



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**INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES**

BY

GARRETT JONES
United States Department of State

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
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Garrett Jones
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Douglas H. Dearth
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

ABSTRACT

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With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been reinvigorated as a forum for the maintenance of world peace. The trend at present is clearly toward a more proactive stance, with the United Nations becoming involved in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking efforts. With this proactive stance has come an increasing need for intelligence support to United Nations activities. This study examines some of the problems associated with such an effort and possible structures and processes which can be implemented by both the United Nations and the United States. The key conclusions drawn by the study are that an intelligence structure within the United Nations needs to be established, with an emphasis toward making the process available to all members of the United Nations, while permitting individual countries to limit their involvement and protect their own unilateral interests. Within the United States government, a central structure needs to be established under the DCI to properly support United Nations activities as a U.S. policy tool, while effectively protecting U.S. intelligence community equities.

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INTRODUCTION

On September 21, 1992, President Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly and endorsed the increased involvement of the United Nations in peacekeeping efforts in strife-torn areas of the world. During his address, President Bush called upon the United Nations to entirely reorganize the manner by which it establishes and maintains its peacekeeping forces around the world; from the joint training of military forces especially designated for peacekeeping operations by individual United Nations members, to the establishment of a permanent logistical and intelligence structure to support United Nations peacekeeping forces once deployed to the field.

President Bush went on to offer United States assistance and support in establishing a permanent structure to support peacekeeping efforts to include the use of Fort Dix, New Jersey, as a possible home for a revitalized United Nations effort.¹ On 1 December 1992, President Bush ordered the commander of the United States Central Command to be prepared to deploy troops to Somalia at the head of a United Nations coalition to assist with international humanitarian efforts.

In a report to the Security Council in January 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali came out forcefully for preventive diplomacy and increased United Nations peacekeeping efforts, and where necessary, peacemaking efforts under the aegis of Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.² The Secretary General followed

up his report with a press conference in March 1992, in which he stated that "If we want to have preventive diplomacy, we will need our own intelligence".³

Despite these developments, the argument rages regarding whether; where, when and how the United Nations should engage in peacemaking and preventive diplomacy efforts in the world's trouble spots, indeed, if such a proactive stance is even "legal". Experts can reasonably argue that international law permits a state to be convulsed by an extraordinarily destructive, yet utterly legal, conflict.⁴ Indeed, many of the United Nations peacekeeping actions have been accompanied by legal challenges in the International Court of Justice presented by one or more aggrieved parties to the United Nations actions.⁵ While the debate continues, international public opinion generally seems to support intervention, at least in situations such as those which have shattered Somalia. If misery, hunger and disease are to be the minimum criteria for armed intervention, a brief scan of the daily newspaper, much less the proclamations of pundits, would indicate that peacekeeping is a "growth industry", at least in the context of the United Nations.⁶

While the discussion of the appropriate role for United Nations peacekeeping/peacemaking efforts in individual situations, in each case a uniquely framed political matter, is beyond the scope of this paper, a reasonable assertion can be made that such efforts will increase in number and scope for the foreseeable future. It can also be reasonably asserted that there will be a

proportional increase in the need for timely and accurate intelligence to support the activities of United Nations forces deployed to potentially dangerous and unstable areas, if these efforts are to be effective and successful.⁷ As noted by both President Bush and Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, intelligence support to United Nations activities needs to be established on a permanent and professional basis. This paper will examine some of the problems associated with providing intelligence support to United Nations activities and possible responses which could be implemented by the United States government and the U.S. intelligence community.

NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The need for intelligence to support the decisions of national leaders and the formulation of national policy is one of the oldest tenets of statecraft. From Sun Tzu to Churchill, when given the choice, any leader of good sense prefers reliable, focused intelligence to ignorance. This is no less true in the context of a United Nations coalition of forces on a peacekeeping mission, than in a bilateral clash of armies in the Fulda Gap. From the earliest experience of United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the Congo, participants have complained about the lack of well coordinated and professional intelligence support.⁸ In the absence of a formal United Nations effort to remedy the problem of timely intelligence information, from at least as early as the Congo experience, the individual participants on the ground have cobbled

together an intelligence structure to meet their needs with the resources on hand.⁹ With the end of the Cold War and the increased pace and scope of United Nations efforts to bring order to an increasingly fragmented world, the time has come to put the intelligence support for United Nations efforts on a professional and permanent basis. The traditional role of the United Nation has focused on peacekeeping, but a revitalized United Nations is now involved in a range of activities, from pre-war preventive diplomacy to post-war peace building.¹⁰ While each of these activities is different, they share the common goals of stability and peace.

Each activity, likewise, would benefit from timely intelligence appropriate to its needs: from targeting information for the forces of Desert Storm, to political intelligence for the negotiations in Bosnia, to geographical and cultural data for the commanders in Somalia. While the multi-national complexion of an activity, be it a United Nations humanitarian activity, an "ad hoc" military coalition or a regional organization's policy decision, greatly alters its political context, it has little impact upon the task-oriented needs for intelligence to support the activity.

Intelligence is, at its foundation, task-oriented. Academic research for the pure love of learning is not intelligence. Academic research for the purposes of assisting in the formulation of a national foreign policy can well constitute intelligence of great value to the policymaker. In more prosaic terms, targeting intelligence is required for putting steel on target and it matters

little whether it is being used by a United Nations force, a coalition of multi-national forces or a single country's army. The task is the driving force behind the need for intelligence. In a United Nations coalition, only the complexity of the process and the architecture of the information flow are different.

As the United Nations becomes less of a "talking shop" and more task-oriented, the need for intelligence will grow. The type of intelligence needed will be the same as that needed by any individual sovereign country attempting to complete the same task. Likewise, as the United Nations continues to develop into an ongoing and major player on the world scene, its requirement for an ongoing intelligence function will also grow, much as would any sovereign country which recently became an effective player on the international stage.

COMMON POLICY GOALS

A fundamental assumption underlying any support by the United States government to the activities of the United Nations is that the United Nations' efforts coincide with United States interests. There appeared to be a consensus among senior Bush Administration advisors that the United Nations umbrella could play a useful role in furthering U.S. interests, witness the Gulf War and Somalia. There also appears to be a growing consensus among national security and foreign policy experts that the United Nations can serve as a forum to rally world support in the face of aggression

and instability, hopefully alleviating some of the burden from the U.S. of attempting to be the world's policeman.¹¹

Recommendations by a select commission of foreign policy experts to President Clinton include specific policies advocating a more active role in providing U.S. government support to United Nations activities and more closely integrating U.S. diplomatic and military efforts with those of the United Nations. The commission also identifies U.S. support for United Nations peacemaking/peacekeeping as a national security objective which should be supported by policy changes and reorganization of appropriate government agencies.¹² Thus the question of intelligence support by the U.S. to United Nations peacemaking/peacekeeping efforts should more correctly be framed as intelligence support to United States policy interests, not an intelligence liaison relationship with an international organization.

This is, perhaps, a more important point than is evident at first blush. All major intelligence services, and U.S. intelligence services in particular, operate their liaison relationships on the basis of net gain. Specifically, any liaison relationship is only justified if more is received from the relationship than is given. U.S. policymakers cannot permit the question of support to United Nations efforts to be framed in this manner. Rarely will the U.S. intelligence community receive more information than it gives when supporting a United Nations effort. The determination to support any particular United Nations effort

with U.S. intelligence information is a policy determination. The U.S. intelligence community must then act in support of this decision. While it is incumbent upon the U.S. intelligence community to warn policymakers of the potential risk of providing a particular item or category of information outside of the U.S. government, the ultimate determination is made by the policymakers. Any other approach constitutes an abdication of responsibility by the policymakers and an unwarranted assumption of policy control by the U.S. intelligence community.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONCERNS

United Nations efforts are, by definition, those of a coalition of nations of varying interests and concerns which act in concert to accomplish a specific task. In contrast, the activities of a country's intelligence services are the most intimate secrets a nation possesses. Often a United Nations coalition will consist of nations which were recently locked in mortal struggle, such as the U.S. and Russia, or nations which may yet come to blows, such as India and Pakistan. For an intelligence service to attempt to share information in such a forum, while continuing to remain effective as a guardian for its own country, raises serious and legitimate questions.

Overt Intelligence

For the purposes of this study, overt intelligence will be considered to be that material reasonably available through public

or open sources which requires only the diligent work of capable people to put into a useful and coherent form. Examples of this would be publicly available maps, academic studies, published government statistics, meteorological information and historical studies of a country or region. Most major intelligence services, to include those of the U.S., maintain relatively large staffs to research and collate this type of information into useable databases. Due to the nature of the sources of this information, this data is reasonably available and replicable to anyone with the resources and time to do the necessary research.

As a consequence, until the overt information is synthesized with covert information, there is little concern over the release of such information to other parties by most intelligence services. The methodology and cost of releasing or providing this information to another organization remains a legitimate worry. Intelligence resources are always finite, and the efficient passage of overt information without duplication or excessive cost will always remain a goal and concern of the managers of an intelligence service. Thus in this instance, sensitivity will be, for a large part, cost-driven.

Covert Information

For the purposes of this study, covert information will be considered to be that information which is obtained through clandestine methods and sources whose existence it is desirable to

conceal in order to protect the source or the capability to collect the information. Also included in this category is overt information which has been synthesized with covert information to produce analysis of a situation, event or person. The inadvertent release of covert information is every intelligence service's worst nightmare. The purposeful release of covert information outside its own government raises concerns of the first magnitude for any intelligence service.

Intelligence Requirements

Intelligence requirements, for the purposes of this paper, are defined as the questions which the ultimate consumer of the intelligence wants answered and questions which the intelligence service needs answered in order to refine or generate its product for the consumer. The intelligence process operates on feedback. Without feedback, the consumer is poorly served, and the intelligence service must grope to define the question instead of seeking the answer. The sensitivity of intelligence requirements cannot be overstated. Simply by knowing what questions an intelligence service is asking and how these questions are framed, an intelligent observer can discern much about the capabilities or lack of capabilities of a particular intelligence service.

Protection of Sources and Methods

In some instances in intelligence work, the mere knowledge that a source of information exists on a particular subject is sufficient to doom the continued existence of the source. Whether the source is human or technical, the cost and effort required to

develop a productive intelligence source can be lost if the product is shared or used improperly. Likewise, the sharing of intelligence product gives the consumer of that product some insight into the capabilities or lack of capabilities of the intelligence service which produced the product. Of equal concern, the use of covert intelligence, even in a responsible manner, can lead the target of the covert collection effort to deduce over time the capability and sources of the intelligence service providing the information. This can then lead the target to take effective measures which can frustrate the collection of further information.

This process is clearly documented in the United Nations' recent efforts to monitor Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) on arms control. Efforts by the United Nations Special Commission's on Iraq (UNSCOM) to verify compliance were supported by U.S. intelligence information. A report commissioned by the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency reveals that "Iraq learned much about the limitations of Western intelligence-gathering during the inspections." The report goes on to state that prior to Iraq's observing UNSCOM activities, which were largely based upon intelligence provided by the U.S., the Iraqis assumed that U.S. intelligence was far more capable than it in fact was. Initially, the Iraqis declared the locations of far more weapons than would have been the case had they known the U.S.'s real capabilities. As the Iraqis became aware of U.S. intelligence limitations, they endeavored to conceal more and more information from the UNSCOM inspectors.¹³

While there is an age old tension between the producers of intelligence who wish to protect their sources and the consumers of intelligence who wish to make use of the information, this tension is multiplied in a situation where a national intelligence service provides information to an international coalition. When an intelligence service provides information within in its own government, there is some possibility of influencing the ultimate use of the information or at least educating the user as to risks involved. This influence potentially disappears when the information is provided to an international body where the ultimate user or consumer may have no training as to the risks or no regard for the consequences to a source. This problem is also clearly documented in UNSCOM's experience in Iraq.¹⁴ For these reasons intelligence services through the ages have scrupulously guarded access to their intelligence products, following Sun Tzu's admonition: "of all matters none is more confidential than those relating to secret operations".¹⁵

Security and Counterintelligence

Intelligence officers process and handle intelligence. While this seems to be a resounding statement of the obvious, it means that if the U.S. intelligence community is to support United Nations efforts, at some point U.S. intelligence officers will come into contact with foreign intelligence officers. Any contact by any member of an intelligence service with any member of another

intelligence service leads to some lifting of the veil of secrecy from both services. Intelligence officers are by nature inquisitive and will engage in their calling of seeking information from habit if nothing else. Whether this results in the latest gossip on who the chief of the service's new girlfriend is, to the revelation that the man across the table is deeply unhappy and looking for help, some information will flow from each party. For this reason, the U.S. government strictly controls the contact between members of its intelligence services and members of foreign intelligence services, requiring regular reporting of contacts as well as limiting those contacts which are permitted to take place.

Another very cogent reason for this practice is to limit the different versions of a particular piece of information available to those outside the U.S. government. In many cases, when intelligence is shared outside the U.S. government, the version released is not as complete as that in the possession of the U.S. intelligence service. This is often done for the very legitimate purpose of protecting sources and methods. If, however, the same request can be made to different parts of the U.S. intelligence community, and if the answers to these requests are uncoordinated, then the requestor may well be able to piece together a complete picture of the situation or source by virtue of the tone and content of the various responses. The writer has personally observed this tactic put into action by the intelligence services of several long time "allies" of the U.S.

As outlined above, the need for intelligence to support United Nations activities is real, and the concerns of the U.S. intelligence community in becoming involved in such activity are legitimate. How then to resolve this conflict? A well defined structure and a clearly delineated process appear to be two good places to start.

STRUCTURE, PROCESS AND LEGITIMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Legitimacy

During the research of this topic, voluminous material was found to have been written on United Nations peacekeeping efforts, experiences and problems. Except for two brief references, no descriptions have been found in the open literature of intelligence support to current or past United Nations peacekeeping efforts. While it is commonly acknowledged in private conversation that such intelligence support to United Nations efforts has been provided by many nations over the years, the subject remains politically sensitive. The sensitivity on this subject appears strongest in the Third World or lesser developed members of the United Nations. Their concern seems to be that involvement by the United Nations in the intelligence business will, in some way, legitimize the practice of espionage against their countries by the more developed members of the United Nations (read the Western Powers and Russia), and hence such a practice could become a threat to their individual sovereignty. This concern is not well thought out. Any country capable of conducting espionage against another member of the

United Nations will do so based upon what it perceives as its own self interest; with or without any sanction or encouragement by the United Nations.

A mind-set within the membership of the United Nations must be overcome in regard to intelligence support to all United Nations activities. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has already called for a new look at the function of standing United Nations organizations with a specific recommendation that a wide ranging early warning function become a standing requirement of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.¹⁶ This change of mind-set among United Nations members should become a goal of U.S. diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. While the U.S. and other Security Council members can cause an ad hoc intelligence arrangement to occur when and where they care to, until this activity is accepted as a legitimate and necessary part of United Nations activity, intelligence support will remain an unsatisfactory and burdensome exercise. One method of assisting in the acceptance of this new concept is to ensure that any member country that wishes to do so may assist to the extent it desires in providing intelligence support to a specific United Nations activity. A specific recommendation in this regard is outlined below.

The Process

While in a perfect world, the establishment of an independent United Nations intelligence service may have merit, the sheer political problems such a move would face from all corners makes such an idea impractical. Few countries, including the United

States, are likely to support and fund a potential competitor on the intelligence scene, especially if such a competitor could at some point in the future be targeted against them.

If we discard as impractical the concept that the United Nations could create and run its own intelligence service in support of its world-wide activities, then we are faced with drawing upon the product of the intelligence services already maintained by member countries of the United Nations.¹⁷ In that regard, it would be useful to introduce the concept of a "donor nation" providing intelligence support to United Nations activities. Much as "donor nations" now provide funds and supplies to charitable non-governmental agencies around the world for the relief of countries stricken by drought and famine, a "donor nation" providing intelligence support to United Nations activities would do so voluntarily and on a case-by-case basis.

If the "donor nation" decides that it wishes to support a specific United Nations activity, it would make its intentions known to a central United Nations body and forward to the central body whatever intelligence data it believes would be useful to support the United Nations activity. (For the purposes of this study this central intelligence body is referred to as "headquarters".) The headquarters staff would then forward this data to those United Nations personnel on the ground who can make use of the information. In a similar manner, United Nations commanders or personnel could forward to the headquarters staff intelligence requirements in support of their activities. These

requirements, in turn, could then be forwarded to "donor nations" who have indicated a desire to support the United Nations activity in question. The "donor nation" could then respond or not as it sees fit and respond in the degree and detail it believes consistent with the protection of its own intelligence service's equities and assets.

By separating the "donor nation" from the ultimate consumer, the "donor nation" will retain a degree of control over what and how intelligence is passed and to whom. This could result in a situation where a "donor nation" may well support a specific United Nations course of action, but object to the command or civilian supervisor of the United Nations personnel on the ground. For example, assume that there is an Indian general commanding a United Nations peacekeeping force somewhere in the Third World. The Pakistan government supports this United Nations action, but is concerned about sharing any of its intelligence product with an Indian military officer, in whatever temporary guise. Using the concept of a "donor nation", the Pakistan government could still signal its intention of supporting the United Nations activity and provide whatever intelligence support it was comfortable with during the tenure of the Indian general. When the Indian general is replaced with, say, a Canadian general, Pakistan could then increase its level of intelligence support without public comment or controversy by forwarding more intelligence and being more responsive to intelligence requirements from United Nations personnel in the field.

As with any international effort or coalition, the "comfort level" of the individual governments is a real and important factor in the success of the effort. Maintaining a satisfactory "comfort level" within the context of United Nations action is simplified using the concept of voluntary "donor nations". A "donor nation" seeking its "comfort level" need only find the point where its own self-interest in seeing the United Nations effort to a successful conclusion crosses with its concerns of providing intelligence support to an international body.

As indicated, one of the most important factors in obtaining and maintaining the legitimacy of intelligence support to United Nations activities is ensuring that all member nations who wish to participate may do so. However desirable this may be, it is axiomatic in the intelligence field that the more people who are involved, the harder it is to maintain security. While "donor nations" may believe it worthwhile to share their intelligence information with United Nations personnel implementing an activity which they support, they are unlikely to want the degree and specifics of their intelligence support made a matter of public record.

If we make the assumptions that the personnel manning the United Nations headquarters and field staffs can be trained to be discreet and that a minimum of physical security procedures can be put into place, then the prime vulnerability of the concept of "donor nations" lies in the secure transmission of the information to and from the United Nations headquarters. Associated questions

are: How can the United Nations ensure that intelligence provided to it from a "donor nation", in fact, originated from the intelligence service of the donor nation and not with an opposition political faction or unauthorized civilian source; and how can a "donor nation" ensure that a request for intelligence actually originated with the United Nations?

The traditional answer to the problems of secure transmission and the validation of originator is to create a secure communications system, complete with cryptographic keys and equipment. While effective, this solution is expensive and burdensome, hardly conducive to encouraging even the poorest and least technically developed members of the United Nations to participate in the process.

Technology and recent academic advancement provide a cheaper, simpler and perhaps better answer. In 1977, three Massachusetts Institute of Technology mathematics professors described an encryption system which operates using a publicly available key and algorithm. This system, called RSA encryption after the initials of the three mathematicians, permits a sender to encrypt a message using a published key and algorithm and transmit the message securely via computer modem. When the receiver decrypts the message, the sender's unique personal "signature" verifies the origin of the message. While the algorithm is theoretically breakable, estimates are that it would take several million years of computer time to effect a solution. The system is based upon a "trapdoor function" by which the published algorithm easily

encrypts the message, but the decryption algorithm is unique and in practice impossible to identify. The system is easy to use and operates very well on commercially available personal computers.¹⁸ Thus, if a country wishes to provide intelligence support to a United Nations activity, it need only once obtain the proper algorithms and associated software. Then using a commercially available personal computer, computer modem and commercial telephone lines, it could securely send intelligence to the United Nations staff and receive secure messages and intelligence requirements from the same central body.

The hardware and the procedures are within the budget and technical ability of all United Nations members, thus opening up the intelligence support role to all members of the United Nations instead of restricting it to those nations with the resources to support large and complex intelligence services. This inclusion of all members of the United Nations should go far to making the concept of intelligence support to United Nations activities much more acceptable to the lesser developed members of the United Nations.

Structure

Questions remain regarding what structure within the United Nations is necessary to support this process and where such a body should be placed within the existing United Nations organization. The United Nations charter specifically authorizes the Security Council to maintain peace and security, and from this authorization, all United Nations peacekeeping efforts have drawn

their mandate.¹⁹ It is logical then that a United Nations intelligence support body would be best placed under the auspices of the Security Council, with the Secretary General as its administrative head. This would permit the Security Council to make intelligence support part of each authorization for United Nations peacekeeping/peacemaking efforts, while permitting the Secretary General to blend the intelligence support into the overall political and military equation. As to the composition of the body, three vital functions emerge: communications, clearinghouse and documentary.

A communications section will need to be established so information from "donor nations" can be received and sent to United Nations personnel in the field and intelligence requirements forwarded from the field through the headquarters to donor nations for satisfaction. Additionally, this communications section will need to manage the RSA encryption system or whatever other system is selected to ensure the security of communications.

A central clearinghouse section will be necessary to match incoming intelligence from donors to field recipients and incoming intelligence requirements with donors who may be willing and able to provide the information. This section will also need to sort overt from covert information, propaganda from real information, as well as providing physical security for the intelligence information in the United Nations headquarters and establishing guidelines for the handling of the information in the field. While sorting overt information from covert information and real

information from propaganda begs the question of intelligence analysis, it is probably a question that is best left unasked until the entire process and structure are more mature. While some sort of intelligence analysis capability is a logical compliment to the intelligence support problem, it raises a host of political problems similar to those associated with the entire question of intelligence support to United Nations activities.

The issue of who will have access to the intelligence information within the United Nations is highly sensitive. The Secretary General, the United Nations personnel in the field and the staffs of the permanent members of the Security Council are probably a politically necessary minimum. Other interested parties will need to be negotiated on the basis of simple administrative manageability, cost and the restrictions placed on dissemination of the intelligence by the "donor nations." This aspect of the problem is again one which will likely be solved over time. By settling the initial question of legitimacy of intelligence support, access to the intelligence can be approached on the basis of "who needs to know." If the permanent members of the Security Council can agree on a "need to know basis" for the information, then other members of the United Nations are likely to fall into line or face irrelevance.

A documentary section is necessary from a cost and efficiency standpoint. By retaining a properly catalogued and securely stored record of information previously shared by "donor nations", the United Nations need not begin at zero when faced with a requirement

for information on a potential area of strife. Collation of such information again begs the question of intelligence analysis, but if styled as "library research", much of the political controversy may be avoided.

A hidden concern which may well be raised by the establishment of a documentary section but applicable to all the sections discussed, is that of control. Knowledge is power. The "donor nations" and the permanent members of the Security Council will undoubtedly wish to institute some sort of safeguards to ensure that information they are providing and have provided in the past is not misused or used against them to their disadvantage.

Perhaps the simplest way to resolve this problem is in the selection of the staff of all sections. Those member countries capable of providing accurate and timely intelligence across the board, and hence having the greatest stake in the proper use of the information provided, are likely to be restricted to the more advanced countries with well established intelligence services. By definition, this will include the five permanent members of the Security Council under whose auspices the intelligence function has been established. If the intelligence sections are staffed by serving intelligence officers of the five permanent members of the Security Council, leavened by intelligence officers of regional powers not having permanent membership on the Security Council but capable of adding significant value to the process, then those having the greatest concerns and interest will be represented in the day-to-day operation of a United Nations intelligence function.

By carefully balancing the selection of the staff of the various sections with an eye toward reaching consensus among the major players, especially among the five permanent members of the Security Council, than a reasonable balance can be reached whereby it is in everyone's interest not to misuse information acquired through this process.

Obviously, many controversies and sensitivities will need to be overcome, and any form of intelligence support to United Nations activities is likely to be an evolutionary process rather than something established by fiat.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE

If the U.S. intelligence community is to provide effective intelligence support to United Nations activities, it must make adjustments in mind-set and structure. The policy decision that such support will occur, appears to have been made or at the very least is in the process of being made. This will, in all likelihood, continue as a policy course under President Clinton. In order for the U.S. intelligence community to retain credibility with the new administration, it must accept these new circumstances and support this policy in an enthusiastic yet prudent manner.

Mind-Set

In providing intelligence to an international organization, the U.S. intelligence community loses effective control of the information. Whatever controls or safeguards may be agreed to by the United Nations as an organization, they cannot be guaranteed in

practice. Additionally, due to the likely staffing of a United Nations intelligence organization, intelligence provided by the United States is likely to become available to citizens of countries with whom we would not normally share such information. This is a given condition of the situation.

It is important, therefore, that the United States intelligence community be fully cognizant of this situation and that the intelligence selected to be shared with the United Nations is screened on this basis. The best that the U.S. or any other "donor nation" can hope for is, that intelligence passed to the United Nations in support of its activities does not become publicly available and is not passed to an interested party who could use the intelligence to thwart the success of the United Nations efforts.

Despite this problem, "real intelligence" must be passed if the United Nations efforts are to be successful and the U.S. intelligence community is to retain credibility with both the world community and the new U.S. administration. The balancing of the need to support United Nations activities with the legitimate need to protect U.S. sources and methods will be difficult for the most well meaning and competent U.S. intelligence official. Nonetheless, if intelligence support to United Nations activities is to be an effective foreign policy tool, an effective solution must be found.

The Need for a Traffic Cop

The U.S. government has many agencies producing intelligence, both overt and covert, which could effectively support United Nations activities worldwide and, by doing so, further U.S. policy interests. The need is not for another bureaucracy to produce information solely for the benefit of the United Nations, but for a central location where U.S. policy interests and United Nations needs can be efficiently matched. In short, the U.S. government needs a "traffic cop" for intelligence and requirements being passed to and from the United Nations.

This "traffic cop" for the U.S. intelligence community would act as the exclusive conduit for intelligence information provided to the United Nations by the United States. The "traffic cop" would identify the issues and situations which policymakers believe warrant U.S. intelligence support and then levy tasking on individual agencies within the U.S. intelligence community. Likewise the "traffic cop" would receive requests from the central United Nations intelligence support organization; and when these requests are consistent with U.S. policy interests, the "traffic cop" would then forward them to the appropriate U.S. intelligence agency for servicing. The "traffic cop" would also serve a record keeping function of what intelligence has been passed, and in what form and for what purpose.

By centralizing the contact with the United Nations intelligence support organization, the "traffic cop" will eliminate the security concerns over multiple points of contact within the U.S. government by foreign intelligence officers, as well as

ensuring that only one fully coordinated version of a particular piece of information is released to the United Nations. Additionally, the centralization of the function will reduce the costs associated with the effort by establishing a permanent functioning office with established communication links and mature procedures and guidelines for the activity.

A serious administrative concern for the U.S. intelligence community is that in an effort to fulfill the requirements of U.S. policymakers, individual agencies within the intelligence community could create a multitude of support arrangements with the United Nations based upon ad hoc requirements. These individual support arrangements may prove to be incompatible and virtually uncoordinated without a centralized coordination point. This would be wasteful of resources and inefficient in accomplishing the task at hand.

As to where administratively within the U.S. intelligence community to locate this "traffic cop", the choice comes down to effectiveness. The decision to share truly sensitive intelligence information with an international body is sure to be controversial among many factions of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as in other branches of the U.S. government. Additionally, most U.S. intelligence agencies are quite mature organizationally, well set in their ways and with clearly identified power centers to whom they are deferential. Thus to be effective, a new interagency "traffic cop" will require leadership which has both prestige and clout to deal with the nay-sayers and the inevitable turf battles.

The logical choice is somewhere under the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI). By virtue of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, the DCI has overall responsibility for managing the U.S. intelligence community. While it is administratively tidy to place the "traffic cop" under the DCI, it is also important because of the inevitable conflicts which will arise between individual intelligence agencies within the U.S. intelligence community. While the individual agencies which produce the intelligence are normally in the best position to determine what can be shared with the United Nations without threatening U.S. interests, there will arise disputes over what or how much should be shared with the United Nations.

As long as the disputes are confined within the U.S. intelligence community, these are best settled by the DCI in his capacity as Director of Central Intelligence for the United States government. Where these disputes occur between policymakers, such as the Department of State, and the U.S. intelligence community, adjudication at the highest level will be required. These disputes will inevitably land on the plate of the National Security Council, as it is the only executive branch institution capable of arbitrating between the bureaucratic and policy behemoths likely to be involved in such disputes. In these cases, the DCI is best placed to represent the intelligence community's concern to the National Security Council and, if need be, ultimately to the President.

CONCLUSION

Intelligence support to United Nations activities is a concept whose time has come. The leadership of the United Nations and policymakers within the United States government have come to recognize that such support is in the best interest of the United Nations and of the United States. The United States and other like-minded members of the United Nations now need to make an active effort to educate doubting members of the United Nations as to the need for and propriety of intelligence support to United Nations activities. With the determination by senior U.S. policymakers that intelligence support to United Nations activities is in the U.S. national interest, it is now incumbent upon the U.S. intelligence community to ensure that this policymaking tool is efficient and effective. It is equally incumbent upon U.S. policymakers to ensure that legitimate concerns for the unique capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community are recognized and safeguarded.

ENDNOTES

¹ George Bush, remarks in address to the United Nations General Assembly, 21 September 1992, New York, New York, press release by the Office of the Press Secretary, The White House.

² United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. 1992.

³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, press conference at the United Nations, New York, New York, reported by Reuter News Service, 19 March 1992.

⁴ Thomas R. Pickering, "The Evolving Security Role of the United Nations", National Strategy Reporter, Volume 3, Number 1, (Summer 1992), p. 1.

⁵ Mary Allsebrook, Prototypes of Peacemaking, (London, St. James Press, 1986), p. 111.

⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93), p. 89.

⁷ Charles William Maynes, "Between Inertia and the 82nd Airborne", The Washington Post, 25 October 1992, sec. C, p. 2.

⁸ Sean Maceoin, "Establishment of a Staff Element in the U.N. Secretariat", in Peace-Keeping: Experience and Evaluation-The Oslo Papers, by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964) p. 120.

⁹ Walter Clarke, instructor at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, interview by the author in January 1993. Mr. Clarke was a young U.S. Foreign Service Officer during the United Nations intervention in the Congo.

¹⁰ Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1993), p. 20.

¹¹ John M. Goshko and Barton Gellman, "Idea of a Potent U.N. Army Receives a Mixed Response", The Washington Post, 29 October 1992, sec. A, p. 22.

¹² Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Institute for International Economics, "Special Report: Policymaking for a New Era", Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93), p. 175.

¹³ Defense Nuclear Agency, Iraq Inspections: Lessons Learned, Kathleen Bailey and others, Final Draft Technical Report, Contract No. DNA001-91-C-0030, JAYCOR Inc., 11 September 1992, p. 28.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press) 1963, p. 147.

¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the U.N.", p. 101.

¹⁷ The author considers the possibility of the United Nations forming its own intelligence service so remote as not to warrant discussion. Besides the fearsome political questions involved, the cost alone would be prohibitive.

¹⁸ Martin Gardner, "Trapdoor Ciphers" and "Trapdoor Ciphers II", Penrose Tiles to Trapdoor Ciphers, (New York, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1989), p. 183 - 204. An excellent non-technical description of the RSA encryption system and trapdoor functions is contained in "Cracking the Code" by Mark D. Uehling, Popular Science, January 1993, p. 71.

¹⁹ Indarjit Rikhe, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974) p. 24.

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