


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**UNITED STATES
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
THE NEED FOR POLICY AND PROCEDURES**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEO E. KEENAN III
United States Army

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The appeals to the collective conscience of the American public inherent in daily media coverage of horrors abroad have exerted powerful pressures on the military to intervene under the aegis of the United Nations. At the same time, it appears that little reflection has been given as to precisely the form and extent of such intervention and its consequences for a military which has little experience and less preparation in this arena. Whether the United States embarks on a policy emphasizing the role of the United Nations as the focal point for resolving these situations or decides to act on a case-by-case basis, the United States must educate itself on how to carry out peacekeeping operations. The challenges facing the Armed Forces include the need to: expand individual and unit training to include peacekeeping techniques; gain experience in peacekeeping; heighten coordination of military activity with diplomatic arrangements; and emphasize the requirement for dialogue between the deployed Joint Task Force and indigenous leadership. This paper recommends: clear policy governing the relationship between the U.N. and the U.S. on peacekeeping operations; increased education and training of U.S. military personnel; clearly stated objectives capable of addressal by military means; and clearly articulated conflict termination objectives prior to force deployment.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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**UNITED STATES PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
THE NEED FOR POLICY AND PROCEDURES**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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INTRODUCTION

Employment of the Army on tasks incident to the emergencies of peace, no matter how great their importance to the general welfare, cannot justify continued neglect of fundamental defense missions. (General MacArthur, Report of The Secretary of War To The President, 1933.)

Since the end of the Cold War the Armed Forces of the United States have found themselves caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of responding to critical emergencies abroad and continued preparation for the nation's defense. It is worth noting that as long ago as 1933 General MacArthur warned of the primacy of preparation for our defense, no matter how pressing the emergencies might be which arise in other nations.

His advice appears to be especially pertinent today with the media continuously pointing out the horrors occurring in many places around the globe, with Somalia and former Yugoslavia as prime examples. The appeals to the collective conscience of the American public inherent in daily media coverage of horrors abroad have exerted powerful pressures on the military to intervene under the aegis of the United Nations. At the same time, it appears that little reflection has been given as to precisely the form and extent of such intervention and its consequences for a military which has little experience and less preparation in this arena.

Compounding the problem is the emergence of the United Nations as apparently a stronger organization than it has been in the past, with consequent appeals to it for assistance in crisis intervention.

Since the end of the Cold War the United Nations has tried to shed the label of an inept organization and emerge as the agent for the resolution of global issues. This is certainly no more apparent than in the area of peacekeeping operations. With renewed interest in bringing the United Nations into the lead as the agency responsible for international collective security, the United States has offered systems which would contribute to peacekeeping forces' capabilities. In September, 1992, President Bush addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations and offered assistance to the United Nations peacekeeping efforts. He stated that the United States can provide strategic lift, training facilities, equipment, and simulations.¹ With waning threats throughout the world, the drawdown of US forces, and the new-found cooperation among the Security Council members in the UN, it was sensible for the US to pledge resources to peacekeeping operations.

The United States now looks beyond the focus of the Cold War, and has shifted strategic planning to a regional focus. As contingency planning turns in this direction, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportions forces to the warfighting CINCs, the most likely contingencies for our forces may

have been overlooked: involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

The United States is transitioning from a country which has limited experience in peacekeeping operations under the authority of the United Nations, to a country which is legitimately the only country able to project power strategically to assist United Nations' operations throughout the world. Funding, personnel, and equipment are routinely the greatest challenges for the United Nations in conducting peacekeeping operations.

United States Armed Forces strive for trained and ready forces through routine and habitual association during training. This is especially true with combat support and combat service support units which augment the combat forces. Peacekeeping forces are routinely assembled quickly and on an *ad hoc* basis with little preplanning available. Traditionally *ad hoc* arrangements are fraught with problems from the start. To avoid this predicament the United States should be proactive in backing President Bush's offer of providing training resources. Since it is increasingly likely the the United states will find itself involved more often in future peacekeeping operations, a training program which requires joint and combined exercises be conducted would help reduce the interoperability problems which are bound to come about without practice. Once forces are deployed on a peacekeeping mission, the operation begins. This is unlike the Gulf War, when allies had weeks or months to coordinate and work out the details of the plans.

The identification of likely forces to be contributed to UN operations would pay immeasurable dividends in overcoming, or at least minimizing the serious obstacles of initial deployment and routine operations.

For the United States to continue to be relied upon by the United Nations as a dependable member nation, it is incumbent on us to admit current liabilities when it comes to peacekeeping experience, and take meaningful steps to produce a well-trained, well-led, and well-supported peace-keeping force. Otherwise, when the United States decides it is time to respond to the "war of conscience" in Bosnia, the forces are likely to suffer unnecessary confusion, hardship and casualties.

The challenges facing the United States regarding participation in United Nations sponsored peacekeeping operations are numerous. The challenges range from a United Nations which has not changed its organizational structure as the world has changed, to the ambiguity of the world order. Once the policy with the United Nations is worked through, the United States must focus attention towards education and training of its Armed Forces. Additionally, the force must be concerned not only with the possible threat from each of the disputants, but also must address the views of the governments providing troops and the sensitivities of other agencies involved, e.g., governmental and international agencies such as the Red Cross.²

The peacekeeping force does not draw forces from only one country; many countries provide forces of varying sizes from

company through brigade, many with different languages, equipment, and their own national chains of command. Thus, the challenge of integrating the forces of several nations in the field under an *ad hoc* organization is fraught with potential problems.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

We may be witnessing a point of division between the United Nations and the United States. The United Nations is trying to assert itself under the Articles of the charter approved in 1945.

A United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and of promoting social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.³

In this connection it is interesting to note the pressure which the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has applied for member nations to provide military forces as part of a standing army for the United Nations.⁴

This organization is hampered by a lack of planning and operational capability. Every action which requires a response means recruitment from a zero base of standing forces.⁵ The case of marshalling troops for the mission to former Yugoslavia took the United Nations four months to receive pledges of troop support before the force could be deployed.⁶

The Secretary General's pleas for a standby force have largely been ignored, although France has pledged dedicated reaction forces. The United States must address this issue, but it will

most likely come down to the question of whether or not the operation is in our national interests, rather than to have armed forces on standby for an operation which may require an immediate response.

Concurrent with the reawakening of the United Nations, the military forces of the United States are drawing down because of diminishing threats throughout the world and increased pressure from Congress to decrease defense spending. The United States is faced with the dilemma of trying to remain the leader in a unipolar world on one hand, and deciding when intervention with military forces would be appropriate on the other. While this internal debate continues the United Nations is trying to assume a more prominent role as the international organization charged with the responsibility of providing collective security throughout the world.

The fact that the United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping operations more often during the past four years than in the previous forty years illustrates its significantly increased role in the world.⁷ This increased responsibility is putting a severe strain on the United Nations. The problem centers around an organization which has assumed tremendous responsibility for conducting peacekeeping operations throughout the world, yet has not adapted its operations base to meet the new demands and scope. The United Nations is overloaded, overwhelmed, and overworked, and just trying to keep up with day to day operations. It is spread too thin to be truly effective, and may be in need of a drastic

overhaul before it loses its sense of purpose. If this shortcoming is not recognized soon and something done to remedy it, not only will the efforts at peacekeeping throughout the world become more and more diminished as time goes by, but the international stature which the United Nations is trying so desperately to earn will also decline. A demonstration of the magnitude of the problem of the U.N.'s increasing involvement in the peacekeeping arena is depicted in tables 1 and 2.

A WORLD OF CHANGE

The world has changed dramatically in the past four years, and so has the strategic landscape. Our head-to-head containment and counterforce relationship with the Soviet Union changed almost overnight. The Berlin Wall came down and Germany reunited with such speed that United States policy could not keep abreast what was happening in a country that had been divided and occupied since 1945. The Warsaw Pact disintegrated, and the Soviets pledged to pull their troops back to within their borders. Countries behind the "Iron Curtain" were suddenly free and trying to set up democracies through free elections. The end of the Cold War and of the bipolar world has unleashed suppressed cultural, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious differences within allied states which were previously kept in check.⁸

Table 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War, 1945-85⁹

NAME	DESCRIPTION
UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) 1947-51	Investigate guerrilla border crossings into Greece
UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), 1948-present	Monitor cease-fires along Israeli borders
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 1949-present	Monitor cease-fire in Cashmere
UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), 1956-67	Separate Egyptian & Israeli forces in Sinai
UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 1958	Monitor infiltration of arms & troops into Lebanon from Syria
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), 1960-64	Render military assistance, restore civil order
UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) 1962-63	Keep order, administer W. New Guinea in transfer to Indonesia
UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM), 1963	Monitor arms infiltration into Yemen
UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 1964-present	Maintain order, separate Greek/Turk Cypriots
UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	Monitor cease-fire in 1965 India-Pakistan War
UN Emergency Force II (UNEFII), 1974-79	Separate Egyptian & Israeli forces in Sinai
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 1974-present	Monitor separation of Syrian & Israeli forces on Golan Heights

Table 2. UN Peacekeeping Operations in the New Era, 1985-92¹⁰

NAME	DESCRIPTION
UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), 1988-89	Monitor withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group (UNIIMOG), 1988-89	Monitor cease-fire in Iran-Iraq War
UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) 1988-91	Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 1989-90	Supervise Namibia's transtion to independence.
UN Mission in Central America (ONUCA), 1989-91	Monitor compliance with peace accords; demobilize Contras.
UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), 1991-present	Monitor cease-fire and creation of new army.
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), 1991-present	Monitor buffer zone after Gulf War.
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 1991-present	Conduct referendum on independence from Morocco.
UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 1991-present	Monitor human rights elections, national reconciliation.
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), 1991-92 UN Temporary authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-present	Supervise government, run elections; demobliize armed factions.
UN Protection force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), 1992-present	Replace Yugoslav forces in Serbian areas of Croatia
UN Opereation in Somalia (UNOSOM), 1992-present	Security for humanitarian aid shipments.

The once certain and predictable world of the Cold War years has been replaced with uncertainty. The bi-polar world has given way to a multi-polar world; the efforts of many allies to contain the spread of communism now deals with a world in which ethnic and religious problems along with other flash-points now receive the bulk of the world's attention. The long standing alliances are being forced to take a second look at their purpose as *ad hoc* alliances are formed for shorter-term collective and common purposes. The once clear and ever present threat of known adversaries has been replaced by ambiguous threats which are less predictable.

The world is witnessing the emergence of the United Nations as an active and prominent force on the international scene to which governments turn in times of acute distress. These global changes have indeed influenced the way in which the world is viewed today. It may be too soon to expect the United Nations to become the full fledged international leader which the charter signers envisioned in 1945. There are numerous challenges of the 1990s faced by an organization which was designed to cope with problems facing the world in the post-war years of the 1940s.

The United Nations may not have the ways or means yet to assume its role as outlined in the charter. To achieve the desired end, the near term could find the United States, along with allies, sending in a decisive force as part of an *ad hoc* coalition. Potential deployments could serve as a response to either humanitarian or peacemaking imperatives.

ASSESSMENT OF STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

AND UNITED STATES INTERVENTION

The United States used to evaluate potential threats in the same way we assessed our own national power; it was based on the political, economic, and military instruments of power. Our fears may no longer focus exclusively on threats to our national security. They may involve groups of religious and ethnic factions which may arise because of nationalistic zeal. Attention must also focus towards any country or region in the world which faces economic privation. Somalia is an apt example of our response with humanitarian relief to a crisis which has been brought about not only through natural calamities, but also from man-made ones. There are other flash-points which must be watched: weapons proliferation, migration, and narco- terrorism."

The United States is now assisting international relief organizations in providing food to starving people in Somalia. This appears easy to monitor because problems of this kind are usually confined to specific regions of the world. Although the regions may be evident, it is important to anticipate where the Armed Forces of the United States could potentially be deployed and in what capacity.

There are three types of organizations routinely involved in situations which generate worldwide public interest. The United Nations' involvement and recognition of a problem, coupled with international relief organizations (e.g., CARE, RED CROSS) and the

media organizations' coverage, all combine to bring moral issues to the forefront of public interest. It appears that the media have taken on a more prominent role in shaping public opinion and generating interest and sympathy in regions where formerly our foreign policy was little-known or had minimal interest for the average citizen.

Whenever these three groups converge, planners on the Joint Chiefs' Staff (JCS) and Unified Commanders' staffs should use the planning assumption that the United States needs to be prepared to intervene and assist the efforts of the international relief agencies, and perhaps even conduct peacekeeping operations.

MILITARY RESPONSE

By the time the Armed Forces are directed to respond to a situation by the National Command Authority (NCA), other instruments of national power will probably not have been successful in bringing about the desired results. The future commitment of United States' Armed Forces to assist the United Nations in conducting peacekeeping operations may not follow the form of traditional military operations. Whenever the United Nations initiates a peacekeeping operation at the request of a member nation, the United States must be prepared to intervene. Based on our current experience of providing troops in sufficient numbers to establish some semblance of order and discipline in

Somalia, there is the likelihood that this could become a precedent of how the United States responds to future crises.

Much of the measured caution for United States involvement came from former Secretary of Defense Weinberger's six points, which outlined the criteria to be met if use of military force was being considered. They are: don't use forces unless our vital interests are at stake; use sufficient numbers to win; define political and military objectives; monitor the relationship between objectives and the size or composition of American forces; reasonable assurance of public support; and commit forces only as a last resort.¹² Based on Weinberger's criteria, the question about when to rely on the military option was clearly defined. The United States has also been fortunate in recent years to have a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) who realized the significance of having clearly stated objectives from the President before committing troops.

Now, more than ever, it will be important to ensure that military forces have clear guidance with specific objectives. The guidance can neither be time driven, nor contain abstract objectives. Specific and concrete objectives which can be translated into a military mission are an absolute necessity. In order for the United States to go in and do what needs to be done, it needs United Nations' sanction and the support of the Security Council. Finally, the conditions for conflict termination need to be clear before the operation begins. If the military objectives are straightforward, and if the conflict termination objectives are

written into the plan, then the transition to United Nations' peacekeeping operations will be easier.

There is, however, no denying that United States involvement in future United Nations peacekeeping operations will become part of many units' Mission Essential Task List (METL); it is incumbent on the United States military to come to grips with this now. To do otherwise would be to expose our forces to the perils inherent in *ad hoc* responses. To gain a professional appreciation of what peacekeeping operations imply, it is important to examine traditional peacekeeping operations which the United Nations has conducted recently.

TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Thirteen peacekeeping operations were established between the years 1945 and 1987; thirteen since then. An estimated 528,000 military, police and civilian personnel had served under the flag of the United Nations until January 1992. Over 800 of them from 43 countries have died in the service of the Organization.¹³

Use of force by the United Nations was foreseen by the framers of the charter. If the need arose, member countries would be protected from aggression by forces provided by member states serving as a United Nations Army. The tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War kept the Security Council from ever authorizing or supporting the standing army which is stipulated in Article 43 of the United Nations charter.

All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call...armed forces, assistance, and facilities...necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.¹⁴

Military forces from permanent Security Council members, with the exception of the United Kingdom, were virtually precluded, by an implicit agreement, from providing armed forces as part of the standby army to the United Nations, although staff officers and observers were available to the United Nations on a limited basis. As a result of this understood agreement among the Security Council members, imaginative ways to use military forces throughout the world began to emerge from the United Nations. The term "peacekeeping operations" identified the way to do something, yet not raise the displeasure of the two opposing superpowers within the Security Council, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The first use of peacekeeping forces, as opposed to observers, was in 1956 when hostilities broke out during the Suez Crisis between Israel and Egypt. In November 1956 the General Assembly requested a plan to set up a United Nations force which was subsequently established to supervise the end of hostilities. Interestingly, the USSR abstained from voting, believing that only the Security Council could establish the force. Since 1956 the United Nations use of military and civilian personnel from member states for peacekeeping has become a well established practice and supported by all the major powers.¹⁵

Defining peacekeeping has been difficult, since a number of functions now seem to fall under the aegis of "peacemaking". Terms such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, and peace building are the new derivatives of peacekeeping. These terms formed the framework for the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposals in "An Agenda For Peace."¹⁶

The original role of getting between hostile forces has, for all practical purposes, been enhanced and supplemented with monitoring elections, providing humanitarian assistance, protecting delivery of relief items, and even disarming warring factions. The good news, however, is that by being able to perform a variety of missions, sometimes concurrently, peacekeeping forces have been thrust into the spotlight and have become a valuable instrument for the Security Council in dealing with conflicts. There are several other terms which have their own meanings, but are often used interchangeably or confused with peacekeeping. To insure that there is a common understanding of the terminology, the following definitions apply:¹⁷

NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Peacemaking: Process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues which led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.¹⁸

To understand what is involved with the mandates which the United Nations issues in order to conduct peacekeeping operations,

it is necessary to understand that peacemaking is the over-arching political process at work. In other words, peacemaking is the term which provides the continuity throughout the spectrum of trying to maintain peace and security throughout the world.

Peacekeeping: Operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions which support diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict.¹⁹

Peacekeeping must be looked at as a strategic-level mission. The overall success must be keyed to the acceptance of the warring factions to maintain the truce and accept the peacekeepers as a neutral force. Before peacekeepers even deploy to the region, a cease fire must have been agreed upon by both sides. When the peacekeepers go in it is critically important that they remain neutral and are not perceived as partisan.

Peace Enforcement: Military operations (including possible combat actions) in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and who may be engaged in combat activities.²⁰

An international mandate is required for peace enforcement to be undertaken. Although this method does not necessarily have to involve combat, there is a high likelihood that it will. The intervention force in this case will not be perceived as neutral, since the force will normally intervene against the aggressor. The

operation also has specific military objectives linked with political goals.

Preventive Diplomacy: Diplomatic action in advance of predictable crises aimed at resolving sources of conflict before violence breaks out, and to limit the spread of conflict if it erupts.²¹

As an integral part of peacemaking, this can be viewed as part of a country's national power. This critical action, if done effectively, can bring about solutions without deploying troops to the area. This aspect of peacemaking has as its near term focus on averting an immediate crisis, reducing tensions, and sustaining a dialogue. Although this process is ongoing, it should not be viewed as a solitary element. Preventive diplomacy will probably be occurring in concert with military operations, but short of actual combat operations.

Peace Building: Post-conflict diplomatic and military actions which seek to rebuild the institutions and infrastructures of a nation torn by civil war or build bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.²²

This operation will require specialized military forces, including medical, engineers, and civil affairs. The focus once the operation enters this phase, will be on nation-building assistance, humanitarian assistance, and regional security institutions.

Although the definitions are fairly clear, they do not reflect the risk factor involved when a country contributes armed forces to a peacekeeping operation. As of January 1993, two American Marines had been killed in Somalia, and twenty-two peacekeepers had been killed in Yugoslavia. When the United States deploys armed forces to contentious areas around the world, which may or may not be areas of vital interest, the American public must be aware of the risks military personnel face.

To try to differentiate which aspect the Armed Forces may actually be engaged in, it may be helpful to use the following chart to correlate the conflict stages, or the spectrum of conflict, with the tools available to the United Nations:²³

CONFLICT STAGES	TOOLS
Pre-War	Preventive Diplomacy
Wartime	Diplomatic Peacemaking Peace-Enforcement/Military Peacemaking
Post-War	Peacekeeping Peace Building

The question which must be answered is what role the military forces of the United States will fill as the importance of peacekeeping operations expands throughout the world. As the United States develops a National Security Strategy to support its survival, vital, major, and peripheral interests, particular

attention will have to be given to the role the United States expects to play and its relationship with the United Nations.

THE CHALLENGES

The question which faces the political and military leadership is how the United States should respond to the issue of peacekeeping. The United States faces three choices in approaching the problem: The United States can choose to take the lead and primarily go it alone; defer to the United Nations' lead, or decide to act on a case-by-case basis.

If the United States lets the United Nations take the lead, the Armed Forces need to be prepared to embrace change. Conducting military operations under the auspices of the United Nations will give new meaning to the term "diplomatic challenge." The United States has an aversion to putting the Armed Forces under the command of someone other than an American commander.²⁴ A sub-element of this course of action is whether or not the United States military will don blue helmets and serve under the UN flag. Another option will be to obtain the mandate and sanction of the United Nations to act in its behalf, on terms largely established by the United States.

In addition to how the United States decides to pursue the peacekeeping operations mission is the issue of how to perform the mission and the details involved.

TRAINING

The United States has not routinely trained its forces to fill the role of peace-keepers. The United States' forces have traditionally been trained as warfighters, a task for which they proved they were indeed ready during the Gulf War. Training soldiers to serve as peacekeepers requires a complete change in the training conducted and the psyche of the American soldier. Warfighters are indoctrinated in how to respond under fire, to have instinctive and reflex reactions, to fire and maneuver, to lay down a base of fire, return fire, close with the enemy and eliminate him. On the other side, the peacekeeper must remain neutral and avoid becoming partisan. Everything described about the warfighter is contradicted; the opposite is true for the peacekeeper. The peacekeeper is caught up in an ambiguous situation where there is no "enemy", even though someone may be shooting at him.²⁵

LACK OF EXPERIENCE

There are several aspects of command and leadership which distinguish these operations from anything else the armed forces of the United States have been involved in before. First, the United States lacks extensive experience in similar operations. To say that this is just another leadership challenge which can be overcome is to seriously underestimate the complexity of the problem. Other countries routinely provide forces for peacekeeping missions and have a wealth of experience upon which the United States needs to draw.²⁶ The only previous experience the military

has in similar operations is the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) Sinai and Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. As a result of relatively little experience, the military has a limited institutional memory of, and much institutional resistance to, conducting peacekeeping operations. On the surface, that may not appear profound or worth mentioning, but these two points get to the heart of the matter of how ill-prepared the United States is to participate in a peacekeeping operation. The United States clearly lacks experience in peacekeeping operations. This may not be accepted by members of the United States' Armed Forces, but clearly it is a fact. The United Nations has not really had the opportunity to turn to the United States in the past for leadership of a peacekeeping operation, and only recently has the United States accepted the mission to provide a large contingent of its Armed Forces to one of these operations.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

In addition to the challenge of organizing the force, there are problems of arranging and coordinating the transport and sustainment of the force. Furthermore, military activity must be coordinated with diplomatic arrangements. The challenge of interagency coordination further complicates the issue. The need to understand the political sensitivities of national forces assigned also provide conditions under which the United States is not accustomed to operating.²⁷ Working in a coalition during the Gulf War has sensitized the military to the effort required to

insure that the political considerations of each member are taken into account so the shared objective can be achieved.

DIALOGUE

It is estimated that there is actually a six week window of opportunity, beginning with deployment, for the force to demonstrate its competence and win local trust. Local mistrust, born out of ignorance of the peace-keeping operation, can be overcome by commanders holding meetings with counterparts to explain the purpose of the mission and how the peace-keeping forces will operate in the country.²⁸

It is difficult to consider Somalia as a precedent for future United States' peacekeeping operations. In the past, most peacekeeping missions were relatively small in numbers. Until the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, the largest United Nations force ever assembled was slightly over six thousand.²⁹ In contrast, the United States insists on sending a decisive force whenever a military option is selected. In the case of Somalia, more than twenty thousand troops were sent.

RELINQUISHING CONTROL TO THE UN

As the current operation in Somalia evolves, the United States will urge the United Nations to assume the leadership role and relieve the United States combat forces with those from other countries. This leads to more concerns which the new administration will face. What is the relationship between the

United States and the United Nations? Will the United States respond with the United Nations in a collective security role or act unilaterally? Will moral conditions, such as starvation and ethnic cleansing, brought to public attention through the media, cause the United States to respond to these "wars of conscience" as opposed to responding because there is a strategic threat to our national interests? These are key issues which need to be addressed soon by the new administration. These critical policy decisions are required by the Armed Services so there is a common understanding of what constitutes the conditions to which the United States will respond as peace-keepers, peace-makers or peace-enforcers.

Whether the United States embarks on a policy emphasizing the role of the United Nations as the focal point for resolving these situations or decides to act on a case-by-case basis, the United States must educate itself on how to carry out peacekeeping operations. This means working with, and learning from, countries who do not possess the international, political or material stature of the United States, but who do possess a wealth of experience in peacekeeping operations and to whom the United States should turn for advice and lessons learned.

CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The following conclusions are submitted in the belief that to ignore them would be a prescription for failure:

1. The terms of the policy governing the United States' relationship to the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations must be clearly spelled out.

2. Attention must be given to the education and training of our Armed Forces to enable them to respond to crises abroad without forgoing continued training and preparation for the national defense which must remain paramount.

3. Clearly stated objectives must be enunciated by the President before American troops are committed. These objectives must be capable of solution by means of a military mission. Objectives should correlate with those of the UN, such as nature of mission and desired end-state, so as to avoid problems of mission as in Somalia.

4. The conditions for conflict termination must be established prior to the beginning of any operation.

5. No matter what the pressures, we as a nation and we as members of the Armed Forces should always keep Gen. MacArthur's words in mind:

Employment of the Army on tasks incident to the emergencies of peace, no matter how great their importance to the general welfare, cannot justify continued neglect of fundamental defense missions. (General MacArthur, Report of The Secretary of War To The President, 1933.)

ENDNOTES

1. Bush speech to United Nations in September 1992.
2. Dan G. Loomis, "Prospects For UN Peacekeeping" Global Affairs (Winter 1993), 131.
3. Charter of the United Nations in Armed Forces Pamphlet 110-20. ed. Department of the Air Force, Washington D.C.: (Department of the Air Force, June 1973), 9-2 to 9-15.
4. Boutros Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace" Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 43.
5. Speech by William J. Durch at the U.S. Army War College Fourth Annual Conference on Strategy on 25 February 1993. Subject: "Enforcing Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order."
6. Speech by Major General Lewis W. MacKenzie, Canadian Army, at the U.S. Army War College Fourth Annual Conference on Strategy on 25 February 1993. Subject: "Peacekeeping In Practice: Strategic Lessons of Sarajevo."
7. Speech by Marrack Goulding to the Army War College class at the United Nations on 12 October 1992. Subject: Peacekeeping.
8. Doug Bandow, "Avoiding War" Foreign Policy No 89, (Winter 1992-93), 165.
9. W. Durch and B. Bleechman, Keeping The Peace: The United Nations In The Emerging World Order (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson center 1992), 11.
10. Ibid., 14
11. Paul Beaver, "Flashpoints" Jane's Defence Weekly. vol 19, No 1 (2 January 93), 12-19.
12. Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor , Jr. and Lawrence J. Korb, American National Security Policy and Process. The Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London 1989, Third Edition, 302.

13. Boutros Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace" Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 28.
14. United Nations Charter Article 43.
15. Mary Allsebrook, Prototypes of Peacekeeping (Essex, UK; 1986)
16. Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda For Peace."
17. CSA Strategic Fellows, "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement", briefing charts, (Carlisle Pa. 1993).
18. Ibid., 12a.
19. Ibid., 14a.
20. Ibid., 15a.
21. Ibid., 13a.
22. Ibid., 16a.
23. Donald M. Snow, "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role In The New International Order." Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College February 1993, 20.
24. U.S. forces served under foreign commanders, generally British, during World War II; residual U.S. forces in Somalia apparently will serve under command of an Indian General.
25. John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd. 1989), 1-23.
26. William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, Keeping The Peace: The United Nations In The Emerging World Order (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center 1992), 85. Some states have already established UN-oriented training centers. The Nordic countries take pride in the system that they have established for training participants in peacekeeping missions: Denmark trains military police; Finland trains observers; Norway provides logistics and transport training; and Sweden trains staff officers. In addition, each country trains its own infantry battalions in peacekeeping and observation techniques.

27. Mackinlay, 8-9. This was a major issue, however, in World War Alliances in all theaters; it was and is a major NATO challenge.

28. Durch and Barry, ii.

29. Loomis, 138.

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