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A New Look at U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba

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ABSTRACT

In the 33 years since the Cuban revolution, U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba remains virtually unchanged. Now that Communism in the Soviet Union is dead and Cuban-Soviet relations are weak, it's time for the United States to revisit its foreign policy toward Cuba. To understand how current policy was developed, this research paper presents: 1) a chronology of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba; 2) a brief history of Cuba through today; 3) an explanation of Cuba's leadership structure; 5) an illustration of the current changing environment; 6) and a number of other factors that must be considered to develop a new foreign policy. The paper presents three alternative policies and their advantages and disadvantages. The author then recommends a new policy which suggests easing pressures, lifting the embargo, and improving the information flow with Cuba.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Now that Communism in the Soviet Union is dead and Cuban-Soviet relations are weak, it's time for the United States to revisit its foreign policy toward Cuba. Since 1986, it appears, time is working against Castro. His 33 year-old dictatorship is under jeopardy by mounting external and internal problems. The collapse of communism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the democratization of Latin America have all left the dictator politically and ideologically isolated with dwindling economic resources.

U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba before 1959 resulted in military interventions, political coercion, and eventual U.S. support of corrupt leaders. Unfortunately, Cuba turned toward a Communist type of government in 1959 and relations between the two countries became adversarial.

In the 33 years since the Cuban revolution, U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba remains virtually unchanged. U.S. current policy is dictatorial and highlighted by:

- the absence of normal diplomatic relations;
- diplomatic isolation in international organizations, and for normal bilateral ties with other countries;
- the comprehensive economic embargo, to deny Cuba the means to carry out policies inimical to the U.S.;
- the broadcast of unbiased news and information to Cuba.

This policy is counter productive. The current U.S. position does not give Cuba any maneuver room by which the two countries could come to some type of accord. An opportunity exists for implementation of a pro-active U.S. strategy that employs every tool available to secure the political opening needed.

This research paper, examines three alternative U.S. policies:

ONE - Continue the present policy of containment, but add political, and economic pressures.

TWO - Seek Castro's overthrow.

THREE - Ease pressures, lift the economic blockade, and improve the information flow with Cuba.

ONE--Continuing the present policy of containment, but adding political and economic pressures could only help Castro continue his regime. He would undoubtedly use Cuban nationalism as the rallying point and convince the people they can survive these bad times. Additional pressures may backfire and cause Cuban armed forces to unite in support of the regime and force human rights activists underground. If the additional pressures work, civil warfare could break out, assuring years of divisiveness amongst Cubans, and further ruining the economy thus making the reconstruction effort even harder.

Coercive diplomacy is not likely to bring down the current regime unless military intervention accompanies it. Any such intervention will suffer from tremendous political and diplomatic criticism in Latin America, the world, and the U.S. unless sanctioned by the United Nations or the Organization of American States. Such an intervention is likely to cause a bloody response from Castro and his armed forces. This involvement would be contrary to all U.S. long-range interests and kills any hope of the U.S. being regarded as a positive partner.

TWO--The assumption that Castro is the sole obstacle to democracy and change in Cuba, and that once he departs democracy will flourish, is incorrect. Whether peaceful or violent, his

overthrow is not the answer.

This option stopped being a policy of the U.S. when President Bush announced that the U.S. does not pose a threat to Cuba. Castro always fed Cuban nationalism by reminding Cubans the U.S. will someday invade them. As a result, Cubans fear that "U.S. imperialist tendencies," displayed in Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and during exercises off Cuba's coast, will one day be exercised against them since "the U.S. is always looking for an excuse to invade Cuba."

One way to convince Castro and his military is by exploring informational exchanges between the U.S. and Cuban armed forces. He may be more receptive to such an information exchange now that the U.S. has clearly stated its non-intervention intents.

If Castro is unwilling to change and continues to perceive the U.S. as a threat, the U.S. should seek Castro's replacement, without civil war or other form of violence. Instead, seek replacement by a political and maybe even democratic process that draws support from the U.S. populace, Cuban exiles, and Latin America.

If Castro dies in the hands of an assassin or dies of natural causes, fighting is likely to breakout. Fighting will occur between two groups-- the regime loyalists, versus the regime's opponents. The outcome of any succession crisis will remain uncertain and take a long time.

In the case of an uprising, the quickness of the revolt could decide the outcome. The longer it takes to develop, the better

chance the regime has to smash it. Conversely, the quicker the revolt, the more likely it will win additional supporters, and the higher the likelihood it will survive and spread. In either case, the U.S. should do everything possible to avoid getting sucked-in to support any side. Doing so would rally nationalistic support for the other side and portray the U.S. supported group as U.S. puppets.

The Best Alternative is to Ease Pressures, Lift the Embargo, and Improve the Information Flow with Cuba.

Improved communications should come first. Better communications between the two societies may eventually lead to further negotiations between the two governments. This would be the opening round to lifting the embargo.

This may be considered by some a conciliatory option but the symbolism associated with lifting the embargo is tremendous. Cuba considers the economic blockade a "state of war." By some, it may be considered a triumph for Cuba, but most will see it as a magnanimous gesture from the only remaining super power. Easing pressures would no doubt nurture reformists, identify new ones, maybe secure better behavior from Castro, and lead to democratic reform.

This alternative is more appealing to Cubans, Latin Americans, and most of the world. The only exception would be the Cuban exiles but, even they may eventually realize the opportunity it may afford. Initially, little economic benefit for the U.S. and Cuba will result but, eventually a 10 million people market and Cuba's

stability will benefit U.S. and Cuban interests.

The U.S. should not take this approach seeking to remove Castro from power. Castro will eventually fall or capitulate. Instead, the U.S. should concentrate on establishing relations with Cuba and salvaging its economy.

This policy clearly forces the U.S. to take a risk and crack the door open in hope that this opening would begin a period of friendly relations between the two countries. Only through mutual political accommodation will this 33 year antagonistic relationship between Cuba and the United States end.

INTRODUCTION

Need For New Policy

January 1st, 1992 marked the 33rd. anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. The government, created by the revolution, under President Fidel Castro Rúz, Cuba's *Líder Máximo* (Maximum Leader), is an authoritarian communist system (Castroism) modeled after the "old" Soviet Union (See Appendix 1). Now that Communism in the Soviet Union is dead and Cuban-Soviet relations are weak, it's time for the United States to revisit its foreign policy toward Cuba. For one-third of a century, the U.S. and Cuba relentlessly confronted each other on issues of foreign policy, economic survival, and national security in the Western Hemisphere. Why should the U.S. still worry about Cuba? Castro doesn't have the international influence today, he once had. He's an old dictator, in a small Latin American country, with no money. Why should we go out of our way to save him or to get rid of him?

The 33 year-old regime of Fidel Castro still pretends that Socialism works even as living standards fall further and further behind the developed West and political discontent builds. On the other side is the Bush Administration, acting as if Cuba were still the menacing outpost of an evil empire and enforcing more stringently than ever the never-ending 33-year-old trade embargo with the island. In effect, neither stand is sustainable. The ties of the two countries are binding, only 90 miles of tropical waters separate them. One million Cuban refugees and immigrants

are a potent political and economic force in the United States, hypersensitive to what happens to Cuba. The 10.7 million Cubans remaining behind watch American movies, play American music, listen to American radio stations, and yearn for the American prosperity that they know their exiled relatives enjoy. Even the island's humor looks North. Before the opening of the Pan American games, the running joke in Havana was, "Cubans say that what they need today is not the Pan American games but instead *"pan y Americanos"* - bread and Americans." ¹

Strategic Significance of Cuba

Is Cuba of any strategic significance? It appears so; the sheer geographic proximity to the U.S., even in today's most seemingly peaceful world make her important:

"The island sits within the most important shipping routes from the North Atlantic into the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal. Since the Spanish-American War, the base at Guantánamo has developed into perhaps the most important naval facility in the Western hemisphere. Guantánamo's strategic importance as a base would have little value in a nuclear war, but is of major importance in limited and conventional war situations, particularly in circumstances involving conflict, or the risk of conflict in the Caribbean arena." ²

I anticipate that the political situation in Cuba will eventually change. Some possible scenarios are: (1) nothing changes--which I think is unlikely; (2) there is a popular uprising--which I think is impossible given the state of security; (3) a military coup occurs--which could happen; (4) Castro goes down with the ship, economically, and the Cuban people wait until

he is gone--which I think is very unlikely; and (5) Castro attempts to create a transitional government--which is possible. ³ Will these changes require a change in U.S. policy? What should be the objective(s) of future U.S. policy toward Cuba? Is the U.S. prepared for a political or leadership change in Cuba? Future U.S. foreign policy should consider the impact of the "New World Order," current conditions in Cuba, internal dissent, and its political leadership.

FOREIGN POLICY

U.S. Foreign Policy in Cuba's History

To get an appreciation for the current state of affairs in U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, a chronology of events between the U.S. and Cuba during its history is necessary. The U.S. relationship with Cuba goes back to the early days of the American Republic. As early as 1807, President Jefferson offered to buy the Island from Spain rather than let it fall into the hands of the British or French. ⁴

Although nothing came of that, American interests in Cuba continued. In the two decades before the American Civil War, three U.S. Presidents made offers to Spain to purchase the island. They were during the Pierce, Polk, and Buchanan administrations. The reasons were clear. First, pressure for annexation came from the South based on their interests to add another slave state to the Union. Second, it fitted very well into our own nationalistic expansionist philosophy. Our drive for expansion resulted in some Cuban-American expeditions. One such expedition took place in 1850 where about 400 Cubans, Americans, and Hungarians landed in Cuba to try to overthrow the Spanish government. The landing was unsuccessful--the expeditioners divided, captured, and executed, or sentenced to hard labor. ⁵

On April 15, 1895, the Second Cuban War for Independence began. Despite pressures for intervention by the U.S., President Cleveland kept the United States from meddling in Cuban affairs.

One of Cleveland's hardest critics was Congressman William McKinley who later became the Republican candidate for president in 1896. Yet, the U.S. favored ending the Cuban insurrection for fear it could draw the U.S. into war with Spain. Spain did not cooperate.

After McKinley took office, he revived the old "purchase" foreign policy scheme and expressed American concern over human rights violations by the Spanish against the Cuban population. Neither of these policies was successful. Still, out of concern for U.S. citizens living in Cuba and to protect American property there, the U.S. Battleship Maine went to Cuba. On February 15, 1898, the Maine exploded in Havana Harbor. A U.S. government inquiry into the sinking of the Maine blamed the Spanish government for the disaster. On April 25, the United States declared war on Spain.

What American historians call the Spanish-American War, is to Cubans only a small episode in Their War for Independence against Spain. This seemingly insignificant difference in name suggests a tendency by the U.S. over the last century to see Cuba and Cuban affairs as an extension of the U.S. and U.S. interests.⁶

In three weeks the war ended. The U.S. claimed victory over Spain and promptly installed a military government in Cuba to oversee affairs. Cuba changed or transformed from being a Spanish colony to a quasi-U.S. colony. The U.S. placed General Leonard Wood as governor of Cuba until Cuba could form its own government. The U.S. military occupation continued until 1902.

On May 28, 1901, at the insistence of the U.S., the Platt

Amendment was added to the Cuban Constitution. It limited Cuban sovereignty in dealings with other countries and gave the U.S. the right to intervene in Cuba at will.

Cuba recognizes May 20, 1902 as their formal Independence Day. On that day, General Wood transferred power to Cuba's first president, Estrada Palma and formally ended the occupation of Cuba. The Platt Amendment was enforced several times after that. Between 1906 and 1909, U.S. forces again occupied Cuba to restore order. Again in 1912, U.S. forces intervened to protect American interests, and returned and stayed from 1917 to 1922, to protect American interests again.

On 20 May 1925, Geraldo Machado was elected president and this began the first period of dictatorship in Cuba. By the 1930s, his brutality led the U.S. to begin distancing itself from the dictator and encouraged him to step down. Machado fled to Nassau in August of 1933. Subsequently, the revolutionary leaders fighting against Machado, influenced by U.S. Ambassador Sumner Wells, appointed Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada, son of the leading revolutionary leader of the first war for independence, provisional president. But, he did not last.

In September 1933, a revolution controlled by several noncommissioned officers arrested their superiors and took over command of the island's military forces. This "Sergeant's Revolt" was led by a man named Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar. This revolution led to the assignment of Ramón Grau y San Martín as the new president of Cuba. Grau immediately began many social reforms,

he denounced the Platt Amendment, and dissolved the old political party machine that was in place. On May 29, 1934, he abrogated the Platt Amendment. In protest, the U.S. denied recognition of his government and then U.S. interests were almost overtaken by Cuba. As a result, the U.S. sent warships to Cuban waters. They stayed on alert but they did not intervene. Batista, in the mean time, gained control of the military, became its commander, and was able to control many of the factions that were wrestling for power in Cuba. Behind the scenes, Batista controlled the government, he put in power four more presidents (Mendieta, Barnet, Gómez, and Bru) from 1934 to 1940 when he defeated Grau for the presidency.

In 1941, Cuba declared war on the Axis Powers soon after the U.S. entered World War II. Under Batista, the country flourished although it was under a ruthless state dictatorship. Cuban sugar production rose to a high level and the U.S. purchased all Cuban sugar at a somewhat high price.

In 1944, Grau again won the presidency under the Conservative Republican Party ticket. He was succeeded in office by Carlos Prío Socorrás who won the 1948 Cuban elections. Cubans became dissatisfied with these two popularly elected presidents and corruption became rampant at all levels of government. Batista became a candidate for the presidency during the 1952 elections. But, before the election took place, he led a bloodless *coup d'état* on March 10, 1952, with the help of his military friends. At this point, 20 years of political development in Cuba came to a complete halt! It was evident that the next phase would be dominated by a

military dictatorship. Batista's years in government were characterized by prosperity in exchange for freedom. Resistance against his regime grew.

On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro Ruz led a revolt in which 165 men attacked the Moncada Army Barracks near Santiago de Cuba. This attack was a failure but it planted the seed for future revolutionary activity. Castro was arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Batista, under pressure from dissidents, declared a general amnesty and freed most political prisoners. On 7 July 1955, Castro left Cuba for exile in Mexico where he began the "26 of July Movement" whose purpose was to organize Cuban exiles for a return to Cuba to fight against Batista.

In December 1956, Castro landed a force of 81 men in Oriente Province to begin the fight against Batista. Only a handful made it. However, supported by *campesinos* (peasants) they hid in the *Sierra Maestra* from which they started guerilla operations against the Batista regime. Castro became a folk hero. The American press brought U.S. citizens into the revolution (it idolized Castro). Through the press, Americans learned that Cubans were denied a free democratic process and support for Castro increased. The U.S. government started supporting the rebels as early as 1958. Under pressure from the rebels, Batista's army started deserting in droves and finally he fled the country on New Year's Day 1959.

Soon after taking control of the island, Fidel Castro declared himself Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government. After some political maneuvering, he managed to replace the revolutionary

president (Urrutia) he had earlier put into office. He replaced him with, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado who later, in-turn, supported him for the post of Prime Minister.

Castro's assumption of power was characterized by the liquidation of the old power groups, the military, political parties, labor unions, and agricultural and professional associations. They were all replaced by new revolutionary bodies such as the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR)*-the Revolutionary Armed Forces, *La Milicia*-the Militia, and the *Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (CDR)*-Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. In May 1959, the Cubans passed the Agrarian Reform Law that nationalized about one third of the arable land in Cuba. This was a great loss to U.S. citizens who owned land in Cuba.

The hallmark years between Cuba-U.S. relations were between 1960-1962. Problems started with Castro overtures about his socialistic thinking. In February 1960, the Soviets and Cuba signed a trade and aid agreement. Later that year, in May, Cuba and the Soviet Union established formal diplomatic relations. U.S. oil companies in Cuba, at the urge of the State Department, refused to refine Soviet crude oil and this led Cuba to nationalize the refineries. In July, the U.S. suspended the Cuban sugar quota effectively cutting-off 80 percent of Cuban exports to the U.S. In turn, the Soviet Union agreed to buy the Cuban sugar refused by the U.S. In retaliation, Cuba nationalized all U.S. private investments on the island--worth approximately \$1 billion. In further retaliation, the U.S. imposed an economic embargo against

trade with Cuba. In-turn, the Cuban government nationalized all commercial and industrial enterprises on the island. Finally, in January 1961, Washington broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. In April 1961, Castro declares that "the Cuban revolution is socialist . . . I am a Marxist-Leninist and will always be."

The U.S. Government, at President Eisenhower's request began plotting an invasion of Cuba in 1960. From 17-19 April 1961, a U.S. government backed, CIA-sponsored, invasion force of Cuban exiles landed at the *Bahía de Cochinos* (Bay of Pigs) and was defeated within 72 hours after President Kennedy refused to allow U.S. air support to the invasion forces. In January 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS) suspended Cuba's membership in the organization.

The next significant event was the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 16-28, 1962. When the U.S. discovered intermediate range Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, Washington blockaded the island and threatened to remove the missiles by force, if the U.S.S.R. didn't. The Soviets backed down, and pulled the missiles out in exchange for U.S. guarantees they would not invade the island in the future. This agreement was reached without consultation with Castro and resulted in the first chasm in Soviet-Cuban relations.

From 1962 to 1968, the CIA organized many paramilitary attacks against Cuba including assassination plots against Castro. In 1964, the OAS voted to require all its members to cut diplomatic relations with Cuba; only Mexico refused.

In October 1965, a boatlift from the port of Camarioca brought

3000 Cuban immigrants to the U.S. In 1967, Ernesto Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia while fighting with Bolivian revolutionaries against the legitimate government. In 1968, Castro supported the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In 1969, Cuba recognized the Provisional Government of South Viet Nam. In 1970, Washington warned Moscow to stop building a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba. Construction was halted. Castro was angered at Soviet lack of backbone. In 1973, the United States and Cuba signed an anti-hijacking agreement.

In 1974, U.S. and Cuban officials secretly met in New York to discuss possible areas for negotiation between the two countries. In 1975, it appeared that the United States was prepared to move in a new direction in its policy toward Cuba. The majority in the OAS wanted to lift diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba. However, the U.S. opted to maintain its embargo, but allowed foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to trade with Cuba.

Then, in November 1975, Cuba started its internationalist policy. At the request of the Angolan government, it sent Cuban troops to help Angola repulse an invasion by South African forces. The Soviets were caught off-guard, but eventually supported Castro's intervention. Ultimately, 30,000 Cuban troops were sent. U.S. President Gerald Ford asserted that Cuban involvement in Angola precluded any possibility of restoring normal relations and broke-off secret negotiations that were underway since 1974. During 1976, Cuban troops continued to fight in Africa and the U.S. Government refused to negotiate with Cuba or normalize relations.

During 1977, President Carter lifted the ban on travel to Cuba and the U.S. and Cuba signed an agreement on fishing rights in boundary waters between the two countries. Castro responded by sending Cuban troops into Ethiopia. This derailed the Carter Administration's efforts to normalize relations. In October 1978, efforts by the Cuban-American community and the Cuban government led to the release of 3000 political prisoners and agreements on travel and immigration policy. This led to Cuban-Americans being permitted to visit their families for the first time since the revolution. More than 100,000 Cubans visited Cuba in 1979.

In April 1979, Grenada restored diplomatic relations with Cuba and established close political and economic ties. In July, the revolutionary Nicaraguan government restored relations with Cuba, established political ties, and received Cuban military advise in their war against the U.S. backed Contras. In August, the U.S. discovered a Soviet 3000 troop combat brigade in Cuba. The Soviets asserted the brigade was a training group that was in Cuba since 1962. In 1980, Cubans began work in Grenada on a new international airport. This became an object of concern for the U.S.

In April 1980, after some Cubans broke through the Peruvian Embassy gates in Havana, the Cuban government removed the guards and 7000 people flooded the Embassy grounds. Subsequently, Cuba announced anyone wishing to leave the country could be picked up at the Port of Mariel. In the next 5 months, 120,000 Cubans left the country for the U.S. Approximately, one percent of those were released from prisons and mental institutions as Castro attempted

to rid the island of unwanted.

Throughout 1981, the U.S. suspected Cuba was aiding the revolution in El Salvador. Additionally, Colombia suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba over its support and training of the M-19 guerilla movement in Colombia. In 1982, MIG-23 Flogger aircraft were introduced into the Cuban arsenal. In April, the Cubans offered aid to Argentina during the Falklands War against the United Kingdom. Soon after that, the U.S. Treasury Department reimposed its restrictions on travel to Cuba to tighten the embargo. In 1983, the U.S. State Department reported that Cuba received 50 MIG-23 aircraft and 140 SAM-3 missiles in 1982.

In October 1982, U.S. and Caribbean nation forces invaded Grenada at the request of a number of Caribbean nations concerned over the Grenada Communist government. U.S. forces occupied the island and established a provisional government. The 784 Cubans in the island fought against the invasion force. The U.S. captured 642 Cubans, killed 24, and 57 were wounded. The Soviets refused to become involved.

In December of 1984, the U.S. and Cuba agreed that 2,746 *excludables* (exemptions) who left on the Mariel Boatlift would be returned to Cuba. In-turn, the U.S., agreed to permit the immigration of 20,000 Cubans to the U.S. per year. In March 1985, Castro declined to attend the funeral of the Soviet Communist Party Chairman Chernenko. This further suggested some strains between the Soviet Union and Cuba.

On May 19, 1985, the U.S. initiated propaganda broadcasts to

Cuba via *Radio Martí*. In response, Cuba suspended the immigration and repatriation agreement with the U.S. In October, the Reagan Administration banned travel of Cuban officials to the U.S.

In April 1986, the Soviet Union agreed to a 5-year, \$3 billion program of aid and economic credit for Cuba. In July of that year, Cuban and U.S. officials met in Mexico to discuss resumption of the immigration agreement but the meeting ended in a stalemate. In November 1987, the United States and Cuba restored the immigration agreement that Cuba canceled in 1985.

In February 1988, Angola agreed to send all Cuban troops home as part of a comprehensive Angola-South Africa peace settlement worked out between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (Cuba was excluded).⁷

Current U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba changed little in the 33 years since the Cuban revolution. According to Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter American Affairs from the State Department, "the United States has no blueprint for Cuba, the U.S. does not claim to order the affairs of that nation. All we hope for is genuine self-determination and change that can come peacefully."⁸

Today, the government of Cuba stands isolated from the rest of the Western Hemisphere--by refusing to permit its people to vote in free elections, by refusing to permit freedom in the marketplace, by refusing to renounce support for violent revolutionary movements, and by refusing to join the international community in

curbing proliferation of nuclear weapons. These things are a result of its own policy decisions not United States' policy.'

What is the current U.S. policy toward Cuba? The United States poses no military threat to Cuba; it has no aggressive intentions toward Cuba; and it has no desire to order Cuba's internal affairs. On the 89th Anniversary of the Cuban Independence, President Bush stated he would welcome changes in a future US-Cuban relationship. In a message that was broadcast on Radio Martí on May 17, 1991, he challenged Fidel Castro:

"I call on Fidel Castro to free political prisoners in Cuba and allow the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to investigate possible human rights violations in Cuba. I challenge Mr. Castro to let Cuba live in peace with its neighbors. And, I challenge Mr. Castro to follow the examples of countries like Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Chile in their achievement of new democracies.

"Put democracy to a test-permit political parties to organize and a free press to thrive. Hold free and fair elections under international supervision.

"If Cuba holds fully free and fair elections under international supervision, respects human rights and stops subverting its neighbor we can expect relations between our two countries to improve significantly." ¹⁰

The tools of this policy are well known to all:

- the absence of normal diplomatic relations;
- diplomatic isolation in international organizations, and for normal bilateral ties with other countries;
- the comprehensive economic embargo, to deny Cuba the means to carry out policies inimical to the U.S.;
- the broadcast of unbiased news and information to Cuba.

One thing is clear: The U.S. government is not reversing its position on maintaining the embargo on Cuba. In fact, it has taken steps to crack down and make sure that the embargo is clearly enforced. The effect of the embargo on the Cuban population is

significant but not easily measured. The embargo in conjunction with the loss of support from Eastern Europe, the non-aligned movement, Latin America, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the former Soviet Union created an economic crisis of serious proportions. The U.S. feels that unless the changes cited by President Bush take place, the embargo will remain in place.

The Cuban government suggests that the U.S. refuses to dialogue with Cuba. Yet despite fundamental disagreements with Cuban policy, the United States does maintain some government-to-government contact and exchanges through the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and the Cuban Interest Section in Washington D.C. In fact, the U.S. has bilateral agreements or understandings with Cuba on migration, search and rescue, and the exchange of real-time information to aid in the apprehension of narcotic traffickers. ¹¹

Speculation exists about the possibility of another Mariel Boatlift. The President's policy is clear--the United States will not permit another Mariel and the U.S. State Department is fully prepared to handle this contingency.

CASTRO'S CUBA

Cuba Before Castro

Freed from Spanish rule as a result of their victory over Spain, Cuba attained partial independence in 1898. The U.S., however, imposed restrictions on the new nation's sovereignty by reserving the right to intervene with troops to preserve Cuban independence, or restore order on the island. The island nation, less than 100 miles from the Florida Keys, remained a ward of the United States until 1934, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt--following the non-intervention policy shaped by his predecessor, Herbert Hoover--successfully arranged a treaty by which Cuba attained full independence although the United States retained the major naval base they had established at Guantánamo Bay.

For the next quarter of a century, Cuba maintained close ties with the U.S., its principal market for sugar, the island's major crop. Some Cubans, however, resented the dependence upon a single crop whose price fluctuated wildly and blamed the U.S. for, in effect, subsidizing unbalanced agriculture. Far more prevalent than this mild disenchantment was the growing opposition to the succession of insensitive, ineffective, and corrupt Cuban governments. The last of these collapsed in December 1958 when President Fulgencio Batista, who had previously led two successful coups against his predecessors, fled before Fidel Castro's rebels.

On 31 December 1958--24 hours before the triumph of the revolution--Cuba was an underdeveloped country, poor and dependent

on sugar, secretly subject to the dictates of a foreign power, and under the control of a tyrant. ¹² Almost 33 years later, Cuba is still an underdeveloped country, poor and dependent on sugar, and under the control of another tyrant. Some would argue--much worse-off. "In 1958, in spite of the deplorable picture described, Cuba, according to the most trustworthy economic indicators--cement, kilowatts, proteins, telephones, steel, and other mysterious symptoms per capita--was the third country in Latin America in terms of development. Today it is eighth." ¹³

Some additional statistics support this argument. In nourishment, Cuba was 26th out of 93 countries surveyed with 2730 calories per day (min. requirement is 2500). In America, only Argentina, the United States, Canada, and Uruguay were ahead. In automobiles, it was third in Latin America behind Venezuela and Puerto Rico with one per every 40 inhabitants. It was third in the world in kilometers of roads per thousands of vehicles. It had one telephone per 38 inhabitants, placing it fourth in Latin American behind Puerto Rico, Argentina, and Uruguay. It had one radio per every 6.5 inhabitants--third place in Latin America. There were 270 transmitting stations. There was one television set per every 25 inhabitants--first place in Latin America. It had five TV stations, one of them in color. In literacy, Cuba rated 35th amongst 136 countries with a literacy rate of 80 percent, placing it in the same category as Chile and Costa Rica and surpassed only by Argentina and Uruguay (80-85 percent). This literacy rate is impressive if one realizes that after the Spanish Colonial period

only 28 percent of Cubans were literate. In numbers of university students, Cuba was tied with Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico with an average of 3.8 students per 1000 inhabitants in 1959. The mortality rate in Cuba was among the lowest in the world with 5.8 annual deaths per 1000 inhabitants. Simultaneously, the U.S. had 9.5, Canada 7.6, and Mexico and Perú had 10.6. In health, Cuba had 128.6 medical doctors and dentists per 100,000 inhabitants. The only two Latin American countries with a larger percentage of health professionals were Argentina and Uruguay. Cuba had one hospital bed per 300 inhabitants, only Costa Rica, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile exceeded Cuba in Latin America. ^{1 14}

Appendix Two, Demographics and Country Statistics, compares Cuba's demographic and economic data to other countries of Latin America. This comparison supports the argument that considerable advances in education and health occurred in Cuba since 1959. Yet, one cannot help but notice that Cuba was already leading Latin America in most categories in 1959, and still leads today despite Castro's Communist state. I can only guess what additional progress was possible if a democratic and capitalistic system and capitalism controlled the government and business enterprises.

¹.The above paragraph is extracted from a longer thesis published as an appendix (*State of the Cuban Economy before Castro*) in Carlos Alberto Montaner's book, Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution: Age, Position, Character, Destiny, Personality and Ambition. It makes the case that Cuba was not as underdeveloped as uninformed historians, economists, and Castro make it seem. In fact, it documents 15 characteristics normally accepted as a guide of underdevelopment and proves that 1958 Cuba breached the threshold necessary to go from underdeveloped to developed.

How Castro Came to Power

Fidel Castro Ruz was born on August 13, 1926. The son of Spanish sugar planters from the province of Oriente, he studied under the Jesuit tutelage and in 1945 enrolled at the University of Havana, from which he graduated in 1950 with a law degree. While at the university, he became a member of the Social Democratic Orthodox Party and was a vocal opponent of the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.

On 26 July 1953, he led an attack on the Moncada Army Barracks that failed, but brought him national prominence. At the time, his political ideals were nationalistic, anti-imperialist, and reformist. Although, he was probably a communist, he was not a member of the Communist Party. Following the attack of Moncada, Castro was tried and sentenced to 15 years in prison but was amnestied in 1955. He then went into exile in Mexico, where he founded the 26th of July Movement, vowing to return to Cuba to fight against Batista. In December 1956, he and 81 others, including Che Guevara, returned to Cuba and made their way to the Sierra Maestra mountains from which they launched a successful guerilla war. Castro proved himself a strong leader; he also demonstrated shrewd political skills, convinced that he had a historic duty to change the character of Cuban society.

Seeing the Cuban Army collapse and unable to count on the support of the United States, Batista fled on January 1, 1959 paving the way for Castro's rise to power.

Cuba Since the Revolution

In the early phase of this new revolutionary government, Castro's revolutionary regime included moderate politicians and democrats; gradually, however, its policies became radical and confrontational. Castro remained the unchallenged leader, and the masses, -whose living conditions he improved, -rallied behind him. Promises of elections remain unfulfilled, foreign-owned properties confiscated, and opponents of the regime either killed, jailed, or driven into exile. As a result, thousands of middle class and professional Cubans left the island once it became clear a communist revolution had taken place.

The U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs' invasion in 1961 failed and Castro was able to consolidate his power. In December 1961, he publicly declared he was a Marxist-Leninist and would remain one until he died. About the same time, Cuba aligned itself with the Soviet Union who granted Cuba massive, economic, technical and military assistance. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis dramatized the Cuba-Soviet alliance. Since then, relations between revolutionary Cuba and the U.S. remain characterized by varying degrees of hostility.

Hopes for normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba during the mid-1970s disappeared, driven by large-scale Cuban military interventions in support of revolutionary governments in Angola and Ethiopia. Although, Interest Sections exist in La Habana and Washington since 1977, very little in terms of diplomatic communications and successful interchange takes place.

During the 1980s, the Mariel Boatlift dramatically increased Cuban-U.S. tensions. Additionally, Cuba, because of its internationalist policies in Central America, was severely criticized by the U.S. during the late 80s.

Despite U.S. objections to Cuban support of revolutionary activities in Latin America and Africa, it was really Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union that was most objectionable. Cuba became a surrogate of the Soviet Union, but sometimes, particularly in Latin American and African affairs, it appeared that Cuba often initiated, what only later became, Soviet policy. Occasionally, Cuba disagreed with Soviet foreign policy, as it did during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fiasco in Grenada in 1983.

The relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union was based on mutual need. According to *Licenciado* Rafael Dausá, Third Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, D.C., when the U.S. closed the doors on Cuba (through the embargo), "Cuba became dependent on the U.S.S.R. Cuba didn't want to be dependent on anyone but had to--they were our only friend." The Cuban regime needed ongoing Soviet economic and military aid for its very survival, while the Soviets in-turn viewed Cuba as a vital link with Africa and the Caribbean Basin. Perhaps most threatening to the U.S. was that Cuba provided the world a powerful political message. A revolutionary communist regime with close geographic and historical ties to the U.S. endured over time and fulfilled many historical aspirations and material needs of its citizens.

Since 1986, it appears, time is working against Castro. His 33 year-old dictatorship is besieged by mounting external and internal problems. The collapse of communism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the democratization of Latin America left the dictator politically and ideologically isolated with dwindling economic resources.

HOW CASTRO MAINTAINS POWER

Charismatic Leadership

Castro's charisma and his revolutionary prestige easily made him the logical person to replace Batista as the leader of Cuba. The power of the charismatic leader-follower relationship between Castro and the Cuban people is almost palpable. Especially early in his career, he seemed to gain strength from the response of the crowd during his long impassioned speeches. Central to the ability of the charismatic leader to elicit a continuing flow of admiration from his audience is his ability to convey a sense of grandeur, omnipotence, and certainty. Such a personality is particularly attractive to individuals seeking idealized sources of strength. This is the basis of Castro's charismatic appeal. ¹⁵

Castro was the man of the hour--the new Messiah. The regular army was leaderless and demoralized. Castro's bid for power was unchallenged. He possessed unquestionable qualities of leadership. With his tremendous gift for public speaking and a fantastic memory, he can speak extemporaneously for hours. Most of the Cuban populace accepted his leadership enthusiastically and without question. There was great hope in the air for the future.

Castro's assumption of power was very ingenious. During his first weeks in power, he assumed no official positions except, Commander of the Armed Forces. He handpicked for President a former judge (the only judge during the Moncada trial that appeared to favor Castro), Manuel Urrutia. Urrutia, under Castro's

direction, proceeded to tear down Batista's government, his organization, his entire structure, and began a "sweep" of Batista's supporters. It soon became clear the real power rested with Castro and his Revolutionary Army. Initially, Castro would announce new public policies without consulting with the President or the Cabinet, and he publicly complained about the slowness of the reforms. Eventually, Castro forced Urrutia to resign and he quickly appointed "his own" new president, Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado. A month after the revolution, the appointed Prime Minister resigned and Dorticós nominated Castro as Prime Minister. He immediately accepted.

After Castro's formal assumption of power, he initiated a purge. His goal became evident--get rid of anyone who could now, or in the future, threaten his leadership position or could mount a revolutionary movement against him. To that end, he brought to trial Batista's military and civilian leaders before revolutionary tribunals. He televised the proceedings and executed hundreds, summarily.

Castro who has no rivals for power, demands the absolute loyalty of those around him. Cuba's command economy responds to the wishes of one man whose desire for total control, combined with his charismatic, mercurial personality, make for a much less rational, orderly, and predictable decision-making process than that previously centered in Moscow. Because of that, he is less than successful as an economic policy maker; Cuba remains a poor country in debt whose livelihood depends on sugar production and,

until recently, Soviet economic aid. He, none the less, holds the system in place. His greatest achievement is the consolidation of a socialist-communist regime in the Caribbean, so close to Cuba's main antagonist, the U.S. In no small measure, the Cuban revolution is still Castro's revolution.

He is the "*líder máximo*." Despite known dissidents and dissatisfaction by the Cuban population, (some experts believe his charisma among the better educated and younger generation is not what it was) there are indications that a large portion of the Cuban community remains attracted to his personal style of government. His long speeches still mesmerize his audience. Despite some disagreements between the military and Castro over Grenada, and the pullout from Angola, he still is in absolute control over his government with no other public figure in a leadership position ready to challenge his authority.

Of late, Castro, his brother Raúl, and their respective followers made sure that all the key positions within the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers are occupied by the "old guard." These are civilians, guerilla veterans, Fidelistas, and Raúlistas along with senior members of the Cuban FAR, together, they occupy key posts in the Party and the government. Despite some speculation concerning Castro's health, he still is as energetic and loquacious as ever. He is still the hero and symbol of national aspirations of many Cubans. He is Cuba's leading government official and its leading critic. He presides over a system in which corruption and favoritism is a way of life. It is

the masses fear of something new and lack of knowledge about any political alternatives that allows him to maintain his popularity and support.

The Problem of Succession

For Cuba and principally Castro, the problem of succession is a critical one. Will Castro be accommodating and step down, or will he be confrontational? The revolution is too important to him. In history, no totalitarian regime has been able to structure a smooth system of transition. Castro's disappearance from the scene could set off an internal power struggle. Though he has taken steps to declare publicly that his brother General Raúl Castro Rúz, Commander of the FAR and Minister of Interior should be his successor, it is likely that some kind of struggle within the revolutionary ranks will take place upon his departure.

Fidel Castro continues to be central to the regime's cohesiveness, stability, and legitimacy, if not as a charismatic figure as in the 1960s, then as a caudillo-style leader.¹⁶ One reason why a succession problem exists is Castro's charismatic authority impeded and stunted institutional development during the first 10 years after the revolution. A communist party was not established officially in Cuba for 6 years after he took power. Even then, it was weak and ineffectual for another 10 years. Additionally, his pure dominance over the last 25 years precluded any individual leaders from taking prominence. He tolerates no potential challengers.

In effect, other than Castro, today's Cuban leadership is characterized by its weakness, subservience, and relative obscurity. It would be very difficult for a collective group to rule in Cuba. Cubans are not used to Junta or collective-type governments. In their entire history, they always favored rule by one man. If Castro steps down, they will be looking for, again, a leader; that leader does not exist today. There may be some leaders that lurk in the shadows, but they are highly dependent upon Castro for their power and authority. None of them really commands any independent sources of political power, either from the populace or from official authority over an important institution.

General Raúl Castro

If Fidel dies naturally, Raúl will step-in and stay awhile. Yet, he " . . . does not have the charisma, following, or rhetorical skills of his brother, and his succession could accelerate the concerns of those in the country seeking change and transformation." ¹⁷ Fidel has strategically placed his heir-apparent brother in three power structures within the Cuban government. First, he is an Army General, Commander of the FAR, and Minister of Interior. Second, he serves as the *Partido Comunista Cubano* (PCC) - Cuban Communist Party Second Secretary. And third, he is First Vice President of both the Council of Ministers and the Council of State. In effect, Raúl is central in three key bodies: the military, and the two highest governmental and state bodies. Raúl is not Fidel: he lacks Fidel's popular basis of support. He may have to rely heavily on his coercive

power exercised through his position and personal control over the FAR, PCC, and *Ministerio del Interior* (MININT) - Ministry of the Interior to assure his position. If Fidel is killed or deposed, Raúl won't stay long. If not Raúl, who? Only a few party officials have the qualities necessary to succeed him, but their political views are unknown.

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias - FAR

Cuba's regime is composed of three basic organizations upon which the revolution stands. They are the CDR, the PCC, and the FAR. Of these, the FAR is undoubtedly the most vital and the most stable. The FAR is really one of the pillars of strength that could assume a leadership role in the future. Founded in October 1959, it was the FAR, instead of the PCC, that had revolutionary legitimacy as a direct descendant of the rebel army that toppled Batista. The FAR is full of genuine military mythology, of exploits, heroes, and martyrs associated with the triumphant insurgency. ¹⁸

The FAR has a large representation in the Party's Central Committee. The FAR's rise to power is partly due to the imminent role it played in advancing Castro's foreign policy goals in the Third World. Cuba is still a garrison state. The FAR which numbers about 230,000 regular and ready reserve personnel is now augmented by the *Tropas Territoriales Milicianas* (TTM) - Territorial Troop Militia that number one million and is led by regular FAR military officers.

Tropas Territoriales Milicianas - TTM

We cannot rule out that Castro may be assassinated or removed by a *coup d'état* because of some military insurrection. I propose that the TTM, created around 1980, should be viewed as an independent force, under Castro's direct command. One can assume that this militia will offset the strength of the FAR in case of an uprising. One should note, the TTM's rise to power coincided with the return of large numbers of troops from Angola. These troops were not happy with the way the war ended. Additionally, recent reports from Brig Gen del Pino, a Cuban Air Force General who defected to the U.S. in 1985, indicates that these dissenting troops could be Castro's "Achilles Heel."

Elite Groupings

Another succession alternative is for him to step down gracefully and be replaced by an elite group. Historically, Cuban groups form out of loyalty toward a particular leader. First, there are the Fidelistas, these were the original members of Fidel's First Front of the *Sierra Maestra* Mountains. Since the revolution, they occupy key positions in the party, the government, the FAR, the MININT, and mass organizations. Another elite group is the Raúlistas who originally came from the Second Front of the *Escambray* Mountains led by Raúl and Camilo Cienfuegos. Since then, they occupy significant positions in the FAR, the MININT, the PCC, and government offices. The third type of elite grouping exists around generation, professional, or racial concentrations. One should note that the majority of the PCC is made up of people from

Castro's 1953 generation. They could also form an elite group. Another large group could form from membership from a province, and yet others may form along racial lines. It is also possible, and maybe most likely, that a coalition of these elite groups could attempt to influence the succession outcome to enhance their political and career opportunities and perhaps maybe even cause policy changes.

Other Groupings

If a coalition would form amongst the junior and middle rank FAR officers returning from Angola, they could be a powerful political force. Displeased with the outcome of the war in Angola, they returned to Cuba to an economy on its knees, with a housing job shortage. They may show their discontent. Additionally, some members of the military may appreciate lessening of tensions between the U.S. and Cuba. This could cause a split in the military and thereby weaken Raúl Castro's position.

Additionally, there are pragmatic groups. These are groups of young people with similar professional interests, education, and technical proficiency. These post-revolutionary elites, currently in their mid-20s and mid-30s, received some advanced education and technical training during their careers. Tens of thousands of civilian managers and technocrats trained in Soviet bloc countries. As an example, the technical competence of the FAR is very high. The top five military schools have university status; engineering degrees from these schools are granted full equivalency; and starting with the class of 1982, commissions in the FAR required a

bachelor's degree. These civilian managers and technocrats share common values. They probably see professionalism, rationality, and technical proficiency as key management traits required to run a country. They also notice these traits are currently nonexistent in Cuba's leaders. This group is likely to be more pragmatic, willing to work for political change, and may seek economic ties with the United States.

Finally, there is the collective leadership option. Raúl is no Fidel. Opposition to Raúl may occur. His opposition would come from non-Raúlita-Fidelista contemporaries in top government positions, and from among the younger and better educated military officers and civilian managers. If this group coalesces, it could promote the interests of the groups. Obviously then, a different political succession outcome will result. One where Raúl would still have a place, but one where he would have to share power with others.

CUBA'S PARADIGM

Impact of the "New World Order"

Today, the continuing dissolution of the Soviet Empire threatens Castroism in Cuba. ¹⁹ The communist system is collapsing. The Soviet drive toward communist world domination is over. Will change come to Cuba now that the Cold war is over? According to Lic. Dausá from the Cuban Interest Section, "the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviets is over, but it isn't between the U.S. and Cuba." Therefore, I don't know when change will come. But, what is clear is that the changing Socialist bloc left Cuba politically isolated from its former allies and accelerated economic decline. Yet, Cuba refuses to change.

Deterioration of the Soviet-Cuban relationship began when President Gorbachev visited Cuba in April 1989. He informed Castro that the Soviet Union would not support any doctrine that sought to justify the export of revolution in the future. This was a condemnation of Cuba's internationalist policy; no doubt inspired by the Soviet's need for U.S. support. The announcement of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Cuba (without consulting Castro) is further proof of this rift. Castro also showed evidence of disagreement with Soviet policies. In a speech he gave on 6 June 1991, he expressed that he saw no reason Cuba should copy Soviet-style *perestroika*. He added, that he respected the Soviets, but saw no reason Cuba should follow the Soviet example to try to rectify Soviet past mistakes. He reminded his audience that Cuba

lacked forced land collectivism and that Stalinism represented by abuse of power, a personality cult, and monuments to current leaders were not the case in Cuba. ²⁰

Soviet Dependence

Cuba had a somewhat free economy before 1959. Before the Revolution, Cuba's economy was one of the best in Latin America-- " . . . third in manufacturing, first in transportation, fifth in per capita income." ²¹ During the next ten years, the Cuban economy floundered and Cuba slowly became economically and politically dependent on the Soviet Union. First they tried to industrialize and neglected agriculture. Later, in the late 60s, they realized a need to reemphasize sugar production--their main agricultural export. "Sugar accounts for approximately 90 percent of Cuba's export earnings, now as compared to 75 percent 35 years ago." ²² Over the last ten years, the world price of sugar fluctuated considerably. This price fluctuation hurt Cuba. Today, the world price is lower than Cuba's cost to produce sugar due to large inefficiencies in their antiquated refineries. Only large subsidies from the Soviet Union, who bought Cuban sugar above the market price, kept Cuba above water.

Cuba's Soviet dependence was great. The Soviet Union purchased about 72 percent of Cuba's export and accounted for three-fifths of its imports. ²³ The Soviet subsidy was larger than that provided by the United States to any country in the world. ²⁴ The total estimated Soviet subsidy given Cuba is \$100 billion.

Still, Soviet assistance to Cuba, once \$4 billion annually, fell to \$1-1.5 billion in 1991. ²⁵ This figure represented about 20-25 percent of Cuba's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1991. Cuba's economy is suffering!

A Deteriorating System

Analysis of what's going on in Cuba suggests many manifestations of a deteriorating system. There is widespread corruption, low economic productivity, crime is on the rise, and reported cases of draft evasion and suicide are on the increase. To combat corruption, crime, and socioeconomic problems, in 1991 the Cuban government created a vigilance system. They called this system the Unified Vigilance and Protection System. This system operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and is designed by the authorities to face all kinds of criminal activities--antisocial, antieconomic, or antirevolutionary. ²⁶ This highly successful program already accounts for hundreds of citizens rounded up and arrested, some of them for criminal activities and others for dissention against the government. This system brings back memories of the revolutionary tribunals of the 1960s.

Another indicator is the number of people leaving Cuba legally and illegally. Legally, more Cubans are applying for non-immigration visas from the U.S. Interest Section in Havana since Cuba reduced the permitted age for applications to 20 years old for both sexes. One motivation for this change in policy was financial since the Cuban government adds \$900 or more in fees, payable in

U.S. currency only, to the cost of each Cuban's travel. ²⁷ Illegally there is an increase in the number of *balseros* (raft people) risking death trying to reach Florida. The number of *balseros* in 1991 was over 2000, this was four times greater than in 1990. Despite these manifestations, Cuba still refuses to accept Soviet style *glasnost* and *perestroika*. According to Professor Howard J. Wiarda, Professor of Latin American Studies, of the National War College, at the National Defense University:

Cuba has made no bows at all to the newer current of openness, democracy, change, freedom, and pluralism now sweeping the world: "old thinking" predominates in its foreign policy. Fidel Castro still dominates the Revolution in a one-man and highly personalistic fashion, and the entire apparatus of the totalitarian state--single-party regime, secret police, state-controlled institutions--remains locked in place. While the rest of the world is changing, Cuba appears not only to be rigid and unchanging but even to have tightened its totalitarian controls. ²⁸

Of the Latin American nation-states, Cuba is the only one that successfully embraced Marxism-Leninism and is one of the few communist countries in the world that still holds-on to those beliefs. Castro's new recent policy initiative is "Rectification." Professor Wiarda defines rectification as a return to moral incentives, ideological purity, central planning, and one-man rule. ²⁹ Ideas, Cubans strayed from during the mid 80s.

Further, Mr. Luis Aguilar, professor of History at Georgetown University reports that, " . . . Castro maintains, any reform or weakening of the socialist system would bring catastrophe from "outside forces." Therefore, "moderates," dissension, and opposition must not be tolerated." ³⁰

Economic Troubles

Between 1986 and 1989, the Cuban economy declined at an annual rate of .8 percent. Labor productivity fell an estimated 2.5 percent during the same period, while the budget deficit increased 4.5 times. The foreign trade deficit exceeded \$2 billion annually and Cuba's hard currency debt almost doubled to over \$6 billion.³¹

What are Cubans to do? Living standards are dropping and the quality of life is falling. Cuba can no longer depend on its socialist allies to feed its people. "Instead of moving Cuba forward with the rest of the world, Castro announced that Cuba is moving backward toward a pre-industrial economy where beasts of burden and bicycles will replace 20th Century machines and modes of transportation--all in the name of preserving the purity of the revolution."³² The economic crisis is of such proportions that Castro began a new program called *El Periodo Especial Durante la Paz* (A Special Period in a Time of Peace).

This Special Period in a Time of Peace is a battle against injustice and exploitation; a struggle between evil and good; the immoral and the moral. The idea is similar to a wartime contingency plan based on national survival, rationing, and economic self-sufficiency. Castro was clear, however, in making the distinction between a special period in a time of war and in a time of peace. The latter he said, is attributed to economic and production problems. The measures call for a 50 percent reduction in the supply of diesel fuel for state sector vehicles and a 30 percent reduction in gasoline quotas for private cars. As an

example, as of October 1, 1990, every Cuban family must reduce its electricity consumption by 10 percent. He introduced teams of oxen and bulls to replace tractors in agricultural tasks, also for use in transportation. In 1990, Castro announced that Cuba successfully domesticated 200,000 bulls and was in the process of domesticating an additional 400,000. From August to October 1990, he additionally extended the rationing program to include practically all goods and fruit, including appliances, clothes, furniture, toys, and personal hygiene items. Everyday, Cubans are waking up to more rationing.

On 1 June 1991, bread rationing began in Cuba. Cubans are used to waiting in line for long periods of time to obtain basic foods, but this is now a great burden. In effect, a new enterprise has sprouted up in Cuba--waiting in line for a fee. Of course, Castro has cracked down on this. Havana television reported nine people received fines or prison sentences for selling their places in line in December.³³ On 10 January 1992, *Habana Radio Rebelde* also reported that the Energy Conservation Commission was assigning energy quotas throughout the island and it gave most of the municipalities a consumption plan not to be violated. It also stated that violation of these quotas would not result in blackouts since that would be irrational and could affect health, food, and defense institutions. It stated that the objective was to conserve electricity.³⁴ Yet, *Habana Radio Rebelde* reported on 16 January 1992, that since *Las Tunas* Province exceeded its energy quota again by 6 megawatts, blackouts would be levied against the province. It

announced that from 1400 to 1800 hours, the industrial neighborhoods of the province would be blacked out, and that from 1700 to 0000 hours the urban areas would be blacked out. ³⁵

The black market thrives on what little there is to buy. Former communist Eastern European countries demand for hard currency in payment for food exports caused Cuba's trade with them to fall by 90 percent in 1991. To cope with the severe oil shortage, Castro started a "back-to-the-land" program that relies on "oxen instead of tractors" for farming. Gasoline and diesel fuel are so short that the government imported thousands of bicycles from China to replace motor transportation. Currently gas is rationed to 160 liters (42 gallons) of gas every three months.

For example, in the Isle of Youth, *Radio Habana* reports that motor transportation has almost come to a standstill. Horse- and oxen-pulled buggies are the new mode of transportation. The distribution of foods and garbage pickup is done by wagon. Buses were modified so that one or two buses can be pulled by one bus or engine. Additionally, tractors are now used to pull these buses because they use less fuel and can pull one, two, or three buses at once. ³⁶ In another example, the Army was experimenting with using vegetable oil to run its trucks in case Soviet oil deliveries, reduced 24 percent in 1990, stop altogether ³⁷--they have. Soviet subsidies are gone. The *Washington Post* reported recently that Castro questions whether the Soviet government could guarantee future oil supplies. ³⁸ (13 million tons in 1989, reduced to 4 to 6 million tons in 1992). ³⁹ There is talk Angola may bail out Cuba

in the future by providing oil to make up some of the Soviet shortfall in oil deliveries. That makes for an interesting situation, because that oil belongs to U.S. oil companies.

There are shortages of medicine and paper. *Habana Radio Rebelde* reported on 23 January 1992, the arrival of a French freighter loaded with aid for Cuba. Its cargo was 200 tons of paper, 15 tons of photographic film, chemical products, inks, and 25 tons of school notebooks for the Cuban educational system. The donation came from French workers and communists. The printing and medical supplies amounted to \$1 million. The medicine wasn't medicine *per se*, but raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry.

To generate hard currency, Cuba successfully invested in biotechnology. It built a superb \$10 million Biotechnology Research Center. This Center is considered by experts "state-of-the-art." At this center, Cuban scientists developed a Hepatitis-B and a Meningitis vaccine. These vaccines are commercially produced and sold throughout Latin America. Additionally, the center produces and exports other biotechnology and pharmaceutical products--mostly aspirins, vitamin C, and other vaccines. ⁴⁰

Transportation is horrible. *Radio Madrid* reported on 13 January 1992, that Cuban authorities eliminated 48 public transportation lines in *La Habana* as part of the new traffic reduction program made under the "Special Period in a Time of Peace." This measure was to alleviate the increasing shortage of spare parts and tires that forced 500 buses to be removed from operation. ⁴¹ Soviet trucks and Hungarian buses continually break

down and can't be fixed for lack of spare parts (another reason for the Chinese bicycle purchase). These adjustments also coincide with the implementation of other restrictions in television broadcasts, the use of street lights, and scheduled postal service. Additionally, people are authorized to switch jobs and seek other employment closer to their homes in *La Habana*. ⁴²

Cubans are showing their displeasure by leaving, legally and illegally. Although, it is a crime for Cubans to depart the country without official permission, people are leaving illegally. During the Summer of 1990, there were many embassy break-ins in Cuba by Cubans seeking asylum. Additionally, persons who attempt to leave by boat, face fines or prison sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year. Despite that, in 1991 the number of *balseros* quadrupled, fence jumping at the U.S. Naval Base in *Guantánamo* is up, and the number of Cubans visiting the U.S. on visas ("During 1991, the general age limit for foreign travel was lowered from 45 for men and 40 for women to 20 for both sexes." ⁴³) and staying is skyrocketing. When asked their reasons for escaping and seeking asylum, the propensity of them said they left for economic reasons.

Internal Dissent

Given the nature of the Cuban regime, it is difficult to know exactly whether the current levels of discontent pose a serious challenge to Castro's rule. Opponents of the government cannot organize or demonstrate. The state controls the press, television, and radio. Opposition is very risky and a potentially costly

business. Although the rising discontent may not prove lethal to the regime, Castro cannot afford to ignore it.

Dissent is visible. Cuban authorities attempt to neutralize dissent through a variety of often non-violent tactics designed to keep activities off balance, divided, and discredited. Dissenters are labelled mentally disturbed, social misfits, or hostile agents of certain government countries. The government sharply restricts most basic human rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and movement, the right to privacy, the right of citizens to change their government, and worker rights.

While many Cubans remain loyal to the Revolution, others are starting to doubt. They talk about their unhappiness, and openly criticize Fidel (a development unheard-of until now for fear of imprisonment). Young Cubans are beginning to question his policies. They question Cuba's shift from capitalism to socialism and away from the U.S. into the Soviet camp. ⁴⁴

On May 10th, 1991, ten Cuban intellectuals--including dissidents and official award-winning poets and writers--issued an appeal urging their government to prevent a national "catastrophe" by allowing direct legislative elections, freedom of travel, the reopening of farmer's markets, and by decreeing a general amnesty to prisoners of conscience. ⁴⁵

This courageous statement attests to the degree of disillusionment with Castro's revolution even among those who are its core ideological defenders.

The new generation of Cubans is pragmatic. They don't believe everything Castro says and they show concern about their personal and their country's future. This "new Cuban man," tires of the

government's inefficiencies and his leadership's unwillingness to change. They tire of: the surveillance and control of the people by the state and the Party; the persistent shortage of consumer goods; the constant rationing of food and lack of clothing; the limited employment opportunities for college graduates; the restriction on geographic mobility; and the housing shortage. They worry about Cuba's internationalist policy, and are aware of what is going on in the world because of the *Radio Marti* broadcasts. "Radio Marti is a propaganda instrument of the United States' government that purports to provide uncensored news and entertainment to Cuban listeners." ⁴⁶

Inside Cuba, the human rights situation deteriorates daily. The Cuban Government calls U.S. human rights activists, "U.S. Stooges" or *gusanos* (worms), instead of addressing their legitimate demands to exercise basic freedoms. Cuban citizens have no legal right to seek their government or to advocate such change. Despite this fact, the Ministry of Justice, under pressure from the United Nations Human Rights Council, now recognizes a few organizations whose job is to monitor and support human rights in Cuba. Apart from recognized churches and one or two carefully monitored groups such as the Masonic Order, small human rights groups represent the only associations outside the State and the Party. "The three principal domestic human rights monitoring groups are: the Cuban Human Rights Committee, the Cuban Pro-Human Rights Party, and the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation." ⁴⁷ These groups exist but are not condoned by the Cuban government

that persecutes its leaders and violates their rights consistently. Lic. Dausá maintains that, "dissidents number about 2000, but they belong to more than one group thus giving the impression there are more dissidents than there actually are."

The Cuban government angrily rejects U.N. criticism of the human rights situation in Cuba. In March, the U.N. Human Rights Commission passed the resolution to investigate the human rights situation in Cuba and named a special representative to do so. Cuba has yet to comply, even though the Vice Chairman of the U.N. Human Rights Commission is a Cuban representative.

Even the Cuban armed forces are showing signs of dissent. In the last five years, several events caused this dissent:

1. The defection of General Rafaél del Pino, the highest-ranking military officer to defect from Cuba who was the Substitute Adjutant to the Chief of the Air Defense of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Del Pino, a hero at the Bay of Pigs and a veteran of the Angolan campaign, reported deep dissatisfaction among the officer corps.
2. The execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa and several of his aides, on drug running charges later resulted in the arrest of hundreds of officers suspected of disloyalty.
3. The dissatisfaction with the Angolan campaign, where, after ten years of fighting, troops returned to Cuba under a treaty signed by the Soviet Union, the Angolan government, and the United States (Cuba did not participate in the negotiations).

Mr. Luis Aguilar reports that Cuban armed forces are,

"Today, surrounded by obsolete Soviet military equipment, they spend time digging trenches on the beaches, waiting for an imminent U.S. Marine landing that the government has been announcing for the past three decades." ⁴⁸

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Cuban Political Leadership

Castro embodies the Cuban Revolution and represents the state and government. As long as Castro is in power, there will be little reform. One possible scenario is where Castro steps back and becomes the power behind the scenes. In this scenario he selects a young leader to succeed him. Three possibilities come to mind: Carlos Aldana, Cuba's Chief of Ideology; another is Roberto Robina, the head of the Communist Youth Union; and a third is Carlos Lage, the President of the National Assembly.

Political leadership outside Cuba resides within the Cuban-American community of Miami. Miami is the spiritual fortress of *La Causa* (the Cause)--defined as:

. . .the spiritual revenge of the Cuban exiles. It is branded into the souls of many Cubans who left their homeland because of Fidel Castro. Their purpose is simple--to overthrow him and displace the totalitarian socialist structures superimposed on Cubans with an open political and economic system based on the liberal democratic capitalist model. ⁴⁹

Cuban-Americans support insurgencies against Castro "behind closed doors" but, in the open they concentrate their efforts on exerting political and economic pressures directed at Washington rather than *La Habana*.

Radical groups do exist. As recently as January of 1992, a group of Cuban exiles landed in Cuba to attempt an infiltration, perhaps commit acts of terrorism, and instigate the population to revolt against Castro. A very small radical group of Cuban exiles who call themselves the "Commando L (Liberty) Units" took

responsibility for those actions. ⁵⁰

The strongest Cuban-American lobby group is the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF). Their primary purpose is to gather and distribute information concerning the economic, social, and political issues facing the Cuban people and help Cuban exiles through the exodus process. The foundation contacted Moscow in 1991 in hope that Moscow would promote change in Cuba. In turn, Moscow sought support from the powerful Cuban-American community in Miami in their search for trade partners and political acceptance. ⁵¹ The CANF's goal was to persuade the Soviets to cut off their support to Cuba. Recently, the Czechoslovakian government agreed to stop serving as Cuba's diplomatic representative in Washington, after the CANF offered to facilitate a new Consulate building in Miami and help them promote trade and investment there.

Cuban Apprehension About Exiles

Cubans living on the island know that positive change will eventually come. However, they do not want to lose the benefits they gained from the Revolution, particularly in education and health services. Cubans see returning Cuban exiles as invaders. Their invasion force, a usurping group returning with revenge in their eyes ready to take back what they left behind.

They fear that returning Cuban exiles will lay claim, with deeds in hand, to the property they left behind. They fear the Cuban exile community will rush in with their capital and establish many new businesses and rape the land of its resources for their

profit. Stories abound that all the Burger King franchises are sold to Cuban exiles (Burger King and McDonald Invasion). Many industries have granted similar franchises in Cuba to those who have put money forth to attain those franchises.³²

They also fear Cuban exiles will return ready to control the *insulares'* (island dwellers) future. They fear they will arrive with constitutions in hand and new leaders vying for political office. To alleviate some of this apprehension U.S. foreign policy must show some restraint. U.S. policy should control Cuban exiles (most of whom are still Cuban citizens, on refugee status) from overwhelming the island. Such an attempt would give Castro the fuel he needs to solidify his position and turn people against U.S. help. It is important that the U.S. moderate and control the flow in which the Cuban exiles go back. The fever pitch of the Cuban exiles needs to be subdued. Most have great intentions and really want to help their brothers left behind. Yet, U.S. foreign policy must be sensitive to the *insulares'* apprehensions.

American Business Ready To Flood The Island

And, it's not just South Florida entrepreneurs are thinking ahead. Giant corporations are also preparing to get in on the action. AT&T, Texaco, Delta, and RJR-Nabisco are all plotting a reentry into the Cuban market. Business managers everywhere are gearing up to flood the island with consumer goods. They are ready to help convert Cuba from communism to capitalism and to cash in on the transition.

Jaime Suchlicki, Director of the Institute of Inter-American Studies at the University of Miami and a Cuban affairs expert claims that the rum and sugar barons of Cuba, the Bacardi and Fanjul families, are planning their comebacks. The Fanjul family hopes to get its properties back he said, but their main trust, if there is a change in government, is to see what they can offer Cuba in technology to help rebuild the country.

Several steamship companies are ready to ferry emergency supplies, food, clothing, and consumer goods to Cuba within days of a change in government. Additionally, Miami international airport authorities foresee that if things get normalized two U.S. carriers will provide three round trips a day initially from Miami to La Habana and they expect Cubana Airlines to operate a similar service with three round trips a day. This will be a great boost to the Cuban and U.S. tourist industry. ⁵³

Cuba - A Nuclear Power?

In December 1974, Castro announced Cuba's intention to turn to nuclear power for electricity generation. ⁵⁴ The Cuban nuclear power program has several elements. They are:

- (1) construction of nuclear power plants,
- (2) construction of high-voltage transmission lines to integrate the nuclear power plants into the national electrical grid,
- (3) establishment of schools to train power plant workers,
- (4) and construction of hydroelectric storage plants. ⁵⁵

Cuba's commitment to nuclear power raises some serious issues. These issues are environmental safety, security, and nuclear proliferation. Construction and safe operation of nuclear power

plants require substantial allocation of scarce financial, human, and material resources which Cuba does not possess. Additionally, it is not clear Cuba possesses the technical infrastructure necessary for the safe and efficient operation of nuclear reactors. It is likely that the Cienfuegos Nuclear Power Plant, under construction, may lack some safety features common in Western nuclear reactors and therefore considered risky by Western standards. These include containment structures, emergency cooling systems, an up-to-date instrumentation.

Cuban defector, Jose Oro Alfonso, ex-director of the National Enterprise for Geophysics Work in Cuba, warned the U.S. about the dangers of the Cienfuegos' nuclear power plant. He claims that obsolete technology and large amounts of combustible nuclear material will be used in that power plant. This in-turn will increase the amount of waste material generated. He also claims that safety measures are both complex and obsolete and that the quality of the civil construction and industrial engineering is below standards and therefore suspect. Historically, Soviet nuclear experts argued that their power plants are completely safe and western-style nuclear safety systems are unnecessary and expensive. Yet, we all remember what happened at Chernobyl! Should a radioactive cloud escape from the plant, it would be disastrous for Cuba and could affect the United States, Mexico, Jamaica, and other Caribbean Islands depending on the prevailing winds.

Finally, the nuclear power program raises the possibility of

Cuba developing a nuclear weapons development program in the future. There is little evidence that supports the existence of a program, yet construction of these reactors capable of producing weapons grade uranium and plutonium raises the question of future nuclear proliferation. These reactors will give Cuba "the opportunity" to produce a nuclear weapon, even if it currently intends to do so. ⁵⁶ This is especially true, considering that Cuba refuses to concur with standing international agreements controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.

Cuba has agreed to abide by the safeguards imposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that guarantee the peaceful use of nuclear programs in the hemisphere. However, Cuba is the only nation in Latin America who refuses to sign the Treaty for the Proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America--The treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty of Tlatelolco renounces the development of nuclear weapons in Latin America and creates a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America.

Fidel Castro Díaz-Balart, Executive Secretary of the Cuban Atomic Energy Commission and son of Cuban President Fidel Castro heads the organization that supervises the construction of the nuclear power plant in *Cienfuegos*. During most of 1990 and 1991, he visited Latin American countries that possess a nuclear power-generating capability. His plan was to use these trips to establish cooperative ties with Latin American countries that have a nuclear research program. *La Habana Servicio Internacional*, on 10 February 1991, reported on an agreement between Cuba, Mexico,

and the Peoples Republic of Korea on nuclear cooperation. Díaz-Balart admitted that the Soviets retracted their support for Cuba's nuclear and energy needs. But, boasted that Cuba retains close ties with such renown non-socialist companies as Siemens and would thereby continue its nuclear energy program. This statement raises the question whether Germany is helping Cuba in bringing their nuclear power plant on line. ⁵⁷

The nuclear power plant construction continues despite the withdrawal of Soviet assistance. *Habana Tele-Rebelde* reported on 31 December 1990, they completed closing off the reactor seal area and placed the dome on its base. This made the first reactor ready for the pouring of concrete. ⁵⁸

Biotechnology Industry

While visiting Argentina, Díaz-Balart bragged that Cuba was heavily involved in the manufacture and research of radiopharmaceuticals and that a radiopharmaceutical center was built with the assistance of Argentine technology. ⁵⁹ Cuban Vice President, Jose Ramón Fernández said that "production of radio isotopes and radio chemistry (*radio farmacos*) is already a reality that benefits health programs and biotechnological research." ⁶⁰

Cuba's investment in their Biotechnology Research Center has paid off. Major plans exist to market its developed vaccines and other products. The question that must be asked is whether medicines and vaccines are the only thing the Biotechnology Center is developing. A research center of this quality is capable of

developing chemical and biological agents that can be used in weapons. Although I found no proof of the existence of such a program, the U.S. should monitor the center's activities closely.

ALTERNATIVE U.S. POLICIES TOWARD CUBA

The collapse of the Soviet Union left Cuba without its key political, economic, and military support. Castro maintains a hard line and refuses to abandon Communism, but because of his mounting economic problems, his government may not survive. An analysis of the situation in Cuba suggests that an opportunity exists for implementation of a pro-active U.S. strategy that employs every tool available to secure the political opening needed.

There is pressure for change. At the First Ibero-American Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico, in July 1991, several democratically elected presidents urged Castro to allow an opening in Cuba. There were also signs of interest in welcoming Cuba back into the inter-American family. In fact, Chile and Colombia used the occasion to reestablish relations. According to *Licenciado* Rafael Dausá, Third Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, D.C., Cuba has diplomatic relations with all Latin American Nations except for Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic. Additionally, in October, when Castro met in Conzumel, Mexico, with the presidents of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, they urged Castro to reform his government and offered to mediate his differences with the U.S.--Castro declined.

A crack exists in the regime. There are those who know that the regime can increase its lifespan only if it introduces liberalizing measures in the economy and in public life. And, there are those who think that liberalization means the decline of

Cuban communism because once this process is underway the capitalist germs would eventually devour the Castro Communist system in its entirety. ⁶¹ I don't think change will be that drastic and quick. Cubans would have some conditions of their own --their fundamental need to remain independent, autonomous and sovereign. At the same time the U.S. must realize that transition to a democratic type of government may take time or not happen at all. The U.S. should accept that Cuba's socialistic infrastructure will be difficult to dismantle, at least in the near term.

Eventually, Castro will make political reforms. Before the Fourth Party Congress, Castro asked the Cuban delegates to come prepared with recommendations for policy changes. He called it, *El Llamamiento* (The Call Out). The Congress rescheduled several times, and after several Party member resignations, finally met, but few policy changes of any consequence resulted. Regardless, the reform process is underway. Party membership is open to Christians, the Church is showing signs of resurgence, and talks began about National elections for Assembly members, yet, Castro diluted the membership of the Secretariat of the Party, and he reinstated the office of Prime Minister to strengthen his position.

ALTERNATIVES

I propose three possible alternative foreign policies:

ONE - Continue the present policy of containment, but add political, and economic pressures.

TWO - Seek Castro's overthrow.

THREE - Ease pressures, lift the economic blockade, and improve the information flow with Cuba.

ONE - Containment with Additional Pressures

This policy seeks to actively contain and pressure the regime to change. Its purpose would be to isolate Cuba diplomatically, weaken its economy using the financial and commercial embargo, contain the regime inside the island by reducing its outside influences, and place the system on the defensive by exerting pressures domestically (radio and TV broadcasting, support dissent organizations, etc.) and internationally exposing failings and human right abuses.

By increasing pressures, we hope to accelerate an internal crisis and perhaps a collapse. This assumes the seed for dissent and even violent revolt exists in Cuba. Specific examples are: close loopholes on the economic blockade, press for multi-party democratic elections, highlight human rights violations, expand broadcasts to Cuba, encourage dissenters to demonstrate actively against the regime, and stop all immigration to the U.S.

Additional pressure could: cause the Cuban military to unite in support of the regime; solidify resolve and lengthen government's collapse; cause human activists to protest perceived cruelty; arouse Cuban exile opposition to hardships caused to relatives on the island; make Castro a martyr amongst Latin Americans if he falls, and if he doesn't, make him a hero.

The advantages of this policy are: it provides continuity from the existing policy; it continues to limit Cuba's opportunity for economic growth; it focuses on the absence of a democratic process in Cuba; it forces Cuba's regime to make reforms before the U.S

would consider a change in policy; it is easily supported by the Cuban exile community; and it is flexible enough to permit adjustments as changes develop.

The disadvantages of this policy are: it helps Castro justify continued repression, and a hard-line stand; it would whip up Cuban nationalism; it would cause undue pressure on dissidents and reform groups within the government; it forces the U.S. against Latin American initiatives to normalize relations; and it may lead to uncontrollable civil war, subsequent refugee problems and a possible U.S. intervention to stop it.

In effect, this policy clearly would divide the Cuban people, the Cuban Army, the Cuban exile community, U.S. and world opinion, and our Latin American neighbors. More important, it will hurt any long-term U.S. political aims and strengthen Cuban animosity toward the U.S.

TWO - Seek Castro's Overthrow

After 33 years of defiance and survival Castro will not cave-in and subject himself to the "new U.S. world order." As long as Castro is there, there is little likelihood of a change in politics. Fidel Castro, however, promised one thing and delivered something different. Cuba became a society characterized by misery, sacrifices, and social tensions. It is therefore legitimate to assume that disillusionment with Castroism is practically absolute. ⁶²

Several things can happen to force him from the scene. One

possibility is his sudden demise or incapacitation by natural causes or accident. If his brother Raúl steps in, he has neither the ability nor the following of Fidel. One can anticipate that competing elements in the military, the government, and the PCC would quickly begin jockeying for position and influence.

Another possibility is an assassination of Fidel or both Castro brothers, as an isolated act or as part of an internal coup attempt. The aftermath would be the same although the expected violence would be greater.

A third possibility would be a military uprising by junior or mid-level officers. While a fourth could be a labor strike that brings the economy to its knees. And a fifth could be a mass uprising or protest that sparks subsequent dissent amongst the FAR, TTM, and other organizations.

External sources also could come into play. A U.S. military invasion is out of the question. Yet, the Cuban exile community over the years supported strategic insurgencies staged from Miami. One such example is an organization called Alpha 66. After, the Mariel Boatlift of the 80s, new recruits surfaced willing to penetrate Castro's fortress. Since 1985, they have sponsored upwards of 20 successful infiltrations into Cuba. The exile community feels that Cubans on the island are a time bomb that could explode at any time. They feel, all the *insulares'* need is some external guidance and contacts with the outside world for them to engineer their insurgency and counterrevolution. The U.S. could support such actions directly or through a third party by supplying

arms, advise, intelligence, propaganda, or by merely turning the other way and allowing the exiles to operate out of the U.S.

Another method is the use of Radio Martí. Enhanced information coverage of the democratization of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could generate similar interests in Cuba. Additionally, making Cubans aware of their human rights movement and violations in Cuba may encourage further dissent. Currently, Radio Martí broadcasts reports of police brutality, military repression, detention, disappearances, and imprisonments of political dissidents.

Further, the U.S. should attack Castro politically at home and abroad. They could do so by conveying the message to other Cuban government officials: "that Castro is the problem." Abroad, the U.S. could use its new found influence in the United Nations and the Organization of American States to exert pressure on Castro and accuse him of human rights violations, nationalization of U.S. property, exporting revolution, trafficking in drugs, exporting terrorism, and training terrorists.

Some advantages realized by Castro's departure are: the emergence of some new *caudillo* who commands sufficient support and is shrewd enough to hold on to power; alternatively the emergence of a committee type leadership who would accept political openings and economic reform. (Based on the structure of the society and the lack of strong well known leaders it is not reasonable to expect this would happen right after his departure).

The disadvantages realized by Castro's departure are: Cuba

lacks the independent institutions or network groups that could cause Castro to leave; one should not expect that a post-Castro Cuba will automatically move toward democracy; any perceived U.S. meddling could rally the Cuban people to support Castro or his successor; Latin Americans who oppose his policies however, respect him as a symbol of Latin American history and would not look favorably at his demise at the hands of the U.S.

One thing is clear, if there is no political development inside Cuba to allow for the evolution of democratic institutions, when Castro does leave, by whatever means, the foundation for a democratic society will not exist.

**THREE - Ease Pressures, Lift the Embargo, and Improve the
Information Flow with Cuba**

A drastic change in policy would help to cement Cuba's process of internal democratization by providing economic breathing space. Lifting the embargo and removing the threat of invasion could significantly improve economic conditions in the island and do away with the state of siege that greatly constrains Cuba's development. Lic. Dausá asserts that "the embargo is tantamount to a State of War between the U.S. and Cuba--it is a blockade." This policy change requires the U.S. to recognize the concept of ideological pluralism and national sovereignty within the Caribbean Basin. Such recognition might provide the basis for a political and economic opening that would signal the next phase in the Cuban revolution. ⁶³

Cuba's potential for threatening U.S. interests is gone, reformist groups in the island need to be supported, and the current regime could fall or change. Cuba, over the years, has occasionally been receptive to conciliatory U.S. overtures aimed at improving relations between the two countries. This may be a good time for the U.S. to consider easing U.S. pressures including lifting the embargo.

Over the years the embargo has lost its teeth. Castro himself stated that, "the embargo is a failure." It has not, for example, prevented Cuba from purchasing elsewhere what it cannot get from the U.S. Cuba succeeds in buying limited U.S. goods and acquires new U.S. technology with the help of an enterprise created in the early 1970s called CIMEX that operates in Panama, Mexico, Canada, Spain, and other countries. The embargo failed in the sense that it did not prevent Cuba from getting access to western goods and technology it needs to keep its economy functioning. It succeeded, however, in raising the economic costs that Castro must pay for his anti-Americanism, revolutionary adventurism, and past military alliance with the Soviets.

It's my opinion that the reasons for continuing the embargo are purely political. It is unsound to assume that economic decline automatically produces revolt (it hasn't for 33 years). We must remember that **despite economic deterioration Cuba is better-off than many Latin American nations** (see Appendix Two). Furthermore, Cuba would only gain limited economic benefits from lifting of the embargo. For example, Cuba would not gain a new

large market for its sugar since the total U.S. allocation for foreign suppliers is two million tons. Additionally, Cuba lacks cash and credits for purchasing large quantities of U.S. goods and services. In effect, the modest benefits gained would not produce an influx of funds that would make up for the lost soviet support.

Tourism is one industry that can benefit from lifting the embargo. Cuban Foreign Minister, Isidoro Malmierca was quoted by the *La Paz, Television Boliviana Network*, as stating that the development of tourism is an important source of hard currency income for Cuba. He boasted that in 1991, Cuba built more than 4000 new hotel rooms for Canadian and European tourists, 1000 of which are in 5-star hotels. He also mentioned they plan to finish 4000 more rooms in 1992. These hotels are subsidized and financed by Spanish and Italian business enterprises. He asserted that tourism accounted for more than \$400 million of income in 1991. ⁶⁴

Lifting the embargo would allow the flow of U.S. capital for business ventures and thousands of U.S. tourists. But, tourist facilities still require, much repair, modernization, and rebuilding to bring them to standards.

To generate badly needed hard currency Castro now allows foreign companies to invest in joint ventures in Cuba. A company called Cubanacán made one of the biggest deals so far. It is a 50-50 venture with Spain's Grupo Sol, owner of the Sol and Melia Hotel chains. The partners are putting in \$150 million into a resort complex on Varadero Beach. The first unit of this complex is open and caters mainly to Europeans and Canadians. A typical weekend in

this resort costs \$800 a week in the summer, air fare included.

"Julio Garcia Oliveras, President of the Cuban Chamber of Commerce (a group supported by state enterprises and a few joint ventures), counts 40 existing joint ventures, 40 more approved, and 70 under discussion." ⁶⁵

Lifting the embargo should be analyzed differently than it has in the past. Initially, Castro could treat it as a victory. However, long term, gradual U.S. trade and investment in Cuba may aid the reformists to institute economic reforms and restructuring of the Cuban economy. This alternative is the first step needed to restore Cuba into the global economy forcing it to deal with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade before tapping U.S. resources.

When you combine breaking open the economic front with breaking down informational barriers you have a tremendously powerful tool. Getting information into Cuba is a long-standing objective of U.S. policy. Sending informational materials to Cuba was always allowed under the terms of the embargo. Cuba has access to international communications satellite systems and has a contract with the Cable News Network. Additionally, *Radio Marti* was a large step forward in creating an information and communication medium between the U.S. and Cuba.

Opening up Cuba any further requires modifying the embargo and other laws and regulations. To improve communications the U.S. should pursue: an increase in availability of U.S. and foreign publications in Cuba; establish telecommunications links to Cuba

via third world countries; direct mail service; and computerized electronic mail. To allow these, the embargo would be modified to permit export of computer software, hardware, and other telecommunications and printing devices.

Personal contacts and cooperation help the information flow. Increased visits by Cuban researchers, teachers, and professionals could be promoted with like visits by U.S. counterparts. Increased contacts and exchanges between exile organizations and Cuban government and non-governmental staff willing to meet with them would be advantageous. And militarily: pursue Pentagon notification of impending exercises; agree to improved information exchanges in drug interdiction; admit Cuban participation in U.S. joint exercises, officer exchange programs, and maybe even Cuban officer attendance at the Inter-American Defense College.

Some advantages of lifting the embargo are: it would enable U.S. businesses to compete with Far East and European investors for the Cuban market; it may result in little U.S. trade or investments due to their lack of cash or credits (yet, Cuba does produce some products that could be sold in the U.S.--cigars, citrus fruits, nickel, cigars, and rum); it would be received favorably by other Latin American nations; it may help moderate Cuba's behavior toward the U.S.; may give Cuban reformers breathing space; and it may lead to a democratization process.

The additional advantages obtained by improving the information flow are: it allows the U.S. and Cuba to deal directly with each other to address specific concerns and build contacts and

communications between people inside and outside Cuba; it strengthens the reformists hand; it helps produce greater political space inside Cuba and thus foster democratic development; it promotes contact between U.S. and Cuban human rights groups; it simplifies humanitarian relief; it helps build a technology base; it helps dispel the hostile image of U.S.; it heightens the military's awareness of the futility of any confrontation against U.S. forces by allowing them to participate in our exercises; and it would be strongly supported by the moderate and liberal Cuban exile community and Latin America.

Some disadvantages of lifting the embargo are: it may allow Castro to claim a major victory; it may be perceived as a weakening of U.S. resolve; it may delay a change to a different political system allowing current leadership to stick around longer; it may encourage other countries to enlarge their economic ventures on the island; it will open travel to U.S. citizens and thus a flood of U.S. tourist dollars; it may provoke criticism from some and enrage the hard-line Cuban exiles for giving in; it may stimulate immigration and refugee flows into the U.S. if things don't improve rapidly. Additionally, a liberalized information flow could provide access to computer-related hardware and software that they could use to develop surveillance and security systems and enable Castro to expand his contacts with outside sympathizers.

Historical Solution

Castro's moment as a world-class figure has passed. To

observers, he appears archaic and weak. Yet, he is potentially dangerous in a crisis. The Cuban leader is a compulsive gambler; he likes to play politics for high stakes in the expectation of winning big, which he often has done in the past. Under current and probable future circumstances the temptation to provoke a major confrontation with the U.S.--to distract attention from problems in Cuba and restore his tarnished international image--will increase with every frustration he suffers.

" . . . even if Castro refuses to make the necessary adjustments and eventually finds himself facing serious opposition at home, he will not go easily. He is likely to fight to the end, and with a deeply polarized society and the armed forces divided, the results of that would almost certainly be an appalling bloodbath." ⁶⁶

If confronted by internal resistance or by a crisis he can't cope with, he may opt to seek a "historical" solution. Outside the U.S., Cuba's FAR is the best equipped and best prepared in the Western Hemisphere. Despite current training cutbacks, equipment failures, and lack of spare parts, it is an army trained to respond to external attacks and it is deployable within short notice. His *Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Air Force) has credible striking power against many American cities and Caribbean countries. If pushed against a wall, he may decide to use forces loyal to him to attack Florida or launch an attack against Guantánamo. The possibility exists for an even more apocalyptic response if Cuba develops a nuclear weapon or develops or buys a chemical/biological weapon capability. U.S. intelligence sources should be on the look out for early warning signals to prevent such a catastrophe.

NEW FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CUBA - RECOMMENDATION

I think, Cuba's regime will change. It's just a matter of time. Therefore, the United States should change its policy toward Cuba. A policy concentrated on getting rid of Castro does not satisfy the full range of U.S. interests in Cuba. The goal must be to facilitate a peaceful transition to coexistence with Cuba.

Problems with Continuing the Present Policy but Adding Political and Economic Pressures.

This alternative could only help Castro continue his regime. He would undoubtedly use Cuban nationalism as the rallying point and convince the people they can survive these bad times. Additional pressures may backfire and cause the armed forces to unite in support of the regime and force human rights activists underground. If the additional pressures work, civil warfare could break out, assure years of divisiveness amongst Cubans, and further ruin the economy thus making the reconstruction effort even harder.

Coercive diplomacy is not likely to bring down the current regime unless it is accompanied by military intervention. Any such intervention will suffer from tremendous political and diplomatic criticism in Latin America, the world, and the U.S. unless sanctioned by the United Nations or the Organization of American States.

Such an intervention is likely to cause a bloody response from Castro and his armed forces. This involvement would be contrary to

all U.S. long-range interests and kills any hope of the U.S. being regarded as a positive partner.

Problems with Seeking Castro's Overthrow

The assumption that Castro is the sole obstacle to democracy and change in Cuba and that once he is gone, democracy will flourish is incorrect. Whether peaceful or violent, his overthrow is not the answer.

This option was effectively closed as a policy of the U.S. when President Bush announced that the United States does not pose a threat to Cuba. Castro has always fed Cuban nationalism by reminding Cubans the U.S. will someday invade them. As a result, Cubans fear that "U.S. imperialist tendencies" displayed in Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and during exercises off Cuba's coast, will one day be exercised against them since "the U.S. is always looking for an excuse to invade Cuba."

One way to convince Castro and his military is by exploring informational exchanges between the U.S. and Cuban armed forces. He may be more receptive to such an information exchange now that the U.S. clearly stated its non-intervention intents.

If Castro is unwilling to change and continues to perceive the U.S. as a threat the U.S. should seek Castro's replacement, without civil war or other form of violence. Instead seek replacement by a political and maybe even democratic process that draws support from the U.S. populace, Cuban exiles, and Latin America.

If Castro is assassinated or dies of natural causes, fighting

is likely to breakout. Fighting will occur between two groups-- the regime loyalists, versus the regime's opponents. The outcome of any succession crisis as explained earlier would remain uncertain and take a long time.

In the case of an uprising, the quickness of the revolt could decide the outcome. The longer it takes to develop, the better chance the regime has to smash it. Conversely, the quicker the revolt, the more likely it will win additional supporters, and the higher the likelihood it will survive and spread. In either case, the U.S. should do everything possible to avoid getting sucked-in to support any side. Doing so would rally nationalistic support for the other side and portray the U.S. supported group as U.S. puppets.

The Best Alternative - Ease Pressures, Lift the Embargo, and Improve the Information Flow with Cuba

Improved communications should come first. Better communications between the two societies may eventually lead to further negotiations between the two governments. Improvements to the information flow will require changes to existing embargo laws and regulations. This would be the opening round to lifting the embargo.

This may be considered by some a conciliatory option but the symbolism associated with lifting the embargo is tremendous. Cuba considers the economic blockade a "state of war." By some, it may be considered a triumph for Cuba, but most will see it as a

magnanimous gesture from the only remaining super power. Easing pressures would no doubt nurture reformists, identify new ones, maybe secure better behavior from Castro, and lead to democratic reform.

This alternative is more appealing to Cubans, Latin Americans, and most of the world. The only exception would be the Cuban exiles but, even they may eventually realize the opportunity it may afford. Initially, little economic benefit for the U.S. and Cuba will result but, eventually a 10 million people market and Cuba's stability will benefit U.S. and Cuban interests.

The U.S. should not take this approach seeking to remove Castro from power. Castro will eventually fall or capitulate. Instead, the U.S. should concentrate on establishing relations with Cuba and salvaging its economy.

CONCLUSION

Mutual Political Accommodation

The implications derived from my analysis suggest the U.S. should ease political and economic pressures, lift the embargo, and improve the information flow with Cuba. This policy clearly forces the U.S. to take a risk and crack the door open in hope that this opening would begin a period of friendly relations between the two countries. The key to the process is to involve Castro in it from the start so once begun the process is irreversible.

The U.S. should not sit back and watch, it must be ready with a new policy to be implemented in the event Cuba becomes accommodating. Washington should take the first step and work toward coexistence with whatever government the Cuban people chose.

This engagement is best done directly, and face to face, but one could use intermediaries as long as they are empowered to make decisions. The OAS should be present to add pressure to Castro or his successor to deal in good faith and deemphasize the bilateral nature of the talks. Moves should be cautious and once begun small steps by one country should be followed by similar or larger steps from the other until both countries "are shaking hands." Only through mutual political accommodation will this 33 year antagonistic relationship between Cuba and the United States come to an end.

Finally, although I've chosen one alternative, any one alternative may not be the answer. Instead selected portions of

all may be combined to form a viable and flexible foreign policy. This flexibility would be beneficial to allow the U.S. to tailor its policy toward the situation unfolding in Cuba, thus achieving U.S. objectives

The U.S. has nothing to lose by engaging Cuba in a constructive foreign policy much like it does with the likes of China (even after Tiananmen Square), or South Africa (under Apartheid). Why shouldn't the U.S. do the same with Cuba? ⁶⁷

APPENDIX ONE

CUBA'S GOVERNMENT

Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by President Fidel Castro, who is Chief of State, head of government, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. President Castro seeks to control nearly all aspects of Cuban life through a broad network of directorates ultimately answerable to him through the Communist Party, as well as through the government bureaucracy in the state security apparatus.

The Party is the only legal political entity and headed by an elite group whose membership is ultimately determined by Fidel Castro. All government positions including judicial offices are controlled by the Party. Though not a formal requirement, Party membership is a *defacto* pre-requisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas.

The Ministry of Interior (MININT) is the principal organ of state security and totalitarian control. It operates order and police forces, orchestrates public demonstrations, determines

whether to recognize non-governmental associations, investigates evidence of non-conformity, regulates migration, and maintains pervasive vigilance through a series of mass organizations and informers. The Ministry is under the *de facto* control of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias-FAR* (Revolutionary Armed Forces).

The mass organizations attempt to extend government and communist party control over each citizen's daily activities at home, work, and school. Through neighborhood *Comités para la Defensa de la Revolución-CDR* (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), citizens are exhorted to ensure ideological conformity and to report deviation. ⁶⁸

APPENDIX TWO

DEMOGRAPHICS

&

COUNTRY STATISTICS

- Section 1 - Cuba
 - Cuba Statistics
- Section 2 - Central America and the Caribbean
 - Statistical Comparison with Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
- Section 3 - South America
 - Statistical Comparison with South America
- Section 4 - Statistical Comparison with all Latin America

SECTION 1

CUBA





FIGURE 1

CUBA

STATISTICS

CUBA Population (in thousands)

9,724 10,450 10,544 10,639 11,532




■ Annual Pop'n Growth: 0.9% ■ Pop'n Density: 244 inhab./sq mi
 ■ Pop'n Doubling Time: 77 years ■ Urbanization: 71.6%

FIGURE 2

CUBA

Age Distribution



- Total Population: 10,450,000
- Total Male Pop'n: 5,267,000
- Total Female Pop'n: 5,183,000
- Life Expectancy (Male): 72 years
- Life Expectancy (Female): 74 years

FIGURE 3

CUBA

Languages	%	Ethnic Groups	%	Religions	%
Spanish*	100	White	66	Nonreligious	55
		Mulatto	22	Roman Catholic	40
		Black	12	Other	5
		Chinese	--		

* Official Language(s)

Language percentages refer to native speakers (-- means less than 1%).

FIGURE 4

CUBA

Health Statistics		
Life Expectancy (Male):	72 yrs	
Life Expectancy (Female):	74 yrs	
Crude Birth Rate:	17/1000	
Crude Death Rate:	7/1000	
Infant Mortality:	16/1000	
	Number	Pop'n per
Hospitals	306	34,150
Hospital Beds	39,809	263
Physicians	28,060	372
Dentists	5,923	1,764
Pharmacists	773	13,519
Nurses	53,595	195

FIGURE 5

CUBA

Education				
	Schools	Teachers	Students	Students per Teacher
Elementary	9,617	59,819	936,914	16
Secondary	2,112	101,708	1,143,137	11
University	35	22,492	262,225	12
GNP for Education: 6.3% Literacy Rate: 96%				

FIGURE 6

CUBA **Gross National Product (in millions of \$US)**




FIGURE 7

CUBA

Natural Resources	Agricultural Products	Major Industries
<p> Timber Cobalt Nickel Iron Ore Copper Manganese Salt Silica Chromite Fish </p>	<p> Sugarcane Milk Forage & Silage Beef Eggs Pork Grains Citrus Fruits Tobacco Roots & Tubers Grains Vegetables Coffee Bananas Roundwood </p>	<p> Sugar Machinery Petroleum Products Beverages Tobacco Products Chemicals Building Materials Textile Products Cement Metal Products Lumber Foodstuffs </p>

FIGURE 8

CUBA

Major Imports	Major Exports
Fuels Lubricants Machinery Electrical Products Vehicles Cereals Raw Materials Foodstuffs Chemicals	Sugar Petroleum Products Nickel Ore Citrus Fruits Fish Products Tobacco Coffee
■ Balance of Trade (1987): -\$2,200,000,000	

FIGURE 9

CUBA

Energy

Electricity	
Capacity (1987)	3,532 1000s kilowatts
Production (1987)	13,594 million kilowatt-hours
Consumption (1987)	13,594 million kilowatt-hours
Consumption per Capita	1,321 kilowatt-hours
Coal	
Reserves (1987)	N/A
Production (1987)	N/A
Consumption (1987)	107 1000s metric tons
Consumption per Capita	0.0 metric tons
Natural Gas	
Reserves (1989)	N/A
Production (1988)	22 million cubic meters
Consumption (1987)	23 million cubic meters
Consumption per Capita	2 cubic meters
Crude Petroleum	
Reserves (1989)	N/A
Production (1988)	N/A
Consumption (1987)	54 million barrels
Consumption per Capita	5.2 barrels

FIGURE 10

CUBA

Agriculture (in metric tons)	
Barley (1988)	0
Coffee (1988)	21,000
Corn (1988)	95,000
Cotton (1988)	1,000
Eggs (1986)	113,000
Meat (1986)	252,000
Milk (1986)	1,100,000
Natural Rubber (1988)	0
Oats (1988)	0
Potatoes (1988)	310,000
Rice (1988)	540,000
Soybeans (1988)	0
Sugar (1988)	7,889,000
Tea (1988)	0
Tobacco (1988)	46,000
Wheat (1988)	0

NOTE: A value of 0 indicates no production reported.

FIGURE 11

CUBA

Manufacturing	
Beer (1986)	2,736,000 hl
Butter (1986)	10,000 m tons
Cement (1988)	3,182,000 m tons
Cheese (1986)	16,000 m tons
Cigarettes (1985)	17,961,000,000
Merchant Vessels (1986)	0 grt
Newsprint (1988)	0 m tons
Paper & Paperboard (1988)	132,000 m tons
Passenger Cars (1985)	0
Radios (1986)	236,000
Televisions (1986)	94,000
Wine (1987)	0 hl
Wool (1986)	0 m tons
hl = hectoliters grt = gross registered tons	

NOTE: A value of 0 indicates no production reported.

FIGURE 12

SECTION 2

CENTRAL AMERICA

MEXICO

AND THE

CARIBBEAN

Central America and the Caribbean




FIGURE 13

**STATISTICAL
COMPARISON
WITH
CENTRAL AMERICA,
MEXICO,
& THE CARIBBEAN**

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
CUBA VS. CENTRAL AMERICA,
MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN

1. Cuba spent a large portion of its 1990 Gross National Product (GNP) on defense (see FIGURE 14). Second only to Nicaragua. Overall economic numbers indicate a large GNP (3rd) but only a yearly GNP growth rate of 2.3 percent (17/28 countries).
2. Because of their great emphasis place on health and health care, Cuba's statistics in this area are impressive. It was number one in population per physician (372/1) (FIGURE 15), dentists (5923), population per dentists (1764/1), and nurses (53,595). It was second in number of hospital beds (39,809), physicians (28,060)--only behind Mexico's 66,373, and pharmacists (773).
3. A third area to note is education. Cuba prides itself on its education system. Statistically, it appears rightly so. It placed first, second, or third in most categories examined. Of note is the number of students per teacher in secondary schools (11/1) (FIGURE 16) placing it first amongst these countries.
4. In terms of manufactured goods, Cuba to my surprise ranked second in all measured categories.
5. It was not surprising to see Cuba first in sugar production (7.889 million metric tons), but I was surprised by its strong finish in two thirds of the other agricultural measures. Particularly in first in rice production with 540 thousand metric tons (FIGURE 17).

COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THIS COMPARISON:

ANTIGUA & BARBUDA	GRENADA	NICARAGUA
ARUBA	GUADELOUPE	PANAMA
BAHAMAS	GUATEMALA	PUERTO RICO
BELIZE	HAITI	ST KITTS-NEVIS
CAYMAN ISLANDS	HONDURAS	ST LUCIA
COSTA RICA	JAMAICA	ST VINCENT
CUBA	MARTINIQUE	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
DOMINICA	MEXICO	VIRGIN ISLANDS-UK
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	NETHERLANDS ANTILLES	VIRGIN ISLANDS-US
EL SALVADOR		

TITLE: CUBA VS. CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO, & CARIBBEAN¹

<u>MEASURE</u>		<u>YEAR</u>	<u>RANK¹</u>
POPULATION		1980	2
		1989	2
		1990	2
		1991	2
	(PROJECTED)	2000	3
POPULATION		1990	
GROWTH	.9%		19
DENSITY			19
DOUBLING TIME			12
URBANIZATION			5
LAND AREA		1990	4
ECONOMY			
GNP		1988	3
		1989	3
		1990	3
GNP GROWTH		1990	17
GNP PER CAPITA		1990	15
% GNP FOR DEFENSE	5.4%	1990	2
TOURIST ARRIVALS		1990	10
RECEIPTS		1990	14
HEALTH		1990	
LIFE EXPECTANCY (M)			8
LIFE EXPECTANCY (F)			21
BIRTH RATE			27
DEATH RATE			5
INFANT MORTALITY			6
HOSPITALS			3
POPULATION/HOSPITAL			16
HOSPITAL BEDS			2
POPULATION/HOSPITAL BEDS			9
PHYSICIAN			2
POPULATION/PHYSICIAN (372/1)			1
DENTISTS			1
POPULATION/DENTIST (1764/1)			1
PHARMACISTS			2
POPULATION/PHARMACISTS (13519/1)			17
NURSES			1
POPULATION/NURSE (195/1)			4
ENERGY		1990	
ELECTRICITY	CAPACITY		3
	PRODUCTION		3
	CONSUMPTION		3
	CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		12

<u>MEASURE</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>RANK¹</u>
COAL		
RESERVES		N/A
PRODUCTION		N/A
CONSUMPTION		3
CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		N/A
NATURAL GAS		
RESERVES		N/A
PRODUCTION		3
CONSUMPTION		3
CONSUMPTION/CAPITA		3
PETROLEUM		
RESERVES		N/A
PRODUCTION		N/A
CONSUMPTION		4
CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		8
EDUCATION	1990	
ELEMENTARY		
SCHOOLS		2
TEACHERS		2
STUDENTS		5
STUDENTS PER TEACHER (96/1)		2
SECONDARY		
SCHOOLS		2
TEACHERS		2
STUDENTS		2
STUDENTS PER TEACHER (11/1)		1
UNIVERSITY		
SCHOOLS		3
TEACHERS		2
STUDENTS		2
STUDENTS PER TEACHER (12/1)		11
GNP FOR EDUCATION 6.3%		9
LITERACY RATE 96%		4
MANUFACTURED GOODS	1990	
BEER		2
BUTTER		2
CEMENT		2
CHEESE		2
CIGARETTES		2
PAPER & PAPERBOARD		2
RADIOS		2
TV		2
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS	1990	
COFFEE		9
CORN		9
COTTON		8
EGGS		2
MEAT		2
MILK		2
POTATOES		2
RICE		1
SUGAR		1
TOBACCO		2

GNP FOR DEFENSE

(in percent)




FIGURE 14

TOP 11 IN CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO, & THE CARIBBEAN
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN




FIGURE 15

TOP 11 IN CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO, & THE CARIBBEAN
NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS PER TEACHER




FIGURE 16

TOP 11 IN CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICO, & THE CARIBBEAN
RICE PRODUCTION (1988)
 (in 1000s of metric tons)




FIGURE 17

SECTION 3

SOUTH AMERICA

South America



FIGURE 18

**STATISTICAL
COMPARISON
WITH
SOUTH AMERICA**

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

CUBA VS. SOUTH AMERICA

1. Cuba was second amongst the nations in this group on percentage of their GNP on defense (FIGURE 19). Only Guyana spent more. Perú was a close third with 3.9 percent. Overall economic figures indicate a strong GNP standing (7/15) despite known economic problems and a 2.3 percent GNP growth (9/15).

2. Health figures are excellent again. Cuba was number one in population per physician (FIGURE 20). It was second in population per dentist (1764/1), population per hospital bed 263, and infant mortality (16 per 1000 births).

3. Education was a leading area once again. Cuba was second in elementary students per teacher (16/1) (FIGURE 21), only surpassed by the Falkland Islands (12/1).

4. As far as manufacturing goods are concerned, Cuba faired well (about 6/15 countries). It was second in the manufacturing of radios (FIGURE 22).

5. In the agricultural products area "sugar was not king," largely due to Cuba's failure to meet their 1990 self-imposed quota. Brazil surpassed Cuba for the first time in history with 8.452 million metric tons to Cuba's 7.889 (FIGURE 23).

COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THIS COMPARISON:

ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA

CUBA
ECUADOR
FALKLAND ISLANDS
FRENCH GUIANA
GUYANA

PARAGUAY
PERU
SURINAME
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA

TITLE: CUBA VS. SOUTH AMERICA²

MEASURE		YEAR	RANK ²
POPULATION		1980	7
		1989	7
		1990	7
		1991	8
	(PROJECTED)	2000	8
POPULATION		1990	
GROWTH	.9%		11
DENSITY			1
DOUBLING TIME			4
URBANIZATION			7
LAND AREA		1990	13
ECONOMY			
GNP		1988	7
		1989	7
		1990	7
GNP GROWTH		1990	9
GNP PER CAPITA		1990	8
% GNP FOR DEFENSE	5.4%	1990	2
TOURIST ARRIVALS		1990	10
RECEIPTS		1990	10
HEALTH		1990	
LIFE EXPECTANCY (M)			2
LIFE EXPECTANCY (F)			14
BIRTH RATE			6
DEATH RATE			4
INFANT MORTALITY			2
HOSPITALS			8
POPULATION/HOSPITAL			4
HOSPITAL BEDS			5
POPULATION/HOSPITAL BEDS			2
PHYSICIAN			4
POPULATION/PHYSICIAN (372/1)			1
DENTISTS			4
POPULATION/DENTIST (1764/1)			2
PHARMACISTS			6
POPULATION/PHARMACISTS (13519/1)			7
NURSES			3
POPULATION/NURSE (195/1)			3
ENERGY		1990	
ELECTRICITY	CAPACITY		7
	PRODUCTION		7
	CONSUMPTION		7
	CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		8

<u>MEASURE</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>RANK²</u>
COAL		
RESERVES		N/A
PRODUCTION		N/A
CONSUMPTION		7
CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		N/A
NATURAL GAS		
RESERVES		N/A
PRODUCTION		8
CONSUMPTION		9
CONSUMPTION/CAPITA		9
PETROLEUM		
RESERVES		N/A
PRODUCTION		N/A
CONSUMPTION		6
CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		2
EDUCATION	1990	
ELEMENTARY		
SCHOOLS		8
TEACHERS		8
STUDENTS		8
STUDENTS PER TEACHER (96/1)		2
SECONDARY		
SCHOOLS		7
TEACHERS		3
STUDENTS		5
STUDENTS PER TEACHER (11/1)		2
UNIVERSITY		
SCHOOLS		7
TEACHERS		6
STUDENTS		6
STUDENTS PER TEACHER (12/1)		5
GNP FOR EDUCATION 6.3%		5
LITERACY RATE 96%		3
MANUFACTURED GOODS	1990	
BEER		6
BUTTER		5
CEMENT		5
CHEESE		7
CIGARETTES		5
PAPER & PAPERBOARD		7
RADIOS		2
TV		4
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS	1990	
COFFEE		6
CORN		11
COTTON		9
EGGS		5
MEAT		7
MILK		6
POTATOES		6
RICE		5
SUGAR		2
TOBACCO		3

GNP FOR DEFENSE

(in percent)




FIGURE 19

COMPARISON TO TOP 10 IN SOUTH AMERICA
POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN




figure 20

NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL STUDENTS PER TEACHER




FIGURE 21

COMPARISON TO ALL OF SOUTH AMERICA
RADIO PRODUCTION (1986)
(in 1000s)




FIGURE 22

COMPARISON TO ALL OF SOUTH AMERICA
SUGAR PRODUCTION (1988)
 (in 1000s of metric tons)




FIGURE 23

SECTION 4

STATISTICAL

COMPARISON

WITH

ALL LATIN AMERICA

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

CUBA VS. ALL LATIN AMERICA

1. Cuba was third in Latin America in percentage of GNP spent on Defense (FIGURE 24). Only Nicaragua and Guyana spent more. Cuba cannot afford to continue to spend its decreasing GNP on defense at this rate.

2. The great effort Cuba has put into health and health care has paid off. The statistics show it has professionally trained doctors, dentists, nurses, and hospital beds in enough quantities to support its population and perhaps most of the Caribbean nations if they wished. It is first in Latin America in population per physician (FIGURE 25).

3. Education is a hallmark for Cuba. They should be proud of their accomplishments. They are second and third respectively in elementary and secondary students per teachers (FIGURE 26 & 27). Their literacy rate is 96 percent sixth in Latin America. The U.S. is also 96 percent. In every educational category they are in the top one fourth.

4. Likewise in manufactured goods they were in the top one fourth of all countries in Latin America and a surprisingly third in Radio manufacturing (FIGURE 28).

5. No doubt "sugar will be king once again," but only if they can harvest the crop. The current shortages in fuels will cause some problems. Nobody makes sugar like Cuba, or as much in such a small island (FIGURE 29). Alternatively, their successes in cultivating rice and tobacco, fifth and fourth respectively in Latin America should give them optional markets.

Postscript: A comparison with the U.S. is interesting.

a. The population rate of growth is the same for both countries (.9 percent).

b. In 1990, the U.S. spent 6.5 percent of its GNP on defense, Cuba 5.3 percent. The U.S. is cutting that number down to 3.3 percent by 1995. Will Cuba?

c. Cuba has fewer people per hospital than the U.S. (34,150/1 versus 35,205/1). It also has fewer people per physician than the U.S. (372/1 versus 418/1).

d. In schools the picture is much the same. In elementary school students per teacher, Cuba has 16/1 versus 21/1 for the U.S. In secondary school students per teacher, Cuba has 11/1 versus 13/1 for the U.S. Both countries have the same literacy rate, 96 percent.

TITLE: CUBA VS. LATIN AMERICA³

MEASURE		YEAR	RANK ¹	RANK ²	RANK ³
POPULATION		1980	2	7	8
		1989	2	7	8
		1990	2	7	8
		1991	2	8	9
	(PROJECTED)	2000	3	8	10
POPULATION		1990			
	GROWTH .9%		19	11	29
	DENSITY		19	1	19
	DOUBLING TIME		12	4	15
	URBANIZATION		5	7	11
LAND AREA		1990	4	13	16
ECONOMY					
	GNP	1988	3	7	9
		1989	3	7	9
		1990	3	7	9
	GNP GROWTH	1990	17	9	25
	GNP PER CAPITA	1990	15	8	22
	% GNP FOR DEFENSE 5.4%	1990	2	2	3
	TOURIST ARRIVALS	1990	10	10	19
	RECEIPTS	1990	14	10	23
HEALTH		1990			
	LIFE EXPECTANCY (M)		8	2	9
	LIFE EXPECTANCY (F)		21	6	21
	BIRTH RATE		27	14	40
	DEATH RATE		5	4	8
	INFANT MORTALITY		6	2	7
	HOSPITALS		3	8	10
	POPULATION/HOSPITAL		16	4	19
	HOSPITAL BEDS		2	5	6
	POPULATION/HOSPITAL BEDS		9	2	10
	PHYSICIAN		2	4	5
	POPULATION/PHYSICIAN (372/1)		1	1	1
	DENTISTS		1	4	4
	POPULATION/DENTIST (1764/1)		1	2	2
	PHARMACISTS		2	6	7
	POPULATION/PHARMACISTS (13519/1)		17	7	23
	NURSES		1	3	3
	POPULATION/NURSE (195/1)		4	3	6
ENERGY		1990			
	ELECTRICITY CAPACITY		3	7	9
	PRODUCTION		3	7	9
	CONSUMPTION		3	7	9
	CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		12	8	19

<u>MEASURE</u>		<u>YEAR</u>	<u>RANK¹</u>	<u>RANK²</u>	<u>RANK³</u>
COAL	RESERVES		N/A	N/A	N/A
	PRODUCTION		N/A	N/A	N/A
	CONSUMPTION		3	7	9
	CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		N/A	N/A	N/A
NATURAL GAS	RESERVES		N/A	N/A	N/A
	PRODUCTION		3	8	10
	CONSUMPTION		3	9	11
	CONSUMPTION/CAPITA		3	9	11
PETROLEUM	RESERVES		N/A	N/A	N/A
	PRODUCTION		N/A	N/A	N/A
	CONSUMPTION		4	6	9
	CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA		8	2	9
EDUCATION		1990			
ELEMENTARY	SCHOOLS		2	8	9
	TEACHERS		2	8	9
	STUDENTS		5	8	12
	STUDENTS PER TEACHER (96/1)		2	2	3
SECONDARY	SCHOOLS		2	7	8
	TEACHERS		2	3	4
	STUDENTS		2	5	6
	STUDENTS PER TEACHER (11/1)		1	2	2
UNIVERSITY	SCHOOLS		3	7	9
	TEACHERS		2	6	7
	STUDENTS		2	6	7
	STUDENTS PER TEACHER (12/1)		11	5	15
GNP FOR EDUCATION	6.3%		9	5	13
LITERACY RATE	96%		4	3	6
MANUFACTURED GOODS		1990			
	BEER		2	6	7
	BUTTER		2	5	6
	CEMENT		2	5	6
	CHEESE		2	7	8
	CIGARETTES		2	5	6
	PAPER & PAPERBOARD		2	7	8
	RADIOS		2	2	3
	TV		2	4	5
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS		1990			
	COFFEE		9	6	14
	CORN		9	11	19
	COTTON		8	9	16
	EGGS		2	5	6
	MEAT		2	7	8
	MILK		2	6	7
	POTATOES		2	6	7
	RICE		1	5	5
	SUGAR		1	2	2
	TOBACCO		2	3	4

GNP FOR DEFENSE
(in percent)




FIGURE 24

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NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS PER TEACHER







FIGURE 26




COMPARISON TO ALL OF LATIN AMERICA
RADIO PRODUCTION (1986)
 (in 1000s)



SUGAR PRODUCTION (1988)
(in 1000s of metric tons)

COMPARISON TO TOP 10 IN ALL LATIN AMERICA
TOBACCO PRODUCTION (1988)
(in 1000s of metric tons)



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4. Hodges, Heather, Ms. Deputy coordinator, Cuban Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.
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