "...is developed and strengthened on a Party basis, and it assumes full force and provides the best results when the 'sole commander' relies upon the support of the Party and Komsomol organizations and entire military collective."⁵¹

The attacks on the party and its role in the military jeopardized the senior military leadership's perception of

⁴⁹Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz, [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Moscow: Pravda Izdat, 1961) 112. Quoted in Kozlov, 5.

⁵⁰Ibid., 90.

⁵¹v.v. Shelyag, A.D. Glotochkin, K.K. Platonov, eds., 310.

the relationship, which they viewed as appropriate and integral to ensuring the defense of the country. Departyization would also rob these leaders of a critical mechanism for delivering their views and indoctrinating officers with their concept of the organization. For many of these leaders, "[d]epoliticization of the army is demoralization of the army."⁵² Similarly, Akhromeev argued that the army could not be outside politics. "Who besides the CPSU, today can attend to the political education of army and navy personnel?" This education, accomplished by the party organs in the military, guarantees "...the carrying out in life of the political line of the CPSU in the Armed Forces, rallying their personnel around the party, educating soldiers in the spirit of the faith of the socialist homeland, promoting the consolidation of the unity of the army and the people."⁵³

In their defense of the party organs in the military, the leadership attempted to portray the issue as one which can be decided only by the military itself, without outside interference from other groups within society. General Major Mikhail Surkov, elevated to the Politburo in 1991, argued that striking miners who were calling for departyization of the military were clearly out of line. "We're not telling

⁵²Valeri Alekseev, interview with General Colonel Boris Gromov, "Samoe strashnoe v zhizni - panika," [The worst thing in life is panic] Dialog, No. 18 (December 1990) 62.

⁵³Akhromeev, Kakaia armia..., "Ogonek, No. 9, (1990), 7.

the miners whether they should keep party committees at the mine heads or not." While he claimed that the process of democratization was "positive," Surkov also insisted that "'departyization' of the army is the army's own business, rather than a sign of the democratization process he ostensibly welcomes."⁵⁴

Akhromeev also saw the efforts by the reformers and democratizers as a direct attack on the institution. Further, their attempts to departyize the military were seen by Akhromeev as an attack on the military leadership personally. "Now it has become clear why Boris Yeltsin and his team have taken such a persistent stand against the generals and admirals for the past three years," Akhromeev stated in an interview. To him, Yeltsin's stand was an attempt to "discredit the generals in the people's eyes." By removing the military leadership, Yeltsin could then "topple our country's supreme bodies of authority and reach his long-term objectives by way of mass rallies, boycotts and strikes."⁵⁵ The result of the democratizers' efforts, according to the senior military leadership, will be repoliticization of the army. They believe that the removal of the Communist Party will only make a place for another

⁵⁴Marina Podzorova, "General Dislikes Ultimatums," Moscow News, No. 21 (26 May-2 June 1991) 10.

⁵⁵Dmitry Kazutin, interview with Marshal S.F. Akhromeev, "The President's Military Adviser," Moscow News, No. 30 (28 July-4 August 1991) 11.

political party, and the fear is that this political party will end the senior officers' control over the military.⁵⁶

Departyization, according to another defender of the party's role in the military, would also weaken the internal administration of the services. Colonel Petrushenko, a leading spokesman for the Soyuz group, stated that "[w]ithout the political organs one-man command will quickly become one-man power....Some [commanders] believe themselves above criticism, above the party organizations."⁵⁷ The implication in this statement is that it is the party organ which serves as an effective check on the commander's arbitrary use of power. Moiseev even claims that restructuring in the military can only occur with the help of the party organs. "Before everything else I want to note, that today restructuring in the army and navy is impossible without the rallying [splochnost'] and solidarity of all communists, without their vanguard role."⁵⁸

The importance of the party-military organs in ideological education and training has also been emphasized

⁵⁶Dmitry Kazutin, interview with Colonel Viktor Kuznetsov, "Armed forces of the CPSU," Moscow News, No. 7 (17-24 February 1991), 6. Kuznetsov is the Chair of Philosophy at the V.I. Lenin Military Political Academy, who announced his withdrawal from the CPSU in early January 1991.

⁵⁷Major I. Plutarev, interview with Colonel N. Petrushenko and Lieutenant Colonel V. Podziruk, "Pered litsom pealii ili po puti otritsaniia?" [Before the face of realism or on the path of denial?] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 7 (April 1990) 32, (JPRS-UMA-90-018).

⁵⁸Filatov, "Vooruzhennye sily...", Voенно-istoricheskyi zhurnal, No. 2 (1990) 9.

as a reason for their maintenance. Through the military's indoctrination and socialization process,

Soviet servicemen are educated in the spirit of boundless loyalty to the people and the communist cause; they develop the qualities of courage, audacity, heroism, and a spirit of comradeship in arms with the armies of socialist countries, readiness to give all their strength and, if need be, even their lives, for the defense of the socialist Motherland.⁵⁹

Such indoctrination also ensures an internationalist attitude among the servicemen. "Today our army, fulfilling its primary mission in the defense of the socialist Fatherland, at the same time is the true school of internationalism. Every Soviet soldier...is continually occupied in relations with representatives of other nationalities."⁶⁰ As examples of the time spent to educate young soldiers, political training in units was to include four hours (or 3 hours when there is one training session per week) on the topic "Dependably to stand guard of creative work of the soviet people." Eight hours (or six, if there is one three-hour session per week) covered the lesson "Imperialism - the cause of war and military danger."⁶¹

⁵⁹Kozlov, 97.

⁶⁰Lieutenant Colonel U. Zurlis, "Natsional'nye chuvstva i natsional'isticheskie emotsii" [National feelings and nationalistic emotions] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 10 (May 1989) 44-5, (JPRS-UMA-89-018).

⁶¹"Politicheskoi uchebe - novatorskii kharakter" [Political training - an innovative character] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 22 (November 1987) 48, (JPRS-UMA-88-004).

The arguments used by the liberalizers and democrats supporting departyization are directly counter to those used by the senior leadership. The liberalizers, pointing to the changes in society and the problems associated with the military-political organs, in most cases argued that the military should not have any political organs. They believed that the Communist Party organs, to include the Young Communist League, or Komsomol, whose members included most servicemen not in the party, were actually damaging to the military's ability to function as a professional force.

One of the primary arguments used by the liberalizers for departyization was that the indoctrination and political education provided by military political officers was boring, poorly done and consumed valuable time which could better be used for combat training. According to figures published by Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, privates and junior commanders reported their attendance at political meetings was 63 percent. "One-fifth of those interviewed were dissatisfied with the periodicity, the time, or the place for carrying out training." And forty-two percent were dissatisfied with the organization of the political work.⁶² Lessons are often boring because of the "...primitive methods and formalism in them, and...political workers do not lead them."⁶³ Part of

⁶²"Utverzhdat' ideologiiu obnovleniia" [To affirm the ideology of renewal] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 17 (September 1989) 10, (JPRS-UMA-89-029).

⁶³"Ot formalizma...", KVS, No. 12, (1990), 14.

the problem, according to Colonel General G.A. Stefanovski, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate, is that "...our servicemen has changed, has become educated, literate, free and bold in judgment, but many ideological cadres continue to work, as it is said, by old methods as with 'average' [usrednennym] personnel."⁶⁴ These old methods are discussed by Colonel A. Pavlov, who writes that

[a]t some places they have not ended the mechanical outlining of works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, party documents, the mindless soundtracks of previously prepared texts of speeches that do not allow students to realize in depth the methodological value of theoretical positions for their own future practical work.⁶⁵

The political organs are also viewed as overly bureaucratic, and therefore unable to get anything done. As a result, commanders and party workers have been ordered to struggle with bureaucratism "...which infects a part of military cadres and which has become a serious obstacle to realizing the program of perestroika."⁶⁶ This bureaucratism often results in duplication of effort by the different levels of party organs, and a flood of massive, and often

⁶⁴Ibid., 12.

⁶⁵"Teoreticheski podgotovlen...", KVS, No. 24, (1987), 47.

⁶⁶"Ot raboty s bumagy - k rabote s liud'mi" [From work with paper - to work with people] Krasnaia zvezda, 12 May 1989, 1. See also "V litavry bit' ne stal by..." [I was not beating a drum...] for similar comments about the bureaucratization of the Komsomol in the military. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 12 (January 1990) 35, (JPRS-UMA-90-024).

unnecessary paperwork. "Paperwork is crushing us," stated one political officer who talked to Colonel A. Manushkin, a correspondent for Krasnaia zvezda. Captain I. Popenko asked the Colonel to "[l]ook around at how much unnecessary, hard work we have."⁶⁷ The command-pressure style is still used by many political workers, and political staffs "still live by the syndrome of willful pressure, bureaucratic habits which do not teach...."⁶⁸

This bureaucratic character is also evidenced by the top-down direction provided to the political officers. Captain A. Taranov complained to Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil that his hands were tied by those above him directing his work.⁶⁹ Higher party organs often remain unresponsive to the primary organization. Even when primary organizations do not recommend an officer for promotion the recommendation is ignored, and the officer is promoted anyway.⁷⁰ This problem

⁶⁷Colonel A. Manushkin, "Nuzhny peremeny," [We need changes] Krasnaia zvezda, 21 February 1990, 1.

⁶⁸"Politorgan i pervichaia," [The political organ and primary party organization] Krasnaia zvezda, 23 September 1988, 2.

⁶⁹Captain A. Taranov, "O roli i meste politrabotnika," [On the role and place of the political worker] Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 5 (March 1990) 21, (JPRS-UMA-90-016).

⁷⁰See for example Lieutenant Colonel I. Kosenko, "Kto zhe khoziain v partiinom dome?" [Who is the boss in the party house?] Krasnaia zvezda, 20 April 1990, 2 for promotions which occur because higher party organizations ignore the recommendation of the primary organ. Higher party organs are also known to ignore problem situations reported to them from the primary organs. See the discussion in Major V. Mukhin "Lopata...?" KVS, No. 1 (January 1990) 39-40.

has even been noted by the senior leadership. General Major N.A. Batarchuk writes,

[a] part of the political organ still has not overcome the desire to "command" political organs. They regulate their work from top to bottom, even down to the party groups, even on such questions as the agenda for the next meeting. What is the reason? Probably the main reason is insufficient preparation of workers of political organs. Many of them have never been in elective positions.⁷¹

This statement indicates there are two major problems associated with the party organs. First, they are not independent, even in the area of finances, and second, the personnel manning the political positions are often poorly prepared for such responsibilities. The latter problem was discussed during a roundtable appearing in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil in 1987. During that discussion, Colonel P. Abramov, the deputy chief of personnel administration in the Main Political Directorate stated,

[w]e continue, unfortunately, to collide with the facts: young political workers do not always clearly see their place and role in resolving tasks which stand before the military collective, they do not know how to organize purposeful party-political work, directed at qualitative fulfilling of the military readiness plan and the strengthening of

⁷¹"Avtoritets avangarda: razmyshleniia pred c'ezdom" [The authority of the vanguard: reflections before the Congress] interview with General Major N.A. Batarchuk, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 2 (January 1990) 18, (JPRS-UMA-90-016).

military discipline, to rely on communists, Komsomol activists, etc., for their own work.⁷²

Officers also complain that despite the changes called for by perestroika and glasnost, party-military organs still operate as they always have. One Lieutenant Colonel complained at a party meeting that "[i]n resolving many urgent problems our party organization maintains the old, habitual and for individual communists comfortable positions. Servility and conservatism still thrive among us." As examples of the old methods of operation, the author cites the fact that votes are still unanimous, and "there are still things known by party buro members, which the rank and file communists are not allowed to know."⁷³ This opinion is shared by Colonel Tsalko, who believes that

[p]olitical organs have turned into the conservative layer of the army, painfully clinging to the spirit of old times in new conditions. They are excessively swollen - today for three to four officers in a company there is one political worker, and they are formed by principles that are far from contemporary democratic reality.⁷⁴

⁷²"Teoreticheski podgotovlen...", KVS, No. 24, (1987), 46.

⁷³Lieutenant Colonel N. Belan, "Perestroika: ostraiia situatsiia: pravdu v glaza," [Perestroika: a critical situation: looking truth in the eyes] Krasnaia zvezda, 4 March 1988, 1-2.

⁷⁴"Kakaia armia nam nuzhna?" Ogonek, No. 9 (February 1990) 30.

The party organs are used frequently by the commander to exercise his power of edinsonachalie. Commanders frequently decide who should be promoted, and then instruct the party secretary to write a letter of recommendation, followed by a positive vote by the party members.⁷⁵ According to Colonel Beliakov, the full dependence of the party committee and political workers on the commander results in "...officers with low professionalism and moral qualities taking the leadership of units of formations."⁷⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Podziruk, a people's deputy, states that "...political organs in the hands of the commanders of one-man command have become a powerful weapon of punishment of 'differently-minded' [inakomyshliashchii] people."⁷⁷ Political organs even can be used by the commander as a scapegoat in cases where political education has failed.⁷⁸

Officers also complain that party membership and not outstanding performance is a required step for promotion. This means that officers see joining the party as a pro-forma task with little actual meaning. "It is a secret to no one, that being a non-party officer can prevent his promotion." The anonymous author of this statement suggests that all

⁷⁵Khudenko, "Vopros reshen." KVS, No. 6 (1990) 35.

⁷⁶Beliakov, "Imet' pravo," KVS, No. 6 (1990) 29.

⁷⁷"Pered litsom realii," KVS, No. 7 (1990) 34.

⁷⁸Ibid., 32.

questions of assignments and promotions need to be decided based on performance only.⁷⁹

The liberalizers, in their push to establish a professional military force, see departyization of the military as a necessary step in accomplishing this goal. While the party organs do help to promote the military's interests, as Colton contends, these interests are not those of the rank and file, but rather of the senior military leadership. Through Gorbachev's reform policies the liberalizers began to identify the party organs as another means by which the senior military officers controlled the organization and denied professional, career military officers the independence and chance for innovation and initiative which they view as critical to running the military as an effective force. The role of political organs in maintaining neotraditionalists' power was lamented by reformer Lieutenant Colonel Podziruk, who

...wondered why, in the context of reducing the strength of the army, several aviation, armour and technical military schools were to be closed down while 12 political military schools

⁷⁹"Po delovym kvestvam," [On job qualifications] Krasnaia zvezda, 26 June 1988, 2. The necessity of belonging to the party has been noted by senior level officers. General Colonel V.M. Semenov, then commander of the Transbaikal Military District, stated "...until recently for a non-party member it was really difficult to assume any kind of higher position. It can even be said that there existed some kind of unwritten rules." "Pliuralizm mnenii i partiinaia distsiplina" [Pluralism of opinion and party discipline] interview with General Colonel V.M. Semenov, Krasnaia zvezda, 14 August 1990, 2.

remained intact. Why keep a large number of superfluous people in the army?⁸⁰

The answer to this rhetorical question is clear. The political officer through his responsibility for educating and indoctrinating military members was a critical communication link for the neotraditionalists. Their hopes to retain power rested on maintaining the party organizations within the military.

Not only were the reformers unable to influence the overall goals of the military, the top-down control which the party-military organs supported denied the officer's ability to act even at the unit level. Only the commander, with his all-powerful control gained through the principle of edinsonachalie, was able to act as he wished. And by controlling the party organs through edinsonachalie, he was assured that his use, and even abuse of power, was maintained as it was applied to the soldiers and other officers of his unit. As a result of the problems associated with military-political organs, according to Major Lopatin, almost 90% of all officers favor the idea of ending party control over the military.⁸¹

With the concept of edinsonachalie already under attack by the liberalizers, the rubber-stamping power of the party

⁸⁰Galina Sidorova, "Upholding military honour," New Times, No. 29, (18-24 July 1989) 22.

⁸¹Carey Goldberg, "A New Discontent Surfaces in Red Army Ranks," Los Angeles Times, 27 August 1990, A16.

organs was seen as an additional useless and harmful practice negating the professionalism of the military organization. A small victory was gained by the liberalizers when the Presidential Decree, "On the Reform of the Political Organs of the Armed Forces, the State Security Troops of the USSR and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Railway Troops" was issued in 1990. However, the decree, intended to be a first step to departyization, merely changed the political organs in the military to military-political organs, i.e., a name change at best. But such a decree must have been viewed by the senior leadership as another act further threatening their control over the military.

Summary and Conclusion

In their attempt to retain power and control over the military, the senior officer corps viewed departyization and professionalization as clear threats. Both policies would decrease the centralization of decision making and defeat the top-down system of control vital to maintaining a corrupted, neotraditional organization. In defending themselves against the reformers suggesting these changes, the senior officers used arguments already familiar to the reader. They emphasized the heroic image of the military in attempts to remind soldiers and citizens of their patriotic duty and the importance of the military in socializing young people. They

ridiculed the concept of a "mercenary" army as counter to the tradition and heritage of the country. They attempted to reinforce the concept of militarized socialism by reasserting the critical partnership of the military and the party and this partnership's role in forming and sustaining the socialist state. And finally, they portrayed both departyization and professionalization as efforts to decentralize what they viewed as the correct form of administration for the military.

The liberalizers, on the other hand, saw professionalization and departyization as intricately related actions necessary for building a modern military under the changing circumstances brought about by Gorbachev's reforms. Only a volunteer force, manned by educated and skilled personnel, with basic needs furnished through the state and not through personal connections, would provide the innovation and initiative needed to keep up with the modern technology and threats which currently existed. The incentives provided by the volunteer force concept, higher pay and the state's allocation of funds to provide for the basic needs of the servicemen, would assure career dedication and longevity critical to maintaining a skilled and professional force.

Departyization would also contribute to achieving a professional military. It would remove the parallel structure of the party organs which frequently resulted in

duplication of effort and a waste of critical manpower and training time. Most significantly, it would end the personalistic command system of the neotraditionalists, with the arbitrary system of assignments and promotions. It would deny the senior officers the mechanism which they used to force-feed and enforce their neotraditionalism. This would allow the institution of meritocracy in the place of the system of personalism which the senior leadership used to control the organization.

These two issues served as major points of debate between the two sides and illustrated the essence of the factional breakdown of the military. Placing personal power and interests above organizational welfare and integrity, the senior officer corps clung to the existing neotraditional system. In contrast, the junior officers used the issues of departyization and professionalization to voice their disillusion with an organization that had been corrupted by its leadership and was in need in basic reform. It was clear to them what actions had to be taken to return the military to a professional status, and departyization and professionalization constituted the most pressing of these actions.

CHAPTER 6

EASTERN EUROPE: THE END OF SOVIET DOMINATION AND THE BIRTH OF NATIONAL ARMED FORCES

The peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 occurred with limited involvement by the countries' military forces. What actions the militaries did take reflected their general support of the changes taking place in their countries, and there were no significant attempts by military members to prevent or halt these changes. In contrast to the public outcries against change from the neotraditionalists in the Soviet Union and the heated debates over reform published in the Soviet media, the East European press in the Gorbachev years contained few articles from the military supporting the existence or continuation of the pre-1989 system beyond the occasional standard propaganda. Those articles which did appear lacked the vitriolic arguments or emotional content characteristic of the debate over Soviet military reform.

This reaction to change is particularly intriguing when one considers the fact that the Soviets had been involved in a dedicated effort to transform the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) militaries into copies of their own. Even by 1955 the Soviet influence on these militaries had reached a significant level, to include the adoption of Soviet-style

uniforms, the presence of Soviet military advisers, the equipping of the forces with Soviet military equipment, and the tying of Eastern European defense industries to the Soviet defense establishment.¹ These ties were strengthened further in the late 1960s and the 1970s following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In Czechoslovakia this strengthening took the form of a "political neutralization" of the military, accomplished in part by emphasizing ideological training. The ideological campaign concentrated on imbuing officers with a hatred of imperialism and the west, i.e., the enemy,² which, as the reader will note, also served as an important element in the Soviet military's heroic image.

Based on these efforts and the inordinate influence possessed by the Soviets, it is difficult to understand why the East European militaries did not experience the same factionalism resulting from the Gorbachev reforms that was seen in the Soviet military. How can their reaction be explained? Why were there so few attempts by military members to defend their Soviet-style institutions from change? Is it possible that the neotraditionalism present in the Soviet military and the source for its factionalization did not exist in their East European counterparts, and that,

¹Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," International Conciliation, No. 573 (May 1969) 33-4.

²Condoleeza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 183-4.

therefore, the conflict inherent in organizations undergoing change simply did not materialize beyond what can be expected?

This chapter will discuss the NSWP militaries' reaction to change. Although each country of the region faced somewhat unique circumstances, with the strength of their ties to the Soviet Union and the societal and political role of their militaries differing markedly, their dominance by the Soviet Union and their frustration in pursuing national goals and interests were traits shared by all the countries. As will be made clear in the discussion, neotraditionalists and their practices did exist in these military organizations and their existence influenced the pace and direction of reform. Two key points differentiate the East European and Soviet cases of military reform. First, in Eastern Europe these neotraditional practices were seen as a direct product of Soviet influence. Second, when this influence was removed, not only was the neotraditionalists' power weakened, but the regionally weak heroic image of the military as the fighter of capitalism and Western imperialism was quickly and readily replaced with a new, or rather restored, heroic image, that of truly national defense. The vital heroic image argument, used so widely by the Soviet military leadership to rationalize and sustain their personal power, simply was invalid in Eastern Europe.

Soviet Control in the NSWP

The East European Communist parties lacked the legitimacy of the Soviet Communist Party, and maintained their power only through the support of the Soviet Union. This meant that the Soviet Union played a significant role in the formulation of policy for East European countries, particularly foreign and military policy. As a result, the militaries of this region were not so much national militaries as they were militaries penetrated by the Soviet model. This relationship has been characterized as one of "dependence,"³ i. e., the Soviets controlled the military organizations and actions of the East European countries until the changes brought about in 1989.⁴

This control was continually reinforced by a number of measures, the most important of which was the Soviet dominance of the region's security alliance system, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Soviet generals have always dominated the WTO Combined Command, and NSWP air defense forces were closely integrated into the Soviet air

³Ibid., 17.

⁴Korbonski labels Soviet instruments of control over East European countries "communist universals," which he defines as the party and dominant role it plays over the means of coercion, i.e., the police and military forces, the means of communication and the economy. Andrzej Korbonski, "Ideology Disabused: Communism Without a Face in Eastern Europe," The Uncertain Future: Gorbachev's Eastern Bloc, ed. Nicholas N. Kittrie and Ivan Volgyes, (New York: Paragon House, 1988) 47. The focus of the discussion in this section is confined to the military instrument of control.

defense forces,⁵ precluding the danger of independent actions. In addition to the air defense forces, all command, control and communication (C3) functions were integrated within the Warsaw Pact military structure and would come under the control of the Soviet Ministry of Defense in the event of crisis and war. The extent of this control was such that one leading analyst of East European politics writes "...it is most unlikely that East European Ministries of Defense could mobilize their forces without Soviet knowledge, and as the Czechoslovak and Polish crises showed, the Soviets have the capability to jam indigenous military communications."⁶

The Soviets also used combined exercises as a means of placing psychological and political pressure on their allies. After the events of Czechoslovakia in 1968, "[t]he Soviets also introduced a new operational concept: Employ the groups of Soviet forces in combined activities with their respective People's Armies in order to ensure the reliability of those armies."⁷ Finally, by serving as the main supplier of military equipment, the Soviets controlled the operational capabilities of the militaries within the WTO. This was demonstrated in Poland in 1981 when, according to one source,

⁵Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) 17-8.

⁶Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe: Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 84-5.

⁷Simon, 81.

"...only about 20 percent of the airplanes in one regiment were in combat-ready status, because spare parts and replacement equipment ordered from the Soviet Union many months earlier had not been delivered."⁸ The Soviets were effectively stalling the shipment of spare parts to preclude the availability and use of Polish military equipment during this unstable (and to the Soviets, threatening) period.

Information now coming to light in many of the East European countries indicates that Soviet control extended further than had previously been realized. It is now known that through the ruling Communist Parties in these countries, secret agreements were made which extended the Soviet's power over military issues beyond the overt measures already recognized. In Czechoslovakia, for example, treaties allowing for the storage of nuclear warheads on Czechoslovakian territory existed, despite the fact that no legislative or executive bodies had discussed the treaties.⁹ The Hungarian Foreign Relations Committee learned in 1990 that a secret protocol existed which said that "...Hungary was obligated, in the case of a situation judged

⁸Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, East European Military Reliability: An Emigre-Based Assessment, R-3480 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1986) 56. The data for this study was obtained through interviews of 59 emigres who had served in or with East European militaries. It should be noted that no Bulgarians were interviewed for the study.

⁹CTK (Czechoslovakian News Service), 10 June 1991, cited in Jan Obrman, "Revelations about Nuclear Weapons," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: 28 (12 July 1991) 9. As Obrman points out, such treaties illustrate that the true power base in the country was not the government organization, but rather the party.

'extraordinary' by the pact's political and military consultative bodies, to put 100,000 troops under the authority of the Warsaw Pact's central command...."¹⁰ With the Soviet dominance of command positions in the Warsaw Pact, this protocol meant that the Hungarians would lose control of the bulk of their own armed forces.

The Soviets also controlled East European military forces through the education and training of their officers. Promotions in the region's militaries were highly dependent on attendance at Soviet military academies. Through the presence of East European officers at military academies such as the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, the Soviets were able to recruit officers to serve as links between their services and the Soviet military.¹¹

These officers, trained in Russian-language schools for the execution of missions defined by Soviet doctrine, [could] serve as the critical link between the Soviet command structure and East European staffs, divisions, regiments, and smaller sub-units. Education in Soviet military academies [afforded] these bilingual officers the opportunity to work out the technical complexities of joint actions by units and formations of the allied armies.¹²

¹⁰Radio Budapest, 29 May 1990, noon, 6:00 p.m., and 9:00 p.m.; Magyar Hirlap, Nepzsgadsaq, Nepszava, and Magyar Nemzet, 23 May 1990, cited in Alfred Reisch, "Government Wants Negotiated Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 23 (8 June 1990) 31.

¹¹According to Alexiev and Johnson, East European officers attending Soviet military schools may have been asked to sign oaths of loyalty to the USSR. See Alexiev and Johnson, 58.

¹²Christopher D. Jones, "Agencies of the Alliance: Multinational in Form, Bilateral in Content," in Jeffrey Simon and Trond Gilberg, eds., Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) 154.

Political training was the most important method of ensuring Soviet control over the region's military organizations. Through such training, two goals were achieved: the reinforcing of the "threat" image of the West, and indoctrination to assure political loyalty of military members. While limited in their knowledge of Warsaw Pact military capabilities, East European officers were constantly reminded of the threat capabilities of the West. As a result, military members

...viewed the issue of a NATO military threat to Eastern Europe as a legitimate East European concern and not just Communist propaganda. For example, much propaganda use was made in the East German army of the U.S. intervention in Grenada, and this was presented, evidently, with some effect, as proof of American aggressiveness.¹³

The argument also was made that, recognizing the necessary use of Warsaw Pact territory for Soviet resupply and logistics support, NATO would be forced to operate against targets within the NSWP countries. "Hence Eastern Europe [was] seen by NSWP officers as what one Polish officer termed a 'natural target for NATO forces,' especially air and airborne diversionary forces...."¹⁴ Thus, by reinforcing the belief that the region's countries would be directly

¹³Alexiev and Johnson, 47.

¹⁴Ibid., 47.

threatened by Western military activity, the Soviets were able to generate some support for the alliance structure. There was likely another important outgrowth of this tactic. By emphasizing the West as a threat and the alliance's critical role in countering this threat, the Soviets naturally portrayed themselves as comrades ready to take up arms to defend their allies' sovereignty, making the presence of Soviet troops in the region more acceptable and building some basis for trust among the allies.

Threat perception was not the only goal of political training and education. The most significant goal of this training was to ensure party control, and therefore Soviet control because it was through the countries' communist parties that the Soviets exercised their dominance over the military and hence the political loyalty of servicemembers. Just as in the case of the Soviet Union, the communist party played the leading role in the military organizations, with party cells at every level of the organization. These units were subordinated to the central Party Secretariat and to the Main Political Administration (MPA) within their own country.¹⁵ The influence of the Soviet military political organization was obvious, and in fact the East European political organs were "...subject to numerous co-optation agreements with their Soviet counterparts, including the

¹⁵Dawisha, 79.

Soviet MPA."¹⁶ Through these mechanisms, Soviet control over the East European militaries was assured.

The military political organizations worked to maintain the political loyalty of the officer corps, i.e., their loyalty to the Communist Party and its dominance of the armed forces. They did so in much the same way that the task was accomplished by the Soviet military political organs, with recruitment of politically reliable officers and political training and socialization programs playing important roles.¹⁷ As part of these measures, membership in the party was emphasized and pressure to join the party in these countries was important to career progression. As Nelson said in his study of the reliability of Warsaw Pact forces,

[s]urely it [had] been concluded by Soviet commanders that the value of their East European allies in less optimal scenarios--when the non-Soviet units operate outside their own territory in an offensive mode, for example--[would] be enhanced by thorough socialization and the integration of military leaders into the party hierarchy.¹⁸

The party's control over the military was also exercised through the *nomenklatura* system, already familiar to the reader from the discussion about the Soviet military. This

¹⁶Ibid., 79. The Soviet Main Political Administration was later renamed the Main Political Directorate.

¹⁷Alexiev and Johnson, 13.

¹⁸Daniel N. Nelson, Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) 55.

system assured that only politically reliable officers were promoted and that these officers in turn filled politically-sensitive positions. According to an article in the Polish press, a list, consisting of four parts, prioritized the posts requiring political reliability. Information was also given on what political organization had the "right to accept" a candidate for a given post. Thus, a marshal or deputy marshal was appointed by the Sejm or the formerly existing People's Council within the framework of the Polish Communist Party. The Central Committee Politburo accepted generals.¹⁹

Political socialization was accomplished through education and training programs, and was a major subject in unit training and in military educational institutions. Although national differences in political training existed among the NSWP militaries,²⁰ all services conducted regular political training. Noncommissioned officers and conscripts were usually subjected to at least two hours of political training per week. "The soldiers [were] often required to take examinations on the subject matter discussed, and failure [could] result in cancellation of leave privileges

¹⁹"Nomenclatura: Government Staffing, Party Entrenchment Viewed," JPRS-EER-89-121, (2 November 1989) 3.

²⁰According to Alexiev and Johnson, indoctrination was less emphasized in Polish military schools than in either Czechoslovakian or East German schools. Further, "[t]he emphasis on indoctrination [was] most pronounced in the GDR, where as much as 40 percent of the students' time [was] spent on subjects such as Marxism-Leninism, party history, and political economy." Alexiev and Johnson, 17.

and other sanctions."²¹ Each country also possessed an organization similar to the Soviet Young Communist League (Komsomol) which was used for political training and indoctrination. Membership in such an organization was usually considered beneficial to one's career aspirations and mandatory for those hoping to join the Communist Party. All of these efforts were built on the political socialization already experienced by servicemembers during their childhood years. In fact, some attempt was made to militarize the societies of the region, with the GDR possessing perhaps the most militarized system.²² However, such militarization never possessed the historical meaning present in the Soviet case, and militarized socialism did not exist in these countries.

The Soviets exercised their control over the East European militaries both through each countries' own Communist Party structure and through their presence and influence over the armed forces through the measures discussed above. These two routes of control meant that the region's Communist Parties, should they want to act separately from Soviet control, could not be assured that the

²¹Ibid., 32.

²²According to Matthew Boyse, "[b]y 1986 militarization of East German society reached unprecedented levels. This policy was part of the SED's response to the challenges of détente in the 1970s: pervasive influence of Western non-communist values; growing pacifist tendencies; and greater withdrawal by citizens from society and 'inner migration'." A number of legal acts, to include an October, 1978 change in the Defense Law and the Military Service Law of March, 1982, facilitated this militarization. Matthew Boyse, "Militarization of East German Society," in Soviet/East European Survey, 1985-1986, ed. Vojtech Mastny, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987) 95-9.

military would support them, a fact which Rice believes "...explains the isolation of the military from political processes and the fear that the military might become politically involved during crises."²³ This control also meant that military and national security policy could not possess a national tone, because issues affecting the military and security policy, and their consequent resolutions, i.e., "societal, ideological, political, and economic policy choices, ...[were] fundamentally conditioned by the nature of Soviet policy and influence at any given time."²⁴

The result of this pattern of Soviet dominance has been labeled a "circumstance of dual service."²⁵ Military members, whose very profession is in many ways synonymous with national service, were asked to subordinate nationalism to Soviet dominance. The conflict between these two requirements would play a significant role in the changes of 1989. Gorbachev's apparent message to the region was that they should pursue their own reforms and would be free to adopt national policies, rather than forced to follow Soviet policies. The impact of these changes on the military was to free them from Soviet domination. No longer tied to the Soviets, these militaries could now become truly national

²³Rice, 26.

²⁴Ibid., 26.

²⁵Ibid., 229.

instruments of policy. In the process, those neotraditional practices which existed in these militaries could be labeled as manifestations of Soviet dominance and replaced by national traditions built on the concept of professionalism.

Corruption in the East European Armed Forces

The problems of neotraditionalism which existed in the East European militaries were very similar to those experienced in the Soviet Union. As one Polish officer said,

[t]he whole Polish army has never been a bastion of totalitarianism. It was its commanders, the political and party machine, the obsessive propaganda, and the training and moral education in effect at the time that endowed it with such characteristics, but, despite everything, the army always remained in essence the Polish Army.²⁶

This officer is saying that the methods of control used by the Soviets were superimposed on the traditions of the Polish Army. These methods, discussed already, were the sources of neotraditionalism in the military.

The first example of neotraditionalism is the power and privileges of the commander. Just as in the Soviet Union, this power was reflected in the privileges available to the senior military leadership. In Poland, generals were able to be build houses with the use of servicemen as laborers.²⁷

²⁶"Officer Denies Army Was 'Totalitarian Bastion,'" JPRS-EER-91-0913, 31 January 1991, 30.

²⁷"Generals: Living Conditions, Advancement Rewards," JPRS-EER-91-006, 18 January 1991, 22. The author of this article claims that some

Military leaders in the GDR were reported to have special shopping privileges, access to special vacation homes, and cars with drivers. These cars, repaired by soldiers in the motor pool, could be bought for low prices and then sold on the black market for a profit. All this, according to the article, was kept away from public eyes by using national secrecy as a cover.²⁸ At the same time that generals exercised these privileges, soldiers lived in substandard barracks whose origins dated back to tsarist times. Officers finally obtaining housing for their families in the cities, where housing shortages are pervasive, frequently found themselves ordered to new locations where the long cycle of waiting for housing would begin again. Sometimes officers chose family separation rather than attempting to move their families from their precious living quarters.²⁹

In Hungary, the most sensational example of privileges was revealed in a book written by Colonel Dr. Imre Bokor entitled Petty Tyrants in Uniform. In his book, Bokor writes,

generals took advantage of their privileged positions in the 1970s by acquiring housing through questionable practices. "To this day tales are circulating about servicemen quarrying stones in Szydlowiec for two country houses for generals, building materials bought for a pittance, and artificially low invoices for construction operations."

²⁸"Morale Problems Detailed in Armed Forces," JPRS-EER-90-040, 28 March 1990, 14.

²⁹"Officers Discuss Recent Cuts in Military Spending, Other Issues," JPRS-EER-89-040, 13 April 1989, 15.

...similarly to our political and economic spheres, grotesque features have appeared in our armed forces as well. For these adversities rank and file soldiers are not responsible, but those leaders whose *incompetence, subjectivism, egotism, megalomania, looting and extortion* evoked them....During the last decades the *critical spirit was killed in the people by exactly those*, whose interests were that their activities go on unabated and undiscovered....The personality and behavior of Lajos Czinege [Minister of Defense, 1960-1984] has determined this process [of moral and professional deterioration].³⁰

Bokor also accuses then Minister of Defense Colonel General Ference Karpati of questionable methods.

In one of the more dramatic stories related by Bokor, Czinege is accused of establishing a private hunting and wildlife preserve, guarded by an 85 mile long and 10 feet high fence, at Kaszopuszta.³¹ Bokor also writes that evaluations of military exercises were routinely falsified and that senior military leaders were frequently drunk, even in the presence of their subordinates. Finally, Bokor discusses the widespread favoritism present in the military and important to officer promotions.³² In its comments on this book, one Hungarian newspaper said "...it is a miracle that Czinege and his associates were unable to 'beat' the

³⁰Imre Bokor, *Kiskiralyok munderban [Petty Tyrants in Uniform]*, (Budapest: Uj Ido Kft., 1989) 9, 11. Quoted in Zoltan D. Barany, "The Hungarian Army Revealed: Colonel Bokor's Sensational Book," Radio Free Europe Research: Background Report/221, 20 December 1989, 1. Italics are Bokor's.

³¹Bokor, 52-3, cited in Barany, 2-3.

³²Bokor, 59, cited in Barany, 3.

entire Hungarian Army....Even though they managed the spirit, and even scientific development with brakes applied."³³

The power of the commander and the lack of legal protection for military members could also be seen in the use of the personnel for other tasks. These consisted not only of tasks associated with senior military privileges, as discussed above, but also national economic tasks similar to those performed in the Soviet military. Hungarian soldiers assisted in the renovation of the Metro, the Arpad Bridge, the Marx Square overpass, and in the replacement of 625 railroad sidings. In 1986, 200 Hungarian soldiers trained as combine drivers and helped in harvesting crops for one month. In September to November of each year, "...10,000-12,000 [Hungarian] soldiers and 800-1,000 transport motor vehicles participate in the autumn gathering and transport work at state farms and agricultural cooperatives."³⁴

The use of soldiers as a labor force was also facilitated through the organization of military construction units. In Czechoslovakia, special construction units were manned by people of "suspected unreliability," i.e., minorities and "people of strong religious convictions." In Poland, engineer-construction battalions [batalion inzynieryjno-budowlany]

³³"Commentary on Abuse of Power," JPRS-EER-89-131, 28 November 1989, 16-7.

³⁴"Soldiers Used Widely For Agricultural, Construction Work," JPRS-EER-86-174, 14 November 1986, 43.

...are staffed primarily with recruits who are considered politically suspect, and ex-convicts. One Polish respondent who had served in such a unit because of prior involvement with firearms recalled that half of his unit consisted of "alcoholics and other degenerates," while most of the other half had only elementary education. All of the construction units [in Eastern Europe] [had] lax discipline, officer cadres of low quality, very limited military training, and grossly inadequate military skills.³⁵

The power and privilege associated with the command position in socialist countries presented both the reason for and the methods of resisting reform. In Bulgaria, the principle of one-man command and its compatibility with restructuring was discussed in the press. One senior officer said that the commander is the one responsible for leading restructuring efforts.

Restructuring requires every commander resolutely to give up hollow declarations and trite appeals, to face up to vital organizational work with personnel, to be uncompromising in the campaign against shortcomings and to cultivate the creative activism of subordinates.

Unfortunately, that commanders and chiefs are out of touch with personnel, that they are not acquainted with their subordinates and the real state of affairs in the collectives are not isolated facts. Clearly, whenever an officer is not familiar with the situation, he is not sufficiently exacting towards himself and others, he covers up violations, he avoids

³⁵Alexiev and Johnson, 30-1.

frank exchange of opinions, and nonregulation attitudes spring up.³⁶

This theme was echoed by Lieutenant General Ivan Bosev, first deputy chief of the Main Political Administration of the Bulgarian People's Army. Bosev's argument is that one-man command and democracy are compatible, and that in fact the need to make decisive changes requires the existence of one-man command to facilitate action. However, he warns that one-man command requires the commander to set the example rather than place himself above other military members. Officers who violate "communist and military morality" are falsely protected by their military position. "This is why excessive sensitivity to the slightest manifestations of criticism is scarcely a valid defense for one-man leadership."³⁷

Just as in the Soviet case, the absolute possession of power by the commander caused frustration within the noncommissioned officers' and junior officer ranks, demonstrated in their relations with soldiers. Defecting East German soldiers complained about the harshness with which their superiors treated them. Superiors were always ready to punish soldiers. "Even the slightest breach of duty or offense [was] severely punished while, on the other hand,

³⁶"Navy's Deputy Commander Damyanov on Leadership, Restructuring," JPRS-EER-88-046, 13 June 1988, 41-2.

³⁷"Deputy Chief of Military's Political Administration on Restructuring," JPRS-EER-88-021, 9 March 1988, 26.

there [were] cases where rights of the soldiers [were] curtailed." Such actions solidified "negative behavior" and demonstrated the "...contradictions between what was said in political indoctrination...." The result was that "...the experiences in dealing with superiors inhibit the morale of soldiers."³⁸

Noncommissioned officers were particularly stymied by their lack of power and the pressure brought about by their absolute subordination to the officer ranks. Subordinated to the officers and with no decisionmaking powers in their positions above the conscripts, these NCOs were "...hassled from above and from below, they were in the midst of a conflict and were the weakest link in the chain."³⁹ Besides being the subject of senior officers' unreasonable orders, NCOs and junior officers were faced with "mountains of regulations and detailed instructions," killing any initiative the individual may have had and resulting in a superficial approach to his or her work. Frustrated by the situation, these servicemembers often turned to an abuse of their authority, caused "...not necessarily [by] weak moral character and low moral standards, but in many instances the cause (is) [sic] impulsive temperament and excessive limitations of freedom of action."⁴⁰ This article's author

³⁸"Better Treatment Urged For Armed Forces Members," JPRS-EER-85-121, 10 December 1985, 11.

³⁹Alexiev and Johnson, 38.

⁴⁰"Improvement of Image," JPRS-EER-86-025, 25 February 1986, 65.

places the blame for such a situation directly on the company commander, who because of one-man command is responsible for everything within the company and therefore squelches the independence of his subordinates. "Under these conditions, the company commander interferes with everything, dampens the initiative of his aids and turns noncommissioned officers into automatons."⁴¹

From these two accounts it is apparent that restructuring efforts were likely to be stonewalled by some commanders who saw them as a direct attack on their personal power over subordinates. Using the power provided them through the principle of one-man command, they could destroy the initiative of their subordinates and ignore the demands for change placed on them. Their command power ensured that subordinates would have no alternative method of pursuing change.

The political training and education programs of the military ensured the commander's continued monopoly of power and authority. Just as in the Soviet Union, soldiers in Eastern Europe complained that political training was boring and badly taught. In Czechoslovakia,

The soldiers sit in the political education hall and the political officers read from Rude Pravo or something else from the party press. They explain something about Marxism and the

⁴¹Ibid., 66.

Soviet Union and how we [the soldier] should love the Soviets....⁴²

Political training was seen as too formal, with content having little significance. Those who wanted to change this, however, found themselves unable to overcome the lack of communication, or what one junior officer termed "the low passing capacity of service channels for the flow of information" between themselves and their superiors.⁴³ This "low passing capacity" is indicative of the top-down neotraditional command style used by the Soviets and passed on to the NSWP.

The senior officers of the East European militaries faced the Gorbachev reforms with a political apparatus which they could continue to use to spread their view of reform. Their arguments for the status quo centered on the continued NATO threat and the significance of the Warsaw Pact in meeting this threat. But as the rapidly evolving changes in East-West relations occurred, the Warsaw Treaty became an irrelevant argument for resisting military reform. The heroic image argument to which the senior Soviet military leaders had resorted simply was not applicable to the post-1945 militaries of the region. The absence of militarized socialism also limited the reform resistance effort.

⁴²Alexiev and Johnson, 32.

⁴³"Changes in Military Agitprop Training Proposed," JPRS-EER-89-040, 13 April 1989, 17.

Finally, in light of the rapid changes occurring in Eastern Europe, even some senior military leaders were persuaded by reform arguments which said that the end of Soviet dominance would allow the restoration of truly national military formations.

The rapidity with which the events of the summer and fall of 1989 occurred also precluded the military leaders from organizing any attempts to resist reform. This assumes that they would have wanted to actively fight against reform and that they could have found supporters within the military and the civilian population. As already discussed, they were able to stonewall some changes, but with their lack of organization or visible support, reform resistance was overcome by events. However, there were efforts to organize support for reforms within the militaries, both before and after the "peaceful revolutions" of 1989. In Poland, an opposition journal Honor i Ojczyzna (Honor and Fatherland) was formed to "...inform the military and civilian population on opposition and democratic currents in the Armed Forces."⁴⁴ In Hungary, a reform circle within the military, interested in ending party influence in the military, received support throughout the Hungarian military.⁴⁵

⁴⁴"Opposition Journal Targets Professional Officers, NCO Readers," JPRS-EER-89-064, 1 June 1989, 21.

⁴⁵"General Distributes Reform Circle Announcements," JPRS-EER-89-131, 28 November 1989, 7.

In Bulgaria, the Georgi Stoikov Rakovski Officers Legion was formed with the goals of depoliticizing the military, affirming the Bulgarian national system, and establishing legal and social protection for servicemembers.⁴⁶ One legion official lamented the power of the party in determining promotions, and claimed that the *nomenklatura* in the military were blocking reforms even after 1989.⁴⁷ Possessing a reported membership of 11,000 officers, noncommissioned officers and civilians, the legion hoped to end the negative image of the Bulgarian military by raising its level of professionalism.⁴⁸

With a touch of sarcasm they [the legion founders] noted that the organization was not meant to replace the "ramshackle political apparatus" that had existed within the military, a reference to the communist party infrastructure, which was officially eliminated from the armed forces on February 15, 1990.⁴⁹

Despite its stated goals, the secretive mode of operation of the organization led one author to complain that its members

⁴⁶"Draft Program of GS. Rakovski Officers Legion," JPRS-EER-91-014, 1 February 1991, 18-9.

⁴⁷Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Pet'o Boyadzhiev, deputy chair of the Rakovski Bulgarian Officer Legion translated in "Rakovski Legion Official Interviewed," JPRS-EER-91-165, 5 November 1991, 1. Boyadzhiev's comments also reveal the lack of rights existing in the Bulgarian military. "Until we reached the age of 45, we had no right to our own homes or our own opinions should those opinions happen to be different from those of our superiors. We had no right to say 'no'!"

⁴⁸Duncan M. Perry, "A New Military Lobby," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 40 (5 October 1990) 1-2.

⁴⁹Rabotnichesko Delo, February 16, 1990, cited in *ibid.*, 2.

acted like "Freemasons with epaulets" who acted as if they were the sole guardians of the Bulgarian state.⁵⁰

Depoliticization and the Reformation of National Militaries

The "peaceful revolutions" of 1989 meant the end of Soviet dominance over the region's political institutions. The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, unable to engender popular support or to count on Soviet force to maintain their political position, lost their preeminent positions within these societies. New civilian elites, many with histories of dissent against the ruling communist regimes, were now free to transform their governments into democratic, or at least more responsive and representative forms. These changes included reforming the military and were illustrated in two actions taken by these leaders: first, the depoliticization of the armed forces; and second, the establishment of new national security doctrines.

Understanding the significance of these two issues is critical to understanding the militaries' lack of factionalism. Soviet dominance over the region had been through two forms, the party and the military. Within the military, party organizations had played a crucial role in maintaining Soviet, or at least Warsaw Pact, allegiance.

⁵⁰"Rakovski Legion Agreement With Interior Ministry," JPRS-EER-91-073, 31 May 1991, 33.

Problems experienced in the militaries, such as their lack of effective training or lack of commander initiative and responsiveness, were naturally seen as an outgrowth of Soviet dominance, a product of applying the alien, Soviet method of operation on a reluctant national military. Doing away with these methods and reinstating the idea of national security became the central concern of the newly formed governments, and a goal which may have acted to unify many members of the military.

Army reform circles of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) were some of the first to call for departyization of the military.⁵¹ In discussing the military changes needed at the first national conference of the army reform circles, one participant presented his view of the changes required by the military:

It also must be accepted that no individual, group, or party in this country has the right to rule the people and against the people, as some power-hungry maniacs profess. It is the people's exclusive right to decide which party it votes confidence to and what social system and form of state it wants. No individuals or parties, and especially no external forces have the right to overrule or forcefully change this decision.⁵²

⁵¹"Army Reform Circles Support Military Free of Parties," JPRS-EER-89-111, 10 October 1989, 10.

⁵²Letter by Brigadier General (ret) Janos Sebok translated in "MSZMP Reform Circle Within Army," JPRS-EER-8-131, 28 November 1989, 7.

In Poland, a Major called for officers to end their association with the party. According to Major Cezary Solski, "[m]embership in the party makes of us a party army rather than a national army." Further, he said, "[t]he special role of the army as a servant of the society obligates us to sever in practice our ties with any political party or orientation while performing our professional military service."⁵³ Only by ending the party's presence in the military could the democratic process be assured.

Czechoslovakia banned political organizations in the military as of December 31, 1989,⁵⁴ and "[o]ther opposition demands related to the military, such as the abolition of political education for soldiers, were met soon after."⁵⁵ New Czechoslovak laws on military service also ended the use of soldiers in industry and agriculture. According to National Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek, these practices were contrary to the terms of the Geneva Agreements on Forced Labor and would therefore have to be limited, despite the fact that the soldiers' labor had contributed substantially to the national economy.⁵⁶

⁵³Letter by Major Cezary Solski translated in "Army Officer Returns Party Card, Calls for Others to Do Likewise," JPRS-EER-90-009, 24 January 1990, 20.

⁵⁴Radio Prague, 16 December 1989, 11:30 p.m., cited in Jan Obrman, "Changes in the Armed Forces," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 14, (6 April 1990) 12.

⁵⁵Obrman, "Changes," 12.

⁵⁶Rude Pravo, 26 January 1990, 8, cited in Obrman, "Changes," 10-1.

Bulgarian depoliticization was to begin on 15 February 1990, with the Young Communist League organizations and the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of National Defense being disbanded.⁵⁷ In East Germany, action against the Principal Political Administration was taken by the Ministry of National Defense in December, 1989.⁵⁸

Officially ending political control in the region's militaries did not mean that all former party members supported the actions. One anonymous writer complained that changes in Poland were occurring too slowly because too many reformers were passive, waiting for their military superiors to initiate change. Such anticipation was unwarranted, however, because these superiors, having gained positions through *nomenklatura*, were not interested in change but in returning to "the good old days."⁵⁹ Despite such complaints and although depoliticization was not an easy process, it did have considerable support within the services. In summarizing the cadre's position on depoliticization, one author wrote that this support

...emanates above all from the conviction that it is high time we stopped the old practice,

⁵⁷Interview with Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, translated in "Defense Minister Conducts Meeting With Military Attaches," JPRS-EER-90-058, 30 April 1990, 29. Dobrev is the First Deputy Minister of Bulgarian National Defense and Chief of the General Staff.

⁵⁸"Reform in Armed Forces Set in Motion," JPRS-EER-90-012, 20.

⁵⁹"Essay on Political Verification of Officer Corps," JPRS-EER-91-006, 18 January 1991, 18. According to the author, at least 50 percent of military personnel possessed "progressive views" toward change.

as well as certain present-day attempts to confine the battle (or perhaps only the political game) to a pen, weighing down military service with it. The political odium should be removed from the service and the service should also be freed from the pressure of ideological confrontation. The civic education aspect of the service cannot be formed by the mechanisms of current propaganda and agitation, but should appeal to universal national values and should be motivated by the state's defense reasons of state [sic] common to the entire society.⁶⁰

From this comment, it is clear that for many of the citizens, leaders, and servicemembers in these countries, depoliticization was synonymous with building more professional militaries and nationally-driven foreign and national security policies.

Based on these beliefs, the region's new governments acted to build national security policies which would in turn determine the required configuration of their armed forces. This process was not immediate because of the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact and the countries' commitments to the alliance. Nor could the new governments outwardly condemn or blame the Soviets for their problems; Soviet troops remained in the region and the fact that they bordered the Soviet Union deterred Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary from such actions. But the depoliticization of the armed forces and the formation of new national security doctrines were clearly pro-national and therefore anti-Soviet

⁶⁰Article by Lieutenant Colonel Tadeusz Mitek, translated in "Officer Supports Depoliticized Army," JPRS-EER-90-097, 3 July 1990, 9.

statements. Their evolution marked the end of Soviet dominance of the region, and resulted in the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on July 1, 1991. Eastern Europe's position on the Warsaw Pact had been most clearly stated by Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel when he said

...that the pact, in its present form, had not shed its heritage of Stalinism, since all the armies of the member states were subordinated to the Soviet Army. He revealed that, in accordance with the still-secret agreement of 1980 binding the bulk of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces to the Soviet high command (the so-called Wartime Statute), two-thirds of the Czechoslovak Army would be under Soviet command in time of war. This statute is obviously now dead.⁶¹

Havel's comments were made at a press conference following a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee (PCC) held in Moscow on June 7, 1990. At that meeting, Hungary had proposed to gradually eliminate the Pact's military element and to review the Pact's functions, character and operation. It was also suggested that "...those elements of the pact that violated the sovereignty of the member states..." should be eliminated,⁶² an act which set the stage for developing new national security doctrines.

⁶¹Radio Prague, 7 June 1990, 4:47 p.m., cited in Douglas L. Clarke, "Warsaw Pact: The Transformation Begins," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 25, (22 June 1990) 36.

⁶²Nepszabadsag, 9 June 1990, quoted in Alfred Reisch, "Hungary to Leave Military Arm of Warsaw Pact," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 26, (29 June 1990) 21.

National Security in Post-Communist Eastern Europe

With the end of Soviet dominance, each East European country began the process of developing its new national security doctrine. Hungary's reform circles emphasized the need to form a truly national army. Discussing the issue, reform circle member Lieutenant Colonel Bartos said that the army that had existed before the reforms was

...an army of the party state. At the same time progress in the direction of a constitutional state demands that the people's army change into a national army. It also demands that it be free of parties and ideologies, and that it reflects national traditions both in its [substantive] profile and outward appearance. Openness and societal control play an important role in this process, because these matters have an unusual molding effect which act as restraints to anomalies.⁶³

This army should be built on Hungarian traditions, from the types of uniforms worn to the historic and national symbols used. The national influence would be illustrated by changing the name of the Hungarian People's Army to the Hungarian Honvedseg (National Defense Force).⁶⁴

Similar sentiments were voiced by General (ret.) Bela Kiraly when he outlined three factors which would determine

⁶³Interview with Ministry of Defense Public Affairs Division Chief Colonel Gyorgy Keleti and army reform circle member Lieutenant Colonel Imre Bartos, translated in "Military Reform Measures Discussed," JPRS-EER-89-128, 21 November 1989, 21.

⁶⁴Ibid., 21.

the framework for military reform. The first factor was nonpartisanship in the Army, and the military's (and its members') exclusion from politics and decisionmaking. The second factor was the recognition "...that an army may become the nation's army only if in the souls of its officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers a nation consciousness, a commitment to the nation constitutes a live force."⁶⁵ This would require education and training in Hungarian history and traditions, but also the "...ideals, actions and after effects of 1956 also require particular clarification. Following decades of distortion, the proper knowledge of history can be the only foundation for developing a healthy Honved spirit."⁶⁶ The final factor listed by General Kiraly was the need to rapidly improve the nation's economy to ensure democracy's survival.

Poland's military reform also emphasized the need to build a national army. Even during the early Gorbachev years, one author argued that defense policy should be guided by the Constitution and "...by the interests of the Polish nation, its sovereignty, independence and security...."⁶⁷ Only a few years later, this same argument was used by a member of the Sejm Commission on National Defense when he

⁶⁵"Gen. Kiraly's Views," JPRS-EER-91-084, 14 June 1991, 33.

⁶⁶Ibid., 33.

⁶⁷"'Socialist National Defense Theory' Cite in Mysl Wojskowa," JPRS-EER-87-085, 2 June 1987, 72.

said that one of the primary duties of the Polish Army was to "...enable foreign policy to be realized in a way that allows Poland to protect its interests."⁶⁸

The changes affecting Poland's military included the reform of the role of the commander. One participant in the reform effort called for legal protection for the commander, ending the hold of superiors over their subordinates. The commander

...must make decisions without fear of what his superior will say or how he will react. He will be that sort [of commander] when he is backed up by a law that makes him a legal entity, clearly defining his legal status, his duties, and the authority that follows from them.... Please note that what I say does not stand in opposition to discipline, the principle of one person command, which must exist in the Army. If however, a decision lies within the powers of a commander at some level, then there is no reason to look higher. Thus, it is not permissible for officers to be unsure of their legal foundations.⁶⁹

Others, in an effort to ensure legal reform, called for military judges to be selected in a democratic manner, rather than appointed by the Minister of Defense.⁷⁰

The formation of Poland's new defense doctrine required changes in the military's organizational, training and

⁶⁸Interview with Deputy Jacek Szymanderski, translated in "Szymanderski Questions Expenditures," JPRS-EER-90-054, 24 April 1990, 9.

⁶⁹Interview with Deputy Jacek Szymanderski, member of the Sejm Commission on National Defense, translated in "Professionalism, Initiative Called For," JPRS-EER-90-054, 24 April 1990, 10.

⁷⁰"Military Judges To Gain More Autonomy," JPRS-EER-90-005, 11 January 1990, 17.

educational structure. These changes included a depoliticization and deideologization of the educational system, which in turn required a reorganization of the system, and the restructuring of the tactical-operational, staff and institutional centers. Finally, the changes included "...changes in military doctrine giving it a clearly national and even more, a decidedly defensive character...."⁷¹ A new doctrine also required reevaluation of the threat faced by the country, with the result being increased attention to the need to balance defense interests between Germany and the USSR, rather than total attention directed against the West.⁷²

Czechoslovakia's new national security doctrine was to be built around the professionalization and depoliticization of the military.⁷³ The removal of the party from military affairs was demonstrated in the appointment of Lubos Dobrovsky on October 16, 1990, as the first civilian Minister of Defense in more than fifty years.⁷⁴ A new military doctrine was published in 1991. It emphasized the role of

⁷¹"Character of Army as Depoliticized, Deideologized, Viewed," JPRS-EER-90-073, 29 May 1990, 15.

⁷²Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Poland and the Soviet Alliance System," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 26, (29 June 1990) 32.

⁷³See Jan Obrman, "Changing Conditions for the Army and the Police," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 4, (26 January 1990) for additional information. The concept of a professional force was later rejected, based on the expense of supporting such an army. Rude Pravo, 26 January 1990, 8, cited in Obrman, "Changes," 16.

⁷⁴Jan Obrman, "Civilian Appointed New Defense Minister," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1: 45, (9 November 1990) 1.

the commander as an apolitical leader in instilling discipline and developing "...personal responsibility in the spirit of patriotism...."⁷⁵ The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's new military doctrine was said to be based on a fundamental principle: "[t]he sovereignty of the CSFR in resolving all questions concerning preparations for the defense of the state in accordance with the right to self-defense in the spirit of the UN Charter."⁷⁶

The first meeting of the East German Commission for Military Reform was held on November 25, 1989, and called for public participation in the debate over military reform. The Commission called for depoliticization of the armed forces and stated that reform was being demanded by the military themselves, "...because mistakes and unsatisfactory situations were allowed to occur; such practices as excessive regimentation and oppressive authority, which must be thoroughly eliminated...."⁷⁷ According to the Commission, the need for military reform was derived from "...the reasoning of a new military doctrine" and from "the consequences of the disarmament process."⁷⁸ The reunification of Germany, however, was soon to overcome the Commission's plans.

⁷⁵"Country's Basic Military Doctrine Published," JPRS-EER-91-0073, 31 May 1991, 35.

⁷⁶Ibid., 34.

⁷⁷"Military Reform Commission Head Cites Objectives," JPRS-EER-90-006, 17 January 1990, 25.

⁷⁸Ibid., 25.

Even Bulgaria, often considered the Soviet's closest Warsaw Pact ally, moved quickly to adjust their military doctrine around national priorities. Major General Stoyan Andreev, head of the Center for the Study of Problems in the Formulation of the New National Security System, called for professionalization of the military based on his observations of the American armed forces and their performance in the Persian Gulf War. As part of the reform efforts, he noted the need for a new law on the armed forces and called on experts to provide their opinions on how to meet the new challenges facing the nation.

The professionals must give their opinions frankly. What is needed is frank analysis, seriously reasoned from positions of Bulgaria's interests. Enough of this mystery, this supersecrecy, this concealment. What are we hiding? That our emperor has no clothes, that we do not have the intellectual readiness to solve the problems of national security.⁷⁹

Andreev's comments highlight the outsider role previously played by the region's experts in determining their nation's national security policies.

The most significant step in establishing armed forces driven by national prerogatives was the reallocation of troops within each state. In stating the objectives of

⁷⁹Interview with Major General Stoyan Andreev, senior science associate of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and head of the Center for the Study of Problems in the Formulation of the New National Security System, translated in "Military Reform, Gulf War Discussed," JPRS-EER-91-073, 31 May 1991, 31.

Poland's new defense doctrine, the former Minister of State for National Security Affairs, Jacek Merkel, said

[t]his doctrine must be adapted to the new external and internal reality and it must constitute a function of a new state political doctrine. We would like Poland to be a member of the European community. This fact bears consequences for the armed forces as well, for its placement and role in the structures of a democratic, sovereign state.⁸⁰

The result of reevaluating their national security needs was the redistribution of forces within the region, ending what had been the distribution of military forces based on Soviet concerns and Soviet evaluation of the threat. As illustrated in Figure 1, before the dramatic events of 1989, the military forces within the region were stationed within the western portions of the countries, with those in the east frequently consisting of training or less than full strength units.⁸¹

Czechoslovakia's parliament began reviewing the distribution of forces in 1990, when it considered the need to move some troops to the eastern border to fortify its defense.⁸² On April 1, 1992, the new Czechoslovak Central Military Command was to be set up in North Moravia in an attempt to improve national security. In addition, some

⁸⁰"Merkel: Security Council, Other Military Reforms," JPRS-EER-91-041, 2 April 1991, 48.

⁸¹Douglas L. Clarke, "A Realignment of Military Forces in Central Europe," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: 10, (8 March 1991) 41.

⁸²Obrman, "Civilian Appointed," 3.

units in western Czechoslovakia were disbanded, while others were moved from the west to the east. "With the redistribution of troops from west to east, 36 percent of the Czechoslovak Army will be stationed in Slovakia and 64 percent in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, which together make up the Czech Republic."⁸³

In discussing the movements, Major General Divis compared the action to that being executed by Bulgaria. He called the previous distribution of forces against the West one based on an "outdated scenario" and noted that the western threat no longer existed, and thus changes were required. The redistribution of forces into Slovakia and Moravia "...means that we are distributing our Army almost universally over the country's entire territory. This is by no means directed toward a confrontation with any of our neighbors. We are strictly implementing our defensive military doctrine."⁸⁴

Poland's reorganization efforts began in 1991, with the announced establishment of the National Security Council to replace the Committee for the Defense of the Country. The

⁸³"National Redistribution of Army Outlined," JPRS-EER-91-110, 26 July 1991, 7.

⁸⁴Interview with Major General Jiri Divis, Chief of the International Relations Directorate of the Czechoslovak Army General Staff, translated in "General Staff Foreign Affairs Expert Interviewed," JPRS-EER-91-095, 1 July 1991, 13.

Figure 1. Distribution of Polish, Czechoslovakian and
Hungarian Forces Before the End of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization*

*Source: Clarke, 42. According to Clarke, the depiction of Hungarian forces in this figure is based on the old divisional structure used prior to changes instituted in 1987.

Council recognized the need to adopt "...a new conceptual approach to the military, its organization, and its place within the framework of the evolving political system."⁸⁵ The redistribution of troops in Poland was meant to achieve "an equal security structure" on all borders. As announced by Polish Defense Minister Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, "...in the future, one-third of the troops will be stationed in each of the three parts, perhaps with a certain emphasis on central Poland. These zones will then allow us to conduct manoeuvres in various directions."⁸⁶

Finally, Hungary's new government declared its intent to use an "elliptical" (korkoros) defense as a part of a new security doctrine.⁸⁷ This defense would recognize that an enemy could exist in any direction. As part of the changes in strategy, General Laszlo Borsits announced that his country had "...changed the territorial distribution of the Hungarian Army, and now the troops stationed in the western

⁸⁵Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Building a National Security System," Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 2: 24, (14 June 1991) 14.

⁸⁶Quoted in Reuters (Bonn), 27 November 1990, and cited in Clarke, "A Realignment," 42. The previous allocation of Polish forces was reportedly 40 percent in the country's western third, 35 percent in the central, and 25 percent in the eastern thirds. According to General Franciszek Puchala, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff (PAP [in English]) 16 December 1990, cited in Clarke, "A Realignment," 42. PAP is the Polish Press Agency.

⁸⁷State Secretary Ernoe Raffay in an interview on Radio Budapest, 10 October 1990, cited in Clarke, "A Realignment," 43.

and the eastern halves of the country have about equal strength levels."⁸⁸

The Persistence of Neotraditionalism

The disbanding of political organs and introduction of new national security doctrines did not end all neotraditional practices within the armed forces. Many in Poland believed that the Jaruzelski had made a deal with the reformers which allowed the army to survive "...as an enclave of the communist system."⁸⁹ The organization "Viritum" was formed within the ranks of the military and was dedicated to pushing forward reform in the services. This secret organization reportedly included nearly 300 Polish officers, 40 of whom were supposedly dismissed from the service because of their reformist attitudes.

Viritum claims that the restructuring thus far in the Army has been used for dismissing young, independently thinking officers. It is a fact that many former political officers have today switched over to the training instruction or cultural-educational division.⁹⁰

⁸⁸vilag, 14 June 1990, translated in JPRS-EER-90-128, 12 September 1990, and cited in Clarke, "A Realignment," 43-4.

⁸⁹"Officer Regrets Absence of Army Purge," JPRS-EER-91-110, 26 July 1991, 19.

⁹⁰"Personnel, Structural Changes in Army Viewed," JPRS-EER-91-131, 4 September 1991, 25.

Some progress in ending the neotraditionalists' dominance was made with the exit of almost 5,000 colonels and 30 generals from the Polish Armed Forces.⁹¹

In Czechoslovakia, a vetting of the services resulted in dismissal of a number of generals who had served on the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. "People from the former political apparatus, military counterintelligence, the administration of cadres, and those who were active in party organizations..." also left the Czech Army.⁹² In contrast, the power and authority of Hungarian generals was said simply to have been transferred from the old military to the newly formed Honved Forces Command. According to one author, the maintenance of power allowed the senior leadership to operate with continued secrecy and precluded the government's ability to control Hungarian forces.⁹³

Summary and Conclusion

The Soviets controlled the militaries of the Warsaw Pact through a number of overt measures. As a result of this control, the region's militaries did not serve as national militaries, with the role of national security serving as the

⁹¹"Deputy Defense Minister on Army at Turning Point," JPRS-EER-91-149, 4 October 1991, 26. The figure of 5,000 Colonels is difficult to believe, unless it also includes those in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

⁹²"Major General Pezl on State of Army," JPRS-EER-91-136, 12 September 1991, 17.

⁹³"Communist Scheme Alleged," JPRS-EER-91-083, 14 June 1991, 31-3.

primary goal of the organizations, but rather served to execute the security goals of the Pact, as determined by the dominant member, the Soviet Union. The Soviet's control measures also resulted in militaries built along the lines of the Red Army, with the same problems of the Soviet Army appearing in their East European copies.

With the domestic and international changes introduced by Gorbachev serving as a signal to the region's Communist Parties, the Warsaw Pact members were finally given the opportunity to build their own national armed forces and define their own national security objectives. Their first actions included the depoliticization of the military and the redistribution of forces to positions which reflected the countries' true national security concerns. Depoliticization ended the Soviet's most important control mechanism, and from the discussion in this chapter, was also meant to end the negative manifestations of Soviet control. For the East European armed forces, the neotraditionalism present in their organizations was seen by many as a product of Soviet domination; something that would be halted by disbanding Soviet control measures and reestablishing the organizations on a truly national basis.

The armed forces of the region, in contrast to the Soviet experience, were not important elements in establishing socialism in these countries. Militarized socialism did not exist in the region, although some attempt

was made to build militarized societies, particularly in the GDR. In the absence of militarized socialism, the heroic image was one which was built on the post-World War II experiences of Soviet dominance, i.e., a heroic image devoid of nationalism and national historic achievements. If anything, this heroic image was actually a tragic one for the militaries of Eastern Europe, since it was built on embarrassing events such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the absence of a truly heroic image, neotraditional military leaders had nothing to fall back on in their attempts to halt reform. No valid rationale for their inordinate power existed. Whether or not this image can even be called "heroic," it was readily replaced by the new governments with a new image emphasizing national security and the role of these militaries in assuring national defense.

Unlike the Soviet military, the armed forces of Eastern Europe did not identify with the communist regimes of their countries. Without the heroic image which served the neotraditionalists of the Soviet military, these militaries were able to adopt a new national heroic image. This did not preclude splits within the military between those who felt some allegiance to the Soviets or the Warsaw Pact, nor did it end the existence of neotraditional practices within these forces. However, without the time to mount a defense of their power and lacking a heroic image to fall back on, the

neotraditionalists found it difficult to sustain their positions. Popular opinion did not support continued Soviet domination. The new national heroic image was accepted easily by many who served in an organization whose mission is typically defined as "providing national security."

The experiences of the militaries in Eastern Europe provide two important insights into the factional breakdown of the Soviet military. First, that the region's leaders worked quickly to professionalize and depoliticize their own forces demonstrates the importance of these actions in ending neotraditionalism. With this in mind, it is easy to understand why the Soviet senior military leadership would see the same actions as threatening their personal power. Of even more importance is that the absence of the heroic image argument facilitated Eastern Europe's military reforms. This demonstrates the importance and usefulness of the heroic image to the Soviet neotraditionalists, who were able to gain support for their position and compromise their antagonists for an extended period of time through the use of this image.

CONCLUSION

The Soviet military was dominated by a senior officer corps whose power was assured through the fact that all their orders had to be obeyed. No order they issued was illegal, no matter what its content or impact on the organization or its members. This fact allowed them to institute a command-obedience hierarchy in the services which subordinated the individual to his or her superior by denying legal rights to all but the highest ranking officers. The militarized socialism of the Soviet Union provided the leaderships' rationale for using authoritarian measures to command the organization. The absolute power possessed by these leaders led them to institute a personalistic system of control over the Armed Forces. They possessed all power within the organization and this power allowed them to use the military as a source of labor which only they had the right to exploit.

Gorbachev's reform program directly challenged the absolute power of the senior military leadership. These officers realized that Gorbachev's concept of a legal state would mean an end to their absolute authority. In a legal state, individual rights would protect the military member

from the arbitrary and illegal acts of the senior leadership. Recognizing the threat the concept of the legal state was to their power, the senior officers immediately turned to the resources available to them because of their power to try to convince the officer corps to maintain the status quo.

The Soviet military, like other modern militaries, was a neotraditional organization. Jowitt explains that neotraditionalism is a combination of modern and traditional features in one organization, with the traditional dominating the modern. In neotraditional organizations, legitimacy is based on a command-obedience hierarchy able to accomplish tasks, in contrast to the modern concept of legitimacy which is based on legal and rule-bound behavior. Modern militaries, with their command-obedience hierarchy and task of providing national security, are neotraditional organizations. However, most modern militaries operate within a state system which provides legal protection for the individual. The Soviet military, however, did not operate within a system of legal limits. As a result, its senior leadership had begun to equate personal interests with organizational interests. In the absence of a legal standard, these leaders could issue any order and be assured that it would be followed, to include orders which were detrimental to the organization and its junior members, but useful to the leadership.

The Soviet military's neotraditionalism produced a factional breakdown over the issues of reform. The issues which indicate neotraditionalism as the cause of this factionalism include debate over individual rights as opposed to absolute subordination, and personalism and personalistic practices in the place of rational organization behavior. These were in fact the issues debated by the two sides. The senior officers' power meant control, and junior, middle-level officers and noncommissioned officers found they were entirely dependent on the senior leadership in both their personal lives and their careers. These officers had no legal rights. Their absolute subordination to their superiors was reinforced again by the absence of any differentiation between legal and illegal acts by their superiors. They were in essence at the mercy of their military superiors.

The senior leadership exercised their control through the command structure, guided by the principles of command which reinforced their personal power. The neotraditionalists' power was extended and reinforced through the system of edinsonachalie. One-man command both assured the authoritarian methods of administration and checked any attempts to work outside of these methods. The serviceman's lack of legal protection, marked above all by the fact that all superiors' orders were legal and had to be obeyed,

ensured that only the superiors possessed any rights at all. Centralism ensured top-down control.

The product of this neotraditionalist system was an ineffective and inefficient military. Innovation and initiative were completely squelched. Instead of training and maintaining equipment, soldiers and their junior commanders harvested crops, repaired generals' cars and served as work brigades available for senior leaders' personal detail. They also spent hours each week undergoing political indoctrination and training based on the leaderships' concepts of the organization and meant to reinforce the senior leaderships' absolute authority.

The individual officer too suffered frustration because of neotraditionalism. Being a "good" officer was insufficient for promotion. Patronage in assignments and promotions demonstrated the neotraditionalists' personalistic system. Good assignments were handed only to those who had "protectors." Commanders could not command because of the constant concern about repercussions and their knowledge that without legal protection they were not truly in command. Force was the only sure method for ensuring discipline and incidents of dedovshchina illustrated the destruction such disciplinary measures had on the entire Soviet military. At the same time that generals and admirals enjoyed the privileges of private cars and luxurious dachas, other officers struggled to find housing for their families and

commanded soldiers living in sub-standard barracks. As the Soviets frequently remarked, "he who has rights, has more rights."

Young officers and those with technical and legal backgrounds saw Gorbachev's reforms as a means by which they could end the absolute control of the neotraditionalists'. Frustrated by their inability to find personal and career satisfaction and by the poor state of military affairs, these officers recognized that by gaining legal rights they could end the military leaderships' personalistic system, which they viewed as the chief cause of the military's problems, and transform the military into an impersonal bureaucracy with rewards and advancement based on merit. Such an organization would encourage initiative and permit organizational members to work toward organizational goals, instead of fulfilling the personal goals of senior leaders. This transformation required dismantling the mechanisms of the neotraditionalists' control, which the reformers believed required departyization and professionalization of the services.

Glasnost provided the means by which the reformers could dismantle the corrupted system within the services, but the senior leadership responded to the attacks on their power by using their access to the media and to sufficient resources to develop their own newspaper. They made alliances with like-minded individuals and groups. Through these means of

communication, the leaders used the heroic image to deliver their arguments, which were meant to remind the ranks of their place in society and their "proper" subordination to their superiors. They called on soldiers and officers to continue their sacrifice of service with the hope that this would restore their absolute authority, portraying their subordinates' sacrifice as a selfless act of the most noble kind.

The leaders actively resisted departyization and professionalization. They knew that the party elements were their voice. Party training drummed in the superiors' message of subordination and party oversight guaranteed their will was executed. Through political indoctrination and training, military leaders could propagate their perception of the organization, with their all-powerful role a key component of this perception, and justify this perception through party dogma and the heroic image. Past literature on Soviet civil-military relations did not clearly present this function of party organizations in the military and missed the significance of party elements in sustaining the leaderships' control over their subordinates. Kolkowicz was right in his belief that the party elements in the military could serve as intrusive elements detrimental to the formation of a professional force. However, he failed to understand that these elements could be used by the military

leaders to extend their power, and therefore they welcomed the existence of these elements.

Professionalization of the military would require fair treatment of all officers. It would mean that incentives rather than punishment would have to be used to entice people to become servicemembers and to remain in the service. Arbitrary behavior and the use of authoritarian power could no longer be used as methods of control. Individuals possessing legal rights would not be mindlessly obedient to their "masters," the senior officer corps, and would not accept the persistence of these methods. Professionalization would also end the practice of using the military as a labor force. Servicemembers would not voluntarily participate in these practices which hindered their military performance, and within a state system of protecting individual rights, the legality of such practices would be questioned. Low quality, illiterate conscripts, the backbone of the forced labor army, would not be accepted in a professional force. This would improve the military's ability to field high-technology arms and end the discipline problems associated with these troops.

The military's actions during the coup of August 1991 demonstrated the factionalism and internal differences over these issues. Even before that time, Yeltsin had gained supporters among the military ranks, who saw him as the reformer they needed. He had taken a stand against the

neotraditionalists by supporting professionalization of the services and had stated that changes were needed within the senior leadership to end their monopoly of power. By the time of the coup, the senior military leaders had lost their battle for control among a large segment of the Armed Forces.

The militaries of Eastern Europe also suffered from neotraditional practices. This resulted from Soviet domination of the region's militaries, who copied and operated under the Soviets' control mechanisms. The rapid series of events in 1989 which ended this domination allowed the governments of the region to quickly curtail the authoritarian mechanisms of control. This curtailment did not occur without resistance, but the absence of a heroic image for neotraditionalists to fall back on precluded dramatic factionalization of these militaries, a point which emphasizes the importance of the heroic image in the Soviet military's own factional breakdown. Factional splits also were diverted by the vetting of the officer corps in many of these countries and the elimination of officer positions based on the requirements of the new doctrines.

Western analysts failed to appreciate the impact of Gorbachev's reforms on the military. Gorbachev changed the political rules of the game and by doing so, gave the reformist officers an incentive to act. Before Gorbachev, discipline in the military was through negative means. There were no methods for resisting neotraditional practices, even

though these practices were disabling the organization. By establishing individual rights and establishing principles of legality, Gorbachev opened the door for change by allowing the reformers access to the media and the knowledge that they could voice their opinions. They could organize reform groups and participate in legislative debates against neotraditional methods of operation. Now there was recourse for complaints about unjust behavior and arbitrary discipline. Measures were taken to establish legal procedures protecting servicemen against arbitrary actions by their commanders. Pursuing these legal actions could still result in punishment for these reformers, but at least they had some rights; more than they had before Gorbachev, and a vision for more rights in the future.

In his writing on the subject, Jowitt believed that neotraditionalism would hinder the development of Western-style systems, i.e., systems based on legal-rational legitimacy. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, however, neotraditionalism contributed to the end of traditional-charismatic legitimacy and supported the formation of legal-rational systems. The reformers were fighting neotraditionalism. Their cause was to end neotraditionalism because they no longer accepted the arbitrariness of the Soviet command-obedience structure. They viewed the military's corruption as harmful to the Armed Forces, and saw the legal state as the means by which they would gain

individual legal protection against their superiors' abuses. They wanted a rational, impersonal organization; a Weberian bureaucracy within a legal state. Their fight was against the corruption of the armed forces and they recognized the need to destroy the means by which neotraditionalism was corrupted in order to construct a new system.

The concept of neotraditionalism and its operation within the Soviet armed forces demonstrates the shortcomings of the three primary models of Soviet civil-military relations. These models, particularly Kolkowicz's conflict model and Odom's model of consensus, examine the relationship between the party and the army from a macro-organizational perspective. In doing so, they fail to address the vital role that personal power plays in leadership decision making. As a result, Kolkowicz sees the political organization within the military as a threat to the military leadership and its concept of a professional organization. What is wrong with this analysis is that the party elements were a threat only as long as they could be used as a check on the senior military leaderships' personal power. Once these organizations were co-opted by the leadership, however, they were no longer a threat and even became a tool to extend the senior officer corps' power.

A similar assessment can be made of Odom's model. Consensus between the party and the military leadership existed as long as the party leadership did not attempt to

challenge the senior military leaderships' power base. However, when this group interpreted the party's actions as a challenge to their power, as they must have seen Gorbachev's attempts to reform the military and society, the consensual relationship between the two groups ended.

Colton's participation model is an attempt to move from a macro-organizational to a micro-organizational level by examining issues as they relate to the domains of party or military interests. What Colton fails to tell us is why these issues should fall into either domain. Why is it that military promotions and assignments are solely within the military's domain, while major societal issues are the party's domain? Without this understanding, we are unable to explain why issues traditionally falling within the party's domain would suddenly gain the attention and efforts of the senior military leadership, as they did during Gorbachev's reforms.

Again, the concept of neotraditionalism provides a vital clue in understanding these events. The military leaderships' dominance of issues of military punishment, promotions and assignments ensured their continued monopoly of power. As long as this was unchallenged by the party, and as long as militarized socialism assured a quiescent population, these domains could be rigidly maintained. However, when Gorbachev began his reform efforts, he blurred the lines of responsibility for all issues. Suddenly, the

military leaderships' personal power was challenged by outsiders, and societal issues became issues they had to be involved in if they were to succeed in maintaining their personal power. By understanding the role of neotraditionalism in the Soviet military, we can both understand how and why certain issues would fall into the military's exclusive domain, and why Gorbachev's reforms would alter dramatically the importance of the issue to each participant in the political system. Through neotraditionalism, the dynamics of the organization take shape, and the analyst is able to understand and interpret not only the organization's relationship to other political actors, but also the organization's own internal operation.

The case of the Soviet military and its neotraditionalism raises questions about the application of the rational organization model and the monolithic concept of the military. The reformers acted on the interests of the organization and their personal interests. They rejected the tyranny of the senior officers in their control over the organization and individuals' lives. The military's factionalism demonstrates that even within a corporate body differences of opinion may exist, and that these differences may extend beyond personal interests. Personal attitudes may result in differing definitions of the organization, its values and goals. Viewing all organizational members as

identical may rob the analyst of vital insights into how the organization works, or how events may develop in the future.

The military members may have been "conservative realists" in a broad perspective, but value trade-offs led them to choose individual and organizational interests over the need to maintain a tight corporateness. However, they did not see their actions as a threat to corporateness. Rather, they saw reform as a way that both individual and organizational interests could be served. The organization would profit from reform and individuals finally would find their deserved place within the organization. Their goal was to redefine the organization and its goals based on ideals acceptable to the individual and conducive to organization performance.

Neither the Soviet coup of 1991 nor the developments in Eastern Europe in 1989 saw the end of the abuses of neotraditionalism. Not all neotraditional leaders left these militaries, and individuals still sympathetic to neotraditional ideas remained members and even leaders of the military. Neotraditional mechanisms were not immediately dismantled. Having been socialized by the neotraditional system, some officers undoubtedly viewed it as appropriate and efficient, and disliked the loss of power they experienced as a result of the reforms. There is no guarantee that neotraditionalism will not continue to be a problem within these militaries.

The former Soviet republics may be able to follow the examples of the East European countries in forming new national security doctrines and organizing their military forces to parallel these doctrines. In doing so, they too may be able to establish the new combat task of national defense as a replacement for the old heroic image. The Russian Republic, however, faces a more difficult task of ending neotraditionalism. The majority of Soviet officers were ethnic Russians, and as Rash continually emphasizes, the Russian historical tradition was the basis of the Soviet military's heroic image. The battles glorified within this heroic image were often battles fought to expand Russian influence. For the Russians, the end of the Soviet Union represents a defeat of the heroic image. Constituting a new Russian military and national heroic image from the remnants of the Soviet officer corps, with much of its neotraditional values intact, will represent a significant challenge for the new Russian leaders.

Hierarchical systems such as the military, which also stress extreme discipline, may be particularly prone to corruption. By providing legal rights and measures to ensure their application, along with establishing outside review bodies such as independent legislatures and inspectors, militaries fight against power corruption. The Soviet and East European militaries are working toward these types of oversight arrangements. It is too early to tell how

successful these efforts will be. However, the formation of a legal state in these countries provides a basis for curtailing the senior officers corps' authoritarian power and abuses by establishing a legal code which guarantees individual rights and transforms absolute into relative subordination.

APPENDIX

GORBACHEV'S PROGRAMS OF REFORM: A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY

1985

- March Gorbachev named General Secretary of the Communist Party
- April Deployment of SS-20 in Europe announced
- May Measures of anti-alcohol campaign announced
- June US-Soviet talks held in Washington to discuss situation in Afghanistan
- July-
August Major personnel changes occur in Central Committee
- November Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting held in Geneva

1986

- February 27th Party Congress held in Moscow. Gorbachev's political report notes political and economic problems in the country and need for changes. Emphasized the need for truth in evaluating the current situation and called for strengthening socialist democracy
- April Nuclear reactor at Chernobyl explodes
- October Reykjavik summit with President Reagan at which the subject of major arms control measures is broached

1987

- January Central Committee Plenum held. Gorbachev stresses program for democratization and warns military that they too are part of the restructuring program

May Mathias Rust lands airplane in middle of Red Square. Event results in changes in Ministry of Defense to include naming of new Minister of Defense, General Yazov

June Central Committee Plenum held. Gorbachev announces Party Conference to be held. Yazov made candidate member of Politburo

Supreme Soviet enacts law giving citizens the right of legal appeal against actions of public officials in violation of their rights

November Secretary of State Schultz and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze agree to medium-range missile ban

December Gorbachev and Reagan sign treaty on medium-range nuclear missile (INF)

1988

January New law on "self-accounting" of state enterprises put into effect

February Gorbachev announces withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan to begin in May

April Geneva accords on Afghanistan agreement announced

May Soviet troops begin withdrawal from Afghanistan

May-
June Reagan visits Moscow

June-
July 19th All-Union Communist Party Conference held in Moscow. Gorbachev's speech includes discussion on need to include citizens in governing country and stresses the concept of socialist legality, law and order. Gorbachev proposes new government system to include office of President and new representative Congress of People's Deputies

July Central Committee Plenum. Gorbachev continues his call for reform

October Gorbachev elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

November Estonia declares its sovereignty

December Gorbachev addresses General Assembly of United Nations. He announces unilateral military cuts. Marshal Akhromeev resigns as Chief of the General Staff, but later takes position as special adviser to Gorbachev

1989

February Czechoslovakia announces Soviet troop withdrawal

March Elections held for Congress of People's Deputies; several Party candidates are defeated

Ministry of Defense announces university students are now excluded from draft

April Demonstrations in Tbilisi result in deaths of 19 people at hands of military troops commanded by General I. Rodionov

Central Committee is purged with nine generals and marshals losing their seats

Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the 20th CPSU Congress, which outlined Stalin's crimes against the people, is published

Declaration "On the treatment of the life and actions of the Armed Forces in the central press," which criticizes media coverage of the military, published

May Congress of People's Deputies holds first session; Gorbachev elected President

New law legalizing strikes proposed

June-
July Supreme Soviet reviews Gorbachev's ministerial nominations; Yazov faces a contentious confirmation hearing

July Warsaw Pact summit in Bucharest; Gorbachev announces member states to pursue their own forms of socialism

Formation of Inter-Regional Group within Congress of People's Deputies to support liberal reforms; membership includes Yeltsin

August Mazowiecki, a non-party member, elected prime minister of Poland

Officers Assemblies founded

September Hungary opens border with Austria

October Gorbachev meets with East Germany's Honecker and delivers what appears to be a warning about the need to reform

Leipzig citizens begin demonstrating for democracy in East Germany

Warsaw Pact summit in Warsaw; members declare right to choose own socialist paths, officially ending hold of Brezhnev Doctrine

November Berlin Wall falls

Governing Party officials resign in Czechoslovakia

December Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta

Second Session of Congress of People's Deputies held

Riots begin in Timosoara, Romania which lead to eventual fall of government and execution of Ceausescu

Non-party member Havel becomes President of Czechoslovakia

1990

January Troops occupying Baku in effort to halt Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict kill at least sixty people

February Central Committee Plenum. Gorbachev calls for multiparty system

Supreme Soviet passes draft law expanding Presidential powers

March Congress of People's Deputies passes law expanding Presidential powers and nullifies Article 6 of Constitution, which gives the Communist Party the leading role in governing the country

Lithuania declares independence

- Congress of People's Deputies reelects Gorbachev president
- Gorbachev forms Presidential Council
- Czechoslovak National Assembly renames the Czechoslovak People's Army the Czechoslovak Army
- May May Day parade protesters jeer at government officials in viewing position above Lenin's Mausoleum
- Bush-Gorbachev summit in US
- Miklos Vasarhelyi, a founding member of the Alliance of Free Democrats and a deputy to the Hungarian parliament, proposes that parliament pass a resolution reinstating the decision of the 1956 Hungarian government to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact
- July 28th Communist Party Congress in Moscow. Yeltsin resigns from Party
- Ukraine declares its sovereignty
- August Armenia, Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan declare independence
- September Gorbachev-Bush summit in Helsinki
- Krasnaia zvezda announces Ministry of Defense order "Ob ispol'zovanii sluzhebnykh dach" [On using official dachas], based on Council of Ministers resolution passed in June, which states that personnel using MOD dachas must pay fees and military personnel will not be used to service the facilities
- Gorbachev announces support for radical economic plan authored by Shatalin
- Four-powers treaty signed in Moscow implicitly allows reunification of Germany
- Supreme Soviet grants Gorbachev power to rule by decree
- Presidential decree "On the Reform of the Political Organs of the Armed Forces, the State Security Troops of the USSR, the Internal Troops of the

Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Railway Troops" issued; results basically in name change of military political organs

October Germany is reunited

Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agree to reduce conventional arms in Europe

Supreme Soviet passes law on multiparty system

Czechoslovakian President Havel appoints Lubos Dobrovsky new Defense Minister, the first civilian to hold the post in more than 50 years

November Gorbachev addresses military group and pledges he will maintain unity of union and military

Supreme Soviet approves reorganization of government to include representatives of republics

Draft Union Treaty is circulated with proposed name change of Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics

Soviet soldiers authorized to use force when attacked by citizens

Presidential decree "On Measures to Implement Proposals of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers" issued in attempt to halt dedovshchina

Lopatin publishes military reform plan as rival to Ministry of Defense plan

December Fourth session of Congress of People's Deputies opens with concern about disruptive spread of nationalism

Shevardnadze resigns post as Foreign Minister with warning about coming dictatorship

Shchit union program adopted

1991

January Violence erupts in Latvia when security troops attempt to capture strategic buildings

Ministry of Defense announces it is sending paratroop units to republics to enforce draft call-up and find deserters

- Violence erupts in Lithuania when troops attempt to capture television broadcasting facility
- February Beginning on 1 February, army assists regular police in patrolling the streets of major cities (order signed 29 December)
- Military holds mass demonstration in Manege Square to protest Union Treaty, cuts in military, and reform efforts
- Conservative groups, to include Soyuz, meet to form a "national salvation" group with goal of maintaining Union
- April Soviet Committee on Constitutional Compliance rules invalid military regulations requiring officers to carry out CPSU policy and to follow CPSU orders
- June Soyuz issues statement on Union Treaty calling for its submission to Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies for approval prior to being forwarded to republics
- Rash publishes "Conservative Manifesto" in Den'
- General Lieutenant Viktor Shilov, Commander in Chief of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces (SGSF) announces that last Soviet military personnel will leave Hungary on June 19
- Boris Yeltsin elected President of Russian Republic through popular election
- July Remaining six members of Warsaw Pact formally dissolve the alliance
- August Military reports draft dodging has grown 18-fold over past 3 years
- Coup takes place; Generals Yazov and Varennikov are direct participants

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