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
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SSI Special Report

**Australian - U.S. Security Relations
in the Post-Cold War World**

Thomas-Durell Young



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AUSTRALIAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS
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
FOREWORD

The tumultuous changes in the international scene over the past four years in what is now the former Soviet Union and in Central Europe have resulted in many analysts neglecting interesting and important developments elsewhere in the world. The end of the cold war has not been without impact in other regions where the United States has long had vital national interests.

One such region is the Southwest Pacific. The end of cold war will affect the conduct of future bilateral Australian-U.S. defense relations. The author of this essay argues that while the alliance relationship which emerged between Canberra and Washington over the years has not owed its existence to the cold war, the end of bloc tensions will surely result in greater scrutiny of existing bilateral defense cooperative programs by both countries. Moreover, areas of defense cooperation nevertheless, which in the past have been defined as being mutually beneficial, may become focal points of controversy. There is every reason to assume that the continued existence of mutual interests should provide the necessary justification for the continuation of bilateral security ties, if managed effectively.

This study meets an identified study requirement as established in SSI's annual research program, The Army's Strategic Role in a Period of Transition: A Prioritized Research Program, 1993.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this essay as a contribution to a greater understanding and appreciation of this often-ignored, but important, alliance relationship.




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THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG has held the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College since 1992. From 1988 to 1992, he was a National Security Affairs Analyst at the Institute. Prior to this appointment, he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland; his M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has published extensively on U.S. alliance issues with particular emphasis on Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific.

Australia's Principle Defence Locations



AUSTRALIAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

The end of the cold war has resulted in a reassessment of the future missions of many Western alliances. For instance, the Western European Union has experienced an institutional revival, in the context of fitful moves to create a European defense identity, which currently includes the creation of a limited military planning establishment.¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has reoriented itself dramatically to include the adoption of a new strategy based upon cooperation with its former adversaries to the east.² This includes the Alliance's recently created North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which is tasked with effecting cordial relations with these states.³ This move manifests an effort by NATO to widen its position from being an organization oriented solely toward collective defense, to one which now includes collective security missions.

While these developments may be well-known to some analysts of international affairs, what has gone widely unnoticed (and unassessed) is how the end of cold war tensions will eventually affect the long-standing security relationship Washington has developed with its respected, if physically distant, ally, Australia. After all, the ANZUS Security Alliance, among Australia, New Zealand and the United States, was created at the height of the early cold war.⁴ While some in Australia might like to delude themselves in thinking that Canberra was only interested in an alliance relationship with the United States as a guarantee against a future resurgent militarist Japan,⁵ declassified contemporary Australian defense planning documents clearly show that Canberra had a strong interest in being intimately involved as a participating member in the emerging global Western alliance system.⁶

The question that needs to be asked is: What is the outlook for future Australian-U.S. security relations in the post-cold war world? In other words, what effects will the end of the cold war have upon this hitherto healthy and mutually beneficial relationship? And of more immediate import from the perspective of policymakers, where are the future potential trouble areas for security cooperation and how can they be avoided?

This paper will argue that, notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the continuing diminution of the Soviet/Russian military threat to Australian vital interests, a strong underlying basis remains for continued peacetime security relations between Australia and the United States. The existence of a potential threat to Australian vital interests by the Soviet Union during the cold war acted to spur bilateral security

cooperation between Canberra and Washington (especially in such areas of antisubmarine warfare operations and control and protection of shipping contingency arrangements).⁷ Over the years a security relationship has emerged based upon the sharing of mutual interests and objectives, as opposed to being solely based upon mutually-held threat perceptions. In short, the rationale for bilateral security relations has become one that is what Morgenthau calls an alliance based upon "ideological solidarity."⁸ Hence, in this regard, a continued commonality of general security interests can be expected to remain, and thereby continue to provide a basis for bilateral defense ties.⁹

This condition does not mean, however, that the alliance, or, more likely, defense activities which take place under its aegis, will not come under closer scrutiny by officials and the public alike in both countries. Defense budgets are likely to diminish considerably in the United States, and possibly in Australia as well, which may have a negative impact over the long term on bilateral security cooperation, such as combined exercises and personnel exchanges. A misplaced reduction in defense spending (i.e., exercises) could have a major effect on the ability of both countries to maintain a high degree of interoperability. Moreover, defense activities closely associated with cold war scenarios, i.e., the Australian-United States Joint Facilities, may increasingly be called into question regarding their value to Australian national security requirements. Thus, an improved and heightened explanation to the publics of both countries of the need for maintaining collective defense arrangements cannot be overly stressed.

Current Defense Relations.

Prior to an examination of envisaged problem areas in the future Australian-U.S. security relationship, it is instructive to describe and analyze the extent that the relationship has evolved from its modest post-war origins to date.¹⁰ While not widely known, this bilateral defense relationship, which slowly emerged as a result of the signing of the ANZUS Security Treaty in 1951,¹¹ produced a very high degree of peacetime cooperation in almost all areas of defense activity.¹² The immediate objective of this cooperation was, of course, to provide the Western Alliance with coverage of the greater Southwest Pacific region and to protect Western interests from hostile challenge.

Bilateral security cooperation in an operational sense was achieved in many areas through the coordination of national responsibilities so as to enable the rationalization of military resources. An example of this approach to coordinating national planning is observable in allied contingency plans for peacetime

ocean surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as wartime defense of sea communications in the Southwest Pacific and Eastern Indian oceans.¹³ Following the growth in Soviet naval deployments in the Pacific region in the mid-1970s, these surveillance and reconnaissance arrangements were expanded.¹⁴ To ensure adequate interoperability in this area, in conjunction with other allies, the Combined Exercise Agreement has been used as a master planning document for conducting combined exercises when these maritime forces exercise together.¹⁵

However, probably the most important tie to the United States was the establishment of Joint Defense facilities on Australian soil.¹⁶ The Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station on Northwest Cape, established by a 1963 agreement; the Joint Defense Space Research Facility, Pine Gap, Northern Territory, established by a 1966 accord; and the Joint Defense Space Communications Facility at Nurrungar, South Australia, established by a 1969 treaty,¹⁷ made Australia a participating member in maintaining the strategic nuclear balance with the then Soviet Union.¹⁸ What is interesting, however, is that it was not until 1974 that the Australian Labor government insisted upon being given a regular series of briefings with high U.S. defense officials concerning global strategic matters which could possibly affect Australia's security by virtue of the existence and operation of Northwest Cape. The accord that eventually emerged from these negotiations, the 1974 Barnard-Schlesinger Agreement,¹⁹ was later expanded by a number of other arrangements with the benefit of enhancing Australian access to senior U.S. defense officials and information.²⁰

In the area of logistics, as a country with limited defense industrial capability, Australia, starting in the latter 1950s, worked to establish logistical cooperative arrangements with the U.S. Armed Force's enormous support and supply structures.²¹ Notwithstanding efforts on the part of Australian governments since Gough Whitlam's Labor Government to create "self-reliance,"²² or as more recently refined, "greater self-reliance,"²³ the Australian Defense Forces' (ADF) capabilities remain limited in this area.²⁴ Formal bilateral logistic support cooperation dates back to the 1965 Logistic Support Arrangements and is currently governed by the 1989 Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Defense Logistic Support. This aspect of bilateral cooperation has become increasingly important to Australia over the years as the ADF has increasingly procured U.S. matériel.²⁵ Reciprocally, the United States has been able to benefit from this arrangement through access to Australian ports, airfields and logistic support facilities when it has deployed units to, or through, the region. With the closure of the extensive U.S. bases in the Philippines, one can only expect

that these cooperative arrangements may become more valuable in the future.²⁶

While only a superficial description of what has become a very extensive cooperative defense arrangement is possible due to space limitations, two important aspects of this relationship deserve further clarification. First, the available evidence does not support the contention of some commentators that Australia has been, in a diplomatic sense, dependent on the United States as a result of this security alliance.²⁷ The decision by successive Australian governments to rely upon the United States for a number of the ADF's key requirements represents a conscious step taken with the full knowledge of the costs and benefits involved. Second, notwithstanding the numerous political contretemps which have occurred between Washington and Canberra since the establishment of the ANZUS pact, it continued to expand.²⁸

Motives for Continued Defense Cooperation.

While it should be evident that security cooperation between Australia and the United States continued to grow in breadth and depth over the years, it is still necessary to identify possible rationales for Canberra and Washington to continue defense ties at appropriate levels.

From the Australian perspective, the end of the cold war has not had a noticeable effect upon its perceived need for continued security ties with the United States. Indeed, in the words of Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Gration, "The Australian-U.S. alliance should become of even greater importance as the U.S. presence in the region recedes."²⁹ The government's white paper remains its official defense policy, Defence of Australia 1987, which unequivocally states Australia's firm commitment to the Western Alliance.³⁰ In 1989, a classified appraisal of Australian high-level defense planning was commissioned to determine whether the 1987 defence white paper remained valid following the end of the cold war.³¹ A declassified version of this document, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, was released in 1992. In it, the Labor government unequivocally declared:

Close defence relations with the US remain central to our policy of defence self-reliance. They also reinforce Australia's standing in the region and provide us with security against nuclear intimidation. The joint defence facilities contribute to maintaining the global strategic balance and

support equitable and verifiable arms reduction measures.³²

Thus, despite the political disintegration of the Soviet Union and its military presence from Southeast Asia, the Labor government apparently sees no reason to change dramatically its peacetime security relationship with the United States.

Nor does the Opposition's new approach to defense policy, as stated in its recent policy document, A Strong Australia, with its emphasis on improved security links with regional states while perhaps relying somewhat less on the United States, appear to be framed in a zero-sum manner.³³ Of concern to the Opposition (and many in Australia) is that, given the end of bloc tensions, the United States will continue to withdraw its presence from the eastern Pacific, and Australia must be prepared to deal with its neighbors without a sizeable U.S. military presence stationed in the area.³⁴ Indeed, if anything, the Opposition has argued for an increase in the U.S. military presence in Australia.³⁵ For example, earlier this year the Leader of the Opposition, Dr. John Hewson, stated during the remembrance of the first Darwin air raid of 1942, that he endorsed a proposal for the United States to establish a naval repair facility in Australia.³⁶ There is little likelihood this will happen because there is simply no need for permanent U.S. facilities in this region. In a political sense, as well, it would be unwise to argue for the establishment of a permanent U.S. military presence in Australia since this would likely open the entire bilateral defense relationship to a higher level of criticism in Australia.

In any case, the most obvious reason for Canberra to continue peacetime security ties with the United States, which one would suppose both the government and opposition would agree to, is that of maintaining a treaty relationship which, in extremis, is the guarantor of Australia's national security. Whether or not the ANZUS Security Treaty does indeed guarantee Canberra's ultimate national security is an issue which is beyond the scope of this paper.³⁷ What is important and relevant to this paper is that Australian governments have continued to base their fundamental security planning on this premise.³⁸ While one can question whether Australia's security outlook includes a military threat to it in the foreseeable future, a number of relevant factors require analysis.

The explosion in arms purchases in South and Southeast Asia since the 1980s has resulted in a sizeable increase in the quantitative, and significantly, the qualitative military capabilities of many states. For instance, Indonesia and

Singapore have purchased F-16s and Harpoon anti-ship missiles (interestingly, from the United States), while India has substantially improved its military inventory, particularly in strike capabilities.³⁹ The qualitative advantage the ADF has long prided itself as having over its regional neighbors has allowed Canberra to maintain small, but more capable, standing forces. The problems associated with these improvements in military capability have not gone unnoticed by the Australian government and are identified as potential problems (particularly for aerial and maritime capabilities) in Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s.⁴⁰ Defence Minister Robert Ray's remarks in this regard are relevant:

I am not saying that these large Asian powers will become a military threat. Rather I am suggesting that the withdrawal of Soviet and United States forces will create opportunities for change. How China, India and Japan develop their military power in this new situation will be a particularly sensitive issue.⁴¹

This is a situation that Australia has not had to face, since the purchase by Indonesia of Whiskey-type submarines and Tu-16 Badger aircraft in the early-1960s.

Leaving aside the issue of the political intentions of these states, the possession of military hardware is only one part, of course, of a very complex equation which determines military capability. The mere possession of modern weapon-carrying platforms and sensors does not necessarily create combat effectiveness. In this respect, then, the U.S. relationship takes on continued importance for Australia. The ability to exercise with the most sophisticated military establishment in the world has had, and will increasingly have, singular value to the ADF. Thus, in addition to the need to maintain an acceptable degree of interoperability which would allow Australian and U.S. forces to deploy and fight together if required, exercising with the United States offers the ADF many insights into the newest fielded technology and doctrinal changes.

Since there would appear to be no discernible move on the part of Australian officials to restructure the ADF in a way that would abjure its traditional emphasis on maintaining a technological edge over its neighbors, the ability to exercise regularly with the U.S. Armed Forces remains crucial. Indeed, a seemingly paradoxical situation arises since the ADF will need to "rely" upon the United States in such crucial areas as exercises to achieve greater defense "self-reliance"; the long espoused

objective for the ADF. Many examples support this assertion, none more pertinent than the need for U.S. assistance in validating doctrine for the defense of Australia and joint procedures for effecting command and control of all three services. While the ADF has become quite sophisticated in the area of conducting joint operations in recent years, its validation on a significant scale requires the participation of U.S. forces in major joint exercises. The ability to employ sophisticated capabilities that U.S. forces can contribute, as has been the case in the Kangaroo series of biennial exercises, has enabled the ADF to create these capabilities more efficiently and quickly than it would have on its own.⁴² Moreover, such exercises have the obvious benefit of encouraging interoperability between the ADF and the U.S. Armed Forces. Thus, for instance, how one can seriously question the value of key exercises with the United States (e.g., the RIMPAC biennial series of exercises) to the operational effectiveness of the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force, in light of the growing maritime and aerial capabilities of many states in South and Southeast Asia, is difficult to understand.⁴³

Concerning the continuation of bilateral security relations from the perspective of the United States, it would appear that this particular relationship may become a "template" for other security alliances in which the United States participates. As the political and financial viability for maintaining U.S. forces forward deployed in Asia and Europe⁴⁴ has come under increasing scrutiny since the end of the cold war, a broader definition of forward presence has emerged, clearly one that is better suited to the new global security realities. The most recent National Military Strategy of the United States defines forward presence as "...forces stationed overseas and afloat...periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts."⁴⁵ Thus, since there never has been a peacetime need for the United States to station U.S. combat forces in Australia, it would appear that U.S. strategy meets the requirements of both Australia and the United States and will require little change from past practices.

As a long-standing member of the Western Alliance, and one that throughout its history has not shied from contributing forces to the defense of British Empire/Commonwealth and later Western allied vital interests, Australia's bona fides as an ally in Washington simply are not in doubt.⁴⁶ Maintaining close ties with Australia has two practical benefits.

First, the race to cut defense budgets, so prevalent in, for instance, many NATO countries, has not been emulated (to date) in Australia. The mere fact that the Australian defense vote has not been substantially reduced since the end of the cold war, but has, more or less, remained constant, is an impressive accomplishment.⁴⁷ To be sure, this falls well short of the 3 percent planning assumption given by Paul Dibb in his seminal review of Australian defense capabilities,⁴⁸ and will surely delay attaining a greater degree of self-reliance. From the perspective of Washington, however, the mere fact that the ADF will not be experiencing sizeable reductions in its order of battle (indeed, in many areas significant capabilities are being procured),⁴⁹ at a time when most allies are experiencing diminishing force structures, makes maintaining cordial ties with Australia all the more important.

Second, the closing of U.S. naval and aerial facilities on the Philippines has made the ADF's facilities increasingly more important in supporting U.S. regional deployments. While the U.S. Navy will decrease in overall size and the extent of its presence in the Far East will correspondingly diminish, U.S. naval and aerial forces will, nevertheless, continue to be active in the region.⁵⁰ Moreover, there does not appear to be any move afoot to close or transfer the Joint Australian-U.S. Defense Space Research and Communications facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar, respectively.⁵¹ One would expect, therefore, that their value to U.S. (and Australian) interests would remain unaffected by the end of the cold war. There may be, however, a number of problematic issues related to these facilities, which will be dealt with below.

Potential Trouble Areas.

In sum, from both the perspective of Canberra and Washington, a deep abiding interest in maintaining peacetime security ties remains, despite the end of the cold war. However, to conclude that future Australian-U.S. security ties can necessarily be conducted as they have been in the past would be erroneous. While not having a direct impact on the agreed need to maintain peacetime security ties, the end of the cold war may allow attention to be directed at some potential troublesome areas of defense cooperation.

Northern Orientation or Obsession? Since the early to mid-1970s when Australian defense planners began to argue the case for attaining greater national defense self-reliance, explicit in their rationale⁵² was the need to improve substantially the woefully neglected defense infrastructure in the country's barren and sparsely-populated north and northwest.⁵³ Since the

publication of the important 1972 Defense White Paper, which advocated these reforms, substantial progress has been made in the north and northwest. In terms of air fields, in addition to the long existing RAAF bare-base at Learmonth, on Northwest Cape, a new bare-base at Derby, WA (RAAF Curtin) has been completed, another one near Weipa on the Cape York Peninsula (RAAF Scherger) is being planned, and one at Gove across the Gulf of Carpentaria may eventually be built. More importantly, a new manned air base, RAAF Tindal, 330 kilometers south of Darwin, is now home to a squadron of F/A-18 fighters.⁵⁴ The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has expanded its activities in the north as well. Modern patrol boat facilities now exist at Cairns and Darwin. A very limited naval support facility, to be located at Port Hedland, was promised by the Labor government prior to the 1989 general election,⁵⁵ but has yet to be established, and probably will not be. Most importantly, the acquisition of Fremantle-class patrol boats has enabled the RAN to increase significantly its presence in support of civil missions in northern waters. Finally, the Army has created surveillance/reconnaissance reserve units, made up largely of local inhabitants in the Northern regions: 51st Far North Queensland Regiment, North West Mobile Force, and the Pilbara Regiment. These units conduct surveillance operations during peacetime and in the event of an incursion into the north, they would provide tactical intelligence on enemy movements. As part of Army Presence in the North plan, the Army will complete its transfer of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment to the Darwin area in 1993, to be followed by a brigade of 2200 soldiers by 2001.⁵⁶

To be sure, these efforts to improve defense infrastructure and maintain a permanent military presence in the north have not been without financial sacrifice. This has been justified, in part, since these military facilities and deployments directly support civil authorities and execute key missions (e.g., sovereignty protection), which have long gone ignored in this vast and underpopulated region. However, with minor exceptions (e.g., the Returned Services League),⁵⁷ the shift northwards has enjoyed bipartisan political support,⁵⁸ particularly in the Northern Territory where defense spending has become a major economic activity.⁵⁹ However, two potential problems, not at all related to the previous bloc tensions, arise in regard to the objective of this northern shift and its impact on the capabilities of the ADF.

First, as the ADF becomes increasingly oriented toward operating in the north, a concern may develop in Washington that this "orientation" has become an obsession. Should Canberra continue to direct increasingly more resources to the north, which are not applicable to other areas, the perception may be encouraged that Australian defense has become self-limiting.

This could particularly be troublesome for the Army. According to former Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General John Coates, by the year 2001, approximately 60 percent of the Army's combat force will be based north of the Tropic of Capricorn.⁶⁰

The orientation question is directly related to the second point; the implication of these moves on the capabilities of the ADF. It is not a question of how much of the Australian Army, for instance, is to be stationed at Darwin, or how much it eventually will cost to bring the Jindalee over-the-horizon-radar in to service,⁶¹ but rather how much of the ADF's attention will be focused on, and tied to, the "Top End." To be sure, the need for Canberra to improve its surveillance and military presence in this region is without question. Yet, one could argue that the employment of civil assets for surveillance would be much cheaper for the government.⁶²

Fundamentally, just as Canberra watches with a wary eye U.S. force presence in the Western Pacific, Washington, for its part, may begin to question the amount of resources being directed to the north, should it appear to be at the expense of, for instance, capabilities which would enable to Army to deploy outside of Australia. A conscious and open effort, as Canberra develops particularly Army infrastructure in the north, to include facilities or generic capabilities,⁶³ which will allow for the deployment of Army units in emergencies, could forestall future contretemps with Washington.

One should not infer from the above argument that the United States would ever inform Australia that it should not improve its capabilities to protect its national territory. One of the guiding principles of U.S. alliance policy since the passage of the Vandenburg Resolution in the U.S. Senate in 1947 has been to encourage allies to do their utmost to provide for their own national defense.

However, clearly the "new world disorder" is likely to require, at a minimum, a constant, if not an increase, in the number of deployments for peacekeeping and possibly peacemaking operations by Western states, at the very time when many of them are cutting their force structures. As a country which is not sizably cutting its defense structure, Australia could well find itself being increasingly asked to participate in these missions, which it has long been willing to undertake. For example, the recent decision by the Australian government to contribute a battalion from the Army's Operational Deployment Force to the U.N.'s Restore Hope operation in Somalia has effectively reduced the Army's rapid reaction capability by half.⁶⁴ Given the relative small size of the ADF, and particularly the unusually

small size of the regular maneuver forces of the Australian Army (e.g., seven maneuver battalions, within a three brigade structure, out of an overall size of 30,000),⁶⁵ Australian officials need to make sound planning provisions for these missions if Canberra is to participate in these multilateral efforts, while not becoming too enmeshed physically and financially in defending the "Top End."⁶⁶

Justifying the Joint Facilities. An issue which could also complicate Australian-U.S. security relations is that of the Joint Facilities. The reason for this assertion is that after President George Bush's September 27, 1991, initiative to remove tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. Navy surface vessels and submarines,⁶⁷ the Joint Facilities are the most visible manifestation of the bilateral security relationship. Heretofore, the existence of these facilities, as openly acknowledged by the Labor government, demonstrated Australia's contribution to the Western Alliance, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, at the strategic level, and did, therefore, make it a potential nuclear target. In spite of this heavy burden, the Hawke government, for instance, stated that this was a potential cost it was willing to pay as a member of the Western Alliance, as a contribution to strategic stability and the verification of arms control accords.⁶⁸

What is interesting, however, is that it took Canberra so long to appreciate the gravity of its decision to host these facilities in terms of quid pro quos from the United States. While the author has written about the background to this issue elsewhere, what is relevant to this essay is that the renegotiation of the lease for Northwest Cape, as codified in the Barnard-Schlesinger Agreement, included a proviso that a regular forum for discussions would be held between senior Australian service and civilian defense officials with their American counterparts concerning the strategic implications of Northwest Cape to Australian security.

These discussions, entitled Defense-to-Defence Talks, have convened approximately every 18 months since 1974. The talks have become valuable to Australian defense officials because they enable high-level access to senior U.S. Department of Defense officials specifically concerning U.S. strategic policy and its possible implications for Australian security. Moreover, the Head of Australian Defence Staff in Washington ("HADS") was granted enhanced access to high-level officials in the U.S. defense community in Washington at very short notice.

These consultative and liaison arrangements were expanded in a May 1978 agreement ("Hamilton-Armacost Agreement") concerning

the operations of Northwest Cape, as well as the other Joint Facilities. In essence, the establishment of the Joint Facilities and the subsequent agreements between Canberra and Washington concerning their operation have encouraged a more substantial bilateral security relationship. By providing Canberra with the requisite means of making a significant contribution to U.S. and Western security at the strategic level, the present bilateral security relationship enables the United States to disseminate security information to Australia and has transformed the Joint Facilities into a means for Australia to achieve its long-sought special access to the U.S. defense community.⁶⁹

The question must now be asked, following the end of the cold war and the ongoing dissolution of the previous strategic nuclear balance, can this relationship remain unchanged? After all, Northwest Cape, while still a joint facility, will revert to Australian ownership and control by the end of the century.⁷⁰ The reasons for this transfer are financial exigencies in the United States and because the facility's immediate value to the U.S. Navy has apparently diminished substantially over the past few years.⁷¹ The intention of this paper is not to become enmeshed in technical details related to the mission and alleged capabilities of these facilities. Rather, the important point is how changes in the strategic environment will affect existing security coordination and discussions between Canberra and Washington. There does not appear to be any move to change this relationship at present, i.e., Washington has made no public announcement to close or relocate any of the Joint Facilities. While not disparaging the value of the many other areas of security cooperation between Australia and the United States, it would be difficult to argue that the overall security relationship would not suffer if this particular aspect, regular high-level discussions of sensitive information and access to senior U.S. defense officials, were reduced in accordance with the evolving mission and perhaps diminished value of the Joint Facilities. In this respect, three potential problems need to be considered: the future nature of security discussions, how the value of the Joint Facilities is explained to the Australian public, and their possible linkage to trade issues.

First, it appears that, notwithstanding the massive sea change in the strategic environment, one could make a strong case that the Joint Facilities will continue to have value from the perspective of both countries. Defense Minister Senator Ray argued this point in his November 1991 comments in Parliament regarding the Defense Support Program's (DSP) ability to support a conventional campaign.⁷² As explained recently by Senator Ray, Nurrungar played a key part in the Allied Coalition's war against

Iraq and may well have important applicability to future U.S. and Australian security, i.e., monitoring the launches of intermediate-range ballistic missiles.⁷³ One would think that given all the new uncertainties in the world, e.g., the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, early intelligence of such developments will remain critical to Western Alliance security. In view of the past history of cooperation in these matters between Australia and the United States, it would be difficult to argue that the basis of the presence of the Joint Facilities needs to be rethought, let alone renegotiated. In short, there appears to be more than sufficient basis for the continuation of the operation of these facilities and maintenance of an active consultative process to discuss matters of mutual interest.

Second, in regard to the Australian public's knowledge and appreciation of the value of these facilities to Australia, one would expect (and hope) that this would be managed better in the future by both parties. As argued above, Australian anti-American and anti-nuclear movements may find these facilities increasingly convenient focal points for their protests. Assuming that both Australia and the United States perceive that these facilities continue to be valuable, it would be logical to explain in public their importance.⁷⁴ Exactly how this is to be effected would have to be worked out between Canberra and Washington. However, the November 1991 statement by Senator Ray regarding an agreement between Australia and the United States to "declassify" Nurrungar's functions was an intelligent move and should be repeated where possible.⁷⁵

Conversely, what should not be repeated is the May 1991 instance where the joint house defence sub-committee charged that the briefings its delegations received after visiting Nurrungar and Pine Gap were "totally unacceptable." According to their tabled report, "...Australian MPs are given less detailed information on the bases than is already available on the public record in the US," which is in contrast to the situation where select U.S. Members of Congress receive classified briefings.⁷⁶ Obviously, both Canberra and Washington need to continue their efforts to improve this situation if future embarrassments such as this one are to be avoided.

Finally, the issue of U.S. Government subsidies to agricultural exports is probably the most difficult one to be confronted and could defy resolution. One of the interesting aspects of the security relationship to date has been the non-linkage of trade to security issues, despite the vehemence of trade disputes. For example, when the bilateral security relationship was reaffirmed in August 1986 after Washington

suspended its security guarantees to New Zealand and effectively ended that country's standing in the ANZUS agreement, former Foreign Minister Bill Hayden in this same meeting harshly criticized the Reagan administration for implementing a program of agricultural export subsidies.⁷⁷ More recently, during the U.S. presidential campaign, the Bush administration's September 1992 decision to subsidize wheat exports resulted in a strong rejoinder from Australia.⁷⁸

The obvious target of these subsidies has been the farming industry in Australia, which is largely represented by the National Party, traditionally one of the alliance's strongest supporters in Australia. The issue of subsidies has reached the point where many in the farming community are increasingly advocating the linkage of the Joint Facilities to trade negotiations with the United States. While rejected by the current Labor government and Leader of the Opposition, Dr. Hewson, this tactic has found unusual support in former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, who was well known for being pro-American.⁷⁹

Speculating exactly if and how this issue will be resolved is beyond the scope of this paper. However, what needs to be understood by Australian and U.S. officials is that, if they are incapable of articulating the direct value of these facilities to Australian security, an unusual political consensus may emerge in Australia (left and right) in favor of linking their continued presence with bilateral trade disputes. I take this line of argument since it is too unpredictable to speculate whether U.S. export subsidies can or will be restrained in the future. However, what is possible is for officials to make the strongest case possible to the Australian public of the exact value of these installations to Australia's national security.

Conclusion.

The outlook, therefore, for Australian-U.S. security relations is encouraging. As described and analyzed above, the relationship is currently very healthy. There continue to be many areas of security cooperation which both countries find mutually advantageous. The end of the cold war has not noticeably diminished a strong mutual agreement in both countries' fundamental threat perceptions and interests in the greater Southwest Pacific region and globally. Moreover, if difficulties develop, this relationship has the advantage of a 41-year record of solving difficulties and misunderstandings. Indeed, the depth and intensity of the relationship are evinced by the fact that bilateral security relations have been institutionalized between defense and diplomatic bureaucracies,

but without any standing alliance organization to manage them; yet another manifestation of this relationship's strength.

In terms of actual military cooperation, there appears to be little in the way of new initiatives that need to be taken. The two countries have long stressed maintaining a high level of bilateral exercises, which has benefitted the armed forces of both. Unlike NATO, however, with its extensive integrated military command structure and numerous programs to promote interoperability and standardization, bilateral exercises and the "ABCA" standardization fora⁸⁰ have been, and will be, absolutely crucial to maintaining Australian-U.S. interoperability. As defense budgets are reduced and their "operations and maintenance" elements come under scrutiny, officials must be prepared to stress the importance of these cooperative programs in maintaining the ability to conduct combined operations. History shows that interoperability can either be learned through a strong commitment to achieving it during peacetime, or through developing it on the battlefield.

Yet, it would be unwise for Australian and U.S. officials to assume that the end of the cold war will not affect the management of bilateral security ties. Notwithstanding the birth of the ANZUS Security Treaty at the height of the Korean War, bilateral Australian-U.S. security ties eventually evolved into a much broader relationship, at times outside of the strict parameters of the cold war milieu. In short, "cooperation with like-minded people" can provide a raison d'être for future bilateral military activities in the post-cold war world. However, the disappearance of a common, identifiable and quantifiable threat to these two states' fundamental security interests, if not handled carefully, could remove the urgency to solve difficult issues as they emerge. The danger here is not, to my mind, one that could cause abrupt harm to the relationship. Rather, a lack of willingness could develop whereby officials will not make the hard, timely decisions to resolve difficult problems and could slowly decrement the support for continued close security cooperation between these two countries. In other words, officials will likely have to work much harder to justify the relationship in the future. One would think that this unpleasant eventuality should encourage Australian and U.S. officials to identify future likely contentious issues, and begin working mutually for their solution.

ENDNOTES

1. See, Western European Union Council of Ministers, "Petersberg Declaration," Bonn, June 19, 1992. For background on the WEU from a more than sympathetic perspective see, Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO, London: Brassey's (UK), 1989.
2. See, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991.
3. See, "The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," issued by the Heads of State and Government, North Atlantic Council, Rome, November 7-8, 1991, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, November 8, 1991.
4. See, Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: A Survey of International Relations, 1941-1968, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 107-125.
5. See, Keith Suter, Is There Life After ANZUS: New Directions for the Peace Movement, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1987, p. 13.
6. I argue this point in my work, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, 1951-1986, Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991, see especially pp. 36-56.
7. This is seen, for instance, in the intensification in defense ties between the ANZUS countries from 1976 to 1984. See, ibid., pp. 4-5; 68-71.
8. See, Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, pp. 183-184.
9. I argue this point in my essay, "Whither Future U.S. Alliance Strategy? The ABCA Clue," Armed Forces and Society Volume 17, No. 2, Winter 1991, pp. 277-297.
10. See, Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations.
11. One should recognize that the ANZUS Security Treaty was crucial to the development of security ties between Canberra and Washington because Australia was distinguished as a formal ally of the United States. This was fundamentally important and can be seen in terms of Australia's ability to participate in many defense activities with the U.S. Armed Forces as stipulated in U.S. legislation, e.g., the Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Acts and Arms Control, as amended, and the Disarmament Act, as

amended. Australia was made eligible for such important areas of cooperation as logistics, intelligence, sales of frontline platforms and sensors, and their subsequent priority in delivery. What is interesting is that the only other countries with this important legal distinction are NATO allies and Japan.

12. See, Young, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, passim.

13. See my essay, "ANZUS Naval Relations, 1951-85," in Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy, ed. by T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick and P.D. Jones, Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1991, pp. 296-315.

14. Apparently, this was a major concern for Australia and New Zealand at the 1976 ANZUS Council meeting. For Australian attitudes going into the conference see, The Age (Melbourne), July 31, 1976. See as well, "Comment and Discussion: A Policy of Denial, or Armed Neutrality?", Pacific Defence Reporter, Volume 13, No. 3, September 1986, p. 3.

15. See, Young, Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Relations, p. 132.

16. The published literature on the Joint Facilities in Australia is rather extensive. For example see, Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1980; idem., Pine Gap: Australia and the US Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988; idem., A Base for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987; and, idem., Australia's Secret Space Programs, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1988. It difficult to know whether the account of the missions and activities of these facilities as argued by Professor Ball is correct, given the official secrecy surrounding many of their activities. Therefore, these works are cited here without acknowledging the veracity of the information presented. However, what one can comment upon, and disagree with, is Professor Ball's interpretation of the political implications of the facilities for Australian security. Cf., Young, "Merely a Suitable Piece of Real Estate?", passim.

17. For copies of these and subsequent amending treaties see, Alan Burnett with Thomas-Durell Young and Christine Wilson, The ANZUS Documents, Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1991.

18. By actively assisting in the operation of the least vulnerable arm of the U.S. strategic triad (i.e., hosting a very-low frequency naval communications station at Northwest Cape), Australia's "relative state of splendid detachment physically, strategically, and politically from the world of strategic nuclear war" came to an abrupt end. See, Roy Neil Wallace, "The Australian Purchase of Three United States Guided Missile Destroyers: A Study of the Defense Aspect of Australian-United States Relations," (Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 1980), p. 204.

19. See, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, January 1974, pp. 40-41.

20. For more details on this subject see my essay, "The Australian-United States Strategic Relationship: Merely an Issue of Suitable Real Estate?" Comparative Strategy, Volume 8, No. 1, 1989, pp. 125-138.

21. This has not always been without its difficulties to the ADF. However, its advantages, in the opinion of its users, far outweigh its peculiar problems. See, Neil Chenoweth, "Guarding the Change," The Bulletin, March 31, 1992, p. 24.

22. See, Australian Defence: Major Decisions Since December 1972, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975, p. 1.

23. For greater analysis of this issue see my essay, "Australia's Defence Planning after the Cold War," The Pacific Review, Volume 4, No. 3, 1991, pp. 222-232; and, Alan Stephens, "The Limits of Self-Reliance," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April-May, 1992, pp. 12-14.

24. See, for instance, the RAAF acknowledgement to a parliamentary defense subcommittee that it holds only a 30-day munitions supply. However, it is instructive to note that Air Commodore Don Tidd, "who fought in Vietnam, said the US had always treated the RAAF 'almost like one of their own squadrons'." See, The Australian (Canberra), July 8, 1992.

25. See, Burnett et al., The ANZUS Documents, pp. 139-169; 202-208.

26. For example, the Australian government has offered Washington the option to relocate bombing and air-training ranges in the Philippines to a RAAF range currently being developed at the Delamere Range, near RAAF Base Tindal in Northern Territory. This would apparently augment access the United States already has to air training facilities in Australia, which include

Lancelin Range in Western Australia. See, The Age (Melbourne), March 7, 1992. The Opposition has offered greater access to the U.S. Air Force and Navy in its recent defense policy paper. See, The Age (Melbourne), October 19, 1992.

27. Cf., Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence, South Melbourne: MacMillan Company of Australia, 1980; and, Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, pp. 195-198.

28. See, Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, pp. 188-210, particularly pp. 197-198.

29. See, Peter Gratton, "The ADF in the Region of the Future," m/s of an address to RUSI Seminar, September 28, 1991.

30. "Australia is part of the Western community of nations. Australia therefore supports the ability of the United States to retain an effective strategic balance with the Soviet Union. A redistribution of power in favour of the Soviet Union in the central balance, or an extension of Soviet influence in our region at the expense of the United States would be a matter of fundamental concern to Australia, and would be contrary to our national interests." Australia, Department of Defence, The Defense of Australia 1987, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1987, p. 3.

31. See, The Age (Melbourne), September 10, 1992.

32. See, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, endorsed by Government, 27 November 1989, Canberra, September 1992, p. 45 (point 6.15).

33. Yet, an early draft of the Opposition's defense policy was framed in the context of expanding ties with Australia's regional neighbors, while relying less on the United States. This aspect of policy was deleted from the final policy draft. See, The Weekend Australian (Canberra), July 4, 1992.

34. This position has recently been supported by a senior Defence official, Mr. Jim Nockels, given the Clinton administration's lack of expertise in Asian-Pacific affairs. See, The Financial Review (Sydney), October 20, 1992.

35. See, The Financial Review (Sydney), October 19, 1992. For an early review of Opposition thinking regarding defense policy see, The Weekend Australian (Canberra), July 4, 1992.

36. See, The Age (Melbourne), February 20, 1992.

37. A common argument against Australian-U.S. security relations is that the ANZUS Security Treaty does not contain any security guarantees to Australia. For example see, Gary Brown, Breaking the American Alliance: An Independent National Security Policy for Australia, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 54, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1989, pp. 61-66.

38. "The defence relationship with the United States gives confidence that in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia's security, US military support would be forthcoming." Defence of Australia, pp. 4-5.

39. See, Ministerial Statement by Senator Hon. Gareth Evens, QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Regional Security, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989, p. 13; and, The Financial Review (Sydney), June 17, 1992.

40. Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, p. 27. See, as well, The Age (Melbourne), September 10, 1992.

41. Address by the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, to the Joint Service Staff College, "Australia and the Region: A Defence Perspective," Canberra, December 5, 1991.

42. See, The Australian (Canberra), October 14, 1976; Pacific Defence Reporter Volume 13, No. 4, August 1986, p. 23; The Sydney Morning Herald, August 2, 1990; The Age (Melbourne), May 9, 1990; The Canberra Times, February 26, 1992; and, The Weekend Australian (Canberra), April 4, 1992.

43. See, The Sydney Morning Herald, July 6, 1992. Cf., Australia, Department of Defence (Navy), Directorate of Public Information, The RIMPAC Experience, 1992.

44. For background on this contemporary issue see, William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, Defining U.S. Forward Presence in Europe: Getting Past the Numbers, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

45. The National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992, p. 7.

46. "The steadfast friendship of our close ally Australia continues to provide a source of strength for regional security tasks, economic development and political stability....Its willingness to host critical communications and intelligence

facilities and to facilitate frequent ship visits and exercises makes it an invaluable strategic partner." See, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, Report to Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 6.

47. See comments attributed to Minister for Defence Science and Personnel Gordon Bilney in Cameron Forbes' lengthy essay in The Age (Melbourne), January 4 and 6, 1992.

48. See, Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 1986.

49. For example, frigates, submarines, and helicopters. For a comprehensive review of the capital acquisition program of the ADF see, Australia, Department of Defence, Defence Report 1990-1991, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991, pp. 91-97.

50. See, National Military Strategy, pp. 3; 22.

51. See, Herschel Hurst, "Why We Need North-West Cape," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, February-March 1992, p. 14.

52. For one of the most eloquent arguments on this point see, former Minister for Defence Kim Beazley's Hermann Black Forum Lecture, Sydney, September 13, 1989, Washington, DC, Embassy of Australia, Australian Overseas Information Service, pp. 5-6 ("Continental Defense Only Option.")

53. The policy basis for this change in defense orientation can be found in, Australia, Department of Defence, Australian Defence Review, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1972; and, Australia, Department of Defence, Australian Defence, November 1976, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976. For commentary on this important change in defense policy and thinking see, Robert O'Neill, ed., The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1976; and, Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980.

54. See, Australia, Department of Defence, Force Structure Review, 1991, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, May 1991, pp. 17-18; 30.

55. See, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), January 23, 1989.
56. See, Force Structure Review, pp. 23-24; and, The Mercury (Hobart), October 2, 1992.
57. See, Northern Territory News (Darwin), August 26, 1992.
58. See, Northern Territory News (Darwin), August 27, 1992.
59. See, Northern Territory News (Darwin), August 19, 1992.
60. See, The Age (Melbourne), April 10, 1992.
61. For a status report on Jindalee see, "RAAF's First Over-the-Horizon Radar Begins Operations," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, August-September 1992, p. 16.
62. Cf., W.J. Meeke, "Coastal Surveillance: The Operator's Perspective," in Desmond J. Ball, ed., Air Power: Global Developments and Australian Perspectives, Sydney: Pergamon-Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988, p. 439; and, comments by Air Marshal David Evans, RAAF (ret) concerning the current ineffective civil force, Coastwatch in, The Sydney Morning Herald, January 21, 1992.
63. The Army for many years has been incapable of procuring sealift to enable it to deploy and sustain itself beyond (and indeed around) Australia. And, this apparently does not appear to be a problem which warrants great attention in Canberra. The decision to procure a helicopter support ship has been delayed until the end of this decade. See, Force Structure Review, p. 28.
64. See, The Canberra Times, January 10, 1993.
65. The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992, p. 141.
66. It is not by chance that the example of the Australian Army is used in this context. According to David Horner and Stewart Woodman, the Army "does not know what it is supposed to do, is unable to mount sustained operations, and is teetering on the brink of failure." See, The Sydney Morning Herald, July 5, 1991. For additional details see, David Horner, ed., Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 1990s, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 77, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1991.

67. See, The Washington Post, September 28, 1991.

68. See, for instance, former Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke's important ministerial statement on this issue, "Australia-United States Joint Defence Facilities," Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), Volume 137, June 6, 1984, pp. 2987-2989.

69. See, Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, 1951-1986, pp. 26-27.

70. See, The West Australian (Perth), September 23, 1992.

71. See, Michael Richardson, "North-West Cape's Surprise Secret," Pacific Defence Reporter, Volume 13, No. 4, October 1986, pp. 10; 34. This article argues that the decommissioning of U.S. Navy Poseidon SSBNs has reduced the need for U.S. Navy VLF communications requirements in the Southwest Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean areas. Conversely, one could argue that the shift by the United States to greater reliance on sea-based strategic nuclear weapons, as a result of the two START agreements with Russian Republic, makes such redundant communications stations, like Northwest Cape, more important.

72. This was first publicly acknowledged by Prime Minister Bob Hawke in a Parliamentary Statement in November 1988. "Nurrungar is a ground station used for controlling satellites in the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP). The DSP satellites provide ballistic missile early-warning and other information related to missile launches, surveillance and the detonation of nuclear weapons." See, Australian Overseas Information Service, Australian Background, November 22, 1988, p. 2.

73. "The Defence Minister, Senator Ray, told Parliament that the US satellite-based defence support program, which includes Nurrungar, had played a superb role in detecting the launch of Iraq's Scud missiles in time to warn the coalition forces and civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia..."

"Senator Ray said that besides its early warning function, the system of which Nurrungar was part, monitored the detonation of nuclear weapons and during the Gulf war provided surveillance, data on weather, navigation, placement of forces and other intelligence.

"I trust that the important role played by the joint defence facility, Nurrungar, in the Gulf war will further enhance public appreciation of its significance in efforts to promote measures for maintaining peace and stability, both globally and regionally.'" See, The Age (Melbourne), November 6, 1991.

74. The issue of inadequately explaining the relevance of the Joint Facilities to the Australian public has been part of a larger problem which has long faced the alliance: that is, public relations. Starke observed in the early 1960s that informing the general public of the value and utility of the ANZUS treaty was the alliance's principal problem and weakness. Nevertheless, credit is due to Ministers for Defence Kim Beazley and Robert Ray for attempting to raise the level of sophistication of the defense debate in Australia and releasing publicly details of the missions of the Joint Facilities. Joseph G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1965, pp. ix-x.

75. See, The Sunday Age (Melbourne), November 10, 1991.

76. See, The Australian (Canberra), May 1, 1992.

77. See, The Washington Post, August 8, 1986.

78. See, The Washington Post, September 4, 1992.

79. See, The Sunday Age (Melbourne), September 27, 1992.

80. I deal with the ABCA programs extensively in my essay, "Whither Future U.S. Alliance Strategy?"

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