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THESIS

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY"
ON THE STRUCTURE AND MISSIONS OF THE FORMER
SOVIET NAVY
BY
Scott Michael Stanley
JUNE 1992
Thesis Advisor: James J. Tritten

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Assessing the Impact of "Reasonable Sufficiency" on the Structure and Missions of
the Former Soviet Navy

by

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B.A., St. John's University, 1982

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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


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
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ABSTRACT

Using content analysis of original writings and speeches by former Soviet military and political leaders, this paper ascertains the impact of the concept of **reasonable sufficiency for defense** on the former Soviet military in general, and its Navy in particular. The research begins with the era of reform initiated in 1985 and ends coincidental to the dissolution of the former USSR in December 1991. This review demonstrates that **reasonable sufficiency**, as a component of the new **defensive-defense** oriented Soviet military doctrine, significantly affected the organizational structure and assigned roles of the former Soviet maritime forces. The final chapter summarizes the historical aspects of **reasonable sufficiency** and projects the concept's future impact on the Russian Navy as the logical successor to the Soviet Navy. As the Russian Navy evolves from the roots of its predecessor, it will continue to play a viable role in the national defense of Russia. The influences of **reasonable sufficiency** on the Russian Navy will continue to be significant into the next century.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper attempts to ascertain past and future aspects of the impact of the concept of **reasonable sufficiency for defense** on naval force development as a basic tenet of the new Russian military doctrine. The author researched original source material of former Soviet military and political leaders as well as the writings of non-government Soviet officials in order to assess how significantly the above concept affected the evolution of former Soviet military forces during the age of reform initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev.

An historical analysis of the formation and subsequent implementation of new tenets to the Soviet military doctrine is conducted, beginning with the birth of the Gorbachev reform era in 1985 and ending with the dissolution of the Soviet state in December 1991. This period provided the researcher with a wealth of original source writings, speeches and interviews from which were drawn conclusions regarding the entire evolution of the concept of **reasonable sufficiency for defense**.

In 1987, the Soviet military doctrine was, in essence, redefined. It was refocused to reflect a more **defensive-defense** posture, stressing the necessity of preventing war between East and West. This new doctrine was conceived coincident with the onset of the era of *new thinking*, espoused by Gorbachev in 1986. One of the premier principles of the *new thinking* was the concept of **reasonable sufficiency**, which was itself legitimized by the 27th CPSU Congress, also in 1986.

In the process of attempting to make **reasonable sufficiency** a viable component of the new military doctrine, it underwent intense scrutiny and was the source of remarkable debates which arose among former Soviet intellectuals, both inside and external to the military establishment. As **reasonable sufficiency** grew in importance,

it attained definition in terms of its relevance to both the missions and structure of the Soviet Navy under the overall new military doctrine.

The reader is initially introduced to the above principle from its political conception through its acceptance *and* rejection by various sectors of Soviet society to its current status of implementation by the Russian government. Finally, the author projects the continued application of **reasonable sufficiency** to the Russian Navy as a viable component of their future role in supporting the maritime objectives of that country's national defense policy. Coincident with this future Russian assessment, the author concludes by attempting to show what possible influences might impact on future U.S. naval missions and force employment.

A major goal of this research is to determine the former Soviet Union's declaratory aspects of maritime-related strategy and doctrine. In lieu of actually possessing or having access to Soviet war plans, a reliance on unclassified statements by the Soviets was required in order to achieve this objective. A detailed usage of content analysis was therefore selected as the primary methodology utilized due to its inherent advantages when attempting to ascertain the *Soviet* view of **reasonable sufficiency** during the age of **perestroika**. Western views, while certainly valuable and in relative abundance, would have tended to insert a bias which could have tainted the conclusions of the research.

The author approached this study with a conscious attempt to minimize pre-conceived conclusions regarding the impact that **reasonable sufficiency** had on the restructuring process within the Soviet Navy. It would be unrealistic for the author to claim *absolute* rejection of personal bias, however, its reduction will have a more positive effect on the results of this study than had the attempt never been tried.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper will examine how the concept of *reasonable sufficiency*, as an element of the Soviet defensive doctrine, impacted on the role of the military in general and the Navy specifically during the Gorbachev era. This theme was chosen due to its central relevance in the great debates over formulating a truly defensive military doctrine and establishing a complementary force structure. Therefore, an examination of *reasonable sufficiency* allows us to capture a historical accounting which traces the reforms affecting the naval forces of the former Soviet Union. Given the magnitude of contemporary change occurring within the former republics, it is important for the U.S. Navy Intelligence community to be able to understand the recent history and process of military reform to enable better reasonable estimates of ongoing change.

It is not the intention of the researcher to approach this study by attempting to prove preconceived conclusions regarding the shape of future post-Soviet naval missions or maritime force structure. Due to the current political and social instability, to do so would be folly. Rather, it is the author's intent to collect and analyze such evidence which belies the possible direction and scope of military transition which is inarguably occurring within the former republics.

This study will limit its examination in terms of time, beginning with the impetus for reform established in 1985 and concluding with the dissolution of the Soviet state in December 1991. Conclusions will be supported and substantiated by evidence elicited by the methodology described below.

A. METHODOLOGY

Extraction of unclassified statements given by senior officials within the former Soviet civilian government and Ministry of Defense is one of three possible methods available when attempting to measure the impact of *reasonable sufficiency* as an element of the Soviet military doctrine. The two remaining methods involve:

1. researching the hardware employed by the subject of the study which translates directly into an examination of its military technical capabilities, and
2. an analytical assessment of the exercise and deployment activity unique to the subject.

The use of hardware analysis as a determinant of naval warfighting policy was minimized by the author due to the uncertainty involved in attempting to quantify recent and current nuclear and conventional force levels. Limited use of hardware analysis will be utilized to support or contradict what was being verbalized by original sources. The object of the content analysis methodology employed here is to determine what the original Soviet sources declare they will/will not do, not to measure their capabilities/incapabilities.

Analysis of deployment and exercise patterns was also not selected as the primary methodology. Continuous reduction of such activity has been in evidence since the mid-1980's. Such evidence by itself could lead to misleading conclusions, however, due to a simultaneous increase in technology which lessened the need for long out-of-area deployments and manpower/unit intense exercises.

This study will primary concern itself with studying the views of the political and military leadership of the former Soviet Union as expressed in their open-source writings, speeches, interviews, etc. as its primary methodology. A detailed examination of articles, books, speeches and media addresses by the political and military policy

makers over the period examined in this study is invaluable for allowing the author to examine the subject of this paper while minimizing preconceived conclusions regarding the impact that the principle of *reasonable sufficiency* had on the restructuring process within the Soviet military in general, and particularly, within the Navy. It would be unrealistic for the author to claim **all** rejection of bias, however, reduction of its impact will certainly have a more positive effect on the results of this study than had the attempt never been tried.

The research will concentrate on analysis of remarks originated by principles within three main groups: civilian, military (general), and Navy leaders. Use of ideas formulated by non-defense specialists and military junior officers will be minimized, particularly in the initial stages of this project. This is an attempt to remain consistent with traditional (*pre-glasnost'*) Soviet emphasis on political democratic centralism and military centralized control and therefore, consideration of minority views should not be considered commensurate with those of recognized policymakers. The author concedes that such is no longer the case, particularly with regards to Russia.

A major goal of this research is to determine the former Soviet Union's declaratory aspects of maritime-related strategy and doctrine. In lieu of actually possessing or having access to Soviet war plans, a reliance on unclassified statements by the Soviets was required in order to achieve this objective.

It should be noted that wherever direct quotes are utilized, the author has italicized certain phrases or keywords in order to draw attention to the fact that they contain concepts of topical significance to the discussion, in no case in this study is such usage part of the original statement. Additionally, focusing on keyword/phraseology may be invaluable in that some Russian vocabulary does not necessarily have an exact English translation and therefore, any potential confusion between the meaning of the original Russian and its English translation will be identified where applicable.

The author has trained as a Russian linguist but conducted his research primarily using translations. This was done due to a greater availability of source materials in English and previous studies which demonstrate that content analysis may be successfully completed using such materials. [Ref. 1]

The author understands that there exists a tension between traditional Russian linguists/area specialists and behaviorist/quantitative analysts who utilize formal content analysis but use translators. With the dissolution of the USSR, many traditional Russian linguists/area specialists find it necessary to use translators as well, since original material is no longer strictly being produced in Russian. A lack of proficiency in say, Ukrainian, would necessitate such a requirement.

Finally, in analyzing original material, the researcher will attempt to discriminate between data which was originated for domestic vice external consumption, as well as the transition between latent themes and those which ultimately became topical in direct discussion.

B. "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY" AND THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE

The Twenty-Seventh Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress was a watershed in the course of historical change regarding the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). When the Congress convened in February 1986, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had been at the helm of political power for nearly ten months and had made significant inroads in implementing his social, political, economic and military reforms.

The 27th Party Congress would be used by Gorbachev as a forum for promoting his view that the USSR, indeed the entire world, had entered an era of "new political

thinking” which demanded “new, bold approaches . . . and a sharpened awareness of responsibility for the destiny of the peoples . . .”. [Ref. 2]

Gorbachev projected an image of a world brought to the brink of military confrontation as the result of a spiraling super-power arms race which required immediate cessation. This could only be achieved, he believed, through significant nuclear arms reductions to the point of *reasonable sufficiency*. That is, a reduction in levels of military arms sufficient to those deemed necessary in order to ensure stability and international security. He utilized the 27th Party Congress as an opportunity to introduce this concept and from that moment its theme was echoed repeatedly in the words of Soviet leaders within and outside the military establishment. The impact *reasonable sufficiency* would have on the military in general, and the Navy specifically, was restated by Gorbachev himself throughout the remainder of his tenure as the chief Soviet leader. For example, in 1987 he stated that the idea of *military sufficiency*

“presupposes such a structure of the Armed Forces . . . that they would be sufficient for the conduct of offensive actions.” [Ref. 3]

Throughout his first months in office, Gorbachev embarked on a process which almost immediately led to an open debate within and outside of the Soviet military regarding policy, C2, and administrative restructuring. *Glasnost*’ enabled the conduct of more open discourse in some Soviet domestic circles which ultimately resulted in certain aspects of traditional soviet military doctrine being no longer applicable. Long-held, dominant themes were questioned as the subject of military doctrine was laid against the framework of “new thinking” and *reasonable sufficiency*.

Simply stated, Soviet military doctrine was undergoing radical revision. In The Twentieth Party Congress had proclaimed in 1956 that war with the capitalist countries was no longer inevitable but the strong possibility remained that the West would

initiate surprise confrontation, given the opportunity to do so. The primary reason for the decrease in inevitability given by the Soviet political leadership in 1956 was that the Soviet Armed Forces had grown sufficiently in strength and that now socialism could achieve victory short of hostile conflict. Now, according to Gorbachev, the latest revision to the new Soviet military doctrine should focus on *preventing* such a war from ever occurring. Also, for the first time in history, the military doctrine of the Soviet Union was not only allowed to be the subject of public scrutiny and debate, but the political leadership openly encouraged such activity.

Responding to a call for such debate on the subject among the intelligentsia, one Soviet social scientist stated

The question of what a state's military power must represent in terms of size, nature, and function is one of the main questions separating the new and old political thinking ... The old thinking proceeds in principle from the idea of 'the more, the better,' ... The new thinking denies this confrontational approach. [Ref. 4]

Subsequent analysis by the private sector led to a more detailed analysis of how to effect the transition from a more aggressive "defensive" military posture to one of purely *defensive defense*. One of the earliest examples of how to identify this de-escalatory process was put forth in an article published in 1988 and co-authored by a social scientist, Andrei A. Kokoshin, deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and a high-ranking military officer, General-Major Valentin Veniaminovich Larionov. They presented four variants of offensive-related strategies directly related to the Soviet military doctrine reform process. Briefly, the four models ranged from an *offensive defense* in which offensive capabilities are inherently significant to the *non-offensive defense* which espoused a totally *defensive defense* posture. [Ref. 5] A more thorough examination of these variants and their relevance to the concept of *reasonable sufficiency* will be presented in a subsequent chapter of this paper.

The point of the matter is that such statements and studies set the stage for the evolution of a modified future mission and structure of the Soviet Navy and, eventually its Russian successor.

As the researcher will show, the rhetorical reform policies proposed by Gorbachev prior to and following the 27th CPSU Congress initially enjoyed the general support of the military leadership. Acceptance of such policies began to deteriorate however, once concrete proposals began to surface. General Secretary Gorbachev's 1988 landmark speech before the United Nations in which he proposed a unilateral reduction in force of approximately 500,000 soviet troops was a case in point. It represented a turning point in the heretofore general acceptance by the military to structural changes affecting the Armed Forces. Still, the concept of implementing a new defensive doctrine incorporating *reasonable sufficiency* was by 1988 well established and had already resulted in certain unprecedented changes within the military and specifically within the Navy. In order to measure the extent of those changes, it is first necessary to determine the traditional role of the Soviet Navy prior to the events surrounding the 27th CPSU Congress and the introduction of the concept of *reasonable sufficiency*.

II. ROOTS OF SOVIET NAVAL POWER

During a remarkable interview with a western military academic journal in February 1989, Fleet Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Soviet Navy, acknowledged that the impetus for a changing role of Soviet Naval forces as a result of the military reforms ongoing in the Soviet Union had begun.

In building our Armed Forces we are guided by the principle of *defensive sufficiency* . . . In the Navy, in particular, the appropriate organizational and technical measures have been implemented . . . [Ref. 6]

When asked about the *traditional role of the Soviet Navy* against the backdrop of reform, Chernavin generically described the Soviet naval posture as wholly defensive, in accordance with requirements within the overall military doctrine.

In practice, the requirements of Soviet military doctrine are realized today in the concrete activities of naval forces. Above all, the exercises in the system of operative and combat training are defensive in nature . . . [Ref. 7]

In general terms, he described a picture not significantly at variance from the state of Soviet naval power as it had existed for some forty previous years, during the tenure of Fleet Admiral Sergei Gروشkov. However, there were underlying significant differences which will be examined at a later point in this research. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the very fact that Chernavin was willing to respond to the western media was *in itself* a breakthrough in attempts to establish a dialogue between Soviet and Western naval strategists – a dialogue which had previously never seriously existed.

When examining the *traditional role* of Soviet naval power, the most obvious observation one can make is that by virtue of its former borders, the Soviet Union

was geographically disadvantaged with regards to open-ocean access. This, in turn, enabled an internal focusing on enhancement of its status as a continental power and a simultaneous weakening of its sea power capabilities. [Ref. 8] Since the inception of the Bolshevik government in 1917, naval strategists were divided as to which posture and employment of naval forces best suited the national security of the Soviet state. Initially, two schools of thought exchanged leading roles as to the role of the Soviet Navy. They were commonly referred to as simply the *Young School* and the *Old School*.

A. "OLD," "YOUNG," AND "SOVIET" SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

1. The "Old School" vs. "Young School"

Briefly, the *old school* retained the conviction that the Mahanist concept of *Command-of-the-Sea* was best served through the offensive employment of battleships and cruisers of a traditional high-seas fleet. This contrasted directly with the doctrine adhered to by the *young school* constituents who espoused that the submarine, supported by aircraft and light surface ships, had supplanted the larger warships in value as the major weapons of contemporary naval warfare. [Ref. 9]

Both circles enjoyed the patronage of Soviet leaders in what became a competition for ideological supremacy. Under Stalin both schools of thought exchanged the leading position until, eventually, a hybrid maritime philosophy emerged approximately coincident with the start of World War II. This new school of thought incorporated, to some degree, elements of both schools – namely the inclusion of the potent weaponry on surface platforms (old school) combined with the superior mobility and surprise elements of air and subsurface units (young school). It became commonly referred to as the *Soviet School*.

2. SOVIET SCHOOL

The basic tenet of the *Soviet School* proceeded from the realization that the Soviet Union was not a major sea power and indeed, maintained a weaker naval force relative to those forces of the leading western powers. As such, the *Soviet School* advocated a limited command of the sea concept which could be achieved by adopting the active *fleet-in-being* strategy promoted by the nineteenth-century naval strategist, Sir Julian Corbett. Corbett had prescribed such a strategy for use by the weaker of two strong navies. Once established, this strategy would provide the *force equalization* necessary to allow an inferior naval force to deny the superior naval power of the enemy absolute command of the sea. Specifically, it is a defensive strategy with the *potential* for offensive action possible, whereby the principle naval combatants are "passively" restrained from engaging the enemy in order to avoid open-ocean attrition. Simultaneously, auxiliary forces (attack submarines, aircraft, and fast attack surface craft) are "actively" deployed at relatively short range from the mainland in a tactically offensive role. This employment provides the goal of the strategy: it holds command of the sea by the superior naval force in dispute. [Ref. 10]

Adopted by the *Soviet School*, the resulting theory called for limited command of the sea, exerted in a given area over a period of time of sufficient length to carry out *quickly executed operations*, but presumably, before reinforcement and intervention by superior enemy naval forces could occur. [Ref. 11]

The *Soviet School* principles allowed for the formation of a contemporary Soviet maritime defense. Inherent to that defensive policy, three concentric areas of maritime operations were established, extending out from the mainland coastline. The depth of each area corresponded to the capabilities of the weapons platforms intended for use within that area. For background information purposes, their descriptions are listed in order of proximity to the Soviet mainland extending outward.

The first area was designated the *pre-coastal* zone. Consisting of an area extending from the coast outward to approximately 150 miles, this zone was considered to be the only one of the three zones in which the Soviets realistically believed that they could enjoy command of the sea in order to successfully maintain a coastal convoy capability. Platforms intended for use inside this region included frigate and destroyer-sized ships, coastal or *brown water* patrol craft and diesel submarines – all capable of employing one or a combination of anti-surface, and anti-air missiles in addition to organic gun systems. These platforms would be aided through the use of land-based sites and air platforms, both also capable of utilizing missile weaponry.

The second maritime defense zone was established as the *remote offshore* zone. Extending from the edge of the first zone (approximately 150 miles) out to an extreme of 300 miles, engagement of the enemy utilizing air assets could be conducted on a limited basis.

The final zone of defense, the *open sea* designates that any area of ocean beyond 300 miles will be the area of operation utilized almost solely by the Soviet submarine force in an ASW/ASUW role. It is at the initial parameter of this zone that the establishment of submarine barriers were envisioned as necessary to provide the first line of defense against enemy submarines whose mission was to attack coastal shipping convoys and to preclude the advance of any hostile amphibious assault force. [Ref. 12]

B. CHERNAVIN ASSUMES THE REIGNS OF POWER

The actual use of such zones in wartime by Soviet naval units following World War II was the subject of debate between two very different philosophies. Since the inception of the Borshkov leadership in the mid-1950's until Gorshkov's replacement in 1985 by Chernavin, the Soviet Navy pursued the goal of maintaining an identity

that was mission-unique to that of the ground-based forces. Chernavin, as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, advocated a transition in the utilization of Soviet sea power. In essence, he held that the integration of the Fleet in a unified combined arms of military operations represented the future role of the Navy. [Ref. 13] Chernavin's view in 1985 was not inconsistent with his earlier documented positions on the subject when, in 1981, he was Chief of the Main Naval Staff. During this debate on the future art of war of the Soviet fleet, Chernavin argued that the Navy needed to decide not only that it *was* prepared to adopt the centralized and unified high command position of Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov, but *to what degree* such an integration was to occur. [Ref. 14]

Ogarkov saw the necessity of "acquiring a qualitively new character" with regard to the "combat control of the Armed Forces in operations on land, at sea and in the air ..." brought about by the advent of new warfighting technology. Although the significance of this view had surfaced in the decade following World War II, it was receiving increased emphasis. Speaking on the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the surrender of Nazi Germany, he drew a comparison between C2 of World War II and that of future combat.

Decisions will be adopted in a short space of time, tasks will occur in a matter of minutes, and the art of fulfilling them will require great intensiveness. This gives rise to the need to have control organs in peacetime capable of operating immediately at the start of a war, without prolonged restructuring. [Ref. 15]

Now, as CINC of the Soviet Navy, Chernavin was in a position in 1985 to begin the redefinition of its mission and structure under the auspice of *reasonable sufficiency* and within the framework of a newly evolving Soviet defensive doctrine. It is at this point in time that this study will begin to examine the internal debate which began with the redefining of its Armed Forces roles and missions.

In summary, the information presented above is intended to give the reader a ready, albeit brief, reference to what has been the foundation of Soviet naval warfighting policy since the founding of the Soviet state. The researcher has provided such a base in order to compare and clarify to what degree, if any, changes to that policy have occurred as a result of the adoption in 1985/86 of the policy of *reasonable sufficiency*.

III. MILITARY REFORM AND THE BIRTH OF “REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY”

Following the conclusion of the November 1985 Geneva meeting between the United States and the former Soviet Union, then General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev spoke before the USSR Supreme Soviet. In his address, he reiterated the chief theme which he had brought with him to the recently concluded summit, namely, that the world had entered a new age of technological innovation which had resulted in a dangerous proliferation of nuclear arms. Such an increase could be responsible, in Gorbachev's view, for the impending, if not imminent, destruction of humanity itself. Furthermore, he restated his belief that the U.S. decision to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative only served to enhance an already unstable situation. In rhetoric unmistakably designed for global consumption, Gorbachev told the Supreme Soviet what he claimed to have related to President Reagan in Geneva. That the current strategic/technological balance was growing increasingly disproportionate and was leaving the USSR in an inferior position. This inequity, according to Gorbachev, was simultaneously dangerous and intolerable. An amelioration of the problem could be found by reducing to a level of parity, those weapons of strategic value. Such parity could be defined as that “level of weapons on each side [which] could be considered relatively sufficient, from the point of view of its reliable defense.” [Ref. 16] Such levels would adequately address mutual national security concerns while promoting the same, by extension, to the international community as a whole.

We do not desire to encroach upon the national interests of the United States ... would not want to change the strategic balance in our favor ... We are convinced that the level of this sufficiency ... will not lessen, but strengthen ... the entire strategic stability of the world. [Ref. 17]

On the subject of parity, both the political and the military leadership had previously repeatedly gone on record as having rejected as unacceptable any idea of strategic superiority on the part of the United States. In that sense, Gorbachev was simply restating an already prosaic line, familiar both domestically and outside the USSR.

He had recently said as much during the Geneva meeting during a news conference in which he insisted that "nuclear war is inadmissible, ... it cannot be waged and it cannot have any visitors." Therefore, the logical course of action was to find a way to reduce the possibility of it occurring while ensuring neither side gained an advantage in the process.

... our deep conviction that less security for the United States of America, if compared with the Soviet Union, would be disadvantageous for us because it would lead to distrust and lack of faith, and would generate instability ... we in turn, would not allow the United States to achieve superiority over us under any circumstances" [Ref. 18]

The Soviet military leadership applauded Gorbachev's initiatives to reduce arms in dealings with the western powers, and strongly reiterated Gorbachev's steadfastness on not allowing parity to become a casualty of any arms reduction process. Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Marshall of the Soviet Union Sergei Federovoich Akhromeyev addressed the same issue following the conclusion of the Geneva meeting.

Our Armed Forces and their integral part – the Strategic Nuclear Forces – are maintained at the necessary level of combat readiness with the sole purpose of holding back a potential aggressor from waging war ... Soviet Military strategy ... is subordinated to the fundamental goals of ... the prevention of war and the *rebuffing* of possible imperialist aggression ...

He further stressed that the Soviet military "... will not waive our security interests or permit military superiority for the United States and NATO over the Soviet Union ..." [Ref. 19]

A. 1986: NEW YEAR ADDRESS AND THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS SPEECH

Shortly after the new year had arrived, in a landmark speech, General Secretary Gorbachev addressed the issues that would be at the forefront of the political arena in 1986. Arms reduction would head that list and in his remarks Gorbachev outlined a specific plan of action that the Soviet Union would initiate. The plan, contained three main stages, summarized by the goal of "... complete liquidation of nuclear weapons..." by the year 2000. Gorbachev emphasized the fears of pending disaster on a global scale stressing that "... the atom ... cannot become an instrument of suicide for people..."

In addition to reducing strategic nuclear stockpiles, Gorbachev also included conventional arms and the scale-sizes of major military exercises as areas that needed downsizing. [Ref. 20] Everything he proposed was to be accomplished with the goal of maintaining the mutual security of the participating nations. *Reasonable sufficiency* was to be accomplished with the goal of maintaining the mutual security of the participating nations. *Reasonable Sufficiency* was no longer a faceless concept, but was beginning to assume a specific form and an acceptable shape to those it would affect most – the Soviet military establishment.

Gorbachev reiterated and expanded on the development of *reasonable sufficiency* in remarks before the 27th Party Congress.

"The 27th Congress of the CPSU has gathered at an abrupt turning point in the life of the country and the contemporary world as a whole." [Ref. 21]

The content of the speech was traditional upbeat and addressed a new era of international political thinking, generally a "... situation created by nuclear confrontation

calling for new approaches, methods and forms of relations between the different social systems, states and regions.”

In that section of the speech dealing directly with Soviet military doctrine, Gorbachev refers to *reasonable sufficiency* on two key occasions. Initially, he assures the audience that the military doctrine will be examined so as to ensure the global community that it is based on purely defensive principles.

Soviet Military Doctrine is being drawn up in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the initiatives put forward. It's orientation is *unequivocally* one of defense. In the military sphere, we intend to act in the future so that no one has any ground for fears ... for their security ... Our country stands for taking weapons of mass destruction out of circulation, and restricting military potential within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency. [Ref. 22]

On the second occasion, he uses the concept as point six in a nine point list of items which, once implemented, will establish "... a comprehensive system of international security." Specifically, he called on the United States to be an equal participant towards achieving "... a strictly verified reduction in the level of the military potentials of states to a reasonable sufficiency." [Ref. 23]

B. MILITARY REACTION

1. Military Reacts Favorably

The military, as it had previously, responded favorably to the concept of *reasonable sufficiency* as it was presented by Gorbachev at the Party Congress. Marshal Akhromeyev actually made a direct link between it and the military doctrine, now under review by the Congress.

At the Party Congress, the very basis of our military doctrine was outlined with complete clarity: long-range monitored reduction down to a level of reasonable sufficiency, ... without disturbing the existing military balance or existing security systems ... The only thing we seek to achieve is the establishment of security equal to that of the United States ... we will not allow anyone to achieve military supremacy over us. [Ref. 24]

Akhromeyev reaffirmed the position of the Party leader Gorbachev in stating that while historical divisions between the two political systems still existed, their potential resolution could be found in "... peaceful competition, not military competition." [Ref. 25]

Another vote of confidence in the concept of *reasonable sufficiency* was offered by then USSR Defense Minister, Marshal Sergei Sokolov who stated that

... the draft new edition of the CPSU Program stresses that the CPSU will make every effort to ensure that the USSR Armed Forces are at a level which precludes the military superiority of the imperialist forces, and to ensure that the Soviet State's defense capability is comprehensively improved. [Ref. 26]

As was previously noted, in his 15 January remarks, Gorbachev had included reductions in the scale of participating exercise units as part of the *reasonable sufficiency* equation. During a dinner speech following the close of the 27th Party Congress, he reiterated a Soviet proposal that first surfaced in 1984 of applying such a concept to the Soviet and American naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea. He called for turning the Mediterranean into "... a zone of stable peace and cooperation ..." by enacting "... confidence building measures to cover that region" Specifically, this could be accomplished through "... reduced Armed Forces, withdrawing ships carrying nuclear weapons ..." and similar activities. [Ref. 27]

In reality, this plan of action theoretically gave the Soviet Union a distinct advantage in military strength with regards to its maritime defense posture. Recalling the concept of the "precoastal" zone of defense previously introduced, the Mediterranean geographically was inclusive to that zone and, even in the absence of Soviet nuclear-capable afloat units, would be easily defendable by numerous land-based air

assets and diesel submarines. This, in turn, would provide the Soviet Union the *limited control* of the area in support of continental theaters of military operations (Teatr Voyennyye Deystviya - TVD) even in the face of a *de-nuked* carrier-type western naval force.

Similarly, Gorbachev proposed the same scenario in the Pacific later that year. Speaking in Vladivostok, he again referred to the Pacific and Indian Oceans as future *zones of peace* and that this could be achieved through significant *confidence-building measures*. Chief among these was a reduction in the level of naval exercise activity in the Pacific, principally ASW activity.

A limitation on competition in the sphere of antisubmarine weapons would help to strengthen stability, in particular, an accord from antisubmarine activity *in certain zones* of the Pacific Ocean ... [Ref. 28]

Finally, the General Secretary included the Arctic, North Atlantic and Baltic waters as *zones of peace* and that the USSR was prepared to implement *confidence-building measures* in those areas as well.

We could go quite a long way, in particular, as far as to withdraw from the Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines equipped with ballistic missiles ... the USSR proposes ... reducing military activity and limiting the scale of the activity of naval and air forces in the waters of the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian, and Greenland Seas ... including an understanding on limiting competition in anti-submarine weapons ... [Ref. 29]

2. Military Reacts Negatively

Coincident with the initial general support of the *new political thinking* and *reasonable sufficiency* espoused by Gorbachev at the 27th Party Congress, there arose within the military a feeling of guarded skepticism as well.

Historically, the Soviet ideological premise held that imperialism was the source of all wars and that the responsibility for past conflicts rested with the West.

Accordingly, it was seen that the main task of the Soviet Armed Forces was to defend socialism from such aggression. In order to accomplish this mission, the military needed to preclude the West from achieving strategic superiority. While the military saw this as feasible under the concept of *reasonable sufficiency*, there was concern that the West might attempt to take advantage of a period of arms reduction and engage in hostile offensive action. Such concerns were expressed by Lt.Gen. Dimitri Antonovich Volkogonov, then Deputy Chief of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy in a written reaction to the program set forth at the 27th Party Congress.

The fact is that we cannot fail to take into account that although imperialism cannot win a nuclear war, it is capable of unleashing one ... In accordance with the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine ... we must be ready for the possibility of a surprise enemy attack and for his unconditional defeat. [Ref. 30]

Circles within the Navy hierarchy concurred to a degree with this cautionary note. Admiral Pavel Medvedev, member of the Navy Military Council and chief of the political directorate addressed similar concerns in a post-Party Congress growing debate on the issue.

... as M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, considering the complex international situation and the growing aggressiveness of reactionary imperialist circles, the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo devote unremitting attention to the country's defense capability and the combat might of the Armed Forces to prevent imperialist forces from gaining strategic superiority. [Ref. 31]

The question that was surfacing inside military circles when discussing *reasonable sufficiency* was how to accurately *define what was meant by sufficient*. Hence the increased focus on examining the military doctrine by the Party Congress and how *reasonable sufficiency* could support that doctrine. In the majority of cases examined

during this research, the essence of the military doctrine centered on the belief that the Soviet Union's national security interests must be reliably safeguarded.

Reasonable sufficiency therefore came to be identified as an integral part of the standing Soviet defense doctrine in that it represented "... the minimal quantitative and qualitative level of military capability of a state that reliably guarantees its security and does not create a real military threat to other countries ... " [Ref. 32]

This would then provide a solid basis for mutual security while precluding strategic superiority by either side. It was precisely this mix or balance that the Soviet military leadership hoped to convey to the West as an acceptable tenet of the arms reduction process. This viewpoint was heavily stressed by three leading figures in the Soviet military establishment beginning in late 1986 into early 1987. Marshals Sokolov, Ogarkov and Akhromeyev successively expressed their opinions in similarly thematic articles. Collectively, they held that Soviet military doctrine was purely defensive and would look to *defeat decisively any aggressor*.

The 27th CPSU Congress confirmed the defensive thrust of Soviet military doctrine ... The defensive nature is demonstrated in the fact that the USSR persistently advocates the maintaining of a balance of military forces at the lowest possible level and the reduction of military potential to limits which are adequate and necessary for defense ... [Ref. 33]

C. SOCIAL SCIENTISTS ENTER THE DEBATE

As the debate within military circles widened on the subject of what constituted a *reasonable sufficient* defense, a parallel discussion was surfacing within the intelligentsia as well.

The first call for open debate among the social scientists was evidenced in an article by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, CPSU Central Committee secretary and a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. He stated that while "... social

scientists have become thoroughly aware of their responsibility ... an atmosphere of creative search must be developed ...” in order to provide the vehicle for input from the intellectuals on the reform process in general. Relative to the already on-going debate within the military, Yakovlev stated that the social scientists had an equal claim in formulating and projecting their views. Only through “... debates triggered by the competition among ideas ...” and the *radical democratization of publishing*, he theorized the barriers to reform could be removed. He flatly states in his article that “... no one holds the monopoly on truth”

The concept of adequacy of military potentials, *including sufficiency* under the conditions ... formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress, must be brought to light and given a material substance. No less important is the task of analyzing, together with military specialists, our military doctrine ... [Ref. 34]

The first concrete analysis of *reasonable sufficiency* to be accomplished *outside* the military establishment came in the form of an article published in mid-1987 by a Doctor of Historical Sciences and member of the Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies, Leonid Semyeko. Briefly, he describes *reasonable sufficiency* as containing three main aspects: political, military, and economic.

The *political aspect* he describes as the need to ascribe more impetus to political solutions of international disputes. This calls for an enhanced “... defensive, non-threatening nature ... of military potentials’ might ... ” to the point where the current “... menacing size and nature of military might must be eliminated”

The *military aspect* relies on “... implementing the reduction of armed forces ... and armaments ... to a level whereby neither of the sides, while ensuring its defense, has the means to suddenly attack the other side or to unleash offensive operations in general.” In this sense, he offers support for the existing opinion of the military on the definition of *reasonable sufficiency*.

Finally, the *economic aspect* adopts a Paul Kennedy-type position that an *overstretch* of economic resources into the military sphere "... slows down socioeconomic and technological processes while simultaneously raising the level of possibility of military confrontation. [Ref. 35]

Later that year, three representatives from the United States and Canada Institute basically agreed with the premise that due to a rapidly changing international arrangement, reliance on political discourse was supplanting military confrontation as the means to settle disputes between nations.

As in Semyeko's article, the authors maintain that "... reasonable sufficiency ... must be determined ... by ensuring an *adequate defense potential* ..." so as to deter surprise attack or escalation of a conflict. [Ref. 36]

Probably the most startling example of how rapidly the debate on *reasonable sufficiency* was developing came during a roundtable discussion among leading academics who were members of The Public Commission on Disarmament Problems of the Soviet Peace committee in December of 1987. They centered their remarks around the question: "What is sufficient for defense?"

They settled on a remarkable point of agreement - that *reasonable sufficiency* could not apply to nuclear weapons. In fact, they maintained that nuclear weapons represented such a threat to stability that even in small numbers "... the possibility of multiple destruction of the other side must not be considered reasonable..."

That left only conventional weapons as having any relevance to the concept of *reasonable sufficiency*. The group advocated significant unilateral reduction so as to "... demonstrate that the given side adheres to a defensive military doctrine ..." They concluded "... Therefore, if we want to have true reasonable sufficiency of our Armed Forces, it can be even less than that of a potential enemy ..." [Ref. 37]

This point of view signaled a turning point in the process of debate within Soviet society in general and review of political policy in particular. Defense issues of such magnitude as *reasonable sufficiency* has previously been outside the realm or possibility of open debate, considered solely the domain of the CPSU political and military leadership. Now, not only was Party policy being debated outside those circles, but openly challenged as well. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that the roundtable discussion cited above would, only two years earlier, never have questioned the position held by the political and military decision makers with regards to the *reasonableness* of reducing nuclear weapons. However, for such a group to not only flatly reject *reasonable sufficiency* concepts applied to nuclear strategic arms but to advocate significant **unilateral reductions** of conventional arms and personnel as a way of legitimizing the defensive military doctrine, is in hindsight, truly remarkable.

As further research shall reveal, General Secretary Gorbachev did indeed adopt a stand similar to that espoused by the academics regarding unilateral reductions. Ultimately, his decision would result in the first measurable resistance to his reform policy by some within the military hierarchy.

IV. "NEW THINKING" AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The year 1987 closed on a high point for Gorbachev and his reform policy. The signing of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December of that year was seen by the Kremlin as tangible evidence that the era of *new thinking* had arrived. That premise was based on the belief that the world had reached the brink of self-annihilation from nuclear arms. It held that nuclear war was not winnable and that nations could not afford to depend on military-technical as the means to resolve current or future problems. A reliance on political means was not only more desirable but had now become essential. The INF Treaty was offered to the world as evidence of the first implementation of this program. It was a direct example of *reasonable sufficiency* and was representative of the three-stage platform offered by the Soviet leader nearly two years prior. Now the opportunity arose, in the post-INF environment of superpower cooperation for more ambitious reductions in strategic weapons – upwards of 50% on both sides.

This post-INF strategy was seen as a move forward by both sides since it focused on cuts in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Early estimates envisioned that "... a 50-percent cut would in itself, probably, entail the elimination for the USSR and the United States of a sum total of ... over 70 missile-firing nuclear submarines" [Ref. 38]

The positive reaction by the Soviet military to the increasingly rapid pace of reform and reduction in the name of *reasonable sufficiency* began to show signs of erosion. At a meeting of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Party Aktiv, Marshal

Akhromeyev brought out the fact that the ability of the Armed Forces to complete assigned missions would be seriously challenged due to diminishing resources.

With regard to arms and equipment, this means that the troops and fleets will probably receive less, but the combat effectiveness and quality must be higher, so that it is possible to resolve tasks with fewer combat resources, yet more effectively. [Ref. 39]

This brought up initial doubts as to whether parity, which the Soviets felt they had roughly achieved, was in danger of being compromised. Akhromeyev was concerned that the demanding mission of the Soviet Armed Forces to defend socialism was potentially endangered now that those forces were being asked to do that job with significantly lesser resources.

Prominent Soviet academics became part of the discussion almost immediately. Aleksei Arbatov, member of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, wrote an article less than a month after the issue was raised by the General Staff in which he reassessed the meaning behind *defensive/reasonable sufficiency*. His conclusions were based on the decision that the level of sufficiency could be found in the capability of one nation to repel the offensive of another, i.e., a retaliatory strike.

“Defensive sufficiency ... is ensured by the ability ... to inflict on the aggressor unacceptable damage ...” [Ref. 40]

Arbatov would become a prominent and highly outspoken member of those civilians who believed that the time had arrived to begin sincerely defining what was meant by *reasonable sufficiency* as opposed to merely continue supplying rhetorical suppositions or theorizing. This, he believed, was especially the case within the military hierarchy and he diagnosed the cause as being a reluctance on the part of those same

military leaders to embrace *glasnost*' and institute its policies to the same degree as was being accomplished throughout other organs of Soviet society.

The debate as to the long-term effect of *reasonable sufficiency* was to increase in intensity due to an event that was the result of the individual who was at the heart of the reform process.

On December 7th, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev would present his concepts of *new thinking* and *reasonable sufficiency*, previously verbalized in his 15 January 1986 remarks, in an historic address before the United Nations. He would cite the dangers inherent in living in the nuclear age and how "... new international relations ..." needed to be cultivated in order to avoid global devastation. Such a dismal accounting was to serve as the backdrop for a Soviet plan that offered the world a solution. Almost a year to the day that the INF Treaty was signed, he used the anniversary to remind the world of the tenets of his *three-stage plan* revealed on 15 January 1986 - his program for building a nuclear-free world.

Before our eyes, we are seeing a new historic reality arising, a turnaround from the principle of over-abundance of weaponry to the *principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense*.

and perhaps the most memorable, part of the speech:

Today, I can inform you of the following: The Soviet Union has made a decision on reducing its Armed Forces. In the next two years, their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 persons, and the volume of conventional arms will also be cut considerably. These reductions will be made on a *unilateral basis*, ...
[Ref. 41]

Needless to say, the reaction on the part of the United States was overwhelmingly favorable. The same cannot be said, however, for certain members of the Soviet military establishment. There was by no means a unanimous consensus that Soviet military

unilateral reduction was necessarily a good thing. Both sides are represented by the following evidence.

First, many *did* see the proposed cuts as a positive step. It can be said that the cuts would be the manifestation of a switch from the principle of *overarmament* to the principle of *reasonable sufficiency*. Colonel General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff assessed the move as giving the Soviet military doctrine a purely defensive and desirable slant. Demonstrating such defensive content had become increasingly important since the reevaluation of the doctrine, under the guise of *new thinking*, had begun in 1986 under the direction of the 27th Party Congress. General Lobov theorized that

We are reducing and reorganizing our Armed Forces guided by the new political thinking and the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine – in other words, we are demonstrating in practice the unity of the political and military-technical aspects of the military doctrine of the USSR ... [Ref. 42]

A. PROS

Positive reaction was heard from outside the military as well. Georgiy Aleksandrovich Arbatov, Director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, stated in an interview his feeling that the reduction plan was a necessary "... graphic demonstration of goodwill ..." and stressed the need for the US/NATO to respond in kind. He assigned a high level of importance to the proposal, claiming that in terms of future impact on the arms reduction process in general, it was a greater breakthrough than the year-old INF Treaty. He stated that it was a prudent move in terms of economics alone and questioned "... whether reasonable sufficiency will always and in all circumstances require us even to have numerical equality with the other side ...," conceding that the U.S. and its allies had "... three to four times the economic potential ..."

... in military building, as in the economy, we had also spent a long time following the extensive cost-based path, relying primarily on quantity, not quality. And that is bad from the viewpoint not only of the economy, but also of security.

He lauded the move away from excessive reliance on military might as an instrument of ensuring our security calling it "... one of our main foreign policy errors in the stagnation period ..." and predicted that *glasnost*' would soon open the military up to scrutiny. [Ref. 43]

B. CONS

However, reaction was not all positive. A week after the UN speech, Marshal Akhromeyev resigned from his position suddenly and was replaced by Colonel-General Mikhail Moiseyev. Citing his age as the primary reason for his resignation, Akhromeyev did, however, simultaneously express his discomfort at the *abnormal situation* created by a sudden unilateral Soviet reduction in significant manpower at a time when the USSR was "... still encircled by U.S. military bases at which combat aircraft and Navy vessels are stationed." [Ref. 44]

Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal Dmitri Yazov spoke in cautious terms of possible negative effects on morale after the troop cuts, basically saying that the forces that would remain would still be charged with performing the same job only in smaller numbers and with less available resources.

... it is essential to resolve all the tasks set with still greater persistence and responsibility, so as to exclude the lowering of combat readiness and ensure a high degree of organization and discipline. [Ref. 45]

Perhaps the most stinging criticism of the proposed cuts from within the military came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, Soviet

Marshal Viktor Kulikov. He warned that unless NATO responded with similar cuts, the
“... common defense shield ... of the Warsaw Pact would be significantly weakened.”

... the reduction of Soviet troops by 500,000 men, which was announced by
Party Chief Mikhail Gorbachev, will further change the qualitative relationship
of the Armed Forces to the disadvantage of the East Bloc. [Ref. 46]

For the first time since its inauguration, Gorbachev was encountering open resistance to his reform policy. The political struggle would deepen and the military dissent expand as the Soviet Union now had taken the first concrete step in unleashing those forces in the name of reform which would ultimately lead to its own demise.

V. POLARIZATION: THE MILITARY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

The Gorbachev U.N. speech was pivotal in terms of widening and intensifying the debate regarding what constituted *reasonable sufficiency*. Examination of the literary evidence shows that the military was clearly uneasy with the unilateral force reduction declared by Gorbachev. Concurrent with their displeasure, the social scientists contrastingly expressed their optimism and openly conveyed their collective view that the Gorbachev initiative was indeed both necessary and highly desirable.

They maintained its necessity stemmed from the fact that it represented the first *concrete* example that the Soviet Union was serious about implementing the *new thinking* which its leaders had been espousing since Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 speech where he unveiled his goal that the world should work to achieve nuclear disarmament by the end of this century. In that respect, it represented the credibility that was *necessary* in order to go beyond the rhetoric which had, up to this point, been highly prolific and equally non-substantive.

Additionally, the social scientists saw it as desirable in that it represented an important point of contention within the public sphere that could be examined and therefore, either praised on its merit or criticized for its unworthiness. In the months that followed, there was no shortage of either viewpoint and a voluminous amount of pro and con opinions surfaced on both sides of the issue. Those views shall now be examined.

A. THE MILITARY VIEW OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY"

In many ways, the Gorbachev speech, and the specifics contained therein, was a litmus test of the validity of *reasonable sufficiency* and even new thinking on the whole.

The military leadership attempted to put on its best face with regards to the impending unilateral cuts announced by their political leadership, but it was not comfortable with them. Following his resignation, Marshal Akhromeyev at one point stated tenuous support for the measures while simultaneously providing a warning that betrayed his personal sense of uneasiness.

I would like to emphasize: the decision to reduce our Armed Forces by 500,000 men, . . . is perfectly correct and justified from both the political and military viewpoints. [Ref. 47]

Yet for all its political merit, Akhromeyev contends that the initiative creates problems for the military that are undesirable and could lead to disadvantageous results in national defense if not implemented with prudence and forethought. He flatly states that the latter element is lacking or even absent from planning considerations.

The decision to reduce the Army and Navy by 500,000 men also requires great creative efforts and organizational measures from the supreme military organs of management. Much work is required if it is to be implemented in a well organized way and without any decline in combat readiness . . . We have no ready formulas; we are finding them in the course of practical work. [Ref. 48]

In addition to the apprehension expressed by the Soviet military over implementation details or even lack thereof, the pace of reform also was an element that warranted equal concern. The US/NATO military presence was a potent adversary with stationary forces maintained in close proximity to the Soviet Union. It was quickly pointed out that reduction measures, much less unilateral ones, must be gradual and cautiously scheduled so as to not result in Soviet military vulnerability or the compromise of its national security.

We must be realistic about today's political situation, still far from that state of world community where use of the military could be fully ruled out. We still have the source of war - *imperialism* . . . [Ref. 49]

The political reformers and advocates of reform represented by the intelligentsia were warned by the military not to become reckless in a desire to realize the global nuclear-free principles inherent to the *new thinking* by portraying the military as an obstacle to reform. Such an opinion was gaining popularity among the Soviet military writers and thinkers as their civilian counterparts became increasingly vocal in the debate regarding military issues in general and the military's role in the *new thinking* process in particular. The social scientists, whose view will be subsequently examined, were taking seriously their assumed role as a counter-balance in the growing debate over what constituted a sufficient defense. The military saw their input as necessary to a lesser degree and in some cases, even intrusive and threatening. Certain military representatives assessed open discourse on the topic of a new military doctrine as having anti-militaristic overtones. They held that such opinions were originated by uninformed sources who were militarily naive and not very pragmatic when regarding traditional East-West military relations.

The impression is that a negative attitude to the Army, its people and military service, is becoming today . . . fashionable . . . It is not reasonable to accept the negative emotional perception of militarism as sufficient argument that the army is unnecessary in modern-concrete historical conditions. [Ref. 50]

Many military academicians opined that the USSR had finally succeeded in a long attempt to achieve military parity with the West. They concurred with the principle of *reasonable sufficiency* so long as it proposed phased and uniform reductions to be executed on both sides. **Bilateral** reductions whereby **both** East and West would

simultaneously step back from the brink of nuclear confrontation was, in their view, the key to ensuring the absolute success of the new military doctrine.

“... parity is a two-sided equation, and the measure of reasonable sufficiency is defined not only by us, but also by the other side’s actions ...” [Ref. 51]

This explains their logical discomfort with the prospect of unilateral action on the part of the USSR. Under such circumstances, it would be impossible to maintain parity with the West and parity, after all, represented the only means to ensure stability.

... we have reason to assert that the implementation of the idea of the new thinking is, ... closely connected with the maintaining of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States ... and ... the qualitative approach enables us to see parity as closely linked with **reasonable sufficiency for defense**. [Ref. 52]

Consistent with this premise, the Soviet military hierarchy maintained that the importance of strategic parity lay in the fact that it represented the ability to

1. maintain a level sufficient as a deterrent to *prevent* offensive aggression and
2. guarantee a level of forces sufficient enough to *repel* an aggressor, should deterrence fail.

B. THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST VIEW OF “REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY”

Members of the intelligentsia were by now quite entrenched in the debate process and unwilling to abdicate that position or, as they saw it, their **responsibility** to present their opinions. Those opinions contrasted sharply with many points, including the parity issue, being presented by their counterparts within the military.

One of the strongest and most outspoken within this group was Alexei Arbatov. As previously shown, he had secured a dissenting position for himself and was recognized as a prominent leader among the intelligentsia, a segment of society with whom

Gorbachev realized early on in his tenure he needed to form an alliance if his concept of **perestroika** was to succeed. Following Gorbachev's 1988 UN speech, Arbatov did not hesitate to intensify his efforts on becoming part of the restructuring process and proceeded to publish his views regarding the military aspects involved in the *new thinking*. The premier example of how much of an impact the private academic sector was becoming on defining the principles of a new military doctrine was represented by a landmark article authored by Arbatov in April 1989 entitled "*How Much Defense is Sufficient?*"

1. Arbatov Defines Sufficient Defense

First and foremost, Alexei Arbatov used his lengthy article to chastise the military for not embracing the spirit of **glasnost**' and for exempting itself from many aspects of the restructuring process in general.

The army is part of the state and society. The negative processes and phenomena ... in the decades of stagnation ... put a huge country on the brink of national crisis and could not have bypassed the army as a kind of natural reserve ... defense became largely exempt from control by society, whose interests it must serve. [Ref. 53]

Arbatov believed that any reformulation of the military doctrine demanded that the military do considerably more to open itself and its policies to assessment by private analysts and public institutions. This, he contended, was certainly not happening.

The problem lies above all else in the lack of **glasnost**' and unclassified information on military matters ... Both the economy and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union are undergoing an in-depth **perestroika** which military policy should contribute to and not hamper. [Ref. 54]

The military had already gone on record with a contrary view. Specifically, the Navy's position had been expressed by Chernavin two months prior to Arbatov

publishing his article. In an interview in *IZVESTIYA* in February 1989, the Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief gave his assessment of the pace of reform to date, even to the point of providing his personal definition of democracy and *glasnost*'.

Glasnost' for me means providing the public with information on the decisions that are being made on the restructuring of the Armed Forces . . . There is now more **glasnost'** and democracy in the Armed Forces and greater attention to actual people and their needs and concerns. [Ref. 55]

Regardless, Arbatov was adamant in his claim that it was necessary to "... bring military theory and practice into greater harmony with the economic, foreign policy and military strategic realities of today."

It was in the area of military strategy that Arbatov made the most specific applications of the principle of *reasonable sufficiency*. In his opinion, the *military strategic realities* dictated that not only was victory in a global nuclear exchange impossible to achieve, but the same could be said of a large-scale conventional war in Europe. Therefore, he reemphasized the premise of the new military doctrine which was that the **prevention of war** should be the overriding goal of the Armed Forces. Specifically, he offered three general principles which would support such a goal.

First, he advocated the shift from an *extensive* to *intensive* means of ensuring an adequate defense. This conceived of a reduced and more efficient fighting force organized to achieve "... Limited strategic objectives and operational plans ..." which he contended "... would be a much stronger guarantee of reliable defense." This Clausewitzian view espousing the merits inherent in a strong defense as a more effective form of warfighting led directly to his second assertion that unilateral reductions would cause the West to adopt similar measures.

Arbatov claimed in his second principle that a military buildup in the West would be curtailed as a result of unilateral reductions by the USSR.

“... the buildup of the possible enemies’ military potential is ... a process directly influenced by our measures.”

In this regard, Arbatov and the social scientists who had allied themselves with his thinking were in effect questioning the need to maintain the *sacred cow* of parity. It was in their opinion, after all, the obsession of the Soviet political and military leaders following World War II to achieve strategic parity with the U.S. which was a paramount reason for the USSR’s current economic trouble.

This focus on the economic rationale for pursuing *reasonably sufficient* means of defense was the third principle developed by Arbatov. Simple stated, Arbatov proposed that “... disarmament talks offer ample additional opportunities to strengthen our security as lower cost.”

Arbatov’s rejection of the feasibility of winning either a global nuclear or conventional was totally compatible with the basic tenets of Gorbachev’s *new thinking* policy. What was unique about Arbatov’s writings, particularly the article now in focus, was that they outline **specific proposals** on how to achieve the objectives contained within the principle of *reasonable sufficiency*. In so doing, Arbatov linked force reduction with a revision of strategy and operational plans. Proposals pertinent to both naval strategic nuclear and conventional naval forces shall now be examined.

2. Strategic Nuclear Applications

In his article *How Much Defense Is Sufficient?*, Arbatov addresses naval strategic force reduction by stating that

1. the role of all nuclear forces (ground-based and sea-based) in war time would be retaliatory in nature and that
2. naval nuclear forces had a *reinforcement* mission with respect to their land-based counterparts. He proposed that a *reasonably sufficient* naval strategic nuclear

force should be composed of a single long-range missile system on board a single class of submarine. Specifically, he identified the SS-N-23 on board the Delta IV class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) as preferable to the Typhoon class with its SS-N-20 capability. He elaborated his proposal by stating that the 16-tube/64-warhead combination found on the former platform would be more effective in a retaliatory role than the 20-tube/200-warhead mixture on-board the latter platform due to the larger number of Delta IV units. Citing expected Strategic Offensive Force (SOF) treaty reductions as the rationale, Arbatov maintained that it made more sense to support the single weapon/platform option because the Delta IV could provide a "... long-range submarine missile system capable of hitting targets from near the Soviet coast and hence making it unnecessary to venture on the high seas through enemy anti-submarine barriers."

This proposal confirmed the viability of the *bastion defense* theory held by some in the West and strengthened Arbatov's position that through greater numbers of submarines (i.e., Delta IV's) the USSR could "... distribute forces over a greater number of launching positions ..." and thereby enhance the survivability of those forces.

3. Conventional Force Applications

Arbatov makes special mention of conventional naval forces in their contribution to maintaining a *sufficient defense*. He argues that conventional naval forces have but two bona fide missions:

- (a) defending the Soviet coast from sea-based strikes and
- (b) defense of the strategic nuclear submarine force.

Arbatov vehemently argues against Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) interdiction and an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role targeting US/NATO SSBN's using submarines. In the former case, he states that SLOC interdiction is "... hardly consonant with a defensive strategy, especially where ground troops and air forces dependable ensure defense in the main continental theaters." He rejects a mission of hunting western SSBN's as impractical given the higher number of those globally dispersed forces compared to the limits of a smaller Soviet diesel/nuclear attack submarine (SS/SSN) force. Again, parity being the issue, Arbatov points out the economic pitfalls connected with attempting to build an anti-SSBN submarine force.

The extension of naval confrontation with the United States in distant seas ... is for objective geostrategic reasons the most disadvantageous sphere of rivalry for us, an extremely costly area *having no direct bearing on the security of the Soviet Union or its main allies.*

He concludes his remarks on this subject by simply stating that "... to chase strategic missile carriers ... would be as absurd as sowing selected seeds in the Kara Kum Desert."

Arbatov claimed it would be far better to protect a Soviet SSBN force which was well hidden and deployed closer to home as a deterrent against sea-based strategic and nuclear cruise missile attack. Such a protected force would provide the deterrent needed by ensuring the delivery of "... a devastating retaliatory strike"

Arbatov addresses the topic of conventional naval force composition by advocating the retention and maintenance of the current inventory of surface platforms in lieu of new-ship construction of aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered

cruisers and amphibious landing ships. This was consistent with his desire to see total force structure depart from an emphasis on the *extensive* to the *intensive* approach.

... it would be useful to seriously revise plans for the construction of a large surface fleet ... *The forces we have are plainly sufficient for defending our littoral and protecting our sea-based strategic forces ...*

As an alternative, he proposed enhancing the capability of the Navy performing its two missions through the utilization of "... multipurpose submarines in smaller numbers and in smaller variety but with higher qualitative indices ..." These forces and existing surface units carrying long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM's) would, in turn, be supported by land-based Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft (also ASCM carriers) under fighter escort.

Arbatov concludes his article by shedding any illusions that his recommendations regarding national defense issues would be readily accepted, much less embraced, by other representatives of Soviet society.

There is no reason whatever to deny that in this area as in other spheres of our society and state there are sincere supporters of **perestroika** just as there are staunch opponents and those who hold forth about **perestroika** yet would like to reduce it to cosmetic adjustments. [Ref. 56]

While it is readily observable that his proposals were quite radical, it is also obvious that Arbatov went beyond even the initiatives proposed by Gorbachev, which were in themselves quite startling. The most poignant example is probably Arbatov's notion that the USSR should pursue a disarmament policy **independent** of that of the West. On this issue, the abandonment of numerical

parity, he saw not only a chance to credibly apply specifics to the principle of *reasonable sufficiency* but also an opportunity to evoke further debate from those who held like and opposing viewpoints. As shall be shown, Arbatov's arguments would challenge them to respond in kind and present specifics of their own, thereby enabling a viable defensive doctrine with maritime applications to be formulated as a result of open discussion.

C. EXPANSION OF THE DEBATE

The points raised by Arbatov's article drew immediate support from other members of the intelligentsia who saw the logic in significant arms reductions. They were particularly drawn to supporting the concept that parity had been overestimated in its importance. The blame for overselling to the Soviet people the need to achieve parity with the West was leveled at the political leadership, beginning with Stalin. A prominent member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sergey Blagovolin reasoned that it was no longer correct to view a prodigious inventory of Soviet armament as a guarantor of Soviet national security.

Why was it that more weapons did not in any way mean greater security? ... in the very recent past, they tried to convince us (and almost succeeded): the greater our military might the better, the greater our peace of mind, the greater our security ... security in a world where we had so many enemies for whom military victory was virtually the only chance for the survival of their social system. [Ref. 57]

Historical enmity with the West as the reason for a perpetuation of a Soviet armed buildup related directly to the questioning by the intelligentsia of attempts to maintain parity with the West. Blagovolin raised the logical point that if the West was so bent on the destruction of the Soviet state and therefore parity was

a necessary evil, why then had the West not taken steps to achieve its goal and “... not attacked us when they had a monopoly on nuclear arms ...?”

Blagovolin concludes that in attempting to achieve military parity on a global basis, the USSR had wrought “... grave economic consequences” This was particularly true in relation to parity in the naval arms race. He advocates the thinking, like Arbatov, that the USSR is primarily a continental power and that its wartime defense should reflect a strictly defensive posture.

... we ... have not acquired such transoceanic political and economic interests that would require the globalization of our military presence *and the creation of a fleet to support it.* [Ref. 58]

Perhaps the most remarkable support for the proposals that Arbatov published regarding *reasonable sufficiency* applied to strategic nuclear armaments appears in an article co-authored by Radomir Bogdanov, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee and Andrei Kortunov, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada. In their writings, Bogdanov and Kortunov renamed the concept of *reasonable sufficiency* and labeled it as a provision of *minimum deterrence*. However repackaged, its principles remained consistent with those inherent to *reasonable sufficiency* and, more specifically, they addressed the same concerns as had Arbatov.

Bogdanov and Kortunov saw the dismantling of the *Cold War* as a process that necessitated the adoption of a new strategy of *minimum deterrence* whereby the USSR should incur a “... drastic unilateral cut ...” in its nuclear arsenal down to a small number of warheads sufficient enough to survive a first strike and which would then “... inflict *unacceptable damage* upon him as a result of retaliation.” Such a strike would destroy *countervalue* or civilian targets

as opposed to **counterforce** or military objectives. Bogdanov and Kortunov proceeded further and specifically identified the number of warheads combined from the inventories of both land-based systems and sea-based platforms would suffice.

To provide *minimum deterrence*, it is indeed enough to retain 500 nuclear warheads differing in yield and mounted on SS-25 mobile single-warhead land-based missiles and Delta IV SSBN's which carry a total of up to 64 warheads on 16 missiles. This is less than one-twentieth of the present number of nuclear warheads. *The rest may, in our opinion, be scrapped without detriment to national security.* [Ref. 59]

Due to the fact that reducing to 500 warheads meant *eliminating 95% of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear capability unilaterally*, they were realistic about the opposition which was certain to follow. In an attempt to preempt such objections, they provided in their article the most probably forthcoming questions and accompanying answers. Most notably, they realized that such a substantial reduction might compromise the national security if the US/NATO did not engage in simultaneous action. They set aside the necessity for such bilateral cuts by stating that the *minimum deterrence* concept presupposed the rationality of the U.S. political and military leadership in wanting to prevent a nuclear exchange.

After all, even Ronald Reagan, possibly the most conservative and anti-Soviet U.S. president of the post-war period, a man who made very dangerous statements . . . showed great restraint and prudence in pursuing his policy. His administration never did anything that could have led to a U.S.-Soviet clash. [Ref. 60]

In addition to writing formal articles in support of the Arbitov perspective on *reasonable sufficiency*, several favorable responses were published in civilian

journals as letters to the editor. Written mostly by academics, they shared Arbatov's indictment of the military in not promoting restructuring efforts commensurate with that of other organs of Soviet society. An excellent example was produced by Pyotr Cherkasov, Senior Research Associate, Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences. He reflected the view that Arbatov was correct and pointed out that "... the army should be helped in surmounting its historically shaped introvertedness ..." by calling for a deeper adherence to the principles of glasnost' within the military.

Until recently, it was normally believed that only career members of the Armed Forces could speak out on such matters ... we the uninitiated, have not even been granted the right to know with what means, at what cost and how reliably our own security has been ensured. [Ref. 61]

There was considerable negative reaction as well. Opposing views involved a fairly wide range of dissenting points. The foremost point raised in objection to Arbatov and his arguments questioned his competency in the field of military doctrine-related issues. Critics questioned his expertise and therefore, the validity of his comments. Such a reaction, particularly from within military circles, is understandable given the fact that for approximately seven decades, the decisions of the military had been initiated, overseen and brought to fruition entirely within that body. Arbatov's attempt to penetrate the sacrosanctity of such a closed process was viewed by many as an unnecessary and unwelcome intrusion. One retired Lieutenant-General accused Arbatov of having become an unwitting stooge of "... U.S. Sovietologists, referring to their sources and presenting all this in the light of the new doctrine and strategy ..." The same officer relayed a common theme of resentment regarding Arbatov's claim that the military was not keeping pace with the reform process, most notably in implementing the

spirit of glasnost'. The tone of resentment is strong, and those objecting express their fears that Arbatov is calling for abandoning future classification of military-related state secrets. Such views are obviously a collective overreaction, given the text of what Arbatov *actually* says regarding the necessity of the military to retain a right to secrecy. They are however, again, understandable in view of the historical perspective held by those members of a society so long accustomed to and even **comfortable with** not being informed when it came to the military. On this point, the same source reflects what is undoubtedly a truism regarding Soviet society's complacency with the **status quo**.

... from one year to the next, thousands of Soviet citizens serve in the Soviet Armed Forces as representatives of society *for whom there are no problems of a lack of glasnost' and unclassified information on military matters.* [Ref. 62]

An example of the strongest criticism of Arbatov is found in an article authored by Major-General Yuri Lyubimov, Doctor of Technical Sciences. Published in *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in August 1989, he attempts to cover on a point-by-point basis the content of Arbatov's thesis. He seems to accept the basic premise provided by Arbatov that working towards the goal of a nuclear-free world community requires an interim process, namely disarmament. He even agrees that *reasonable sufficiency* is a viable process by which to achieve that goal and that a *sufficient defense* requires definition. However, he chastens Arbatov for attempting to define the process from an unqualified perspective and that by **being** unqualified, Arbatov provides a highly simplistic definition. Lyubimov charges that elements of Arbatov's argument are unrealistic and therefore flaw his attempt to define what constitutes a *sufficient defense*.

Unfortunately, the article "How Much Defense is Sufficient?" does not advance us either toward an understanding of the principles of the new defensive organizational-development nor to realistic proposals ... [Ref. 63]

Lyubimov firmly disagrees with Arbatov's view that *glasnost*' is not receiving attention equal to that given by the non-military sector of society. He dismisses the most substantive parts of Arbatov's article dealing with remolding the military-technical aspect of the Armed Forces to becoming more compatible with the new military strategy. In this area, Lyubimov charges that "... the author is fairly far removed from such realities and an understanding of strategy."

Regarding the naval aspects of both strategic nuclear disarmament and conventional naval force employment, Lyubimov says that the proposed plan of Arbatov to operate a single platform/ICBM submarine force as a deterrence against a nuclear first-strike is simplistic, stating "... the author does not have a clear understanding of this deterrence" Likewise, regarding conventional naval forces, Lyubimov attacks Arbatov's call for a shift from *extensive* to a more *intensive* posture of forces. In his criticism, however, Lyubimov does not, in a single instance, provide any counter-proposals or factual contradiction to Arbatov's arguments. Specifically where the Navy is concerned, he simply reiterates Arbatov's proposals yet does not offer alternatives of any kind. In fact, Lyubimov concludes his enumeration of Arbatov's points by merely stating that "It would seem sufficient to give these excerpts from the text without commentary." [Ref. 64]

What is notable is that Lyubimov's article is in excess of five pages and yet nowhere does he present what could be even remotely considered a substantive

rebuttal involving factual contributory information. Therefore, it must be concluded that as an individual, Lyubimov represented that large segment of society willing only to verbalize about the restructuring process. As Arbatov stated in the closing remarks to his controversial article "... there are ... those who hold forth about perestroika yet would like to see it reduced to cosmetic adjustments."
[Ref. 65]

VI. MILITARY-TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY"

While it may be debatable that Arbatov provided a well redefined concept of the missions of the Soviet naval forces, it **cannot** be said that he failed to offer a beginning to the process. He represented a segment of Soviet society which had, prior to the era of **glasnost**, been prevented from entering into a discussion on military doctrine and national security issues. Now, with that debate well underway and non-traditional viewpoints gaining prominence, a natural reaction arose from within the Navy to seriously consider and respond **factually** to the points being raised by Arbatov and his colleagues.

A. NAVY BEGINS TO DEFINE ITS ROLE

It can be argued that the military in general drew a significant part of its philosophy regarding the new defensive doctrine from a concept which was conceived in an article published in 1988 and co-authored by Andrei Kokoshin and General-Major Velentin Larionov. As was previously shown, their concept consisted of four variant levels of potential warfighting capability and it was used as a yardstick by which to measure the level of Soviet forces under the old military doctrine against the goad of **a desired future capacity** driven by the new military doctrine. A brief description of the four variants has been previously provided, suffices to say that this concept with its inherent variants provided the framework by which the individual services worked to mold their individual capabilities to become consistent with variant four, the level which represented the purest example of *defensive defense*.

With regards to the Soviet Navy, their efforts in this area by their own admission required considerable revision to the basic tenets of the *Soviet School* theory which espoused a *defensive* naval force. In testimony before the U.S. Congress in March 1989, Kokoshin himself admits the difference between the old and new military doctrines and how revision had become a necessary reality.

For several decades, the Soviet military doctrine, for all its generally defensive character reflected with evidence in its political component, *was largely offensive in its military-technical component.* . . [Ref. 66]

The revisions which could be necessary to realize the new reduced levels of naval armament and changes to existing warfighting concepts demanded by *reasonable sufficiency* were described in an article published by Captain 2nd Rank Victor Dotsenko in *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in 1989. He identified the imminent changes as representative of a *fifth stage* in the development of Soviet operational art of naval warfare following World War II.

The fifth stage in development of the Soviet art of naval warfare began in 1985. Its principal content is **perestroika** of the Soviet Armed Forces under conditions of new political thinking, a defensive military doctrine, and phased nuclear disarmament. [Ref. 67]

He describes three principle missions of the Navy as applicable to this stage:

1. delivery of retaliatory and surprise counterblows against the enemy,
2. destruction of enemy naval offensive force groupings to disrupt nuclear missile strikes against the territory of the USSR and
3. defending basing areas and sea lines of communications.

This identification of specific missions was directly at odds with the viewpoints advocated by Arbatov and that segment of the intelligentsia which he represented. Only in terms of enabling the Navy to conduct *retaliatory* strikes and *counterblows* were the two lists of missions compatible.

Arbatov had discounted the necessity for engaging a naval force in order to prevent a sea-based nuclear attack. As has been shown, he believed it would sufficient to *bastion* one class of numerous submarines and by their ability to survive a first strike, that survivability factor would provide the deterrent necessary to prevent such a strike from even ever occurring. Contrarily, Dotsenko believed it necessary to preempt any naval nuclear strike potential.

Likewise, Arbatov held that it was folly for the USSR to aggressively pursue a policy of open SLOC interdiction. This was refuted in the Dotsenko article as well. Dotsenko provides a matrix in which he identifies the five progressive stages of naval mission development, **SLOC protection** is listed as having been a principle mission of the Soviet Navy since the mid-1980's.

B. CHERNAVIN DEFINES NAVAL MISSIONS

The response of the naval hierarchy to the questions of SLOC interdiction as a valid mission for the Soviet Navy came in the form of a book on the subject authored by Admiral Chernavin, excerpts of which were published in two parts in *MORSKOY SBORNIK* beginning in January 1990.

The book represents a significant stage in the development of the Soviet Navy in the age of the *new thinking*. For the first time, a representative of the Navy's decision-making authority went on record with **specific** ideas on how the Navy saw itself as a future player in the *defensive defense* aspect of the new military doctrine. Further

examination of Chernavin's views as presented in his work is therefore warranted as part of this research.

Chernavin begins by establishing the premise that the best method to determine the validity of supportability of a future SLOC role for the Navy is to assess the effectiveness of SLOC interdiction in World War II. The use of historical example as a surrogate for future planning is therefore the basis for Chernavin's conclusions.

Chernavin begins his analysis by quantitatively measuring the results of allied naval force operations on SLOCs during the war. In his view "... it is difficult to find an analysis of what influence naval operations on sea lanes of communication have had on the course and outcome of some continental operations ..." [Ref. 68] Therefore, he identifies *four levels of SLOC interdiction effectiveness*:

1. **prevention/suppression** - >80%,
2. **temporary interruption of shipping** - 60-80%,
3. **reduction** - 30 to 50-60%, and
4. **impeding/hampering** - 25-30%.

It is more correct to select effectiveness criteria on enemy maritime shipping while considering the influence that they are having on enemy troop formations' capabilities to accomplish missions ... [Ref. 69]

Chernavin points out that "In spite of the continental nature of the Second World War ..." the importance of SLOC interdiction as a contributing factor to achieving victory should not be overlooked or underestimated.

During the second half of the war, the Allies succeeded in creating antisubmarine forces that were capable of accomplishing *the strategic mission of protecting the sea routes*. [Ref. 70]

Chernavin underscores his view that the submarine force, in conjunction with aviation assets will play a key SLOC role in any future conflict, based upon their overall positive performance in that area during the war. It is prudent to note that Chernavin is himself a submariner, however, that fact does not appear to bias his views regarding the joint use of air and subsurface assets when conducting a SLOC mission. He does, however, minimize the importance of surface units in the SLOC efforts of World War II and therefore, it is logical to assume that any future SLOC use by surface combatants would be negligible.

... surface ships played a significantly smaller role than other component services in operations to interdict enemy sea lines of communication, ... Experience has shown that ... *surface ships already do not correspond to modern conditions for conducting combat operations at sea.* [Ref. 71]

He blames their ineffectiveness during operations in World War II particularly on "... their lack of coordination with other component services, especially with the air forces ...". He does not find similar fault with joint efforts involving submarines and aircraft. Particularly, he focuses on the area of mine-warfare and reflects how subsurface and air force assets complimented each other in minelaying as part of an overall successful SLOC effort.

Chernavin addresses the individual merits of a potent submarine force and air force as well. Citing the importance to enter a conflict with a superior submarine force capable of conducting effective SLOC interdiction from the initiation of hostilities, Chernavin emphasizes that "There is no doubt that this type of submarine combat employment ... has great promise for the future."

Regarding aviation, Chernavin stresses a clear preference for developing a viable carrier-based mission in conducting SLOC interdiction, both through the employment of mines and in a strike role.

Aviation proved to be a new operational-strategic factor in the struggle for the maritime lanes of communication . . . carrier aviation achieved major successes . . . High mobility, large combat radius, considerable striking power, and the capability to use its own forces to support the conduct of reconnaissance and achievement of air superiority . . . caused the success of the use of aircraft carrier formations against shipping. [Ref. 72]

In this, the first part of his accounting of SLOC interdiction during World War II, Chernavin describes through its use as an historical surrogate of the important future mission of submarines and carrier-based aviation on interdicting SLOCs in a wartime environment. As he states,

“There are sufficient grounds to suggest that . . . sea lanes of communication will also retain their predominant role in the future . . .” [Ref. 73]

The second and concluding Chernavin excerpt in the February edition of *MORSKOY SBORNIK* contains an explanation by the author as to why attention should be drawn to the concept of interdicting SLOCs in general and in the case of the Soviet Union in particular.

. . . theorists proceed from the fact that in the event of a war of a protracted nature, disruption of sea lanes of communication even under modern conditions will constitute the main content of warfare at sea. [Ref. 74]

Applying this theory to a future conflict involving the Soviet Union, Chernavin sees a well-defined mission for the Soviet Navy.

One of the defensive missions that the Soviet Navy must accomplish in a war . . . *will be warfare on ocean and sea lanes of communication that have a great significance for the functioning of our economy, movement of troops, military equipment, fuel and other material on the continental theaters of combat operations* without which successful conduct of combat operations on land fronts by the main imperialist countries will turn out to be impossible. [Ref. 75]

Three substantive points may be drawn from this statement.

- First, it is notable how Chernavin places equal value on SLOCs in terms of emphasizing their importance and the need to ensure their use by friendly forces in support of a land campaign *while simultaneously denying their use to the enemy.*
- Second, Chernavin makes a clear distinction between seemingly adjacent areas of operations when referring to *ocean and sea lanes* of communications. It could be argued that this is a clear reference to the *zones of maritime defense* principle prescribed by the *Soviet School* and previously described in this paper.
- Finally, Chernavin clearly rejects any Gorshkov-like precept that the Navy should pursue any identity mission-unique to that of the ground-based forces. As is obvious from the above statement, Chernavin fully supports the Ogarkov model of a centralized and unified command structure applied to a naval role in SLOC interdiction.

The strong advocacy for a conventional aircraft carrier aviation capability and a similar desire to enhance the Soviet non-SSBN submarine presence in advance of a future conflict did not, according to Chernavin, contradict the reduced emphasis on **offensive capabilities** that was an inherent part of the new, more **defensive** military doctrine. In his closing statement, he concluded that his stated goals were fully compatible with “The defensive sufficiency of the military potential of the USSR ... and the non-offensive trend of military doctrine.” [Ref. 76]

Prior to writing his book, Chernavin had already been called upon in interviews to explain or arguably, justify, conventional aircraft carrier construction. In an interview with a Yugoslavian journalist in May 1989, Chernavin was questioned on the subject:

• **MAY 1989:**

- **Question:** Despite the defensive role of the Soviet Navy, you are now nevertheless building new aircraft carriers. How does this fit in with the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency?
- **Chernavin:** *Our aircraft carriers* are not like those of the United States. *Our ships are defensive.*
- **Question:** Could you define the difference more precisely?
- **Chernavin:** This involves basic airplanes that are based on carriers. On U.S. carriers, there are fighter-bombers and on Soviet carriers, there will be interceptors. This is the basic difference. [Ref. 77]

The designation by Chernavin of an interceptor role and the marked **exclusion** of a strike role for carrier-embarked aircraft is noteworthy in that it is reemphasized by Chernavin in a subsequent *PRAVDA* interview with a **Russian** journalist.

• **OCTOBER 1989:**

- **Question:** Do we need aircraft carriers? After all, they have always been considered the strike units of any fleet. How does this square with the policy of arms reduction and the country's defensive doctrine?
- **Chernavin:** ... when people ask today whether the construction of aircraft-carrying ships contravenes our defensive doctrine, I reply: no. We see *their main role as platforms for fighter aircraft* able to provide long range cover for our vessels ...
- **Question:** Does this mean that in the concept of our Armed Forces, aircraft carriers are defensive weapons?

- **Chernavin:** Yes. But what does defensive mean? Certain people have a simplistic and primitive understanding of this. They think that since we have adopted this doctrine, we should be purely passive, defend ourselves, and, in the event of conflict, retreat deep into our own territory. Yet modern warfare . . . is, above all fluid. *Submarines should find the enemy and sink them. A surface ship's mission is, if necessary, to inflict missile strikes on the enemy without waiting for them to enter our territorial waters.* [Ref. 78]

The reference to those possessing a *simplistic and primitive understanding* was probably intended for both foreign and domestic consumption. While Arbatov and his colleagues had by now unmistakably aroused the passions of a proud military entrenched in its own tradition, the reference probably also served as a warning against any US/NATO thoughts of taking advantage of the climate of revision occurring within the USSR, whether by misreading or *reading in* to the situation. Whether that point contains validity will not be debated here, it is only interesting to note that Chernavin felt the need to express his personal view on the subject.

It is interesting to note as well that Chernavin explains the absence of strike aircraft embarked onboard future Soviet aircraft carriers as unnecessary due to the fact that such a role will be adequately filled by long-range anti-ship cruise missile carrying submarines and surface ships. Based on the additional fact that current *Kiev* class ships are similarly armed, it is logical to conclude that Chernavin includes the carriers in question as having that future potential as well.

Through interviews similar to those cited above and from the content of his book, Chernavin had provided the first concrete evidence that the Navy was indeed affected by and responding to the principle of *reasonable sufficiency*. Likewise, the degree of

the effect was now being made easier to measure. One of the remaining uncertainties was to what point the Navy would *continue* to be affected.

VII. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY"

The question of how to effectively implement the changes inherent to the principle of *reasonable sufficiency for defense* in accordance with the larger framework of new military doctrine policy was economic as well as military-technical in scope. Since the widening of the debate due to the involvement of the social scientists and Arbatov's controversial article in particular, the effect of swindling economic expenditures as well as arms level reductions was of concern to everyone involved in the debate, not least of the groups being the military.

As part of his argument justifying a two-mission concept of the Navy's role in the future defense of the USSR, Arbatov had mentioned that by scaling down to a one-class SSBN force, the Navy could contribute to an overall savings in the military budget of up to 40-50% over a five year period. This sounded attractive enough to those who, like Arbatov, would not be on the receiving end of such measures. However, it was disconcerting to those within the military to hear propositions of this nature surfacing with more frequency and greater intensity. Again, it assumed the same level of unattractiveness as had the prospect of cutting arms levels when those scale-down measures started taking on definition and specific parameters. As mere concepts, they were not threatening but only became so when concrete proposals were attached to them.

A. REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY BUDGET: RESISTANCE AND WARNINGS

Marshal Yazov acknowledged the woeful national economic situation when he addressed the issue during an interview in *IZVESTIYA* in September 1989. During the interview, he was asked about the economic aspect of *perestroika* within the Armed Forces and what benefits could be derived for those non-military sectors of society should military spending be appreciably reduced. His answer centered around reservations he held regarding the pace of reform. While he acknowledged that reform was necessary, he cautioned that its hasty implementation would result in a serious detriment to the ability of the Armed Forces to perform its role of ensuring national security. He based this conclusion on the fact that while the overall global situation had changed for the better with respect to a lessening of possibility of military confrontation, the threat, he maintained, had not disappeared. This was particularly true in the area of naval disarmament and in the United States continued support for the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet military and political leadership viewed SCI as contributing to danger and instability in a world which was on the verge of enjoying unprecedented international cooperation. Therefore, Yazov stated, there is reason not to look at military expenditure reduction as the cure-all to the country's economic ills.

It is economically unfounded and politically shortsighted and dangerous to depict ... the reduction of defense expenditure as virtually the only way to eliminate the budget deficit and to resolve practically all today's social problems. [Ref. 79]

Not only did Yazov downplay the growing urge among some to cut drastically into the defense coffers, but he even suggested that the military might require additional funding in view of the continued threat from the West.

In conditions where a real military danger persists, the principle of reasonable sufficiency must be underpinned by the *further technical re-equipment of the Armed Forces* on a qualitatively new basis. Naturally, *that requires corresponding expenditure.* [Ref. 80]

Similar sentiments had already been expressed earlier that year by General Moiseyev. In a February interview with *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*, he had admitted that *perestroika* was necessary but that the focus should be on reforming the appropriations process itself and, accordingly, the military's part of it. He stated that those in authority, including himself, shared the "... responsibility for the thrifty expenditure of the funds appropriated for defense." [Ref. 81]

Faced with the future realities of a shrinking budget for defense, Moiseyev admitted that the onus of responsibility

... makes it incumbent upon us, on the one hand, to learn to take better care of the money and to be more careful in spending the material resources appropriated for the training and development of the Armed Forces while, on the other hand, being more active in our quest for ways to maintain defense at the level of reasonable sufficiency ... [Ref. 82]

The Navy did not remain silent on this issue. Chernavin expressed the need for caution coincident with the need for reform. Like Yazov, he stated that in view of a declining economic state but in the face of a significant remaining military threat, it would be unrealistic to use mainly the Army to provide cover for all the country's economic misfortune. Additionally, he echoed Moiseyev's desire to adopt a more prudent spending policy.

In an interesting examination of his statements however, there is confusion as to just **how** affected Chernavin believes the military should be by a more *thrifty* approach to spending. In two successive published opinions, he initially makes the case for progressive reform based on **reduction** in defense spending while in a subsequent

article, he states that the military will have to **increase** its spending and should do so at the expense of non-military sectors of society. The following two statements are indicative of this inconsistency.

- **JUNE 1989:**

- **Question:** I would like to hear your opinion of the proposed reduction in the military budget.
- **Chernavin:** This is, *in principle*, a correct decision. Under present conditions, when the state has to count every ruble, it is really necessary to seek reserves for improving the people's life. But, at the same time, *the reduction in appropriations for defense* must be within reasonable limits, and I would say that reasonable sufficiency must be displayed in the approach to this question. [Ref. 83]

- **SEPTEMBER 1989:**

- **Question:** Do you regard the discussion of questions connected with Armed Forces organizational development and with providing reliable national defense satisfactory?
- **Chernavin:** I am convinced that one can speak of reasonable sufficiency in military organizational development only from the position of sufficient reasonableness, especially in questions of allocating funds for defense. *In reducing the Army and Navy, that approach obviously requires directing a portion of the freed-up funds for the Armed Forces themselves . . . Only this kind of approach to defense will not harm it and will not allow us not only to keep from falling behind, but even to rise to a new, higher qualitative state.* [Ref. 84]

Chernavin's inconsistency toward his views on the economic aspects of *reasonable sufficiency* may be indicative of an overall negative feeling toward the policy and its implementation. This perspective is made clearer upon examination of two television interviews by the Soviet Navy's CINC. The first was conducted in conjunction with Navy Day 1990 and a subsequent appearance by Chernavin in March 1991. On both occasions, Chernavin clarifies his position on *reasonable sufficiency* by drawing a clear distinction between its **political** and **military-technical** applications. While stating his general support for *reasonable sufficiency* within the political spectrum, he minimizes its importance relative to the military.

• **JULY 1990:**

- **Question:** Tell me please, this military reform ... what kind of shape is it in today and how will it ultimately reflect on the Navy?
- **Chernavin:** Today what I would call *not a military but a political concept of defensive sufficiency exists*. How can this defense sufficiency be understood? In *political circles* such a term can be used and it will probably be correct. However, *we military people cannot be guided by such a term* because we must have precise calculations; we must establish a *correlation of forces* ... according to these criteria we must answer the question of what is sufficient defense. [Ref. 85]

• **MARCH 1991:**

I think that this term, *reasonable sufficiency*, deserves to exist. *But we must set some limits here*. It is one thing *from a political point of view*. Here I think *this term is valid*. But it is another thing for us military specialists. *I think we cannot be guided by this term in full or sufficient measure*, because if this term is comprehensible in a general political way, *it means absolutely nothing militarily*. [Ref. 86]

During the same interview, Chernavin even goes so far as to question whether *reasonable sufficiency* has any legitimate role when considering the importance of the military and the necessity of that organ in being allowed to function as protector of the interests of the state.

Once more, as far as the term *reasonable sufficiency* is concerned, it seems to me that the question of ensuring the country's defense unconditionally is so important and is of such decisive significance that *it is even difficult to say whether reasonable sufficiency ... should be our principle attitude* on this most important issue. [Ref. 87]

B. DEBATE OVER CREATION OF A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY

Another aspect of *reasonable sufficiency* which had economic implications was the growing debate involving the possible transfer from the long-accepted policy of universal conscription to one of an all-volunteer military force. The idea for such a policy change had originally surfaced following Gorbachev's landmark December 1988 speech at the United Nations. The unilateral manning reductions declared in the speech were just the beginning of what represented potential major military organizational changes. It was argued that a professionally manned Armed Forces would be indicative of such changes that were necessary if the government was serious about instituting a new military doctrine which reflected a truly defensive posture.

The military hierarchy immediately expressed wide dissatisfaction with the idea of a volunteer Armed Forces and found fault on several grounds: **ideological** (mercenary armies were the tools of *colonial imperialist* powers and not representative of *fraternal socialist governments*); **sociological** (universal military service was the *just and honorable duty* of every Soviet citizen); **professional** (proficiency of a war-time reserve force would suffer); and not least of all, **economical** (a professional Armed Forces would be financially burdensome). Military leaders therefore dismissed the idea

out-of-hand as the product of an uninformed and naive group of individuals, unqualified to address an issue of such importance. Citing it as unaffordable and therefore an unacceptable tenet of *reasonable sufficiency*, General Moiseyev stated

We must not agree with those who advocate a professional Army. The transition to manpower acquisition . . . on a voluntary basis will give rise to repeated increases in expenditures for their maintenance. [Ref. 88]

The principle argument used by those opposed to the plan came in an address by Marshal Yazov at an Armed Forces conference in early March 1989 and then in an April article published in *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*. His main point on both occasions was that, if adopted, the professional Soviet serviceman would have to be paid a salary at least commensurate with that of workers in other circles of society and that that would add to the strain on an already sagging economy.

A professional Army is a still heavier burden on the economy. It requires at least several times more expenditure on paying personnel alone than an Army manned on the basis of a universal military service obligation. [Ref. 89]

Specifically, paying a professional Army's salary would entail a four to five-fold increase in the average salary and so the standard explanation for not pursuing the idea became simply that, according to Yazov, ". . . we cannot afford a professional Army." [Ref. 90]

However, proponents of professionally manned services would not allow the subject to be dropped from any future discussion about ongoing reform, particularly reform pertinent to the structure of the Armed Forces. They argued that the four main reasons cited above by the opponents of switching to a professional Army and Navy were not separable. That, in fact, economics was the only issue involved and that the other three elements were affected directly by it. These advocates of a professional force

admitted to a short-term expense involved in abandoning the universal conscription policy, however, they argued that by making the change, the USSR could achieve its long-term goal of a leaner and more effective fighting force that was **more defensive and less expensive**. If for nothing else, as Aleksei Arbatov had stated in his article, it would represent a large qualitative and quantitative step towards effecting a successful transfer from the long-dominant *extensive* or *more-is-better* mindset to the more advantageous *intensive* posture he and his colleagues desired. [Ref. 91]

C. MILITARY ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE POINT OF NO RETURN

As the Soviet economic situation continued to decline, economic aspects of *reasonable sufficiency* gained in importance. Soviet economists like Georgi Arbatov, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and an elected USSR Peoples Deputy were emboldened in their efforts to ensure that the military bore its share of the reductions which, they saw, were a necessity if the Union was to survive. In many ways, the strengthening movement to outline the economic reforms that were needed was starting to dominate any public discussion that involved the implementation of *reasonable sufficiency for defense*. A premier example of this new emphasis was represented by an historic article written by Georgi Arbatov in early 1990. Entitled *An Army for the Country, or a Country for the Army?* and published in a reform oriented periodical *OGONEK*, its content did not portray a flattering picture of the military nor the military's historical approach to utilizing its allotted part of the national budget.

In his article, G. Arbatov detailed *four arguments against continued levels of military spending* and he justified them against the backdrop of the new, more *defensive* military doctrine.

- **First**, Arbatov argued that in the past, a supposedly *defensive* Soviet Union had used the threat of aggression by the West as the justification for a large military. Citing the secret foreign policy tendencies of Stalin (i.e., the 1939 agreements with Hitler), the use of Soviet Armed Forces in Czechoslovakia (1968) and the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan (1979), he charged that the penchant to blame these actions as a necessity due to an outside threat was false and misleading. He even went so far as to equate these actions as "... guided by [Soviet] imperial ambitions on many occasions." [Ref. 92]

He rejected the premise of past thinking that security could be found in a larger, more well-equipped Armed Forces.

... the new policy does not require Armed Forces (and consequently, military spending) which are as big ... the surplus of military might is not at all "a margin of strength." It is harmful because the other side judges your intentions by your military potential rather than by your words. [Ref. 93]

This last statement represented the level of pressure that was being exerted on the military by the intelligentsia as the declining economic situation demanded the reform process be quickened. *Reasonable sufficiency* no longer lacked a definition, the social scientists had provided that in the face of much reluctance from the military. Now they were pushing for action to replace the rhetoric which, in their opinion, was a leading cause of increasing fiscal stagnation.

- Arbatov explains his **second point** for less financial allocation to the military by using a simple analogy. He declares that the money simply isn't there to support the traditionally high level of military spending and that the Admirals and Generals had to start thinking in terms of "... what every housewife knows: Live within our means ..." [Ref. 94]

- His **third reason** for wanting to downsize the military budget was that he saw a militarization of society as having occurred due to years of dominance by the military "... in many aspects of our life ...". He states that

... marshals and generals, on the one hand, and general designers from the defense industry, on the other, were given a *completely free hand and became subject to no control*. [Ref. 95]

- Georgi Arbatov concludes his article with an ironic twist that he borrowed from the military themselves. Until now, Arbatov and those advocates of specific reform outside the military had been criticized for their supposed lack of knowledge and credibility. Now, in his article, he uses his **fourth point** to counter-attack those he felt had been patronizing him and his colleagues. In a direct appeal to his fellow People's Deputies, he warns that the military leadership have been attempting to stifle the reform process by "... trying to frustrate such a discussion by any means, including ... concealing or falsifying information, attempting to discredit the critics personally, ... and so on." [Ref. 96] Arbatov clarifies the lines of division by identifying Admiral Chernavin as having attacked him in the press, as well as Marshal Akhromeyev.

By virtue of Arbatov's position within the legislature and his commitment to providing a viable political voice for promoting *reasonable sufficiency*, the proponents of reform had a valuable tool by which they could sustain efforts at keeping the debate at the forefront of the political decision-making process. And while it must be acknowledged that indeed many members of the Congress of Peoples Deputies wore military uniforms, they were not all allied with the anti-reform camp.

VIII. MILITARY SUPPORTERS OF MILITARY REFORM

Until now, this research has focused on those proponents of military reform found outside the military establishment. Since they represented the majority of those within the Soviet Union advocating the need for implementing genuine reform, such an examination is justified. However, due to the sequence of geopolitical events beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, the Soviet Union was caught up in a surging pace of international changes. The growing instability of the Warsaw Pact alliance and subsidizing nature of the USSR within that organization lent itself to a closer examination of the benefits to be derived versus its detrimental effect on the Soviet economy. Finally, the areas of ethnic and nationalities discontent within the Republics themselves was intensifying and providing the catalyst for taking a closer, more scrutinizing look at the commitments of the Soviet Union on a cost/benefit level.

The effects of all these elemental changes would have a direct impact on the parallel acceleration of change now underway within the Soviet Union itself. It is not the intention of the researcher to examine the details of these events, only to draw the reader's attention to the fact that by their occurrence, they contributed to the growing ranks of those within the Soviet Union who advocated the accelerated implementation of *perestroika* and who desired to see some tangible evidence that it was working.

A. MAJOR LOPATIN AND THE PRO-REFORM ALLIANCE

One such individual was himself a military officer and, more importantly, an elected member of the Congress of People's Deputies. Major Vladimir Lopatin gained notable prominence among the military members of the reform movement when he

published an article in July 1990 entitled "The Army and Politics." This article clearly defines Lopatin's vision of the role that the Soviet military must assume if it was to go about **seriously** implementing reform. He provides a summary of **eight points** for ensuring that this occurs, many of which are reiterations of those arguments already presented in this paper and for that reason, those points will not be reexamined. He does, however, present new specific proposals for restructuring the military which, in his view, would significantly contribute to the overall reform process. His new proposals center around the prospect of a Soviet military stationed abroad to be substantially reduced in size. He raises the point that, given the new, evolving climate of political cooperation in Europe, the Soviet Union needed to be seriously reexamining the value of its commitments **outside its own territory**.

Military doctrine also needs to be rethought. We must take under consideration all the processes that are underway in Europe ... we must arrive at a major conclusion concerning the necessity of defending the Fatherland only on the territory of its state. [Ref. 97]

Given that commitments abroad would be significantly curtailed, Lopatin and others began to look at the logical fallout from such a scenario. Paramount in their minds was that of the actual reorganization and structure of what they envisioned as the smaller, more efficient Soviet Armed Forces of the future. He openly questions the proper role of the military/civilian decision-making process and advocates the creation of a **civilian** head to the Ministry of Defense. He envisioned more of an independent role for the General Staff which, in turn, would grant greater decision-making autonomy to other levels of command. As startling as his proposals must have appeared, they probably did not get the attention of his military superiors as much as did the ominous warning with which he ended his article.

Changes in the Army and its place in society are imminent. The absence of ... Army restructuring heightens tension, *and if we do not take some significant measures at this point to improve the situation, we may see ... the further deepening of crisis not only in the Army but in our whole society as well.* [Ref. 98]

B. PROPOSED DRAFT OF MILITARY REFORM: POSITIVE VIEWS

Major Lopatin was not alone in his appeals for substantive reform within the military. In his article, one of his major points had been severe criticism of the current military leadership. In another example of the use of historical surrogates, he underscored the importance of how the absence of effective leadership under the current set of circumstances was equatable with the strategic errors made during World War II by leaders who were similarly lacking. In his conviction that military reform was necessary from within and that its rapid implementation imperative, Lopatin called upon those willing to add their voices to his by exploiting his position in the Soviet legislature.

Military reform ... is not realizable without the establishment of an "institute of reformers," without reorganizing the entire system of the formation and implementation of military policy. [Ref. 99]

Evidence shortly appeared that such a group was ready to come forward. In August of 1990, Major-General Vladimir Ivanov, senior lecturer at the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces, published a paper which described in detail the policy changes which had support within the General Staff. Citing the policy declarations of the 28th CPSU Congress which considered it essential to implement military reform in the form of organizational development, Ivanov advanced "... certain proposals regarding the system of transformations in the organizational development of our Armed Forces." [Ref. 100]

Briefly, the plan envisioned a three-tiered structure of personnel, weapons and other hardware to be maintained in differing states of readiness. The **first contingent**

was to be the active duty or the highest state of *permanent combat readiness* achievable whose *strength and composition* depended upon the current domestic economic situation and the international *military-political* situation.

The **second contingent** would be the largest, to include reserve personnel and their equipment.

The **third contingent** was the training pipeline and would focus on ensuring that "... all the country's citizens do regular military service on the basis of the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation." [Ref. 101]

The above contingents would be subject to a revised command and control structure, composed of **administrative, strategic, and operational** elements. Each of those levels, in turn, would be subdivided into subordinate commands with separate chains-of-command. For as much as the plan offered, its author concluded that "... it is not possible in this article to set forth all the questions of the proposed conception ..." but did contribute immeasurably towards ensuring that the debate over restructuring the military maintained momentum.

The Ivanov paper was followed by a draft proposal for military reform and championed by Major Lopatin. Authored by a group of scholars and USSR People's Deputies, Lopatin among them, the draft was submitted for review to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidential Council and the Ministry of Defense. Lopatin saw the need to circulate the document as widely as possible and so he sent a copy to the press who published it in its entirety with the open invitation for interested readers to respond with appropriate commentary. Additionally and perhaps most importantly, a copy of the draft was disseminated to each Supreme Soviet of the individual republics. This last category of recipients is noteworthy in that among the proposals advanced in the draft package, was the section which would

Establish within the USSR Armed Forces structure of national-territorial elements of ground forces and a *professional reserve in each republic, administratively subordinate to central and local leadership* and operationally and strategically subordinate only to the center. [Ref. 102]

Increased delegation of authority to the Republics on military matters was only one of the more significant points contained within the draft. Additionally, the plan endorsed:

1. appointment of a civilian Minister of Defense,
2. stricter subordination of the Armed Forces to the constitution,
3. transition to a volunteer Armed Forces with an interim mixed-recruitment policy,
4. broader levels of *glasnost*’, particularly involving open discussion and debate over budgetary line-items involving defense matters,
5. development of greater initiative and sense of responsibility down the chain-of-command, and
6. initiatives to de-politicize and *de-partyize* the Armed Forces. [Ref. 103]

In total, the draft represented a radical set of proposed reforms – all consistent with the prior established goals of the *new thinking* and based upon the principle of *reasonable sufficiency* as a critical component of the new defensive military doctrine.

C. PROPOSED DRAFT OF MILITARY REFORM: NEGATIVE VIEWS

Negative reaction to the draft military reform package was swift. It originated from both the political leadership and the military leaders still opposed to radical reform within the military.

At a meeting of the Congress of Peoples Deputies open only to those members of the body serving in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, President Gorbachev addressed two points within the package with which he found two basic points of disfavor. First, he emphatically rejected the move towards implementation of the professionally-manned Armed Forces.

There are no professional Armed Forces anywhere apart from in three states ... All states everywhere have effectively adopted the principle that we have in our country. I think that this is a very good principle and I am convinced that society is in favor of it. [Ref. 104]

The second point of dissension with Gorbachev centered around the proposal to form republican-based and subordinated ground-forces (albeit that such subordination applied solely to administration matters of those forces and not their operational employment). Regarding this point, he simply stated, "People are saying that armies should be set up within the republics. I do not think that this is convincing." [Ref. 105]

Following the remarks by Gorbachev at the meeting, those in attendance were given the opportunity to speak as well. Among them was Rear Admiral Yuri Khaliulin, deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Among his concerns was an issue which would prove to be of serious consequence in the future, specifically following the dissolve of the Union. Again, it focused on the prospect of decentralizing the command and control of certain elements of the Union's fighting forces. In this case, he was addressing the possible effect of such action on the Black Sea Fleet.

... the country's Navy is a kind of organization we cannot have everyone controlling. Efforts (and they are no longer just declarations) by certain republics to have their own Armed Forces have raised the question of the unity of the Navy. Take the Black Sea Fleet - it is stationed in four union republics: Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. How can you divide it up? [Ref. 106]

Admiral Khaliulin's anxiety over the potential break-up of the Soviet Navy was summarized by his urgent feeling that "... any attempt to divide the Navy up is bound to result in the ... defense capability being undermined." [Ref. 107]

IX. TOWARDS REALIZATION OF “REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY”

The *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, held in Paris on 19-21 November 1990, was viewed by the political leadership of the former Soviet Union as further evidence that the age of the *new thinking* had indeed arrived. Furthermore, it proved, in their opinion, that the goal of *reasonable sufficiency* was achievable. The signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was further evidence, together with the INF Treaty which had preceded it, that the Soviet Union could realize its goal of implementing a more *defensive* military doctrine without compromising the national security of the Union. Indeed, even a select group of highly placed military leaders saw the CFE as deserving of attention in that it supported the overall tenets of the *new thinking*. Defense Minister Yazov hailed the treaty as “... a high point in the history of mankind ...” in that it “... draws a line under the era of confrontation and opens up real prospects for the creation of ... lasting world peace without coercion.” [Ref. 108] This was somewhat of a more enthusiastic endorsement than what he had espoused during the conference itself. At one point during the proceedings, he had pointed out that the treaty caused to lessen the potential of the Soviet Armed Forces but simultaneously denied that such an action would result in an undermining of national security. [Ref. 109]

However, not all reaction was as favorable. In fact, a rather scathing indictment of the treaty was presented three months after its signing by First Deputy Chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, now General of the Army Lobov. General Lobov's comments shall be subsequently examined.

Coincident with the conclusion of the Paris Treaty, the USSR Armed Forces General Staff released its own draft version of a new Soviet military doctrine. Signed to press on 30 Nov 1990, it largely represented a counterbalance to Lopatin's more radical package of proposed reductions and restructuring but in such a way as not to alienate the growing number of reformers within the military. The new military draft package addressed two specific aspects of doctrine, **political and military technical**. Inclusive to those areas were specific points designed to appeal to the more reform-minded individuals but in no way did they fully represent what Lopatin and his colleagues felt were the changes which needed to occur. In order to appreciate the areas of controversy and disagreement concerning the General Staff produced doctrine, it is necessary to examine the draft itself.

A. GENERAL STAFF MILITARY DOCTRINE DRAFT PROPOSAL

1. Political Aspect

The political aspect centered around the premise that war was not winnable and therefore, should be rejected. This was the same view adopted in 1986 by Gorbachev and was at the core of the *new thinking*. The difference between previous statements on this subject and those included in the draft of the military doctrine was that while before the world had stood at the brink of nuclear holocaust, it now had stepped back from the brink of confrontation. The international situation was one of increased cooperation and therefore, members of the world community were obliged to sustain efforts to ensure a reduction in arms levels to "... a minimum agreed-upon level so that in providing for its defense,

1. *no side would have the means and capabilities for a surprise attack on another side, and*
2. *for conducting large-scale offensive operations.* [Ref. 110]

Additionally, and in the spirit of increased international security, the doctrine opened up the "... possibility of assigning its military contingent to the UN Armed Forces for peacekeeping operations in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution." [Ref. 111] Undoubtedly, this section was influenced as a direct result of the deteriorating geopolitical situation between the United Nations and Iraq following that country's invasion of Kuwait the preceding summer.

2. Military-Technical Aspect

Although the political aspect determined that the threat of military confrontation between East and West had lessened, it identified the United States' adherence to a military policy conducted from a *position of strength* as the principle, and largely, sole remaining military danger facing the USSR. Confrontation was still possible, asserted the draft proposal, insofar as the U.S. maintained the technological edge in weaponry thereby threatening to upset the level of parity between the superpowers. The importance of parity had been reduced in stature by both the pro-reform social scientists and by the like-minded reform advocates within the military. However, in the minds of the political and military leadership, it was still very much at the forefront of consideration when addressing the topic of arms and troop reductions.

The **military-technical** aspect of the doctrine identified the principal defense **missions** of the Armed Forces. They were divided between **peacetime** and **war** situations whereby a *sufficient level of defense* played a key role in determining in the case of the former situation, how well those forces a) ensured the inviolability of the national borders and b) provided a viable deterrent in order to prevent aggression. In the event hostilities did arise, the doctrine again called for a sufficient level of defense in order to ensure adequate repulsion of the invading forces, thereby bringing about "... the most rapid cessation of war and the restoration of a just and lasting peace." [Ref. 112]

Specific missions were assigned by the doctrine to both *strategic nuclear forces* and *general purpose/conventional forces*. The sufficiency of the strategic nuclear component of the Armed Forces was determined to be "... the *quantitative-qualitative parameters* of the nuclear potential necessary for *delivering a retaliatory strike*." This level of sufficiency was viewed as only an intermediate step in the process toward realizing the goal of total nuclear disarmament.

The application of *sufficient defense* to the realm of conventional forces involved "... that minimum quantity of them necessary for ensuring reliable defense, *but insufficient for conducting large-scale offensive operations*." [Ref. 113]

Generally, the draft proposal put forth by the General Staff fell far short of outlining specifics with regard to the individual services or even in providing particular guidance regarding the organizational changes that were admittedly required. The question of a change to the conscription laws remained largely unanswered, however, the draft did leave open the suggestion that "... a combination of universal military obligation and volunteer acceptance on military service under contract ..." was possible.

The issue of establishing inter-republic militia was rejected outright. As Gorbachev had expressed his previous displeasure with this concept, the General Staff echoed those sentiments as well: "The USSR Armed Forces are constructed on the following principles: ... extraterritoriality; sole command on a legal basis and the **centralization of leadership** ...". [Ref. 114]

In summary, the military doctrine draft proposal authored by the General Staff did not compare even remotely in substance, detail or depth with that of its Lopatin-sponsored counterpart. Overall, however, it was consistent, in principle, with the move towards a more *defensive-defense* posture as delineated by the Kokoshin-Larionov **variant three**, previously described.

B. THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE: APATHY AND DISSENT

1. Non-Commitment

Following the publication and dissemination of the new military doctrine draft to the press, the General Staff took the unusual step of inviting the services to respond to its content. The military publication *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* printed the invitation in its first edition of 1991, simply stating that "... now the general Army and Navy community has its chance for input." [Ref. 115]

Response was quick and ranged from apathy to pointed criticism. In an example that *glasnost*' had not quite conceptualized within the middle and even lower ranks of the military, *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* sent one of its staff writers to survey "... a number of units and subunits of the Volga-Ural Military District ..." and came away puzzled and disappointed that the proposal was not receiving the attention that it deserved. As the assigned correspondent wrote about the draft

I would prefer to say that it is being discussed everywhere actively, constructively, and with interest, but as yet there is no basis to make that kind of positive statement. [Ref. 116]

The paper expressed bewilderment that the document was perceived by the servicemen with an attitude "... incommensurate with the importance of this general program of changes in the state's military policy ... it is a fact that this is actually a matter of the future of the Army." [Ref. 117]

The responses of those military members interviewed portrayed a constituency clearly taken off-guard by the manner in which the proposal was presented to them, i.e., via the open press and not as an official release by the Main Political Directorate of the General Staff itself. One battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel S. Yermokhin, stated

... the document came to us in a nontraditional manner ... we learned of the [plan] from press reports; we found out the most by reading the magazine *VOYENNAYA MYSL*, the newspapers *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* and *PRAVI-TELSTVENNYY VESTNIK*, and the district newspaper *ZA RODINU*. **But why not from guidance documents of the Ministry of Defense ... ?** [Ref. 118]

Others, such as LtCol Yermokhin's executive officer simply were not interested in contributing: "I have no time to read. Too much work." [Ref. 119]

Contrary to the views expressed above, others *did respond* to the draft proposal and did so by using the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement as a litmus test by applying *reasonable sufficiency* and *sufficiency for defense* as viable concepts to the goals stated in the military doctrine proposal.

2. Objection

As has already been stated, General Lobov supported the concept of *reasonable sufficiency* but wholeheartedly disagreed with the Ministry of Defense and that body's method of determining what constituted reasonable defense levels. Specifically, he objected to the CFE Treaty and the numbers contained therein as they applied to reductions by the USSR in both manpower and armament compared with the reductions to be incurred by the West. Once again, the need to maintain parity with the West was of paramount importance and Lobov argued that the details of the treaty threatened to upset that balance in favor of the US/NATO alliance. He cited his view that western technology, command and control, quantitative and qualitative combat armament and the ability to project combat forces abroad rapidly and effectively were all superior to similar Soviet capabilities. These statements were influenced by observations of the successful build-up and use of a largely US-composed combat-ready force in the Middle East during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Regarding the capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reinforce theater-based force

groupings in Europe, Lobov stated that there was no comparison between the potential effectiveness of the rival military alliances in the event of future conflict – NATO held a definite edge. Finally, Lobov accentuated the superior industrial capacities of the U.S. and its NATO allies compared with those found in the East. In summary, Lobov stated

The facts cited provide all grounds to draw the conclusion that requirements of the concept of sufficiency for defense hardly can be fulfilled after a reduction of conventional arms and Armed Forces under the Paris Treaty. [Ref. 120]

Lobov did not limit the content of his article to mere criticism of the Treaty. He did offer solutions as to how to rectify the decisions of the Paris Treaty in order to bring force reductions more in-line with the concept of *reasonable sufficiency*.

Specifically, General Lobov presented an **eight point** plan of action, the gist of which are examined below:

- **First**, the quality of armaments produced in the future must be *at least equal but preferably superior* to those of NATO. This was an area which Lobov reminisced fondly about, referring to the technological edge enjoyed by the Soviet Union in tank warfare during World War II.
- **Second**, the quality of training must improve, to include an increase in allocated resources for this purpose.
- **Third**, he proposed that with the advent of new technology, the first-term soldier was incapable of attaining a sufficient operating knowledge level and therefore, a switch to a more specialized, professionally trained force was necessary.

- **Fourth**, he advocated a streamlining of command and control organizations whereby the peacetime structure should more closely resemble its wartime counterpart. This would then ameliorate much of the difficulty incurred when switching from a peacetime to a wartime posture.
- **Fifth**, with growing evidence that the Warsaw Pact's future was more than an uncertainty, Lobov called on expanding the number of bilateral political agreements with "... armies of allied countries ..." in order to achieve new levels of coordination.
- **Sixth**, again, using the experience of the Gulf War as an example, he emphasized the importance of both sea-based and land-based lines-of-communications in future conflicts. Therefore, attention should turn to enhancing their protection, particularly on land.
- **Seventh**, Lobov strongly advocated the USSR should dismantle or eliminate those former bases located in the countries of eastern Europe as Soviet ground forces withdrawals occurred. This would eliminate a built-in advantage given to advancing NATO armies in the event that territory became occupied during a future conflict.
- **Eighth**, related to the point dealing with the establishment of a professional Armed Forces, Lobov addressed his concern that the reserve forces required equal attention in terms of revision.

He ends his eight-point plan with the warning that "... if we fail to implement the paths mentioned in the shortest possible time periods, then there will be no force in Europe capable of withstanding the military potential of the NATO bloc."

[Ref. 121]

In his article, which mainly addresses the strategic implications of the Paris Treaty on the Soviet military doctrine, Lobov devotes much attention to the importance of SLOC's in terms of their effect on the land strategy of warfighting. In this regard, his assessment of their importance equals that of Chernavin's, previously examined. Lobov stresses that the protection of friendly SLOC's and the interdiction of hostile forces'. SLOC's contributed directly to the more important development of achieving political objectives in continental theaters of military operations. He, like Chernavin, uses the surrogate examples found in World War II to prove his point, as he lauded the decision of the Germans to continue with high levels of submarine construction (575 built during 1944-45) even when faced with having to shift to a policy of strategic-defense along the Soviet-German front during that same period.

Therefore, in response to his own question which pondered the role of the future Soviet fleet, he advocates their use in conducting aggressive operations against enemy naval combatants and merchant ships. He declares that this is not necessarily inconsistent with the more *defensive* nature of the new military doctrine due to the fact that the role of SLOCs in wartime represented an area of such importance that they deserved special consideration and, therefore, his opinion was totally justifiable.

... as applied to the Navy sufficiency for defense must be determined with consideration of the need for a successful struggle by ships and aircraft in ocean TVD's and *must bear an offensive nature despite the defensive content of Soviet military doctrine*. One should not fear this discrepancy, since the interest of national security are above all fears. [Ref. 122]

While it may not be remarkable that Lobov emphasized the importance of the continental aspect of strategic warfighting, it is notable that he, being an Army representative, applies the same value to the Navy's role in the overall scheme of formulating a military doctrine based on the concept of sufficient defense as does the Navy itself, as previously shown by the statements of Chernavin. The difference between the

two men and their philosophies regarding the new military doctrine lies with Lobov's urging to replace verbal formulations of the concept of *sufficiency for defense* with "... fully specific numerical values of criteria ..." contrasted with Chernavin's reluctance to apply **any** specifics to how the military can reduce to a level of *reasonable sufficiency*.

X. "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY" AND THE END OF THE UNION

The final chapter in this examination of the impact of *reasonable sufficiency* on the Soviet military in general and specific naval applications will be addressed for purposes of this research with events which followed the failed August 1991 coup. It is not the intent of this research to examine the political reasons which led to the attempted coup or the roles played by particular branches of the Armed Forces prior to or during the coup. Regarding this subject, it may be ascertained that collectively, the Armed Forces of the former USSR did not actively support the *putsch*. Rather, a select group of military leaders, mostly of higher rank, were counted among the instigators of the failed attempt to overthrow Gorbachev and their motives for doing so are beyond the purview of this paper. The researcher will limit discussion of the coup itself to an examination of the immediate personnel changes which occurred within the military following the events of 19-22 August.

A. THE AUGUST COUP: CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP

By the replacing of certain key individuals who had resisted or opposed *perestroika* within the military, the new political leadership within the Soviet government was in a much better position to enact reform and at an accelerated pace.

Immediate expectations of a purge within the military leadership were realized to an extent. Minister of Defense Yazov was replaced by the Chief of Aviation of the USSR, Colonel-General Yevgeniy I. Shaposhnikov. It was determined by a post-coup review of evidence that Shaposhnikov was instrumental in opposing the coup and at one point actually pressured Yazov into withdrawing the use of the military in support

of the coup. [Ref. 123] Shaposhnikov initially announced that he intended to replace upwards of 80% of the High Command, but later amended that proposal, focusing instead on only the highest echelons.

One such example of installing reform-minded leaders into key positions saw General Lobov replacing Moiseyev as Chief of the General Staff. This particular reassignment was important to the reform movement in that, as has been shown, Lobov had already gone on record as desiring concrete proposals describing that **exact** levels of *reasonable sufficiency* be identified, particularly in any future negotiations involving arms reductions. Lobov's appointment was indicative of the fact that large numbers of strategic planners and thinkers in the collegium and Defense Council would be replaced. One such victim was Oleg Baklanov, a deputy of the Defense Council who was identified as a pro-coup activist.

Lobov quickly asserted his authority following his new appointment and repeatedly established his strong intentions to go beyond the proposals previously cited in the military doctrine draft proposal. Indeed, Lobov stated in an article he authored in October 1991 that military reform, particularly applied to the Soviet military doctrine, needed to be elevated to yet a new level.

... there have been radical changes in the foreign military-political situation in Europe and the world as a whole, which are also initiating *a review of our country's military doctrine* under the influence of the new thinking and new realities. [Ref. 124]

His belief that "... a radical review of military doctrine is objectively due ..." centered around the restructuring of the military organization on the Union and republic levels. Specifically, he advocated a redrawing of military districts to coincide with the borders of each republic and that those forces within those republics would be responsible for the protection of their external borders. In total, this realignment would

capacity to repel rapid aggression contains some merit, especially when it is considered that the slant of the new military doctrine still relied heavily on ground forces to carry the brunt of the defensive fight. The authors argued that future repulsion of attacking forces would occur primarily in the air and not on the ground. Therefore, they advocated not only a less sweeping embrace of the proposed defensive strategy concepts, but even a more flexible fighting strategy with **offensive** combat elements.

In the opinion of these detractors of *defensive sufficiency*, the content of the new military doctrine was a *paper tiger* unless it set aside the provision for a significant *offensive capability*.

... there can be no talk about any prevention of war, deterrence of aggression or a crushing military rebuff *without creating a similar threat* to installations of other states ... one should *proclaim the right to repel aggression using all kinds, forms and methods of military operations ... and if necessary also preemptive actions ... [Ref. 128]*

Still, the opinions represented by the statements cited above were coming to represent a smaller and smaller circle of individuals. The pervasive view was that the concepts inherent to the new military doctrine were lasting and as such, were enjoying deepening support.

The effect of the changing landscape following the coup had affected the Navy as well. The depth of that effect can be measured by examining a view 'at dealt with the future of the Navy in the aftermath of the failed coup of August 19-22, 1991. Authored by Admiral Chernavin, it represents his opinion as to the structure and mission of the Union Navy and what they should be, given the changing political climate in the USSR following the failed coup attempt, and in reality, that which existed up to the dissolution of the Union itself. Its content serves to provide the reader with an appreciation for the extent to which *reasonable sufficiency* had affected the Navy throughout its development as a concept, which has been the purpose of this

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paper. It is appropriate therefore, that an analysis of the views presented in the article serve as the conclusion to this research topic.

B. CHERNAVIN ASSESSES THE FUTURE

While he did not actively support the coup attempt, Admiral Chernavin had historically resisted, and in some cases, openly rejected the reform process epitomized in the persons of Yeltsin, Shaposhnikov and Lobov. Therefore, it is unclear why he survived the Shaposhnikov-led purge efforts following the coup. Indeed, Chernavin was one of only two members of the former Branch Chiefs of the Armed Forces who retained their positions, the other being Army General Yurii Pavlovich Maksimov of the Strategic Rocket Forces. While the latter was shown to have been opposed to the attempted **putsch**, Admiral Chernavin's role had never been clarified. What is certain, is that he displayed resentment of the reform process prior to the coup attempt, both in theory and specific application, as this research has shown. Regardless, he continued to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces well after the shock-waves of the coup had subsided. In his continued capacity as Navy Chief, Chernavin dutifully outlined his concept of the Soviet Navy beyond those recent turbulent events which he survived. It is probable that while he did not foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union, his vision of the Soviet Navy can perhaps be seen as the future of the successor to that body.

Chernavin published his opinion on the missions, composition and overall continued strategic value of the Navy in the post-coup Soviet Union in November 1991 in *MORSKOY SBORNIK*. He began by reaffirming the correctness of the *new thinking* and its goal to reduce the threat of human extinction by reducing the global military threat, particularly regarding nuclear weapons. He pointed out that the 1987 INF Treaty and the 1990 CFE Treaty testified to the fact that significant progress had been made in this area. Chernavin also supported the goal of the Soviet military doctrine

adopted in 1987 as contributing to the realization of the *new thinking* by way of its more *defensive defense* posture. He added that while all of this contributed to a substantial reduction in the threat of global confrontation between the superpowers, the threat of *regional confrontation* was still very much a reality (exemplified by the Gulf War) and that such lesser confrontations had the potential *to develop into* global war. Therefore, military forces which provide a *sufficient level of defense* were necessary, indeed desirable, if the world's nations were to achieve true cooperation and international security. This security depended upon "... the fact that the Armed Forces of no state possess either striking or defensive supremacy" and in this regard, Chernavin opined that the Soviet military doctrine was totally in step. [Ref. 129]

Concerning the Navy, Chernavin espoused his oft repeated contention that the Soviet Navy existed as part of a unified strategy and as such, had no separate agenda to pursue. It contributed to the overall security of the Soviet Union and "... has never been considered to be some autonomous, self-contained system." In this sense, he echoed the sentiments of former Minister of Defense Ogarkov and that individual's assertion that there could be no unique maritime strategy.

Further, Chernavin explained that in its wartime function of supporting continental TVD groups of forces, the Navy could compensate by way of augmentation for "... whatever reductions or limitations the ground forces and land-based aviation are subjected to ..." as a result of the arms negotiations process.

Naval forces and manpower gain especial significance under contemporary conditions ... and more so in the long run *as the most universal and highly mobile branch of the Armed Forces*. This branch of the forces ... *remains outside the negotiating process aimed at reducing or substantially restricting the arms of the ground forces and of aviation*. [Ref. 130]

Chernavin identifies the two-fold purpose of the Navy as that of **deterrence and SLOC interdiction and protection**. He enumerates four elements associated with those missions, namely

1. **averting war** (essence of the new military doctrine = deterrence),
2. **repelling aggression** if deterrence fails,
3. **protection of troops and facilities** from sea-borne strikes, and
4. **depriving the enemy's use of contiguous waters** for purposes of conducting offensive operations.

These missions are consistent with the previously examined teachings of the *Soviet School* examined which espoused a naval presence that, while not coastal in nature, reflected a layering of maritime defenses positioned relatively close to home. Accordingly, these missions necessitated utilizing platforms designed specifically for employment in those *zones of defense*.

On the subject of specific missions-to-platform linkage, Chernavin identifies the deterrence role as the remaining responsibility of the strategic submarine force. Since deterrence of war has been shown to be *the primary goal* of the new military doctrine, the SSBN will probably remain the most significant tool by which that goal will be achieved and simultaneously retain its position of importance ahead of the other naval force components.

The general-purpose forces will be charged with conducting "... physical preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any conditions ..." while concurrently "... inflicting defeat on enemy naval strike groups ... as well as ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the effective performance of *defensive operations in the continental theaters of military operations ...*". [Ref. 131]

Having identified the missions of the Navy in future peacetime and wartime scenarios as well as the platforms designated to carry out those missions, Chernavin next addresses the prospect of what the future holds for force structure composition. Faced with the inevitable (however unpleasant) reality of significantly reduced funding for the Navy, Chernavin again underscores the significance assigned to the survivability of the SSBNs by outlining the course of future spending within the Navy regarding new ship construction. Briefly, his plan calls for a halt in SSBN construction while emphasizing the enhancement of non-SSBN submarine programs, both nuclear and diesel. These submarines, together with the strike capability of smaller surface ships and naval aviation, will comprise the "... foundation of the strike potential of the fleet ..." and provide the dual capability to protect *bastioned* SSBNs while actively engaging in an *active fleet-in-being* type defense. Chernavin makes a notable effort to emphasize the importance of increasing the number of aircraft carriers to the Soviet naval order of battle as a means to compensate for a simultaneous reduction (up to 60% total; 75% strike units) in shore-based naval aviation units. He justifies this transfer of responsibility by stating that "... carrier-based fighter and ASW aircraft are able to operate much more effectively than shore-based aviation for analogous purposes ...". [Ref. 132] This equates to a *force-multiplier* situation and in the event of conflict, Chernavin states that it is actually more cost-effective for the Navy to build conventional aircraft carriers than to reject the concept of sea-based fighters.

Military scientific research that has been carried out confirms that the use of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers in certain operational sectors *raises the combat capabilities of the groups* by 1.5-2 times and leads to a significant decrease in the losses of our forces ... Even if we were to talk only about the value of the forces preserved, *it is several times all of the spending on the creation and operation of the ... KUZNETSOV class.* [Ref. 133]

With the planned reduction in shore-based SNA, the absence of strike aircraft onboard aircraft carriers and the simultaneous reduction in the building of large surface combatants (Chernavin specifically refers only to continued construction of *SOVREMENYY* class guided-missile destroyers), the capability to conduct future SLOC interdiction in the outer zones of defense would appear to be the primary responsibility of shorter-range missile surface platforms combined with contemporary long-range cruise-missile subs and cruisers.

Finally, Chernavin described his desire to institute a greater level of cooperation or, "... mutual confidence-building ..." between the naval powers. Specifically, he called for a reduction in the frequency of naval exercises and the increase of on-scene observers on an exchange basis. It is this point which is perhaps most ironic concerning the impact that *the new thinking* had on *sufficiency for defense* within the former Soviet Navy. Admiral Chernavin, an individual who once questioned the prudence of permitting the application of *glasnost*' to the military, was now counted among the strongest advocates of exchanging information and granting access to former enemies, information which only a few years before was among the most closely held of any state secret. Additionally, he now assumed a position which perceived the reduction in force levels in view of a greatly diminished threat from abroad as necessary and desirable. Prior to the introduction of the concept of *reasonable sufficiency* and its adoption as part of the new military doctrine, such a belief was in total contrast to traditional Soviet ideology and the practice of socialism.

C. CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that the principle of *reasonable sufficiency* had a significant impact on reevaluating the mission of the Soviet military in general and that of the Navy in particular during the period of reform from 1985 to 1991 in the former Soviet

Union. During the course of this research, in excess of 300 original source documents were examined for pertinency of which approximately 70% contributed information relevant to the subject.

Content analysis proved extremely valuable during this research, largely due to the prodigious amount of information available with which to measure the impact of *reasonable sufficiency* on the Navy, primarily for two reasons.

- **First**, as the era of reform gained momentum, the amount of material produced came to represent an ever widening circle of authors with equally varying positions. This trend has increased with the writings of heretofore unknown authors in newly independent nations now having to be considered.
- **Second**, due to the rapidity of unfolding events combined with the brevity of the period covered, content analysis became inherently more valuable than deployment/exercise analysis could have been and certainly a more acceptable method than tracing hardware procurement, development and utilization.

This is not to say that content analysis should be relied upon to provide a complete and finished analysis of how the former Soviet Navy was impacted by the concept of *reasonable sufficiency*. In support of this method, the author utilized limited hardware/deployment evidence in order to confirm patterns and points of discussion. For example, the most recent statements by the naval hierarchy advocating a *closer-to-home* defensive posture could easily be supported by evidence in reductions of both larger surface platform construction and out-of-area deployments by such units. Limits involving principally smaller ship construction and emphasis on reduced naval aviation exercise activity tend to sustain simultaneous calls for a **variant-three** type defensive defense.

Differences in themes promulgated internally and externally to the former Soviet Union were negligible. Regardless of the author, dominant areas of agreement and disagreement among the participant were consistent as to content. For example, what Marshal Akhromeyev was saying in front of the House Armed Services Committee was similar to interviews given on Soviet television and in published journals and newspapers in Moscow. As the era of *glasnost*' emerged, this consistency became especially pronounced, for obvious reasons. Whether or not the debate was intended to widen is not within the realm of this discussion.

Beginning with the concept of *new thinking*, then General Secretary Gorbachev introduced during the 27th CPSU Congress, the impetus for change in the Soviet military doctrine and a review/reevaluation of its declared defensive qualities. In so doing, Gorbachev acted in the role traditional to Soviet (and Tsarist) politicians; he asserted the dominance of the civilian over the military element of society. This relationship is deeply ingrained in the traditions of Russian/Slavic governments. Therefore, while it was natural for the radical *new thinking* to be advanced by the former Soviet president, any successor to the reigns of political power in Russia and the former Soviet republics will probably originate like concepts as well, in lieu of any military initiative.

The civilian leadership and its military counterpart are part of a larger bureaucracy, and as such, each will continue in the need to communicate its respective positions. Based on that assumption, future content analytical examination is certainly justified, if not warranted. It is from these sources that content analysis may then be used to extract clues to possible future national military policy. The author does not advocate replacing existing traditional sources of analysis with empirical methods. It is for good reason that future studies should continue to originate from reliable and established sources (i.e., Center for Naval Analysis, academic contributors, private contracts, etc.). The author does recommend, however, that content analysis be used in a

supplementary fashion to traditional information assessment methods. Contributions of this kind with the goal toward understanding future intent is inherent to any intelligence effort. The methodology utilized herein has applications outside the study of the former Soviet Union as well. As our nation's intelligence community begins a concerted shift of focus toward more regional areas of interest, Navy intelligence will certainly share an expanding role in those efforts as well.

Internal to the Armed Forces, it is unlikely as well that the successor to the Soviet leadership will abandon the historical view that the Navy remain supportive to both the strategic rocket forces and ground forces. Results of this research have shown that Navy participation in the new military doctrine debate was limited. Discussion regarding policymaking and formulation of doctrinal changes was largely dominated by representatives of the Ground and Strategic Rocket Forces. The Navy, consistent with its traditional supporting role in the military hierarchy, played a relatively minor role in terms of a naval contribution to the development of a new military doctrine during the era of *new thinking*. So for the present as well as probably the future, the *blue-suit* representatives of the Navy will echo the doctrine of their *green-suit* brethren.

Applied to the Soviet Navy, the changes which occurred during the time covered in this study were significant. This research has shown how the Navy, in accordance with the 1987 adoption of the new defensive military doctrine, transformed from an admittedly offensive role in the operational art of war (despite its *defensive* definition) to a declaratory one indicative of a more defensive posture. Throughout the era of prolific change examined in this paper, the basic declaratory defensive posture and mission of the Soviet Navy developed as a result of 1) *political* and 2) *economic* elements of reform, introduced at a remarkable rapid rate.

Incorporating elements of the *Soviet School* and its concept of a *limited command-of-the-sea*, the *active fleet-in-being* maritime strategy serves as the basis for the defensive posture which resulted from those reform elements. The area which stands most affected by *reasonable sufficiency* is the former Soviet SSBN strategic missile force. As a strategic nuclear asset, the SSBN fleet is considered an element to be eliminated under the guidance of *new political thinking* which teaches that a nuclear war is not winnable and therefore, its potential components are undesirable. However, the practical reality is such that parity remains a desirable element in the minds of the political and military leadership of the former Soviet Union and therefore, any arms control agreements involving the reduction of Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles must be linked to parallel reductions in opposing triad arsenals. Another major effect that *reasonable sufficiency* had on the Soviet military was the opportunities it provided for a new era of open debate on the subject of the Soviet military doctrine. Prior to its introduction, the Soviet military doctrine was under the monopolistic guidance of a relatively few individuals who did not encourage input on the subject. Following its introduction as a concept, *reasonable sufficiency* became a popular topic of discussion among select senior military officers, growing numbers of lower echelon military officers and social scientists alike.

While many uncertainties remain regarding the implementation of the concept of *reasonable sufficiency*, we may be assured that the debate is ongoing and its results continue to be measured both inside the former Soviet Union and from abroad.

While it was not the purpose of this paper to parallel discussion of former Soviet military matters with an assessment of how the United States naval force was or will be impacted, it is necessary to briefly describe such a relationship.

With its demise, the military arsenal of the former Soviet Union remains a formidable force with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. While it might be

tempting to overestimate the threat reduction which has undeniably occurred, such optimism must be tempered with realism. The former Soviet Navy's ability to deploy intercontinental strategic nuclear strike assets remains, albeit in reduced numbers and frequency. Additionally, the fundamental role of the Navy in the new *defensive defense* retains ambiguous aspects as to surface and air unit deployment parameters.

The U.S. Navy force planning and programming efforts have traditionally stemmed from a reaction to past Soviet maritime-related strategies and platform employment. Until recently, Soviet *bastion* defense, open-ocean ASW and forward deployed forces contributed to the overall Western maritime posture. Now that the Soviet state has collapsed, thereby fostering the need for a reassessment of traditional naval roles and missions, future topical Russian debate warrants no less of a close scrutiny. For example, if, as has been shown, Chernavin's desire that future SSBN construction be halted for a significant period, (i.e., the next decade), then the need to counter enhanced *bastion* defenses would be of even greater import to Western navies, thereby strengthening the argument for more capable coastal ASW platforms such as *CENTURION* class SSNs. [Ref. 134]

In summary, it is prudent to bear in mind Russian maritime forces will probably retain the position of the world's second most powerful maritime power at least for the remainder of the century. By tracing the historical development of *reasonable sufficiency for defense*, it is hoped that this paper will help provide some insight into the possible future role and structure of that successor and its potential effect on the U.S. Navy. However, whatever developments occur in the future, it is certain that their roots will be traced to this remarkable era.

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