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Integrating Industry Into Graduated Mobilization Response

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) is a system designed to provide mobilization response to an early, ambiguous, and/or specific warning. As a concept GMR is designed to enhance deterrence, ease the impact of reaction to a particular event or situation, and reduce the start-up time required for mobilization should the emergency intensify.[1] To date, the emphasis and progress in implementing GMR has been on administrative and resource responses, rather than military or diplomatic actions. Additionally, GMR has only been implemented, in varying degrees, by agencies and departments within the federal government, i.e., not by elements of the private sector.

The concept of GMR is required by (Executive Order (EO) 12656) to prepare all federal departments and agencies to respond to a national security emergency.[2] Most agencies and departments have limited numbers of personnel and fiscal resources that can be devoted in peacetime to emergency preparedness planning; therefore, GMR is intended to provide the greatest return on investment for the limited resources that can be dedicated to emergency planning. This return is based upon development and maintenance of comprehensive preparedness plans and programs. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has the responsibility for ensuring GMR development and implementation by civil departments and agencies. GMR has five basic characteristics:

- **Effective Planning** - Targeted on specific objectives and problems likely to arise in a crisis. Flexibility is key.

o **Preparatory Actions and Investments** - Designed to improve the posture of the federal government and the private sector based upon the specific crisis.

o **Alternate Response Levels** - Provides appropriate response to a particular crisis.

o **Interagency Coordination** - Provides effective planning and response at every stage in the GMR process.

o **Specific and Preplanned Withdrawal Measures** - Provides means of reversing actions if the crisis abates.[3]

GMR planning will likely be implemented by departments and agencies. However, implementation/activation of GMR in a developing crisis would not be as successful as when industry is made aware, in advance, of the Governments GMR plans. Prior to and during crisis situations, DOD and the various department secretaries need access to a cross section of opinion and information regarding the industrial base. This information provides an early economic check to ensure that recommendations to the National Command Authority are, in fact, "doable."

One approach to ensuring private sector involvement in the GMR process is the chartering of National Security Industry Advisory Committees (like the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee with the National Communications System) that will work with the appropriate government departments or agencies and provide the necessary industrial liaison on a regular basis. Informed industrial base managers who have been habitually

involved in the process of requirement identification can respond more quickly than those of an industrial base that has been omitted from the preparedness process.

The success of the National Communications System in handling large numbers of communications emergencies during the recent Desert Shield/Storm operations provides an excellent example of government-industry cooperation. If the organizational model established by the National Communications System (NCS) is any indicator, private industry is willing (if not eager) to participate in the planning process. Although GMR process has not been fully implemented within the Executive Branch, it is not too early to begin developing the necessary framework to bring industry into the process.

A preparedness program that relies on US economic strength for responsiveness is more likely to receive political support than one relying on standing forces and war reserve stockpiles sized to worst-case scenarios. Government mechanisms that recognize and react to warning signals during the early stages of a crisis are needed if timely preparedness actions and investments are to be effective. The need for GMR will become more relevant as the Nation's reliance on force potential rather than standing forces increases.

GMR requires presidential support and detailed guidance to be fully integrated into the federal government. Its scope needs to be broadened to include the civilian sector, industry and trade associations, and even key members of Congress. Only through preexisting (peacetime) coordination with

industry, commerce, and government is effective movement along the GMR continuum possible.

CHAPTER I

GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

GMR is essentially grand strategy--the ability to harness the power of a nation to protect its interests. As a grand strategy it draws upon all three elements of national power--political, economic, and military, to achieve national interests and objectives. GMR does this by reinforcing deterrence and providing the capability to systematically mobilize national power.

In 1987, the Defense Department developed a concept that was predicated upon the assumption we needed a system to mobilize US infrastructure and industry at an early stage to respond to intelligence warning. Initially, this mobilization was to be in response to Soviet threat in Europe, but with the recent breakup of the former Soviet Union, the system must now look at regional conflicts (without regard to the adversary) that might escalate into clashes between the US and those nations that may enter the "nuclear club" and view themselves as new superpowers. The system would provide a trigger to industry or parts of industry that recognized the increasing lead times that have developed over the past 30 years in producing defense related materials.

Since 1989, Presidents Reagan and Bush have stated in their yearly National Security Strategy statements the need for being able to quickly

mobilize industry and infrastructure in response to early intelligence warning.

Executive Order (EO) 12656 lays out the need for each governmental department and agency to develop plans, actions, and preparedness measures to take advantage of this early warning. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is designated executive agent for GMR under the direction of the National Security Council (NSC).[4]

Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 334 further delineates the guidance found in EO 12656.[5] However, there is still a gap between the CFR and the EO and what each individual department mobilization planner has to do. To further assist, FEMA and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a contract for the development of a prototype GMR Plan of Action and Costed Option Package. This package demonstrated the GMR principle in concrete terms and provided DOE with a useful mobilization instrument.

In September 1991, FEMA contract for the development of similar action plans for the Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Interior (INT), Department of Labor (DOL), Department of Transportation (DOT), Government Services Administration (GSA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In addition to the plan of action and sample costed option, the contract will develop a table top exercises designed to test the plans and packages. The first deliverable were received by FEMA during January 1992.

With GMR, decisionmakers can choose options or combination of options

that respond to a specific crisis. These options provide the ability to act in the incipient stages of a crisis by activating elements of national power that are appropriate to the situation. This ability to act on warning reinforces deterrence by showing that the nation has the will and ability to defend its vital interests.

For a deterrent to be effective, the projected power must be capable and credible in the mind of the adversary. If an adversary believes that the US has the ability and the will to use its power, then deterrence may work. If an adversary doubts either ability or will, then deterrence fails. GMR will provide decisionmakers with options that can support deterrence.

If deterrence fails, GMR does something more. It not only provides the means to mobilize national power, but it makes the required elements of national power available when needed. For example, the budgetary constraints on the military in the future will mean significant reductions in training, force structure, and war reserve stock levels. These reductions, along with the withdrawals from overseas bases, mean that the US will not have the forces in being and the logistics in place to respond to a variety of military threats as quickly as it has in the past.

As necessary, additional military power must be generated. GMR assists in generating this military force structure. The military force would be generated before the crisis requires its use. Utilizing GMR, the military can have the force to fight and win even in the face of declining force structure. GMR can do the same thing with industry and the economy.

B. PURPOSE OF GMR

According to Title 44, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 334.1, GMR'S purpose is to establish a "system for developing and then implementing mobilization actions that are responsive to a wide range of national security threats and ambiguous or specific warning indicators. GMR provides a coherent decision making process with specific responses to an identified crisis or emergency."[6]

FEMA has published the Federal Preparedness Guide (FPG-2) entitled Graduated Mobilization Response Planning Guidance. FPG-2 deals primarily with industrial and infrastructure mobilization, but the guide outlines three key assumptions that form the basis for GMR. These assumptions include the notions that::

1. For many national security emergencies, some level of mobilization resources will be required to support national security objectives.
2. Warning for many national security emergencies will be available sufficiently in advance of hostilities to permit at least some level of mobilization.
3. There are prepatory actions that can be taken early in the warning period to improve mobilization response times.[7]

An important feature of the process is the increased control exercised by

the executive agent as the nation moves through the three stages of GMR:

GMR Stage 3 - Planning and Preparation - Exclusive Federal department and agency actions and information exchange, as appropriate.

GMR Stage 2 - Crisis Management - Progressively increasing Federal coordination and NSC direction.

GMR Stage 1 - NSC or other centralized control.[8]

Under this system the individual department and agencies will develop response option papers identifying and describing the range of option that could be taken within the various GMR stages. These papers are:

o a table of actions delineating the full range of activities the agencies might undertake in response to a national security emergency;

o a set of tables cross-indexing the potential actions by the department or agency with the GMR stage system; and

o a set of sample costed option packages identifying specific actions in response to a specific crisis and the associated costs for those actions.[9]

C. CURRENT STATUS OF GMR

"While important progress has been made in recent years, more can be done to preserve our ability to produce the weapons and equipment we need.

Mobilization plans will also have to reflect our changing understanding of warning for global war and develop graduated responses that themselves signal US resolve and thus contribute to deterrence."[10]

Pres George Bush.

GMR could underpin U.S. national security strategy in the 199Os by planning for the expanded use of the military, economic, and political elements of national power to improve this country's deterrent and warfighting capabilities. As the US draws down force structure without eliminating any of its vital interests, two imperatives emerge:

- First, the U.S. must rely more heavily on the nations potential power.

- Second, the military must be able to "flesh out" force structure in response to warning.

The fulfillment of these two tasks is critical if the US is going to continue to protect its national interests. The capability to perform crisis management planning and to consider the resource implications of DoD actions must be incorporated into all department, agency, and industry routine practices.[11]

Policy statements cannot make GMR a reality, but they are necessary to establish the basis and authority for an orderly implementation and execution process.

Crucial to the implementation of GMR are:

Enhancement of deliberate planning efforts in peacetime to identify requirements for a range of possible emergency situations; improved intelligence collection/assessment and decisionmaking processes; and more responsive and flexible coordination that can select and execute timely responses.[12]

Part of the problem GMR is facing is that Washington has a very long institutional memory. Mention mobilization and many people think of WWI and WWII. Mobilization is often seen as an On/Off switch that is cumbersome, escalatory, and provocative. GMR must be something more than that it must be precise, deliberate, deterrent, and flexible.

As the foundation of a new national mobilization strategy--GMR relies on deliberate planning for the triggering of political, economic, and military elements of power to improve our deterrent and warfighting capabilities in the future. As the US draws down force structure, we will rely more heavily on the nation's potential power to protect our vital interests. On warning, the military must be able to "flesh out" force structure to be ready for the conflict. It provides a bridge between industry and the force structure we have and the industry and force structure we might need. GMR provides the military with the bridges to go from a base force to a regenerated force (full obilization); from a regenerated force to a reconstituted force (total mobilization) as the threat increases.

D. PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTING GMR

There appear to be two reasons for the problems inherent in implementing GMR:

- First, as it currently exists, GMR is not only a national strategy, but is also a military strategy. This is significant because of the differences between a military strategy and a national strategy. This blending of these national and military strategies is causing confusion over who is leading in GMR's development and who directs GMR's military effort.

- Second, FEMA is the main proponent of GMR when it is viewed as a national strategy. The director of FEMA is an advisor to the NSC, but lacks authority over other Federal departments and agencies on GMR matters. This has resulted in GMR's developing almost independently within FEMA, OSD, and the JCS. This means there have been some exchanges of ideas, but there is a wide disparity between some organizations' definitions and understandings of GMR.

At the request of FEMA, the Manufacturing Studies Board of the National Research Council formed the committee to examine the GMR system as it relates to current realities in US industry. The committee reported that GMR could be a valuable strategic tool . However, in its present form, plans to implement GMR are inadequate. The system provides a challenge to existing

management concepts and communications techniques, and will require the full and sustained support of the president, the executive departments and agencies, the Congress, and industry to be successful.[13]

Industry experience indicates that long-term planning requires continual adjustment and is resource-intensive (financial and human); therefore, the committee suggested that FEMA be prepared to manage the demanding problems associated with the planning and implementation of GMR. The committee's report also discusses the application of civil strategic planning to FEMA's GMR implementation process, and describes industry's role in GMR.[14]

To be effective, the MSB recommended that GMR must have the complete support of the Executive Branch, the Congress, and industry. Specific GMR legislation (perhaps through an amendment to the Defense Production Act (DPA)) is needed to provide requisite support and visibility. Currently, a Congressional conference bills language specifically calls for GMR planning by departments and agencies.

Additionally the board recommended that FEMA must:

- adopt a strategic planning role in the GMR process;
- take advantage of new information management technologies;
- create an industry advisory group; and
- exercise the GMR process regularly.[15]

CHAPTER II

RECONSTITUTION

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In testimony before Senator Warner and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz outlined the basis for a new US defense strategy derived from a DoD assessment of the changes in the international environment and in the light of the conclusion of operations in the Persian Gulf. These changes are occasioned by three interlocking trends: developments in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; changes in regional conflicts; and increasingly capable friends and allies. This new defense strategy is crafted to ensure US security against a broad spectrum of threats in a changing, but still dangerous world, to promote the values of political and economic freedom, and to show moral and political leadership; to reassure others of our commitments to protect our interests; and, if necessary to respond to threats resolutely with forces for deterrence or defense. The most important new element is the shift in focus from a global Soviet threat to regional contingencies.

Our ability to provide forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution, presents crucial equipment, logistics, and personnel problems for industrial base and mobilization planners.

The build-down in US forces correspond to the breakup of the former Soviet Union has led President Bush to include "reconstitution" as a pillar in his National Security Statement.[16] In many ways the term differs little from the old terminology of partial mobilization or full mobilization. What the term implies is that you build-down to a certain level and as signs of an impending threat become apparent you rapidly ramp back up. The reconstitution concept obviously depends upon how well we recognize the sign of resurgent growth and how quickly we can gear up industry to counter the threat. This is where the costed options in each departmental action plan begin to pay dividends. Analysis of what you can get in return for dollars spent at various levels of buildup enables policy-makers to make informed decisions concerning how much needs to be done.

B. RECONSTITUTION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Reconstitution planning--and implementation--should be accomplished using GMR planning methodology. During the Cold War era the short warning time available caused military planners to assume that mobilization (M) and deployment (D) of forces would start on the same day as the war itself.[17] The M = D assumption was a worst case assumption that had adverse effects on all mobilization planning. The adverse effects of this view were the tendency to regard mobilization as a single massive spasm and the tendency to demand results that were often unattainable. The worst effect of this model of mobilization was that it proved impossible to provide additional resources to the

military forces in time to influence the outcome of the initial battles, thus paving the way for early use of nuclear weapons to offset resource shortages. The ultimate effect of the M = D assumption was that military planners simply gave up on mobilization - as did some of the mobilization planners. In 1988, the anticipated amount of warning of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on Europe increased from days to weeks or even months based upon new methods of intelligence collection. The prospect was that we would have some warning of an attack in time to take prepatory measures. In short, we could start mobilization before the other side started the war.

Starting early, however, was necessary but not sufficient. There still had to be a way to plan and implement mobilization in a time-phased, organized manner. The idea was to prepare the mobilization plan in numerous discrete sets of related actions--options that could be implemented one at a time or severally when indicated by warning. Mobilization could be implemented by a series of graduated actions in response to warning of enemy activity.

The concept of GMR caught on, and there seemed to be unanimous support for doing it, but the doing proved to be more troublesome than the concept. Disagreement over definitions and procedures filled the initial stages of development; however, despite these early problems, today GMR is available to assist in reconstitution planning.

During reconstitution, implementation ofGMR planning will result in the development of several sets of related actions that can be presented to the

President or other decisionmakers as options for their response to warning of a particular set of enemy actions. Using the GMR process for reconstitution will allow us to fashion a response that is appropriate to any enemy provocation.

On the military side, it is important to understand the current military view of GMR. First, the JCS and OSD are developing aspects of GMR to generate military force in the future. The JCS is developing GMR in response to a statement made by President Bush in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990, the same day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. President Bush said,

"Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of reconstitution of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depth of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces--but to generate wholly new forces."[18]

C. THE PURPOSE OF RECONSTITUTION

Reconstitution is the capability to expand existing force structure to achieve a specified level of warfighting capability, within a specified period of time. The capability is intended to reduce the risk of reemergence of a global threat, and to deal with its consequences if deterrence fails.

Key elements of effective reconstitution include:

- warning time

- o decisive leadership
- o understanding of requirements
- o awareness of capability

In the National Security Council's view, reconstitution

- o generates wholly new forces before an opponent can generate overwhelming offense
- o includes manpower, defense technology, and the industrial base
- o is not synonymous with mobilization
- o includes (but does not rely on) allies
- o requires programmed resources
- o involves risk
- o requires selectivity as we down-size[19]

Reconstitution would necessitate the diversion of resources from civilian uses to military uses. One of the key elements of reconstitution will be our reliance on the civil sector of the US economy. The total amount of resources involved would depend on the reconstitution targets, and the severity of the impact on the civil sector would depend on the timing of the implementation and the way in which it was done. A sudden, massive move to rearm would create a greater impact than would a carefully designed and graduated reconstitution accomplished over a period of several years.[20]

OSD and FEMA are the two agencies most heavily involved in reconstitution. OSD has the lead for the military part and the responsibility to

enunciate clearly the goals (especially reconstitution force targets) and operational assumptions. FEMA has the lead to coordinate the activities of the civil resource agencies of the federal government. FEMA's ability to manage the entire planning process is strengthened by the existence of the Policy Coordinating Committee for Emergency Preparedness and Mobilization Planning (PCC-EP/MP) as one of the 19 interagency committees established under the aegis of the National Security Council. The PCC-EP/MP is chaired by the Director of FEMA and is tasked to manage the reconstitution planning effort.

CHAPTER III

ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATING INDUSTRY

One of the recommendations of the MSB was the establishment of a partnership strategy between government and industry regarding GMR. To better understand future strategies, a review of some affordable strategies (past and present) to improve industrial readiness/responsiveness is, perhaps, appropriate at this time:

A. STANDBY AGREEMENTS

Standby agreements were used in a variety of circumstances to provide a means of mobilizing private industrial resources quickly to meet emergency needs. Effective standby agreement programs must include preparedness planning (by both government and industry) and a process to ensure timely activation of those agreements/mechanisms in the event of emergency. A variety of programs has been used in the past and is worth noting for possible future use.[21] The list below is by no means inclusive, but does provide a sample of past approaches to integration:

a. Educational orders - Educational orders were used between 1939 and 1941 as a means to prepare industry for a shift from commercial work to the production of essential military items in the event of war.[22] Under such

orders a company was provided standby equipment and tooling to augment its existing capabilities. Thus equipped,A company could go from producing automobiles to machine guns in the shortest time possible. Although the War Department actively promoted the program during the 192Os and 1930s the Congress showed little enthusiasm to provide funds for "if and when purposes."[23] As late as 1950, the role of educational orders was still being recognized when the munitions board identified educational orders as the final step in its industrial preparedness: "If time and funds permit, the next step is the actual manufacture of a limited number of the product for educational purposes."[24] This tool apparently became a victim of the short-war planning decisions of the mid-195Os. Although no current mobilization planning documents mention the technique, the process is still permitted under law. Budgetary constraints may cause prototyping of some weapons systems. This type of standby agreement or some modified form may have utility under many conditions.

b. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) - Under this program various federal departments and the civilian airline industries developed a standby agreement that is a model of effective preparedness, planning, and cooperation.

The CRAF program receives necessary planning and resources because it has the potential to immediately augment our strategic airlift capability. US air carriers have committed a portion of their aircraft for a proportional share of the annual military procurement of civilian airlift services. If the CRAF is activated, conflicts over prioritization between civilian and military requirements may arise.

The authority to establish priorities and allocate resources is provided under the provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950. It is interesting to note that the airline carriers provide (by standby agreement) the air frames, the crews and remaining infrastructure committed to the CRAF voluntarily. The history of the CRAF's utilization has been a major success story. From Vietnam to Desert Storm, the CRAF has been there. As the number of US-based airline carriers dwindles, we will, almost certainly, be required to relook our agreements.[25]

B. DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950

This Korean War vintage law provides government with the broad authority to intervene in the national economy in the interest of defense. Since their passage, these titles have been re-enacted--usually at 2 year intervals--with modest changes. Integrating the industrial base is the foundation of the nation's efforts to ensure that we are prepared to meet national defense and material resource needs during both peacetime and in time of crisis. From its inception the DPA has served as the backbone for defense programs.[26]

Title VII of the DPA authorizes the establishment of voluntary agreements among representatives of industry, business, agriculture, and other interests, to help provide for the defense of the United States. Voluntary agreements were designed to improve the responses of industry through the exchange of information such as production data, technology, and product distribution information. During the Korean War there were 77 voluntary agreements. Most covered sharing of product data and distribution information. Currently only one voluntary agreement exists and that covers the transporting

of North Shore oils by the maritime fleet.[27]

C. NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

A MODEL FOR GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE

With few exceptions, GMR has been limited to the area inside the Beltway. To be successful federal departments and agencies must involve industry in the initial planning process. I believe the National Communication System (NCS) provides a model of how government and industry can work together effectively in support of a national security strategy.

During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy became aware of the president's inability to communicate effectively with his key advisors via existing government and commercial telecommunication facilities because of a lack of interoperability between federal agencies. He decided that the government needed a reliable and robust telecommunications infrastructure. President Kennedy issued an order to correct the problem. Thus was born the National Communications System (NCS).[28]

For much of the next 20 years the NCS provided little more than an administrative oversight for the telecommunications industry because no agreement had been reached on system design or system management. This passive role would come to an end with the election of President Ronald Reagan and the court-ordered divestiture of AT&T.

In 1984, President Reagan revitalized the NCS, whose membership had grown to over 23 federal agencies, and assigned each agency special functions to carry out in the event of a national security or emergency incident. Additionally, the Reagan administration was concerned about the relationship between the federal government and the telecommunications industry. As a result, several industry-government conferences were held to identify issues requiring future analysis and review. The chief executive officers (CEO) of some 30 telecommunication companies were invited to participate.[29]

D. NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (NSTAC)

The result of the conferences was an executive order issued (on the same day as Judge Green's AT&T divestiture order went into effect) by the President establishing the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) within the NCS.



Figure 1.[30]

This committee composed of a maximum of 30 industry leaders, was to bring to the president (through his national security advisor) and to the secretary of defense, the knowledge, expertise, and insight available within the telecommunications industry on problems relating to the implementation of national security telecommunications policy. Procedurally the emphasis would be on consensus-building among the 23 members (Figure 2) of the Federal Government Committee of Principals (COPS) and the 30 members from the private sector telecommunications industry (NSTAC). Technically the focus would be on the interoperability and survivability involving large numbers of telecommunications systems.



Figure 2.[31]



Figure 3.[32]

Although 30 members may serve on the committee, currently there are only 25 member companies. Each member (CEOs only) is appointed by the president and his prime function is to advise the president. The committee has direct access, through reporting channels, to the president and his executive agent (SECDEF), ensuring that its advice is not filtered through layers of

bureaucracy. The NSTAC provides the president with a source of technical information not available to him within the federal government.



Figure 4.[33]

These figures represent the contribution to our nation's economy by the members of the NSTAC. Additionally, they reflect our Nation's substantial reliance on the telecommunications infrastructure and underscore the importance of joint industry-government cooperation under a process like the NSTAC.



Figure 5.

The NSTAC meets every 9 months to approve studies and recommendations forwarded from its internal Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES). The IES directs working groups and task forces to monitor operations, planning, and regulatory issues related to National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications. Task forces are established to study specific issues that the NSTAC deems appropriate. The NSTAC agenda is framed in terms of specific NS/EP issues that may be generated by either industry or government. After the issues are worked by the task forces, the results/recommendations are considered by the NSTAC. If approved, the recommendations are forwarded to the president and the NCS executive agent (SECDEF).[34]

To date the NSTAC has met and addressed 18 NS/EP telecommunications issues. Several of these issues have resulted in the president's approving the recommendations of the NSTAC and the

establishment of essential communication programs and other NS/EP initiatives. To provide an overview of the NSTAC process consideration of sample issues may be appropriate:

a. National Telecommunications Management Structure (NTMS). The purpose of the NTMS is to provide a comprehensive, survivable, and lasting management structure capable of initiating, coordinating, restoring, and reconstituting the nation's telecommunications resources in the event of a national emergency, including war. A study of this issue conducted by the IES for the NSTAC resulted in a recommendation to establish an NTMS program office. It further recommended, and the president approved, establishing NTMS Regional Coordinating Centers (RCC). The staff for these RCCs was to be a combination of industry and government personnel. The first RCC was opened in Massachusetts during the fourth quarter 1990. Two more RCCs were opened in Texas and Washington during 1991. The remaining three RCCs will come on line during 1993.

b. National Coordinating Center (NCC). The NSTAC recognized the need to have a national coordinating mechanism to ensure that government and industry could respond to NS/EP requirements in the post-divestiture environment. Therefore, the NSTAC recommended the establishment of the National Coordinating Center (NCC)--a joint industry-government center that supports federal government's NS/EP telecommunications requirements.

The President approved the recommendation of the NSTAC and created the

NCC in January 1984.[35] Eleven telecommunications entities and the United States Telephone Association formed the private sector contribution along with representatives from the NCS. These 12 companies each provided a representative (from its company) to work NS/EP telecommunications actions. The mission of the NCC is to assist in the initiation, coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of NS/EP telecommunications services or facilities.

The NCC is the unique mechanism by which the federal government and the telecommunications industry jointly respond to NS/EP telecommunications service requirements. The organization structure of the NCC is depicted below.



Figure 6.[36]

All 25 members of the NSTAC are eligible to provide representatives to the NCC. Memoranda of agreement are completed between the NCS and the private sector companies wishing to participate, that outline relationships. A more detailed description of the criteria for participation can be found in National Coordinating Center, Operating Charter, dated October 9, 1985.[37]

IV. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

NCS A SUCCESS STORY IN GMR:

It is no accident that the NCS and NSTAC have been so successful in integrating the telecommunications industry into graduated mobilization response; they have worked hard at developing relationships and solving issues/problems for over 9 years.

The NSTAC has been a success from its inception. The reasons for this success include:

- o It has, over time, developed a highly productive working partnership with the government
- o It has direct access to high level decisionmakers (including the president).
- o It focuses on concrete issues and active problem-solving.
- o Perhaps most important, it shows the willingness of industry to work collectively on matter of national concern despite a competitive environment.[38]

Other industry and federal government departments/agencies may be able to use the NCS NSTAC model as a GMR model for the future.

Those federal government department and agencies that are involved in GMR should seriously consider developing a joint industry-government model similar to the NSTAC in their own organizations.

NOTES

1. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Mobilization Preparedness, Graduated Mobilization Response Planning Guidance, Washington, August 1990, p. 1-1.

2. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Graduated Mobilization Response Plan for the Department of Energy, April 1990, p. 1-1.

3. Ibid., pp. 1-2-1-3.

4. See "Executive Order 12656," November 18, 1988, p. 3.

5. See the Federal Register 334.1, Vol. 55, No. 13, of January 19, 1990.

6. Ibid., p. 2.

7. FEMA, Op. cit., p. 2-1-2-2.

8. Paul E. Taibl, Graduated Mobilization Response: A Key Element of National Deterrent Strategy (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988), p. iii.

9. Conversation with Mr. Steven Hood, FEMA, December 1991. Mr. Hood provided an informative perspective on past efforts in support of GMR and some future FEMA initiatives.

10. See "National Security Strategy of the United States" March 1990, p. 27.

11. William J. Evans, Graduated Mobilization Response: A National Mobilization Strategy (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991), pp. 1-3.

12. National Research Council, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, Manufacturing Studies Board, Committee on Graduated Mobilization Response, Graduated Mobilization Response: Forging a Strong Partnership with Industry (Washington National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 15-17.

13. Ibid., p. 2.

14. Ibid., pp. 13-17.

15. Ibid., p. 2.

16. See "National Security Strategy of the United States" March 1990, p. 30.

17. John R. Brinkerhoff, Reconstitution: The Fourth Pillar of the New National Security Strategy, Burke, VA, August 1991, p. 5.

18. "Remarks by the President at the Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium," The Aspen Institute, Aspen Colorado, August 2, 1990.

19. See "National Security Strategy of the United States" March 1990, pp. 24-27.

20. John R. Brinkerhoff, Op. cit., p. 5.

21. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Affordable Strategies to Improve Industrial Responsiveness, Volume 1: Past and Present Uses of Standby Agreements, Washington, May 1985, p. Es-1.

22. Ibid., p. Es-2.

23. Ibid., p. 2-7.

24. Ibid., pp. 2-1-2-7.

25. Ibid., pp. 6-1-6-32.

26. Wallace E. Stickley, "The DPA: Its Importance in an Uncertain World," Journal of Civil Defense, February 1991, pp. 12-14.

27. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Mobilization Preparedness, The Defense Production Act of 1950, Washington, 1992, pp. 27-52.

28. Defense Communications Agency, National Communications System, A History of the National Communications System: The First 25 Years, 1963-1988, Mitre Corporation, 1990, p. iv.

29. Briefing by Mr. William Belford, Director, National Coordinating Center, National Communications System, November, 1991.

30. Briefing by Mr. Peter Gness, NSTAC, National Communications System, November, 1991.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Conversation with Mr. Peter Gness, NSTAC, NCS, Febryary, 1992.

35. Conversation with Mr. William Belford, NCC, NCS, January 7, 1992.

36. Ibid.

37. Briefing by Mr. Peter Gness, NSTAC, National Communications System, November, 1991.

38. Conversation with Mr. Peter Gness, NSTAC, NCS, February, 1992.