

AD-A261 766



2

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

DTIC
ELECTE
MAR 19 1993
S E D

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. NAVY OF A 50 PERCENT
DECREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING

by

Patrick Hahler Brady

December 1992

Thesis Advisor:

James J. Tritten

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

88 3 18 119

93-05793



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If Applicable) Code 38	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	
6c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000		7b. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If Applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. NAVY OF A 50 PERCENT DECREASE IN DEFENSE SPENDING			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Brady, Patrick H.			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (year, month, day) December 1992	15. PAGE COUNT 93
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUBGROUP	
		United States -- National Security; Naval Warfare	
		United States -- Military Policy	
		United States Navy --	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
<p>This thesis addresses the capabilities of the 300-ship Navy that could be afforded with an assumed fifty percent decrease in defense spending and the restrictions that this size navy would place on U.S. foreign policy. This navy could fulfill the nation's strategic deterrence requirements for the post Cold War era. The SSBN force alone provides the required EMT to provide the nation with an assured destruction capability. This navy could also fulfill the nation's forward presence requirements. However with the ability to maintain only two CVBGs forward deployed, the Navy would be forced to use non-traditional methods, such as new deployment force structures or a mix of high cost/high capability and low cost/low capability ships, to fulfill this role. The requirements for crisis response can be fulfilled but only at the tactical level of warfare. It is unlikely that this navy could even lift one division to conduct forced entry missions with. Even if one division was lifted, it is too small to conduct forced entry missions even at the low end of the operational level of warfare. This would force the U.S. to rely more heavily on joint and coalition warfare. Additionally, the ability of this navy to handle more than one crisis at a time is doubtful. Finally, this navy could fulfill the nation's reconstitution requirements if given the full assumed warning period (8 to 10 years) to reconstitute forces.</p>			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL JAMES J. TRITTEN		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (408) 646-2143	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL NS/TR

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Implications for the U.S. Navy of a 50 Percent

Decrease in Defense Spending

by

Patrick Hahler Brady
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1981


Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1992

Author:


Patrick Hahler Brady

Approved by:


James J. Tritten, Thesis Advisor


Frank M. Teti, Second Reader


Thomas G. Bruneau, Chairman,
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the capabilities of the 300-ship Navy that could be afforded with an assumed fifty percent decrease in defense spending and the restrictions that this size navy would place on U.S. foreign policy. This navy could fulfill the nation's strategic deterrence requirements for the post Cold War era. The SSBN force alone provides the required EMT to provide the nation with an assured destruction capability. This navy could also fulfill the nation's forward presence requirements. However with the ability to maintain only two CVBGs forward deployed, the Navy would be forced to use non-traditional methods, such as new deployment force structures or a mix of high cost/high capability and low cost/low capability ships, to fulfill this role. The requirements for crisis response can be fulfilled but only at the tactical level of warfare. It is unlikely that this navy could even lift one division to conduct forced entry missions with. Even if one division was lifted, it is too small to conduct forced entry missions even at the low end of the operational level of warfare. This would force the U.S. to rely more heavily on joint and coalition warfare. Additionally, the ability of this navy to handle more than one crisis at a time is doubtful. Finally, this navy could fulfill the nation's reconstitution requirements if given the full assumed warning period (8 to 10 years) to reconstitute forces.

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. FUTURE DEFENSE SPENDING ASSUMPTION.....	7
III. HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN FULFILLING NATIONAL POLICY	13
IV. THE NAVY'S ROLES AND MISSIONS UNDER THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY	20
A. FORWARD PRESENCE	20
B. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE.	23
C. CRISIS RESPONSE.....	26
D. RECONSTITUTION.	29
V. FORCE STRUCTURE WITH A 50 PERCENT SPENDING DECREASE.....	31
VI. COMPARING THE BASE FORCE WITH THE 300-SHIP NAVY.....	41
A. BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES	41
B. FORWARD PRESENCE	46
C. RESPONSE TIME	49
D. CVBG REQUIREMENTS	50
E. SURFACE COMBATANT (SC) REQUIREMENTS.....	53
F. ATTACK SUBMARINES	55
G. AMPHIBIOUS LIFT	55
H. COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT/AUXILIARIES FORCE	60
I. SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL CONFLICTS.....	61
J. TRAINING CARRIER	62
K. COUNTER-NARCOTIC OPERATIONS.....	63

L. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE	63
M. CONCLUSIONS	65
VII. CONCLUSIONS	67
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	79

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1.	DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (\$ BILLIONS)	8
TABLE 2.	DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 CONSTANT \$ BILLIONS).....	9
TABLE 3.	PROJECTED GROWTH IN DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 CONSTANT \$ BILLIONS)	10
TABLE 4.	DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY BY SERVICE (\$ BILLIONS)	11
TABLE 5.	DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 CONSTANT \$ BILLIONS)	11
TABLE 6.	PROPORTIONAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE 600-SHIP NAVY.....	33
TABLE 7.	NUMBER OF SHIPS FORWARD DEPLOYED UNDER PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION MODEL	36
TABLE 8.	NUMBER OF CVBGs, ARGS, AND MEUS FORWARD DEPLOYED UNDER PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION MODEL.....	36
TABLE 9.	COMPOSITION OF THE 300-SHIP MODEL.....	40
TABLE 10.	CVBG CAPABILITY OF THE BASE FORCE AND 300-SHIP MODEL.....	52
TABLE 11.	SURFACE COMBATANT CAPABILITY OF THE BASE FORCE AND 300-SHIP MODEL	54
TABLE 12.	AMPHIBIOUS LIFT CAPABILITY UNDER THE 300-SHIP MODEL.....	56
TABLE 13.	AMPHIBIOUS LIFT REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE BASE FORCE IN 1997	57

TABLE 14. MEU ARG LIFT CAPABILITY 58

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Conservative Estimate of the Equivalent Megatons on Patrol	
	Under 300-Ship Model	45
Figure 2.	Exercise Commitments (March 11, 1992).....	48
Figure 3.	CVBGs in Operation Desert Shield/Storm.....	50

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War has resulted in major changes in the international and national security environments that have major implications for the U.S. Navy. These changes include calls for significant defense budget cuts, the increased importance of economics as a determinant of defense spending and the disintegration of the Soviet Union which resulted in the absence of a clear tangible global threat to U.S. national interests. What has resulted from these changes is the formulation of a new U.S. national security strategy that focuses on regional contingencies, and the decision to cut U.S. defense budget/forces by at least 25-30%. Given this lack of a principal threat, it is likely that the defense budget will be driven even lower by economic necessity and scarcity.

This fundamental change, as enunciated in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Military Strategy*, requires a comprehensive reexamination of service strategies and programming. This examination is well underway as each service struggles to determine its contribution in the post-Cold War world. What has yet to be determined is the exact amount which will be cut from the U.S. defense budget and what restrictions these cuts will place on U.S. foreign policy. This paper attempted to address objectively the capabilities of the 300-ship Navy that could be afforded with an assumed fifty percent decrease in defense spending and the restrictions that this size navy would place on U.S. foreign policy.

The 300-ship Navy's ability to fulfill this role is significantly less than the Bush Administration's Base Force. Due to the fact that the 300-ship Navy could only maintain two CVBGs available for forward presence and rapid crisis

response, the Navy could no longer use the traditional methods it has used to fulfill this role.

The 300-ship Navy provides significantly reduced crisis response capability when compared to the Base Force. Due to fewer ships in the 300-ship Navy, and without a change in current employment policies, the Navy would have fewer ships on station and more often no CVBG in theater to respond to a crisis. This will result in a significant reduction in naval forces which the National Command Authority could use to react to ambiguous warning in the early stages of a crisis. A timely show of force during this stage could stabilize the situation and permit diplomacy to prevail. With no naval expeditionary forces in the crisis area the risk versus gain calculus of potential adversaries is simplified and could cause them to undertake action counter to U.S. interest.

Furthermore, fewer ships would be in a state of readiness to quickly deploy to the crisis, resulting in significant delays in the arrival of additional CVBGs deployed from U.S. bases. These delays in the arrival of initial forces could translate into critical delays in the arrival of heavy ground and air units. Additionally, this increased response time could cause the crisis to develop into a situation requiring deployment of a larger number of U.S. forces.

The smaller size of the amphibious forces under the 300-ship Navy will also have an adverse effect on the nation's ability to conduct forced entry missions. It is unlikely that the Navy/Marine Corps team could even get one division lifted to conduct forced entry missions. Even if one MEF was lifted, it is too small to conduct forced entry missions even at the low end of the operational level of warfare. The 300-ship Navy would limit future amphibious operations to "Grenada" size operations. Even this size of operation would require longer

planning/slower response time due to the smaller number of forward deployed amphibious ships.

Under the 300-ship Navy, the nation's ability to respond unilaterally, at the operational level of warfare, when American interests are threatened is questionable. The United States would only be able to project power conventionally at the tactical level of warfare. Therefore, the United States would be forced to rely more heavily on joint and coalition warfare to accomplish its objectives.

The strategic situation that the United States faces in the near future will be fundamentally different from the one it faced during the Cold War and even the one it faces today. If the United States and Russia continue to follow through on their agreements to reduce the size of their strategic nuclear forces, then at some point the United States will be forced to shift to an assured destruction strategy.

The level of destruction required to fulfill the United States' assured destruction capability, which was determined by the Secretary of Defense and accepted by the President and Congress, is 400 EMT. Very conservative calculations of the EMT on patrol under the 300-ship Navy show that the SSBN force could deliver 522 EMT and still maintain a sizable strategic reserve capability. Therefore, the 300-ship Navy's SSBN force appears to meet the nation's assured destruction capability requirements for the post Cold War era. Additionally, it demonstrates that the SSBN force alone is all that is needed if the nation shifts from a countervailing strategy to an assured destruction strategy.

Additionally, the 300-ship Navy would not be able to fulfill its required reconstitution roles. Instead the United States would be forced to rely more heavily on its strategic nuclear forces to deter the attack of a REGT.

Major changes in our national policy have occurred in the last three years. This has changed the required roles and missions the Navy must fulfill. The Navy must recognize these changes and plan accordingly. A consensus of opinion, based on merit, must be reached by the Navy's leadership about what course the Navy will steer in the future. Additional defense budget cuts are going to occur, and if the Navy continues to use bureaucratic compromise to make force structure decisions it will find itself drifting aimlessly into the next century.

I. INTRODUCTION

Although Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait received most of the news coverage on August 2, 1990, another event which arguably will have much greater historical significance also occurred that day. This event was President Bush's speech at the Aspen Institute which described the new national security strategy for the United States.¹ Bush's plan laid out new national objectives; and called for a drastic restructuring of the U.S. military establishment and defense policy.

This new defense agenda calls for recasting U.S. defenses around four major principles: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The first three of these sound familiar. However, beneath the superficial similarity to past U.S. principles, important differences exist. The strategy calls for maintaining a much smaller active and reserve force mix primarily focused on presence and world-wide major contingency operations -- not a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. If forces were required to fight a major war against the Soviet Union, the United States assumes that there would be sufficient time to reconstitute them. This shift from a focus on the "worst case" threat to the "most likely" case will have major programming and strategy implications in both the near term and the long run.²

There are three important assumptions behind this new strategy. First, that the military threat from the former Soviet Union has been significantly reduced. This allows the United States to have eight to ten years of warning prior to a resurgent/emergent global threat (REGT) once again threatens to launch a major conventional offensive into Europe. Second, NATO will still

¹"Remarks by the President to the Aspen Institute Symposium (as delivered), Office of the Press Secretary (Aspen, CO), the White House, August 2, 1990, 6 .

²See James J. Tritten, "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force," in *Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy*, Tritten, J.J. and Stockton, P.N., eds. (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 9.

exist. This is tied into the new strategy's concept of reconstitution.³ Lastly, that the total resources devoted to defense can be reduced by at least 25-30 percent from fiscal years 1991-1994.⁴

The Bush Administration's proposed force structure is termed the Base Force by the Department of Defense (DOD). Under the Base Force, the recommended force level for the Navy fell from a goal of 600 ships (545 actual ships) to approximately 448 ships. This included 12 deployable aircraft carriers and 1 devoted to training, 13 carrier airwings (CVWs), 150 surface combatants with no battleships, a 2-1/2 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine Corps of around 159,000 personnel with simultaneous amphibious lift for the assault echelons of 2-1/2 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).⁵

Since the Base Force originally was in part based on the existence of a Soviet threat, the Soviet Union's failed coup, which occurred in August 1991, and its subsequent dissolution combined with domestic economic difficulties have caused many individuals, including newly elected Bill Clinton, to call

³See James J. Tritten, *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 17-18. "Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or regeneration-- it is more like what the United Kingdom had planned during the interwar years, when it assumed that up to ten years of strategic warning would be available. New defense manufacturing capability and new forces and military would be built from the ground up."

⁴For detailed examination of the New National Security Strategy see: James J. Tritten "America Promises to Come Back: The President's New National Security Strategy," *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1991, p.173-234; Tritten's "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force," in *Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Strategy*; Tritten's *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back*; and President George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, D.C. : GPO, August 1991).

⁵Tritten's "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force," in *Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security*, 16.

for more drastic cuts in defense spending.⁶ President Bush made some concessions in his 1992 State of the Union address by agreeing to a 30 percent cut in defense spending (i.e., an additional \$50 billion spread out over 5 years), but he warned, "This far and no further." Many individuals were still not satisfied. The other two presidential candidates proposed additional cuts on the order of \$40 to \$60 billion, and some in Congress have proposed additional cuts on the order of \$150 to \$200 billion.⁷ The recent election of Bill Clinton will result in America's military becoming even smaller and less expensive. The real questions are how much smaller will the military become, and how much will the defense budget be cut by?⁸

Under this emerging national security strategy, what roles and missions is the Navy required to fulfill? What impact will additional defense cuts have on the Navy's ability to fulfill these roles and missions? What size of Navy

⁶For detailed examination of the debate see: P. Towell, and G. Hager, "Soviet Union's Disintegration Spurs Call for Defense Cuts," *Congressional Quarterly*, September 14, 1991, 2631-4; P. Towell, "Defense Spending Bill to Test B-2 Bomber," *Congressional Quarterly*, September 21, 1991, 2703-4; E.A. Palmer, "Defense Budget Wins Approval; Clouds on '93 Horizon," *Congressional Quarterly*, November 23, 1991, 3468-9; D.S. Cloud, "Bush Talks of Defense Cuts, Loosening Budget Pact," *Congressional Quarterly*, January 4, 1992, 15; P. Towell, "The Defense Budget: A Pre-emptive Strike?" *Congressional Quarterly*, January 18, 1992, 103; and G. Hager, "Budget Drama, Act II: Scenarios for Chaos," *Congressional Quarterly*, January 25, 1992, 156-9.

⁷For detailed examination of the debate see: P. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold War Era," *New York Times*, February 17, 1992; P. Tyler, "Aspin Asks More Cuts in Military," *New York Times*, February 23, 1992; Representative Les Aspin, *An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options* (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Congress, February 25, 1992); R. Maze, "Democrats Target 200,000 More Jobs," *Navy Times*, March 9, 1992; R. Maze, "Cheney: Firing 300,000 'Ain't Painless,'" *Navy Times*, March 16, 1992; S. Dentzer, "Ross Perot's Bitter Tonic," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 3, 1992, 45-49; S. Daggett, and R. Goldich, "Defense Policy: Threats, Force Structure, and Budget Issues," CRS Issue Brief, August 25, 1992, 14; and W. Matthews, and T. Philpott, "Bush vs. Clinton," *Navy Times*, October 5, 1992.

⁸B. Auster, "Fighting Tomorrow's Wars," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 16, 1992, 77-78.

would the nation have? What types of ships should the Navy have? Is it time for the Navy to rethink its Cold War procurement and deployment practices? The purpose of this paper is to discuss these and related questions in order to assist in determining future roles, missions, and force structure for the U.S. Navy. It is recognized that in this era of joint operations the capability of one of the branches of the Armed Services complements, enhances and enables the capabilities of the others. This paper does not attempt to prove the superiority of one branch over the other, but rather looks at the future of the Navy.

Strategic planning starts with an analysis of either the threat, the goals, or the available resources. In the United States, war planning generally starts with the threat (or goals). While program planning officially starts with the threat, it usually really starts with available resources. The Bush Administration attempted to guide the current defense budget debate by developing a new U.S. national security strategy that was budget driven. Thus, the budget now drives strategy (goals) which drives force structure which drives threat scenarios. "Breaking the budget's stranglehold on strategy will be extraordinarily difficult without the rallying point of a principal threat and may perhaps be impossible given the likelihood, indeed the certainty, that the defense budget will be driven even lower by economic necessity and scarcity.

Second, without clear, crisp, and enforceable strategic direction and policy objectives, the cumulative effect of the budget cuts, if the past is any guide,

will be to exacerbate and magnify the diminution in aggregate military capability."⁹

Although predicting what future defense spending will be may be impossible, a study which examines the capability that the nation will have at a given level of defense spending could provide some of the missing ingredients to our nation's current debate over defense spending by revealing the restrictions these spending cuts will place on U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, it may help ensure the most efficient spending of limited defense resources.

This paper will start with an assumption about the amount of resources which will be made available for defense spending in the future. An analysis of roles and missions for the Navy under a new strategy will then be conducted. Due to the fact that, in many ways, the historical analogy for today's strategic environment is the 1920s, this analysis will also include an historical examination of the role the Navy has played in fulfilling the nation's policies.¹⁰ The purpose is to look for examples that the Navy can follow in these tough budget times.

A probable force structure will then be offered that can be afforded under the assumed defense spending. An examination of this force structure will be conducted to determine which roles and missions cannot be fulfilled.¹¹ The

⁹Harlan K. Ulman, *In Harm's Way: American Sea Power and the 21st Century*, (Silver Springs, MD: Bartelby Press, 1991), 149.

¹⁰See *National Security Strategy for the United States*, 3; and Ulman, 10-14.

¹¹Chief of Naval Operations, ADM. Frank B. Kelso, II testified before Congress, on March 11, 1992, that additional budget cuts would result in the Navy not being able to fulfill all of its assigned roles and missions. U.S. Congress, House, Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, "FY-93 Navy Budget," Committee Hearing, 102th Cong., 2nd Session, 1992, 61-2.

purpose of this is to relate decreases in defense spending to decreases in the capability of the Navy.

It is realized that this paper cannot describe every possible alternative force structure, but it can contribute to meaningful discussion about the future of the U.S. Navy. This paper will take a macroscopic look at the problem. The critical assumption this paper makes deals with training and readiness. It is assumed that the DOD will not repeat the mistakes of the post-Vietnam build-down which resulted in a "hollow" U.S. military force with a significantly reduced war fighting capability.

II. FUTURE DEFENSE SPENDING ASSUMPTION

The first order of business is to look at the proposed levels of future defense spending. The Bush Administration's request for fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1997 is seen as the best possible case for future defense spending.

The next step is to assume a future level of defense spending. This assumption will be used for the analysis of the Navy throughout the rest of this paper. This assumption is not intended to be a prediction of what the outcome of the current battle over the defense spending will be, but rather to show how dramatically the roles and missions which the Navy can fulfill will change with each additional decrease in defense spending.

Table 1 shows the DOD budget authority for FY 1992 through 1997. In one year's time the Bush Administration has decreased requested defense spending by \$63.8 billion (\$50.4 billion in program cuts, and another \$13.4 billion that was a result of adjustments in the baseline for inflation) for this period. The final row is this paper's assumed level of defense spending for the same period. This level assumes an additional \$175 billion decrease in defense spending over the period FY 1993 through 1997.

Although percentages can be misleading depending upon the baseline figures used, this assumed budget calls for about double the cuts originally agreed upon under the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990. For FY 1991, the first year under the BEA, defense was cut eight percent below the baseline, which was the previous year's level plus inflation. If defense spending was funded through 1995 at levels proposed under the BEA, defense spending

would fall \$235 billion below the baseline.¹² This original \$235 billion decrease in spending was termed a 25 percent cut in defense spending, therefore for consistency this paper's assumed budget will be called the "50 percent decrease" budget.

TABLE 1. DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (\$ BILLIONS)

	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>CUM</u> <u>92-97</u>
President's FY 1991 Budget	278.3	277.9	278.7	280.7	282.6	287.4	
Adjusted Summit Level	277.5	275.6	275.8	278.3	279.9	284.6	-13.4
Program Adjustments (Rescissions/ Supplemental)	6.6	-8.0	-8.0	-8.4	-9.5	-10.0	-50.4
President's FY 1993 DOD Budget	270.9*	267.6	267.8	269.9	270.4	247.6	-63.8
Additional Decrease		-20.0	-30.0	-40.0	-40.0	-45.0	-175.0
50% Decrease DOD Budget	270.9*	247.6	237.8	229.9	230.4	229.6	-238.8

*Excludes the cost of Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Source: Secretary of Defense briefing charts used during DOD Budget Briefing January 29, 1992. The 50% Decrease DOD Budget is provided by the author.

Table 2 shows DOD budget authority in constant FY 1993 \$ billion. These figures are needed in order to make meaningful projections about future defense spending. Note that the "50 percent decrease" budget will result in a cumulative 47.1 percent real decline in defense spending since 1985.

¹²See R. Doyle and J. McCaffery, "Defense and Budget Enforcement Act of 1990," (unpublished paper).

TABLE 2. DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 CONSTANT \$ BILLIONS)

	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>
Summit Level	277.9	268.0	260.5	252.8	248.7
% Real Decline	-3.7	-3.6	-2.8	-3.0	-1.6
President's FY 1993 DOD Budget	267.6	258.0	250.4	241.8	237.5
% Real Decline	-7.0*	-3.6	-2.9	-3.4	-1.8
Cumulative % Real Decline since 1985	-28.8	-31.3	-33.3	-35.6	-36.7
50% Decrease DOD Budget	247.6	229.1	213.3	206.0	198.6
% Real Decline	-13.5*	-7.5	-6.9	-3.4	-3.6
Cumulative % Real Decline since 1985	-34.0	-38.9	-43.2	-45.1	-47.1

*From Enacted level excluding cost of Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Source: Secretary of Defense briefing charts used during DOD Budget Briefing January 29, 1992. The 50% Decrease DOD Budget is provided by the author.

Unless a crisis or an "identifiable" threat emerges, political or economic pressures will continue to drive down defense spending. The only question is how much. To get an idea of what defense spending might be like at the turn of the century the "50 percent decrease" budget must be projected into the future. Table 3 gives an example of what DOD budget authority might be through FY 2005. Four scenarios are provided to cover a range of possible futures for defense spending. This results in a worse case scenario of a \$143.5 billion defense budget by FY 2005.

**TABLE 3. PROJECTED GROWTH IN DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993
CONSTANT \$ BILLIONS)**

	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>2003</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>2005</u>
Scenario 1									
(+2% growth)	198.6	202.6	206.7	210.8	215.0	219.3	223.7	228.2	232.8
Scenario 2									
(no growth)	198.6	198.6	198.6	198.6	198.6	198.6	198.6	198.6	198.6
Scenario 3									
(-2% growth)	198.6	194.6	190.7	186.9	183.2	179.5	175.9	172.4	169.0
Scenario 4									
(-4% growth)	198.6	190.7	183.2	175.9	169.0	162.2	155.7	149.5	143.5

Source: The author

The next step is to determine how much of this future defense spending will be spent on the Navy. Table 4 shows the percentage of the total DOD budget authority that each service received during the period FY 1990 through 1993. (Note FY 1993 data is based on the Bush Administration's proposed budget.) The Navy received 32.9 percent, which is consistent with its post World War II historical average.¹³

¹³See Donald C. Daniel, "Beyond the 600-Ship Navy," *Adelphi Paper 261*, (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Studies), 6-8.

TABLE 4. DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY BY SERVICE (\$ BILLIONS)*

	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>FY 1990-3</u>
Army	77.9 (26.8%)	72.5 (26.3%)	67.0 (24.7%)	63.3 (23.7%)	25.4%
Navy	99.5 (34.2%)	94.9 (34.4%)	84.8 (31.3%)	84.6 (31.6%)	32.9%
Air Force	92.4 (31.8%)	83.6 (30.3%)	80.2 (29.6%)	83.9 (31.3%)	30.7%
Defense Agencies	18.3 (6.3%)	20.6 (7.5%)	21.2 (7.8%)	21.3 (7.9%)	7.4%
Defense Wide	2.9 (1.0%)	4.4 (1.6%)	17.7 (6.5%)	14.6 (5.5%)	3.7%
Grand Total	291.0	276.0	270.9	267.6	

*Excludes cost of Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Source: Secretary of Defense briefing charts used during DOD Budget Briefing January 29, 1992. Percentage figures added by the author.

The final step is to determine the probable Department of the Navy (DON) budget authority under the "50 percent decrease" budget. Using possible future levels of budget authority from Tables 2 and 3, and possible Navy shares of 30, 33 (today's share), 40, and 50 percent, Table 5 shows the fiscal consequences for the Navy.

TABLE 5. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY BUDGET AUTHORITY (FY 1993 CONSTANT \$ BILLIONS)

DON Share (percent)	50% Decrease Budget for FY 1993-1997					Possible Future Range	
	<u>247.6</u>	<u>229.1</u>	<u>213.3</u>	<u>206.0</u>	<u>198.6</u>	<u>185</u>	<u>145</u>
30	74	69	64	62	60	56	44
33	82	75	70	68	65	61	48
40	99	92	85	82	79	74	58
50	124	115	107	103	99	93	73

Source: Data is from the author's tables. Format for this table is Harlan K. Ulman, *In Harm's Way: American Seapower and the 21st Century*, 157.

For the near term (through FY 1997), the DON budget authority, under the "50 percent decrease" budget, is most likely to be in the \$60 to \$80 billion range. In the longer term (through FY 2005), the DON budget could decrease to the \$45 to \$55 billion level depending upon the economy and the emergence of a perceived threat.

These figures will be used later to show the size and makeup of the Navy that the nation can afford in the future. It should be noted that it would be wrong to create the impression that there is a specific formula that relates budgets and force structure. There is no formula that can do this. A very large navy can be built for "little" money if the ships are small, inexpensive, and of low capability, or if training and readiness are sacrificed. Conversely, a small high quality navy could have a "big" price tag. As stated earlier, this paper assumes the Navy will not sacrifice training and readiness. Therefore, it is possible to make some cost versus force size/capability comparisons.

III. HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN FULFILLING NATIONAL POLICY

Since the present can seldom be properly understood except in light of the past, significant elements of our national policy and the Navy's role in support of that policy are traced from the American Revolution down to the present. It should be noted that a number of major changes in our national policy have occurred since 1775 and that the Navy's role has changed accordingly.

U.S. policy and its related national objectives have gone through three major stages and is arguably entering its fourth stage. In the first stage (1775-1890), the driving force was the desire to complete the internal consolidation of the United States as a nation. During this period the nation increased its importance in the Western Hemisphere. The Navy performed admirably but was far from being a major force in the world. Additionally, the Navy did not play a dominant role in the nation's policy due to the policy's related objectives. The size varied throughout the period, but was usually extremely small unless a conflict gave the nation a reason to build new ships.

In the second stage (1890-1945), the United States emerged as a world power. American policy fluctuated between a desire to project American power and influence, and a desire to avoid international responsibilities. One of the driving forces behind the nation's new national policy and subsequent rise in the importance of the Navy was Alfred Thayer Mahan.

According to Mahan, expanding foreign commerce was essential to national power and prosperity. To compete successfully a nation must have

a strong merchant marine. These vessels required secure ports at their destinations and protection throughout their voyages. Therefore, a nation needed to have overseas colonies, and a powerful Navy. Such a navy was also necessary to defend the colonies, and the colonies, in turn, provided bases to support overseas operations.

Mahan stressed the need for a navy capable of engaging in offensive naval warfare in order to support defense in the political sense. A navy capable of only defensive military action would leave "the enemy at ease as regards his own interests, and at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting." Additionally, Mahan believed a strong Navy would provide a "shield of defensive power" behind which America could mobilize in time of war.

The United States gradually began to follow Mahan's advice and build up its naval forces. Finally with the Naval Act of 1916, Congress authorized the building of a "Navy second to none." After World War I new construction virtually stopped until the mid 1930s. During the interwar period the Navy was used in its role of a "shield of defensive power"; acting as the country's first line of defense. Smaller less capable ships were deployed in small numbers throughout the world; but the majority of the ships were kept in one fleet, which was shifted between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in order to achieve Mahan's principle of "concentration of forces."

Despite the fall off in new construction and the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy entered World War II much better prepared for combat than it ever had in the past. A solid base of the fleet that would be

used in the war already existed, and the additional ships which would be needed were at least in the blueprint state by 1941.¹⁴

In the third stage (1945-1990), the United States accepted a peacetime position of world leadership and was determined to stop the spread of communism and to deter Soviet aggression. This was characterized by our support of the United Nations (UN), and various bilateral and multilateral collective security agreements throughout the world. Additionally, a new strategy of deterrence through nuclear weapons emerged.

The Navy's role during this period went through many changes. Initially, after World War II, the Navy's concern centered on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and nuclear strike warfare. During the later 1950s and 1960s the focus shifted toward limited war and deterrence through nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). In the early 1970s, the Navy formally stated its four missions -- strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. Sea control was discussed as the dominant role throughout most of the 1970s. In the late 1970s, the focus shifted to flexible offensive forward global power protection, with a wide range of options, against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. This was later refined into "the Maritime Strategy" which justified the massive naval build-up of the 1980s. Throughout this period, Mahan's justifications for a strong Navy took

¹⁴For more detailed discussion on the Navy and its relationship to national policy during the first two stages see: L.K. Pomeroy, "The Navy and National Policy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1960, 90-97; and P.A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Paret, P., ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 444-479.

a back seat to the Soviet "threat" and the Navy's attempt to win the Cold War.¹⁵

The third stage of U.S. policy and its related national objectives ended over a period of three years (1989-1991). During this period the Berlin Wall fell; the Warsaw Pact dissolved; Germany reunified; democracy took hold in Eastern Europe; a U.N. sponsored international coalition successfully defeated Iraq; and the Soviet Union dissolved as communism collapsed as an ideology and way of life. In response to these changes and the country's economic difficulties discussed earlier, the United States is in the process of making drastic changes to its policies and objectives.¹⁶

In this fourth stage, the United States is now the lone superpower in the world and is looked upon as a stabilizing force throughout most of the world. The threat has vaguely been categorized as "the unknown and the uncertain."¹⁷ "The national interests and objectives include:

- * The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies to:

- Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and -- should deterrence fail -- repel or defeat

¹⁵See J.D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy"; J. Lehman, "The 600-Ship Navy"; and P.M. Swartz, "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1986, 1-47; and CAPT. Peter M. Swartz, USN, and Jan S. Breemer, Bibliographers, with James J. Tritten, Principal Investigator, "The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic in the 1980s" (Naval Postgraduate School, September 30, 1989).

¹⁶See General Colin Powell, *National Military Strategy 1992*, (Washington, D.C: GPO, January 1992); and *National Security Strategy of the United States*, .

¹⁷See *National Military Strategy 1992*, 3-4.

military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies.

- Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism.

- Improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities.

- Foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism.

- Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combating international traffickers and reducing demand at home.

- * A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

- Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space.

- * Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

- Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights.

-Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic, and social progress.

* A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

-Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.

-Aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking."¹⁸

In many ways, the nation's new policy is similar to its policy during the latter portion of the second stage (post World War I to the mid-1930s). There is a desire to project American power and influence, but there is also a desire to avoid international responsibilities (now termed "not of vital interest").¹⁹ Although the nation does not possess colonies or a strong merchant marine, it is still dependent on overseas markets, and requires a strong navy to protect shipping. The Navy and other military forces need to be capable of engaging

¹⁸See *National Military Strategy* 1992, 5.

¹⁹The United States has never possessed the ability to project conventional power at the strategic level of warfare. Under the Bush Administration's proposed new strategy the United States will only be able to project conventional power at the tactical level of warfare. Coalition style war fighting will be needed to project power at the operational level of warfare. For more details on the levels of warfare see, James J. Tritten, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992," *The Submarine Review*, July 1992, 19, "The strategic level of warfare is a global war fought generally between coalitions. The operational level of warfare is a major campaign; such as Desert Storm, Vietnam, or Korea. The tactical level of warfare is the Panama/Grenada invasions, or something less, and does not necessarily involve all the armed services and combat arms."

in offensive and defensive warfare to provide a "shield of defensive power" behind which the nation can reconstitute in time of global war.

Similar domestic economic problems exist which will translate into decreased defense spending and a smaller navy. Despite the expected fall off in new construction, the research and design (R and D) phase of the new strategy should ensure additional ships and aircrafts, which will be needed to fight a European-centered global war, will at least be on the drawing board at the start of the reconstitution.

This means the Navy will return to its pre-Cold War emphasis of contributing to events ashore. So although the waters may be unfamiliar, they are far from uncharted. The past may hold valuable lessons as the Navy decides how it wants to adjust to the future.

IV. THE NAVY'S ROLES AND MISSIONS UNDER THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Given the unpredictability of where or when future crises will occur, what role should the navy fulfill in support of these new national security objectives? The four fundamental elements of the Bush defense agenda (forward presence, deterrence, crisis response, and reconstitution) are used to develop future roles and missions for the Navy.²⁰

A. FORWARD PRESENCE

In this new era of regional threats the need for forward presence has become more important.²¹ Yet defense budget cuts and the closing of many overseas bases have prompted the DOD to reevaluate its traditional definitions of forward presence in order for the nation to continue to fulfill its many obligations.²² The new definition of forward presence emphasizes the need to "show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance

²⁰The following discussion is summarized from the *National Military Strategy 1992*, 6-9; *National Security strategy of the United States*, 25-31; Tritten's *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back*, 17-26; and an insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 61.

²¹See *National Security Strategy of the United States*, "In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threat to Europe or the danger of global war, the need to support a smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies ... will shape how we organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our forces." 25.

²²This is discussed in Tritten's, *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back*, 25-26.

regional stability, and provide crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access."²³

The planned reduction of forward land-based U.S. forces worldwide could mean naval forces will be increasingly responsible for fulfilling the objectives of forward presence. There are six roles for the Navy under forward presence. The first role is **peacetime engagement**. This is similar to the traditional presence role the Navy has historically fulfilled. It is needed to counter the image of an American global withdrawal as force reductions occur and fewer forces are forward based. The forward deployment of naval forces in this role "provides an underpinning for diplomatic activities which, when combined with other U.S. foreign policy initiatives, are influential in shaping events. These forward operations are oriented toward diplomacy, coalition building and the promotion of stability which fosters peace and cooperation."²⁴ Additionally, this role will also guarantee the freedom of the sea which will facilitate trade and improve the economic conditions of the United States and our allies. Typical missions include: Stationed forces; rotational overseas deployments; access and storage agreements; port visits; military-to-military relations; and joint and combined training exercises.²⁵ This role does not necessarily have to be fulfilled by aircraft carrier battle groups to be credible.²⁶

²³*National Military Strategy* 1992, 7.

²⁴See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 2.

²⁵This is discussed in Tritten's *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back*, 25-26.

²⁶For further discussions concerning naval diplomacy and credible naval presence see, James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979* (London: The MacMillan Press, 1981); Edward N. Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,

The second role is to **enhance crisis response capability**. Naval forces provide the National Command Authority with the ability to react to ambiguous warning in the early stages of a crisis. This timely show of force can stabilize the situation and permit diplomacy to prevail. By complicating the risk versus gain calculus of potential adversaries, we cause them to consider carefully the initiation of activity which might be counter to U.S. interests. Depending upon the crisis, forward deployed naval expeditionary forces can respond autonomously or become an enabling force about which a decisive joint/coalition based response can be shaped.²⁷

The third role is **protecting U.S. citizens**. This includes not only responsive and capable evacuation lift, but the ability to be able to do it in the midst of conflict. This could also include protection against terrorists by stopping vessels, suspected of containing terrorists or illegal arms shipments, on the high seas.

The fourth role is **combating drugs**. This involves ocean surveillance of potential drug traffickers, interdiction of drug shipments, and intelligence collection for counter narcotics agencies.

The fifth role is **humanitarian assistance**. This requires the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to disasters. As stated in the National Military Strategy, "Not only must our forces provide humanitarian aid, but as seen

1974); Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978); and Jan.S. Breemer, "Where Are the Submarines? Deterrence, Naval Presence, and the Submarine Fleet," *The Submarine Review*, October 1992, 28-37.

²⁷See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 2.

recently in Northern Iraq, in some cases they must also be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and project those in need."²⁸

The final role is **intelligence collection**. This requires the ability to overtly and covertly collect information, and then transmit real-time information to the National Command Authorities in time to avert or mitigate crises. This role is necessary under all four elements of the new defense agenda. Typical missions include maritime intelligence collection in support of national requirements; surveillance of air or naval forces that could act hostile against vital interests of the United States; and detection, tracking, and reporting vessels involved in terrorist-related activities.

B. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

Nuclear and conventional deterrence costs less than any level of conflict, and is the cornerstone of U.S. military strategy. As long as any nation possesses the nuclear weapons capability to attack the United States or U.S. forces abroad, deterrence of nuclear attack will be the highest priority. Conventional deterrence will rely on our ability to sustain credible forward presence and/or respond to crises in key regions. Deterrence is achieved by convincing a potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level, exceeds any possibility of gain.²⁹

²⁸See *The National Military Strategy* 1992, 15.

²⁹See *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 25-27; *National Military Strategy* 1992, 6; H.L. Garrett, F.B. Kelso and A.M. Gray, "The Way Ahead," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1991, 38-39; and Department of the Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), *Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, January 18, 1992), 2-3.

Under deterrence, the Navy has four roles. First, the Navy should be able to **deter use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies.** The ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will be used to fill this role during normal peacetime operations. The SSBN has long been recognized as the most survivable element of the nation's nuclear deterrence, and provides the nation with an assured second strike capability. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) as well as the unilateral initiatives of the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union have led to real reductions in on-alert nuclear weapons by both superpowers. As the United States has taken its bomber force off alert and deactivated half of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force in preparation for dismantling, the sea-based leg of the strategic triad has assumed more responsibility.³⁰

President Bush put the issue of non-strategic nuclear forces on the back burner with his nuclear initiatives of September 27, 1991. In a crisis, if the President deems it necessary, these tactical nuclear weapons can be brought back aboard the Navy's air, surface, and subsurface units to assist in fulfilling this role.³¹ The ability to fulfill this role depends upon the Navy maintaining its tactical nuclear weapons' administration, qualification and training programs. If these programs are cut to save money, then this capability will have to be reconstituted.

³⁰For further details, see Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Pete Williams, ASD (Public Affairs) Saturday, September 28, 1991," which followed the President's nuclear initiative address on national television.

³¹*Ibid.*

Second, the Navy should be able to **hold an adversary's nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction at risk**. By holding these weapons at risk, additional uncertainty with respect to the viability of these weapons is created in a potential enemy's mind. Attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft are the most effective way of hold threat SSBNs at risk. Russia is likely to continue to decrease its strategic warhead inventory. Their past preference has been toward land based ballistic missiles. Therefore, in the future the number of SSBNs that the United States needs to hold at risk may decrease or this role may even be eliminated. This possible decreased emphasis toward strategic ASW could free up attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft for other roles.

Carrier battle groups and cruise missile capable surface ships and submarines are capable of fulfilling this mission against Third World nations with a relatively small number of these weapons. The Navy may also fulfill this role by way of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)/GPALS capable platform. In the near future this seems unlikely due to the cost of this type of system. Political impediments must also be removed to allow the deployment of an ABM system. Until a land based system is deployed, it is unlikely that a sea based system will be developed.

Third, the Navy should be able to **deter the use of conventional weapons against the United States or its allies**. A quick reaction capability and the demonstrated willingness to use force in defense of vital interests act as significant deterrents to escalation of conventional crises.³² The Navy

³²See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 4.

possesses a full range of options including the carrier battle group with its imposing physical presence; the surface action group with its capability to fire hundreds of precision cruise missiles; and attack submarines, acting alone or in groups, with their capability to deny use of the seas or conduct precision strikes ashore. All these options have the ability to cripple vital elements of an aggressor's military and economic infrastructure, and the capability for sustained combat without requirements for forward basing. Additionally, this role can be fulfilled without risking negative foreign domestic opinion by having to place our forces within another country's borders. Overall, the availability of credible and sustainable naval forces provides the United States with many options, including diplomatic leverage to dissuade a regional aggressor.

Fourth, the Navy should be used to provide an **insurance policy with respect to a REGT**. This means retaining the capability to defeat or neutralize the Russian military in conflict. This would enable the nation to "hedge our bet" in case Russia dissolves into an authoritarian type of regime, or some other scenario developed that required the United States to rely on this insurance policy. This would also provide the United States with leverage to ensure Russia continues to decrease the size of its military.

C. CRISIS RESPONSE

Threats less than that of a global war, in the past assumed to be handled by forces procured to fight the former Soviet Union, now occupy the majority of programming war fighting contingencies. The 1991 *Joint Military Net Assessment* (JMNA) proposed a series of conventional conflict scenarios. These threats range from generic counterinsurgency (COIN)/narcotic

operations, to lesser regional contingencies (LRC), to major regional contingencies (MRC). An MRC might, if not properly handled, escalate into a regional war. Regional war is not viewed as a smaller version of the old global war.³³

The LRC threat scenarios are at the tactical level of warfare. The MRC threat scenarios are at the operational level of warfare, not at the strategic level of war.³⁴

The end of the Cold War may result in increased regional conflicts fueled by ethnic, cultural or economic differences, or control of resources. The range and scope of such contingencies can be many and varied. However, when U.S. interests are threatened, the goal will be constant -- where possible prevent conflict in consonance with U.S. national security objective. American forces must be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort with other nations.³⁵

Naval crisis response goals have been described as using peacetime presence forces to respond to a crisis area within seven days. Forward deployed and surge forces are expected to combine into *Expeditionary Strike*

³³See James J. Tritten, "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992," *The Submarine Review*, July 1992, 17-20.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 19. "The strategic level of warfare is a global war fought generally between coalitions. The operational level of warfare is a major campaign; such as Desert Storm, Vietnam, or Korea. The tactical level of warfare is the Panama/Grenada invasions, or something less, and does not necessarily involve all the armed services and combat arms."

³⁵See *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 28-29; *National Military Strategy* 1992, 7; *Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond*, 2-3; and "The Way Ahead," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1991, 38-39.

Fleets within thirty days. If the crisis is not contained by these efforts, the combined air, land, and sea forces would be organized within sixty days.³⁶

Under crisis response the Navy has three roles. First, the Navy should be able to conduct **regional sea denial**. This could range from enforcing blockade restrictions imposed on specified adversaries up to establishing local sea superiority during a conflict. This could require a full range of capabilities including: anti-surface warfare (ASUW); anti-submarine warfare (ASW); anti-air warfare (AAW); mine warfare/counter measures; strike warfare; special warfare; and intelligence collection.

Second, the Navy should be able to conduct **precision strikes** in order to project power ashore. Traditionally this role has been fulfilled by aircraft from the carrier battle group (CVBG). The proven success of the Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) during Dessert Storm allows many naval platforms to credibly contribute to this role.³⁷ The use of cruise missiles also decreases the risk of American casualties, and therefore decreases the likelihood of negative public opinion affecting the outcome of the conflict. Between the two options the Navy is capable of striking over 75 percent of the earth's land mass.³⁸ Additionally, both options have the capability to remain within weapon's range of the target for sustained periods of time.

Third, the Navy should be able to provide **ground warfare support**. This role may overlap with the precision strike role, with aircraft and TLAMs

³⁶See Tritten's "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium, 12 May 1992," 21; and Department of the Navy ... *From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, 30 September 1992)

³⁷See ... *From The Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*.

³⁸See *Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond*, 15-16.

supporting joint or combined ground operations. Other missions include: amphibious warfare operations; maritime strategic lift; special warfare operations; coastal reconnaissance; and intelligence collection.

D. RECONSTITUTION

A fundamental concept in the Bush Administration's new strategy is that there will be sufficient warning prior to a European-centered global war to allow the United States to reconstitute its forces in adequate time to counter that threat or any REGT. Reconstitution is the generation of new forces to meet contingencies that require forces beyond those available from active and reserve components. Implicit in this concept are the assumptions that any military threat beyond regional crisis will also have to be built or reconstituted.³⁹

Under reconstitution, the Navy has four roles. First, the Navy should provide a **"defensive shield"** behind which the nation can reconstitute its forces in time of war. Due to the United States' geographical location and size, a strong navy can credibly hold off any large scale conventional attack. This should enable America to have the necessary time to rebuild the equipment necessary to achieve victory in a global war. In order to fulfill this role the Navy will require a core of modern, capable forces, plus a ready reserve.

Second, the Navy should be able to **guarantee the freedom of the seas** for our nation and its allies. The U.S. military's reliance on foreign parts and

³⁹See *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 28-29; *National Military Strategy* 1992, 7; *Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond*, 2-3; and "The Way Ahead," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1991, 38-39.

resources is likely to increase as the United States cuts its defense budget. By guaranteeing the freedom of the seas, the United States will be able to ensure it receives the resources necessary to reconstitute its military. Additionally, it will enable the United States to ensure joint/coalition equipment and forces can be lifted by sea to fight and defeat a REGT.

Thirdly, The Navy should **maintain a credible naval shipbuilding capability**. The maintenance of this nation's naval shipbuilding capability is included in the concept of reconstitution. This role involves deterring the emergence of a competing naval power through the maintenance of a credible naval shipbuilding capability. This capability could be used to reconstitute forces when called upon.

The final role is **maintenance of naval superiority**. This role involves deterring the emergence of a competing naval power through the maintenance of superior naval forces, and thus make it too costly for any potential adversary to consider building credible naval force. Additionally, this should provide sufficient warning time for the United States if a REGT attempted to build up its naval forces in order to challenge the United States. This warning time should allow the United States to reconstitute its forces in time to fight and defeat any REGT.

V. FORCE STRUCTURE WITH A 50 PERCENT SPENDING DECREASE

It would be wrong to create the impression that there is a specific formula that will relate budgets and force structure. There can be wide differences in opinion with respect to how large a navy can be bought for a given amount of money. For example, a recent Congressional Budget Office study contradicted the Administration's Base Force figures. They felt the Navy could only live without real budget growth if procurement costs for ships and weapons remained stable, and the fleet was reduced to 310 ships (including support) by 2010 (it should be noted that these numbers were contingent on the Navy building both Seawolf submarines and AX aircraft).⁴⁰ Another Congressional Budget Office estimate on the effect of additional budget cuts show that an additional ten percent cut in the defense budget beyond the Administration's original plan (i.e., a \$250 billion defense budget) will drive naval force levels down to 10 to 11 aircraft carriers and fewer than 400 ships overall; and Douglas Johnston's, Executive Vice President for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, rough rule of thumb for defense cuts states "for each additional \$50 billion across-the-board cut beyond that already built into the defense budget, a reduction of one to two aircraft carriers and about 50 ships can be expected."⁴¹

⁴⁰See Congress, Congressional Budget Office, *Statement of Robert F. Hale, Asst. Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, Before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate* (Washington, D.C.: CBO, June 14, 1991), 4 and 29.

⁴¹D. Johnston, "NATO Realignment and the Maritime Component," *The Submarine Review*, October 1992, 23.

This paper does not factor in procurement growth, and assumes that training and readiness will not be sacrificed in order to maintain a larger force structure. Additionally, the effect and cost of decommissioning a large number of ships is not accounted for.

When predicting future force structures, examining alternative ways of carrying out roles and missions is difficult. First, no model or test is foolproof. Second, the military has a strong operational and tactical bias against departing from proven force structures. Although the DON's recent reorganization should help come up with less biased solutions, in the short term each warfare specialty is likely to continue to fight for its community's "turf," especially if large defense budget cuts occur. Thus, many times decisions are based on bureaucratic compromise rather than merit. Finally, the political reality of the situation is that the Navy must also convince Congress of the merit of alternatives. Seldom is a consensus reached, and the results is, once again, bureaucratic compromise.⁴²

Procurement realities mean that the Navy can really argue over numbers rather than type of basic platform to be bought. The only type of aircraft carrier that the Navy can presently build is a Nimitz class. An alternative type of aircraft carrier would take at least 10 to 15 years to develop. Therefore, the Navy can only really decide how many Nimitz-class ships it needs, and not on what type of carrier it needs.

Thus, downsizing tends to be along current force posture rather than determining new ways of accomplishing roles and missions. For these

⁴²See Ulman, 190-191; and D. Steigman, "Reorganization: Will It Work?" *Navy Times*, August 10, 1992.

reasons, the most probable force structure with a 50 percent decrease in defense spending would be a proportional cut of the existing force structure.

Table 6 lists the last published version of the Navy's 600-ship plan, plus the composition of the fleet based on proportional reductions of 25 (i.e., the Base Force) and 50 percent. In examining the capabilities of this navy it is assumed that deployment/maintenance cycles (with respect to length) will be similar to today's rate of 33 percent.

TABLE 6. PROPORTIONAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE 600-SHIP NAVY

<u>Ship Type</u>	<u>600-ship Navy no reduction</u>	<u>450-ship Navy 25% reduction</u>	<u>300-ship Navy 50% reduction</u>
Ballistic missile submarines	20-40	18	12
Aircraft carriers *	16	13	8
Battleships	4	0a	0a
Cruisers & Destroyers **	120	80	66b
Frigates **	104	65	52
General purpose submarines	100	80	50
Mine countermeasure ship	14	30	7
Amphibious ships	75	50	38c
Patrol combatants **	6	5	3
Combat logistic ships	65	50	33
Support/auxiliaries	60-65	60	31

* Aircraft carrier total includes CV/CVNs in service life extension programs (SLEP), maintenance, and includes the auxiliary training carrier (AVT).

** The Base Force specified 150 surface combatants.

a. All battleships have already been decommissioned

b. 20 CG and 46 DD

c. 8 assault carriers and 30 amphibious warships

Source: Donald C. Daniel, D.C., "Beyond the 600-ship Navy," *Adelphi Paper* 261, 14. The data for the 25% reduction is from the Bush Administration's planned Base Force. The data for the 50% reduction is provided by the author.

The twelve SSBNs are assumed to be Ohio-class submarines. This number is smaller than the START limit of eighteen Ohio-class, to account for the expected decrease in the nation's strategic warhead inventory. The President's desire to reduce strategic warheads to 40 percent below START counting limits will probably result in the Navy needing less SSBNs than planned for under the Base Force. The approximately 2300 SLBM warheads could be carried on 12 Trident SSBNs (1 Trident SSBN = 24 missiles x 8 warheads per missile = 192 warheads).⁴³ It is unlikely that SLBMs would be de-MIRVed significantly due to the fact this would significantly reduce the SSBNs cost effectiveness.⁴⁴ Eight SSBNs would actually be deployed on strategic deterrent patrols (4 per fleet). This issue will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.

The eight aircraft carriers are assumed to be CVNs. One carrier would be designated a training carrier and two would be in SLEP/overhaul, and could not be used to fulfill any of the roles discussed earlier except reconstitution. If one carrier remained home ported in Japan, six aircraft carriers would be cycled through the normal deployment cycle. This would result in one carrier per fleet forward deployed at any time. If necessary, probably four or five carriers could be made available in a crisis with a lot of difficulty especially if on different coasts. However, this might mean leaving one of the fleets without a forward deployed aircraft carrier.

⁴³For a good summary of the President's initiatives with respect to nuclear weapons see Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing on FY93 DoD Budget with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Donald Atwood, ASD (Acquisitions) Wednesday, January 29, 1992."

⁴⁴MIRV refers to Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles.

The twenty cruisers are assumed to be Ticonderoga-class. Six to seven cruisers would be forward deployed (3-4 per fleet). The forty destroyers are assumed to be a mix of thirty-one Spruance-class and fifteen Burke-class. Fifteen to sixteen destroyers would be forward deployed (7-8 per fleet). The fifty attack submarines are assumed to be a mix of twenty-four Improved Los Angeles-class and twenty-six Los Angeles-class. This would result in sixteen forward deployed submarines (8 per fleet). The assault carriers are assumed to be a mix of four Wasp-class and four Tarawa-class. This would allow two or three assault carriers to be forward deployed (1-2 per fleet). Finally, the thirty amphibious ships would allow ten to be forward deployed (5 per fleet). Tables 7 and 8 summarize the number of ships, CVBGs, ARGs, and MEUs per fleet that would be forward deployed under the proportional reduction model.

**TABLE 7. NUMBER OF SHIPS FORWARD DEPLOYED UNDER
PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION MODEL ***

<u>Ship Type</u>	<u>LANTFLT</u>	<u>PACFLT</u>
Aircraft carriers	1	1
Cruisers	3	4
Destroyers	7	8
Assault carriers	1	1
Amphibious warships	5	5
SSBNs	4	4
General-purpose submarines	8	8

* Based on a 33 percent deployment rate and an OPTEMPO of 50.5 days/qtr. deployed and 29.0 days/qtr. non-deployed⁴⁵.

Source: The author

**TABLE 8. NUMBER OF CVBGs, ARGs AND MEUS FORWARD DEPLOYED
UNDER PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION MODEL ***

<u>Category</u>	<u>LANTFLT</u>	<u>PACFLT</u>
CVBGs	1	1
Amphibious ready group	1	1
MEUs	1	1

* Based on a 33 percent deployment rate and an OPTEMPO of 50.5 days/qtr. deployed and 29.0 days/qtr. non-deployed.

Source: The author

In order to enable each fleet to have one carrier battle group (CVBG) and one amphibious assault group continuously forward deployed, the size of each would have to be reduced. This would seem to be consistent with the

⁴⁵See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, "OPTEMPO is the number of days per quarter a ship is underway steaming. The Chief of Naval Operations' goal is 50.5 days per quarter deployed and 29.0 days per quarter non-deployed. These figures are derived on the basis of proven underway requirements to sustain training and operational readiness. These balanced guidelines, established to maintain readiness over the long haul, are fully supported by the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Navy," 7-9.

Navy's current plans with respect to future task forces.⁴⁶ The CVBG (excluding frigates and support ships) would include one aircraft carrier, one or two cruisers, three or four destroyers, and three attack submarines. The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) (excluding frigates and support ships) would include one assault carriers, one or two cruisers, three destroyers, two or three attack submarines, and five amphibious warships.

In areas where the CVBG or ARG were not available or their vast power were not fully needed to handle a crisis, the Maritime Action Group (MAG) could be an alternative building block for naval operations. The MAG, as described by VADM William Owens the Navy's Deputy Chief for Resource, Warfare Requirements and Assessments, consists of two surface ships (usually a cruiser and a destroyer), an attack submarine, and an alert P-3 aircraft. It possesses significant AAW, ASUW, ASW and strike (via Tomahawk cruise missiles) capabilities. Creative deployment ideas, such as this, could add needed flexibility to the Navy and help compensate for force reductions.⁴⁷

If in the future Russia decides to reduce the size of its SSBN force, as discussed earlier, there would be a decreased emphasis on strategic ASW. Then the proportional reduction model would appear to contain too many

⁴⁶Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett, III summarized future task forces by stating the "... with a smaller fleet -- we will not always have a traditional carrier battle group to MODLOC in every potential trouble spot ... It simply won't be possible or necessary ... for us to lumbar around everywhere in our Cold War armor of dozen-ship carrier battle groups." CHINFO, Washington, D.C., Message 082104Z, November 1991; ... *From The Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*; and VADM W. Owens, "Mediterranean Fleet a Test-bed for Navy's Future," *Armed Forces Journal International*, July 1992, 32-35.

⁴⁷See Owens' "Mediterranean Fleet a Test-bed for Navy's Future," 32-5; and ADM. Paul David Miller, "Doing the Job with a Smaller Fleet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1992, 55-57.

attack submarines. Unless new roles were found for attack submarines, this may be an area that could be reduced further.⁴⁸ In fact some analyst recommend the submarine force be cut to pay for the rest of the Navy's force structure.⁴⁹

It should be noted that in the short term decommissioning nuclear submarines does not result in any immediate savings. This is due to the fact it costs significantly more to decommission a nuclear submarine than it does to operate it. Once built a submarine is the Navy's most cost effective platform, with an annual operating cost of only \$5 to \$10 million. That is about one-half that of a destroyer or frigate and only one-third that of a cruiser.⁵⁰

The rapid decrease to 300 ships by 1997 will make the Navy's ability to act as an insurance policy, against the Russian Navy, questionable. In the rush to reduce forces there will be little that could be done to influence the size of their Navy. If Russia continues to reform itself, the United States can probably stand to leave this role unfilled.

Maritime strategic lift may also suffer under the "50 percent decrease" budget. As the various warfare communities fight for funding, strategic lift is likely to take a back seat to the Navy's big ticket items. Instead the Navy may try to convince the Congress that the nation can rely on chartered vessels. Chartered ships, prominently foreign flag ships, delivered half the cargo

⁴⁸For ideas about future roles and missions see: *Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond*; and Breemer.

⁴⁹See "Owens: Carrier Level Doesn't Have To Drop If Budget Continues To Decline," *Inside The Navy*, October 5, 1992, 3.

⁵⁰See *Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond*, 20.

during Operation Desert Shield/Storm.⁵¹ If the U.S. is going to rely on coalition warfare under the auspices of international bodies, then the nation may be able to rely on foreign flag chartered ships again. The Navy would have to convince Congress that it is more cost effective to rely on chartered vessels than to buy and maintain a larger sealift capability. This will be difficult because the new strategy relies heavily upon the nation's strategic lift. If strategic lift is inadequate the whole strategy becomes questionable.

Currently Congress is demanding more money be spent to improve the nation's capability. Therefore, the Navy may be forced to give up warships to buy sealift. "Procuring roll-on/roll-off ships and keeping them at high readiness (the second tier, after maritime prepositioning) would ensure immediate access to needed ships. A program of 30 such ships would provide a robust sealift capability at a procurement cost of \$4.5 to \$7.0 billion depending on the mix of new and used ships. Ensuring prompt access to the Ready Reserve Force, (the RRF is the third tier), will require \$100 to \$200 million a year more in operations and maintenance funds."⁵²

Table 9 summarizes the composition of the 300-ship model that can be afforded under the "50 percent decrease" budget. The specific class of ship is only listed for major combatants and amphibious ships.

⁵¹See D. Kassing, "Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert: An Annotated Briefing," (Rand Note N-3508-AF/A/OSD, 1992), p. vi.

⁵²Ibid., 58-59.

TABLE 9. COMPOSITION OF THE 300-SHIP MODEL

Ship Type	Class of Ship	Number in Each Class	Total Number in Ship Type
SSBNs			12
	SSBN-726	12	
Aircraft Carriers			8
	CVN-68	7	
	CVN-65	1	
Cruisers			20
	CG-47	20	
Destroyers			46
	DD-963	31	
	DDG-51	15	
Frigates			52
SSNs			50
	SSN-688	26	
	SSN-688I	24	
Mine countermeasure ship			7
Amphibious Ships			38
	LHD-1	4	
	LHA-1	4	
	LSD-49	2	
	LSD-41	8	
	LSD-36	4	
	LST-1179	11	
	LKA-113	5	
Patrol combatants			3
Combat logistic ships			33
Support/auxiliaries			31

Source: The author.

VI. COMPARING THE BASE FORCE WITH THE 300-SHIP NAVY

In this period where there are many individuals who are calling for increased defense cuts to reap a "peace dividend" and jump start the economy, the issue of what capabilities the nation will lose often is not even discussed. The purpose of this chapter is *not* to become involved in this debate over how much the United States should cut out of its defense budget. Instead, this chapter will attempt to address objectively the capabilities of the Navy under the "50 percent decrease" budget as compared to the capabilities of the Navy under the Bush Administration's Base Force. It is hoped that this examination of capabilities that the nation will have at a given level of defense spending will provide some of the missing ingredients to our nation's current defense budget debate by revealing the restrictions these spending cuts will place on U.S. foreign policy.⁵³

A. BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

The 300-ship model has six less SSBNs than the Base Force. This might not fulfill the National Command Authority's **current** requirement for credible strategic deterrence. However, the strategic situation the United

⁵³The following discussion, in particular the data concerning the Base Force, is based in large part on the insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 7-12. It should be noted that the station-keeping multipliers cited by ADM Kelso are smaller than those cited by other naval analysts. For an example of navy sizing based on forward-deployment requirements see, Ronald O'Rourke, "Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy," *CRS Report for Congress*, November 13, 1992, "Depending on the kind of ship involved, its home port, and the distance to overseas operating region, the number of ships of a given kind required to keep one continuously forward-deployed in the overseas operating area -- the station-keeping multiplier -- can range from 4 to more than 8."

States faces in the near future will be fundamentally different from the one it faced during the Cold War and even from the one it faces today.

In 1990, U.S. strategic nuclear forces contained some 13,000 individual strategic nuclear warheads (4,500 on bombers, 2,500 on intercontinental land-based ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 6,000 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)). The START Treaty reduced this 13,000 to 9,500 individual strategic nuclear warheads (4,600 on bombers, 1,400 on ICBMs, and 3,500 on SLBMs). The START accounting procedures had discounted value for strategic nuclear warheads on bombers so the number of accountable warheads with respect to START was 6,000.⁵⁴

On September 27, 1991, President Bush unilaterally took steps to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and to encourage the Soviets to do the same. This included standing down the bomber force from alert, and first standing down and then deactivating Minuteman IIs, 450 of U.S. ICBM launchers. Soviet President Gorbachev responded positively to these measures taking unilateral steps to reduce the Soviet nuclear stockpile.⁵⁵

President Bush proposed several unilateral and bilateral strategic nuclear force initiatives in his January 28, 1992, State of the Union Address. Unilaterally, the President announced the termination of the B-2 at 20

⁵⁴For a good summary of the number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons see Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing on FY93 DoD Budget with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Donald Atwood, ASD (Acquisitions) Wednesday, January 29, 1992."

⁵⁵For further details, see Department of Defense, "Department of Defense News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, Pete Williams, ASD (Public Affairs) Saturday, September 28, 1991," which followed the President's nuclear initiative address on national television; and Jack Mendelsohn, "Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Cuts," *Arms Control Today*, November 1991, 27-28.

aircraft, the cancellation of the small ICBM program, the termination of further production of the advanced cruise missile, and the elimination of further development of the W-88 warhead⁵⁶ (although production of the Trident D-5 missile would continue).⁵⁷

Bilaterally, the President proposed to eliminate all 50 Peacekeeper missiles, download the Minuteman IIIs from three warheads to one, reduce submarine warheads by a third, and shift many of U.S. strategic bombers to primarily conventional roles. In return, the President asked the Russians to eliminate all MIRVed land-based ICBMs, and to reduce strategic nuclear force levels consistent with the change in the threat from the West.⁵⁸

If all these initiatives were achieved U.S. strategic nuclear forces would be reduced to 4,700 individual strategic nuclear warheads (1,900 on bombers, 500 on ICBMs and 2300 on SLBMs). Using START accounting procedures this would be roughly 3,600 warheads.⁵⁹ These figures could be reached by the year 2003. If the United States assists Russia in the destruction of old warheads these numbers could be reached as early as the year 2000.⁶⁰

⁵⁶The W-88 warhead is the heavy warhead (300-475 KT) for the Trident D-5 missile. For more detail see, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1990) 216-217.

⁵⁷For further details on the President's initiatives see, Department of Defense News Briefing on FY 93 DoD Budget, January 29, 1992.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

⁶⁰See *The Military Balance 1992-1993* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992) 220-227.

To date the Russian response to these initiatives has been very positive. Additionally, Russian President Yeltsin has proposed further reductions in strategic nuclear forces. His proposals call for reductions to 2,000 to 2,500 individual strategic warheads per side (this would result in approximately 1,750 SLBMs).⁶¹

If the United States and Russia follow through on their agreements to de-MIRV land based ICBMs, then sea based warheads will comprise the majority the world's warheads. To measure the deterrence effectiveness of the 300-ship model's SSBN force the number of actual warheads and their equivalent megatons (EMT) on patrol needs to be examined.⁶² Figure 1 demonstrates the necessary calculations to determine the EMT on patrol.

⁶¹Ibid., 222-227.

⁶²Equivalent megatonnage (EMT) is used to acknowledge that the destructive power of nuclear weapons does not grow proportionately with yield.

8	Number of SSBNs on patrol (based on 33 percent deployment rate)
-1	Assumed number of SSBNs lost to strategic ASW
7	Number of surviving SSBNs
x24	Number of missiles per SSBN
168	Number of surviving missiles on patrol
x.75	Assumes 25% of the missiles are withheld for use as a strategic reserve
126	Number of missiles on patrol available for use
x.95	Assumed percentage of missiles that will work
119	Number of surviving missiles that will work
x8	Number of warheads per missile
952	Number of warheads launched toward Russia
x.95	Assumed percentage of warheads that will work
904	Number of warheads that make it to Russia
x.95	Assumed percentage of warheads that survive Russian ABM systems
858	Number of warheads that survive and explode
x.6089	EMT of one W-76 warhead (eMT= (.1) .2154434)
522	Amount of EMT on patrol (does not include those missiles withheld for strategic reserve)

Source: The author. *The Military Balance 1990-1991* was used to obtain data for the missiles and warheads.

Figure 1. Conservative Estimate of the Equivalent Megatons on Patrol Under the 300-Ship Model

The level of destruction required to reach our nation's "assured destruction" capability, which was based on a judgment reached by the Secretary of Defense and accepted by the President and Congress, has been influenced by the fact of strongly diminishing marginal returns. This level was determined to be 400 EMT. Delivering more warheads above this amount would not significantly change the amount of damage inflicted.⁶³

The very conservative calculations used in Figure 1 demonstrate that the 300-ship model's SSBN force could deliver 522 EMT and still maintain a

⁶³For a more detailed discussion concerning the level of EMT required for "assured destruction" see, Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969* (San Francisco and London: Harper Colophon Books, 1971), 207-210; and Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 369.

sizable strategic reserve capability. Therefore, the 300-ship model's SSBN force appears to meet the nation's "assured destruction" capability requirements for the post Cold War era. It also demonstrates that the SSBN force alone is all that is necessary if the nation shifts from a countervailing strategy/targeting to an assured destruction strategy/targeting.

B. FORWARD PRESENCE

The 300-ship model represents a 25% force reduction from the Base Force. This reduction, and adherence to current employment policies, would result in a significant reduction in U.S. naval forces forward operations. This would force the National Command Authority and the Unified Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) to either decrease the forward presence requirements or change the Chief of Naval Operation's employment policy guidelines. These numbers are derived on the basis of proven underway requirements to sustain training and operational readiness. These balanced guidelines, established to maintain readiness over the long haul, are fully supported by the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Navy.⁶⁴

1. OPTEMPO

As discussed earlier OPTEMPO is the number of days per quarter a ship is underway steaming. The goal is 50.5 days per quarter deployed and 29.0 days per quarter non-deployed.⁶⁵ The Navy has not been able to fulfill these goal for deployed ships since the late 1970s, and has just barely been able

⁶⁴See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 7.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 7.

to meet the goal for non-deployed ships, and this is with a navy significantly larger than the Base Force.⁶⁶ Therefore, the 300-ship model could not meet these guidelines unless there was a significant reduction in current employment policies.

If current employment policies are reduced significantly then the "forward presence" pillar of the Bush Administration's new strategy might crumble. This is due to the Navy's probable increased responsibility in fulfilling this role under this new strategy (as discussed earlier).

Conversely, if the OPTEMPO goal is increased so the 300-ship model can fulfill the current employment policies then the Navy's upkeep, maintenance and training operations policies will have to be revised. The long term result of these changes would be a less ready and poorer trained navy.

2. PERSTEMPO

PERSTEMPO is a consideration of the time available for Navy personnel for "training and other aspects of Quality of Life."⁶⁷ Once again a reduction to 300 ships without a corresponding reduction in operational requirements will result in longer deployments, shorter turn around time between deployments, and less training conducted in home port. This is likely to result in a less trained force with a lower quality of life. This is due to the fact most formal schooling opportunities, for personnel assigned to naval vessels, occur while the ship is non-deployed and that family separation will increase significantly. Given the fact that the United States

⁶⁶Ibid., Figure 9.

⁶⁷Ibid., 7.

plans to remain an all volunteer military force, this is likely to cause morale and retention in the naval service to fall.

3. Combined Exercises

Last year, Navy ships and Marine Corps personnel participated in 288 exercises involving 60 nations. Figure 2 shows the exercises in which U.S. naval forces were participating in on March 11, 1992 (the date of the CNO's testimony before Congress).⁶⁸ The 300-ship model would result in significantly fewer assets being available to participate in combined exercises.

Exercise Name	CV	Surface Ships	SSN	Amphib	Spt	Total
TEAMWORK 92	1	5	4	5	5	20
DISTANT THUNDER 92		3	1		1	5
GALARA 92				5		5
DOGFISH 92			2		1	3
INDUSA 92		2				2
LANTSUBICEX 2-92			1			1
GULFEX IX		1				1
TOTAL SHIPS:						37

Source: Insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, Figure 11.

Figure 2. Exercise Commitments (March 11, 1992)

The ability to work effectively with our allies, in coalition style warfare at the strategic and operational level of warfare, is one of the underlying elements that the Bush Administration's new strategy depends upon if the strategy is to succeed. The reduced opportunities to practice this style of warfare through combined exercises seriously reduces the effectiveness of new strategy.

⁶⁸Ibid., 8.

C. RESPONSE TIME

Response time is the time between the start of the crisis and the arrival of ships. According to ADM Kelso, "with the Bush Administration's proposed Base Force, the Navy, deploying about 30 percent of the available fleet, could provide an immediate response to a crisis anywhere in the world within seven days. It would comprise one Amphibious Strike Task Force, consisting of one CVBG and an ARG with an embarked MEU. A second CVBG could be available within fifteen days. A full MEB could arrive within thirty days. Hence, the most the sea services could deliver to a crisis area under this plan is a token force within a week, and a force about the size of one Army light division with an additional few squadrons of aircraft within a month."⁶⁹

Due to fewer ships in the 300-ship model, and without a change in current employment policies, the Navy would have fewer ships on station and more often no CVBG in theater to respond to a crisis. This would result in a delay in the arrival of the first CVBG if the crisis occurs during a period when no CVBG is on station in theater. Furthermore, fewer ships would be in a state of readiness to quickly deploy to the crisis, resulting in significant delays in the arrival of additional CVBGs deployed from U.S. bases. These delays in the arrival of initial forces could translate into critical delays in the arrival of heavy ground and air units.⁷⁰ Additionally, this increased response time could cause the crisis to develop into a situation requiring deployment of a larger number of U.S. forces.

⁶⁹See Tritten's "The New National Security Strategy and the Base Force," 23.

⁷⁰See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 8.

D. CVBG REQUIREMENTS

Under the 300-ship model the eight aircraft carriers are assumed to be CVNs. One carrier would be designated a training carrier and two would be in SLEP/overhaul. This represents a reduction of five operational aircraft carriers (7 vice 12 CV/CVNs) when compared to the Bush Administration's Base Force. Operation Desert Shield/Storm is a useful example to demonstrate the effect this reduction will have on the nation's ability to get CVBGs to crisis areas. Figure 3 shows the number of CVBGs that the Navy of February 1991 (note this force is bigger than the proposed Based Force) could sustain on station throughout this eight month crisis that the Navy participated in.⁷¹

6	Engaged in combat operations
3	Ready to Respond
2	Rotated to CONUS
3	Unavailable (depot maintenance)
14	Total CV/CVNs in the inventory (excludes AVT and CVN-72, which was not ready for combat operations)

Source: Insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 9.

Figure 3. CVBGs in Operation Desert Shield/Storm

According to the CNO, "using this Desert Shield/Storm example, it took 2.33 CVBGs (6 of 14) to sustain the participation of one CVBG engaged in combat operations throughout the crisis and fulfill the other requirements imposed on the Navy by the nation's leaders. The three CVBGs that were classified "ready to respond" and the two classified "rotated to CONUS" represent the rotational base needed to sustain the six CVBG level of effort

⁷¹See Ibid., 8-9; for CVBG data during Desert Shield/Storm.

required by Desert Shield/Storm. These five CVBGs could have responded to a second contingency, or been used to augment forces in Desert Storm, if necessary."⁷²

Thus, the Navy could have responded with eleven CVBGs in February 1991, if it deferred some routine maintenance and held in abeyance peacetime employment policies (OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO). This effort could not of been maintained indefinitely, but could have been maintained for two sequential crises of Desert Shield/Storm duration. Therefore, this maximum effort would require 1.27 CVBGs (11 of 14) to sustain the participation of one CVBG engaged in combat operations.⁷³

Current peacetime employment practices for each of the three forward deployed aircraft carriers employed by the Unified CINCs require a total of four CV/CVNs. This 1:4 ratio uses a methodology which includes factors such as transit time, deployment length, and maintenance and training requirements.⁷⁴

Table 10 uses these factors discussed above to determine how well the Base Force and 300-ship model would do in fulfilling a Desert Shield/Storm size crisis and the current peacetime employment practices. The Base Force is capable of fulfilling the current peacetime forward presence and rapid crisis response requirements. The Base Force comes close but is not able to match the Desert Storm equivalent goal of sustaining six CVBGs in combat operations, and would have a difficult time doing much more than

⁷²Ibid., 9.

⁷³Ibid., 9.

⁷⁴Ibid., 9 and Figure 13.

responding with a holding force to a second contingency of Desert Storm's equivalent. Overall, this force is judged capable of fulfilling the Bush Administration's goal of handling one and one-half crises.

TABLE 10. CVBG CAPABILITY OF THE BASE FORCE AND 300-SHIP MODEL

Type of Operation	Factor	CVBGs Available (Base Force) *	CVBGs Available (300-ship Model) *
Forward Presence and Rapid Crisis Response	1:4	3	2
Sustainable Combat Ops (Desert Storm equivalent)	1:2.33	5	3
Maximum Possible Combat Operations Effort	1:1.27	9	6

* These numbers are rounded to the next highest whole number.

Source: The factors are from the insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 8-9. Data for the Base Force and 300-ship model determined by the author.

The 300-ship model falls far short of being able to fulfill the Bush Administration's current goals. Unless the unified CINCs current requirements were changed only two carriers would be able to be kept forward deployed fulfilling forward presence and rapid crisis response roles. This will make the United States less able to deter crises and slow the U.S. response when attempting to handle crises before they escalate to a point that a large U.S. force deployment is required to successfully solve the crisis. Additionally, while the nation may be able to succeed with only three CVBGs in joint operations where significant coalition land air bases are available, it would be difficult for the U.S. military to fight its way into areas where it had

to secure hostile air bases for its use. Although some may argue that with maximum effort the 300-ship model is still able to respond with six CVBGs, it must be noted that this response would be significantly longer than the required time it took to get six CVBGs to Desert Shield/Storm in February 1991.

E. SURFACE COMBATANT (SC) REQUIREMENTS

The requirements for surface combatants (SCs) can be calculated using the same methodology used to determine CVBG requirements. The SCs are a major part of the Unified CINC's three required forward operating CVBGs and additionally comprise the Middle East Force (MEF), support Counter-Narcotic Operations, UNITAS, and Standing Forces Atlantic commitments. A total requirement of 40 SCs is needed to fulfill these commitments on a continuous basis. Current peacetime employment policies, which take into consideration transit times, deployment length, and maintenance and training requirements, result in a deployed to non-deployed ratio of 1:3.75.⁷⁵

Analysis of the number of SCs used in Operation Desert Shield/Storm and of the maximum possible two contingency effort indicate that deployed to non-deployed ratios are the same as those used to determine the CVBG requirements for these two categories. The required number of SCs needed to match these efforts are 73 and 134 SCs respectively⁷⁶ Table 11 use these factors to determine how well the Base Force and 300-ship model would do in

⁷⁵Ibid., 10 and Figure 13.

⁷⁶For exact calculations see, Ibid., 10 and Figure 13.

fulfilling a Desert Shield/Storm size crisis and current peacetime employment practices.

TABLE 11. SURFACE COMBATANT CAPABILITY OF THE BASE FORCE AND 300-SHIP MODEL

Type of Operation	Required SCs	Factor	SCs Available (Base Force) *	SCs Available (300-ship Model)*
Forward Presence and Rapid Crisis Response	40	1:3.75	40	32
Sustainable Combat Ops (Desert Storm equivalent)	73	1:2.33	64	52
Maximum Possible Combat Operations Effort	134	1:1.27	118	95

* These numbers are rounded to the next highest whole number.

Source: The factors are from the insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 10. Data for the Base Force and 300-ship model determined by the author.

The results of this analysis of the SC requirements are identical to that of the CVBG requirement analyses. The 300-ship model falls far short of being able to fulfill the Bush Administration's current goals. Unless the unified CINCs current requirements were changed, surface combatants would not be able to fulfill their forward presence and rapid crisis response roles using traditional deployment modes. New and innovative methods to fulfill these roles might help make up for the lack of numbers.⁷⁷ Still the U.S. response,

⁷⁷For ideas concerning possible future deployment modes see, Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett, III summarized future task forces by stating the "... with a smaller fleet -- we will not always have a traditional carrier battle group to MODLOC in every potential trouble spot ... It simply won't be possible or necessary ... for us to lumbar around everywhere in our Cold War armor of dozen-ship carrier battle groups." CHINFO, Washington, D.C., Message 082104Z, November 1991; ... *From The Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*; VADM W. Owens, "Mediterranean Fleet a Test-bed for Navy's Future," 32-35; and ADM. P. D. Miller, "Doing the Job with a Smaller Fleet," 55-57.

when attempting to handle crises before they escalate to a point that a large U.S. force deployment is required to successfully solve the crisis, will be significantly slower than what was experienced during Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

F. ATTACK SUBMARINES

Attack submarines are forward deployed with CVBGs to provide indication and warning and act as a potent force multiplier for the CVBG's capabilities in strike, anti-submarine (ASW), and anti-surface warfare (ASUW). Attack submarines are also forward deployed independently to provide the nation with unique intelligence, strike, strategic ASW, and special operations capabilities. Currently the Unified CINCs require approximately 14 continuously forward deployed attack submarines.⁷⁸ The 300-ship model with its total of 50 attack submarines (16 of which would be continuously forward deployed) can fulfill the CINC's requirements. Unless new roles are found for attack submarines this may be an area where further cuts could be made.⁷⁹

G. AMPHIBIOUS LIFT

Tables 12 and 13 summarize the amphibious lift capability under the 300-ship model and the lift requirements for various Marine Corps force structures (MEU, MEB, and MEF). They demonstrate that if all amphibious

⁷⁸See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 11.

⁷⁹The Submarine Force and Naval Submarine League have conducted numerous studies/symposiums to determine new and innovative future roles and missions for the Submarine Force. For examples see *Submarine Roles in the 1990s and Beyond*; Breemer; and Tritten's "Address to the Submarine Technology Symposium."

ships in the entire navy were made available there would only be enough lift to transport approximately 28,000 troops (this is the approximate size of the assault echelon (AE) for one MEF).

TABLE 12. AMPHIBIOUS LIFT CAPABILITY UNDER THE 300-SHIP MODEL

Ship	Number	Troops	Vehicle Space (ft ³)	Cargo Space (ft ³)	Helo a	LCAC
LHD-1	4	1873	22,000	101,000	42	3
LHA-1	4	1924	30,000	110,000	38	1
LSD-49	2	504	13,000	40,000	0	2
LSD-41	8	560	12,500	5,000	0	4
LSD-36	4	338	15,800	1,400	0	3
LST-1179	11	431	19,000	3,200	0	0
LKA-113	5	211	33,400	68,600	0	0
TOTALS	38	27,824	773,200	1,347,800	320	64

a. Helo spots are measured in CH-46 equivalents. 1 CH-46= 1.88 CH-53E or 1.38 AV-8B or .86 AH-1W.

Source: Polmar, N. *The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet*, 14th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987). Number of ships from the author's 300-ship model.

**TABLE 13. AMPHIBIOUS LIFT REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE BASE FORCE
IN 1997**

<u>Category</u>	<u>MEU</u>	<u>MEB (AE)^a</u>	<u>MEF (AE)^a</u>
Troop Berthing	2,758	9,445	24,674
Vehicle Space (ft3)	62,615	255,125	627,253
Cargo Space (ft3)	164,026	451,746	823,593
Deck Spots	*	167	345
LCAC Spots	6	22	58

* The MEU embarks on an LHA or LHD which has a "typical" composite squadron of 18 CH-46, 4 CH-53, 4 AH-1W, and 2 UH-1Ns.

a. The amphibious lift requirement actually represents only what is needed to lift the assault echelon (AE) of the force. The remaining troops, vehicles, and cargo will be transported to the area by Military Sea Lift Command vessels.

Source: The author is indebted to LT K. Szczublewski, USN, for performing the original calculations used to develop this table.

Using the number of ships forward deployed under the 300-ship model (see Table 7), there will be sufficient ships available to keep a MEU-level Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) forward deployed in each fleet. Table 14 details the composition for the MEU ARG and the percentage of required lift it provides using data from Table 13.

TABLE 14. MEU ARG LIFT CAPABILITY

<u>LHD Package</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Lift %</u>
LHD-1	Troop Capacity	142%
LSD-41	Vehicle Space	184%
LST-1179	Cargo Space	133%
LSD-49	Helicopter Spots	n/a
LSD-36	LCAC Spots	200%
LKA-113		
<u>LHA Package</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Lift %</u>
LHA-1	Troop Capacity	144%
LSD-41	Vehicle Space	195%
LST-1179	Cargo Space	139%
LSD-49	Helicopter Spots	n/a
LSD-36	LCAC Spots	167%
LKA-113		

* ARG composition based on data from Table 7.

Source: The author.

Using these projected capabilities, at what level of warfare can the United States conduct forced entry amphibious missions? To determine this one must examine the operational (e.g., Operation Desert Shield/Storm) and tactical (e.g., Operation Urgent Fury) levels of warfare and the capability of a MEU, MEB, and MEF to operate at those levels.

The need for this unilateral capability was stated in the *National Military Strategy* 1992 as follows:

"While we emphasize multinational operations under the auspices of international bodies such as the United Nations, we must retain the capability to act unilaterally when and where U.S. interests dictate."⁸⁰

⁸⁰See *National Military Strategy* 1992, 6.

Thus, although coalition warfare is preferred, there may be instances where a U.S. vital interest is threatened and host nation support is not available in the crisis area.

The operational level of warfare is defined as involving a corps size force. The size of a MEF is projected to be 37,052 total personnel under the Base Force. As described in Table 13, the assault echelon for a MEF would be 24,674 personnel, and could be lifted to a crisis only if all amphibious ships were available. Due to overhauls and maintenance only about two-thirds of these ships could ever be available at once. Thus it is unlikely that the Navy/Marine Corps team could even get one division lifted to conduct forced entry missions. Even if one MEF was lifted, it is too small to conduct forced entry missions even at the low end of the operational level of warfare.

The tactical level of warfare is fought at the division level or below. The MEF would be an ideal size unit at this level, but, as mentioned above, the time and resources that it would take to collect and deploy such a force rules it out for rapid response.

A MEB can be lifted to the crisis although a lot of difficulty would be encountered. It would require all the forward deployed amphibious ships of both fleets and some non-deployed forces to be committed to the crisis. Thus one fleet would have no ARG forward deployed. Although it would take time to get it there, a MEB should be able to handle some crises that occur at the tactical level, or seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow the entry of heavier Army or Air Force forces.

The MEU that is kept forward deployed in each fleet is best suited to conducting missions, such as, non-combatant evacuation operations,

amphibious raids, a presence force or a force enabler for heavier follow on forces. Due to its small size and lack of heavy armor, the employment of a MEU for the purpose of establishing a force on a hostile shore should be viewed with caution. The MEU can operate only at the low end of the tactical level of warfare.

Therefore, the 300-ship model would limit future amphibious operations to "Grenada" size operations. Even this size of operation would require longer planning/slower response time due to the smaller number of forward deployed amphibious ships. Although the purpose of this paper is not to discuss cuts in the Marine Corps force structure, these facts suggest that additional cuts in their force structure would also be warranted under the "50 percent decrease " budget.⁸¹

H. COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT/AUXILIARIES FORCE

The size of the Combat Logistic Force for the 300-ship model is a proportional reduction of the 600-ship model and the proposed Base Force. Depending upon the mix and capabilities of the ships, this force would likely meet the logistics requirements needed to allow the 300-ship model to perform as described in Tables 10 and 11.

The size of the Support/Auxiliaries Force for the 300-ship model is a proportional reduction of the 600-ship model, but is only half of the proposed Base Force. Depending upon the mix and capabilities of the ships, this force would likely meet the logistics requirements needed to allow the 300-ship model to perform as described in Tables 10 and 11. It should be noted that

⁸¹The author is indebted to LT K. Szczublewski, USN for his research in the area of Marine Corps amphibious assault capabilities.

with the draw down in overseas bases and their logistics infrastructure these assets will become more critical. As these bases are closed the Support/Auxiliaries forces will need to be increased to allow the 300-ship model to performed as described earlier.

I. SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Approximately 170 U.S. naval ships were directly involved at some point in the eight month long Operation Desert Shield/Storm. A similar number of ships would be required in support of a Korea conflict (Korea is used as an example of a MRC, other scenarios could also be used).⁸² The combined total of the ships required to handle two MRC greatly exceeds the capability of the 300-ship model, especially if units required for redeployment, rotation, maintenance, training, or responding to other needs. The 300-ship model would not be able to adequately respond to two MRC.

The 300-ship model's ability to fulfill the Bush Administration's goal of handling one and one-half crises simultaneously is uncertain. This goal might be accomplished if the second crisis (i.e., the "one-half" crisis) was a LRC and if the Army, Air Force, and Navy were split among the crises. An example of this would be similar to the evacuation of Liberia (Operation Sharp Edge) which was conducted by the Navy during Operation Desert Storm.⁸³ An alternate method to accomplish this goal might be to fight one

⁸²See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 4-5 and 8.

⁸³See S. Weeks, "Crafting a New Maritime Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 1992, 30-7.

crisis and deter/conduct a holding operation against the second crisis with SSNs or a MAG.

J. TRAINING CARRIER

One option to improve the ability of the 300-ship model to fulfill the CVBG requirements might be to get rid of the requirement for a dedicated training carrier (AVT). This might theoretically free up another carrier to be used in the normal operational rotation cycle.

According to Navy studies, "not having an AVT in the total carrier force would increase the annual underway requirement for each non-deployed CV/CVN. If the AVT were activated for a crisis and other deployable CV/CVNs were used in place of a dedicated AVT for flight training it would displace required upkeep, maintenance, and pre-deployment training. If activated, the AVT would require extensive overhaul to restore inactivated systems, replace intermediate maintenance capabilities, and modernize and reactivate command and control capabilities. Additional time would also be required for the training of the reconstituted crew and airwing."⁸⁴ Therefore, eliminating the requirement for a AVT does not appear to be a valid method of freeing up another carrier for use in the normal operational cycle, but could be used during reconstitution.

⁸⁴See insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 11.

K. COUNTER-NARCOTIC OPERATIONS

Throughout 1991, sixty percent of the surface force participated in counter-narcotics operations at one time or the other.⁸⁵ With the decrease of surface forces under the 300-ship model the Navy will no longer have the assets needed to fulfill this role completely. Therefore, the Navy may be forced to give up much of its role of combating drugs in order to accomplish other higher priority roles.

Many already question the military's effectiveness at handling this role. Feeling that it could be better fulfilled by police agencies.⁸⁶ Therefore, if the Navy is forced to give up this role it will have only a small effect on the nation's drug problem.

L. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The 300-ship model would require a draw down of about 90,000 military personnel beyond the planned reductions of approximately 70,000 personnel associated with the reduction to the Base Force. This draw down would be driven by the lower manning requirements for 150 fewer ships and the corresponding reductions in shore support, and headquarters and command staffs. These additional reductions would likely necessitate large scale reductions in forces (RIF).⁸⁷

⁸⁵Ibid., 8-9.

⁸⁶See Ulman, 65-70; and W. Matthews, "Biden: Military Ineffective in Drug War," *Navy Times*, March 9, 1992.

⁸⁷Data for the 300-ship model is determined by the author based on proportional reductions. For supporting data see, insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 11.

According to the CNO, "the Navy required twenty home ports (ten major complexes and ten other smaller, stand alone bases) to support a 600-ship navy. At present the Navy has capacity beyond that required to support today's Navy."⁸⁸ Reducing to the 300-ship model will mean fewer bases will be required. Navy studies indicate that fifteen home ports are needed to support the Base Force. Reducing to the 300-ship model will mean fewer bases will be required, it is estimated that only ten home ports are needed to support the 300-ship model. This will result in a proportional reduction of approximately 50,000 additional civilian personnel.⁸⁹

Reductions of an additional \$175 billion (this is in addition to the amount already removed in the Bush Administration's proposed FY 93 DOD budget) over the FY 93-97 period would result in further reductions to the DON's acquisition, research and development (R&D), and U.S. Marine Corps accounts. This is likely to have a direct impact on force modernization programs and future naval capabilities. This is also likely to jeopardize the reconstitution pillar of the Bush Administration's new strategy since with decreased R&D funds it will take longer to reconstitute.

It is doubtful that the nation could maintain either a credible naval shipbuilding capability or naval superiority given the outlay implications of the "50 percent decrease" budget. Thus, the Navy's ability to accomplish its reconstitution roles is doubtful under the 300-ship model.

⁸⁸Ibid., 12.

⁸⁹Data for the 300-ship model is determined by the author based on proportional reductions. For Base Force data see, insert for the record to ADM Kelso's March 11, 1992 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 12 and Figure 16.

M. CONCLUSIONS

The 300-ship model could result in a significant reduction in the U.S. international forward presence. This possible reduction in forward presence could result in the United States being less likely to positively influence world events and deter crises which threaten our vital interests. Additionally, the reduction in forward presence will decrease the nation's crisis response capability. This slower response could ultimately force the United States to deploy a larger number of troops when it does decide to intervene in a crisis.

If these drastic reduction in forces occur, the nation's ability to respond unilaterally, at the operational level of warfare, when American interests are threatened is questionable.⁹⁰ The United States would only be able to project power conventionally at the tactical level of warfare. Therefore, the United States would be forced to rely more heavily on joint and coalition warfare to accomplish its objectives. There would be no way to accomplish the "Pax Americana" strategy that some in the DOD have discussed.⁹¹

The 300-ship model navy's ability to fulfill the Bush Administration's goal of handling one and one-half crises simultaneously is uncertain. Due to its reduced force structure, the 300-ship model's response time would be slower than what the Navy has traditionally been able to accomplish. Successful future crisis response will rely heavily on joint/coalition operations using a mix of active and selective reserve units.

⁹⁰Under the Reagan Administration's proposed 600-ship Navy the United States could respond unilaterally at the operational level of warfare.

⁹¹Patrick E. Tyler, "Defense Leadership Wants New Watchdog Role for U.S. Military," *New York Times*, March 7, 1992.

The 300-ship model should be able to provide a credible strategic deterrence against the use of mass destruction against the United States and its allies. Due to its decreased size and capability it is doubtful that it will be able to act as an insurance policy with respect to a REGT, or deter the use of conventional weapons against the United States or its allies.

Finally, the 300-ship model's ability to fulfill all of its reconstitution roles is doubtful. The Navy could probably still guarantee the freedom of the seas, but its reduced capability might tempt a potential adversary to attempt to build a naval force which could credibly threaten the U.S. Navy. Additionally, the United States would probably not be able to maintain a credible naval shipbuilding capability under the drastic cuts called for under the "50 percent decrease" budget.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War has resulted in major changes in the international and national security environments that have major implications for the U.S. military. These changes include calls for significant defense budget cuts, the increased importance of economics as a determinant of defense spending and the disintegration of the Soviet Union which resulted in the absence of a clear tangible global threat to U.S. national interests. What has resulted from these changes is the formulation of a new U.S. national security strategy that focuses on the uncertain threat of regional crises and contingencies instead of global war as the basis for U.S. military forces, and the decision to cut U.S. defense budget/forces by at least 25-30%.

This fundamental change, as enunciated in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Military Strategy*, requires a comprehensive reexamination of service strategies and programming. This examination is well underway as each service struggles to determine its contribution in the post-Cold War world. What has yet to be determined is the exact amount which will be cut from the U.S. defense budget and what restrictions these cuts will place on U.S. foreign policy. This paper attempted to address objectively the capabilities of the 300-ship Navy that could be afforded with an assumed fifty percent decrease in defense spending and the restrictions that this size navy would place on U.S. foreign policy.

Strategic Deterrence and Defense

Although, at first glance, the 300-ship model's twelve Ohio-class SSBNs (eight of which would be on strategic deterrent patrols at a time) might not fulfill the nation's current countervailing strategy requirements for credible strategic deterrence, the strategic situation that the United States faces in the near future will be fundamentally different from the one it faced during the Cold War and even the one it faces today. If the United States and Russia continue to follow through on their agreements to reduce the size of their strategic nuclear forces, then at some point the United States will be forced to shift to an assured destruction strategy.

The level of destruction required to fulfill the United States' assured destruction capability, which was determined by the Secretary of Defense and accepted by the President and Congress, is 400 EMT. Very conservative calculations of the EMT on patrol under the 300-ship model show that the SSBN force could deliver 522 EMT and still maintain a sizable strategic reserve capability. Therefore, the 300-ship model's SSBN force appears to meet the nation's assured destruction capability requirements for the post Cold War era. Additionally, it demonstrates that the SSBN force alone is all that is needed if the nation shifts from a countervailing strategy to an assured destruction strategy.

The 300-ship model's ability to hold an adversary's nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction at risk is significantly less than the Bush Administration's Base Force. This is due to its reduced number of platforms that will be forward deployed and its slower response to crises. This might

force the nation to accept a strategy which punishes an adversary for use of these weapons rather than a strategy which holds these weapons at risk.

The 300-ship model will use the same assets as the Base Force to hold an adversary's weapon of mass destruction at risk. Attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft would be used to conduct strategic ASW against an adversary's SSBN force. Carrier battle groups and cruise missile capable surface ships and submarines are capable of fulfilling this role against Third World nations with relatively small numbers of these weapons.

The 300-ship model's ability to deter the use of conventional weapons against the United States or its allies is also significantly less than the Base Force. This is due to the 300-ship models reduced capability to respond quickly to emerging crises.

Finally, the 300-ship model's ability to act as an insurance policy against a REGT is questionable. In the rush to reduce forces there will be little that could be done to influence the size of the Russian or any other navy. If Russia continues to reform itself, the United States can probably stand to leave this role unfilled.

Forward Presence

In this new era of regional threats the need for forward presence has become more important. The 300-ship model has the ability to fulfill this role, but not as well as the Bush Administration's Base Force. Due to the fact that the 300-ship model could only maintain two CVBGs available for forward presence and rapid crisis response, the Navy could no longer use the traditional methods it has used to fulfill this role. There are though several

alternatives the Navy could use to improve the 300-ship model's forward presence ability.

The first alternative would be to change the Chief of Naval Operation's employment policy guidelines. This may provide some short term improvement in the 300-ship model's ability to fulfill the forward presence role, but in the long run it would cause more problems than it solved. If OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO goals were increased so the 300-ship model could fulfill current employment policies then the Navy's upkeep, maintenance and training operations would suffer. The long term result of these changes would be a less ready and poorer trained navy.

Another alternative would be for the Unified CINCs and National Command Authority to decrease the Navy's forward presence requirements and use non-Navy assets to fulfill the nation's forward presence obligations. This might be done by permanent or temporary stationing of land based forces overseas, access and storage agreements, military to military relations, or overflights from U.S. based aircraft. It still needs to be determined if these methods could cost effectively show credible U.S. commitment and enhance regional stability as well as the traditional naval methods used in the past.

A third alternative would be to design a navy which emphasized a mix of both high cost/high capability platforms and low cost/low capability platforms. This would allow the Navy to maintain a larger force structure under the assumed "50 percent decrease" budget. With more numbers the Navy could use more traditional methods as it tried to fulfill all its forward presence requirements.

A final alternative would be to use new deployment force structures to fulfill some of the missions that have traditionally been filled by CVBGs. This could include using ARGs, MAGs or even a single ship to fulfill forward presence missions. This alternative appears to be consistent with the Bush Administration's new definition of forward presence. While this may be a successful method in areas where a potential adversary's military capability is low, a potential adversary with a relatively strong military may not view such a force with the same amount of fear/respect. It may also force the United States to view forward presence operations under a new light. Under this alternative, in many cases ships would be operating with little assistance in the immediate area. Therefore, the United States may, have to be willing to accept the loss of a ship and then respond to the loss, rather than the traditional method in which a force with such a large combat capability is deployed that it prevents a potential adversary from being able to effectively attack any one ship.

The 300-ship model possesses significantly less assets which can be used to conduct joint and combined exercises. The ability to work effectively with the other U.S. armed forces and our allies, in joint/coalition style warfare will be adversely affected by the reduced opportunities the Navy will have to practice this style of warfare. Since the Bush Administration's new strategy relies heavily on joint/coalition warfare, this could pose serious problems during future military operations.

With the decrease of surface forces under the 300-ship model the Navy will no longer have the needed assets to fulfill its counter-narcotic role and still fulfill higher priority roles. This will have little effect on the nation's

overall drug problem. Therefore, the nation can probably accept leaving this role unfulfilled.

The 300-ship model's ability to overtly and covertly collect intelligence, and then transmit real-time information to the National Command Authority in time to avert or mitigate crises is significantly less than Base Force's ability. This is primarily due to its reduced number of intelligence collection assets. Since the Bush Administration's new strategy relies heavily on the nation's intelligence collection ability, the 300-ship model's decrease in intelligence collection capability could undermine the new strategy's effectiveness.

Finally, the 300-ship model provides significantly reduced crisis response capability when compared to the Base Force. Due to fewer ships in the 300-ship model, and without a change in current employment policies, the Navy would have fewer ships on station and more often no CVBG in theater to respond to a crisis. This will result in a significant reduction in naval forces which the National Command Authority could use to react to ambiguous warning in the early stages of a crisis. A timely show of force during this stage could stabilize the situation and permit diplomacy to prevail. With no naval expeditionary forces in the crisis area the risk versus gain calculus of potential adversaries is simplified and could cause them to undertake action counter to U.S. interest.

Furthermore, fewer ships would be in a state of readiness to quickly deploy to the crisis, resulting in significant delays in the arrival of additional CVBGs deployed from U.S. bases. These delays in the arrival of initial forces could translate into critical delays in the arrival of heavy ground and air

units. Additionally, this increased response time could cause the crisis to develop into a situation requiring deployment of a larger number of U.S. forces.

Crisis Response

The end of the Cold War may result in increased regional conflicts fueled by ethnic, cultural or economic differences, or control of resources. The range and scope of these contingencies could be many and varied. When U.S. interests are threatened, American forces must be able to respond rapidly to deter and if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort with other nations. With only three CVBGs available crisis response, as compared to five under the Bush Administration's Base Force, the 300-ship model could not meet the new strategy's stated naval crisis response goals but could provide some crisis response at the tactical level of warfare. These goals are to use peacetime presence forces to respond to a crisis with one CVBG and a MEU within seven days, and a second CVBG within fourteen days. Forward deployed and surge forces are to be used to form expeditionary Strike Fleets within thirty days. If these actions are not able to contain the crisis, then combined air, land, and sea forces would be organized within sixty days.

This will make the United States less able to deter crises and slow the U.S. response when attempting to handle crises before they escalate to a point that a large U.S. force deployment is required to successfully solve the crisis. Additionally, while the nation may be able to succeed with only three CVBGs in joint operations where significant coalition land air bases are available, it would be difficult for the U.S. military to fight its way into areas where it had to secure hostile air bases for its use. Although some may argue that with

maximum effort the 300-ship model is still able to respond with six CVBGs, it must be noted that this response would take significantly longer than the required time it took to get six CVBGs to Desert Shield/Storm in February 1991.

The smaller size of the amphibious forces under the 300-ship model will also have an adverse effect on the nation's ability to conduct forced entry missions. It is unlikely that the Navy/Marine Corps team could even get one division lifted to conduct forced entry missions. Even if one MEF was lifted, it is too small to conduct forced entry missions even at the low end of the operational level of warfare.

The tactical level of warfare is fought at the division level or below. The MEF would be an ideal size unit at this level, but the time and resources that it would take to collect and deploy such a force rules it out for rapid response.

A MEB could be lifted to the crisis although a lot of difficulty would be encountered. It would require all the forward deployed amphibious ships of both fleets and some non-deployed forces to be committed to the crisis. Thus one fleet would have no ARG forward deployed. Although it would take time to get it there, a MEB should be able to handle some crises that occur at the tactical level, or seize and defend an adversary's port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow the entry of heavier Army or Air Force forces.

The MEU that is kept forward deployed in each fleet is best suited to conducting missions, such as, non-combatant evacuation operations, amphibious raids, a presence force or a force enabler for heavier follow on forces. Due to its small size and lack of heavy armor, the employment of a MEU for the purpose of establishing a force on a hostile shore should be

viewed with caution. The MEU can operate only at the low end of the tactical level of warfare.

Therefore, the 300-ship model would limit future amphibious operations to "Grenada" size operations. Even this size of operation would require longer planning/slower response time due to the smaller number of forward deployed amphibious ships.

Under the 300-ship model, the nation's ability to respond unilaterally, at the operational level of warfare, when American interests are threatened is questionable. Unlike the Reagan Administration's proposed 600-ship navy, the United States would only be able to project power conventionally at the tactical level of warfare. Therefore, the United States would be forced to rely more heavily on joint and coalition warfare to accomplish its objectives.

The 300-ship model navy's ability to fulfill the Bush Administration's goal of handling one and one-half crises simultaneously is uncertain. Due to its reduced force structure, the 300-ship model's response time would be slower than what the Navy has traditionally been able to accomplish. This goal might be accomplished if the second crisis (i.e., the "one-half" crisis) was an LRC and if the Army, Air Force, and Navy were split among the crises. Successful future crisis response will rely heavily on joint/coalition operations using a mix of active and selective reserve units.

Reconstitution

A fundamental concept in the Bush Administration's new strategy is that there will be sufficient warning prior to a global war to allow the United States to reconstitute its forces in adequate time to counter the threat of any REGT. Reconstitution is the generation of new forces to meet contingencies

that require forces beyond those available from active and reserve components. Implicit in this concept is the assumption that any military threat beyond a regional crisis will also have to be built or reconstituted.

Although the Bush Administration's Base Force comes closer than the 300-ship model, neither are capable of meeting the requirements needed to fulfill the Navy's reconstitution roles. This is primarily due to the fact that the Navy can not afford to fulfill these roles either the Bush Administration's proposed defense budget or the assumed "50 percent decrease" budget. Additionally, it is unrealistic to think that the normally near sighted U.S. political process will respond to an emerging threat eight years prior to a potential conflict. Therefore, even if the United States could afford to maintain the ability to reconstitute its forces it is doubtful that we would start to respond to a potential adversary until a potential conflict was imminent.

There are several implications for the United States of not being able to fulfill all of the Navy's reconstitution roles. First, the nation will not be able to maintain a credible naval shipbuilding capability. This could eventually result in the U.S. Navy losing its naval superiority since its ability to build more than a few ships a year in the 21st would be questionable. This would mean the cost for a potential adversary of building a credible naval force would be significantly less and could cause the emergence of a competing naval powers.

Additionally, the nation's "defensive shield" behind which it could reconstitute its forces in time of war would have to rely heavily on its strategic nuclear forces. The small number of new equipment that could be afforded under both the Bush Administration's proposed defense budget and

the "50 percent decrease" budget could eventually result in a military that could no longer credibly hold off any large scale conventional attack against the U.S. or its allies by the use of conventional forces alone.

The United States can probably afford to leave the Bush Administration's new strategy's reconstitution pillar unfulfilled and instead rely on the nation's strategic nuclear forces to deter any REGT from attempting to attack the United States directly or start a global war. Since the United States and NATO successfully relied on their strategic nuclear forces to deter a European-centered global war during the Cold War it seems logical that American strategic nuclear forces can also deter any potential REGT during the post-Cold War era.

The Navy's Future Course

Major changes in our national policy have occurred in the last three years. This has changed the required roles and missions the Navy must fulfill. The Navy must recognize these changes and plan accordingly. A consensus of opinion, based on merit, must be reached by the Navy's leadership about what course the Navy will steer in the future. Additional defense budget cuts are going to occur, and if the Navy continues to use bureaucratic compromise to make force structure decisions it will find itself drifting aimlessly into the next century.

National missions that require a navy must be determined. From these national missions the Navy's force structure (i.e., total number of each category of ship) must be determined. This should include a study of various alternative force structures. Then the specific type of ships can be determined.

Although lessons from the past should be remembered, now is the time for the Navy to consider how to best fulfill roles and missions in the future.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314-6145	2
2. Library, Code 52 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5100	2
3. N-51, The Pentagon, Room 4E566 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, D.C. 20350	1
4. Deputy Director for Assessment Joint Staff (J-8) The Pentagon, Room 1E965 Washington, D.C. 20318-8000	1
5. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1
6. Dr. James J. Tritten (Code NS/TR) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1
7. Dr. Frank M. Teti (Code NS/TT) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1

- | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| 8. | Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Net Assessment
OSD/NA, The Pentagon, Room 3A930
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 9. | CAPT Peter Swartz, USN
5419 Point Longstreet Way
Burke, Virginia 22015 | 1 |
| 10. | CAPT Keith Hahn, USN
Director for Defense Policy
National Security Council Staff
Room 380 OEB
17 Pennsylvania Ave
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20506 | 1 |
| 11. | CAPT Michael Martus, USN
OP-00K, CNO Executive Panel
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)
4401 Ford Ave
Alexandria, Virginia 22302 | 1 |
| 12. | Ron O'Rourke
Congressional Research Service
CRS/F, LM-315
Madison Bldg.
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540 | 1 |
| 13. | James Blaker
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)
4401 Ford Ave
Alexandria, Virginia 22301 | 1 |
| 14. | LCDR Patrick H. Brady, USN
918 Mastline Drive
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 | 1 |