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THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN EUROPE:
AN ANALYSIS WITHIN THE POST-COLD WAR
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

by

Matthew K. Moeller

December 1992

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An Analysis Within the Post-Cold War Security Environment

by

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Lieutenant, United States Air Force
B.S., San Jose State University, 1989


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


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ABSTRACT

A United States Air Force presence in Europe promotes stability in the region and displays an ongoing U.S. commitment towards a peaceful and prosperous Europe. These forces also enable the U.S. to have an important voice in European security matters that directly affect the United States. In addition, a United States Air Force presence in Europe provides flexible and mobile combat forces which are essential in sustaining American and allied security interests within the new international order.

While the U.S. Air Force in Europe is being reduced in size, it is adjusting and reorganizing to more effectively and efficiently perform its still critical roles within the region. According to current plans, there will be approximately three forward deployed active duty fighter wings stationed in Europe. U.S. nuclear guarantees for Europe will be supported by U.S. Air Force multi-role fighter/attack aircraft. To maintain effective strategic agility capabilities within the region, it will be essential that the United States continue to stay actively involved within the European political and military environment.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States is adapting to the new world order by re-shaping its national security and national military strategies to better face the challenges this new order brings. Military strategies are no longer founded on the old international paradigm of East vs West. The new environment requires flexibility and rapid mobility to respond to regional crises and conflicts. The ability to successfully prevail militarily in these types of contingencies requires greater emphasis on both strategic airlift and tactical aviation capabilities. Examination of relevant issues influencing the United States Air Force provides insight into regional security postures and operational requirements.

The United States is closely linked with Europe, and there has been a long term U.S. Air Force presence in the region dedicated to insuring U.S. interests by bolstering European security and well being. The United States Air Force in Europe will continue to operate in concert with U.S. allies within the security framework provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. According to current plans there will be approximately three forward deployed active duty fighter wings stationed in Europe, capable of performing crisis response operations in the region. In addition to these forward deployed forces, there will be two active duty fighter wings located in CONUS tailored to fight in the Atlantic region. Including reserve units there will be a total of eleven fighter wings planned and available for operations focused in the area. While the Air Force in Europe is being reduced in size, it is adjusting and reorganizing to more effectively and efficiently perform its still critical roles within and based from the region.

One important role the U.S. Air Force will continue to fulfill involves providing Europe with viable nuclear forces. U.S. theater nuclear forces located in Europe will consist solely of dual-capable fighter/attack aircraft which will be limited to using gravity dropped bombs. CONUS based ICBMs, strategic bombers, and SSBNs also contribute towards allied nuclear guarantees. Providing our European allies with a credible nuclear commitment serves as a deterrent against hostile actions and reduces incentives for many European nations to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

Effective strategic agility will be an essential element in successfully dealing with any contingency of the future. Within Europe and the surrounding region, it will be critical for the U.S. to maintain base usage and overfly rights. As U.S. influence decreases in the region, there may be greater resistance to U.S. actions from these bases unless completely supported by not only the host country, but by the majority of our allies. In this respect, it is essential that the United States continue to stay actively involved within the European political and military environment.

Other significant issues include current military strategy and structural reorganizations, as well as arms control agreements. Current reorganizations, both in the U.S. and NATO, will significantly affect Air Force operations of the future. Changing threats, new technologies, and strategic innovations are changing the structure of our forces and re-directing the way they will fight. Continuing arms control agreements will have a significant effect on the size of our future forces and the missions they can accomplish. It will be important to continually examine these issues to better evaluate and update methods of operation.

A United States Air Force presence in Europe promotes stability in the region and displays an ongoing U.S. commitment towards a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition, these forces enable the U.S. to have an important voice in European security matters that directly affect the United States. Finally, a United States Air Force presence in Europe provides flexible and mobile combat forces which are essential in sustaining American and allied security interests within the new international order.

I. INTRODUCTION

...military strength is not an alternative to a national search for peace. It is an essential element of it...a national commitment to the search for peace not backed up by military strength would be no policy at all. It would be a pious expression of hope, devoid of either credibility or effect...¹

A variety of forces are shaping a new international order with major implications for U.S. national security policy and military strategy. Within this new international order U.S. military forces will be called upon to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe. As the United States forges a new path in this international order, the role of the military must adapt to face international pressures and domestic constraints. The cold war provided a stable framework that guided many policy issues, particularly those issues related to European affairs. This framework no longer exists and future U.S. involvement in European affairs, both political and military, is subject to dramatic reorientation. There are numerous factors that may affect this reorientation including; economic dependency, public opinion, political unity, and changing security requirements. These changing security requirements will have a significant impact on the future of the U.S. military in Europe.

¹U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power.

In the past the U.S. Air Force has played a significant role in the European defense posture. As history has shown, effective air power plays an integral part in any successful military endeavor. This was most recently re-emphasized in the skies over Iraq during the Gulf War. How will this "new world order" affect the United States Air Forces in Europe? To effectively answer this question requires a working knowledge of the new political and military landscape. It is important to recognize possible threats in this new order and to fully understand the international dynamics influencing U.S. and allied security objectives. It is within this framework that strategy and doctrine are formulated. This directly affects force structure and sizing. Examining U.S. National Security objectives and National Military Strategy will be useful in understanding the new direction in which U.S. policy makers are approaching the new global environment. The U.S. Air Force has recently published its new directional focus in the June 1990 White Paper "Global Reach-Global Power" and re-emphasized many of these ideas in a February 1992 testimony to Congress "Reshaping for the Future"² by Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice. An examination of current Air Force direction will be valuable in determining the possible roles of the United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE). A discussion of the 'base force' concept as outlined in the United States National Military Strategy will help evaluate what the U.S. Air Force presence in Europe might look like in the near future. When discussing

²Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, "Reshaping for the Future," from testimony to the House Armed Service Committee, February 1992.

issues relating to a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe, it is essential to discuss how these forces participate within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An examination of NATO military strategy and force structures will contribute to better understanding of issues relating to a U.S. Air Force role in the region. Of particular importance is examining the role of nuclear weapons in Europe and how the Air Force continues to contribute to nuclear deterrence and nuclear war-fighting capabilities. In addition, there are other issues that affect the U.S. Air Force in Europe, such as limitations on strategic agility, current military reorganizations, and arms control agreements that will be discussed. It is hoped that this top down approach will provide a lens through which a clearer picture of a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe can be envisioned.

II. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Throughout the past 45 years the global security arena has been primarily driven by confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has drastically changed current security requirements, and Cold War policies of the past no longer apply. The old international system provided a stable framework that acted as a focal point for Free World policies. This focus has now been blurred by a whirlwind of dramatic change. To formulate new strategies it is essential to analyze the changes taking place and adopt policies that pursue defined national security ideals.

The most dramatic change in the international arena is occurring within the former Soviet Union. The familiar hammer and sickle have been replaced by the Russian tricolor. Russia and the independent republics are on the threshold of embracing democratic ideals to guide their new governments. While there is reason for optimism about the future, the situation should be handled cautiously considering the possible instabilities of the current situation. The failure of the 1991 coup attempt was a great victory for democratic forces, however, it did illustrate the fragility of the current situation. Political leaders in the former Soviet Union continue to grapple with tremendous internal problems as they attempt to reorganize political, military, and economic power. Throughout this

process one of the largest, most heavily armed territories on earth is proceeding toward an uncertain, and perhaps dangerous, future.

The conventional forces of Russia and the other nations which form the Commonwealth of Independent Nations are still very formidable. However, it is improbable that a serious conventional challenge to U.S. and Western security will reemerge from the Eurasian heartland for years to come, and if such an eventuality did materialize, the West would have ample warning time. Though not currently a direct threat, this military potential will continue to be a security consideration within the region.

Russia will certainly remain a nuclear power with very substantial forces. There are currently about 27,000 nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union; 15,000 of these are associated with strategic assets, 9,000 are with ground and air forces, and the remaining 3,000 are dedicated to maritime forces.³ There are many concerns that surround the eventual disposition of these nuclear forces. In addition to concerns over where the weapons will eventually be located are issues regarding command and control, weapon safety and security, and material disposal. Perhaps the most serious ramification arising from the changes occurring in the former Soviet Union relates to the possibility of increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to Third World regions. This

³Thomas C. Reed and Michael O. Wheeler, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order," (Washington, D.C., mimeo, December 1991) p. 17.

proliferation includes weapons hardware, warhead materials, and nuclear technicians and scientists from the former Soviet Union.⁴

The events of the Gulf War, subsequent revelations regarding Iraq's nuclear programs, and the uncooperative approach of Saddam Hussein's government reinforce concerns about the spread of mass-destruction weapons to Third World nations. Unstable, and potentially dangerous, Third World countries that are actively pursuing these types of weapons include Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Within the new international order, controlling the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons will be a top priority for the United States and its allies. Attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are but one problem stemming from Third World nations in the Middle East.

The Middle East and Southwest Asia are very unstable regions. The coalition forces ejected Iraq from Kuwait during the Gulf War. However, Saddam Hussein still remains in power of a belligerent Iraq. Iran continues to support radical groups, nationalism, and religious fanaticism. Other factors that contribute to regional instability include the ongoing Arab- Israeli issue, water rights conflicts, and the continuing rift between the rich and the poor.⁵ The collapse of the Soviet regime raises the possibility of new regional coalitions, particularly among former Soviet Islamic republics and other nations in Southwest Asia. These historic

⁴The Pentagon, National Military Strategy, Washington D.C. 1992, p. 2.

⁵Ibid., p. 3.

conflicts, fueled by arsenals of modern weapons, will continue to challenge regional stability. The Middle East and Southwest Asia will continually pose serious security threats for the U.S. and Europe. It is of vital economic importance to the United States and European allies to have free access to resources located in this region. In addition, stability within the region is closely linked to European security due to close geographical proximity. American and European military forces must maintain the option of responding, if circumstances dictate, to a crisis within the region to protect and preserve pre-defined security interests. While the Middle East and South West Asia are serious concerns for European security, there are other problems closer to home that have significant security ramifications.

The revolution in Eastern Europe, which eventually led to the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and German reunification, also saw the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the rebirth of independence for many regional states. While these events have greatly reduced the immediate military threat to Western Europe, within some states they have unleashed powerful nationalistic sentiment that has manifested itself in regional unrest. The current situation in the Balkans is an example of this unrestrained nationalism. Unrest in the Baltics is also a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. These conflicts have helped contribute to a massive influx of Eastern refugees into Western Europe. This in itself poses serious strains within the region that must be considered in European security planning. It is in the best interest of the United States and Western

Europe to promote stability within the region through active dialogue and economic assistance. It also will be critical to maintain viable defense structures to safeguard Western European security while offering security assistance to Eastern European countries seeking democratic reform.

The recent changes discussed above in the international arena have fundamentally altered the concept of threat analysis as a basis for force structure planning. There is no longer a clearly defined threat. The threat of today is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that is unexpected or unpredictable. It seems inevitable that U.S. forces would be called upon again. However, predicting the time, place, and circumstance will be difficult, considering the volatile nature of the future security environment. Whatever form the threat takes, it is essential that U.S. forces be able to respond if necessary.

The Cold War is over and the political and military landscape is reflecting this dramatic reorientation. The new international arena offers hope for democratic ideals and the transition to a more peaceful global coexistence. It is important to understand this new framework in order to better comprehend security challenges that face the U.S. and its allies. It is these security challenges that drive strategy formulation and shape the structure of our forces. A discussion of relevant strategies will be useful in better understanding a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe.

III. STRATEGY AND FORCE DESCRIPTION

The United States has recently defined its new National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy to face the challenges this "new world" brings. The future role of the U.S. Air Force in Europe is defined within the boundaries these new strategies dictate. It is therefore essential to be familiar with these documents in order to study the Air Force's future function in Europe. This study is not attempting to validate these policies within the new world order. Instead, it utilizes them as a framework in which U.S. military forces will be structured and operated within the near future.

A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

In August of 1991 the White House published the President's view of the National Security Strategy of the United States.⁶ These interests and objectives are the executive articulation regarding U.S. national interests in the new world order. The foundation of U.S. National Security policy rests on the following four primary interests and selected objectives:⁷

- 1) The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

⁶The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington D.C. August 1991.

⁷Ibid., p. 3-4.

- Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies- should deterrence fail- repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies.
- Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States, its interests and its allies.

2) A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space.

3) Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

- Establishing a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities.

4) A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

- Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.
- Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.

These four national security interests and selected objectives provide the guidance in which our national military strategies are built. The fundamental objective of the U.S. armed forces is to deter aggression and, should this deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any foe. Deterrence

remains the primary and central motivating purpose driving our National Military Strategy.⁸ This strategy is founded on the premise that the United States will provide the leadership necessary to promote global peace and security. Changes in East-West relations have shifted the strategic focus away from global war to that of regional threats and crises. The new U.S. strategy emphasizes multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations. However, the U.S. must retain the capability of acting unilaterally if U.S. interests dictate. These principles are the foundations in which a future role for the U.S. Air Force in Europe will be formulated. The National Military Strategy provides guidance on how U.S. forces will be utilized in promoting U.S. national interests.

B. UNITED STATES NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

To effectively evaluate the role of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, it is essential to understand the basic foundations and principles of the United States National Military Strategy. This strategy, built upon the national security interests of the U.S., provides guidance for the branches to formulate specific doctrine. It is essential to be familiar with this document in order to more effectively understand the rationale for specific service branch Strategy. The National

⁸The White House, op. cit. in n. 6, p. 6.

Military Strategy is built upon the four foundations of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.⁹

1. Strategic Deterrence and Defense

Recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives are optimistic signs for real reductions in the arsenals of the nuclear powers. Unfortunately, the threat posed by increasing numbers of potentially hostile states that are acquiring and/or developing nuclear weapons is very serious. Due to these threats maintenance of a modern, fully capable, and reliable strategic deterrent remains the number one defense priority of the United States. A credible deterrent requires a reliable warning system, modern nuclear forces, the capability and flexibility to support a spectrum of response options and a defensive system for global protection against limited strikes (GPALS).¹⁰ Strategic deterrence and defense is particularly important in Europe, where U.S. nuclear guarantees are considered by many as a basic requirement for regional stability. A later section will be devoted to this issue.

2. Forward Presence

U.S. forces deployed overseas show U.S. commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Forward presence includes

⁹Ibid., p. 6-8.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 6.

periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts. Although U.S. overseas forces will certainly be reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crises will continue to depend on judicious forward presence. A forward presence in Europe remains critical for long-term European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests.¹¹

3. Crisis Response

Maintaining U.S. forces capable of responding to regional crises is an integral part of our military strategy. Regional crises may arise on very short notice and U.S. forces must be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort. Crisis response may range from a single discriminate strike to the employment of overwhelming force to defeat a regional aggressor. This strategy recognizes that during a regional conflict, force levels elsewhere cannot be reduced to leave the U.S. or its allies vulnerable to other potential aggressors. U.S. troops stationed in Europe are essential to perform crisis response operations in the Atlantic region.¹²

¹¹Ibid., p. 7.

¹²Ibid., p. 7.

4. Reconstitution

As the global threat diminishes U.S. military forces will be reduced. The ability to reconstitute is intended to deter any hostile power from militarizing and, if this deterrence fails, to provide a global war-fighting capability. In addition to activating the military industrial base, reconstitution involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and innovation necessary to retain a competitive edge in critical areas of potential military competition.¹³

The U.S. employs a set of Strategic Principles which build upon the four National Defense Foundations. These principles capitalize on U.S. military strengths and permit the exploitation of any military challenger.¹⁴

- **Readiness-** Deterrence and crisis response dictate that U.S. forces maintain a fighting force which can respond quickly and effectively to any regional conflict.
- **Collective Security-** The U.S. expects to strengthen world response to crisis through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations.
- **Arms Control-** The U.S. will strive to reduce military threats to national interests, promote greater predictability into military relationships, and channel force postures in more stabilizing directions, while maintaining viable military forces.

¹³Ibid., p. 7-8.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 8-10.

- Maritime and Aerospace Superiority- The ability to quickly establish control of maritime and aerospace operations provides for increased combat effectiveness, fewer losses, and efficient employment of combat power in critical areas.
- Strategic Agility- Rapid movement of forces to conflict areas is required for successful engagement. Regardless of location U.S. forces will be capable of worldwide employment on short notice.
- Power Projection- The U.S. ability to project power has strategic value for crisis response and provides continued contribution towards deterrence, regional stability, and collective security.
- Technological Superiority- The U.S. must continue to rely on technological superiority to offset quantitative advantages, to minimize the risk to U.S. personnel, and to expedite decisive termination of conflict.
- Decisive Force- An essential element of U.S. national military strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to overwhelm potential adversaries and in so doing terminate conflict swiftly with minimum loss of life.

The National Defense Foundations coupled with the Strategic Principles form the framework in which each service functions under their specific branch orientated strategy. The separate services utilize their inherent strengths to formulate their contribution towards U.S. national security. The USAF White Paper entitled *Global Reach-Global Power*¹⁵ outlines the U.S. Air Force contribution towards national security.

¹⁵Department of the United States Air Force, A White Paper: The Air Force and National Security: Global Reach-Global Power, Washington D.C. June 1990.

C. AIR FORCE STRATEGY

Responding to the dramatic changes occurring in today's security environment, the Air Force has sought to capitalize on its inherent characteristics- speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality¹⁶- to develop a force with agile and responsive capabilities which compliments their sister services. The Air Force has emphasized five main objectives and associated forces to provide a planning framework to support the U.S. National Defense Strategy.¹⁷

1. Sustain Deterrence

Deterrence is, has been, and will remain the foundation of U.S. national strategy. Only nuclear attack threatens the very survival of the United States, making sustained nuclear deterrence the first priority. The Air Force provides two legs of the nuclear triad forces- land based ICBMs and long range bombers. Although the threat of an all-out nuclear exchange is minimal, the price to be paid for complacency could be catastrophic.

2. Provide Versatile Combat Force

The Air Force helps sustain deterrence across the potential spectrum of conflict by providing versatile combat forces for power projection and combat operations. USAF assets- long range bombers, tactical fighters, airlifters, tankers, air/space-based surveillance and communications systems- offer highly flexible

¹⁶United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, March 1992.

¹⁷United States Air Force, op. cit. in n. 15, p. 5-15.

methods for meeting U.S. national security requirements. The ability to effectively concentrate force over great distances- to change the military and/or political conditions necessitating the response- is a key attribute of the Air Force.

One convincing rationale for maintaining an Air Force presence in Europe is forward deployment for crisis response. The U.S., either unilaterally or in concert with European allies, must be able to project military power quickly to regional crises or conflicts. This capability is essential, politically and militarily, to enhance regional stability and show U.S. commitment while promoting American influence and access.

3. Supply Rapid Global Mobility

The contribution of U.S. airlift and tanker forces takes on increased importance when balancing the necessity for global reach with reductions in overseas bases. Strategic mobility is essential for a credible deterrent posture. Without the ability to project combat forces, there is no viable conventional deterrent. Airlift provides rapid mobility which is critical for effective power projection. Tankers enhance the range, ordnance loads, and flexibility of aircraft from the Air Force, the Navy, the Marines, and allied nations.

The ability of U.S. airlift and tanker forces to operate using bases in Europe will remain essential in fulfilling U.S. national security objectives. Increased instability and uncertainty will heighten the importance of a U.S. capability to respond to any crisis quickly.

4. Control the High Ground

USAF surveillance, communication, and navigation systems provide U.S. political and military leaders with global knowledge and situational awareness that is essential in today's international arena. During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, USAF communication, navigation, and surveillance systems increased the combat capabilities of all the services. AWACS today and JSTARS in the future are rapidly deployable systems that can function as the "eyes and ears" of the joint force commander.

The ability to use European bases as staging areas for U.S. AWACS, JSTARS (if deployed), and related airborne command posts and airborne relays is essential in meeting future security requirements. These elements act as deterrent forces as well as providing key war-fighting capabilities.

5. Build U.S. Influence

The Air Force plays an important role in building U.S. influence overseas by strengthening security partners and relationships. Air Force aircraft are potent policy tools that build U.S. influence and presence through airlift activities with overt geo-political overtones that the Air Force calls air movements of national influence. Deployments of AWACS aircraft signal presence, a show of force, and a symbol of U.S. concern, all without the negative connotations that can be raised by combat forces.¹⁸

¹⁸Department of the Air Force, The United States Air Force and U.S. National Security: A Historical Perspective 1947-1990, Washington D.C. 1991, p. 5.

Humanitarian operations also contribute to building U.S. influence. Military humanitarianism provides a bridge between Cold War military capabilities and the vision of a new world order.¹⁹ The Air Force's ability to deliver rescue personnel, foodstuffs, medicine, shelter, and other critical emergency supplies quickly to any location worldwide is unmatched. Measuring the impact of these operations is difficult to quantify, but there is no question that these humanitarian operations have helped strengthen bonds of friendship with numerous nations overseas.²⁰

The capability to enhance security conditions, strengthen security partners, and project U.S. influence using Air Force assets is an important aspect of U.S. security commitments for Europe and the surrounding region. European bases will continue to play key roles in conducting security assistance, air movement, and humanitarian missions throughout the region and for adjacent regions.

Global Reach-Global Power depicts the U.S. Air Force's role in pursuing defined national security objectives. It provides a framework within which all USAF assets will be utilized. Arguments for a continued USAF presence in Europe have already been discussed. However, what will the actual composition of these forces be? Within the new National Military Strategy the concept of the

¹⁹Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism", Survival, September/October 1991, p. 464.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 464.

Base Force is defined. This Base Force concept provides the foundation in which the services will structure future force requirements and this will certainly influence the U.S. Air Force in Europe.

D. THE BASE FORCE

As U.S. armed forces restructure in recognition of the changing security environment, it is essential to preserve a core capability to deter aggression, provide meaningful presence abroad, respond to regional crises, and maintain an ability to rebuild a global war-fighting capability if necessary. These forces must be prepared to meet the demands throughout a spectrum of environments from peace to multiple regional crises. In each case, the force must be flexible enough to adapt to the changing circumstances while maintaining those essential capabilities necessary to deter and defend. During peacetime, forces not dedicated to strategic deterrence will primarily be responsible for forward presence and preparing for crisis response. The forces dedicated for forward response are largely driven by interests in various regions of the world, as well as commitments to allies and formal collective security agreements. Those forces earmarked for crisis response will train for regional contingencies and often serve in forward presence roles as they participate in various deployments and joint and combined exercises in various regions of the world. This carefully managed blend of highly ready forces provides the nation with global strength to deter potential aggressors, influence world events, and encourage continued democratic

and economic progress and human rights in an atmosphere of enhanced stability.²¹

The Base Force maximizes the capabilities of each component and integrates active and reserve forces from each of the services into an effective military force capable of responding across the spectrum of conflict. Forward presence forces are primarily drawn from the active component of all the services. During a regional crisis reserve forces can be utilized as necessary. If a crisis becomes larger or more protracted, force composition will increasingly rely on reserve components.²²

The Base Force is subdivided into four conceptual force packages and four supporting capabilities. This framework is a force sizing tool and not a blueprint for a new command structure. The four conceptual force packages are; Strategic forces, Atlantic forces, Pacific forces, and Contingency forces. The four supporting capabilities include; Space, Transportation, Reconstitution, and Research and Development.²³

1. Strategic Forces

To deter the threat of nuclear aggression, the U.S. must continue to maintain a credible triad of modern, flexible, and survivable systems. For a more

²¹The White House, op. cit. in n. 6, p. 19.

²²The Pentagon, op. cit. in n. 4, p. 23.

²³Ibid., pp. 20-25.

detailed discussion see nuclear issues section. SDI efforts have been refocused to develop a viable global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) capability that could be used to defend U.S. deployed forces, friends and allies, and the United States.

2. Atlantic Forces

The United States will maintain forward stationed and rotational forces, a capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the United States, and the means to support deployment of larger forces when needed. Forward Presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and postured to preserve an active and influential role in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework for the region. Air Force fighter wings possess the flexibility to meet a wide range of theater commander tasks. They can gain air superiority, suppress enemy defenses, and strike tactical and strategic targets with precision. In addition, the Air Force in Europe provides the core basing, command and control, and mobility infrastructure to facilitate the receipt of reinforcing units. Three to four wings are required to meet these forward presence demands.²⁴ In the event of a regional crisis the U.S. must have the capability to reinforce forward presence forces while still maintaining commitments in other regions. Two active duty Air Force fighter wings based in

²⁴Ibid., p. 21.

the U.S. are also kept available for immediate deployment to the region.²⁵ By combining available forces already stationed in the region with other U.S. based forces, both active and reserve, there are eleven Air Force fighter wings planned to be available for conflict contingencies within the Atlantic region. In addition to these forces dedicated to the Atlantic region, there will be assets available from the Pacific region if necessary.²⁶

3. Contingency Forces

The U.S strategy for the "come-as-you-are" arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises, requires fully-trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable, and initially self-sufficient. Therefore, such forces must be created primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each service and the special operations forces. Reserve forces will perform much of the airlift and other vital missions from the onset of any contingency operation. Contingency forces include forward stationed and deployed forces from all branches as well as special operations forces, and U.S. based units. U.S. based Contingency forces include an airborne corps headquarters, 5 Army divisions, 7 Air Force fighter wings, and 1 Marine Expeditionary Force.²⁷ Air Force Wings provide a full

²⁵Ibid., p. 22.

²⁶Ibid., p. 22.

²⁷Ibid., p. 23.

spectrum of air combat capability to include air superiority, strategic attack, mobility, air refueling, and support of surface forces. Selected forces are organized into composite wings- Air Force multi-aircraft organizations specifically tailored for rapid power projection abroad and in support of air-land operations. Contingency forces complement forward deployed assets in that they can provide an initial response capability where there are no forward deployed forces. Selected Contingency forces could deploy to Europe in the event of a regional crisis. If deployed they would serve as reinforcements to combat forces already performing forward presence roles in Europe or elsewhere as required.

4. Transportation

Regional focus, flexible/adaptive planning, and reduced forward presence have all combined to increase U.S. reliance on strategic mobility. The United States depends on strategic mobility to rapidly deploy and sustain decisive combat power in any region where U.S. national interests are threatened. This capability is essential in the Atlantic region to secure national and allied security objectives. For a more detailed discussion of strategic agility, see chapter 4.

This new Base Force concept is designed to fulfill U.S. national security requirements in the new, and changing, international arena. The same environment that generated change in U.S. national military force structure and planning is also forcing changes within the NATO military structure. When discussing a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe, it is essential to discuss factors relating to NATO.

E. NATO STRATEGY AND FORCE COMPOSITION

U.S. Air Force equipment and personnel stationed in Europe are an integral part of the NATO military requirement. Important issues that should be addressed when discussing a U.S. Air Force presence within NATO include: defining the basic rationale for such a presence, examining the current military strategy being developed by NATO, looking at NATO Air Doctrine, describing Air Force assets that will probably fall within NATO, and discussing how possible future security organizations, other than NATO, may affect U.S. military involvement in the region. In any discussion of a U.S. military presence in Europe, it is useful to examine current rationale supporting such a commitment.

1. Rationale behind a U.S. Military Presence in Europe

The security of the United States remains linked to that of Europe.

The United States has a clear national interest in helping to preserve democratic values, stable governments and economies, and peaceful relations among nations of Europe. Twice before in this century, the outbreak of war in Europe led to U.S. involvement in major military conflicts, with great losses of American lives and fortune.²⁸

Within this broad context there are significant reasons for U.S. troops to be stationed in Europe.

²⁸The John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe, Washington D.C. 1991, p. 4.

- U.S. prosperity is closely related to European prosperity.
- The presence of U.S. military forces promotes stability within the region.
- U.S. forces contribute in defending against military threats stemming from an unstable and changing former Soviet Union.
- U.S. forces in Europe help promote the continuation of the favorable trends in the former Soviet Union and surrounding region.
- Continued democratization of Eastern Europe remains an American ideological as well as strategic interest.
- U.S. troops give the United States a seat at the European table and a voice in many economic and political matters as well as security affairs.
- U.S. troops in Europe act as a forward presence to respond, either unilaterally or in concert with other forces, to any military objective defined by the U.S., her allies, and friends.²⁹

Europe remains a vital element in U.S. National defense, both in and of itself and because security and stability in Europe contribute to the security of the United States. Our forward presence in Europe not only serves to protect America and American interest; it provides us a relationship with Europe that fosters solidarity - the Atlantic link - and gives Americans the opportunity to be of influence as important decisions are made on collective defense. We need to remain involved and influential in European affairs with a competent, credible, operationally significant force in Europe ready for a multifaceted mission.³⁰

Having forces stationed in Europe is a critical prerequisite for successful crisis response, which may very well be the most significant application

²⁹Ibid., p. 1.

³⁰General John R. Galvin, Commander in Chief U.S. European Command, "Still Vital to U.S. Security", Defense, July/August 1991, p. 10.

of U.S. military forces in the foreseeable future. However, given the current European security environment, coupled with American economic factors, U.S. force levels in Europe will certainly be reduced. A complete withdrawal from Europe would not only be de-stabilizing for the region, it would adversely affect U.S. national interests.

Withdrawing U.S. Forces from Europe would greatly diminish U.S. influence on the Continent both politically and economically. Therefore, a major U.S. policy goal is retaining NATO, and for this purpose, Washington is prepared for major changes in NATO's missions.³¹

Knowing that a U.S. military presence in Europe supports both U.S. and European security objectives, it will be prudent to examine current NATO strategy.

2. NATO Strategy

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO strategy of "Flexible Response" became out-dated. NATO needed a new military direction and in November 1991, the sixteen allied nations collected in Rome to sign a new NATO strategy statement. The Rome document, titled "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," marks a fundamental break with "Flexible Response."³² NATO's

³¹Werner J. Feld, "Toward a European Security and Defense Policy," Military Review, July 1991, p. 25.

³²Larry Grossman, "NATO's New Strategy," Air Force Magazine, March 1991, p. 26.

mission is no longer to thwart an attack from the East. Instead, NATO's new mission is to manage small crises on NATO's periphery. General John R. Galvin, who served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), explained:

We have shifted from a strategy of immediate defense against a very large threat to a strategy of crisis response.

He continued by explaining that the Strategy is for the West to use its power:

to bring down the level of confrontation in a crisis and to maintain the peace.³³

This new concept places emphasis on tailoring the response to a crisis in order to deter but not provoke any adversary. These forces must be capable of escalating the size and readiness of their combat power to the appropriate level needed to defuse the crisis, and then quickly de-escalating to avoid provocation.³⁴ The new strategy calls for Allied nations to organize highly mobile, combined-arms, rapid reaction units

³³Ibid., p. 28.

³⁴Lieutenant General Richard Evraire, "Designing NATO's New Military Force Structure," Canadian Defence Quarterly, February 1992, p. 12.

able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable.³⁵

Supporting this relatively small collection of ready military forces would be a larger contingent of in-place forces, which could be raised to higher readiness, and an enhanced Alliance ability to mobilize its reinforcements, reservists, and replacement equipment in Europe and North America. To support this basic defense strategy NATO is reorganizing forces into three main categories of military power: Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation forces.

The Reaction Forces would consist of multinational forces allocated to the major NATO commanders for early military response to a crisis. These fast moving forces would be divided into two groups - the Immediate Reaction Forces(IRF), and the Rapid Reaction Forces(RRF). The Immediate Reaction Forces would consist of approximately 5,000 troops and would be able to deploy within 72 hours to any region of Allied Command Europe. General Galvin explained:

The Immediate Reaction Force is not a strike force. It's not an expeditionary force. This is a reinforcing force, to be used within NATO.³⁶

³⁵Grossman, op. cit. in n. 32, p. 28.

³⁶Ibid., p. 29

USAF officers report that the IRF air component would likely consist of one or two squadrons of F-15 air-superiority fighters. The RRF would be built around a capable multinational corps and trained and equipped to provide significant combat power at a time and place chosen by NATO leadership.³⁷ These forces would consist of 50,000 to 70,000 forces and would be capable of deploying within one week. The RRF will have a major air component that would be commanded by a Luftwaffe officer. In addition to a large complement of modern air-superiority fighters, the air component will have a multinational force of hard-hitting ground-attack planes: F-16 multi-role fighters, Tornado GR Mk. 1 attack aircraft, and GR Mk. 5/7 Harrier jump jets, among other air-ground systems.³⁸

The Main Defense Forces will be regionally oriented, national and multinational, forces that maintain a lower level of readiness and are composed of active and reserve forces. Selected "ready maneuver forces" will be maintained in high states of readiness and availability for use in support of crisis management or for early operations in preparation for defense.³⁹

The Augmentation Forces will consist primarily of North American forces but will also include European forces. These active and reserve units will require longer warning times and will be heavily dependent upon sea and air

³⁷General John R. Galvin, *op. cit.* in n. 30, p. 4.

³⁸Grossman, *op. cit.* in n. 32, p. 29.

³⁹Galvin, *op. cit.* in n. 30, p. 5.

strategic lift. They provide appropriate operational reserves that may not be tied to specific regions. Some of these forces will also consist of "ready maneuver forces" available in support of crisis management.⁴⁰

Strengthening these three categories will be the focus of NATO force planning. In addition to these changes in force planning, the Rome strategy document offers radically different concepts of operations. One significant change is that Alliance leaders will no longer assign to specific nations the responsibilities for defending specific sectors of a front. As a result, Western forces will no longer maintain a fixed, in-place, linear defensive stance along cold war boundaries, where for years NATO ground and air forces stood guard. These changes in NATO's overall strategy have significantly affected the way in which NATO air forces operate and train. While examining a U.S. Air Force presence in Europe, it will be useful to discuss some key points regarding NATO's Tactical Air Doctrine.

3. NATO Tactical Air Doctrine

Since 1970 there have been four primary sources for NATO's tactical air doctrine: (1) the national interests of the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany (currently Germany); (2) the institutional interests of the United States Air Force, the Royal Air Force, and the Luftwaffe; (3) the operational interests of the several regional or sub-regional commands such as

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 5.

Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), the 2nd allied Tactical Air Force, and the Northern Army Group; and (4) the overriding interests of the planning staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

From these sources NATO's doctrine for planning and conducting combined air operations has been developed by national delegations joined by representatives from NATO's military commands. This occurs during the annual meeting of the Interservice Tactical Air Working Party (TAWP) at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The goal of the Tactical Air Working Party in developing combined air doctrine is to improve combat effectiveness by enhancing the inter-operability of NATO's constituent forces.⁴¹

The four most debated issues have been: (1) the command and control of allied air power, (2) the organization and conduct of air missions in support of ground forces, (3) introduction of the Follow-on Force Attack concept, and (4) means of Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).⁴² Throughout the 1970's the issue of command and control was the center issue of NATO's internal debates on the effective use of tactical air power. From the late 1970's to the present, methods for the conduct of air-support missions and air-ground coordination have drawn the most attention. In 1979 the concept of Follow-on Force Attack (FOFA) for interdicting Soviet second echelon forces was first discussed. It

⁴¹David J. Stein, The Development of Tactical Air Doctrine, R-3385-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, December 1987), p. 8.

⁴²Ibid., p. 5.

generated new questions about the command and control of air-support operations. Since 1978 the TAWP has repeatedly considered, and rejected, U.S. proposals to make the suppression of enemy air defenses a major counter-air mission. The debate over command and control of allied air power stems from the differing philosophies between Britain's Royal Air Force in Germany (RAFG) and the U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE).

Britain's Royal Air Force in Germany is the "lead element" in the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Forces (2ATAF) and it emphasize coordinated decisions between air and ground elements at echelons of command that are close to the battle area. It emphasize command and control of the forces at the "lowest possible levels". This philosophy encourages the local coordination of air and ground forces whenever possible. British argue that this type of effective combat aircraft management, along with methods of "procedural control,"⁴³ reduce the need for costly infrastructures.

In contrast, the USAF-led 4th allied tactical air forces (4ATAF) emphasize making decisions at the "highest practicable level". This philosophy favors "positive control" methods that permit using air power in a flexible but centrally managed fashion. Both of these arrangements and control facilities each have their own characteristics of simplicity, flexibility, restrictiveness, vulnerability, and costs.

⁴³Ibid., p. vi.

Great Britain and the United States both ratified *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine* and supported its statements of principle regarding the "centralized command" of air forces at the highest practicable level and the "decentralized execution" of air operations. However, this agreement was made possible largely by careful wording of key sections. This wording allowed each constituent air force and regional command to apply the "common principles" in its own fashion. Therefore, the 2ATAF could continue to follow the Royal Air Force tradition of squadron autonomy in making command decisions without reference to higher echelons and could operate out of "pockets of control" throughout the region. Meanwhile, the U.S. and German air force elements in 4ATAF could continue to conduct their air operations through highly articulated, centralized control systems where decisions regarding the flexible management of air power were made at the "highest practicable level."⁴⁴ The second major topic of debate was the organization and conduct of air power operations in support of ground forces.

Key issues involved in NATO's doctrine on Offensive Air Support operations were the tasking of air assets for conducting support missions and the influence of ground force commanders on target nomination and development. Once again, the differences between U.S. and U.K. command and control philosophies played a critical role in Offensive Air Support doctrine development.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. vi.

The USAF and its elements in the Central Region had a theater-wide concept of offensive airpower employment. They viewed tactical air assets as a flexible means of supporting ground forces, but one that required a highly centralized command point for effectiveness.⁴⁵ Although the RAF and its elements in the Central Region agree with the USAF regarding the flexibility of airpower, they do not favor a highly centralized command structure. The RAF prefers a more direct and immediate means of coordination and implementation. It maintains that *national* chains of command provide a better instrument for coordination than does NATO direction.

In 1978 the British proposed a revision to NATO Offensive Air Support doctrine that re-defined the two attack operations of Close Air Support and Air Interdiction. The British introduced Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) that they believed would ensure responsive and direct applications of air support. The United States was able to provide a reworked version of the original British proposal on Battlefield Air Interdiction that accommodated British desires in retaining some form of offensive air support tied to land force requirements while preserving USAF interests in both the theater-wide aspect of airpower management and the autonomy of airpower in executing support operations. The new doctrine defined the two attack operations within Offensive Air Support as:

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 26.

1) Close Air Support (CAS). Close Air Support is air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. This means that the aircraft is under positive or procedural control.

2) Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). Battlefield Air Interdiction is air action against hostile surface targets which are in a position to directly affect friendly forces and which requires joint planning and coordination. While BAI missions require coordination in joint planning, they may not require continuous coordination during the execution stage.⁴⁶

In 1983 the concept of Follow-on Force Attack (FOFA) emerged from an array of operational concerns and controversial proposals for renewing NATO's conventional capabilities. FOFA was introduced due to new assessments of Soviet conventional capabilities, heightened concern regarding the pressures for early NATO nuclear use because of the weaknesses of its conventional defense, and the general need to maintain alliance cohesion on the old strategy of Flexible Response.

FOFA, as envisioned when originally introduced, entailed deep attacks beyond the range of organic assets to be conducted in conjunction with engaging enemy forces in the close-in battle.⁴⁷ This combat tactic would exploit the Soviet combat organization and its mode of tactical advance. It would also disrupt time critical reinforcement of their engaged forces and reduce their overall capabilities.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 33.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 37.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, old static line defense concepts were no longer applicable and a greater emphasis has been placed on maneuver. FOFA has been crafted into a more flexible concept called "Joint Precision Interdiction (JPI)."

The basic concept behind JPI is similar to that of FOFA, "to keep forces out of the battle before they can form into battle lines."⁴⁸ In fact, as far as General Oaks is concerned this could be called either FOFA or JPI because, in his view, "they're kind of blood brothers."⁴⁹ What makes JPI "joint" is that the Army now has the ATACMS (Army's Tactical Missile System), an interdiction weapon, so there has to be an integrated air and land operation, just as the air defense fighter and antiaircraft missile operations must be coordinated.⁵⁰ Another doctrinal issue involves repeated American proposals to promote the function of suppressing enemy air defenses (SEAD) from its original NATO status as a support activity to that of a major mission.

Most of NATO's member air forces and their ground and naval counterparts view SEAD as a support activity. Although, the USAF eventually accepted the NATO view, their own doctrine made SEAD a mission equal in importance to offensive and defensive counter-air missions within the context of

⁴⁸General Oaks from: Charles W. Corddry, "NATO's New Model," Air Force Magazine, June 1992, p. 75.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 75.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 75.

a counter-air campaign. Important reasons that explain varying views on the doctrinal importance and status of SEAD are the differences between U.S. and allied capabilities for conducting such operations and their respective fiscal abilities to modernize their inventories. Another important factor that permeates these differing viewpoints is that only the United States developed the electronic sophistication and the advanced munitions needed for the conduct of SEAD campaigns.

Historically the allies were reluctant to accept U.S. proposals regarding the status of SEAD because they feared that statements of operational need and force requirements would follow on the heels of doctrinal change, obliging them to acquire additional financial burdens. They would more than likely have to give up other capabilities to acquire SEAD assets. Since U.S. SEAD assets were made available theater-wide, there was little incentive to change the status of SEAD from a support activity. The debate regarding the status of SEAD is ongoing, and for the present it will remain a supporting activity in NATO air doctrine.

Current reorganizations and strategy updating certainly will affect the eventual outcome of many of these doctrinal issues. Reorganization issues will be discussed in greater detail in chapter III. With a basic understanding of some of the issues affecting NATO's Tactical Air Doctrine, it will be useful to describe the U.S. Air Force contribution to NATO.

4. U.S. Air Force Assets Within NATO

USAFE is slimming down, dropping to about 3.5 fighter wing equivalents from the long maintained 8.5 wing equivalents, closing out more than half of its main operating bases in Europe, and eliminating about 25,000 personnel spaces to get down to 44,200.⁵¹ The command is transferring more than 400 of its approximately 700 fighter aircraft. These are the USAFE statistics for the projected U.S. force level of 150,000 troops to which General John R. Galvin, NATO and U.S. European commander, wanted to reduce by 1995. Most of the USAFE drawdown is scheduled to be complete by the end of 1993. The U.S. Air Force in Europe contribution to these forces will consist of the following,⁵²

- 86th Fighter Wing, Ramstein AB Germany
Two F-16 multi-role fighter squadrons
- 36th Fighter Wing, Bitburg AB Germany
Two F-15 air-superiority fighter squadrons
- 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB Germany
One F-16 multi-role Fighter Squadron
One A-10 close air support aircraft squadron
One OA-10 forward air controller squadron
- 48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath UK
Two F-15E dual-mission strike fighter squadrons
- 32nd Fighter Group, Soesterberg AB, the Netherlands
One F-15 air-superiority fighter squadron

⁵¹Ibid., p. 72.

⁵²Ibid., p. 75.

- Three squadrons of special operations aircraft based at RAF Alconbury, UK
- 435th Airlift Wing, C-130s, Rhein-Main AB, Germany
- 100th Air Refueling Wing, KC-135s, RAF Mildenhall, UK

Within this structure General Oaks says he will maintain the capability for reconnaissance- which may be of first importance in rapid reaction operations. In addition to understanding the basic U.S. Air Forces dedicated to NATO, it will be important to examine issues regarding future European security organizations.

5. Issues Regarding Future European Security Organizations

NATO was formed to provide security for Western Europe against a Soviet invasion. That threat no longer exists and NATO's role in Europe is changing. There is ongoing debate, in both Europe and North America, questioning whether NATO should remain the European security vehicle for the future or if another organization should replace it. Historically NATO has been an extremely successful organization, and it will probably remain the bedrock of European security for some time. However, NATO does not currently fulfill all the requirements necessary to ensure a lasting peace in the region.

Two important issues that NATO may not be able to adequately address in the future include out-of-area concerns and membership limitations. Within the new security environment threats outside of the NATO area will constitute a serious European dilemma. The environment in which NATO currently functions does not freely allow its military forces to be used outside of

NATO territory. An effective European security organization of the future cannot be hindered by such a limitation. In addition to the out-of-area concerns, there remains a membership limitation problem. In order for a future security organization to be effective in maintaining regional security, it must include the governments of the former Warsaw Pact as well as European and North American governments. While many of the governments from the former Warsaw Pact have requested membership in NATO, their inclusion into the organization is not likely in the near future. Other organizations that may provide an alternative option for a European security vehicle include the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community (EC), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A meaningful discussion of these organizations that attempts to predict which institution, if any, will provide the best vehicle for European security is beyond the scope of this paper. It may be likely that just one of these organizations alone cannot fulfill all of the requirements necessary for a viable European security organization. This notion is emphasized in NATO's 1991 Rome Declaration:

The challenges...cannot be...addressed by one institution alone...Consequently, we are working towards a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other.⁵³

⁵³Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, North Atlantic Council, 8 November 1991.

Regardless of the exact form that any future European security organization may take, it will be in the United States' best interests to actively participate within its framework.

It is difficult to predict with any certainty a specific U.S. role within a future European security establishment. Current international relations within the region are, not surprisingly, fluid and uncertain. However, it is important for the U.S. to look ahead and begin to evaluate possible policy directions.

...in those instances in which the interests of the United States and some or all of its NATO allies coincide, the United States should encourage the active cooperation of its allies. The particular legal or institutional framework within which coordination occurs is of little importance...The United States should remain flexible enough to welcome other arrangements, such as European coordination through the WEU or the EC. Even in those cases in which U.S. and allied interests differ, the United States should seek the requisite political understandings to enable U.S. forces to use NATO facilities in support of out-of-area operations.⁵⁴

Whatever form any future European security organization takes, it will be important for the U.S. to remain flexible within that framework. U.S. military forces located in Europe must be able to continue fulfilling regional security guarantees as well as serving to further U.S. national interests when necessary.

For now, NATO will remain the European military organization in which allied security issues are addressed. U.S. military forces will continue to

⁵⁴John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, op. cit. in n. 28, p. 188.

be dedicated to NATO and will train and fight within the framework established by NATO officials. As long as these forces continue to function within the NATO framework, it will be essential to continue exploring important issues that affect NATO. With regard to the USAF presence in Europe, it will be particularly important to continue to examine NATO strategy issues, including NATO's tactical air doctrine. One very important issue that requires detailed examination is the continued nuclear presence in Europe.

F. THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE

The creation of nuclear weapons changed the face of warfare like no other previous technological innovation. The stakes were raised to a global scale, in that an all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union could have devastated the entire planet. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, such an all-out exchange has become an extremely remote prospect. However, nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, and this reality must be taken into account when forming future policy. Outdated nuclear strategies need to be revisited, as well as the force structures utilized to support them. Dramatic changes continue in Europe, and nuclear requirements are being molded to adapt to the new environment.

Throughout the cold war the protection of European allies against a massive Soviet invasion was the primary reason for stationing U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil. Since a Soviet invasion is no longer a credible threat, U.S. and

NATO nuclear strategies have been redefined to meet new security requirements. The U.S. Air Force has been, and will continue to be, a critical element for U.S. and NATO nuclear planning requirements in Europe.

In order to gain a better understanding of the U.S. Air Force nuclear presence in Europe, it will be useful to discuss present and possible future issues that may affect nuclear strategy and force composition within the region. An overview of the current political and military landscape that focuses on nuclear related issues will provide a framework in which a clearer understanding of nuclear strategy and force composition can be attained.

1. Nuclear issues within the Current Political and Military Environment

U.S. security policy since World War II was largely dominated by the Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In late 1989 the Berlin Wall fell; it was perhaps the premier symbol of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has been met with high optimism tempered with concern over regional stability. The many reasons for optimism include the peaceful reunification of Germany, the revolution in Eastern Europe, and the apparent reduction in the possibility of a global nuclear war. However, the Cold War relationship was relatively predictable and provided stability to many areas of the globe. Now that this situation has drastically changed, the international arena is marked with fragmentation and nationalistic uprisings in many parts of the world. Events in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East attest to the regional instabilities the

end of the Cold War has fostered. While the end of the Cold War has signalled a dramatic improvement in the prospects for peace, security and economic progress, it is still a world where crisis, war, and challenges to U.S. vital interests will continue to be very real possibilities. Within this new international order fostering European security will continue to be a U.S. vital interest.

The United States continues to have a fundamental interest in preserving European peace and security. Twice before in this century, the outbreak of war in Europe led to U.S. involvement in major military conflicts, with great losses of American lives and fortune. For now, the likelihood of a major European war seems very remote. However, continued U.S. involvement in the European security environment serves as a hedge against an uncertain future, and it provides a political commitment to reassure alliance security arrangements. Therefore, it is essential that the U.S. remain militarily involved in Europe. Given the dramatic changes in the recent years, it is essential that new military strategies be formulated to fulfill current security requirements. Of particular interest is what role nuclear weapons will have in the new political and military landscape.

One interesting characteristic of the new international environment is the decline in the perceived utility of nuclear weapons. Because U.S. nuclear weapons were apparently not a factor in deterring the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and were not used during Desert Storm, some analysts have concluded that nuclear weapons do not have a role in the types of wars most likely to be faced by the

U.S. in the future. In addition, advanced conventional munitions (ACMs) proved accurate and powerful enough to destroy hardened Iraqi targets. ACM performance during the war fueled the argument that ACMs may be able to substitute for nuclear weapons in some "strategic" targeting scenarios.⁵⁵ However, even if ACMs can be utilized for strategic targeting, nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented; and this fact must be reflected in current policy planning.

There are several reasons why the United States must continue to rely on nuclear weapons for national security. First, deterrence of nuclear attack will remain, for the foreseeable future, a critical element of U.S. national security. U.S. nuclear weapons will be needed to deter nuclear attacks on the U.S. homeland and to guarantee the survival of the U.S. as an independent nation with its peoples, values, and institutions intact. Also the U.S. should retain a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to prevent coercion, blackmail, or aggression by future nuclear states. In addition, a secure nuclear reserve force may be needed to provide escalation leverage during acute political crises. Second, nuclear weapons are needed to underscore U.S. international political and military commitments. The extension of U.S. security guarantees to its allies may eliminate the need for those allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons, thus promoting nuclear non-proliferation. Third, nuclear weapons are required to provide insurance against a breakdown in arms control commitments and/or the

⁵⁵U.S. Air Force White Paper, "Nuclear Sufficiency in the 1990s and Beyond: The New Strategic Equation," AF/XOXXI, 10 April 1992, p. 4.

international non-proliferation regime. It is not clear that the Commonwealth of Independent States will coalesce sufficiently to effectively implement either the START agreement or the Gorbachev/Yeltsin unilateral disarmament initiatives. The potential re-emergence of an authoritarian regime raises the possibility of a breach of international arms control commitments.⁵⁶ Given the necessity for nuclear weapons within the context of the new international arena, it will be useful to examine the current nuclear strategies of the U.S. and NATO.

2. Current U.S. and NATO Nuclear Strategy

The old nuclear strategies the United States and NATO adhered to during the Cold War are no longer applicable in the new political and military landscape. Strategies that focused on the old monolithic Soviet threat no longer apply. The threats faced today are difficult to define or predict, and this makes detailed strategy planning difficult at best. This fact is reflected in current U.S. strategic thinking which seems to be very general in nature. In light of this, it is sensible to discuss current U.S. strategic thinking in its most general form. The main underlying theme defining current strategic thinking pivots around the concept of deterrence.

Deterrence is prevention of an action by the fear of its consequences—a state of affairs brought about when rational individuals in positions of authority are persuaded there is a credible prospect of devastating

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 11-14.

retaliation far outweighing anything they conceivably could gain if they initiate a specific action.⁵⁷

Without a specific threat it is difficult to formulate a more precise nuclear strategy. A broad strategy of deterrence has a built-in degree of flexibility that may be necessary in dealing with "unknown" future crises. Another aspect of the new landscape is an increased likelihood of nuclear proliferation.

An increased probability of nuclear proliferation is one reason why the United States is developing a missile defense system. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) introduced by President Reagan has been redirected to pursue a system providing Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). As intended by the Bush administration, GPALS was planned to counter threats posed by global ballistic missile proliferation and from an accidental or unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil. In addition to protecting the United States, GPALS could defend U.S. forward-deployed forces and U.S. allies. While GPALS could help protect NATO allies, the U.S. nuclear involvement in the NATO nuclear strategy is a more important factor.

Given the sweeping changes that have recently occurred in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, NATO allies were required to rethink old strategic policy. In November 1991 the old NATO strategy of flexible response

⁵⁷Thomas C. Reed and Michael O. Wheeler, op. cit. in n. 3, p. 17.

was replaced by a new strategic concept. There were difficulties in devising a sound strategy without a clearly defined threat. However, NATO officials claim they do not need an enemy; rather NATO can now concentrate on what to protect and how to protect it.⁵⁸

The new strategy will continue to be a 'war prevention' strategy, but now with more emphasis on protecting peace and managing crises: stability and its underpinnings are at the center of this. Thus, military strategy and the roles and tasks of the armed forces will not relate exclusively to war-fighting capability, but will include much broader functions. Greater emphasis will be placed on the management of crises, with appropriate political and military measures. Military roles in the future will include intensified military contacts with members of the forces in Central and Eastern European nations, increased levels of cooperation and greater transparency in strategy, force structure, and defense planning.⁵⁹

NATO's multinational forces for crisis response and defense will be highly mobile and flexible, and will be able to react to a range of potential risks with both regional and transatlantic reinforcement as necessary. Much longer warning time allows for a smaller "forward presence" and a greater reliance on the ability to build up forces as and when they are needed. With the greater likelihood of defusing a crisis and mounting a successful conventional campaign,

⁵⁸Lieutenant-General J.K. Dangerfield, "A New Military Strategy for NATO," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 4, February 1992, p. 19.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 19.

the need for the alliance to contemplate using nuclear weapons is very remote. However, as mentioned previously, nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented and NATO has modernized its nuclear strategy to meet current security requirements.

NATO's nuclear strategy, laid down in the new strategic concept, is endorsed by all members, including France.

The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression.⁶⁰

In addition, nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The NATO nuclear forces will have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. These forces will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.⁶¹ Within the framework of NATO's new Strategic Concept the United States Air Force will play an important role in fulfilling the new strategy's nuclear policy.

⁶⁰The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991. paragraph 55.

⁶¹Ibid., paragraph 56.

3. U.S. Air Force: Current Nuclear Role in Europe

In the new security arena the U.S. Air Force will continue its nuclear responsibilities supporting two legs of the strategic triad. The Air Force will be responsible for the ICBM leg and the bomber leg of the triad. However, given the dramatic recent changes there will be less emphasis on the ICBM component of the Triad. Both the ICBM forces and the bomber forces have been greatly affected by ongoing arms control agreements between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the successor governments of the Soviet Union. A more detailed discussion of ramifications from these agreements will be discussed later in the paper.

NATO will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with U.S. strategic nuclear forces reinforcing the trans-Atlantic relationship. These forces will consist solely of dual-capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range missiles and they will be eliminated.⁶² The U.S. Air Force contribution towards these NATO nuclear forces will consist of dual-capable F-111, F-15E, and F-16 fighter/attack aircraft stationed in Britain and Germany.⁶³ If needed these aircraft could operate from Britain, Germany,

⁶²Ibid., paragraph 56.

⁶³Air Force Association, "U.S. Air Forces in Europe," Air Force Magazine, May 1992. p. 92.

Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, and Greece.⁶⁴ In October 1991 U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and other NATO defense chiefs cut the nuclear arsenal in Europe by 80 percent. These cuts reportedly stipulated that only 700 nuclear gravity bombs will be available for these dual-capable fighter/attack aircraft.⁶⁵

In summary, the U.S. Air Force ICBM forces, located in the U.S., and strategic bomber forces will continue to provide the European Allies security protection in the form of extended deterrence guarantees. In addition, dual-capable fighter/attack aircraft located in Europe will provide the flexibility needed to fulfill security requirements in the new unstable environment. These cumulative forces not only provide European security assistance but also provide a very important political and military link that enhances European and North American relations and promotes regional stability.

4. Future Nuclear Issues

Dramatic changes in the former USSR have profoundly altered the threats against which the United States and the West, generally, must make their security arrangements, and, particularly, their plans for nuclear forces. Even in

⁶⁴David S. Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures and the Future of European Security," in Beatrice Heuser, ed., Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European Security (London: Brassey's for the center for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, 1991).

⁶⁵Alan Riding, "NATO Will Cut Atom Weapons for Aircraft Use," New York Times, 18 October 1991, p. A1.

a dramatically transformed world there will continue to be international tensions, crises, and wars in which U.S. forces may be engaged. Given the current international environment, the two primary concerns regarding future nuclear threats to the U.S. and the European Allies include policies that could grow out of a counterrevolution in internal Russian politics and the threat from new nuclear states outside of Europe.

The difficulties of the domestic situation within the successor states of the Soviet Union could lead to a dramatic reversal of the process of internal reform. For a long time there will be a danger of a Russian relapse that could bring to power a nationalistic, militarized, and possibly adventurist regime in Moscow. Despite the economic, social, and political problems of Russia, such a regime would have access to a vast military, including a large nuclear arsenal.

Military, including nuclear, threats would surely be part of such a regime's bullying diplomacy.⁶⁶

The other significant nuclear threat the U.S. faces stems from nuclear proliferation. As the confrontation with Iraq dramatized, conflicts in remote areas with and among regional powers -- many likely to be nuclear-armed or capable of becoming so -- will become more important in the future. Given the likelihood

⁶⁶Walter B. Slocombe, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in a Restructured World," in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America, p. 55.

of other nations acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, the United States, and other acknowledged nuclear states, are faced with the task of managing a world with multiple nuclear powers. Arrangements for rapid exchange of data in the event of third-country (or accidental or unauthorized) nuclear incidents would promote stability if such an event occurred. Future strategy and doctrine must deal seriously and systematically with how, and whether, U.S. nuclear and other weapons might be used to respond to (or even preempt) third-country nuclear (and conceivably chemical) attacks. Thus, a critical mission for U.S. security policy in the future will be to retain the capacity to contain such threats, and in particular to rebuild both U.S. and allied conventional and nuclear forces as needed to face such crises. Issues relating to policy formulation and force structure that will be relevant in the future include a greater emphasis on missile defenses, a shift in targeting doctrine, and the need to maintain modern nuclear forces.

The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept.⁶⁷ The successful deployment of the Patriot missile in the Gulf War has generated greater interest in missile defenses. With the spread of nations developing both ballistic missile capabilities and weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. will need to deploy missile defenses in order to protect the United States and its Allies from these

⁶⁷Dick Cheney, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 31, 1992. p. 22.

future threats. Another important issue relating to the future of U.S. nuclear policy is changes in targeting doctrine.

New and future technologies will provide greater accuracy for both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons delivery. This increased accuracy could lead to an even greater emphasis on counterforce targeting, which would eliminate many of the "sticky" problems associated with countervalue targeting doctrine. In addition, a realistic targeting policy that takes greater multipolarity into account is required for the future security arena. One other important issue facing U.S. nuclear forces in the future is modernization.

As long as nuclear weapons remain in the hands of other nations, and as long as the future of the former USSR is uncertain, there will be a need for the United States to continue to maintain survivable, modern, flexible, and effective nuclear forces. The United States also needs survivable, redundant, and enduring command and control systems. It is particularly critical for these aspects of U.S. nuclear war-fighting capabilities to be modernized as the numbers of systems dramatically decrease. It will be important for the U.S. to maintain its technological advantage into the future.

It does seem advisable to have at least one large combat aircraft and one ballistic missile in development or production into the foreseeable future. Moreover, the next generation SSBN should be planned while boatyards retain competency with SSNs.⁶⁸

⁶⁸Reed and Wheeler, op. cit. in n. 3, p. 33.

Even in the face of reduced military budgets, a viable modernization plan will be critical for the future effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces.

The invention of the atomic bomb drastically altered the face of warfare and forever increased the price of all out-war between nuclear countries. Some see nuclear weapons as basically immoral weapons that should have never been invented. However, the last 45 years have yielded unprecedented relative peace among the major military powers. While it is impossible to know without a doubt that nuclear weapons were the reason for this period of peace, it is just as impossible to know otherwise. Regardless of one's philosophical beliefs regarding nuclear weapons, the simple fact remains that they cannot be disinvented. With that in mind, it is prudent for the U.S. to formulate, and update, policies and strategies that attempt to insure the healthy existence of the U.S. and its allies.

In order to more clearly understand complex security arrangements protecting Europe, it is useful to have a working knowledge of these U.S. nuclear forces and how they interact within the larger strategic context of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. Nuclear forces dedicated to Europe's security are an important aspect of a healthy and cooperative European-American relationship. U.S. Air Force dual-capable aircraft stationed in Europe will constitute the only U.S. nuclear presence located on the European continent in the foreseeable future. These forces not only serve as a hedge against an unknown, and possibly dangerous, future; they also provide an important political link that maintains positive and productive ties between the U.S. and Europe.

IV. SELECTED ISSUES AFFECTING THE U.S. AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

The U.S. Air Force in Europe functions in a very diverse political and military environment. In addition to examining strategies and force compositions, it is necessary to discuss other factors which influence these forces and how they operate. Some of these factors include the ability to move troops and equipment to desired locations, current reorganizations, and ongoing Arms Control negotiations. One issue that greatly affects military efficiency is strategic agility.

A. STRATEGIC AGILITY: A STRATEGIC CULTURAL APPROACH

The United States is politically, economically, and militarily tied to Europe. The United States benefits from a healthy Europe and has a vested interest in maintaining stability in the area. A U.S. military presence in Europe provides deterrence against any possible aggressor and contributes to European stability. Having basing rights gives the U.S. a forward presence that is a basic pillar in our national military strategy. This presence gives the U.S. critical power projection capabilities that contribute to deterrence and allow for effective crisis response. In addition, the U.S. military presence gives the U.S. a voice in European security issues. U.S. basing privileges are the cornerstone behind effective strategic agility within the region. This paper will define strategic agility as the capability to rapidly deploy U.S. forces, stationed in CONUS and overseas, to any foreseeable

military contingency. A critical aspect of the strategic agility equation is to have basing and overflight rights with friendly nations.⁶⁹

Better understanding of the future of U.S. strategic agility in Europe is aided by analysis of historical trends regarding U.S. basing and base usage in Europe. The analysis in this thesis focuses on U.S. basing and usage rights in Britain and Germany, since the majority of USAFE assets are located in these two countries. In addition to policy trends relating to these issues, this thesis will examine Germany's and Britain's strategic culture and how this may relate to possible policy decisions.

The comparison of strategic cultures will, it is hoped, shed some light on the differences in perceptions and policy decisions between the United States, Britain, and Germany with regard to basing issues. It is important to note that strategic culture is just one of many possible factors that contribute to a nation's policy making behavior. It is expected that a clearer image of a country's decision-making rationale can be acquired through the study of strategic culture.

The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force. The strategic culture derives from its history, geography and political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices; these may

⁶⁹General John R. Galvin, Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 3 March 1992. p. 9.

be, depending on the nation, the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion.⁷⁰

With a better understanding of strategic culture and how it affects U.S. basing issues, it may be possible to formulate interpretations that could guide policy related decisions, particularly regarding the effectiveness of U.S. strategic agility in the region.

1. A History of U.S. Base Issues in the United Kingdom

To reach informed judgments about what the future may hold with regard to U.S. strategic agility from the United Kingdom, it is necessary to begin with a history of U.S. air bases and their uses. The initial approach to U.S. bases in the United Kingdom had roots in the 'special relationship' that had grown between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill during World War II. The United Kingdom was the most politically stable country in Europe for the U.S. administration to consider as a basing option. Britain had obvious military attractions in that operations could be mounted from its soil in order to intervene in any conflict in Europe while at the same time affording a high degree of survivability.

The main motive for pressing ahead with acquisition of basing rights was U.S. national security considerations- particularly, the basing of nuclear forces

⁷⁰Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed", from Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990).

in Europe. The primary consideration at the time was the limited range of the B-29 bombers, which made overseas bases an operational prerequisite. The U.S. Air Force had two criteria for prospective basing:

First, that the bases must ensure that all possible routes to [the USA] are protected via overseas basing of defensive fighters; and second, that bases must be close enough to all potential enemies so that bombers could reach targets within the strategic heartland of an adversary.⁷¹

The basing of nuclear bombers in Britain was believed to have a deterrent effect against a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, and also filled the gap while Britain was developing its own nuclear forces.⁷²

Contributing factors to why Britain was the logical choice for U.S. base acquisitions in Europe included France's and Italy's initial refusal of air bases because of possible adverse political ramifications. In addition, Britain had the added attraction of having hosted 165 U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) installations between June 1942 and December 1945. This was significant for two reasons: first, the bases could be readily modified for very heavy bomber (VHB) operations, and there were several ideal locations in East Anglia well suited to this purpose; and second, the British populace was accustomed to the idea of a

⁷¹Simon Duke, US Military Forces and Installations in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 294.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 292-293.

foreign military presence stemming from the war. Psychologically, it would be less of a trauma to have a U.S. military presence in the U.K. than in most other European countries.⁷³

These circumstances eventually led to the Spaatz-Tedder talks held on 25-26 June and 4-6 July 1946. A tentative agreement was reached that the RAF would prepare four or five East Anglian bases by mid-1947 for use by U.S. bombers in time of emergency and that the USA would obtain RAF cooperation in the modification of certain bases to support atomic operations.

The Berlin crisis in 1948-49 provided the justification for the introduction of further U.S. forces into Britain. The USAF judged that the crisis reinforced the case that there was indeed a need for overseas bases. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal put three reasons forward why sending B-29s to Britain was important.⁷⁴ First, it would underline to the American people how seriously the United States viewed the sequence of events. Second, it would give the American and British forces involved experience with how to deal with these types of operations. Third, and most significantly, he saw it as vital to send the B-29s first and then formalize an agreement later. Forrestal was worried that the situation might deteriorate and the British would be compelled to reverse their attitude. In July 1948 a high military decision was made which effectively stated

⁷³Ibid., pp. 292-293.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 295.

that the Air Force's visit would be of longer duration than the 30-60 day temporary duty tours. In addition, a third bomber squadron was requested and approved to deploy to Britain from Germany.

In 1950 the first moves were made towards formalized negotiations. The U.S. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Hector McNeil stated:

Both the British and American governments recognized the mutual advantages of continuing the groups here, and that the British must proceed to make available the fields required in the midland areas.⁷⁵

The major problems with the basing issues were of a budgetary nature. Negotiations began at an ambassadorial level and an agreement was reached for future basing rights. The 'Ambassador's Agreement', as it is commonly known, was remarkable in that no time limit for the base durations was established. Negotiations continued with the Attlee-Truman and Truman-Churchill negotiations.

The Attlee-Truman negotiations, followed by the Truman-Churchill negotiations, concluded with what is often referred to as "the base agreements." Key elements of the Attlee-Truman negotiations included an agreement, though not specifically written, that neither the U.S. or Britain will use an atomic weapon without prior consultation with each other. In addition, it was agreed that:

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 298.

The use of British bases involved British sovereignty and that it was therefore natural that the United States would seek acquiescence before launching a war from them.⁷⁶

The Truman-Churchill negotiations concluded with an official statement that remains the only public written agreement regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom by U.S. forces. The communique, issued jointly by Churchill and Truman, stated:

Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.⁷⁷

Interpretations of the agreement have been notoriously difficult. Vagueness has been a traditional part of the working arrangements of the communique so the United States would not feel that it was constitutionally tied and the United Kingdom would feel that it had some kind of consultation guarantee. The U.S. retaliation against Libya on 15 April 1986, operating out of Britain, illustrates the vagueness of the 'joint decision' formula.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 299.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 300.

In the evening of 14 April 1986, a USAF strike group took off from RAF Lakenheath and RAF Upper Heyford simultaneously. The F-111Fs from Lakenheath and the EF-111As from Upper Heyford were part of a strike force destined for targets in Libya. The fighters were refueled by KC-10 and KC-135 tanker aircraft from RAF Fairford and RAF Mildenhall enroute to their targets around Tripoli and Benghazi. The role of the American forces operating out of Britain, it was said, was crucial to the military success of the operation aimed at suspected terrorist training and bivouac sites in Libya.⁷⁸ The strike led to serious political ramifications for both the British and the Americans and brought to the surface many pressing questions including the vagueness of the 1950-52 base agreements.

In a parliamentary debate immediately following the raid, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated:

...the arrangements under which American bases are used in this country have been the same for well over thirty years and they have not changed. Under those arrangements our agreement was required.⁷⁹

This may have been true but only in the narrowest sense, as only heads of government and those closely associated were involved in the decision. It seems

⁷⁸Simon Duke, US Defense Bases in the United Kingdom, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1987 p. xvii.

⁷⁹Duke, op. cit. in n. 71, p. 300.

likely, from all the public materials, that not all of the cabinet were involved in the Libyan raid decision. The 1950-52 base agreements were further attacked by Mr. Dave Steel who stated:

If damage is not to be caused to the NATO Alliance, there must be no doubt as to the conditions under which the American bases in this country are used.⁸⁰

The actual motives behind using the British bases for the raids are also a critical issue relating to U.S. base usage. The official justification for British involvement in bombing Libya has been that the USAF's British-based F-111s possessed the technical capacity for precision night bombing of highly specific targets, with minimum civilian casualties and risk to U.S. pilots.⁸¹ However, this claim is somewhat thin in that other equivalent military options were available that did not necessitate the use of British bases. One such option could have been to use NAVY A-6 aircraft based on carriers in the Mediterranean as the primary attack aircraft for all the strikes. The same 'Pave-Tack' system fitted to the F-111Fs operating from RAF Lakenheath were also fitted to the A-6Es in the Mediterranean. It seems from published evidence that the decision was more political than military.

⁸⁰Duke, op. cit. in n. 78, p. xviii.

⁸¹Malcolm Spaven, "A Piece of the Action: The Use of U.S. Bases in Britain", from; Mad Dogs: The US Raids on Libya, Pluto Press, London 1986, p. 17.

Political explanations are varied and difficult to verify, but the leading arguments include the desire of the U.S. Air Force to get 'a piece of the action', the U.S. desire to have at least one European ally involved with the raid for popular support, and a desire on the part of the U.S. government to unilaterally assert its position of power in the region. The actual reasons for conducting the raids in the manner undertaken were undoubtedly a composite of varying rationales and motives.

2. British Strategic Culture and U.S. Basing Issues

Ken Booth states that strategic culture:

...represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices; these may be...the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion.⁸²

In the case of the Libyan raid, it is clear that the political elite, particularly Margaret Thatcher, almost single-handedly, committed Britain to the course of action taken. It is more than likely that the 'special relationship' between the Prime Minister and Ronald Reagan strongly influenced the decision. This is an example of how a country's elite can represent a segment of a nation's strategic culture make-up regardless of political sentiment. By analyzing related aspects

⁸²Booth, op. cit. in n. 70, p. 2.

of British strategic culture, a foundation can be built that will be useful in determining possible policy trends regarding U.S. bases in Britain.

A 1985 Gallup Survey indicated that 51 percent of the British public answered affirmatively when asked whether the United Kingdom should rid itself of American nuclear bases, whereas 41 percent replied negatively.⁸³ Looking at certain aspects of British strategic culture should give us insight into these survey results.

In 1948, the U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James sent the Secretary of State his detailed analysis of the anti-American mood. His report stated:

in and out of government... attitudes towards the U.S. border on the pathological. Almost every day brings new evidence of (Britain's) weakness and dependence on the United States. This is a bitter pill for a country accustomed to full control of her national destiny.⁸⁴

Over forty years later the ambassador considered that anti-American accusations in Britain had reached a fevered pitch, and that the British response to the U.S. raid on Libya might persuade American elite and public opinion that it was time

⁸³Dean Godson, "British Attitudes Toward the United States", from; Martin Holmes, British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990s, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc, Washington, 1987, pp. 114-115.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 97.

to bring home "our boys" from Europe.⁸⁵ According to a leading British observer, Godfrey Hodgson, this sentiment has not impinged seriously upon policy, there is probably more anti-British feeling in America than anti-U.S. feeling in Britain and that pro-Americanism in Britain is more prevalent than anti-Americanism. Nonetheless, it is still useful to analyze this negative sentiment and possible policy implications. Part of this anti-American sentiment stems from British suspicion of American encroachment on British sovereignty.

In his letter to his constituents in Oldham, Michael Meacher described a massive encroachment by America on the British right to run their own affairs. He claimed that this encroachment included secret contingency plans in the event of a possible nuclear attack to hand over large areas of Britain to control by U.S. forces and the placement of CIA personnel in the Ministry of Defense.⁸⁶ Similarly, Anthony Wedgwood Benn has said that a U.S. president, whom the British people do not elect or control and cannot remove, has the power to make war from British territory and hence make it a prime target. He stated that this,

should not be underestimated as a permanent source of fear and resentment.⁸⁷

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 97.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 110.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 110-111.

One other aspect to Britain's strategic culture is a deep sense of national pride. This pride stems from a long history of military successes including Henry the V's unlikely victory over the French in the battle of Agincourt and the victories of World War I and World War II. When discussing the Royal Navy's involvement with suppressing the slave trade in the nineteenth century, Irving Kristol stated,

...such action defined the kind of power Britain wanted to be. It was a matter of national identity, not foreign policy in any strict sense of the term.⁸⁸

Further evidence of this national pride can be seen regarding the Gulf War:

Some Britons would want to react like France, but most would not. If there is going to be dangerous work to do in the Middle East they would feel ashamed to let the Americans shoulder the burden on their own...when it comes to shouldering world responsibilities we are more than a match.⁸⁹

Given this intense national pride it is sometimes difficult for the British to accept having to depend on the Americans for certain aspects of their defense. If there

⁸⁸Peregrine Worsthorne, "What Kind of People?," The National Interest, Winter 1990/91 p. 98.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 99.

were other feasible alternatives, the British would rather shoulder the burden without the help of the United States.

The original factor that placed U.S. bases in Britain is gone. The threat of Soviet attack no longer exists. With the new international arena come new rationales for U.S. bases in Britain. The predominant explanations are that these bases strengthen nuclear deterrence in the region by providing military linkage between the United States and NATO and that these bases provide forward presence for U.S. forces. Besides these direct military reasons, these bases serve as a symbol of NATO unity and indicate a commitment by the U.S. to support European stability.

With the lack of a tangible military enemy and the desire for greater European autonomy, the strength of the ties that kept U.S. bases in Britain is weakening. However, because of economic and political ties there is no reason why all these bases will be removed in the near future. A greater challenge for the U.S. is determining the manner in which these bases can be used. The Libyan raid was a unique event that may very well have been a by-product of the 'special relationship' between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.

Within the emerging security environment, a greater emphasis on British-American cooperation will be a necessity if the U.S. desires to use these bases for "Libyan type" raids. While U.S. support will remain important to European countries, it will not be as essential as it was during the Cold War

years. The British government will rightfully insist upon approval prior to any military action staged from these facilities.

3. A History of U.S. Base Issues in Germany

The deployment of U.S. troops to Germany arose from the post-war situation in Europe and was motivated by two primary concerns. First, U.S. military deployments were seen in the context of a containment strategy. Post-war Soviet expansion into Europe was taken seriously by the allies. With respect to containment, post-war Germany represented an ideological battlefield between the powers of East and West. The potential for serious conflict was demonstrated in the Berlin crisis of June 1948. The second reason to deploy U.S. forces to Germany was to accommodate French and British fears about the rearmament of Germany and a possible resurgence of German military power. Before examining the post-war U.S. forces in Germany, it will be useful to discuss the role of the occupation forces.

The occupation zones in Germany were established by the London protocol of 12 September 1944 and, upon the surrender of the German armed forces on 7-8 May 1945, Germany was occupied within the borders established in December 1937. The Protocol established the Allied administration of Germany's four occupation zones and the control of Berlin by the four Allied powers. The U.S. zone of occupation was located in south and south-west Germany, with smaller contingents in Berlin and Bremerhaven.

The Potsdam Conference of 17 July-2 August 1945 ensured the dependence of Germany for the indefinite future on foreign security guarantees. According to an official communique published by the U.S. State Department, the purpose of the agreement was to extirpate German militarism and Nazism and, in order to eliminate Germany's war potential, 'the production of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented'.⁹⁰ The Potsdam conference had the result that Germany could not defend itself in any shape or form and was thus completely reliant upon some form of foreign military presence.

The first steps toward a post-war collective defense effort were made when the Dunkirk Treaty was signed in March 1947. The Treaty was established 'to prevent any further aggression by Germany and [to preserve] peace and security'.⁹¹ The WEU was formed in March 1947 and was a collective defense organization that was intended to meet the dangers of possible German as well as Soviet aggression. The major milestone in the establishment of the Western security system was the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance in April 1949.

Communist aggression occurred much sooner than leaders in America and Europe expected. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 had a profound

⁹⁰Duke, op. cit. in n. 71, p. 58.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 58.

impact on the permanence of U.S. forward deployed military forces globally. The possibility of similar aggression occurring in Europe led to American and Allied concern. On 9 September 1950 President Truman announced that:

...I have today approved substantial increases in the strength of United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area...⁹²

This announcement meant the addition of four divisions to Europe to join the two already there. More significantly, the status of U.S. forces already in Europe was changed from an occupation force to a combat force that would help contain the Soviet Union. The U.S. military presence in the FRG, and indeed Europe as a whole, may have helped to shore up some of the more urgent defense needs of Western Europe, but the problem of how to integrate the FRG into some kind of European defense structure remained.

An initial attempt at German integration faltered when plans for a European Defense Community (EDC) were rejected by the French. The failure of the EDC led to renewed efforts to connect the FRG with NATO. In fall 1954 a treaty was drafted that ended the occupation regime and integrated the FRG into the Alliance structure. In May 1955 the FRG formally joined NATO. In

⁹²Daniel J. Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces In Germany, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1987 p. 41.

return for membership, the FRG agreed to permit the stationing of British, French and American forces on its soil for the indefinite future.

The decision to increase the U.S. military presence in the FRG was seen by the U.S. as stabilizing for Western and U.S. security. It was seen by the Germans as a sign of genuine German-U.S. solidarity and cooperation. The decision was viewed by all as a profound and long-term American commitment to Europe.

The number of U.S. troops in Germany remained over 300,000 from 1955 to 1968 when, because of the Vietnam War, almost one third were withdrawn. Changes in strategy, namely the shift from 'massive retaliation' to 'flexible response', also contributed to force shifts and reorganizations. In addition, domestic debates inspired by Senator Mike Mansfield and others also contributed to a decline in U.S. troop levels in Europe through the 1970's.

Relations between the U.S. and the FRG deteriorated during 1981 when Pentagon personnel planned for three additional U.S. based 'Reforger' divisions in the FRG, accompanied by a move of U.S. forces closer to the German border. The proposal met with strong criticism in the FRG, where the government was in the midst of trying to bring a substantial budget deficit under control. The U.S. response was to threaten a withdrawal of U.S. forces unless the FRG seemed more enthusiastic and willing to pay for more of its share of defense. A compromise was reached whereby the German government agreed to make payments on various projects to support the arrival of CONUS-based emergency troops and an

addition of 2000 German troops to guard the stocks and equipment needed for their arrival.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the prime rationales for U.S. forces in Germany, that of containment, no longer exists. However, U.S. forces now in Europe continue to contribute to collective defense in the region. The reunification of Germany has also changed the strategic landscape. These events have led to greater debate regarding the presence of U.S. troops in Germany. For a clearer picture of the future of U.S. bases in Germany, it will be useful to examine pertinent aspects of Germany's strategic culture.

4. German Strategic Culture and U.S. Basing Issues

Since the end of World War II, there have been American troops on German soil. This presence has certainly been a part of creating Germany's strategic culture of today. It will be useful to examine German perceptions regarding a U.S. presence in their country to gain insight into policy decisions currently being made.

Differences in public opinion regarding a U.S. presence in Germany can be traced to differences in key experiences during political socialization. For the generation of Germans born between 1925 and 1945, the decisive experiences were the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Crisis. For the generation born after 1945 the

decisive experience was the conflict in Southeast Asia. These experiences produced fundamental differences in the image perception of the United States.⁹³

German public opinion of the United States after World War II was quite high. However, public opinion of the United States during Vietnam and the Reagan years dropped. This caused an impression that younger Germans had a more anti-American attitude and that this trend would increase with time. However, recent surveys indicate a reversal in this trend and an increase in pro-American sentiment. In a survey conducted late in 1991, 68% of Germans had a positive view of the United States.⁹⁴ It is important to note, however, that there is a difference between pro-American sentiment and support for American troops on German soil. The old equation that stated that positive attitudes toward the United States and support for NATO translated into support for an American troop presence no longer necessarily holds. In 1991, 57% of all Germans favored a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. In addition, 70% supported a withdrawal of all American nuclear weapons.⁹⁵

It is important to note that the relationship between public opinion and government policy is a complex one. Politicians respond to, as well as shape

⁹³Harold Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Origins of Estrangement," *International Security*, Summer 1987, p. 53.

⁹⁴Ronald D. Asmus, Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence, P-7767, (Santa Monica, CA Rand Corporation, January 29, 1992, p. 2.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 5.

public opinion. Nonetheless, public opinion is a very important political factor and a useful guide in identifying long-term trends in attitudes and the challenges such trends pose for governments.

The current trends in public opinion regarding pro-American sentiment and American troop presence in Germany seem to indicate a positive outlook for German-American cooperation on the whole, but a German desire to remove U.S. troops from their soil. Further evidence of a German desire to remove U.S. bases can be found in a request by Minister President Carl-Ludwig Wagner of Rheinland Palatine. He asked for the U.S. to shut down some of its largest installations in that state. The list includes Kaiserslautern, Bitburg, Hahn, Spangdahlem and Zweibruecken.⁹⁶ The Pentagon is planning to drastically reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe, and many these USAFE installations will be affected. Another important aspect of Germany's strategic culture is its historical reliance on foreign military forces for security requirements.

Immediately following World War II Germany was occupied by the allies and was not allowed any military forces of her own. In the 1954 London and Paris agreements, the FRG was granted membership in the WEU and subsequently NATO. Germany was allowed to rearm for defensive purposes with certain restrictions. Certain types of conventional weapons with 'offensive

⁹⁶Stephen F. Szabo, "The New Germany and European Security," from: Beyond the Cold War: Current Issues in European Security, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., August 1990, p. 23.

capabilities' were not allowed to be produced by Germany, as well as NBC weapons. The 'offensive capabilities' restrictions were gradually lifted beginning in 1958 and were abolished in January of 1986. The forces that Germany did possess were to be under NATO control and were not allowed to be used outside of allied territory. Germany completely depended on the United States and Britain for a nuclear umbrella and continues to do so today. However, with the drastic changes in the region, a change in this historical situation may be developing.

German unification, along with the eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe, will dramatically change the strategic culture of a unified Germany. The collapse of the Soviet threat and the need to reorganize the Bundeswehr have raised basic questions about the purpose, size, and structure of the German armed forces. Germany is no longer in an extremely exposed position on the front line of the East-West conflict. Instead, Germany has been placed in a central position, surrounded by peaceful and- for the time being, at least- democratic neighbors. This is a strategic transformation of breathtaking proportions, and German leaders are still coming to grips with its implications. The strategic landscape may lead to the 'normalization' of Germany. If 'normalization' can be defined in terms of Germany's gradually overcoming many of the previous constraints rooted in the Cold War conflict, the more difficult

challenge is defining a positive vision for Germany as a more 'normal' security policy actor in Europe and beyond.⁹⁷

There is little doubt that Germany will be required to take a position of greater responsibility and leadership in the European security system. It seems that the German public is willing to take on this new responsibility. A 59% majority supports Germany assuming greater international responsibility.⁹⁸ Germans see no reason to continue to be treated differently from other major states in Europe. The growing references to "singularization" of Germany in any settlement are evidence that the Germans will wish to be treated in the same manner as the French or the British.⁹⁹ This 'new' German thinking will have a significant effect on how Germany views the United States. This is of particular interest with regard to the future of a U.S. military presence in Germany.

Germany does not favor the creation of an alternative defense structure through the EC that would exclude the United States. However, this does not automatically translate into support for an American military presence. Recent data suggests that support for a U.S. military presence in Germany is eroding and should therefore discourage a policy of 'business as usual'.¹⁰⁰ The primary

⁹⁷Ronald D. Asmus, Germany After the Gulf War, N-3391-AF, (Santa Monica, CA Rand Corporation) p. viii.

⁹⁸Asmus, op. cit in n. 94, p. 13.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 13.

explanation for these figures lies in the narrow view that Germans have traditionally had of NATO and the U.S. military presence. For over forty years Germans have viewed the alliance, and the U.S. military presence, almost exclusively in terms of the need to defend the Federal Republic from a specific threat. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Germans increasingly do not see the need for such a presence. Although there is some concern about the consequences of an American troop withdrawal, in the case of a future deterioration in East-West relations, this does not necessarily translate into support for an American military presence.¹⁰¹ However, there are arguments that support a continued U.S. military presence in Germany.

President Bush has stated that the United States is a European power and that American troops will remain in Europe so long as they are wanted. Given the changes in Europe and the overall downward pressure on the size of the U.S. military, there is a growing tendency to see such a forward deployed American military presence in Europe and in Germany as fulfilling multiple goals. First, a future U.S. troop presence in Germany is seen as a hedge against residual uncertainties and a means to provide political reassurance. Second, it is seen as an effective forward deployment to help meet Western security interests and obligations in the Mediterranean and further east. These forces are physically closer to potential deployment areas than CONUS-based forces. More

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 19.

importantly, they are part of a larger allied force and command structure that can provide a basis for effective multinational operations.

Whether Germans are willing to support the concept for a future U.S. military presence that is increasingly tied to "out of area" scenarios is unclear. For such an agreement to be politically viable in both countries, Germany would have to openly accept and support such a role for an American military presence and ideally also participate in supporting such a role. Without those prerequisites the U.S. runs the risk of U.S. troops in Germany being seen as forward-based means for American power projection. If the U.S. is to successfully build a new German-American relationship based on what President Bush termed "partners in leadership," it will require an open dialogue that clearly establishes the degree to which our interests continue to overlap as well as political leadership to ensure that it is understood and supported on both sides of the Atlantic.

5. United States European Basing Outlook

America's leadership role in NATO is based on the presence of our military forces in Europe; the ability of the U.S. to influence events in Europe is derived from our visible and continuing commitment to the alliance. In order to meet U.S. security requirements in the European Theater, we have developed a European Base Force, taking into account the new security environment and constrained fiscal resources.¹⁰²

¹⁰²General John R. Galvin, op. cit. in n. 69, p. 5.

The bulk of the troops that make up this base force are stationed in Britain and Germany. British and German policies regarding U.S. basing issues, partially derived from their strategic culture, directly affect U.S. military capability in the region. The dramatic changes that have recently been re-shaping the international arena are causing the U.S. and our overseas allies to re-evaluate security policies that date back to the end of World War II.

Alfred Dregger sees a shift in the relative "security weight" of the U.S.-European partnership in NATO. An American military retrenchment from Europe is inevitable:

In the train of disarmament and demilitarization, one has to reckon with a partial withdrawal of American forces from Europe.¹⁰³

He views this development as a "natural" one consistent with the global interests of the United States. The U.S. military is decreasing its military presence in Europe in response to changing security requirements and economic constraints. However, the ability to rapidly deploy forces located in Europe is a critical aspect of current Air Force doctrine.

The U.S. will continue to enjoy basing and overflight rights in these countries for the foreseeable future. However, as U.S. influence decreases in the

¹⁰³Alfred Dregger, from: German Perspectives on NATO and European Security, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington D.C., August 1991, p. 18.

region, there may be greater resistance to U.S. actions from these bases unless completely supported by not only the host country, but by the majority of our allies. The reason for this is that the political price paid within Europe for supporting an unpopular military action may be greater than the ramifications from the U.S.. In this respect, it is essential that the United States continues to stay actively involved within the European political and military environment.

Our European forward presence protects America and American interests and provides a link that gives us the opportunity to influence important decisions that affect our common defense. It is in our best interests to remain involved and influential in European affairs. In order to do so, we need a competent, credible, and operationally significant force in Europe ready for multi-faceted missions.¹⁰⁴

The future structure of European security will certainly include the United States. The strategic cultures of the participants will influence how the United States fits into this structure. U.S. basing rights and use privileges directly affect American strategic agility capabilities. Careful analysis and policy evaluation regarding these issues and how they are affected by strategic culture will certainly enhance our ability to formulate effective policy.

¹⁰⁴Galvin, op. cit. in n. 69, pp. 11-12.

B. EFFECTS ON THE U.S. AIR FORCE FROM REORGANIZATION

...Organize to ensure unity of command in peace and in war, under whatever command structure makes sense. Make sure you have unity of command, and make sure you practice it...Train like you're gonna fight.¹⁰⁵

A dramatically changing international environment coupled with modern technological innovations have required a basic re-evaluation of U.S. military force structures. The United States Air Force is on the leading edge of change and is reorganizing its fundamental structures in order to perform its missions more efficiently and effectively. To understand how these reorganizations may affect the United States Air Force in Europe, this section examines the actual structural changes being made within the Air Force and the reorganizations occurring specifically in USAFE and NATO. In addition, it will be important to discuss how *Desert Storm* affected these reorganizations and to look at how these changes may affect future joint and/or combined operations. The changes occurring within the Air Force are dramatically altering old functional mind-sets.

The Air Force is rethinking the ways it has traditionally operated because of smaller forces, overseas cutbacks, and a changing world situation. There are five basic themes the Air Force is following during the reorganization.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵General Russell E. Dougherty, "Roots and Wings: A Perspective on Reorganization," Airpower Journal, Summer 1992, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.* p. 5

- Decentralization of power from headquarters down to operating units.
- Bolstering the authority of lower echelon commanders.
- Streamlining the organization by removing links in the chain of command.
- Consolidating operations under a single commander.
- Clarifying functional responsibilities.

The Air Force is also incorporating modern management principles such as streamlining, delayering, empowering and removing roadblocks to improvement. Revolutions in communications and information transfer alone demand new methods of leadership and management, with decentralized organizations where people in the field are able to improve operations and respond quickly to unexpected change.¹⁰⁷ In addition to improving the way the Air Force will function, there are dramatic changes in the actual structures.

Significant structural reorganizations are occurring within the major commands. Three major commands will be reorganized into two new commands. Tactical Air Command (TAC) is merging with the bomber, nuclear missile and reconnaissance elements of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to form Air Combat Command. Responsibilities of Air Combat Command will include deterrence and air campaign operations used for crisis response. Military Airlift Command (MAC) will take part of SAC's tanker assets and form the Air Mobility Command

¹⁰⁷U.S. Air Force White Paper, "Air Force Restructure," September 1991, p. 1.

(AMC). Air Mobility Command will be responsible for global airlift and aerial refueling. In addition, Air Force Logistics Command and Air Force System Command will merge into the new Air Force Material Command. Also the Air Force Communications Command will be downgraded into a field operating agency. These changes will reduce the number of major commands from 13 to 10.¹⁰⁸ Other significant changes are occurring at the squadron and wing level.

The old wing structure had a commander, a vice commander, a base commander, and three deputies, while the new structure consolidates leadership into a wing commander, a vice and three group commanders. In the squadrons on-aircraft maintenance is combining with operations to restore the teamwork between the crews who fly the planes and the chiefs who maintain them. The creation of composite wings that possess all the assets necessary for rapid air response to any threat is also a significant result of the reorganizations. Wings and squadrons have dropped "Strategic" or "Tactical" from their names in an effort to remove artificial distinctions and emphasize that air power is most effective when employed as an integrated whole.¹⁰⁹ These bottom up changes will be integrated into the overseas forces to give them the flexibility required to effectively perform their mission.

¹⁰⁸Julie Bird and Joe West, "SAC, TAC, MAC to Become 2 Commands," Air Force Times, 30 Sept 91, no. 8, pp. 4-6.

¹⁰⁹General Merrill A. McPeak, "Air Force Restructure: A Status Report," Foundation Forum a collection from presentations to the Air Force Association, January 1992, p. 2.

Many of same reasons that compelled the U.S. Air Force to reorganize have also encouraged the NATO alliance to restructure, the most significant reason is that the collapse of the Soviet Union has fundamentally changed the regional security environment. The massive, linear, defensive forces that NATO had built up needed to be replaced by more dynamic, fluid, flexible, and multifaceted forces. This fact has necessitated the requirement for USAFE and NATO to dramatically restructure their forces.

Major restructuring within USAFE includes giving up more than 400 of its 700 fighter aircraft.¹¹⁰ However, USAFE will be acquiring its own refueling tankers and airlift aircraft. With these changes USAFE is better preparing itself under the new mobility concept, with all its forces in the theater under a single commander.

USAFE is also eliminating some organizational layers and streamlining others. Two numbered air forces, 3d Air Force at Mildenhall and the 17th Air Force at Sembach AB, Germany are to cut back to fewer than 100 persons from a previous 185 to 190. The focus at these locations will be the flying missions and preparations to receive reinforcements when and if required.¹¹¹ Like the U.S. Air Force, NATO is making significant changes to its major command structures.

¹¹⁰Corddry, op. cit. in n. 48, p. 75.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 75.

One major change is that NATO is eliminating one of its three basic combat commands. The Alliance will maintain Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic, but will disband Alliance Command Channel. Subordinate commands to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) will include: Allied Forces Central Europe, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and Allied Forces Northwest. Within Allied Forces Central Europe five primary subcommands have been reorganized into two entities: Air Forces Central Europe and Land Forces Central Europe. The Air Force Central structure will combine the old 2d Allied Tactical Air Force and the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force and will be based at Ramstein AB, Germany.¹¹²

NATO military restructuring began shortly before August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, but the performance of U.S. and Allied forces in the Gulf War has come to serve as a model for USAFE and other NATO air forces planning mobile and multinational operations. An example can be seen by examining the new NATO headquarters structure which, by coincidence or not, closely resembles that used in the Gulf War, where General Schwarzkopf had air, land, and sea component commanders under his command.

Another example of how Desert Storm affected NATO reorganization involves the changes taking place in the central tasking agency. Within this agency planners examine threats, lay out the targets, and plot the courses for a

¹¹²Grossman, op. cit. in n. 32, p. 31.

composite force of fighters as allocated by the commander. In the current setup, this agency is the Allied Tactical Operations Center. After the reorganizations are complete, it will be the Combined Air Operations Center which will deal directly with the combat units. This concept builds on the experience from composite wings in the Gulf War.

A change that USAFE is making as a result of the Gulf War involves logistical support. There are major changes being made with how USAFE stores munitions and other war reserve material, the U.S Air Force having learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm that these supplies are not easy to move or transport. These supplies are now being containerized and made ready for swift movement via railway to ports.¹¹³ The Gulf War not only influenced reorganizations occurring within USAFE and NATO, it also demonstrated the importance of joint operations.

A few years ago I was taught that Jointness basically meant getting everybody lined up shoulder to shoulder. Now I know that real jointness means attacking the right target at the right time with the right force.¹¹⁴

Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that an increased emphasis placed on joint operations translates to an effective combat force package. Old interservice

¹¹³Ibid., p. 76.

¹¹⁴Major Mark B. Rogers, from: The Pentagon, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, November 1991, p. 68

rivalries and parochialism are giving way to cooperation for the greater good. While the services have acted grudgingly at times with regard to joint operations, the Gulf War has solidified resolve that this is the correct way to conduct warfare and hence train. Recent service strategy documents have indicated an open approach towards joint operations. The recent Navy strategy document "...From the Sea" states:

The success of modern U.S. military strategy depends on forces organized, trained, and equipped for the division of combat labor.¹¹⁵

The Air Force strategy document "Global Reach-Global Power" explains:

The future holds significant opportunity for complementary Air Force and naval operations that capitalize on the unique characteristics of both. In the future we can best achieve specific military and political objectives by capitalizing upon the advantages of both land-based and naval forces.¹¹⁶

Continued cooperation between the services will enhance the United States war fighting capability. However, as Joint Pub 1 emphasizes, joint warfare does not lessen individual service traditions, cohesion, or expertise. Successful joint operations are impossible without capabilities developed and embodied in each

¹¹⁵Department of the United States Navy, "...From the Sea," September 1992, p. 4.

¹¹⁶U.S. Air Force, op. cit. in n. 15, p. 10.

service. As Desert Storm emphasized, joint operations will take on increased significance in the new world order. New security threats will be difficult to predict and will place a premium on flexible combat operations brought to bear by multiple aspects of the United States military.

Joint force employment is a hallmark of our times. It is a dictate of our congress, it makes sense, and it is the right thing to do. This nation is not an island; it lives in the world. Our services cannot survive alone, and certainly they cannot fight alone in all the circumstances we must face.¹¹⁷

Desert Storm also emphasized the importance of preparing for combined operations. In the new international environment military cooperation among U.S. allies will play a significant role. The solidarity of the U.N. coalition was a critical aspect of the victory in the Gulf War. It is probable that future contingencies may involve coalition type forces, and it makes sense that these forces should train together as much as possible. As well as honing the combat skills that these combined units require, peace time military cooperation fosters closer international relationships that may provide future political avenues for the U.S..

Greater emphasis on combined and joint operations will increase U.S. combat effectiveness. Reorganizations within the U.S. Air Force and NATO will streamline operations and may enhance the ability of the United States and the

¹¹⁷Dougherty, op. cit. in n. 105, p. 12.

Alliance to prevail in the new political and military landscape. An ongoing examination of these issues will provide valuable insight about U.S. and allied forces that may be of significant use in future policy formulation.

C. ARMS CONTROL AND THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN EUROPE

With the end of the Cold War, the United States military is facing drastic reductions and force reorganizations. These changes are driven by many factors including budgetary constraints and strategic realities. In addition, arms control negotiations play a role in shaping the future of the United States military. The United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) could very well be further affected by conventional arms control negotiations. Arms control negotiations that could affect these forces are the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. Even though conventional arms control negotiations may not be a major factor driving Air Force sizing and structuring, they certainly do play a significant role. To better understand the future of the United States Air Forces in Europe, it is useful to analyze the ramifications of these negotiations.

A logical approach in analyzing these treaties is to begin with a description of the treaty itself, followed with a discussion of disputed topics to better understand the political and military questions involved, and finally an assessment of how these treaties could affect the United States Air Force in Europe. One major arms control agreement that will affect the sizing and structuring of air forces in Europe is the CFE treaty.

1. Conventional Arms Control

On 19 November 1990 the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and members of the Warsaw Pact at a summit meeting of the CSCE in Paris. CFE negotiations resulted in the most far-reaching arms control treaty that has ever been concluded, requiring significant reductions and establishing ceilings in five major categories of conventional weapons (tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters). The treaty limits the non-nuclear forces of the participating countries in an area extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (ATTU). The treaty itself consists of twenty-three articles and associated protocols. Articles II through VII deal with the provisions on weapons in Europe. Article IV limits the total number of combat aircraft for each group of State Parties to 6,800 aircraft. Article VI limits each State party to no more than 5,150.¹¹⁸ Under provisions of the Treaty, both of these figures need to be met no later than 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. The target date for ratification by all members is July 1992.¹¹⁹

According to Article II section (K) of the Treaty, a combat aircraft is defined as "A fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns,

¹¹⁸Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

¹¹⁹Col Rafaenelli, "Conventional Arms Control," handout and lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, 3 June 1992.

cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model or version of such aircraft which performs other military functions such as reconnaissance or electric warfare. The term 'combat aircraft' does not include primary trainer aircraft."¹²⁰ Under the provisions of the Treaty, the only Western country that needs to make any reductions is Germany. The Germans have a CFE ceiling of 900 combat aircraft and are currently holding 1,018 aircraft. The United Kingdom and the United States will not be required to make any combat aircraft reductions. In contrast, The East will be required to make cuts of 1,461 combat aircraft.¹²¹

One of the disputes between the West and the Soviet Union related to how the Soviets classified portions of their forces. The issue was whether certain weapons the Soviets say are assigned to Coast Guard, Naval infantry, and Strategic rocket units should be covered. The Soviet line of argument was that the mandate only covered conventional armed forces - and thus not strategic - and that it also excluded all Naval forces, including its permanently land-based components. By taking this position, the Soviets excluded a total of 5,457 pieces of armaments and equipment from their ceilings, thereby decreasing their overall reduction by the same number.¹²²

¹²⁰CFE Treaty, op. cit. in n. 118.

¹²¹John D. Morracco, "NATO Plans Call for Boosting Number of Combat Aircraft Under CFE Treaty," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 15, 1991.

¹²²Ambassador Lambert W. Veenendaal, "Conventional Stability in Europe in 1991: Problems and Solutions," NATO Review, August 1991.

Article III of the Treaty, which contains the counting rule, clearly stipulates that all battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters as defined in the Treaty within the area of application, should fall under its ceilings. Therefore, the Soviet equipment holdings in question should have been counted under the ceilings of the Treaty.

The disputes were eventually resolved to the satisfaction of all participants and was confirmed in Vienna on June 14, 1991. During this meeting the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from the ATTU zone an equivalent amount of equipment to that of the disputed holdings with the Coastal defense and Naval infantry. In addition, it was explicitly reaffirmed that all armaments and equipments within Treaty limited categories and based on land - except for some explicitly agreed categories - would be subject to all numerical limitations stipulated by the Treaty.

A crucial issue raised by the disintegration of the Soviet central government is what happens to Soviet arms control obligations. Which of the resulting entities will be bound by the Treaties the Soviet Union entered into? This is an extremely complicated issue involving international law and political maneuvering among the former Soviet republics.

Immediately following the August 1991 coup attempt, and the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia and the other republics informally agreed to adhere to the Soviet signed CFE Treaty. This seems to have been formally resolved as of 6 June 1992, as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,

Khazakhstan, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan formally signed the CFE Treaty. Other problems result from this situation (i.e. the Khazakhstan/Russia border east of the Urals). However, it appears additional problems will be resolved without reopening the CFE Treaty. Reopening the Treaty could force complicated adjustments to the document from member nations who were not completely pleased with the initial CFE Treaty.

The limits established by the CFE treaty for combat aircraft are 6,800 per side with a 5,150 limit for one country. In addition, it was decided that participants would undertake a political commitment outside the CFE Treaty limiting land-based naval aircraft to 430 on each side.¹²³ Currently the US has approximately 626 combat aircraft deployed in Europe. Under provisions of the treaty and current NATO plans, the U.S is allocated a total of 784 aircraft.¹²⁴ The U.S. will certainly not fill this allocation, but it does leave room for future deployments in the event of a crisis or unforeseen political shift.

Given these numerical limitations set by the Treaty, certain aspects of U.S. and NATO operational concepts will change. Reduced force-to-space ratios will have to be compensated for by increased tactical mobility. The operational concept of FOFA was designed to break the mass and tempo of a numerically superior and technologically inferior enemy before engagement in a close-in

¹²³Rafaenelli, op. cit. in n. 119.

¹²⁴Morraco, op. cit. in n. 121.

ground battle by attacking the enemies' uncommitted forces behind the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). Force parity and technological advances on both sides in Europe called for the FOFA concept to be refined into what is now called Joint Precision Interdiction (JPI). The JPI concept expands the planning, coordination, and execution on interdiction of not only an enemy's uncommitted forces but also his mobility-producing potential.¹²⁵ Thus, the CFE Treaty has affected the means in which the U.S. and NATO will operate in future regional conflicts. Another conventional arms control treaty that is significant to discuss is the Open Skies Treaty.

On March 24 1992, 24 countries including Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine concluded a treaty on Open Skies in Vienna. The Open Skies Treaty will allow participants to overfly the territory of other participants with observation aircraft equipped with various sensor equipment. Open Skies is designed to improve mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participating countries, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about military forces and activities that concern them. The four principal elements involved with the Treaty include;¹²⁶

- Territory- All participants must agree to make all of their territory accessible to aerial observation.

¹²⁵Lt Col Jack W. Ellertson and Lt Col Alan K. Huffman, "Joint Precision Interdiction in the Post CFE Environment," Military Review, July 1991.

¹²⁶Rafaenelli, op. cit. in n. 119.

- **Aircraft-** All observation flights will be conducted on unarmed aircraft provided either by the observing country or the observed country. All aircraft used in Open Skies will be subjected to rigorous certification and inspection procedures to ensure that the sensors on board meet the standards of the Treaty and that sensors which are not permitted are not installed.
- **Sensors-** Aircraft may be equipped with video cameras, panoramic and framing cameras for daylight photography, infrared line scanning systems which can operate day and night in any weather. To ensure the fullest possible participation the Treaty provides that sensors which are used shall be commercially available to all participants.
- **Quota-** Each participating country has agreed to an annual quota of observation flights which it is willing to accept from other participants. Quotas are loosely scaled to the size of the country, with the smallest participants having two or four flights each. The United States and Russia, as the largest participants, have accepted quotas of 42 annual observation flights each. The number of flights actually conducted over a country and which other country conducts the flight will depend on the particular concerns of individual countries and on how the international situation develops.

Original disputes focused on Soviet unwillingness to open large parts of its territory to overflights because of security concerns. However, in November of 1991 Moscow agreed to open its entire territory to overflights. Other disputed areas include which country will supply the aircraft and equipment for the overflight. The U.S. originally insisted that the inspecting country should use its own planes and pilots for inspection of other countries. However, the U.S. has since modified their views and has agreed to use other countries' equipment as long as the equipment performs satisfactorily and foreign inspectors have access

to the cockpit. Other problems that remain now concern creating a "pool" of aircraft to use by the international committee, the scheduling of overflights, and the dissemination of raw data collected on the flights.

For the United States the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) will be responsible for conducting and receiving Open Skies flights in coordination with the Department of Defense and other relevant agencies. The plan right now is to use one to three C-135's as inspection aircraft for the U.S.. The Air Force will likely supply pilots and support for these overflights within the Open Skies Treaty. Greater effects could arise as the data is collected and analyzed. Information from these flights could be used by the U.S. and NATO to update operational concepts currently employed. However, it seems more than likely that the primary result from an Open Skies Treaty will be greater openness and trust among the participating countries.

2. Nuclear Arms Control

Arms control agreements with significant impact have been the INF Treaty and the START Treaty. In December 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty was agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union. The INF Treaty eliminated all ground based intermediate-range missiles from both sides.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union on 31 July 1991. The START Treaty limits the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers -- of each party to 1,600. The total number of accountable, deployed

nuclear warheads is limited to 6,000 for each party. In addition, the Treaty stipulated a 4,900 limit for warheads on ballistic missiles.

While these limitations are a significant step in nuclear weapons reductions, they have already been surpassed by separate proposals between President Bush and President Yeltsin. If these proposals are accepted by both sides, the U.S. ICBM forces will consist of 500 Minuteman III missiles with a single-warhead configuration. The only nuclear-capable strategic bombers allowed under these proposals would be 1,000 warheads on 95 B-52Hs and 272 warheads on 17 B-2s (currently there are plans to build only 20 B-2s of which three will be test platforms).¹²⁷ The B-1 bomber, originally a nuclear-only bomber, would assume a purely conventional role under these proposals. Regardless of the eventual outcome of these ongoing arms control discussions, the United States will maintain nuclear forces in Europe for the foreseeable future.

Arms control negotiations are helping to re-shape current military and political postures. Effects from arms control agreements will be felt throughout the region by all parties involved. Nuclear arms control agreements are designed to lower tensions and foster a new period of cooperation. The CFE Treaty will have significant, long lasting effects, which hopefully, will result in greater European stability and international cooperation. The U.S. Air Force in Europe will be required to provide support for the Open Skies Treaty and re-think

¹²⁷Jack Mendelsohn, "Factfile: Past and Projected Strategic Nuclear Forces," Arms Control Today, July/August 1992, p. 36.

operational concepts currently employed in the theater due to changes in the strategic environment brought about, in part, by current arms control negotiations. Prudence dictates continuing evaluation on the ramifications of arms control negotiations to better understand the future security environment in Europe.

V. CONCLUSION

The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present...As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves.¹²⁸

The United States is adapting to the new world order by re-shaping its national security and national military strategies to better face the challenges this new order brings. Military strategies are no longer founded on the old international paradigm of East vs West. The new environment requires flexibility and rapid mobility to respond to regional crises and conflicts. The ability to successfully prevail militarily in these types of contingencies will require greater emphasis on both airlift and tactical aviation capabilities. An examination of relevant issues influencing the United States Air Force provides insight into regional security postures and operational requirements.

The United States is closely linked with Europe and there has been a long term U.S. Air Force presence in the region dedicated to insuring U.S. interests by bolstering European security and well being. The United States Air Force in Europe will continue to operate in concert with U.S. allies within the security

¹²⁸"Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1862," in Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 (New York: Library of America/Viking Press, 1889), 415.

framework provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. According to current plans there will be approximately three forward deployed active duty fighter wings stationed in Europe capable of performing crisis response operations in the region. In addition to these forward deployed forces, there will be two active duty fighter wings located in CONUS tailored to fight in the Atlantic region. Including reserve units there will be a total of eleven fighter wings planned and available for operations focused in the area. While the Air Force in Europe is being reduced in size, it is adjusting and reorganizing to more effectively and efficiently perform its still critical roles within and based from the region.

One important role the U.S. Air Force will continue to fulfill involves providing Europe with viable nuclear forces. U.S. theater nuclear forces located in Europe will consist solely of dual-capable fighter/attack aircraft which will be limited to using gravity dropped bombs. CONUS based ICBMs, strategic bombers, and SSBNs also contribute towards allied nuclear guarantees. Providing our European allies with a credible nuclear commitment serves as a deterrent against hostile actions and reduces incentives for many European nations to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

Effective strategic agility will be an essential element in successfully dealing with any contingency of the future. Within Europe and the surrounding region, it will be critical for the U.S. to maintain base usage and overfly rights. As U.S. influence decreases in the region, there may be greater resistance to U.S. actions

from these bases unless completely supported by not only the host country, but by the majority of our allies. In this respect, it is essential that the United States continue to stay actively involved within the European political and military environment.

Other significant issues include current military strategy and structural reorganizations as well as arms control agreements. Current reorganizations, both in the U.S. and NATO, will significantly affect Air Force operations in the future. Changing threats, new technologies, and strategic innovations are changing the structure of our forces and re-directing the way they will fight. Continuing arms control agreements will have a significant effect on the size of our future forces and the missions they can accomplish. It will be important to continually examine these issues to better evaluate and update methods of operation.

A United States Air Force presence in Europe promotes stability in the region and displays an ongoing U.S. commitment towards a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition, these forces enable the U.S. to have an important voice in European security matters that directly affect the United States. Finally, a United States Air Force presence in Europe provides flexible and mobile combat forces which are essential in sustaining American and allied security interests within the new international order.

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