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THE ROOTS OF
REGIONAL AMBITIONS

by

Hesham H. Islam

December, 1992

Thesis Advisor:

Glenn E. Robinson

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The Roots of Regional Ambitions

by

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ABSTRACT

The Persian Gulf area is vital to United States national interest, because oil is essential to America's economy. 60% of world's oil production comes from the Persian Gulf, and the U.S. consumes 10% of this oil. A series of potential threats in the region can draw the world into confrontation. Inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict are two major threats that jeopardize U.S. national objectives and continue to reduce the possibility of regional stability.

These threats are core issues in the Baathi ideology which is essential to the Iraqi regime. The Iraqi Arab Baath Socialist Party programs and ideology provide a source of energy to Inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the region.

Although the United States with its regional allies may be capable of ousting Saddam Hussein, the analysis provided in this thesis indicates that without fundamental changes in the Iraqi Baath regime, the 1990 Gulf War is unlikely to be the last conflict between Iraq and neighboring Gulf States.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS

More than half of the world's current oil production comes from the Persian Gulf region. While only six percent of the United States' imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf, the market price for oil everywhere, including the U.S. is dependent on the free flow of oil from the Gulf.

As America's industrial base relies on Persian Gulf oil as source of energy, the politically unstable Gulf states will continue to threaten U.S. economic independence. Oil plays a leading role as the basis for U.S. military, political, and economic policies towards the Persian Gulf region and the Gulf states in particular. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States deployed over half a million of its men and women in uniform to the Persian Gulf to insure its access to the region's oil. Clearly the primary United States' interest in the Persian Gulf revolves around oil.

A series of potential threats in the region can draw the United States into direct military involvement in the area. Inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict are two predominant threats for instability in the Persian Gulf, impeding the United States' ability to achieve its national objectives in the region. The recent Gulf War resulted from one of these threats.

Pan-Arabism is an idea that has dominated the Arab political system for many years. It is also a principal source of tension in the inter-Arab politics among the Arab leaders. Moreover, unification in the Arab world continues to

be a dream for charismatic leaders and regimes with ambition to increase their power base in the Middle East. The Iraqi Baath Party's promotion of the pan-Arab ideology will continue to raise the level of instability in the region.

Many serious regional conflicts have competed for global attention, but none has had as much impact on the United States' interests as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. is seen by Arabs and Israelis as the only power that can succeed in achieving stability in the region. The United States-sponsored Middle East peace talks represent a possible turning point in Arab-Israeli relations. However, unless peace talks participants achieve significant breakthroughs, another Arab-Israeli war could erupt at anytime. If the Arabs are serious about using oil embargo threats, this will result in another major economic crisis for the United States. The Baath Party in Iraq is seeking to promote the Arab-Israeli conflict in the aftermath of Desert Storm, as can be seen in its use of anti-Zionist racist slogans against Israel in particular and Jews in general.

Inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict are core issues in Iraqi Baathi ideology. This thesis examines the development of the Iraqi Baath Arab Socialist Party, its ideology, and the means by which the party enhances regional tensions in order to further Iraqi interests.

In turn, this thesis concludes that the Baath ideology in Iraq will continue to provide fuel, to the core tensions in the region, increasing regional instability and jeopardizing U.S. national objectives in the area. Moreover, the thesis also argues that the removal of Saddam Hussein alone will not prevent the resurgence

of another tyrant, or another Baathi leader who believes in Iraq's goal to become a major regional military power.

Analysis provided in this thesis suggests that without fundamental changes in the Iraqi Baath regime, the 1990 Gulf War is unlikely to be the last conflict between Iraq and neighboring Gulf States. A country like Iraq, with a regime that wants to become a regional power and the vanguard of pan-Arabism, will rise again sooner or later with other surprises that will jeopardize regional stability.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is an area that has become exceedingly important politically, militarily, and economically. The area's political importance is evident. For example, the Arab-Israeli conflict led to the involvement of both the United States and the former Soviet Union in the recent Middle East peace talks. This shows a significantly high level of interest in international political relations.

The main facet of the area's military importance is the strategic location of the Suez Canal. The Canal provides a quick means of circumventing the long trip around Africa by military warships of various countries which shuttle back and forth between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Oil tankers and merchant ships also utilize the Suez Canal as an efficient means to reach Western markets.

However, from the stand point of this thesis, the area's economic importance takes precedence over the other two factors. There are approximately 990 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves in the world today. Current estimates tell us that there are another 500 billion barrels, most of which lie beneath the sea yet to be discovered. At current consumption rates, the remaining oil on the planet will be used up in another 70 years.

Moreover, 60% of the world's current oil production comes from a 500 by 800 mile block in the heart of the Middle East.¹ This block of land is known as the Persian Gulf States. Thus, the Persian Gulf States are the primary supplier of oil, the world's major energy source.

With only 5% of the world's population, the United States consumes approximately 45% of the world's oil. Surprisingly, the United States is currently importing 37.8% of its oil needs. Six percent of this oil comes from the Persian Gulf.² The United States' economic interests in the region, although diverse, have one common essential feature: oil. In securing Persian Gulf oil, the United States fostered a strong commercial and financial interdependence with the Gulf States. This interdependence takes on many forms, such as America's exports of goods and services to the region, U.S. investments, repatriation of U.S. oil company profits and dividends, and several hundred thousand jobs for American citizens which the exports generate.³

The United States is dependent to a certain degree on the Gulf States. The revenue generated from America's exports to the Gulf States totals more than 5

¹Interview with Julie Scott, Statistic office, American Petroleum Institute, Washington D.C., 23 Dec. 1991.

²Dr. Moyara Ruehsen, in a talk at the Naval Postgraduate School on 10 August 1992. Dr. Ruehsen stated, "Even though the United States imports very little from the Persian Gulf, if that oil is cut off, the price of oil everywhere in the world will increase tremendously.

³John Duke, The Persian Gulf: Ideology and power in the Middle East, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 415.

billion dollars per year. Additionally, investments from Saudi Arabia alone, primarily in United States' government securities, is estimated at 70 billion dollars.⁴

The relationship between the United States and the oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf region keenly illustrates the definition of economic interdependence. Therefore, Arab oil producing countries today have three options available to utilize their oil weapons: a slow down in oil production; raising oil prices; or an oil embargo. For these reason the Persian Gulf region holds the key to international economic stability.

The thesis presented in this study is that the United States' national interest in the Persian Gulf region revolves around oil and that this interest is threatened by the existence of the secular Baath party regime in Iraq. Therefore, this thesis will examine the secular Baath party regime in Iraq. It will give an assessment of its policy and leadership effects on United States' interests. Then, the thesis will prove that ousting Saddam Hussein will not obtain stability in the region. Thus, many significant and difficult changes in the secular Baath regime will be required to limit its effect in Iraq.

This thesis will be an analysis of America's policy in the Persian Gulf. The roles of American Presidents since World War II, their attitudes and policies towards the Persian Gulf will be examined. This thesis will focus on a number

⁴Interview with Julie Scott, Statistics office, American Petroleum Institute, Washington D.C., 23 Dec. 1991.

of U.S. Presidents such as Truman, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, all of whom have had a significant impact on politics in the region.

It is appropriate that the Truman Presidency (1945-1952) provides the opening chapter of American policy in the Persian Gulf for a number of reasons.

First, it coincided with the end of World War II and the beginning of a period of postwar international relations during which the long-range trends could assert themselves in contrast to the immediate, often as hoc moves and solutions dictated by the demands of the war. Second, this new, postwar era witnessed an intensive involvement of the United States in the political and economic affairs of the Middle East, in contrast to the hands-off attitude characteristic of the prewar period. And third, under Truman the United States had to face and define its policy in all three sectors that provided the root causes of America's interest in the region: the Soviet threat, the birth of Israel, and petroleum.⁵

A series of potential threats present actual dangers to the United States' national interest in the Middle East and in particular the Persian Gulf. These threats can draw the United States into direct military involvement in the area.

⁵George Lenczowski, "The Truman Presidency," in American Presidents and the Middle East (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 7. George Lenczowski's exposure to the Middle East began with military and diplomatic service in the area during World War II and was followed by a career as professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley. Over the years he has made frequent research visits to the Middle East and Europe and is personally acquainted with many of the actors in the political arena. Lenczowski has served as a consultant to the United States government, the defense establishment, research institutions, and private industry. Among other works, he is the author of The Middle East in World Affairs (4th ed.), and has lectured at many foreign universities, including those of Oxford, London, Toronto, Geneva, and Middle Eastern capitals.

However, this thesis will only discuss inter-Arab politics, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts, which it considers major threats. These threats are core issues in the Baathi ideology which is essential to the Iraqi regime. In turn, the thesis will attempt to prove that the Baath ideology in Iraq jeopardizes the United States' national objective and will continue to reduce the possibility of any regional stability.

The thesis will thus attempt to show that, with the present Baath regime in Iraq, the 1990 Gulf War is unlikely to be the last war between Iraq and other Gulf States. Finally, as the thesis examines the Baath regime in Iraq, it will seek to show that the Baathi ideology provides a fuel, or a source of energy, to the core threats in the region.

II. AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Today the Persian Gulf region is the focus of wide spread interest because of its strategic geographical location and due to the fact that it is the world's principal supplier of oil. In return, the Persian Gulf region has a vital impact on the policies of first world countries, specifically the United States' national security.

The U.S. became involved in the region after the outcome of World War II. This war devastated the British economy, forcing them to reduce the costs of maintaining their Empire around the globe and reducing their presence in the Persian Gulf. As the British began to withdraw their military contingents, loosening their mandates and giving the regional states their independence, the United States as a superpower stepped in to help maintain a balance of power between the West and the Soviet Union.

The United States asserted itself as the new protector of Western interests in the Middle East in the immediate aftermath of World War II (and during the gradual devolution of the British Empire) and spent the next decade trying to prevent what was then seen as a Soviet penetration of the region.⁶

⁶Itamar Rabinovich, "The Middle East," in Sea -Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed, ed. Nicholas X. Rizopoulos (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), p. 33.

A. U.S. INTEREST: EVOLVING PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTORIES.

The Persian Gulf is one of the most strategic regions in the Middle East. Countries bordering the region, as well as its waters, contain the largest reserves of oil in the world. These countries provide the world with the bulk of its oil supplies.

The Persian Gulf has been an important part of foreign policy in American administrations since the Truman Presidency, when he articulated in one of his speeches describing the Persian Gulf:

The area contains vast natural resources. It lies across the most convenient land, air, and water communications. It is consequently an area of great economic and strategic importance, the nations of which are not strong enough individually or collectively to withstand powerful aggression.⁷

President Truman played a direct role in shaping early American policy toward the Middle East and in particular the Persian Gulf region. After the end of World War II, Truman resented the Soviets' occupation of northern Iran. He

⁷Farouk A. Sankari, "The Effects of the American Media on Public Opinion and Middle East Policy Choices," American - Arab Affairs, 20 (Spring 1987), 113. Dr. Sankari is a professor, Department of Political Science, and Associate Dean of Social Science Division, College of Letters and Science, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh.

stipulated a deadline and called for immediate evacuation of all Soviet troops from Iranian territory by March 2, 1946.⁸

When the Soviets failed to withdraw troops by March 2, Truman personally instructed Secretary Byrnes to send a blunt message to Stalin. Moreover, when Truman clarified information about his message, he said:

The Soviet Union persisted in its occupation until I personally saw to it that Stalin was informed that I had given orders to our military chiefs to prepare for the movement of our ground, sea, and air forces. Stalin then did what I knew he would do. He moved the troops out.⁹

President Truman understood the expansionistic nature of the Soviet system, as well as his conviction that Soviet aggression should be contained. In this broad conceptual frame work Iran played a strategically significant role, as a vital link in a chain of non-Communist states bordering on the Soviet Union and as a rich source of oil.¹⁰

President Truman led the U.S. foreign policy makers in understanding the importance of the Persian Gulf region and the need for security assistance and containment of the Soviet Union that was deemed necessary at that time. The Truman doctrine was based on the containment of the Soviet Union.

⁸George Lenczowski, "The Truman Presidency," in American Presidents and the Middle East (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 12.

⁹*Ibid.* , p. 13.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

The administration not only induced the Russians to withdraw troops from Iran and to give up demands for boundary concessions and base rights from Turkey, but in addition committed itself to support the government of Greece against an externally supplied communist insurgency and to make the presence of the Sixth Fleet in waters surrounding the latter two countries a permanent fixture of the postwar world.¹¹

The Truman doctrine committed the United States to building the military in Iran and Turkey in order to contain the Soviet Union and to ensure that Iran would act as the policeman in the Gulf. This policeman was to maintain open sea lanes and would ensure the continuous flow of oil to the United States.

The Truman administration developed a containment plan directed at the Soviet Union in northern Iran and later against communist plans in Greece and Turkey. Effective containment of the Soviet threat meant that the Middle East's oil resources would be safeguarded for the benefit of the West. Every subsequent administration has in one way or another built upon this containment policy, with

¹¹John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies Of Containment : A Critical Appraisal Of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 22. The author also stated "The Truman doctrine also showed up in the Far East, where Washington continued to resist any substantive role for the Russians in the occupation of Japan, while at the same time making clear its determination to prevent a Soviet takeover of all of Korea. It showed up in Germany, where the United States cut off reparation shipments from its zone and began moving toward consolidating it with those of the British and the French, while at the same time offering the Russians a four-power treaty guaranteeing the disarmament of Germany for twenty-five years. It showed up in the Council of Foreign Ministers, where Byrnes firmly resisted Soviet bids to take over former Italian territories along the Mediterranean, while at the same time patiently pursuing negotiations on peace treaties for former German satellites." The Truman doctrine obligated the United States to resist Soviet expansionism wherever it appeared.

emphasis on the Middle Eastern states bordering the Soviet Union, or the "northern tier" states, as they are known.¹²

A couple of decades later, the Nixon doctrine consisted of three propositions:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.¹³

Because of the Gulf States' oil resources, the Nixon administration considered their survival vital to United States' security. Yet, they looked at Saudi Arabia and Iran (the largest oil producers in the region) as the pillars upon which the security of the American national interest could rest on. This doctrine

¹²Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, ed., Ideology and Power in the Middle East Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988) p. 433.

¹³John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies Of Containment : A Critical Appraisal Of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 298.

came to be known as the "Twin Pillars" policy.¹⁴ This resulted in economic, technical aid and conventional arms sales to the latter two countries.

Two administration later, President Carter felt very strongly about the Arab oil embargo policy in 1973.

As a Presidential candidate, he had stated during a debate with President Ford that if any country should ever again impose an embargo on oil against the United States, he would consider such a move an economic declaration of war, and would respond instantly and in kind.¹⁵

President Carter viewed the denial of oil as blackmail and he mentioned to many American leaders that, "the greatest nation on earth was being jerked around by a few desert states."¹⁶

The Carter doctrine is another of America's official policies dealing specifically with the Persian Gulf region. The President in his State of the Union message on January 23, 1980, pledged defense of the Persian Gulf in the following words:

¹⁴J.L. Campbell, "U.S. Objectives and Policies in the Persian Gulf Region," (Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base AL, April 1988), p. 9. Iran and Saudi Arabia would constitute the pillars upon which rested both the security of the Persian Gulf region and the American national interests. This policy would last for the remainder of the Nixon administration and through most of the Carter years.

¹⁵George Lenczowski, "The Carter Presidency," in American Presidents and the Middle East (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 159.

¹⁶Ibid.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.¹⁷

In justifying this powerful statement Carter comments on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by saying:

. . . successful take-over of Afghanistan would give the Soviets a deep penetration between Iran and Pakistan, and pose a threat to the rich oil fields of the Persian Gulf and to the crucial waterways through which so much of the world's energy supplies had to pass.¹⁸

Prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the United States looked to Saudi Arabia and Iran as the military powers required to provide and maintain security in the region. As a result of the Iranian Revolution, the ensuing hostage crisis, and the invasion of Afghanistan, by the Soviet Union, the United States' national security lost one of its "Twin pillars" in the Gulf.

Moreover, the United States realized that Saudi Arabia was an unlikely pillar for such a policy. The need for U.S. military intervention became inevitable. To

¹⁷Ibid., p. 206.

¹⁸Ibid. Carter's sensitivity to the strategic value of the Persian Gulf led him to write in his diary, describing the Soviet take over of Afghanistan, as "The most serious international development that has occurred since I have been President."

support the United States' interests in securing oil supplies for the West, the job of policing the area was left for the United States alone.¹⁹

During the Iran-Iraq War when Iran threaten to block the Strait of Hormuz President Reagan declared on October 19, 1983:

I do not believe the free world could stand by and allow anyone to close the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to oil traffic through those waterways.²⁰

On March 7, 1987, President Reagan reflagged all the Kuwaiti tankers.²¹ Two days later the United States Navy began escorting the reflagged Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf. This was a reconfirmation of the Reagan administration to keeping the Straits of Hormuz open.

For this reason President Reagan enunciated a corollary where he stated:

... after the Iranian Revolution demonstrated clear risks to the Gulf powers from "internal" threats and pledged that the United States would not permit Saudi Arabia to become another Iran.²²

¹⁹Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States. (Winchester, Mass. : Unwin Hyman Inc., 1989), p. IX.

²⁰George Lenczowski, "The Reagan Presidency," in American Presidents and the Middle East (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 246.

²¹Ibid.

²²Lenore G. Martin and WM. J. Olson, eds. , "Patterns of Regional Conflict and U.S. Gulf Policy," in US Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 9.

The Reagan Corollary led to the development of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and increased the United States presence in the region.²³

B. TESTING AMERICA'S RESOLVE.

Due to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on the 2nd of August 1990, and the perceived threat that Iraq might invade Saudi Arabia, the United States and the Western economies once again realized just how dependent they were on the Gulf States' oil supplies.

By putting American policies to the test, President Bush showed the world how important Middle East oil was. He clearly stated his foreign policy to the American people in relation to Arab oil producing countries, particularly Saudi

²³Interview with William J. Flanagan Jr, Rear Admiral, USN. , Chief of Legislator Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 13 November 1991. And J.L. Campbell, "U.S. Objectives and Policies in the Persian Gulf Region," (Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base AL, April 1988), p. 9-12. For additional commentary on this point see Lenore G. Martin and WM. J. Olson, eds. , "Patterns of Regional Conflict and U.S. Gulf Policy," in US Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 23. "USCENTCOM, is designed as the principal instrument for resisting military intervention by the Soviet Union, an overthrow of the Saudi regime, or other crises within the Gulf sheikhdoms. This rapid deployment force of approximately 300 -360 thousand personnel drawn from all branches of the US Armed Forces. USCENTCOM has no bases in the Gulf, but by agreement with Oman (not all of which is public). During crises USCENTCOM is permitted access to air and naval bases built to accommodate US forces in Oman. Only Marine contingents stationed on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, some 2,000 miles from the Gulf, will have the capability of a rapid response to any Gulf crisis. It has been estimated that approximately 1,800 marines could be airlifted to the Gulf within two days, and more optimistically, that up to 50 thousand marines could be delivered to the Gulf in a little more than one week."

Arabia. On 8 August 1990, President Bush addressed the nation from the White House and made the following statements:²⁴

. . . we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes, these choices are not easy. But today as President, . . . we made to stand up for what's right and condemn what's wrong.

At my direction elements of the 82nd Airborne Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabian government in the defense of its homeland.²⁵

The President thus spelled out the principles which would steer the United States' policy for months to come. Then, President Bush addressed the argument justifying U.S. involvement in Persian Gulf affairs.²⁶

Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more vulnerable to Iraq's threats.

. . . we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors. Saddam Hussein promised his friends he would not invade Kuwait. And 4 days ago, he promised the world he would withdraw. And twice we have seen what his promises mean. His promises mean nothing.

²⁴Franklin Malafarina, "The United States and Saudi Arabian Oil Policies," an unpublished paper 1991, p. 15. Professor David Winterford, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

²⁵President George Bush, "The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles," United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C., (8 August 1990), Current Policy No. 1292.

²⁶Malafarina, p. 15.

I've spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait. This is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem. It is the world's problem.

I pledge here today that the United States will do its part . . . to induce Iraq to withdraw without delay from Kuwait. . . . after consulting with King Fahd, I sent Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to discuss cooperative measures we will take. Following those meetings, the Saudi government requested our help. And I responded to that request by ordering U.S. air and ground forces to deploy forces to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Let me be clear. The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, grows out of the longstanding friendship and security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression.

Through their presence, as well as through training and exercises, these multinational forces will enhance the overall capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the Kingdom.

I want to be clear about what we are doing and why. America does not seek conflict, nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other nations. But America will stand by its friends. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf.

I will ask oil producing nations to do what they can to increase production in order to minimize any impact that oil flow reductions will have on the world economy. And I will explore whether we and our allies should draw down our strategic petroleum reserves. Conservation measures can also help. Americans everywhere must do their part. And one more thing. I'm asking the oil companies to do their fair share. They should show restraint and not abuse today's uncertainties to raise prices.²⁷

²⁷President George Bush, "The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles," United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C., (8 August 1990), Current Policy No. 1292.

As many presidents have done in the past, President Bush made it clear to the world that the United States would go to war to defend its access to Persian Gulf oil. In August 1990, the U.S. President clearly articulated in his speech at the Pentagon, that the U.S. would continue to ensure its access to the Persian Gulf States oil.²⁸

Our objectives remain clear: the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; . . . security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

Our action in the gulf is not about religion, greed, or cultural differences. Our action in the gulf is about fighting aggression and preserving the sovereignty of nations. It is about keeping our word and standing by old friends. It is about our own national security interests and ensuring the peace and stability of the world.

We are also talking about maintaining access to energy resources that are key not just to the functioning of this country but to the entire world. Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.²⁹

²⁸Malafarina, p. 16.

²⁹President George Bush, "Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf," in United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington D.C., (15 August 1990), Current Policy No. 1293. On the subject of justifying U.S. action in the gulf, also see Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander, Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam's War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 53. Where the Secretary of State James Baker stated, "It is not about Kuwait and the flow of oil from its wells but about a dictator who, acting alone, could strangle the global economic order, determining whether we all enter into recession or the darkness of a depression."

The American people were still not convinced the United States would go to war in the Middle East. The United States allowed the Shah to fall in 1979 and left Lebanon in 1984 without completing its mission.³⁰ Yet, on 30 August 1990, President Bush again stated the United States' intention to defend its access to Middle East oil.³¹

During the recent Gulf War the United States and its allies were militarily involved in the Persian Gulf area, more than any other active region on the globe. On 27 February, 1991, the Bush administration liberated Kuwait and is currently involved diplomatically, economically, and militarily in the region.³² This brief assessment of United States policies indicates that Washington has been consistently involved in the Persian Gulf region since World War II.

³⁰Malafarina, p. 18.

³¹President George Bush, "American's Stand Against Aggression," in United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C., (20 August 1990), Current Policy No. 1294.

³²"Desert Shield/Storm Chronology," All Hands, Desert Storm special issue, p. 70. On Feb. 26, 1991, on Baghdad Radio, Saddam Hussein announced Iraqi troops began withdrawing from Kuwait and that this withdrawal would be completed within the day. In the 25 minute speech, Hussein maintains that "Kuwait was a part of Iraq which was separated from it in the past, and current circumstances are such that armed forces are forcing us to withdraw. " President Bush calls Hussein's speech " . . . an outrage. He is not withdrawing. His defeated forces are retreating. The coalition will continue to prosecute the war with undiminished intensity. It is time for all Iraqi forces to lay down their arms. And that will stop the bloodshed. The liberation of Kuwait is close at hand. " On Feb. 27, President Bush addresses the nation, declaring "Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated."

The specific United States' national objectives for the Persian Gulf region, as stated from official government sources, were tailored to the need of the United States at a certain time frame. For example, Secretary of State George P. Shultz in 1987 stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that denying the Soviet Union control over the region is one of the United States' national objectives.³³ Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the Armed Services in 1990 that the United States' national objectives in the Persian Gulf were to:

- Deter and repel further Iraqi aggression.
- Obtain the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
- Restore the legitimate government of Kuwait.
- Protect American citizens in the region.³⁴

Unequivocally, the United States won the Cold War and the Soviet Union has collapsed. The threat from Soviet expansion is diminished in the region. Thus moving the Eastern bloc nations in a direction that the United States and its Western allies prefer to see.

³³J.L. Campbell, "U.S. Objectives and Policies in the Persian Gulf Region," (Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base AL, April 1988), p. X.

³⁴U.S. , Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy options and implications, 100 1st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990, p. 16.

The recent events in the former Soviet Union caught the world by surprise. The Soviet Union is in pieces, anti-communism is now surging, and the country is struggling to cope with many serious domestic, economic, political, social and ethnic problems. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are now independent and the United States has recognized them as members in the United Nations. Former President Gorbachev vowed huge arm cuts to match President Bush's plans of scrapping tactical nuclear weapons and massive reductions in offensive strategic weapons. Meanwhile, after our victory in the Gulf and the liberation of Kuwait, the U.S. national objectives, as stated by Mr. Shultz and Mr. Cheney in the Persian Gulf, will require review and modifications.

C. U.S. INTEREST AND THE GULF WAR.

Official statements seem to commit the United States to protect the independence of the Gulf States. Yet, in the case of Iran this did not arise. The United States did not deal specifically with the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Iran, since the triumph of the revolution did not negate Iranian sovereignty.

The United States' vital interests do not include the sovereignty of the Gulf States. Nor will it be willing to deploy massive numbers of troops to protect American citizens in the region alone. The United States' vital interest in the region is oil. Since the United States' access to the Gulf oil was threatened due to the Iraq/Kuwait conflict, the U.S.'s vital interest was violated.

To discover the degree of concern of the United States over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a content analysis project was conducted to compare the attitude of the American media towards Iraq after its invasion of Iran and following its invasion of Kuwait.³⁵ The results of this content analysis indicate that the U.S. press demonstrated greater *neutrality* toward Iraq after its invasion of Iran and greater *hostility* toward Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait.

As Western industrial world dependence on the Middle East oil increases, the politically unstable Gulf states proportionally raise their oil production to meet the world demand. This clearly signals the importance of the United States' role to ensure friendly control of the Gulf oil. They will ensure its continuous flow and price stability in order to provide the required energy, security and stability to the industrial well being of the free world economy.

It is not possible to fix an exact date for the establishment of Kuwait City but most researchers agree that the town facing the sea was built around 1716.³⁶ Kuwait was just another sand box in the Arabian desert carved on the map of the Middle East. The United States' opposition to Iraq's 1990 take-over of Kuwait was not only due to the offensive nature of the Iraqi aggression. This box of sand

³⁵Robert P. Samborski, Hesham H. Islam, Franklin J. Malafarina and Lili D. Mann, "Research and policy analysis" an unpublished paper. Professor Dana Eyre, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

³⁶Jean P. Sasson, "Kuwait: A Brief History," The Rape of Kuwait: The True Story of Iraqi Atrocities Against a Civilian Population (New York: Knightsbridge Publishing Company, 1991), p. 2.

contains 13 percent of the world's oil reserves. The United States was concerned that Iraq would control a large amount of Kuwait's oil reserves.

Saddam Hussein staged his army on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border. His tanks were little more than 200 miles from Ras El-Tanura, the main Saudi oil port. When he repeatedly warned of attacking Riyadh with Iraqi Scud missiles, the United States feared that Saddam Hussein's action was heading towards the invasion of Saudi Arabia. This would have placed him in a position to dictate world oil prices had he gained control of Saudi Arabia.

Oil played a leading role in determining U.S. national objectives. The Iraqi dictator constituted a threat to America's national objectives. Therefore, the United States with its allies formed the Coalition forces and deployed them to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. Such action clearly indicates that the U.S. government believed that one of its own vital interests was being threatened.

The U.S. national objective serves as the basis for United States military, political, and economic policies toward the Persian Gulf region and the Gulf states in particular. Furthermore, this objective may require the use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, or military power for implementation.³²

³²J.L. Campbell, "U.S. Objectives and Policies in the Persian Gulf Region," (Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base AL, April 1988), p.X Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, Leif R. Rosenberger, "The U.S. Dilemma," Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War college, 1990), p. 70.

Through a historical analysis of the United States' interest in the region and the result of the content analysis project, there should be no doubt in any American's mind that the Persian Gulf and its vast oil reserves are vital to the security of the United States. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the President of the United States of America, with the overwhelming support of the American people, deployed over one half million military troops to the Middle East to insure the United States maintained access to Persian Gulf oil.³³

Meanwhile, the Bush administration has taken a different stance concerning the Yugoslavian conflict where, 100,000 civilians, mostly Muslims and Croats, are in refugees camps, more than 8,000 are dead and an unknown number are injured as a result of the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, since Yugoslavia offers no oil assets to the U.S. "the Bush administration has no intention of sending ground troops."³⁴

However, in respect to the Iraqi conflict the United States waged war on a large scale to ensure that no man or country could control enough of the world's oil assets as to dictate world oil prices and cause instability in the world oil market. A stable supply of oil is vital to the economy of the United States. Therefore, oil is vital to the U.S.'s national interest in the Persian Gulf.

³³George Gallup, and Frank Newport, "First Anniversary of Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," The Gallup Poll Monthly, July 1991, p. 34. Sixty nine percent approved President Bush's decision to go to war with Iraq; only twenty one percent disapproved.

³⁴"The Face of Defeat," Newsweek, 24 August 1992, p. 45.

III. U.S. / IRAQ RELATIONS, POINT OF CONTENTION

The Middle East is an area where proliferation of local conflicts, has the potential of drawing the World into a major confrontation. Many patterns of regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf contribute to its instability. This chapter will examine two predominate issues as principal sources of instability and how they have significant effects on the international politics of the region.

Inter-Arab politics, and the Arab-Israeli conflict are two major issues which impede the United States' ability to achieve its national objectives in the Persian Gulf. Inevitably, the recent Gulf War was a result of at least one of these factors.³⁵

The relatively calm atmosphere that currently prevails in the Persian Gulf area may prove to be temporary, more the result of exhaustion than resolution of underlying tension. Iran is still recovering from its seven year war with Iraq which ended in 1988 and Syria is deeply involved in Lebanon. Israel is strained by having to cope with the Intifadha and its internal affairs in the occupied lands.

³⁵Abraham Nafia'a, "One year after the war," Al-Ahram North America Edition, (January 1992), p.1. Tariq Azziz, second most powerful man in the Iraqi regime stated; "Iraq's annexation of Kuwait was a result of two factors: Kuwait's horizontal oil well drilling was actually pumping Iraqi oil. And, Kuwait's demand of the return of the Warbah and Bubiyan islands." ". . . Kuwait had belonged to the Ottoman Empire along with Iraq and was governed from Baghdad. Therefore, Kuwait is part of Iraq."

Iraq is in chaos after its defeat in 1991. Kuwait will require years to rebuild. Escalation of any single point of tension could have destabilizing effects on the Persian Gulf states, the United States and its Western allies. The reduction and optimistically, the eventual elimination of these tensions, should be a top priority for United States policy makers. If the United States can utilize its current preeminence to mitigate these tensions, then the United States' vital interest will no longer be threatened.

A. INTER-ARAB POLITICS.

In the next few pages I will discuss the unification attempts between the Arab countries and why this concept has influenced their political system. I will attempt to prove that this unification is a dream based on an eroding political foundation between the Arab leaders. Therefore, pan-Arabism will continue to cause instability in the region. The rise in instability lies in a historical context. Less than a century ago the Middle East was dominated by the British, French and Italians. Jordan and Lebanon did not exist on the map and boundaries were not well defined. Indeed a high percentage of nomadic tribesmen still inhabited the region. Colonialists drew up the map of the Middle East.

European colonization in the Arab world resulted in forced pacification, economic exploitation and cultural penetration. The colonial powers controlled the military, political, economic and educational activities of the Arab countries. This resulted in the Westernization of the laws, and in some cases the

constitutions of many Arab countries, which was far from traditional Islamic law.³⁶

The Arab World, with more than 200 million people, stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to Iraq. Almost all the Arabs are bonded together by one religion; Islam, and one language; Arabic. Yet, the Arabic dialects of North Africa are heavily salted with Berber and French, they are almost incomprehensible to the Arabs of Asia. The Nile Valley has sedentary people, while the deserts of Arabia are still home to the Bedouins, restless nomads who have warred sporadically against one another.³⁶

Despite the inescapable sense of community from Morocco to Iraq, the deep rivalries and conflicts in the area, and the social and economic discontinuities, Arab leaders constantly invoke the symbols of Arab unity.³⁷ Pan-Arabism is a movement towards political unity first, then ultimately to a future federal union between all Arab countries. It is a movement of Arab awareness towards their identity,

. . . of belonging to a vast group supposed to share a common origin, characterized by a name and by common cultural features. . . it may not be powerful enough to overcome the many schisms and differences that exist

³⁶Abraham Nafia'a, "The History of Imperialism in Egypt," Al Ahram North America Edition, No. 1645 (August 1991), p. 1.

³⁶Louise Lief, "Battling for the Arab mind," U.S. News, 21 January 1991, p. 26.

³⁷Michael C. Hudson, "The Middle East," World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 483.

among the peoples and leaders of the Arab World and, therefore, can not on its own drive them towards the road of organic unity. Yet, as an idea and a symbol it is potent enough to set cultural, even normative, standards with which most citizens of Arab countries tend to identify.³⁸

To some Arab leaders, pan-Arabism is the vehicle that will transform the glorious Arab past into a heroic future.

. . . its obsession with ethnic heritage, Arabs drew courage from their long and distinguished history, . . . with its emphasis on state-buildings, modernization and scientific development, the arabs, for the first time in almost five hundred years, could become excited about their future.³⁹

Pan-Arabism is an idea that has dominated the Arab political system for many years. It's an idea that derived from the following factors:

- The Universalism of the Ottoman Empire of which Arab states have been a part for four centuries.
- The Balfour Declaration and the Sykes/Picot agreement made their imprint on a large number of Arab nationalists. As a result of these Western treaties an entire generation of Arabs were traumatized.
- The power and popularity of a charismatic leader to conceive and spread the ideology of pan-Arabism among the Arabs.⁴⁰

³⁸Adeed Dawisha, "Arab Radicalism a clarification," The Arab radicals (New York: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1986), p. 10.

³⁹Ibid. , p. 21.

⁴⁰Fouad Ajami, "The end of pan-Arabism," Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1978/79), p. 365.

In reaching out toward unity, Arabs hope for support and solidarity between them. Some Arab leaders seek unity, to gain strength during their struggle for emancipation from foreign influence. To them it's their only power of opposition to Israel and particularly to its territorial expansion.

Since the Arabs gained their independence, they have attempted unsuccessfully to reunite. On March 5, 1958, Egypt and Syria were united, constituting the United Arab Republic with Gamel Abdel Nasser as its first President.⁴¹ In public the unification between Egypt and Syria was applauded by all the Arab leaders. It was a step towards Arab unity, stimulated by Pan-Arabism.

In March of 1958 a crisis broke out in Saudi-U.A.R. relations because of the alleged attempt of King Saud to bribe Syria's executive minister of interior, Colonel Sarraj, to rupture the union with Egypt and assassinate Nasser.⁴²

⁴¹George Lenczowski, The Middle East In World Affairs, 4th ed. (New York, Univ. Of Cornell Press, 1990), p.538. "March 8, Yemen joined in a federal union with the United Arab Republic, forming the United Arab States. In contrast to the complete merger of Egypt and Syria, the United Arab States provided for the retention by each state of its form of government and its separate diplomatic representation abroad except in the cases where by mutual consent a single mission was to be appointed. Control of common affairs was to be exercised by the Supreme Council, composed of heads of member states. It was to be assisted by the Union Council, which would include an equal number of representatives from member states, to be presided over alternately by each member state for a period of one year. In outline, this was the formal arrangement. In reality the federative link proved to be of the loosest kind, and Yemen stubbornly persisted in her own ways, politically and socially."

⁴² Ibid. , p. 539. King Saud's action was a retaliation to the plot carried on by Egyptian agents against his regime.

The unification between Egypt and Syria lasted for approximately three years.

Damascus became dead as a decision-making center. Syrian ministers, even those in the union cabinet in Cairo, soon discovered that they had no real authority and that important decisions, including the issuance of new laws, were being taken by Nasser without even a pretence of consultation, ostensibly in the name of the presidential system under which the union was expected to operate.⁴³

Syrians had a much higher standard of living than the Egyptians. Syria's economy suffered tremendously as a result of their unification with Egypt.⁴⁴

At dawn on September 28 (1958) the High Arab Revolutionary Command as the Syrian conspiratorial junta styled itself—effected a coup and after some negotiation with Nasser's viceroy, Marshal Amer, proclaimed the separation of Syria from Egypt. Amer and the commanding general of the First (i.e., Syrian) Army, Jamal Faisal, were arrested and deported to Egypt. A civilian cabinet headed by Dr. Maamun Kuzbari was appointed to govern Syria during the transitional period pending return to a constitutional and parliamentary system. Syria's official name was henceforth to be the Syrian

⁴³Ibid. , p. 546.

⁴⁴Ibid, . p. 546. Syria's economy suffered many reverses and dislocations as a result of the union. It is important to remember that the Syrian bourgeoisie had agreed to union with Egypt in 1958 only for the sake of the principle of Arab unity. It did not visualize, or intend to give blank approval to, the extension of the Egyptian revolution into Syria. Consequently, despite the unitary rather than federal character of the United Arab Republic, Syria's landowning and business circles expected that their economy would follow its natural course and not be forcibly merged with that of Egypt. Syria's economy represented largely free enterprise, and, furthermore, Syria's standard of living was markedly higher than Egypt's. Anxious to preserve these two features, Syrian's Chambers of Commerce as well as the governor of Syria's Central Bank repeatedly begged Cairo to practice restraint in its schemes of economic planning and unification.

Arab Republic. It would seek readmission both to the Arab League and the United Nations.⁴⁵

On April 10, 1963 a federation agreement was concluded between Egypt, Syria and Iraq.⁴⁶ On May 26, 1964 Nasser and Arif of Iraq signed an agreement to establish a union between the two countries.⁴⁷

Yet, for any country to enter a union agreement with Nasser of Egypt, it must be ready for substantial changes in its military command, socioeconomic and political systems. They must agree on establishing a joint military command and a unified political, economical structure. This new political system will be identical to the political structure that exists in Egypt.

Moreover, Arif issued a number of nationalization decrees, increasing his government control on the economy. He promised Nasser that Iraq would gradually become more like Egypt. Eventually Arif lead Iraq towards socialism

⁴⁵Ibid. , p. 548. The break up between Egypt and Syria was followed by the termination of the federation arrangement with Yemen.

⁴⁶Ibid. , p. 554. In less than three months Nasser denounced publicly the agreement with the Syrians. An Iraqi delegation headed by President Abdul Salam Arif, unsuccessfully attempted to act as a mediator between the Egyptians and Syrians. While negotiations were going on, Nasser and his followers in Syria and Iraq were engaging in a plan to overthrow both governments in Syria and Iraq. Their plot failed and the leaders for this coup were hung the next day. The conflict between Egypt and Syria was never resolved. For this reason, the tripartite union never materialized.

⁴⁷Ibid. , p. 302.

and away from capitalism.⁴⁸ Nasser of Egypt and Arif of Iraq were gradually paving the way for a full union between the two countries.⁴⁹ However, this unification was just another formal arrangement. In reality neither Nasser nor Arif were willing to share this power. Arif died in 1966, Nasser in 1970, putting an end to unification between the two countries.

A year later with the rise of other Arab leaders, Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi pushed for another unification in the Arab World to encompass Egypt, Syria and for the first time Libya. On April 17, 1971 Sadat, Asad and Qadhafi signed an agreement in Benghazi and established the Federation of Arab Republics.⁵⁰ Yet, this new federation was like many other federations established between Arab countries, participating member states had their own political system and each member followed its own path.

⁴⁸Ibid. , p. 303. Arif issued on July 14, 1964 a number of nationalization decrees which put under government control banks, insurance companies, and thirty-two major industrial firms. To administer these enterprises a State Economic Organization was formed to be headed by Socialist-leaning Dr. Khairuddin el-Hassib. Soon afterwards, a number of State monopolies for imports of staple consumption goods was established, ostensibly to protect the interests of the consumers against excessive prices.

⁴⁹Ibid. , p. 555. However, in Iraq the establishment of the Arab Social Union in Egypt provoked resentment and distrust. The Iraqi government looked at the ASU as the vehicle for Nasser to extend his power base to Baghdad. In mid September the Iraqi prime minister, General Arif Abdul Razzaq (also a Nasserite), attempted a coup to depose Arif while he was attending a summit meeting in Casablanca in the company of Nasser and other Arab leaders. Razzaq was effectively thwarted by acting Chief of staff of the Iraqi army General Abdul Rahman Arif, President Arif's brother. This experience was a turning point in Arif's attitude towards Nasser and Egypt.

⁵⁰Ibid. , p. 760.

On August 2, 1972, Sadat and Qadhafi agreed on establishing a unified political leadership between Egypt and Libya.⁵¹ The purpose of this joint declaration was to unify and improve the economy, education, political and constitutional organization between the two countries. Qadhafi announced through the media to the public that he was prepared to step down as head of the Libyan state in favor of Sadat. Sadat and Qadhafi vowed to overlook the differences of ideologies and any other obstacles they may face. They pledged, and they were determined, that their objective was unity, a full merger between Egypt and Libya. Again it was a step towards Pan-Arabism.

On August 29, 1973 they announced the establishment of a new unified Arab State.⁵² Sadat was the President and Qadhafi assumed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. On October 6, Egyptian forces launched a surprise attack against Israel. Egyptian soldiers crossed the Suez Canal and destroyed the Bar-Lev line. The Israeli army was caught off guard and for the first time since 1948 the Egyptians made a breach in the Israeli defense line. The October war was a result of coordination and extensive planning between Sadat and Asad. The President of the unified Arab Republic (Egypt and Libya) did not consult the Supreme Command of his Armed Forces. Qadhafi was left completely out of the planning and execution of the war.⁵³

⁵¹Ibid. , p. 565.

⁵²Ibid. , p. 565.

⁵³Ibid. , p. 762.

On April 17, 1974 Egyptian officials discovered a plot to overthrow the government. To their surprise, this plot was masterminded by the Libyan President Colonel Muammar el-Qadhafi.⁵⁴ This resulted in the breakup of the merger between Egypt and Libya.

Arab leaders called for pan-Arabism, yet they feuded over territorial disputes. Boundary disputes between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are a source for their domestic instability within the Gulf States.⁵⁵

Many countries around the world lack the freedom of speech, press, religion and from unwarranted search and seizure. The lack of these protections against unlimited state or government action could generate hostilities in the country. The Middle East epitomizes this situation. In this part of the world distrust and hostility are characteristic of most Arab leaders' relations with one another. Because of this, leaders are usually haunted by insecurity and distrust.

⁵⁴Ibid. , p. 565.

⁵⁵Lenore G. Martin and WM. J. Olson, eds. , "Patterns of Regional Conflict and U.S. Gulf Policy," in US Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region (Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 10. Eleven other Gulf boundaries, although unsettled, give no evidence of any sustained interest in settlement or active dispute, although there have been scenes of sporadic border incidents. Examples of this lack of settlement include the Saudi-Oman border (which could have been settled with Saudi Arabia's resolution of the Nuraymi dispute with the UAE in 1974, but was not) and the long-standing dispute between Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar Islands and Zubara. Examples of sporadic disputes include incidents between South Yemen-North Yemen; and Iraq-Iran. Each of these disputes has raised questions not merely over border adjustments but concern as well for significant loss of territory or even wholesale takeovers.

Clearly as indicated from previously reviewed cases of Arab unity, the record of the Arab unification is full of many impressive schemes and solemn agreements but it is also punctuated with almost as many failures.⁵⁶ The division within the Arab world can be traced to a number of reasons.

- Profound differences between the cultural and social levels. Discrepancies in economic wealth, and the continual increase in the gap of their Gross National Product between the rich and poor Arab countries.
- Differences in ideologies and political structures among Arab states largely account for the failure to achieve the desired unity. This deep ideological difference between the revolutionary and conservative monarchy regimes was responsible for the Arab Cold War between 1957 and 1967.
- Arab Leaders, those who actually hold power, whether they are conservatives or radicals, never cherish the idea of parting with it. The suspicion and mistrust between them usually leads to their ambitions to consolidate power to themselves.⁵⁷

Unification in the Arab World will continue to be a dream. Yet, for charismatic leaders such as Nasser and Qadhafi, they will continue to manipulate this dream in order to gain popularity and increase their power base in the region.

⁵⁶George Lenczowski, The Middle East In World Affairs, 4th ed. (New York: University of Cornell Press, 1990), p. 763.

⁵⁷Ibid. , pp. 756-764. Revolutionary ideology are compromised of the socialist regime in Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen. These revolutionary radical groups were in turn opposed by a virtual coalition of monarchies, namely Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Kuwait and other Gulf States. Arabs striving for unity often stemmed from emotion and exaggerated idealism and lacked a solid social and cultural foundation.

Many Arab governments, headed by Kings, Amirs, Sultans, military dictators and political strongmen rest on eroding economic and political foundations.⁵⁸ Their visions of the future are sharply different from one another, resulting in further evidence of a split among Arabs on many regional but vital issues in the Middle East.

Anwar El-Sadat signed the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty because he believed it was beneficial to Egypt. Yet Sadat's initiative broke the Arab iron rule which indicates no negotiation with the Zionist state. He jeopardized Egypt's relationship with the rest of the Arab world for many years.

Iraq is one of the Arab countries where almost every Baathi must believe in Arab unity.⁵⁹ Iraq opened its boundaries and absorbed as many Arabs as were willing to immigrate without requiring passports or visas. On the other hand, on the 2 of August 1990, Iraq bore arms and invaded its Arab neighbor, Kuwait. Iraq's one million man army attacked, in spite of the Iraqi government's knowledge that Kuwait had no military power to speak of.

⁵⁸Interview with Aymen Ezzat, First Assistant to the Egyptian Ambassador, Washington D.C. 28 January 1992. Yemen, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt and now Lebanon are among the world's poorest nations. Egypt for example, is still a predominantly agricultural country, with 36% of its GDP being accounted for by farming, and only 15% of its output coming from industry.

⁵⁹Fouad Ajami, "The end of pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs*, (winter 1978/1979), p. 355. The Iraqi Baathi slogan is *Umma Arabiyya Wahida Dhat Risala Khalida*, "One Arab nation with an immortal mission."

Moreover, after Iraq annexed its weak Arab neighbor Kuwait, the Arab leaders were in a dilemma. Yaser Arafat, one of Iraq's most vocal Arab backers, pleaded to the Arabs to form an Arab delegation to be sent to Baghdad. They should bow to Saddam and ask him to withdraw from Kuwait. Meanwhile the Egyptian President Husni Mubarak demanded the Arabs to arm their men and join the multinational force in Saudi Arabia.

The Arab League finally issued a short statement that condemned the Iraqi aggression, but even then seven members abstained, after league members voted to waive their normal rule requiring unanimity on public statements.⁶⁰

Syria, another Arab country and a neighbor of Iraq supported Iran during its eight year war with Iraq. Moreover, Iraq has been a patron of most of the opposition movements in Syria. Hafez El-Assad an old client of the former Soviet Union and an enemy of the United States agreed on joining the Coalition forces. Assad of Syria and Hussein of Iraq are long time personal enemies, even though they both head a different branch of a similar Socialist Baath party. Moreover, both parties are built on the same principle of Arab unity. Yet, to Assad its

⁶⁰Brian Duffy, Louise Lief, Peter Cary, and David Makovsky in Washington, Gordon Robison, in Dubai, Richard Z. Chesnoff, in Damascus and Ben Lynfield, in Jerusalem, "The Man Who Would Be King," U.S. News & World Report, 13 August 1990, p. 23.

another opportunity to destroy his long time enemy the strong man of Baghdad, Saddam Hussein.

After Iraq's defeat and as Iraqi troops began to withdraw from Kuwait, they set fire to more than 750 oil wells, damaging all the refineries and pipelines. The Kuwaiti oil minister estimated that the cost of the Iraqi damage to their oil industry is estimated at 75 billion dollars.⁶¹

The Kurds have been struggling in Iraq for many years and during the 1990 Gulf War Saddam Hussein suppressed them. He turned their towns and villages into rubble and caused a huge exodus of Kurdish refugees into Iran and Turkey.⁶² This action forced the coalition forces to set up a security zone in northern Iraq, to guarantee the safety of the Kurds. Today Saddam Hussein, the same man who used poison gas on the Kurdish women, children and elders, is arming and supplying the Kurdish movement. This supports their struggle in south eastern Turkey and increases the number of armed clashes in the region.⁶³

Furthermore, on September 16, 1991 six of the Arab countries voted to repeal United Nations resolution 3379. It was what Arabs inspired on November 10,

⁶¹"Kuwait ships crude for first time since war," The Pittsburgh Press, 28 July 1991, p.A4.

⁶²Ali Baba-Khan, "Some of Saddam's crimes," Free Iraq Weekly, No. 19 (7 October 1991), p. 6. Dr. Ali Baba-Khan, indicates that in seven Kurdish cities (Arbil, As-Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, Al-Mowsil, Salah al-Din, and El-Tamim) Saddam's forces damaged 1757 schools, 2457 Mosques, 271 hospitals, and left 219,820 Kurdish homeless.

⁶³Voice of America, 23 October 1991.

1975. This resolution characterized Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination.⁶⁴

Saudi Arabia has been ridding the kingdom of thousands of Palestinians for many years. The Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait motivated the Saudis to start replacing the Palestinians with Egyptians, restricting the immigration law and becoming more conservative on granting visas to Palestinians entering Saudi Arabia. Yet in November 1991, King Fahd asked the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, to help ease the plight of the Palestinians. Many in the region feel that the monarchy in Saudi Arabia staunchly prefers the Israelis over Yaser Arafat or Jordan's King Hussein for controlling the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.⁶⁵ Israel has proven through the years it is a more efficient policeman and can be easily blamed. Most Arab leaders overwhelmingly support the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinians' drive for statehood, only if this support does not result in a conflict with their own interests.

Saudi Arabia and the United States have agreed on a continuous U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia. This will allow the United States a rapid

⁶⁴"U.N.'s reversal on Zionism," San Jose Mercury News, 17 December 1991, p. 16A. The Arab countries that reversed their votes on this topic are: Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, Oman and Bahrain. Zionism refers to the state of Israel which was founded in 1948. Zionism calls for establishing a Jewish state in the Biblical land. The majority, which consisted mostly of Arab states, cheered and applauded the U.N resolution 3379 as it passed in 1975. It was a moment which represented Arab solidarity against Israel and Western domination.

⁶⁵Badr Ahmed Abdel Ali, "The Palestinian Problem: And Eventual Settlements," in Al-Siassa Al-Dawlya (Al-Ahram. press, 1991), p. 162-167.

response in defending the Kingdom in any event similar to the 1990 Gulf War. The House of Al-Saud recognized the need to keep U.S. military presence in the area. Yet, on October 19, 1991 King Fahd promised his nation that all Desert Shield/Storm forces will depart the Arabian desert within one month, stating on Riyadh Radio:

Victory is achieved. Kuwait is liberated, and our brothers in Iraq will no longer threaten our security. The War is over. Oh, Saudi people, continue with your life. All the American military forces will depart Saudi Arabia soil within thirty days.⁶⁶

The United States began to ship home all military equipment that was designated for permanent stock piling in the area. Saudi Arabia has resisted the plan of continuous U.S. military presence in the Arabian desert, because of fear that the United States presence will cause a strain in their society.⁶⁷

In a contrary way, Kuwait endorsed a 10 year defense agreement with the United States allowing American military forces the use of Kuwaiti military installations and the deploying of military equipment to Kuwait.⁶⁸

⁶⁶"Saudi Arabia after the War," Al Majala, 20 December 1991, p. 20.

⁶⁷Voice of America, 20 October 1991. This strain in the Saudi society will result due to the vast differences in culture and traditions between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

⁶⁸Ibid. , 20 October 1991.

The United States' commitment to ensure the free flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf was successfully tested during the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. However, the United States government may find itself in the future in another situation similar to the Iraq-Kuwait War. If there is another war, America's options to employ military power may be politically constrained, leaving any belligerent country considerable latitude for action. One problem is that if the United States stands aside in such an event, its inaction might encourage other countries to abuse another nation's international rights and attempt to control their oil.

Inter-Arab politics is fragile, indecisive and not an easy picture to follow. This stream of politics continues to polarize and divide the Arab world, causing instability of many Arab states, some of which have a significant impact on the U.S.'s national interest.

B. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.⁶⁹

Since World War II dozens of serious regional conflicts have competed for global attention, but none has had as much impact on U.S.'s national interests as

⁶⁹This section is a result of a joint effort by the author and Captain Lili Mann, USAF. The central ideas and analyses of this section of the paper were first put forth by Capt. Lili Mann in "Israel: A Strategic Asset for the United States or A Strategic Liability?" and "What's special in the special relationship between the United States and Israel" (unpublished papers, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA. 1991-1992). These papers were heavily used in this section, and also persuaded the author to conclude that the U.S. interest in the region will continue to be threatened by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

the Arab-Israeli conflict. As argued in this section, American domestic politics have played an important role in the special U.S.-Israeli relationship and this has negatively affected the attainment of U.S. objectives in the Middle East. This section begins by illustrating the rise of the Arab-Israeli conflict; it then examines how the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has negatively impacted and constrained U.S. policy makers. This resulted in that, the U.S. failed to play the role of "honest broker" in the region, allowing the Baath regime in Iraq to convince other Arabs of the American biased role towards Israel. In return the United States became an easy target for Arab retaliation, retaliation which threatened America's national interests in the area.

In 1896 the Zionist movement was officially formed, and a few years later it welcomed a British policy favoring a "national home in Palestine" for the Jewish people.⁷⁰ Through the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Zionist movement obtained a formal acknowledgement of its importance and elevated its national status.⁷¹ Jewish immigration into Palestine was increased by the Zionist movement and resulted in Arab protest.

As Jewish immigration steadily increased so did Arab unrest. Moreover, the British government did not want to expend too many of its resources to put an end to either one. The Jews continued to gain ground on the Arabs, and the

⁷⁰George Lenczowski, The Middle East In World Affairs, 4th ed. (New York: Univ. Of Cornell Press, 1990), p.767.

⁷¹Ibid. , p. 391.

Zionist dream of converting Palestine into a Jewish state was within their grasp.

A few years later, the Zionist idea of a Jewish state became a reality.

On May 14, 1948, the British officially terminated their mandate over Palestine, withdrawing their last forces from the country. On the same day the National Council at a session in Tel-Aviv proclaimed the Jewish state of Israel. A few hours later President Truman extended de facto recognition to this new state on behalf of the United States.⁷²

Like the United States, Israel is a country founded and developed by immigrants from many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Yet, unlike the U.S., Israel is a country with a democratic political system only for the Jewish population in Israel while the Israeli Arabs continue to be treated as second class

⁷²Ibid. , p. 407. For additional commentary on this point see Lenczowski, "Truman Presidency," American Presidents and the Middle East (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 27, 28. President Truman was experiencing continuous pressures from the Jewish community in the U.S. He stated "Top Jewish leaders in the United States were putting all sorts of pressure on me to commit American power and forces on behalf of the Jewish aspiration in Palestine." This pressure was also noticed by Margaret Truman. " . . . a New York Democratic Party delegation called on her father to urge him to offer Israel de jure recognition, lift the arms embargo, and endorse the widest possible boundaries for the Jewish state. Failure to do this, they warned, would result in certain loss of New York State."

citizens.⁷³ Since the creation of the Israeli state in 1948, Arab Palestinians have been unsuccessfully trying to reclaim their homeland.

The origins of the Israeli state can be found in the 1896 formation of the Zionist political movement. Not until 1917, with the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, did the Arabs begin to openly oppose Jewish immigration into Palestine. The British government, failing to find an acceptable resolution to the growing problem, avoided making a decision by leaving the Palestinian issue to the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the United States' concern over Soviet influence in the Middle East was prevalent even before the founding of Israel. When asked by President Truman to provide a position paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

. . . recommended against any action that would cause disturbances in Palestine beyond Britain's military capability to control and definitely opposed the use of U.S. forces. Such a use of troops, they believed, would not only hurt British and American interests in the Middle East (including adverse effects on control of oil) but also pave the way for the Soviet Union "to replace the United States and Britain in influence and power in much of the Middle East."⁷⁴

⁷³"His Majesty, Intifada and the Islamic Conference," Alyaman Alqobra, (January 1992), p. 5. Alyaman Alqobra is published in London. Although Israeli Arabs are allowed to vote in Israel, any Israeli party depends on Arab votes is considered illegitimate in the Knesset. Palestinian Arabs are restricted in buying real estate in Israel. However, they are encouraged to sell their homes to Jewish residents. Arab Israelis are prohibited from occupying many governmental and military positions in Israel.

⁷⁴George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p.25.

Despite reservations on the part of the military and the State Department, President Truman supported the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. Although the United States had never before recognized or supported the sovereignty of a state without defined borders, President Truman recognized Israel within eleven minutes of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's declaration of the state in 1948. The borders of Israel were not then nor have they ever been officially defined.⁷⁵ In part, through the powerful role that the United States played in the United Nations, Israel became officially established in the Middle East.

There are two schools of thought which compete to explain the uniqueness of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. The first school of thought is that this relationship was primarily based on U.S. strategic interest during the cold war with the former Soviet Union. Through this time period Israel was seen as a large U.S. military base in the Eastern Mediterranean. Their military forces were equipped and trained by the United States to respond against any Soviet aggression in the region.

Although this school of thought was very important for U.S. national interests it was not the predominate one. Apparently, U.S. military and economic aid programs and the profound American domestic support for Israel did not equate to Israel becoming a strategic asset for the United States. The second

⁷⁵Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 10. And George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p.25.

school of thought, which this paper supports, is that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is primarily a by-product of domestic and political considerations.

The government of the United States has been committed to the survival and security of the state of Israel. Close political ties have existed between the Israel and the American administrations. Israel's security has been affirmed by every American President since Truman's recognition of Israel in 1948.

Israel is seen as a like-image state whose survival is crucial to the ideological prospering of the United States and the prevention of the dominance of nondemocratic perspectives.⁷⁶

Truman had several close associates, who were committed to the Zionist idea, some of these associates were themselves Jewish. One example was David K. Niles, a former aide to Roosevelt, who ensured that Truman;

... gave no speech or authorized any document on the issue of Palestine or the Displaced Persons without Niles' counsel.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Bernard Reich, The Powers in the Middle East: The Ultimate Strategic Arena. (New York: Praeger Press, 1987), p. 62.

⁷⁷Sachar, as quoted in; Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 26.

Later administrations have continued to pursue Jewish electoral support by maintaining a strong U.S.-Israeli relationship.⁷⁸ Kennedy actively sought the Jewish vote in 1958 and received funds from Jewish supporters, in particular Abraham Feinberg. Feinberg a Jewish banker, was considered by Stephen Isaacs, in his book Jews and American Politics, as the first Jewish fund raiser for national politics.⁷⁹ Coincidentally, Kennedy also continued the concept of a special relationship with Israel and began the policy of providing the Jewish state with sophisticated American weapons.⁸⁰ During the Nixon and Ford administrations,

⁷⁸Lenczowski, pp. 46-47. And John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 98-101. The "Czech. arms deal", in which Egypt purchased Soviet made military equipment through Czechoslovakia, alarmed President Eisenhower, who called it; ". . . the first evidence of serious Communist penetration" in the Middle East. America's fear of the spread of Soviet communism following World War II led to the foreign policy of "containment" which was designed to "block further expansion of Soviet power. . . by all means short of war." For that reason, a high priority was placed on alliances such as the Baghdad Pact to act as a roadblock to Soviet hegemony in the area.

⁷⁹Ibid. , pp. 53-55. Feinberg was a major backer of Kennedy and had also raised money for Truman. When Kennedy asked Philip Klutznichk, a wealthy Chicago real estate developer and president of B'nai B'rith, what the Jews wanted, he told Kennedy that Eisenhower on the Suez was unsatisfactory, while Truman in 1948 was on the mark.

⁸⁰Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American national interest, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 91. Such arms transfers began with the sale of HAWKS, (Homing All the Way) guided missile system against Egyptian bombers in 1962, tanks in 1964 (under Johnson) and Skyhawk planes in 1966. These sales marked the beginning of Washington's commitment to assure the absolute regional military superiority of Israel, which has continued to be a cornerstone of U.S.-Israeli relations and of American policy in the Middle East.

Henry Kissinger, himself an American Jew and highly sympathetic to Israel's needs, was appointed National Security Advisor and later, Secretary of State. Kissinger played a key role in bolstering U.S.-Israeli ties in both strategic and political realms.

Although President Carter, recognized and pushed for Palestinian political rights during his campaign, he strongly emphasized American commitment to Israel.⁸¹ President Reagan's perception of Arab-Israeli problems in terms of the East-West conflict lent further importance to Israel because he perceived it as a strategic asset in countering former Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Even though President Bush, has repeatedly and publicly criticized Israel for its occupation and settlement policies, he still reaffirmed U.S. commitment to Israel in this year's National Security Strategy.⁸²

The following four areas serve to highlight Israeli activities which have detrimentally affected U.S. objectives but which have continued with impunity.

⁸¹George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 158. Carter's commitment was based on his Baptist belief that a homeland for Jews was mandated by God, shared democratic governments and perception of Israel as a strategic asset.

⁸²National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington D.C., 1991), p. 10. Also see, Cal Thomas, "Anti-Semitism remains a blight," The Herald, 30 March 1992. p. 9A.

1. Foreign Aid/Settlement in Occupied Territories

Since the mid 1970's, the U.S. has provided Israel with ever increasing amounts of foreign aid. From 1949 to 1991, the U.S. gave Israel \$53 billion in loans and grants.⁸³ Israel is currently the largest recipient of U.S. aid and is estimated by some sources as receiving an annual \$3 to \$4 billion in military and economic assistance.⁸⁴ According to Representative Lee Hamilton, D-Ind, Israel's aid is closer to \$5 billion when smaller (i.e. million dollar versus billion dollar) military and economic assistance programs are included (e.g. military refurbishment for Gulf War damage).⁸⁵ The \$5 billion figure could again be doubled when unofficial forms of aid are added (e.g. extension of credit by the U.S. Import-Export Bank, exemption of Israeli products from import duties, American investments in Israel, sale of Israeli government bonds, private contributions to Israel, and the loss of government revenue from these tax deductible contributions).⁸⁶

⁸³Edward T. Pound, "Special deal for Israel boost taxpayers' bills," Wall Street Journal, 1991.

⁸⁴\$3 billion is cited by Louis Rene Beres, in "Israeli security in a changing World," Strategic Review, (Fall 1990), \$4 billion is used by John Rossant, in "Behind the Headlines, a very sick economy," Business Week, (October 1991).

⁸⁵Rep Hamilton's House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee identified Egypt and Turkey as the other two countries where U.S. aid exceeds popularly quoted figures. Edward T. Pound, "Special deal for Israel boost taxpayers' bills," Wall Street Journal, 1991.

⁸⁶Rubenberg, p. 333.

Moreover, this aid differs from U.S. aid to other countries in several aspects. First the United States has increased the proportion of grants to offset Israel's economic problems and foreign debt. From 1974 to 1989, Israel received over \$16 billion in loans (which were converted to grants), out of more than an estimated \$40 billion in cumulative U.S. aid.⁸⁷ The entire 1985 package of \$4.5 billion was provided as a grant, a doubling of grant assistance since 1983.⁸⁸ Additionally, unlike Egypt's, economic support to Israel is given in credit and not tied to specific development projects, a practice which permits Israel's ultimate discretion in its use. Third, aid is given in a lump sum at the beginning of the year rather than in standard quarterly payments, which results in an interest savings to Israel in millions of dollars while costing the American taxpayers the same. Fourth, the Reagan administration permitted a portion of its military sales assistance to be used toward the research and development of the Israeli LAVI fighter aircraft, in essence, subsidizing a foreign competitor against the American market.⁸⁹

Furthermore, U.S. aid has rarely been tethered to policy objectives. Despite President Carter's irritation with Prime Minister Begin's efforts to control the West

⁸⁷Ibid. , According to Pound, the money went to Israel initially categorized as military loans rather than grants because loans don't require oversight by American officials. However, the U.S. never intended Israel to repay the loans.

⁸⁸Taken from AIPAC members. See Curtis, p. 75. FY-85 aid was quoted as \$2.5 billion, provided as a grant, in Peter Grose, A Changing Israel: The New Political, Economic and Social Realities in Israel Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p. 60.

⁸⁹Peter Grose, A changing Israel, pp. 60-64.

Bank and Gaza, he promised not to use U.S. aid as a leverage.⁹⁰ In 1983, Israel's Defense Minister Moshe Arens observed,

It has never happened that an American President has said that the supply of aid to which the United States obligated itself is conditioned on concessions on policy.⁹¹

Linkage between aid and policy objectives has recently become an issue. Testifying before the House Foreign Operations subcommittee, Secretary of State James Baker said,

Washington would back \$10 billion in loans over five years only if Israel agreed to freeze all construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.⁹²

The Bush administration is the first U.S. administration, ever to publicly lay out conditions for granting loan guarantees to Israel. However, Baker also added,

⁹⁰Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign policy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 227.

⁹¹Rubenberg, p. 323.

⁹²Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. lays terms to Israel," The Herald, (25 February 1992), p. 1A.

. . . that if the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir felt that it could not accept a total freeze, the administration was prepared to offer an option.⁹³

After the 1967 War, American presidents have been disturbed by Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories, referring to them as "illegal", or as "an obstacle" to the United States mediated peace process.⁹⁴ However, U.S. attempts to elicit Israeli compliance with UN Resolutions 242 and 338, (considered the cornerstones for Arab-Israeli peace), have been met with hostility and rejected. The most deliberate U.S. action taken to date has been to delay Congressional voting on Israel's requested \$10 billion housing loan guarantee. Although the Bush administration made it clear that the \$10 billion housing loan was tied

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴According to Dr. Ralph Magnus, Chairman of Middle East Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, 4 December 1991, Presidents Carter and Nixon called Israeli settlements "illegal", while they have been termed "an obstacle to peace" since the Reagan administration. Several administrations have presented various peace initiatives, and President Bush continues U.S. efforts towards peace. Reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states as well as with the Palestinians remains a U.S. strategic concern as outlined in National Security Strategy of the United States 1991, White House, p. 10.

directly to the cessation of building new settlements,⁹⁵ it is not clear that this has occurred.⁹⁶

The billions of dollars in annual American aid to Israel was estimated by Rubenberg as equal to \$10 million a day in 1985, or \$20 million when official and unofficial sources of aid are indicated.⁹⁷ Strangely, this aid has rarely been linked to concessions when U.S. and Israeli objectives diverged. Furthermore, for the past 24 years, Israel has been able to create new settlements in the occupied

⁹⁵Morton Kondracke, "Unsettling," The New Republic, (July 1991), pp. 8-10. And Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker rebuffs compromise plan by Congress on Israel loan issue," New York Times, 17 March 1992, pp. A1-A6. In July 91, Bush said there shouldn't be a quid pro quo between U.S. provision of the \$10 billion loan guarantee and cessation of settlement activity in Arab territories. Administration officials said that President Bush and Mr. Baker "are not willing to accept the granting of any loan guarantees without restrictions on settlements". Meanwhile, Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, said "his country would rather abandon its quest for the loan guarantees than renounce the right of Jews to live in Judea and Samaria," the biblical names for the West Bank. Some leaders of American Jewish groups predicted today that President Bush would pay in November elections for his demand that Israel must freeze settlements as a pre-condition for its loan guarantees.

⁹⁶Glenn Robinson, "Israeli Policy Questioned," The Monterey Herald, 28 August 1992, p. 12A. Professor Robinson stated that Yitzhak Rabin's government recently approved 11,000 housing units in spite of the approval of the loan guarantee. These units will house over 50,000 Israeli settlers. However, this massive number of housing units are only in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additional units are currently being constructed in East Jerusalem.

⁹⁷Rubenberg, 333. Along with an interview with Dr. Glenn Robinson, Middle East Department, Naval Postgraduate School, 30 March 1992, according to the Cranston Amendment of 1985 it is now a law that the U.S. must fund Israel at a higher rate than what Israel owes the U.S. Therefore, Israel will never lose money to the U.S., at the very least it will break even.

territories and even to accelerate construction during critical periods of U.S. interest, such as the Madrid conference, without penalty.

As a result of Washington's general refusal to link aid to Israel with policy objectives, U.S. goals in the Middle East have been negatively affected. And because linkages are absent, Israel has continued to implement with impunity policies which undermine U.S. objectives. The most obvious example of this is Tel-Aviv's continued persistence in building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, despite Washington's expressed displeasure and statements that these settlements are an "obstacle to peace".

2. Violation of Arms Sale Agreements

The U.S. supplied Israel and other Arab countries with much of their sophisticated and most advanced military equipment. In the past, the U.S. tolerated Israel's violations of U.S. arms transfer agreements (i.e. use of American-supplied weapons for defensive purposes) although it did not tolerate such transgressions by others.⁹⁸ For example, the U.S. suspended military assistance

⁹⁸Defensive terms were outlined in Israel's 1952 agreement with the U.S. Rubenberg, p. 266. For additional information see George Lenczowski, "Reagan Presidency," American Presidents and the Middle East(North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 257. Under the provisions of the U.S.-Israeli Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952, Israel pledged to use only American military equipment to maintain its internal security, for its self defense and not to under take any act of aggression in the region.

to Turkey for two years after it invaded Cyprus in 1974.⁹⁹ However, Israel bombed the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor (Osirik) in 1981 with F-16 fighters. Those fighters were made and supplied by the United States. This event was a violation of the arms sales agreement between Israel and the United States. The American F-16 and F-15 fighters supplied to Israel were supposed to be employed for defensive purposes only.¹⁰⁰

By violating the air space of two neighboring countries and bombing a nuclear reactor in a third country, Israel clearly carried out a well-planned offensive operation. Moreover, the American administration did not take any punitive action against Israel. And, Israel's raid did not leave any negative effects on U.S.-Israeli relations.¹⁰¹ In fact, although the President temporarily suspended shipment of four F-16s, delivery was increased to fourteen F-16s, with two additional F-15s a couple of months later.¹⁰² Israel violated the Arms Export

⁹⁹Stephen Green, Taking sides: America's secret relations with a Militant Israel, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. , 1984), p. 254.

¹⁰⁰Israeli warplanes bombed a nuclear reactor in Osirik near Baghdad in Iraq using F-16 Jet bombers accompanied by F-15. To accomplish this mission Israel violated the air space of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

¹⁰¹George Lenczowski, "Reagan Presidency," American Presidents and the Middle East (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 258. Reagan stated on June 16, 1981 "One has to recognize that Israel had reasons for concern in view of the past history of Iraq, which has never signed a cease-fire or recognized Israel as a nation, has never joined in any peace effort of that." Iraq had also been a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Israel was not.

¹⁰²Rubenberg, p. 266.

control act once more by using American supplied cluster bombs in Lebanon in 1982.¹⁰³

More recently, U.S. administration officials leaked information to the media that a State Department investigation revealed Israel may have sold American weapons technology to several third world countries including China, Thailand and South Africa.¹⁰⁴ A delegation of 15 members headed by a State Department official, was sent to Israel to investigate these allegations, and "found no evidence that Israel transferred Patriot technology to China", according to Israeli officials. However, there was no comment from the U.S. delegation.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³Ibid. , p. 220. Although President Reagan warned Israel that its actions were inappropriate, the U.S. did not back it up by suspension of military or economic aid.

¹⁰⁴"Israel reselling U.S. arms State Department charges," San Jose Mercury News, 14 March 1992, p. 6A. Officials said that the State Department's inspector general recommended that Assistant Secretary of State Richard Clarke be disciplined for failing to act on intelligence reports of the sales. Officials also added, Clarke, a career civil servant who has held several intelligence posts at the State and Defense departments, was being moved from his position as assistant secretary for political military affairs. Clarke is known among colleagues as sympathetic to Israel. The intelligence reports clearly indicated that Israel sold air-to-air missiles to China and Thailand, and is also suspected of having sold them to South Africa.

¹⁰⁵"No sign of misuse of Patriot Israel says," a Washington Post article reprint in San Jose Mercury News, 29 March 92, p. 5A. Israeli spokesmen accused the U.S. of conducting a "smear campaign" to "slander" Israel through leaks of allegations about the Patriot. The U.S. officials have refused to comment on the result of the investigation and the State Department has indicated that some parts of the report may be kept secret. Also see "If Israel sold Patriot secrets. . .," The New York Times, 23 March 1992, p. A20. Although Israel knows how to produce advanced weapons on its own, it sells many of them to other nations to offset the costs of defending itself. Take the Israeli built Python-3 air-to-air missile. To some U.S. officials it looks like an American design, AIM-9L Side-Winder (heat

3. Defense Sales

United States' efforts to recycle petro-dollars from oil-rich countries, to improve the self-defense capability of pro-Western Arab regimes, and to extend American political influence with Arab regimes through defense sales have been impeded by AIPAC, which has successfully lobbied Congress to cancel or downgrade such sales.

During the 1950's and 1960's Arab dissatisfaction with U.S. arms sales have increased the former Soviet and other Western countries influence in the region. The Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser turned to the Soviet Union in late 1955 to purchase weapon systems (known as the Czech arms deal).¹⁰⁶ Nasser opened the doors to Soviet sales with his purchase in 1955. U.S. efforts to meet Saudi arms requirements (for self defense against non Arab and Arab states such as Iran and Yemen) best illustrates the success of the Israeli lobby in the United

seeking missile). Israel sold this missile to China. Then China designed its own version (PL-8), and sold it to Iraq. Israel uses American parts, which it buys with U.S. military aid. Yet, it replaced those parts in weapons exported to China, "a claim accepted by some U.S. officials". Even when Israel has violated U.S. export controls, American officials have declined to crack down. "In a notorious case last fall, an Israeli owned company exported American ballistic missile components to a South African company and used them in its own Jericho-2 missile. The Administration imposed trade sanctions on the South African company, but waived them for the Israelis. In exchange it wrested a pledge from Israel to accept international controls against further missile proliferation."

¹⁰⁶Robert Henriques, 100 Hours to Suez, (New York: The Viking Press, 1957), p. 26. This arms deal allowed Egypt to purchase Soviet tanks, artillery, and Air crafts from the Soviets through Czechoslovakia. For a detailed list of Egyptian equipment prior to 1955 and of Soviet arms delivered to the Egyptians, see pages 26-27.

States. Saudi's 1976 request for Side-winder air-to-air and Maverick air-to-surface missiles was reduced; the 1978 request for F-15's was approved after basing restrictions were imposed (in relation to Israel), and the level of armament and refueling capabilities were reduced; the 1984 request for Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and launchers was canceled; as were the 1985 and 1986 requests for F-15's.¹⁰⁷

The United States lost its position as the sole supplier of Saudi aircraft as a result of the recent Tornado sale by Britain, which also received a sole source contract to build two air bases.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, Kuwait, a traditionally pro-American state, was recently compelled to buy arms from the former Soviets, Britain and France in 1984 because of AIPAC culpability. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Soviet Union supplied about 41 percent of Arab arms between 1982-1986, while the United States supplied about 13 percent.¹⁰⁹ Each rejected arms deal has needlessly cost the economy of the U.S. billions of dollars in its revenues.

¹⁰⁷Jacobs, pp. 27-29.

¹⁰⁸Jacobs, p. 31. The British sale was worth \$4 billion. Additionally, loss of Saudi contracts have an immediate economic impact because they are cash sales (in contrast to arms transfers to Israel which are provided as grants).

¹⁰⁹Charles B. Perkins, Arms to the Arabs : the Arab Military Buildup Since 1973, (published by AIPAC), refers to the arms buildup among seven major Arab states, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Perkins did not include any footnotes to explain the ACDA figures located on page 9.

4. Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nuclear proliferation continues to concern the United States. The 1991 National Security Strategy published by the White House reflects that concern.¹¹⁰ The United States has withheld foreign aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear program.¹¹¹ But again Israel was an exception. Despite knowledge of Israel's program since the mid 1960's, the U.S. terminated inspections at the Dimona nuclear reactor in 1969 and has since allowed Israel to proceed without requiring adherence to established international controls.¹¹² Additionally, Israel was grand-fathered from restrictions which suspended foreign aid to countries selling or receiving nuclear materials, equipment or technology.¹¹³ President Bush also waived sanctions against Israel in November when it violated a 1987 international

¹¹⁰National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991, Washington D.C., p. 10.

¹¹¹Guy Gugliotta, "House Passes \$25.4 billion aid bill: Controversial provisions expected to evoke White House displeasure," The Washington Post, (21 June 1991), p. A4. In June 1991, the bill also reaffirmed the "Pressler amendment" cutting off aid to Pakistan unless the President certifies the country does not possess nuclear weapons.

¹¹²Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980's, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 215. For additional information see William C. Potter, "Israel: An unlikely Nuclear supplier," International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation, (Lexington Books, 1990), p. 182. The U.S. has been aware of Israel's nuclear weapons capability since the mid 1960's through Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports and subsequent confirmation in 1974 by Israel's President Ephraim Katzir to Secretary of State Kissinger. Feldman, p. 215. According to Gerald M. Steinberg, the U.S. has until recently, also supplied highly enriched uranium to fuel Israel's research reactor at Nahal Soreq.

¹¹³Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option, (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 262.

agreement by transferring key ballistic missile components to South Africa.¹¹⁴ Moreover, Arab states have used Israel's unchallenged nuclear program as an excuse to develop their own nuclear capabilities as a means to restore the regional balance of power. Iran's Deputy President, Ayatollah Mohajerani said all Muslim countries should be allowed to develop weapons if Israel remains a nuclear power, adding "What has been done to Iraq. . . should be done exactly to Israel."¹¹⁵ Finally, with the political and economic dissolution of the former Soviet Union, and the reduction in its strategic nuclear forces, its nuclear experts may potentially be employed by Arab States wishing to become new members of the world's nuclear club.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴"Bush reportedly waived sanctions against Israel," The Sunday Herald, (27 October 1991), p. 2A.

¹¹⁵Elaine Sciolino, "Intelligence report indicates Iran has been seeking Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 31 October 1991, p. A9.

¹¹⁶Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald H. Blake, "The Middle East and North Africa: The Global Context," The Middle East And North Africa: A Political Geography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 33. For additional information see Parker L. Payson, "Danger for 1990 elections: Pro-Israel PACs at work," the Washington Report: on Middle East Affairs, June 1990, p. 30. There are six million Jews in the United States, few of them play a vital role in shaping national policies toward Israel and the Middle East. By March 31, 1990, 55 pro-Israel PACs had already raised more than \$6.9 million and had invested over \$1.8 million in their choices for the 102nd Congress. Some 166 Democrats received more than \$1.3 million. While 61 Republicans received more than \$497,000. Incumbents received 94 percent of pro-Israel PAC donations. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), who is pressing implementation of a joint Israeli-US anti tactical ballistic missile program, has received \$147,300 for his re-election. Mel Reynolds has received the most pro Israel PAC money for any House race, some \$35,050 for his unsuccessful primary race against incumbent Gus Savbage (D-IL), one of the few congressmen who endorsed a cut in Israeli aid. He is followed by Sidney Yates (D-IL), who protested House proposals urging Israel to reopen West Bank schools,

The next portion of this paper will examine the domestic political factors which have been important to Israel's special status with the U.S.

a. AIPAC Lobby and PAC Power

American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) currently has a staff of 100, a budget of \$12 million, and members from more than 55,000 households.¹¹⁷ Like almost all special interest lobbying organizations, it also created its own Political Action Committee (PAC). The first pro-Israel PAC appeared on the national scene in 1976.¹¹⁸ Since then, 124 pro-Israel PACs were established. In the 1988 elections, pro-Israel PACs outspent any one of the five largest PACs.¹¹⁹

AIPAC's primary strength has been its close working relationship with Congress which it has fostered in several ways. First, all its lobbyists are former congressional aides so they enjoy a unique status with members of Congress and

and who has received \$28,250.

¹¹⁷Lloyd Grove, "On the March for Israel: The Lobbyists from AIPAC, Girding for Battle in the New World Order," The Washington Post, 13 June 1991, p. D1.

¹¹⁸Curtiss, p. 15.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. V. Pro-Israeli PAC spent \$5.4 million versus the \$3 million spent by the National Association of Realtors (the other four spent \$2 million each. The other four largest PACs are Teamsters Union, American Medical Association, National Education Association and National Association of Federal Employees.

their staff.¹²⁰ Secondly, AIPAC attends every hearing, every session, and every mark up affecting Israel.¹²¹ Moreover, as AIPAC itself points out it functions as a daily,

... information resource for virtually every candidate for Federal office (by providing) a dependable source of information about the Middle East.¹²²

It has been alleged the pro-Israel lobby and its PACs are different from other PACs in several ways.¹²³ First the PACs have been able to circumvent Federal laws which limit PAC contributions to \$5,000 per candidate per election, (i.e. \$5,000 for primary and \$5,000 for general elections each year).¹²⁴ With over a hundred like-minded PACs under AIPAC direction, it has been able to contribute ten to twenty times over the limit prescribed by law.¹²⁵

¹²⁰Nimrod Novik, Israel in U.S. foreign and security policies, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 21 November 1983, p. 21.

¹²¹Excerpted from "What is AIPAC?" brochure.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Curtiss, pp. V-VII.

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Lloyd Grove, "On the March for Israel," The Washington Post, 13 June 1991, p. D1. Although these allegations have not been proven, Andrew Kilgore, and six other former U.S. government officials submitted a complaint to the Federal Election Commission against AIPAC and 27 pro-Israel PACs in January 1988 for violating Federal campaign spending limitations by orchestrating its donations. In December 1990, the FEC ruled that there was "insufficient evidence" to support the charge.

AIPAC outspent the combined forces of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans by 145 to one in the 1988 elections. And unlike other PACs which identify their sponsors or purpose in their title, only six out of 124 PACs established since 1976 mention the Middle East, Israel, Judaism or Zionism in their titles.¹²⁶

Furthermore, AIPAC lobbies Congress on behalf of a foreign country, yet has never registered as a foreign agent because its funds originate in the United States. Yet there seems to be a close association between Israel and the lobby.¹²⁷ When the Johnson Plan was proposed by President Kennedy in 1962, American Jewish leaders, (many of whom are on AIPAC's Executive Committee) worked together with Israeli officials to prevent adoption of a plan contrary to Israel's interests, while disregarding its benefit to the U.S.¹²⁸

Finally, many, if not most of AIPAC's activities are in opposition to initiatives proposed by the administration and the American private sector as they seek to reduce impediments to commercial trade with Middle Eastern countries,

¹²⁶Curtiss, p. VI.

¹²⁷Tivnan, p. 24. The roots of this close relation can possibly be traced to Ben-Gurion's intervention, which installed Rabbi Silver as head of the American Zionist movement in 1946. Ben-Gurion played a vital role in convincing the American Zionist organization members to elect Rabbi Silver (known as a Jewish hard liner) as their leader.

¹²⁸Etta Zablocki Bick in her analysis of U.S.-Israeli relations between 1956 and 1968. Excerpted in Tivnan, p. 57. The Johnson Plan was to allow "Arab refugees to return to their homes in what was now Israel or be resettled in other parts of Israel, Arab countries or elsewhere in the world with Israeli compensation." The Johnson Plan was scrapped sometime after it was made public in 1962.

increase sales of defensive arms to friendly Arab States, and limit transfers of military and civilian technology and jobs to Israel, initiatives supported by the Department of Commerce, the State Department and the Pentagon.¹²⁹ However, AIPAC's success in countering these proposals have resulted in the loss of American jobs to overseas competitors. Additionally, AIPAC's efforts to strengthen American-Israeli ties have exposed U.S. military and diplomatic personnel as well as businessmen and tourists overseas to Arab reprisals which

¹²⁹George Lenczowski, "Reagan Presidency," American Presidents and the Middle East (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 259. The closer the United States and the Arabs get together, the greater the embittered confrontation between Washington and Tel Aviv becomes. The United States has used the arms sales to some Arab countries as a method of improving relations with their regimes. Yet, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has successfully lobbied Congress to cancel or downgrade such sales. In order for the Carter administration to protect its arms sales to Jordan and Egypt in 1977, it had to include them in an Israeli arms package. All sorts of restrictions were placed on the use of the American warplanes sold to Arab countries, example; F-15 fighters were sold with smaller than normal fuel tanks and denuded of bomb racks. On October 29, 1981, after the arms package for Saudi Arabia was approved by fifty-two to forty-eight votes in the Senate, the Israeli government made it clear to the American administration that in practice, any sale of American arms to the Arabs would be subjected to the Israeli veto. They also gave the message that in the congressional contests between the Israeli premier and the U.S. president (unless he exerted extraordinary efforts), Israel was likely to prevail. For additional information see Eric Schmitt, "U.S. hopes to sell F-15's to Saudis, but delicately," New York Times, 26 February 1992, p. A6. Although the Bush administration is considering going ahead with a sale of seventy two advanced F-15's to Saudi Arabia, with an estimated cost of \$5 billion which could keep the assembly lines open through 1997, Israel's supporters in Congress are already gearing up for a fight. When reports of the sale first surfaced last November, 67 Senators signed a letter to Mr. Bush objecting to the proposal.

are directed against American support and tolerance for Israel's refusal to negotiate land for peace.¹³⁰

Israel is now forty four years old and is recognized by the United Nations like any other sovereign state. Some Arabs, however reluctantly, have begun to accept Israel and its existence. Though no general solution to the problem of Arab-Israel relations is in sight, it would be brought nearer if the United States discontinued the allowance of special interest groups to steer its foreign policy.

Land for peace and the halt of settlement constructions in the West Bank and other Arab lands occupied in the 1967 War are not likely to be the answer to the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather they will only calm the tension between them temporarily. U.S. foreign policy should seek the following actions which can lead to a greater chance for regional peace and stability.

- Palestinians within Israel must have equal rights.
- Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip must gain their independence.
- Palestinians and Israelis must learn to reconcile themselves realistically.¹³¹

The United States is seen as the supporter and protector of Israel. With its strong friendly relations with many Arab countries in the region, the U.S. is seen

¹³⁰Curtiss, p. VI-VII.

¹³¹Interview with Dr. Abdallah Sbeih, Director of Political and Information Affairs, League of Arab States, Mills College, San Francisco, California, 28 February 1992. As long as the Israeli-Palestinian problem continues to exist, relations between Arabs and Israelis will never fully heal. This situation will not serve U.S. interests in the region.

by Arabs and Israelis as the only power that can succeed in achieving stability in the region.

Although some progress was achieved during the Carter administration by signing the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, numerous U.S. attempts over the past 43 years have failed to resolve the Palestinian issue, the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since Israel will not submit voluntarily to such a settlement, and since the Arab States alone are unable to unilaterally implement it, this amounts to a demand for an imposed settlement between the Arabs and Israel by the only great power left, the United States.

Arabs are weak militarily and lack the modern technology to defeat Israel. Conversely, Israel has a strong and well trained army. Its armed forces consists of well over 200,000 men and is supported by the most modern weapons. Obviously Israel is the most powerful state involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel, though wracked with internal economic problems such as high unemployment and inflation, has a higher standard of living than the non-oil producing Arab countries.¹³² The only effective weapon in Arab possession is oil. Since the birth of the Jewish state, Arab Leaders of oil producing countries have not only used this weapon effectively once, but have threatened to use it

¹³²Michael C. Hudson, "The Middle East," World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 469. Israel's economic power is a reflection not only of its efficient structure and trained manpower but also of a large capital inflow from Western governments and Jewish communities, especially the United States.

five times.¹³³ The Arab oil embargo on the United States in 1973 underlined the growing global power of the Arabs. Israel continues to try to persuade the world in recognizing all of Jerusalem as its capital. Meanwhile, all Arab leaders, including those from oil-producing countries, continue to warn the world away from this recognition. King Fahd stated at the Islamic Conference in Dakar in December, 1991 that the title of the Saudi Monarchy should be changed from the "Servant of El-Haramayn" to "Servant of El-Aharam". This means that the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem was added to Mecca and al-Madina as those places King Fhad has sworn to protect. Thus, Saudi Arabia, the largest Arab oil producer, has developed an increasingly outspoken interest in restoring Jerusalem to Islam.¹³⁴

¹³³Ahmed Shawky, "Crisis of 73," al-Petrol, 17 January 1992, p. 11. For additional information see George Lenczowski, "Nixon Presidency," American Presidents and the Middle East, p.133. On 21 November 1973, Kissinger publicly threatened American retaliation in response to the use of Arab economic weapons against the U.S. Because Arab oil was denied to the U.S. Navy and the embargo was proving very burdensome to American consumers, as exemplified by long lines of cars at gas stations, Nixon was contemplating sending a special emissary to Saudi Arabia who would exchange certain American promises in connection with the forthcoming Geneva peace conference in return for Saudi assurances to lift the embargo.

¹³⁴Mohammed Barakat, "Islamic Conference," Al-Muslimoon Weekly, 20 January 1992. p.1. El-Haramayn are Mecca and el-Madina. El-Aharam are Mecca, el-Madina and the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Also see Youssef M. Ibrahim, "2 Kings compete for Holy Shrines," The New York Times, 14 May 1992, p. A7. King Fahd offered to pay all expenses of a major renovation plan for the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. This plan will include their continued maintenance. It is another indication that King Fahd is determined to eventually claim publicly to be the custodian of the Muslim shrines in Jerusalem.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a time bomb that is still ticking. The U.S. sponsored Middle East peace talks brought the Arabs and Israelis closer together. However, until the participants put aside their grievances, allowing for a significant break through another Arab-Israeli conflict can erupt at anytime. If the Arabs are serious about using oil embargo threats, this will result in another major economic crisis and the U.S. can suffer major economic setbacks.¹³⁵

The U.S. has a large stake in the Middle East and it should remain engaged in the affairs of the region. Neither total repression of Arab-Israeli opposition nor total appeasement of Arab-Israeli demand is possible. The partial use of either method is not likely to enhance American interests in the Middle East.

¹³⁵Interview with Julie Scott, Statistic office, American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C. 1 March 1992. In 1974, U.S. oil production was 8.8 mbd. OPEC oil export was 30 mbd. U.S. oil consumption was 16 mbd. In 1990, U.S. oil production was 7 mbd. OPEC oil export was 28 mbd. U.S. oil consumption was 17 mbd.

IV. CONTEMPORARY IRAQI POLITICS: FORGING THE NATIONAL BASE

This chapter is about the Arab Baath Socialist Party in Iraq. The author will give an assessment of the party's ideology and policies. By examining the domestic roots of Iraq's regional ambitions, this chapter where the author found out that to obtain stability in the region, major fundamental and difficult changes in the Baath regime are required.

This chapter is broken up into three sections. Section one, "The Iraqi Government After World War II to Present," examines the growth of pan-Arab sentiments among a number of underground movements called "Baathi Sleeping Cells." Through the use of historical analysis, this section will reveal the party's determination to maintain a strong central Baathi government.

Section two, "Building Support and Retaining Power," opens with discussions of the party structure and its extreme hierarchy institutions. The bulk of the chapter will demonstrate that prior to the Gulf War, economic growth and the budding Iraqi ballistic missile program were the primary agents for the Baath Party in Iraq to build support and retain power among the masses. Ironically, these factors (economic growth and Iraq's ballistic missile program) explain current Iraqi resistance to significant changes in Baathist institutions.

The last section, "The Roots of Regional Ambitions," examines the political system of the Baath Party. This section analyzes the Party structure, how it exploits its high degree of institutionalization, its disciplined organization and the global dimensions that successfully illustrate this party's ambitions. Particularly important are unity, freedom, and socialism as defined by Baathi doctrine and their influence on the Arab World.

A. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AFTER WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT

Political repression during the British occupation of Iraq, and the outcome of World War II were major factors which contributed to the temporary cessation of pan-Arabist activities in the country.¹³⁶ These factors divided Iraqis into two factions. The first was a minority group led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, which supported Britain against the Axis powers. This group was seen as an obstacle to pan-Arabism. The second faction was weary of the political oppression during the British presence in Iraq. It was influenced by, or attracted to, ideas of pan-Arab nationalism which were presented by scholars, mainly from Syria.¹³⁷

¹³⁶Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), p. 183. According to the author the pan-Arabism movement initially began in Iraq during King Faisal's reign in early 1930's. The author is an Iraqi expatriate. His real name as it was published in the 6 January 1992, New Yorker, is Kanan Makiya.

¹³⁷Ibid. , for more information see S.N. Mehdi, "Baathist Syria and Iraq: A Comparative Approach, an Outline of Political History," Islamic Revolution, December 1981, pp. 5-6. Those scholars were Michael Aflaq, the ideologue and

A number of underground movements began to flourish. Originally they were called "Baathi Sleeping Cells." Their members were fed with articles by Satie al-Husri and Michael Aflaq, promoting "without much scientific proof, the racial theory of a common Arab heritage."¹³⁸ This resulted in the rise of emotions supporting an "Arab Nation." Initially, this nation was to be made up of Greater Syria and Iraq.¹³⁹ Ironically, the same factors (political repression and

the Baath party political philosopher, and a Christian Greek Orthodox, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the party tactician and organizer, and a Sunni Muslim. Both men were born in 1912 in Midan, Damascus, Syria. Aflaq, the son of a wealthy grain merchant, was educated in Greek Orthodox schools, after which he was sent to the Sorbonne, in France for higher education, where he began to work with al-Bitar. Their aim was to create a nationalist consciousness which would precipitate Arab unity and social revolution among the Arab world of the twentieth century. In Paris, he became familiar with the Communist ideology and it is said that he wrote articles for Communist publications. Aflaq and al-Bitar returned to Syria in 1932 and became teachers at the *Taihz Dimashq High School*. Bitar later plunged into participating in various government offices and activities, as opposed to Aflaq, who served only three months as Minister of Education in 1949. They began to gain their dynamic force and legitimacy among the masses by clearly identifying their party purpose: by presenting the failures of the existing government in Syria. This was difficult to accomplish in a country that was oppressed and under an authoritarian ruler at that time. When the Alawis began to dominate and control many leadership positions in the Syrian governmental structure and penetrated the Syrian military officer corps, Aflaq began to lose his mass base in Syria. As a result, he began to seek other ground to expand from. He therefore focused on expanding his political influence in Iraq where he already had colleagues trained, educated, and who accepted his ideology.

¹³⁸ Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander, Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam's War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 14.

¹³⁹ Ibid. Greater Syria is defined as Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and Syria. In the case of Iraq, its call was accompanied by the additional claim that the Iraqis were the direct descendants of the Mesopotamians and Babylonians. The claim was made in an effort to promote a common feeling of national loyalty for the country which had not even existed a few years earlier.

the outcome of WW II) which opposed the pan-Arab movement fueled the activism of a group of students in Baghdad. They called for the return to pan-Arabism.¹⁴⁰ The influence of these students was weak, spread slowly, and was limited to other students. But it was effective enough to eventually establish the Iraqi Baath party in 1952 as a branch of the Syrian party.¹⁴¹

1. Qassem, a Kurdish President

The party was driven underground to survive Prime Minister al-Said's oppressive measures, which were publicly criticized in several newspapers.

In an editorial in London's Baghdad Times on 23rd February 1955, Nuri al-Said was criticized for going too far in banning political parties and withdrawing licenses from some sixty newspapers. The writer warned of a possible disaster.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰Interview with Adjunct Professor Kamil Said, Middle East Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 12 April 1992. Among those students were Abdel Salam Arif and Ahmed Hassen el-Bakr, both of whom later became president of Iraq and leader of the Baath party.

¹⁴¹al-Khalil, 183. The idea of the Baath party was introduced to the Iraqis through a series of articles by party founder and leader Michael Aflaq, beginning with an article written in 1935 entitled "The Period of Heroism." By the late forties, these ideas about Arab Nationalism attracted the masses to the Arab Baath party.

¹⁴²Darwish, and Alexander, 16.

While Iraqis continued to struggle for their basic civil rights, many external events inspired the Baath party to demand changes. Some of these events were:

- The nationalization of oil in Iran which encouraged similar measures in Iraq, especially when oil revenues were growing rapidly. The oligarchy kept these revenues for itself.
- The emergence of the Iraqi Communist Party. They targeted the poor and middle class of the Iraqi society. They then penetrated many government bureaus, and public organizations.
- The rise of Gamel Abdel-Nasser in Egypt and his challenges to the superpowers. The Egyptian leader gained popularity in the Arab world for his fiery speeches denouncing "western imperialists" involvement in the Middle East, and for his unconditional support to any Arab revolution against a monarchy regime.¹⁴³

On the night of 13 July 1958, the Baath party indirectly had its first taste of power in Iraq, and the "possible disaster" became reality to al-Said. Although he was not affiliated with the Baath Party, but through his Baathi supporters, Brigadier-General Abdel Karim Qassem led the revolution against the Monarchy ruler and seized control of Baghdad. Soon, all members of the royal family that resided in the Iraqi capital, including King Faisal II and Crown Prince Abdullah, met their death. Al-Said, who went into hiding, was later discovered disguised

¹⁴³Mohammed Shadid, and Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," Middle East Journal, 1988, pp. 16-23. A famous anti-Western slogan of Nasser's which was often heard between the Arabs is "What was taken by force, can only be regained by force." Also see Darwish and Alexander, 19. Nasser had two squadrons of MIG-15s and MIG-17s flown to Syrian air bases in a state of readiness to protect Qassem's revolution in Iraq in 1958.

as a woman. He was captured, tortured, killed, and then buried in a secret location.¹⁴⁴

Qassem, an Iraqi Kurd and leader of the revolution, was installed as the first President of the new Republic, while Colonel (later General) Abdel Salam Mohammed Arif became deputy premier and deputy Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Qassem was not a Baathi, but his victory was attributed to the overwhelming support of Baathi advocates. Abdel Salam Arif, a Baathi member, and a principle conspirator and architect of the coup, was critical to its success.¹⁴⁵

Therefore, Qassem relied heavily on his Baathi revolutionary colleagues, and assigned them to key governmental positions. The result was that most of the policies of the new republic were affected by the Baathi ideology and the call for an "Arab nation."

On July 26 the government announced a provisional constitution which proclaimed Iraq as "part of the Arab nation," described the Kurds as

¹⁴⁴George Lenczowski, The Middle East In World Affairs, 4th ed. (New York: Univ. of Cornell Press, 1990), p. 289. On the eve of overthrow of the monarchy, the Baath party barely exceeded three hundred people.

¹⁴⁵Darwish and Alexander, 18. General Arif led a column of armor towards King Faisal's palace, although some historians claim that Arif's plan was to spare the King's life. When King Faisal and his uncle Crown Prince Abdullah came out into the palace garden to listen to Arif's demands, they were shot on the spot. In 1963, Arif became the second Iraqi President and was then promoted to Marshal.

associated with the Arabs "in the bosom of Iraqi unity," and named Islam as the religion of the state.¹⁴⁶

However, the Baathi vision of the Arab nation expanded beyond Greater Syria, to include all Arab lands.

Within a few months after the revolution, the new government began to split into three factions.

- The Communist Party, which exerted major efforts either to share power with the National Democrats and the Kurdish Democratic Party, or to seize it outright.
- Baathis under Arif's leadership. They were driving towards Arab solidarity and unification with Egypt and Syria.
- Iraqi nationalists, who supported Qassem's domestic development and his effort towards achieving a completely independent and united Iraq. A country which should be free of both Communist and pan-Arab (Baathi) domination.¹⁴⁷

Qassem, attempting to slow the merger with the Arab federation, removed Arif from Baghdad, and assigned him as ambassador to West Germany. When Arif expressed his reluctance to accept the post, he was arrested, and accused of

¹⁴⁶Lenczowski, p. 289.

¹⁴⁷Interview with Adjunct Professor Kamil Said, Middle East Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 12 April 1992. Public support of the Iraqi Baath party increased tremendously when the Communist party began to explore its ideology. The Communist party was then looked upon as a party that encouraged the structure of ethnic and minority groups against pan-Arabists.

plotting a coup attempt against the government. Later, in 1959, Arif received the death sentence.

The death sentences pronounced on Aref . . . in January 1959 were important advances in the struggle that the Qassem regime was waging against the pro-Nasser forces.¹⁴⁸

This event contributed directly to the deterioration in Iraq's domestic situation and in foreign relations with the Arab world (especially with the U.A.R.).¹⁴⁹

Qassem continued to disassociate himself with pan-Arab nationalists. His regime ordered a wave of violence, terror and conspiracies against the Arab nationalists. In February 1959, the Baathis resigned from the government, and Qassem's National Front collapsed. Consequently, Baathist plots against Qassem's life began to abound.¹⁵⁰ The Baathis believed a military coup was the

¹⁴⁸Lenczowski, p. 292. Professor Said added that, Abdel Salam Aref's death sentence was never carried out. Two critical factors saved Aref's life. First; President Nasser and his pro-elements in the Iraqi government pressured Qassem to reduce the sentence to life in prison. Secondly; the Baath Party, which represented the majority of Qassem's government protested his decision and warned Qassem of the consequences of retaliation. When the Baath Party overpowered Qassem in 1963, they freed Aref from jail. Not surprisingly, Aref sentenced Qassem to death.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Darwish and Alexander, 23. On 7th October 1959, a six man assassination squad was waiting on Al-Rashid street in Baghdad. The team included 22 year old Saddam Hussein, whose job was only to cover the escape of his five fellow assassins upon completion of their mission. When his comrades could not execute the assassination due to faulty equipment, Saddam moved forward towards Qassem's car. He opened fire, killing the driver and wounding Qassem

shortest route to power. On 8 February 1963, they overpowered Qassem's regime, ending a chapter of anti pan-Arabism rulers in Iraq.¹⁵¹ Qassem, a Kurd and opponent to Arab unity, was killed along with some of his aides and followers. His death was attributed to his ideology of being an Iraqi nationalist versus being a pan-Arabist.¹⁵² The fact that Qassem was a Kurd also contributed to his demise, because Baathis were looking for an Arab leader to rule Iraq and vanguard pan-Arabism. Ironically, the dictator was eliminated by the same faction which placed him in power.

in the shoulder. Saddam was hit in the leg and later fled to Cairo.

¹⁵¹Darwish and Alexander, 26. Abdel Salam Arif was installed as President. Ahmed Hassen al-Bakr was his vice president. Later, al-Bakr was made an ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the office of vice-president was abolished. Saddam Hussein returned to Iraq and was appointed as the head of Jihaz Haneen, the intelligence organization of the Baath party. Eventually, this organization became an instrument of terror.

¹⁵²Interview with Professor Said, 11 August 1992, also see Darwish and Alexander, 24-25. Iraqi communists warned Qassem of the 1963 coup, but he disregarded them. Pan-Arab nationalists, dissatisfied with Qassem's "Iraqi nationalist ideology," stormed the defense ministry where Qassem resided. They slaughtered Qassem and his supporters. Furthermore, Baathis transmitted pictures of Qassem's assassination on the Iraqi television and broadcasted a decree on Baghdad Radio, calling for the massacre of all who tried to save "God's enemy, Qassem."

2. The First Baathi Government: The Arif Brothers Set the Stage

Abdel Salam Arif took control after Qassem's death and with him came members of the long suppressed Baath party. Upon his assumption of power,

... as Head of State and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Arif proclaimed that the new regime would strive to achieve unity, freedom, and socialism; i.e, the standard Baath objectives, and would be under collective leadership.¹⁵³

Arif pushed for closer ties with the few independent Arab countries, and for federation with Egypt and Syria. Representatives from the latter countries met in Cairo, and negotiated for unity among them. Major differences soon emerged. Nasser insisted on unity in all forms under his leadership, while the Baathis called for a federal government with a collective leadership.¹⁵⁴ Arif acceded to

¹⁵³Lenczowski, 299.

¹⁵⁴Salih Kubba, a former Iraqi Minister of Economics in 1968 from 17 to 30 June, currently resides in the United States. This shows Baathis insistence on pan-Arabism, even though the unification with the U.A.E. during Qassem's, reign was full of obstacles. For Arif to think that Nasser would accept anything less than leadership of the Arab union, was either naive or very brazen, since Egypt was the undisputed leader of the Arab world at this time. Also see Salah Al-Serafy, "Economic Development by Revolution: The Case of the United Arab Republic," The Middle East Journal, (Summer 1963), p. 50. And, Richard Nyrop, Egypt: A Country Study, (Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1982), p. 109. Egypt's economic system had deteriorated more than Iraq's and Syria's. Egypt was among the poorest Arab nations. It was a country with little capital, overworked land, overflowing with superfluous labor, and a population growth rate that was accelerating. It is still predominantly an agricultural country with 36% of its GDP being accounted for by farming, and only 15% of its output coming from industry.

Nasser's demands, and gradually alienated himself from the Baathi (right wing) concept.¹⁵⁵

Three years later, on 13 April 1966, President Arif died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His death was likely brought about by his pro-Nasser leanings. Nasser pressed his followers in Iraq to choose Arif's brother, Abdel Rahman Arif as Abdel Salam's successor. Abdel Rahman was sworn in as President, and the following two years saw a period of instability the continual growth of economic difficulties.

The Arifs' administrations did not achieve any gains and their regime had no basic legitimacy other than the support of the armed forces. Consequently, the Iraqi population saw little improvement in the economic situation, unemployment continued to rise, and jails were overcrowded with political prisoners.¹⁵⁶

With the rise of public demonstrations throughout the country and mounting political pressure on the government, the Baath party returned to

¹⁵⁵Ibid. Most important to Arif was the federation with Egypt and Syria. However, the party's right wing indicted him for his "pro-Nasserite tendencies," especially after a number of nationalization decrees, socialization of the economy, and the placing under government control of all banks and major industrial firms. This was a process that Arif felt was necessary to bring about closer cooperation with Egypt's social economic system. Free enterprise was discouraged and much of Iraq's capital fled the country in search of safer havens. Later, Arif changed his attitude towards Nasser following the failure of a coup against him by Nasser's agents in 1965. However, Baathi leaders did not change their attitude towards Arif.

¹⁵⁶Darwish and Alexander, 27-28. One detention center, the Nuqrat al-Salman desert prison, alone received 2368 prisoners and 1671 detainees between February 1963 and October 1965.

power. On 30 July 1968, the party's right wing asserted its authority by installing Michael Aflaq as Secretary General, Major General Ahmed Hassen al-Bakr as Head of State, and Saddam Hussein as Vice-President.

Why did the Arif brothers not last as Baathi leaders while others have, including the leader of present day Iraq? The answer can be summarized in five points.

- Cabinet members in the Arif brother's governments grew more fearful as their leaders gave increasing power to Cairo. Obviously, Baathis were concerned with consolidating leadership power in Baghdad more than establishing pan-Arabism.
- An attempt to achieve unity between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq failed, resulting in a split among the founders of the Baath party between Syria and Iraq.
- The Arifs' era did not have any agreed upon policies over issues such as democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Instead of addressing political, economic, and social reforms they were more interested in executing Qassem's followers and suppressing the Iraqi Communist and Kurdish parties.
- The Six Day War in June 1967 exposed the rhetoric of pan-Arab nationalists as hollow. The Arab defeat by Israel and the halfhearted response by Arif's government was seen by pan-Arabists as an extension of "Western imperialism." This resulted in helping the Baath party seize power in Iraq in 1968.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷Darwish and Alexander, 29-56. On 4 June 1967, President Nasser received assurance from the U.S. via the Soviet ambassador in Cairo that Israel would not attack Egypt. However, on June 5, Israel, without warning, launched several air strikes targeting Egyptian air bases. Within a few hours the Israeli air force destroyed almost all of the Egyptian air force, leaving Nasser's ground forces without air cover in the desert. Egypt suffered heavy losses and Israeli forces occupied the Sinai. Meanwhile, Washington failed to take any action against Israel and continued its support against a background of what was seen by the Arabs as a superpower conspiracy to defeat Nasser and to enable Israel to expand its Zionist dream of an "Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates." The Iraqis made

- The rise of the Kurdish war in northern Iraq. Under al-Barzani's leadership, Iraqi Kurds demanded recognition for their language, local administrative autonomy, and participation in Baghdad's government. The war added to the ailing economy in the country.¹⁵⁸

3. Baath Party of Iraq: The Mantle of Arab Leadership, with Bakr and Saddam.

Senior members in the Baath party learned from Qassem's and the Arifs' errors. Since they gained power in 1968 many changes took place, from tighter control on the country to the consolidation of power in their hands. They enacted a new constitution, and established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), declaring that the latter has full executive and legislative powers.

Additionally, the RCC was only to be composed of Baath Party members.¹⁵⁹ At this point Iraq was transformed from a multi-party to a single party government, diminishing the existence of the checks and balances process

no effort to go to the aid of Egypt or Syria. Only after public demonstrations throughout the country and mounting political pressure did the Iraqi President dispatch a token force, which took no part in any fighting.

¹⁵⁸Mark A. Bruzonsky, "Iraq: Centuries of Conflict in the Garden of Eden," The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs, (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1977), p. 34. The Kurds are a non-Arab, mostly Moslem, people who inhabit the mountains of northern Iraq, northwestern Iran, and southeastern Turkey and spread out into tiny pockets of Syria and the former Soviet Union. They make up about twenty percent of Iraq's population. The Kurds demanded virtual veto power over legislation in Baghdad affecting Kurdistan and the inclusion of rich oilfields in their region. The central government called the demands tantamount to secession.

¹⁵⁹Baathi view, p. 5.

between the executive and legislative branches. This ultimately left the power in the hands of the President.

Although Bakr was President, Saddam (with Baathi support) was the prime mover behind all the country's policies. Baathists helped to bring about detente with Iran in 1975, and crushed the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq after 14 years of uprising. Saddam, as second in command, signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the (former) Soviet Union, moreover, under his leadership, the Iraqi cabinet (dominated by Baathis) adopted numerous industrial programs, improved the economy and built the army to eventually become a regional power.¹⁶⁰

Bakr made several announcements in the RCC's opening conventions indicating that Saddam was his most suitable successor;

. . . my brother and our devoted Baathi Comrade Saddam Hussein is not only my Prime-Minister, but also my Caliph.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰Ibid. , p. 20. President Bakr was constantly ill, and his health began to deteriorate after the death of his wife in late 70's. He depended solely on his prime minister and long time companion Saddam Hussein.

¹⁶¹Baathi ranks are *Mustaqil (Independent)*, *Muayyid (Supporter)*, *Nasir (Helper, Protector, Defender)*, *Nasir Mutaqaddim (Senior Protector)*, *Rafiq (Comrade, Friend)*. Comrade is the senior rank to a member in the party. Information was provided to the author by Lieutenant Abdel-Kader al-Hafzi, Saudi Arabia Royal Navy. Lt. al-Hafzi, an intelligence officer during Desert Shield/Storm, procured this information as a result of interrogations conducted with Iraqi prisoners of war.

However, Saddam was not ready to assume the presidency.

I did not want him (Bakr) to leave his post as President . . . my situation would have been exactly like any other revolutionary situation in the world or in the Arab nation, with no clear-cut moral difference. If the one who is better takes over his friends place and seeks only the reward, then we would be exactly like so many other revolutionary movements, whereas this is far from the truth.¹⁶²

According to Professor Dhaher, President Bakr's health severely deteriorated with the years. This resulted in Bakr overlooking many sensitive governmental issues.¹⁶³ Bakr's authority gradually faded and he eventually became nothing more than a figurehead in the Presidential Palace.

There are two schools of thought which compete to explain the rise of Saddam as the Iraqi President in 1979. The first school of thought is that Bakr

¹⁶²Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, 1st ed. (London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991), p. 85. As Kazem el-Zytoon wrote in the daily Al-Thawra, a pro-governmental newspaper on 23 June 1977, "Iraqis should envy themselves, we are ruled by the voice of Bakr, the mind of Baathis and the hands of Saddam." Bakr provided the kindness and indulgence. The Baath party attributed the brain and alertness. Saddam is referred to as the strength and capabilities.

¹⁶³Interview with Professor Ahmed Dhaher, Yarmouk University Political Science Department, Irbid, Jordan, 13 June 1991. He also added that Bakr allowed his health problems to affect his personal life (he turned a blind eye to his elder son's alcohol problems). Dr. Dhaher was Bakr's son's tutor in the Baghdad Presidential Palace.

was forced into retirement, which can be easily supported in many articles and books published in the west.¹⁶⁴

The second school of thought is that Saddam was asked on many different occasions by the Senior members of the RCC and by President Bakr to take over the presidency.¹⁶⁵ Although this school of thought was not popular in Western countries it has been and still is the predominate one in the Middle East, and particularly in Iraq. In either case, and for this paper's argument, President Bakr retired and Saddam Hussein emerged as the President and the strongman of Baghdad.

Later on, when in the Presidential palace, Saddam would recall the nature of his relationship with Bakr during that period: It might have seemed that in an emergency, I conducted myself with an authority of a head of state, this may also have happened in private, but I never turned this emergency status into one that was permanent. When the emergency was over, I became once more the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council. . . I would respectfully return to my place.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴To support this argument see Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), p. 295. Appendix I. Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr was placed under house arrest, the night Saddam came to power and was gradually stripped of all positions.

¹⁶⁵"*al-Tarik al-Arabi*" (History of Knowledge), Egyptian ministry of Education, High School text, for the academic year 1991-1992. (Cairo: Published by *Dar al-Nasher*, 1991) p. 35.

¹⁶⁶Karsh and Rautsi, p. 86.

In summary, the history of the Baath regime in Iraq from 1952 to the present reveals its determination to maintain a strong central government. Regardless of who resided in the presidential palace (Qassem, Abdel Salam, Abdel Rahman, Bakr or Saddam), the Baathis remained the most powerful political party in Iraq. Moreover, Baathi goals were unbending, demanding the liberation of all Arab land in the name of pan-Arabism with Baghdad as its capital.¹⁶⁷

B. BUILDING SUPPORT AND RETAINING POWER¹⁶⁸

Emerging from a legacy of military coups and political instability in 1968, the Baath party manages to retain a stranglehold on power in Iraq to the present. The legacy of hate and bitterness towards the Baathi regime in Iraq has been mounting for years. Iraqi opposition groups have planned several unsuccessful coup attempts against the Baathi regime and President Saddam Hussein.

The March 1991 uprisings were the prime example of how determined the opposition is to over power the Baathi government in Baghdad.

¹⁶⁷Iraqi Baath Party document, p. 209. The document has no author nor a title, and it was presumably published by the Iraqi government. This party document was a mandatory article to study for Baathis with the rank of *Nasir Mutaqaddim*. The author procured this copy in 1980, while attending the Arabian Gulf Academy, Basra, Iraq. Hereafter, this book will be referred to as Baath doctrine number two.

¹⁶⁸This section is a product of the effort by the author and Lieutenant Mark Huber, USN. For more information see LT. Huber, "Legitimacy and Hafez al-Asad" (unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 1992.)

. . . three days before the formal Iraqi surrender . . . the revolt gained momentum. Masses would gather in the streets to denounce Saddam Hussein and Baathist rule, then march to seize the mayor's office, the Baath Party headquarters, the secret police building, the prison and the city's garrison. People shot as they went at every poster or wall relief of the dictator. As the cities came under rebel control, the insurgents cleaned out Baathists and the secret police.¹⁶⁹

Even though these incidents may raise doubts about the Baathi's grip in Iraq, the opposition groups usually ended up being crushed by Baathi forces and the organizers assassinated or fleeing the country.

It has been taken for granted that the Baath Party relies exclusively upon an iron fist to perpetuate its survival in Iraq. Through examining historical events which were recorded because of the rise of the party in Iraq, the author found that cruelty and repression are certainly utilized against those who dare to challenge the regime. But, it is unreasonable to turn a blind eye and ignore the fact that the regime utilizes techniques other than brute force alone to sustain power.

¹⁶⁹Faleh Abd al-Jabbar, "Why the Uprisings," Middle East Report, May-June 1992. pp. 8-9. The author stated that, a lack of organization, limited transportation and insufficient communication, in addition to the tight curfew enforced by Baathi forces prevented not only near by towns but also "adjacent neighborhoods within the same town to not know what was going on in each other's quarter."

1. Leader and Party

The following paragraph is a composite definition of common Arab leaders and their governmental institutions from a number of scholars in the Middle East,

A charismatic leader (Nasser) or an institution (Baath of Iraq), which were able to embed their ideology and beliefs, in that they convinced the people that any action they took was correct, whether it was in reality legally right or wrong. They provide massive moral and financial support only to personnel in key governmental positions, and provide basic needs to the public proportional to public support of the government.¹⁷⁰

Through its command controlled economy, the Baath Party of Iraq convinces enough Arabs within Iraq that its ideology is the only successful way to prosper and progress. Prior to the Gulf War and even after extensive damage to Iraq's economy following the Iran/Iraq War, Baathis in Iraq believed they were the best fed Arabs in the Middle East. Also the Baathi government in Baghdad declared their victory over the Persian infidels and Iraq became a regional power under Baathi leadership.

¹⁷⁰Interview with the following personnel, Dr. Ahmed Dhaher, Yarmouk University, Jordan. Dr. Farouk I.tyif, Eyen Shamech University, Cairo, Egypt. Ezzat Abdellalidf, Former Egyptian Ambassador to Holland. Dr. Abdallah Sbeih, Director of Political and Information Affairs; League of Arab States. Helmy Islam, Commodore (Ret.) Egyptian Navy. And, Dr. Walid Ahmed Selim, Editor, Al-Ahram newspaper. The interviews took place over a period of one year from 6 July 1991 to 30 July 1992. The interviews were obtained through several phone calls, correspondence through the mail and some personal meetings with the interviewers in the United States.

Moreover, the Baath Party is an institution that is hierarchically structured; advancement is based on a merit system.¹⁷¹ As any Baathi advances through the ranks, his or her moral and financial support from the government increases. In this manner, the Party gains support and retain power among the masses by co-opting its members, either by financial inducement or by increasing perks and personal political power by virtue of the position held within the party or government.

The Baath party in Iraq is characterized as a party with a higher degree of institutionalization, is organized and more disciplined than any other party in the Middle East.

There are few political parties in the world so strictly disciplined as the Baath Party in Iraq, and few operate under such a heavy veil of secrecy. Dissent, even whispered, is not heard here. Nor is much laughter heard.¹⁷²

The Baath Party is structured along the lines of the former Soviet Communist Party. It is extremely hierarchical and almost all authority is vested in the party leader, which is commonly the Head of State.¹⁷³ The party controls

¹⁷¹This information is based on Baathi documents presumably published in late 70's early 80's.

¹⁷²William S. Ellis, "Iraq at War: The New Face of Baghdad," National Geographic, January 1985, p. 93.

¹⁷³Iraqi Baath Party document, p. 60. This document has no author nor a title. It was presumably published by the Iraqi government. This party document was a mandatory article to study for Baathi with the rank of Nasir. The author

the country through an elaborate intelligence and security network to maintain the pretense of support among the masses, and an iron grip on the country. Additionally, through party organization of which the party cadre is an integral component, they reach down to local levels and to almost every Baathi member.

There are many Iraqi and Arab members in this hierarchical party. A relatively small percentage of these are full members (*Rafiq*). A dozen men who command key military units and civil or security services, are below the president who is on the apex of this pyramid of power.¹⁷⁴ One becomes a member by signing a petition in a ceremonial event, declaring in the presence of other members that he believes ideologically and practically in "One Arab Nation."

procured this copy in 1980, while attending the Arabian Gulf Academy, Basra, Iraq. Hereafter, this book will be referred to as Baath doctrine number one. Every Iraqi president is the chairman and the senior member of the RCC, Regional Command, National Assembly, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

¹⁷⁴Phebe Mar, "Iraq," Ideology and Power in the Middle East, pp. 186-194. These dozen men are usually a network of Tikritis and distant relatives of the President. With approximately equal power, they counter balance and neutralize each other. Their areas of responsibility are compartmentalized and overlapping and they report directly to the president rather than coordinating with their counterparts. Consequently, they can not easily build their own bases or form coalitions that might pose a threat to the President's rule. In spite of kinship ties with Hussein and Tikrit, the only vehicle of elite recruitment is the Baath Party. Prior to the Gulf war, the key figures were also long-standing party members of proven loyalty. Relatives with low party standing were not in the top positions. However, since the end of the war, Hussein has sought to tighten his grip on power by turning over key functions of his government to trusted family members, i.e. Hussein's cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, Minister of Interior. Mr. Sibawi, Hussein's half-brother, Minister of Intelligence Services, and General Kamel al-Majid, his son-in-law, Minister of Defense.

Additionally, the new member must confirm that this nation can only take place through the transformation and expansion of the Baath doctrine to other Arabs.

Eventually, new members move up the ranks within the party and become full members. This advancement is dependent on individual merits. These merits are a result of two factors.

- Individual progress through a series of stages in which each member is increasingly indoctrinated in the ideology and practices of the Baath.
- Each member must have an impressive personal Baathi record. This record must be full of merits, as a result of personal achievements, most of which may be considered by any civilized nation as immoral and deviant.

Baathis gain merit as informers, rioters, coup organizers, or for being jailed or exiled as a result of defending and exporting Baathi ideology.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵Lieutenant al-Hafzi, Saudi Arabia Royal Navy, personal notes. Baathi hierarchical positions are as follow; *Murashah* (Candidate), *Udu Mutadarrib* (Trained Member), *Udu Amil* (Active Member), *Udu Qiyadat Firqa* (Division, Unit Command Member), *Udu Shuba* (Branch Member), *Amin Sir Shuba* (Branch, District Secretary), *Amin Sir Far* (Section Secretary), *Udu Mktab* (Department Member), *Udu Qiyada Qutriyya* (Regional Command Member), *Udu Qiyada Qawmiyya* (National Command Member), *Udu Qiyyada Qawmiyya* (National Command Member), *Rais al-Haizb* (The President of the Party). Iraqi's POW's stated that, although the party structure is very sophisticated, the hierarchical organization failed to properly inform other Baathi members (in the army) of the party's expansionist plans into Kuwait. According to many POW's interviewed by LT. al-Hafzi, they were told that the Iraqi army was moving towards Israel. It was not until they read Arabic street signs did they discover they were in Kuwait City. only later in the day and prior to the actual shelling, were the Iraqi fighting men informed by their chain of command, that they were in Kuwait, answering a rescue call from their "Arab brothers and sisters". Iraq would save the Kuwaitis from their Amir, and the Zionist and CIA spies.

Samir al-Khalil's writing on the informer program in Iraq does it greater justice.

Who is an informer? In Baathist Iraq the answer is anybody. No casual cash-for-information informers, they are a mass under discipline, expected to inform on all acquaintances, including other party members. All members of the National Union of Iraqi Students (NUIS) and all recipients of a government scholarship . . . are informers of one sort or another.¹⁷⁶

Where informers can be loyal to either side, current government or opposition faction, riots and coups can eventually lead to revolution and their organizers have a prestigious place among Baathis. The Baath Party stresses the point of the transformation of thoughts and spirit of the Arab people, which is a pre-condition for the creation of a new society. This process is called *Inqilab* or revolution. Aflaq states,

¹⁷⁶The atmosphere created by masses of informers was described by a journalist during a visit to Baghdad: "Diplomats are unanimous in declaring their inability to meet Iraqis. Some leave here after three years without knowing a single Iraqi . . . Official business, . . . is conducted in the minimum amount of time, with a minimum of preliminary chitchat and usually in the presence of more than one Iraqi functionary. The hotel lobbies are occupied day and night with idle men filling most available seats, playing with worry beads and keeping an eye on the guests, particularly when the guests meet, what in most cases are their Iraqi business contacts. There is a feeling that at least three million Iraqis are watching the eleven million others. The security services permeate society to a degree that no one ever knows who's who". See Samir al-Khalil, pp. 61-62.

The struggle which I designated as a practical expression of the Inqilab . . . creates its own crusaders. The Inqilab becomes a living thing in their souls, minds and manners, or it becomes life itself.¹⁷⁷

Inqilab is a pre-requisite for the unity of the Arab people. Only then can the Arab reach the trinity of Baath doctrine: unity, freedom, and socialism.

The party refers to each Arab country as a Region, and every region is equipped to deal with local societal issues. Meanwhile, foreign policies and party policies are left only to the National Command in Baghdad. It is there where leaders can control all elements of the Baath Party throughout the Arab world.

Each Region is subdivided into district Branches and each Branch into Units. The Units in turn are composed of many Cells, which lie at the bottom of the organizational structure. These Cells play an important role in maintaining contact with various sections of society and are responsible for recognizing and recruiting new members for the party. Every Region has a Congress for advisory purposes, an Executive or Regional command and a Secretary. At the very top of the pyramid of organizational structure lies the General Congress, the national leadership (of the "Arab nation"), and the Secretary General. Local societal issues are resolved within regional headquarters, while matters of party policy are decided by the General Congress.¹⁷⁸

In summary, while the Baath Party structure is very sophisticated and organized, it has its own downfalls. The party structure does not accept the

¹⁷⁷S.N. Mehdi, p. 7.

¹⁷⁸S.N. Mehdi, "Baathist Syria and Iraq: A comparative approach, an outline of political history," Islamic Revolution, December 1981, p. 7.

legitimacy of other Arab countries as individual sovereign states. Furthermore, the party's ultimate goal is unity, freedom, and socialism. Yet, the party's merit system strongly encourages people to be informers and to promote peace disturbances. With its elaborate intelligence and security, the party has invaded the rights and privacy of its citizens and degraded the value of human rights. Freedom is a non-existing feeling among Baathis, but it is a word which is easily found in any Baathi doctrine.

2. Economic Growth

Prior to the 1968 revolution, the gap between rich and poor citizens was wide and growing wider. The cost of living was rapidly increasing. Over 88 percent of the population was illiterate, of which most were women. Very few families sent their children to school. Health care programs did not exist, and the nation desperately lacked any form of governmental social security plans.¹⁷⁹

The Baath party's resurrection in 1968 pursued several socialist economic policies. Revenues from oil exports made development of these social programs an easy task for the Iraqi government. Unlike other Arab oil rich states, the Baathis of Iraq did not distribute their wealth directly to the people. Instead, the oil revenue was scattered throughout several economic plans that were concerned

¹⁷⁹Interview with Professor Ahmed Dhaher, Yarmouk University Political Science Department, Irbid, Jordan.

with social welfare in the country.¹⁸⁰ Saddam Hussein publicly attacked the bureaucratic red tape and called for further economic activities in the country.

From now on the State should not embark on uneconomic activity. Any activity, in any field, which is supposed to have an economic return and does not make such a return, must be ignored. All officials must pay as much attention to economic affairs as political ideology.¹⁸¹

To implement this policy, the Iraqi government developed the state and the private sector bilaterally. Many factories and major national projects were established throughout the country with state support and financing. The government built factories and electric plants, linking them to several housing projects by paved roads and rail. Moreover, it built new cities and expanded the boundaries of old ones. By replacing patched homes with towns, over a million people live on sites where muddy squatters once stood.

¹⁸⁰Samir, al-Khalil, "Iraq and Its Future," The New York Review, 14 March 1991, p. 9. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraqi patronage was distributed indirectly through the development of Iraq's infrastructure. "The Iraqi Baath transformed Iraq's physical infrastructure, its educational system, social relations, and its technology, industry, and science. The Baath regime provided free health and education for everyone, and it also revolutionized transport and electrified virtually every village in the country." While Lieutenant al-Hafzi states "Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States patronage is the combination of indirect payments ie: schools, hospitals and paving roads and direct payments ie: personal checks, "bonuses for certain achievements (victory in the Gulf War).

¹⁸¹Robert Scott Mason, "The Economy," Iraq: A Country Study, 4th ed. (Washington D.C., Library of Congress Press, 1990), p. 129.

Baathis realized the Iraqi people needed more and better housing, sanitary water supplies, and paved roads. They raised the living standards of peasants. This change to a better lifestyle was a great concern to the party. As oil continued to be drawn from the ground, costs of rehabilitating the country were of less concern. Iraq's massive growth, the building boom, and oil wealth attracted labor expertise, both Arab and foreign top rated architects. They came to make the construction revolution possible and to share in the country's prosperity.

There is in Baghdad a street called Haifa, and it is the site of one of the largest urban housing construction projects in the world. Plans call for nearly 2,000 housing units on Haifa Street, along with schools, nurseries, shopping centers, clinics, parks, and entertainment centers. Contractors from many nations are participating in the work.¹⁸²

¹⁸²William S. Ellis, "Iraq at War: The New Face of Baghdad," National Geographic, January 1985, p. 103. Prior to 1968, Iraq's sanitation facilities were antiquated, and most of the roads unpaved. There was not a single first class hotel in the country. Major development was started by the 1968 Baath government with huge construction sites. Several housing projects provided low rent living spaces. By 1985, Iraq was full of luxury hotels and block after block of modern apartment complexes. Hundreds of miles of new sewer and water lines were laid in the ground, and a network of super-highways trace around and through the cities. Baghdad itself witnessed the construction of a new airport and new government buildings. New cities like Saddam City and Medical City are said to be the largest in the Middle East. Twelve bridges were built across the Tigris. Monuments of grand scale are rich and cryptically symbolic "*Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves*," and "*Qadissia Martyrs Monument*." For good or ill, depending on the artist, street art was plentiful.

Petroleum dominated the Iraqi economy, accounting for more than one third of its Gross National Product. Since petroleum is a governmentally controlled industry, the RCC enacted many laws to enhance the private sector in the non-petroleum field.

In 1983, Legislation exempted the private sector from customs duties and from excise taxes on imported spare parts and on machinery needed to build factories. The private sector was also given tax exemptions for capital investment and for research and development spending. Finally, the replacement of sole proprietorships by joint stock companies was encouraged as a means of tapping more private investment.¹⁸³

Abolishing the State Enterprise for Iraqi AirWays is one of the best examples given by the RCC towards encouraging privatization in the country.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³Mason, p. 148. New ministers were appointed and were charged with improving both the quality and quantity of industrial output. Large parts of the state bureaucracy that had controlled industry were abolished.

¹⁸⁴Al-Thawara, 15 March 1988, p. 5. In February 1988, the government sold a major portion of its Airlines to the private sector, while it retained only a small portion through the government's Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Saddam Hussein opened the fertilizer plant in Basra, the second major project for that city this year. Last month Mr. Saadoun Hamamdy opened the cement factory. Iraq, under the Baath leadership, will never have to import any of these products. In contrast, the Minister of Industry announced that within the next decade the country will begin to export and compete in the international market. The government of Iraq sold its bus and transportation company, between the capital and six cities, to the public.

In the agricultural field, the government of Iraq worked towards restoring an irrigation and drainage network. To deal with restrictions on water supplies caused by its neighbors, Iraq constructed several dams; additionally, the government rehabilitated old canals and constructed barges on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to control flooding. The cultivated land increased, and the Iraqi government encouraged foreign and Arab companies or individuals to lease plots of land from the government.¹⁸⁵

In the education sector, the Baath doctrine calls for full equality between men and women. Women today in Iraq attend universities and hold some of the highest positions in the country. Iraqi women are the most progressive among their counterparts in other Arab countries. Benefiting from the guaranteed equality under the Baath doctrine, they constitute over one third of the country's work force. Mrs. Ayoob, deputy director of the General Federation of Iraqi Women, said:

When the present government decided to eliminate illiteracy, 1.4 million women went to the centers to learn to read and write. Now we have programs to get them jobs. Many go into factories. Others go on to higher

¹⁸⁵Mason, p. 154-159. A Chinese-Brazilian joint venture constructed a \$2 billion dam on the Great Zab River. Additional dams were planned for Badush and Fathah. At Hindiyah on the Euphrates, and at Ash Shinafiyah on the Euphrates.

education and the professions. We now have 16 women including myself, in the National Assembly.¹⁸⁶

The Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 Gulf War accounts for a high percentage of women in the work force today.¹⁸⁷ The acceptance of equality between the genders had a strong reflection in the social aspects of life and unequivocally increased the legitimacy of the Baath Party among Iraqi women.

As a result, the industrial development sector grew, agricultural programs increased, illiteracy was reduced, and Iraqi trade prospered, and for the first time, became competitive with other nations.¹⁸⁸ Under the Baathi leadership, Iraqis became the most educated, healthiest and best fed Arabs.¹⁸⁹

The Iran-Iraq War was initially a burden on the Iraqi economy. Economic experts estimated that the Iraqi debt in 1986 was about \$80 billion. However, this debt was of two types:

¹⁸⁶Ellis, p. 97. Iraqi women today are engineers, pilots, doctors, architects and lawyers. Women now account for 50 percent of the work force, one of the highest percentages in the Arab world.

¹⁸⁷Samir al-Khalil, "Iraq and Its Future," The New York Review, March 14, 1991. p. 10. Men were diverted into soldiers to fight the enemy and defend the country. Meanwhile, women had to replace the men's labor force in various occupational jobs in the homeland. Iraqi women today make up the staffs of all the ministries and run much of the civilian life of the country. Similar examples occurred in the United States during World War II.

¹⁸⁸Country Study p. 123. In 1980 Iraq held reserves estimated at U.S. \$35 billion.

¹⁸⁹Michael Messing, "Can Saddam Survive?" New York Review of Books, 15 August 1991, p. 61.

- Most of the debt was owed to other Arab Gulf states. Eventually those states waived the repayment.¹⁹⁰
- Iraq still owes some western loans. Yet, through crude oil sales Iraq has begun to provide its western creditors with cash or reimbursement in oil after the war.¹⁹¹

3. Dealing with Sanctions

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and a subsequent annexation of Kuwait, claiming it as its 19th province, was a turning point for the country. This incident brought Iraq a set of problems, not only with its neighbors, but also worldwide. Among these problems were:

- Iraq's debts; Iraq's post 1990 Gulf War total liabilities are difficult to determine accurately because the Baath government did not publish any official information.
- Economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations. These sanctions caused the Iraqi government to exhaust its reserves and temporarily put a stop to its development programs.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰According to an official at the Kuwaiti Embassy, Washington D.C. stated that, Kuwait and other Gulf States waived all Iraqi debts to their countries. He also added "The Gulf States in general and Kuwait in particular gave monetary aid to many Arab countries over the years. Never the less, none of these countries have attempted to pay their creditors, nor did the oil Gulf States ask for reimbursement.

¹⁹¹Badr Ahmed Abdel Ali, Al-Siassa Al-Dawliya (Al-Ahram Press, 1992), pp. 100-116.

¹⁹²Voice of America, 15 January 1992. Mr. Tarik Azziz said: "We will immediately after the war, repair our damages. And then upon lifting sanctions we will continue to build new projects." With oil revenues the outlook for new developments in the country is promising.

Economic sanctions have a tremendous effect on the population. They impose a grave hardship on many innocent Iraqi citizens, many of whom are already suffering from food and medicine shortages.

Baghdad Radio on 22 April 1992, . . . the government said that shortage of medication, vaccines and basic food supplies brought by the United Nations sanctions, are causing the deaths of children by measles, other diseases, and starvation.¹⁹³

A recent study done by Gary Clyde and Jeffery Schott of the Institute for International Economics concluded that more often than not economic sanctions are ineffective. Their study revealed that governments have used economic sanctions 108 times since 1914. Yet, in only 39 cases were sanctions considered successful and the governments that imposed them made progress towards a stated goal of foreign policy. The most interesting part of the study shows,

Sanctions that work have usually been short, sharp shocks. Time allows the target to adjust to its new economic surroundings.¹⁹⁴

Therefore, if sanctions are to be enforced, patient and tight blockades are a prerequisite to this policy. Meanwhile, prior to sanctions, oil in Iraq had provided

¹⁹³Voice of America, 23 April 1992.

¹⁹⁴Gary Clyde Huflauer and Jeffery Schott, "When Sanctions Make Sense," The Economist, 3 August 1989, p. 59.

the country with needed currency. Some of this currency was hidden or invested abroad. Through leakage, the government can continue to withstand sanctions imposed by the U.N. and retain some support among the masses.

Jawad Hashim, former Hussein financial adviser in 1977, explained to White House officials, that one of the Baathi schemes was to save billions of dollars in foreign banks.

The money was to be held outside Iraq in Swiss banks. The Baath Party wanted to accumulate sufficient funds, held abroad, to be used to finance their return to power in the event the party was ousted by a coup, or if the country was invaded."¹⁹⁵

In a country like Iraq, with a centralized economy and tight restrictions on imports, consumption and distribution of goods and products, are being monitored. This will allow Iraq to withstand a long period of economical sanctions. Economic sanctions, driven by Baathi actions under Saddam, do

¹⁹⁵Ibid. Hashim calculated that this fund might now total over \$31 billion. Also see David Ignatius, "The Hunt of Hussein's Stash of Cash," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 4 May 1992, p. 9. Some officials believe that a network of hidden assets continues to keep the Baathi regime afloat. R. Richard Newcomb, the director of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, warned Baathi leaders continue to have assets outside the country that are very difficult to find or trace, despite the effort of western intelligence and private detectives hired by the Kuwaiti government. The Baathi government's intention is to use these hidden assets to carry out secret Iraqi financial activities and rebuild its arms-and-technology infrastructure upon the lifting of U.N. economic sanctions. CIA officials add this money can be used to counter the effect of U.N. sanctions. Although, it is sufficient towards rebuilding Iraq's economic base.

not necessarily reduce power or support. On the contrary, Saddam and his Baathi regime are viewed as true heroes for standing up to the West.¹⁹⁶ To the people of Iraq, the U.S. bombed their homes, killed their relatives, and starved their children. Meanwhile, the Baath's pot of gold and its untraceable cash flow are used to repair war damages by "western infidels".

Every bar of gold out of the Iraqi Central Bank of Reserves used to pay for the import of grain and medicine helps to retain support among the masses. Continuation of economic sanctions against Iraq will eventually threaten to bankrupt its Treasury Department. At this point, it is difficult to predict whether the masses will continue to support their government after it exhausts all its reserves to feed them.

4. Enhancing Military Capabilities: Iraq's Ballistic Missile Program¹⁹⁷

Baathis generally refer to the appeal of Iraq's military high tech modern equipment such as the ballistic missile program, as indicative of what the country achieved under their leadership. On every anniversary date of the Baathi revolution in Iraq, Saddam Hussein and his Baathi comrades take great pride in

¹⁹⁶Al-Thawra, 20 March 1992, p. 6. Iraqis demonstrated their pride by refusing to sell \$1.6 billion in oil, as allowed by the United Nations, to purchase food and medical supplies.

¹⁹⁷This subsection is a combined effort by the author and Lieutenant Mike Greenwood, USN. Some of the information provided here can also be found in LT. Greenwood's "Iraq's Ballistic Missile Program", (unpublished paper, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA. 1992).

presenting Iraq's military power during their military parades. On 30 July 1989, an Egyptian correspondent reports,

. . . tanks, fighter jets, and an impressive array of Iraqi manufactured weapons, including anti-tank and surface-to surface missiles were presented on the Baathi revolution day in Baghdad.¹⁹⁸

The former Soviets, motivated by Cold War politics and seeking more influence in the Middle East, began exporting ballistic missiles to the region in the 1960's. Iraq received its first ballistic missiles in 1969 with the receipt of the FROG-7, a solid-fueled rocket with a range of 150 Km. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the USSR sold the larger and more sophisticated R-17E to Iraq.¹⁹⁹ These missiles are best known by their NATO designator SCUD-B.

Iraq's ballistic missile inventory remained steady until the start of the Iran-Iraq War.²⁰⁰ Because Tehran was 600 km from the Iraqi border, it remained well

¹⁹⁸Ahmed Sobhi, El-Mosawer, 1 August 1988, p. 2. The article discussed some of the most developed weapons for that year. Scud B and Condor 2 were what impressed the author the most. Also, Saddam's speech was geared towards justifying his excessive military build up. He stated, "The security of the Gulf of Basra (Arabian Gulf) is the sole responsibility of the Arabs. Iraq is developing its programs to stand against any foreign aggression".

¹⁹⁹Steven Zaloga, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," International Defense Review, November 1988, p. 1425. At Iraq's request, the Soviets shipped approximately thirty-six R-17E missiles.

²⁰⁰Zaloga, p. 1424. On 8 October 1980, Iraq fired three FROG-7's at Dezful, Iran and began the slow buildup which eventually escalated into the most significant ballistic missile exchange in history.

outside of the range of the Iraq Scuds. This angered the Iraqi leadership. Unable to acquire a still longer-range missile from the Soviet Union, Iraq's defense industry began to develop its own ballistic missile capability. Bent on striking directly at Tehran, Iraq joined forces with Egypt and Argentina, and began a program to build a long range ballistic missile.²⁰¹

Iraq greatly expanded its military power base, putting an end to its long eight year war with its neighboring country, Iran.

The Iraqi missiles had a devastating effect, mainly psychological, and played a major role in bringing forward the Iranian decision to accept a ceasefire in July 1988.²⁰²

By the 1990 Gulf War, the Iraqi ballistic missile inventory included three operational missiles systems and nine more under development.²⁰³

²⁰¹Seth W. Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, "Iraq's al-Husayn Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May, 1990, pp. 204-207. The goal, which came to be known as Project 124, was to modify the Scud-B to increase its range, i.e. "al-Hussein and al-Abbas". The long term solution, the second and third approach, was to develop a new long range missile. The Iraqis preferred to develop a completely indigenous ballistic missile system, i.e. Fahd. As a contingency in the event the indigenous program failed, the Iraqis participated in developing a new ballistic missile program with Argentina and Egypt, i.e. Condor-2.

²⁰²Adel Darwish, and Gregory alexander, Unholy Babylon: the Secret History of Saddam's War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 87.

²⁰³Karp, pp. 385-386. Operational missile systems are, the FROG-7, Scud-B, and al-Hussein. Missiles under development are, the Laith, Nissan, Kassir, Baraq, Fahd, Al-Abbas, Condor-2, Tammuz-1, and Al-Abed.

When the United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan signed an agreement in 1983 to restrict the supply of missile-related technology to the third world, the threat of ballistic missile proliferation was widely acknowledged.²⁰⁴ In the spring of 1989, the Director of Central Intelligence, William Webster, warned that at least 15 third world countries will be manufacturing ballistic missiles by the twenty first century.²⁰⁵ This trend is best exemplified by the Iraqi ballistic missile program. Additionally, the Bush administration has publicly shown concern over countries acquiring mass destruction weapons;

In spite of our best efforts to control the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, more nations - - more, not less - - are acquiring weapons of mass destruction - - and the means to deliver them. Right now, 20 countries have the capacity to produce chemical weapons. And by the year 2000, as many as 15 developing nations could have their own ballistic missiles. In the future, even conflicts we once thought of as limited or local may carry far - reaching consequences.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴This agreement, which was publicly announced on 16 April 1987, is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

²⁰⁵Karp, p. 372.

²⁰⁶Remarks by President Bush to the Aspen Institute symposium, the White House Office of the Press Secretary, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August, 1990. Also see Martin Navias, Adelphi Papers 252: Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World, (London: Brassey's IISS, 1990), p. 7. By January 1990, twenty one developing nations possessed ballistic missiles. "Warheads Traced," The Herald, 1 May 1992, p. 2A. Several nuclear warheads vanished from the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazkhstan. The report further indicates that Iran has obtained at least two nuclear warheads which were reported missing from Kazakhstan. This raises the question about whether the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States will be able to control their most dangerous weapons.

Iraq's ballistic missile program prior to the 1990 Gulf War had suffered a minor set back. On September 1989, a huge explosion destroyed Al-Hillah missile solid-fuel plant killing seven hundred people.²⁰⁷ From 1986, until the spring of 1991, Iraq made a phenomenal leap forward in developing an indigenous ballistic missile capability.²⁰⁸ Using all means available, Iraq acquired the necessary technology and expertise, and forged a successful, albeit primitive, missile program. For three decades, ballistic missiles symbolized the technical achievement and military powers of the most technologically advanced nations, while less developed nations could only obtain these jewels at the bequest of the superpowers.

The Baathis in Baghdad developed their ballistic missiles to enhance national prestige and confront perceived security threats. The national prestige bestowed upon Iraq as a nation which harnessed the scientific and technical disciplines necessary for a successful ballistic missile program can be parlayed into a

²⁰⁷Many Egyptian technicians lost their lives in this explosion. It took the Iraqis months to recover from the explosion. Despite heavy press coverage of the incident, no alarm was raised and western governments did nothing to pressure Baghdad. See Darwish and Alexander, p. 90.

²⁰⁸In 1988, the Iraqi government announced their successful development in the preliminary tests of a second modified version of the Scud-B missile, designated Al-Abbas, with a war head of 300kg and range exceeding 900km. In 1989, Iraq launched a three-stage rocket designed to carry a satellite, designated Tammuz-1, launched from the space center Al-Anbar. In December of the same year, the government of Iraq announced their successful testing of Al Aabed with a range of 2000 km. Again in November of 1990, the Iraqi government announced their successful test of Al Hijara at the Iraqi test range in Mauritania with a maximum range of 2000 km. See Darwish and Alexander, p. 91.

heightened regional status and a successful achievement of national political agendas.²⁰⁹ In addition, the Iraqi government declared that its ballistic missile program's purpose is to deter aggressions from potential enemies.²¹⁰

Success of the Baathi ballistic missile program surprised not only the American administration, but most Western intelligence agencies which claimed to be unaware of the existence of this program until the missiles started to hit targets deep in Iran.²¹¹ Former Secretary of State George Schultz and CIA Director William Webster, claimed that Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal and its

²⁰⁹Navias, pp. 10-11.

²¹⁰Rachel Schmidt, U.S. Export Control Policy and the Missile Technology Control Regime, (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1990), p. 6. Third World nations on the course of ballistic missile development perceive a regional rival. This is validated by the fact that ballistic missile proliferation is most intense in regions with traditional conflicts: China-India, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, Argentina-Brazil, Greece-Turkey, South Korea-North Korea, Israel-Syria, and Iraq-Iran-Israel. Moreover, Syria and Egypt fired on Israel in the October 1973 War, while Iran and Iraq pounded each other with ballistic missiles in the Iran-Iraq war. In the recent Gulf War, Iraq fired approximately 68 Scud-B's and variants at Israel and Saudi Arabia.

²¹¹Carus and Bermudez, p. 207. Also see Darwish and Alexander, pp. 88-130. In 1987, Israel passed photographs and information to the CIA on Iraq's development of Condor-2. In November 1988, the United States confronted the German leader Chancellor Helmut Kohl, with information and satellite photographs "which provided irrefutable evidence of participation by West German companies in the Iraqi missile programme". Britain became aware of the main Iraqi missile research and development center (Saad 16, located outside Mosul in the north of the country) in December 1989. The huge explosion of Al-Hillah missile solid-fuel plant was reported in detail by the British "Independent on Sunday" paper. In May 1990, when Iraq lacked the space for its long-range missiles trails, they began to construct missile test facilities in Mauritania. This information emanated from the U.S. whose satellites detected early stages of construction work in a remote part of the country.

long-range missiles tipped the balance of power in the Middle East to the Arabs.²¹² Iraqis under their Baathi leadership began experiencing a revolution in military capability and domestic weapon system development.

C. THE ROOTS OF REGIONAL AMBITIONS

This section discusses the Baath Party structure, in particular its hierarchy, and party programs, in order to show that its programs and ideology will continue to polarize and divide the Arabs among themselves.

1. Arab nationalism in Baathi perspective

From the conception of the Baathi movement, the founding fathers called for the awakening of the Arab consciousness, and based the foundation of their doctrine on an Arab nationalistic ideology. Michael Aflaq wrote,

The party was named the Arab Resurrection party not only because it was the first party to believe, ideologically and practically, in Arab unity, and to place its organization on a universal Arab foundation, but also because it believed that any view point or remedy of the vital difficulties of the Arabs, either in party or in toto, which does not emanate from the axiom 'The

²¹²Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R. Rosenberger, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), pp. 48-78. Schultz told an audience in San Francisco in October 1988, that his worst nightmare was the combination of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the hands of a country with a terrorist history. Although the Iraqi Army was badly defeated in the 1990 Gulf War, American military officials described this Army and in particular its Republican Guard as "The lean-mean army."

Unity of the Arab People' is an erroneous out look and an injurious cure.²¹³

The founding fathers called for Arab nationalism. This ideology is deeply embodied in the Iraqi Baath Constitution and can be easily noticed within speeches by its leaders. The following quote, is out of Iraq's Constitution,

One Arab Nation with an immortal mission, the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party, a popular National Revolutionary Movement striving for Arab unity, freedom and socialism.²¹⁴

Other Arab leaders had established almost similar nationalistic movements. From the Baathi perspective, these movements were not founded on Arab unity as an instrument of struggle against any form of foreign domination. Instead it

²¹³S.N. Mehdi, "Baathist Syria and Iraq: A comparative approach, an outline of political history," Islamic Revolution, December 1981, p. 6.

²¹⁴Baath doctrine number one, p. 1. also see S.N. Mehdi. p. 6.

was based on personal gains.²¹⁵ To the Baathis of Iraq, this is what differentiates their movement from any other in the Middle East.

The Iraqi Baath Party is universal, founded on the unity of the Arab people. Additionally, it uses this ideal of unity not as a self-centered goal but as a simultaneous struggle against foreign domination, particularly Western, as well as achieving other political goals such as freedom and socialism.²¹⁶ The Baathis of Iraq have a strong distrustful view towards Western nations, which can be easily discovered in earlier Baathi doctrine. Aflaq stated,

The philosophies and teachings that come from the West, invade the Arab mind and steal his loyalty before they rob him of his land and skies [emphasis added]. We want a unified nationalist programme of education that derives its roots from the particularities of the Arab nation, the spirit of its past, and the needs of its future. It should preserve loyalty to the Arab homeland and the Arab cause without sharing in this venture any other homeland or cause.²¹⁷

²¹⁵Iraqi Baath Party document, has no author nor a title. It was presumably published by the Iraqi government. This party document was a mandatory article to study for Baathis with the rank of *Nasir Mutaqaddim*. The author procured this copy in 1980, while attending the Arabian Gulf Academy, Basra, Iraq. Hereafter, this book will be referred to as Baath doctrine number two. In page 240, this book conducts a comparative analysis of the federation between Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya. It gives a conclusion which includes that unity during Nasser's regime was based on Nasser expanding his personal power base to other countries. Meanwhile, Sadat's ultimate goal was to only save his country and its disheveled economy.

²¹⁶Baath doctrine number two, p. 45. Universal meant any Arab whether individual or a group, could become a Baathi member and a participant in policy making through the party hierarchy institutions, even though his or their government did not.

²¹⁷Samir al-Khalil, p. 193.

However, as previously discussed in "Inter-Arab politics", unification in the Arab world will continue to be a dream. The division among the Arabs will keep this dream far from reach.

Baathis defined Arab nationalism as love, no matter what the person's faith or beliefs. Jews, Christians, or Muslims, their love of the Arab nation is what is important. Love comes first, nationhood follows second. Aflaq was single minded about passion, love, and faith. He articulated in many of his speeches that the foundation of his work and the roots of the Baath goals is faith. This faith is not the faith and love of God, but the faith of the Arab people in uniting and building their nation.²¹⁸ It's the spirit that gathers all Arabs together. It is the Arab spirit, a pure faith and trust that has no ties to any specific emotion. Arab spirit is an idea of endless existence. Something that was, is, and always will be there.

To constitute a nation means, in Baathi doctrine, to form a society with a social order. Love, spirit, or faith between participants must be present. While the former factors are not goals to Baathism, they are a precondition for nation building. Arabism to the Baathis is a body and its spirit is Islam. Through the force of this spirit pan-Arabism can resurrect. Aflaq called for Arabs to be like the prophet Muhammad. Yet, Aflaq opposed that this prophet should be preaching the love of God. Those who choose to follow will learn about the Arab

²¹⁸Ibid. , p. 191.

spirit, because through it they will develop faith, practicing nationalism and forming unity.

The Baath ideology was based and founded on a similar moral order of all religions in the Middle East. This ideology was clearly defined and expressed in a simple way that the regional natives were already knowledgeable about. Yet, Aflaq put emphasis on Islam by choosing the prophet as the example to follow. On the contrary, conversion to Islam is not required in order to join the party.

There is an absolute separation of religion and state in the Iraqi Baath Party, which adds to the list of differences between Baathis and other movements within many Arab Islamic countries whose constitutions declare Islam as a state religion. Aflaq explains that,

The Arabs do not want their nationalism to be religious because religion has another aspect, one which does not bind the nation but which, on the contrary divides a single people, although there is no fundamental difference between the religions. Islam must now conform to Arabism rather than shaping it as it did in the early days of Islam. Islam in a sense ended as a moral and unifying influence among the Arabs when it spread beyond the pale and included non-Arabs.²¹⁹

²¹⁹S.N. Mehdi, p. 6. In contrary to Aflaq's view on Islam, Professor Said while teaching National Security course, NS 4300, "Islamic Civilization," compiled much information on Islam. Many revealed that prophet Mohammed indicated to his companions and followers, "only through Islam can we unite, though we will continue to live as separate nations."

Aflaq, acknowledged the major role Islam plays in Arab life. Yet, he assigned to it a minor position, because the Baath comes first.

Islam was an element in Arab nationalism yet . . . it must subordinate itself to the secular nationalist movement. In other words, Arab nationalism would replace Islam as a motivating force within the Arab nation.²²⁰

To many Moslems, it is very difficult to understand the concept of following the prophet as an Arab ideal, especially when they would not be permitted to learn or preach about Islam. To Christian Arabs, pan-Arabism as defined by Aflaq and his supporters is a threat to their Christianity.²²¹

The Baath Party has taken aggressive steps towards formatting a secular course for a secular party, among natives embodied with sacred thoughts and traditions. To some extent, Islam is an inseparable phenomenon within Arab culture. In some Arab countries, it is a religion where the foundation of many political issues is made upon.

For many years, Moslems and Christians have been fighting and killing one another in southern Egypt. Many Islamic factions continue to shape policies in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and the GCC states. Lebanon is still divided between

²²⁰S.N. Mehdi, p. 7.

²²¹Professor Said, 23 May 1992. He also added that Aflaq was converted to Islam a couple years prior to his death. His son joined Islam and was re-named Abdullah.

Moslem and Christian factions. Iraq has the majority Shiite resuming their struggle against the oligarchic Sunnis. And, King Fahd and King Hussein are now competing to pay all expenses for renovation and maintenance for the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. All are examples that proves religion can not be excluded in the Arab world. Nation building as defined by the Baath doctrine is unacceptable in the Middle East, and will continue to polarize and divide the Arabs among themselves.

2. Iraq: Socialist and Racist.

a. *Socialism*

"One Arab nation", is the Baath's primary concern, and socialism is the type of economic and welfare system of this unified nation. Iraq's constitution describes socialism as a system which will give strength to the Arab economy and will increase the populace's productivity.²²² Aflaq states,

Socialism means that all citizens should share in their country's resources with the intention that they better their lives and consequently the life of their nation, because man does not accept his rendering of himself as an end in life.²²³

²²²Baath doctrine number two, p. 99.

²²³S.N. Mehdi. p. 7. Aflaq continues by explaining that there is no distinction between socialist and nationalist doctrine, they are "fused into one entity."

In spite of the Party slogan of socialism, the Baathi government's beginning years in Iraq made an all-out effort to obtain the support of Iraqi businessmen.²²⁴ They developed the state and the private sector bilaterally. However, the Baathis of Baghdad ensured ownership would be limited and proportional to what a person could use and trade. It is clearly stated in many Baathi publications that, capitalism and Communism are not solutions to the Arab's economic problems.

The latter in particular can not be successful in the Arab nation. The reason is that socialism has two differences with communism.

Communism is an international ideology and strives to carry out worldwide revolution, and that until it does so, it cannot carry out its economic plans adequately. For this reason communist countries are restricted by this goal and must constantly be prepared for war forcing them to practice "Bloc policy" with concomitant "help Imperialism" as a result. The second difference is between the spiritual and moral principles of Baath and the materialistic ideology of communism.²²⁵

Baathis view point on capitalism will not feed the hungry and clothe the naked. Only through socialism can Baathis wipe out aristocratic monarchies, which rule some Arab nations from generation to generation. Additionally, it can promote and free man's talents and abilities, increase productivity and bring

²²⁴Gordon Torrey, "The Baath ideology and practice," The Middle East Journal, 4 August 1969, p. 50.

²²⁵S.N. Mehdi. p. 7.

prosperity to the economy. The ultimate economic Baathi goal, is to have an economic system centralized and governmentally controlled by the National Command Council in Baghdad.

The Arab economic system is full of discrepancies in economic wealth, and there is a continual increase in the gap of the Gross National Product among the haves and have nots. To the rich Arab, socialism means liquidating their wealth and handing it down to the poor. Since the political structure among most rich oil producing countries is a conservative monarchy regime, Baath socialism is a time bomb. This bomb enhances the chance of insecurity and instability of many governments in the Middle East which are of a vital interest to the United States.

b. Racism

Iraq is a country that was described by Drysdale and Blake in The Middle East and North Africa, as "Both a linguistically and religiously diverse state."²²⁶ Although the authors emphasize the problems of the Kurdish population, Iraq has many other oppressed minority groups.²²⁷ However, the

²²⁶Alasdair Drysdale, and Gerald H. Blake, The Middle East and North Africa, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 161. The greatest obstacle to Iraq's unity has been the cleavage between the Arab majority and the Kurdish-speaking minority population. The Kurds number about 20 percent of the total population. To ensure permanent government control over Kurdish areas, the regime destroyed dozens of Kurdish villages, established non-Kurdish zones and began mass mobilization of Kurds from northern to southern Iraq.

²²⁷Interview with Professor Joseph Kallu, Defense Language Institute, Monterey California, 23 May 1992. These minority groups are: Assyrians,

Iraqi government was able to garner Arab support for its oppressive measures against only one minority group. This group initially was the Jewish community in Baghdad; latter it included the state of Israel. Almost every official Baathi doctrine the author has studied includes a chapter or a subsection on the state of Israel and its existence in the Middle East.

Baathis believed it is necessary to create an external enemy in Israel in order to revive the pan-Arab movement. Israel was chosen because Baathis strongly confirm that Palestine is an Arab land and will continue to be part of the "One Arab Nation." Yet, this land was forcefully occupied by Israel in 1948, as was the rest of the Occupied Arab Territories in 1967. According to the Baath doctrine, the legitimacy of the Palestinians to their land is mainly based on history, where they continue to inhabit this part of the world since the seventh century C.E. Although the ancient Hebrew Kingdoms did exist in Palestine many years ago, it is unjustifiable to establish a Jewish state in Palestine in the twentieth century, particularly since the Jews chose willingly to live in exile.²²⁸ The Baath Party's theory of the Jewish claim to Palestine contradicts real historical and religious beliefs which Ms. Gerner presented in her book, One Land, Two Peoples.

For many Zionists, the Jewish claim to the land of Palestine is based on the history of the Hebrew tribes who intermittently lived in and occasionally

Armenians, Turkuman, Sabeans, Chaldeans, Failys, Yazidis, Shiites and Jews.

²²⁸Baath book number two, p. 149.

ruled this land from the second millennium B.C. until their expulsion from Jerusalem by the Romans in 135 C.E. Furthermore, according to the Bible, this land was promised to the Hebrew people and their descendants by their tribal god, Yahweh, in a covenant with the Prophet Abraham in the seventeenth century B.C. As reported in Genesis 15:18 Yahweh told the Hebrew people: "To your descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates."²²⁹

Additionally, Baathis explain, it was Europeans (Eastern and Western), who oppressed and murdered the Jewish people. They were the ones who treated Jews as second and third class citizens. Today, neither Europe nor the United States has any right to put an end to the Jewish diaspora by creating a Jewish state in the midst of the Arab World.²³⁰

Baathis warned in their training books that Arabs are not taking the existence of the Zionist state seriously. They emphasized the danger of the Jewish political ambition and its expansion in the Middle East. This danger is described as the "unescapable destiny".²³¹ If what was revealed in Genesis 15:18 is correct, then it is clear that the Zionist plan of occupying Palestine was never their sole target. Instead, the Zionist's ultimate political as well as religious goals are to

²²⁹Deborah J. Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict Over Palestine, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 3.

²³⁰Baath book number two, p. 150.

²³¹Ibid.

extend their state to the Nile of Egypt and the Euphrates of Iraq.²³² This expansion will not be done peacefully, but through conspiracy among many divided Arabs, violence, and mass bloodshed.

The Baathis, who once placed their anger on the British for their invasion, are now placing it on Israel and Jews. By fueling their distrust and anger towards the Jews, they are attempting to keep the possible expansion of the Zionist State a constant thought on Arab minds as well as keeping the pan-Arab movement alive and moving forward. To keep the Jewish state from expanding and the Arab movement growing, a peaceful strategy is not likely.

The non-Zionist sociologist Gumplowicz, in a letter to Herzl prior to the establishment of the Israeli state, wrote:

You want to find a state without bloodshed? Where did you ever see that? Without violence and without guile, simply by selling and buying shares.²³³

²³²This is the official Iraqi Baathi view, or at least what the government of Iraq stresses to its citizens. See Baath book number two, p. 155.

²³³Walter Z. Laqueur, "The unseen question," Gordon Levin, ed. The Zionist Movement in World Politics, 1800-1900, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Press, 1972), p. 245.

Baathis add that Gumpowicz was correct. Israel expanded through buying land in Palestine or using force in the occupied land. Moreover, Baathis promote Nasser's theory that "What was taken by force, can only be regained by force."

Israel is a Jewish state by the nature of the country's name. From the brink of its existence, the Zionist plan was to transform the Jewish minority to a dominating majority in Palestine. Hundreds of illegal settlements, and thousands of settlers exist today in the Occupied land. Yet, consensus by settlers was summarized in their new slogan: "Behityashvut lo dai"; Settlement is not enough.²³⁴

The Baath Party reluctantly opposes any type of negotiation with Israeli officials. In November 1976, Iraq hosted an "International Symposium on Zionism." This conference was attended by representatives from 46 countries. According to reporters,

Zionism was baked, boiled, fried and roasted in an unrelenting ideological tirade.²³⁵

²³⁴Baathi View, p.15.

²³⁵"Iraq: Centuries of Conflict in the Garden of Eden," The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs, 3rd ed. (September 1977), p. 36.

Tarik Aziz stated in May 1977,

The Arab nation can afford to struggle for many years against Zionists and still live well.²³⁶

Saddam Hussein in an interview in the same month stated,

We will never recognize the right of Israel to live as a separate Zionist state.²³⁷

Baathis tend to emphasize how vital it is to every Israeli government to protect the "integrity of the Whole Land of Israel," and that there is no future for the Zionist State in the Middle East as long as there are continuous Arab

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷ibid.

demands for their destruction.²³⁸ Tarik Aziz stated, in the 1990 RCC annual ceremonial opening in Baghdad,

. . . there is no chance that Israel will ever be able to give up a millimeter from any of its Arab Occupied Land. Arabs must be aware that whatever illegitimate Zionists ancient religious historical ties they claim to have, does carry tremendously emotional weight. It also increases the religious and political legitimacy among Israelis to the land (Palestine). Settlements continue to be established beyond the green line. Israeli maps referred to the Arab Occupied Land as area within the Zionist State municipal boundaries. . . if Syria, Jordan, or any other Arab country are willing to join Egypt, officially recognize the Zionist State and open peaceful dialogue with it, they may do so. They will be only fooling themselves. Because the Israeli government will not change its foreign policy towards the Arab Lands. Finally, . . . without Arab unity, then utilizing force against, and imposing pressure on the Israeli government it will be impossible to negotiate land for peace with any Zionist prime minster.²³⁹

²³⁸Baath doctrine number two, p. 162. Although Prime Minister Menachem Begin astonished the world by returning Sinai to Egypt, it indeed contributed to his resignation. Arthur Hertzberg, "Israel and the West Bank," Foreign Affairs, (Current News special edition, August 1983), p. 7. Menachem Begin resigned in 1970 from Golda Meir's cabinet when the latter accepted U.N. Resolution 242, which supported the return of Arab territories in the occupied land to Arab control. Additionally he said "Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel, all of it, and forever". Also see, Ian S. Lustick, "Israeli politics and American foreign policy," Foreign Affairs, (Current News special edition), 15 March 1983, p. 3. Begin dramatically affirmed his devotion to the cause. At a large campaign rally in Ariel, a new settlement erected in the heart of a heavily populated district in the West Bank he declared: "I, Menachem, the son of Ze'ev and Hasia Begin, do solemnly swear that as long as I serve the nation as prime minister, we will not leave any part of Judea, Smaria, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights."

²³⁹Baath doctrine number two, p. 219.

The Baathi government declared on several occasions that their position on Israeli settlements is derived from the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Land (1907),

... any "permanent" settlement to be, ipso facto, illegal. According to the High Court's interpretation of the convention land for settlements cannot be "expropriated" but only temporarily "requisitioned" as required, not for political or ideological purpose, but for vital military needs. The Hague Convention also prohibits a wide range of settlement related activities in occupied areas.²⁴⁰

Iraq, a country which is crowded with minority groups, has no room for equality. Moreover, its Baathi government is rooted with racism. Khairallah Tulfah, Saddam's uncle and a high ranking member in the party said at a party convention, "Three whom God should not have created: Persians, Jews and flies."²⁴¹ Khairallah defined Persians as animals God created in the shape of humans. Jews, in his view, were a mixture of the dirt and leftovers of diverse people, while flies, the least appalling of the three, were trifling creatures."²⁴²

These comments made by Iraqi officials reveal the roots of reluctance in their government, to participate in any future recognition of the State of Israel.

²⁴⁰Ian S. Lustick, "Israeli politics and American foreign policy," Foreign Affairs, (Current News special edition), 15 March 1983, p. 14

²⁴¹Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), p. 264.

²⁴²Efraim Karsh, and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, 1st ed. (London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991), p. 15.

Meanwhile, despite the unbending position the Baath regime has towards Israel, the Iraqi government once pledged signing a peace treaty with Israel in conjunction with other Arab states.²⁴³ It seems that the Baathis view on the Israeli issue is not as central to their policies as they may attempt to convince the Iraqi citizens. Yet, it is important for expanding their influence among the people. Consequently, Israel has inherited the wrath once directed at the British, thus perpetuating the pan-Arab movement in Iraq. Just as it did years ago, pan-Arabism united Iraqis against an external enemy and was seen as a way of maintaining support for the Baathi government.

²⁴³Interview with Professor Glenn Robinson, Middle East Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 15 July 1992. "In 1988, Saddam Hussein met with the U.S. Senator Robert Dole, in Baghdad and pledged to the U.S. administration Iraq's willingness to enter into a peace treaty with Israel within the context of given an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." Also see Al Majalla, 29 January 1991, p. 45. The magazine revealed that Saddam Hussein, prior to invading Kuwait suggested arranging a secret meeting between him and Yitzhak Rabin to discuss a possible peace treaty between Israel and Iraq. An unknown Iraqi businessman was arranging the details of this conference.

V. CONCLUSION

As discussed in chapter one, "American Interest in the Persian Gulf," the United States' oil interest is America's primary concern in the Persian Gulf. This interest would be more difficult and complicated to obtain without the United States' accessibility to the region. The United States Navy maintains a continuous carrier presence in the Indian Ocean. It also maintains amphibious ships carrying a contingent of approximately 1,800 Marines on board in the region. Yet, to drive 360,000 soldiers with 2,800 tanks and 1,400 artillery pieces out of any Gulf State, requires the United States to maintain air and land superiority.²⁴⁴ In this case the presence of the United States Navy alone might then be regarded as a helpless giant and the value of the United States commitment to ensure the free flow of oil would be questioned.

²⁴⁴Interview with William J. Flanagan Jr. Rear Admiral, USN. , Chief of Legislator Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 13 November 1991. Rear Admiral Flanagan added that maritime superiority is vital for an effective blockade policy. Yet, to win a war in the Persian Gulf by forcing the enemy to withdraw from any occupied land, the U.S. must establish a sophisticated Command and Control center to coordinate all offensive and defensive operations, and an integrated supply network to consolidate storage facilities, storage depots and ammunition dumps. Both require accessibility to friendly territory in the region. An offensive phase, must start with air campaign directed at the enemy's air defenses, airfields, missile sites, and scoring direct hits at the enemy's command, control and communication network. Consecutive operations should be guided towards the enemy's supply facilities. Yet, to achieve the policy of forcing the enemy out of any occupied land, and to dislodge hundreds of thousands of troops from dug in positions a ground campaign is a must. Extensive air fire followed by a ground campaign is the only solution to dig the enemy out of their bunkers.

The United States, by the nature of its position as the ultimate superpower, will always intervene in Middle Eastern affairs. However, inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict are major threats that will always jeopardize America's national objectives in the region. Those threats (inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict) are serious enough for the U.S. to intervene militarily in order to safeguard its interests, and provide regional stability.

America's foreign policy makers could draft resolutions and force policies to temporarily resolve inter-Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, through exploiting the Iraqi Baath ideology, the author discovered, that the present Baath regime in Iraq symbolizes the fuel that will continue to provide a source of energy to the before mentioned threats in the region. Moreover, this regime is determined to maintain a strong government in Baghdad, be a vanguard for pan-Arabism, and become the mantle of Arab leadership in the Middle East.

The outcome of the 1990 Gulf War was a major setback to Iraq's armed forces. They lost thousands of soldiers and almost 50% of its huge military inventory.²⁴⁵ Additionally, Iraq's extensive stock piles of chemical and biological weapons, its ballistic missiles and its sophisticated uranium enrichment program were discovered by United Nations inspection teams. This resulted in Western

²⁴⁵For details of numbers and types of inventory retained by Iraq after the Gulf War see; Free Iraq, (January 1992), p. 3. The Military Balance, 1990-1991, pp. 101-102. And Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 309.

powers increasing the pressure on the Iraqi government to remove its technologically advanced mass-destruction weapons. Yet, Iraq is still not cooperating with the U.N. inspection teams in destroying its nuclear weapons, and fully disclosing all technology related to its mass destruction weapons.

The director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, said Iraq is therefore not in full compliance with the Security Council's Gulf War cease-fire resolution. The foreign ministers of six Persian Gulf nations, meeting yesterday in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, said the sanctions should be maintained until Iraq obeys all aspects of the U.N. resolutions.²⁴⁶

Present United Nations' actions against Iraq must be thoroughly reviewed, because the economic sanctions are taking their toll on the Iraqi people.

Officials stress the damage to health. Infant mortality has tripled since the war, partly for lack of medicines, and anesthetics are no longer used in dentistry or for the setting of broken bones. About half the population uses contaminated water.²⁴⁷

However, the government of Iraq is using building materials stockpiled before the war, and components that continue to slip through the embargo, in exchange for Iraqi petrol to rebuild the country. A report from Baghdad by a

²⁴⁶"U.N. : Iraq must Comply," The Herald, 4 June 1992, p. 2A. Those six Persian Gulf States are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

²⁴⁷"Building up Baghdad," The Economist, 16 May 1992, p. 56.

special correspondent to The Economist, confirms that 70% of its war damaged infrastructure is restored.

Foreign aid organizations inside Iraq broadly agree. Working three shifts a day, under floodlights at night, the Iraqis have pulled themselves up by their bootstraps. Of 134 bridges hit by bombs, 120 have been rebuilt. At night Baghdad blazes like a Christmas tree: electricity is said to be back from about 15% to 90% of the pre-war level. The city's telecommunications centers have been rebuilt, restoring telephone and telex communication with the outside world. . . . industrial output is around 60% of what it was. The Iraqi's . . . oil refining is back to two-thirds of the pre-war figure . . . Baghdad's streets are choked with traffic; taxis heading for Amman carry extra tanks, filled with cheap Iraqi petrol for sale across the border in Jordan."²⁴⁸

Obviously, the trade embargo on Iraq has devastated the country's economy but elicited no concessions from its leaders. On the contrary, President Saddam Hussein and his Baathi comrades are strengthening their political control of the country.²⁴⁹ If the embargo must continue, it should be re-evaluated, crack downs

²⁴⁸"Building up Baghdad," The Economist, 16 May 1992, p. 56. Meanwhile, the Baathis of Iraq are confident that they have thwarted their enemies' attempts to beat the country into the dust. Using "Baathi pride" tactics, they are motivating the people to rebuild war damages.

²⁴⁹Elaine Sciolino, "Reports indicate Saddam stronger than a year ago." Reprint of New York Times article in The Herald, 16 June 1992, p. 2A. Ms. Sciolino states, despite stringent economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq is stronger now than he was a year ago, according to a classified intelligence report that will be presented to President Bush and his chief aides. Saddam has begun to rebuild some of his country's infrastructure by importing goods from Jordan in violation of the U.N. mandated sanctions and by tapping into hidden Iraqi reserves . . . he is trying to reconstitute his military and is strengthening his political base by imposing more repressive mass on his

on leaky trade, and tougher measures should be enforced. Increased pressure on the government in Baghdad is a must, especially when it appears that the Baathi military-backed government in Iraq has defied international pressure to restore constitutional order.

Even when Saddam Hussein is no longer in power, this will not prevent the resurgence of another tyrant, or another Baathi leader who believes in Iraq becoming a military regional power.

If the Baath Party remains in power the count down for producing mass destruction weapons will begin again immediately after the United Nations inspectors complete their task in the country (Iraq).²⁵⁰

On the 15 of January 1991, the U.S. went to war and many people were killed. America and its coalition forces defeated, what was seen by many analysis prior to the Gulf war as "a lean, mean army".²⁵¹ An army that was considered by the Commander-in-Chief as the fourth largest army in the world.

population.

²⁵⁰Free Iraq, (April 1992), p. 1. Also see "Iraq will Destroy Weapons, but Won't Rule Out Rebuilding." Reprint of Washington Post article in The Herald, 16 March 1992, p. 2A. "Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said that while his government intends to co-operate with the United Nations in destroying Iraq's existing weapons of mass destruction, Baghdad will not repudiate its right to be a major military power and to build such weapons in the future."

²⁵¹A State Department issued a document in 1988 stating, ". . . Iraq had emerged from its eight year war with Iran as a great military and political power, and is aiming higher." See Elaine Sciolino, "New details emerge on U.S. Iraq policy." Reprint of New York Times article in The Herald, 7 June 1992, p. 18A.

Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military in the world.²⁵²

The United States liberated Kuwait, a country that very few Americans ever heard of or cared about before the war. Yet, Saddam Hussein is still in power.

The U.S., with its regional allies, is capable of ousting Saddam Hussein. Yet, the analysis provided in this thesis suggests that without fundamental changes in the Iraqi Baath regime, the 1990 Gulf War is unlikely to be the last conflict between Iraq and neighboring Gulf states. Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sheik Salem al-Sabah stated,

It is also the Iraqi Baath regime as well as Saddam Hussein who are fully responsible for the instability and the presence of foreign forces in the Persian Gulf.²⁵³

A country like Iraq, with a regime that wants to become a regional power and be the vanguard of pan-Arabism, may rise again sooner or later with other surprises that can jeopardize regional stability.

²⁵²President George Bush, "The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles," United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs Washington, D.C., (8 August 1990), Current Policy No. 1292.

²⁵³al-Majalla, August 1992, p. 16.

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