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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY
DOUGLAS W. MIKATARIAN
JUNE 1992
Thesis Advisor: David S. Yost

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**West European Defense Identity:
Implications for U.S. Security Policy**

by

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
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
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This thesis examines whether the development of a West European defense identity could result in the marginalization of the United States in European security affairs. The fundamental changes in the European security environment since 1989 provide the starting point for the analysis. The thesis reviews U.S. and West European assessments of the risks and threats affecting European security, and several of the other key issues associated with the quest for West European defense identity: motives for such an identity, prospects for West European nuclear cooperation, Germany's role, and NATO's future in the changing security environment. The thesis concludes that, while many factors in European-American relations and international politics will shape the future of the Atlantic Alliance, the U.S. government, and the Congress in particular, will play perhaps the pivotal role in determining the extent of future U.S. participation in European security affairs.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The dizzying pace of world events since the fall of 1989 has surpassed the powers of comprehension of most decision-makers (and analysts). The world order in place since the end of the Second World War faded with the revolutions of Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union relegated it to the annals of history. The East-West paradigm which shaped most American foreign policy decision-making for over forty years has disappeared, and with it the foundations of many of the institutions dependent upon the Cold War.

A. HYPOTHESIS AND PURPOSE

This thesis examines several of the key issues affecting the future of the American security relationship with Europe. Specifically, it attempts to answer the question, "Will the United States be reduced to a marginal role in European security affairs owing to the emergence of a more autonomous West European defense identity?" In order to prepare for this analysis, it is necessary first to review key elements of the recent history of European security affairs. This introduction then considers various issues concerning alliance affairs, especially those dealing with the formation and cohesion of alliances.

B. RECENT WORLD CHANGES

Shortly after the end of World War II, the political and military scene in Europe developed into a distinct bipolar order. Soviet troops of occupation remained in Eastern Europe, and these nations were denied the opportunity to implement promised democratic reforms. The beginning of the Cold War and the development of alliance systems based on this bipolarity were to shape strategic planning worldwide for the next forty years. Nearly every political event throughout the world was analyzed in terms of its significance for the East-West struggle, whether it be in East Asia, South America, or West Africa. The Soviets and the Americans engaged in a contest for the loyalties of both established and newly independent governments across the globe. Proxy wars were common; as important as were the Arab-Israeli Wars to the combatants, the results were often portrayed as victories and defeats for the superpowers. In addition, fear of the "domino effect" came to influence much strategic planning.

The international system resulting from bipolarity was characterized by the formation of numerous security alliances. Though the most important was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), other "Western" alliances included the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Each was tasked with carrying out President Truman's containment policy, designed to resist the spread of Communism. The containment of Communism was a

major rationale for the Korean War and for the effort to prevent the fall of South Vietnam. Much of President Reagan's foreign policy involved contesting Communist regimes and insurgents all over the globe. Political events were considered peripheral if not directly involved in the Cold War struggle; the fight to contain Communism was one of the supreme political goals of the West.

The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Union, and that empire's subsequent decline and collapse, have led to a paradigm shift among Western strategic planners. No longer simply able to base their defense needs on the requirement to meet the Soviet threat, Western countries must reexamine the missions of their military forces and the reasons for maintaining the alliances in which they have participated. While most believe that the newly introduced uncertainty is preferable to the possibility of a catastrophic superpower nuclear exchange that was inherent in the Cold War, some analysts, such as John J. Mearsheimer, believe that the stability and predictability of the Cold War will be missed.¹ The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 has opened the door for the entrance of new players into the central forum of international politics. Germany's 1990 reunification has introduced a powerful economic entity that is beginning to assert political power commensurate with its

¹John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic Monthly, August 1990.

economic strength. The directions Germany chooses in the future will be crucial to the future of Western security.

As the bipolar order has crumbled, its replacement is as yet uncertain. The quick fall of the USSR conferred on the United States the position of the world's sole superpower, a role the U.S. played during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis and war. Still, this does not mean that a unipolar system is inevitable, especially as the relative importance of military, political, and economic sources of influence is in flux. Some have recommended German and Japanese permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, while others have expressed interest in the European Community (EC) assuming such status. As Russia recovers from the pain of Communism, its future political status will be uncertain. China may also play a larger role in international politics in the 1990s. American strategic planners must take all these possible scenarios into account as they examine the international environment in which the U.S. will carry out foreign and security policy in the coming years.

C. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

An important change in post-Cold War politics is the acceleration of the process of European integration. Stemming from the 1948 Brussels Pact and the 1950 European Coal and Steel Community, the union process has progressed toward a common market, monetary union, some components of social and

political union, and certain aspects of united foreign and security policies. European integration is important because it shows how Western Europe changed as a result of World War II, after which the world's leading powers became the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe's historical powers, unable to defend themselves or rebuild individually, were forced to seek strength through unity, ultimately backed up by the U.S. As one British scholar has stated,

[The North Atlantic] pact...revealed the inability of [Britain and France] not only to shape the postwar world, but to defend themselves. In 1939 Britain and France were seen to be the world's leading powers; ten years later they needed American support to survive.²

In the years since, the integration process has both deepened and widened, culminating in the planned 1992 economic integration agreed to in Luxembourg in 1987 and confirmed in Maastricht in 1991. While there are limits to the degree of actual and projected integration, such as Britain's ability to "opt out" of monetary union, the EC has established itself as an economic bloc and as a political force. Efforts are also underway to transform economic union into political union, a more difficult undertaking. As an outgrowth, and partly as a result of efforts to satisfy American demands for more balanced burden-sharing and the need for insurance in the event the U.S. ever failed to honor its security commitment,

²John W. Young, Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe, 1945-1951 (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1984), 107.

the Europeans have embarked on attempts to define and conduct common security policies.

The process of redesigning European security, involving the attribution of roles to NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), CSCE, the EC, and possibly other institutions, is far from showing a clear direction, however. Each of the major players (France, Germany, Britain, to a lesser extent Italy, and of course the United States) has its own goals for the process; their goals sometimes mesh but often do not. Moreover, there are serious divergences within the domestic political entities of the key nations which increase the complexity of the security picture. In one sense, moves toward a common security policy and in time a common defense reflect the view of many that such policies will complete the process of West European integration, and as such are essential. At the same time, however, the December 1991 Maastricht Summit highlighted the differences among the EC members that make the challenge of forging common policies particularly difficult. One important driver for those favoring and opposing common defense policies is the future course of the United States, which remains unclear yet sure to wield considerable influence.

D. CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES

The post-Cold War United States finds itself in a much different condition than the country which emerged from the

Second World War as one of the most powerful nations history has ever known. The consensus that formed to permit and support institutionalized American involvement in European political and military affairs has been shaken as a result of a number of domestic pressures. The chronic U.S. budget and trade deficits of the 1980s have led to calls for large cuts in defense spending, including in Europe, as well as for various types of protectionism. The issue of burden-sharing has gained political momentum as the Soviet threat has evaporated. The stalemate of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks to progress has hinted at the link between transatlantic trade relations and security ties.

The American public has shown, in a number of recent opinion surveys, that it would like the government to shift much of its attention from international and military affairs to domestic issues.³ At the same time, pressure on Congress to adopt protectionist measures has increased with the growth of anti-foreigner sentiments around the country, notably "Japan-bashing" protests about Japanese trade practices. Prominent individuals, such as Pat Buchanan with his "America First" campaign, add to the pressure for the U.S. to withdraw from many of its overseas commitments, including those in Europe.

³See for example R.W. Apple, Jr., "Majority in Poll Fault Focus by Bush on Global Policy but Back New Order," New York Times, October 11, 1991, A8.

Much of what is transpiring on both sides of the Atlantic stems from what is perceived as a loss of American power and influence. Though the purpose here is not to attempt a thorough survey of power and its measurement, American influence in Europe has changed in several ways since the early postwar period. Clearly, the relative economic weight of the United States has changed considerably from the late 1940's and early 1950's, when its undamaged wartime economy was dominant. Economic growth has made Japan the world's largest creditor and has shifted much economic power away from the U.S. In addition, the recent steps toward amalgamation of most West European nations into one prospering and growing entity (the combination of European Community and European Free Trade Association countries) with a larger market than the U.S. further changes the balance of economic power.

Perhaps the most important factor is that the significance of the various types of power has changed with the passing of the Cold War. As significant as economic and political power have been, the very nature of the perceived threat from the Soviets ensured that military power, of which the U.S. held a preponderant share in the West, would be the most important type. Without the Soviet threat, and with the perception that the American economy has weakened relative to Europe and Japan, Europe's economic power may serve to diminish American influence in Europe. Joseph Nye has noted the diffusion of power through economic interdependence, transnational actors,

nationalism in weaker states, the spread of technologies, and the rise to importance of new political issues.⁴ At the same time, however, it should be recalled that, as the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War indicated, decisive political and diplomatic power continues to reside in the United States. According to Nye, "The natural decline [of American power] after 1945 is often exaggerated by comparison with a mythical past, when America allegedly 'bestrode the world.'"⁵ Shifts in both the amount and type of power will significantly affect the future of U.S.-European security relations.

E. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE

The American public's desire that the federal government devote greater attention to domestic issues than to foreign affairs has been adopted by a Congress that has increasingly asserted its role in the making of foreign policy. With the end of the clear Soviet threat, Congress as a whole will be able to take advantage of its Constitutional powers of the purse, while the Senate will have added clout in the advising and consenting over much policy-making. This is significant because of the added pressure on the President to take policy initiatives, knowing the Congress is poised to do so in the

⁴Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 182.

⁵Ibid., 21.

absence of executive leadership. These developments confer much more power on the Congress than previously existed.

Regional aspects of American planning will also play an important role in the future. Considerable U.S. attention has shifted toward the Pacific Rim. Already providing the largest American trade market as well as a growing segment of the American population, Asia is gaining importance in U.S. strategic planning.⁶ As a result, and coupled with additional attention focusing on the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, Europe is losing some of its predominance in American concentration.

Still, there is no denying the importance of U.S. ties to Europe. Historical ties and cultural heritage are significant, as is the economic relationship between the U.S. and the EC, especially after 1992. Concern about potential instability in Europe in the near future will also help to perpetuate the American desire to retain influence in European security affairs. In order to keep this influence, NATO will have to survive the Cold War. As one of many members with nominally equal votes in the CSCE, and no voice in the EC or WEU, the United States will have to rely on NATO to keep that influence in the future. The future of not only American

⁶For purposes of comparison, the "Asian" trading bloc consists of Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian states. The data used to rank the various trading blocs were drawn from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington, D.C., March 1992, 141.

forces but also American influence in Europe is highly fluid. European integration will have an impact, as will executive-legislative wrangling in Washington. U.S. strategic planning is entering into a new period with few givens, yet it has the responsibility to plan a viable, cost-effective military posture.

F. A EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY AND ALLIANCE THEORY

Alliance cohesion depends on commonly perceived needs and interests. Stephen M. Walt, in The Origins of Alliances, theorizes that alliances are formed in order to balance a threat. Walt compares his theory to a greatly simplified view of balance of power theory, in which potential alliance members choose sides so as to create an overall power balance. In this way states prevent others from achieving a dominant position.⁷ Walt considers this theory to be mistaken, in that too many historical examples exist of nations joining with much stronger powers in contrast to power balancing

⁷Walt's analysis, primarily drawn from his article "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead," Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 1989, streamlines at least twenty theories of the "balance of power" into one which he uses for purposes of comparison. He notes in his article that he has drawn upon the work of Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 126-7 and passim, but Waltz acknowledges the presence of numerous theories, especially several identified by Ernst Haas, Martin Wight, and Hans Morgenthau. It is important to note that Walt has not thoroughly defined the theory to which he is comparing his own; however, Walt's generalized description of the "balance of power" is sufficient for differentiating it from his own theory.

behavior. In its place, the "balance of threat" theory holds that nations facing a common threat join forces in opposition.⁸ In addition, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions of the potential aggressor help cement the alliance. The balance of threat theory is especially effective in explaining the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in the post-1945 period. Even though the United States was the predominant world power after the Second World War, the Western European countries quickly allied themselves with it because of the commonly perceived Soviet threat.

The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 brought about a significant change from the Soviet Union on the international political scene. Recognizing the perception held by others of his country which led to the counteractions Walt's system describes, Gorbachev acted to overcome its reputation.

Since Gorbachev's emergence as general secretary, Soviet diplomacy has focused on the single overriding goal of reducing the threat that other nations perceive from the USSR.⁹

⁸Walt's book, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), primarily analyzes postwar alliance behavior in the Middle East. He uses this region to show that his theory applies outside the bipolar superpower relationship. Much of the subsequent description in this section is drawn from Walt's article, "Alliances in theory and practice: What lies ahead," which analyzes NATO at that time using his book's framework.

⁹Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 4.

Just as for years Soviet leaders had attempted to undermine NATO's cohesion, one of Gorbachev's motives may well have been the same. Where all before him had failed, however, Gorbachev's attempt had the greatest prospect for success because it weakened the strongest base for the alliance - the unifying threat. Without the threat the alliance would lose much of its traditional military purpose; cohesion would become vulnerable.

The Soviet military nevertheless remained quite powerful. The NATO countries were able to recognize the difference between capabilities and intentions and demanded more definitive action by the Soviets. Much has changed since Walt's 1989 analysis, however. Given the changes in Eastern Europe since 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it is necessary to reexamine Walt's theory and to consider other theories.

Threat-based planning is essential in producing a national military strategy. Without threats to consider, it would be especially difficult to convince a skeptical Congress to spend huge sums on the defense establishment. Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has articulated the need for threat-based planning because

...no other approach to force planning tells you how much is enough...[and]...what citizens look for from their national security establishment is protection of their

vital interests against things they perceive as threatening them.¹⁰

It is also incumbent upon the members of alliances to hold common views on what threatens them in order for their alliances to thrive.

NATO¹¹ has gained considerable strength since its founding in 1949. Balancing the continuing threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc as a whole contributed greatly to alliance maintenance. Other factors augmented NATO's cohesion. First, David Mitrany describes how the ability of an alliance's members to handle the growing complexity and importance of technical issues is enhanced by institutional cooperation, which in turn reinforces the alliance itself.¹² NATO has been a central forum for discussion and policy-making in areas ranging from arms control and aid to Eastern Europe to world security issues.

Second, Karl Deutsch postulates that the continued cohesion of an alliance depends on three factors: compatible

¹⁰Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era," House Armed Services Committee, January 24, 1992, 3.

¹¹NATO will be employed as the example for the alliance theories examined here because of its familiarity and ease of use. Nevertheless, these theories have general applications and should be considered applicable to actual and potential alliances discussed throughout this thesis.

¹²Mitrany's theory as well as the subsequent ones in this section are discussed in James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 419.

values, predictability of behavior, and the responsiveness of allies to each other's needs.¹³ Though many political conflicts have arisen throughout NATO's history, such as those over France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure as well as INF issues, Deutsch's factors reflect the alliance's strengths and have prevailed over the long term. A third factor is the "sense of community" that develops over the lifetime of an alliance, which may prevent its dissolution when its objective is met.¹⁴ This sense of community serves to institutionalize the alliance in the domestic politics of the members, further reinforcing it.¹⁵

With the passing of the Soviet Union, the major factor underlying NATO's formation has seemingly ceased to exist. Robert Osgood has described alliances as "latent war communities,"¹⁶ and if that is all NATO is, then it has no chance for survival, regardless of any new political missions it can assume. Additionally, it will be exceedingly difficult for any other European alliance to establish itself, unless the EC becomes a truly supra-national state. On the other hand, significant threats in the post-Cold War world remain that, while less deadly than a superpower conflict, would best

¹³Ibid., 426.

¹⁴George F. Liska and William R. Riker, in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 449.

¹⁵Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 11.

¹⁶Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 448.

be handled multilaterally. It is apparent, then, that many motivating factors exist which could promote NATO's cohesion or contribute to its disintegration.

Since the threat is so fundamental to the formation and cohesion of an alliance, chapter two of the thesis examines the threats facing Europe. European and American perspectives are considered to determine whether any basis for an alliance exists. Next, considering the impact that greater West European security autonomy might have on U.S.-European security relations, this eventuality is analyzed from European and American perspectives. Implications of potential West European security autonomy for the United States are highlighted. The next chapter of the thesis focuses on the two West European nuclear powers, Britain and France, and their potential nuclear cooperation, again with due attention to implications for the United States. As nuclear weapons have been considered both a status symbol and instruments of national sovereignty, they illustrate well the changing nature of European security.

The role of Germany in European security structures is treated separately, primarily analyzing the domestic and international forces acting on German politics. This chapter is particularly important because of Germany's role as a pillar in both NATO and the EC/WEU structures. Next, the future of NATO is examined, in view of the previously analyzed topics and domestic political trends in the United States.

Finally, an attempt is made to draw together recurrent themes and to identify the critical factors in the interrelationships among the key nations. This analysis illustrates the implications for the United States of actions the Europeans are taking as well as of those in progress in the U.S.

II. THREATS AND DEFENSE ALLIANCES

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what security risks and threats might justify the maintenance of a European military alliance, whether it be NATO or any other pact. Richard Hart Sinnreich's 1975 observation is still appropriate: "The danger [of NATO's unravelling] is greater when the threat against which the alliance is principally directed declines, or is perceived to do so."¹⁷ Though this comment referred to the Soviet threat, it applies equally to any threat(s) around which an alliance is formed. This analysis draws its theoretical basis largely from Walt's balance of threat theory, in order to consider the threats described by leading officials from Western Europe and the United States. It then offers judgments as to whether as a whole these risks and threats are likely to sustain an alliance. The chapter begins with a review of some traditional views of the postwar threats to Europe. It proceeds to an analysis of the threats within Europe from European and American perspectives, and then does the same with threats originating outside Europe. It concludes with an

¹⁷Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma," Orbis, Summer 1975, 461.

explanation of why the post-Cold War risks and threats will probably be sufficient to justify a continued Atlantic Alliance and a Western European security alliance.

B. TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF THE THREAT

The paramount security concern for the United States and its European allies after World War II was the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This threat was perceived as being manifest in different ways by different countries. Greatly simplified, Konrad Adenauer saw a direct military threat to West Germany; the British and French envisioned threats to their empires; and the United States saw the threat through the operation of the domino theory. A clear picture of how the threat was considered in the past is important in understanding how it has changed in the post-Cold War period, especially across national perspectives.

The British and the French emerged from World War II on the second tier of world powers, displaced from the top tier by the United States and the Soviet Union. The psychological reaction to this change was as significant as the real implications of this shift in international security. Initially, the French in particular feared the threat of a revived Germany, while the British, though less fearful, were

still cautious.¹⁸ In time, however, the concerns of the two nations shifted. Both the British and French were left with declining empires, the dissolution of which accelerated in the late 1950s, but which both were determined to keep in some form. Though both were concerned with the Soviet threat on the central front, each had to deal with threats to its empire, whether inspired by the Soviets or not.¹⁹ The possession of worldwide colonial interests, as opposed to the overarching anti-Soviet global scope of the United States, forced British and French attention to be split. The prime concern remained in Central Europe, but forces and planning were devoted to threats of national concern elsewhere.

In West Germany's case, the concern focused exclusively on the Soviet military threat in Central Europe. Konrad Adenauer cast his lot firmly with the United States and the West, and in so doing had the support of the overwhelming majority of the West German people.²⁰ Even into the 1980's public opinion largely reflected this opinion. Germany has shown

¹⁸For a detailed description of the postwar German question see John W. Young, Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951 (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1984).

¹⁹Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic Options in the 1990's, Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), 14.

²⁰Mary Fitzgerald, et al., Challenges to NATO Strategy - Implications for the 1990's, National Security Research, 1990, 184.

little interest in threats outside the NATO area. Only reluctantly did Germany participate in Operation Desert Storm by sending frigates and mine countermeasures ships to the eastern Mediterranean and protecting aircraft to NATO ally Turkey.²¹ As the Soviet threat has declined, a majority of Germans has come to view the Soviets and their successors favorably,²² a product of closer bilateral relations begun by the policy of *Ostpolitik*.²³ During the Cold War, alliance membership was imperative as the threat was unquestioned; the Cold War's end has raised new uncertainties.

For the United States the threat has been broad but simple: halting the spread of Communism. Beginning with George Kennan's "X" article of 1947, the United States has pursued a policy of containment for this purpose.²⁴ For

²¹Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," Survival, May/June 1991, 250-5.

²²A recent German poll showed almost three-quarters of those surveyed (ranging across political party lines) viewed the Soviets very favorably or somewhat favorably. Taken before the August 1991 coup and subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union, it is clear that such an attitude toward the Soviets and their successors remains strong. See Ralf Zoll, "Public Opinion on Security Policy and Armed Forces: The German Case," paper presented at the International Meeting on the Future of Security in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of European Public Opinion, Brussels, December 16-17, 1991, 18.

²³Peter Meroth, "Germany 2000: The State We Want for Ourselves," Suddeutsche Zeitung, January 4, 1991, 8-15 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service - West Europe Daily Report [hereafter designated FBIS-WE], January 15, 1991, 22).

²⁴X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947 (reprinted in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1987).

years the Americans viewed nearly any threat or crisis as Communist-inspired, and military planners reacted accordingly. Though recent analyses have speculated that the threat from the Warsaw Pact may have been overestimated, it is nevertheless clear that this threat thoroughly dominated U.S. planning.²⁵ The domino theory of the 1960's and 1970's was popularly used to explain simply the American view of the Soviet threat. This U.S. view differed from that of some of America's key allies, in that while the U.S. view concentrated on the central front in Europe, it demonstrated worldwide concern. This differentiation might, under less threatening circumstances, reduce alliance cohesion, because of the importance of common perceptions of the threat. A survey of current threat perspectives is, therefore, essential in determining whether significant European-American divergences exist.

C. RISKS ORIGINATING WITHIN EUROPE

1. European Perspectives

In order for the threat or security risk to be sufficient to warrant the continuation either of NATO or another security alliance in Western Europe, it must be viewed

²⁵Report of the Defense Policy Council of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, "The Fading Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline," 101st Cong., 2nd sess., July 9, 1990, 3.

to be sufficiently serious by each of the main participants. As already described, these main actors are the UK, France, Germany, and in some cases Italy, though the views of other nations should be taken into account in a comprehensive analysis. Without the threat, there would be no reason for nations to take part in organizations other than those promoting political or economic cooperation. As a result, this examination considers threat assessments as seen by each of the primary actors. In discussing threats involving the former Soviet Union, the word "risk" often replaces the word "threat," as in NATO documents, not only to reflect the warming of relations between East and West, but also to emphasize the level of uncertainty which now exists in Europe.

The Western Europeans consider that several risks or threats to security remain in Europe, including instability in the newly independent former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, the spillover of refugees and/or fighting from the East, and the possibility of a resurgent Russia. In addition, some have expressed concern about the possibility of instability in Western Europe itself, fearing the revival of the nationalism that was subdued in the wake of two world wars.²⁶ Prominent Germans have spoken of the need to form as

²⁶The terms stability and instability have often been used rather loosely both in the literature and in official government statements. Webster's New World Dictionary (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980) defines stability as "the state or quality of being stable, or fixed; steadiness," or "the capacity of an object to return to equilibrium or to its

quickly as possible a new security structure in Europe while the Germans maintain their pro-European stance, in order to dissipate any concerns over post-reunification German nationalism. As Chancellor Kohl has stated, "I advise anyone afraid of the Germans to join in building a firm roof over Germany. Then these fears will be completely overcome."²⁷ NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has spoken of the need for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Europe to prevent the return of the nationalistic rivalries for power that plagued Europe for so many years.²⁸ Nationalism could also manifest a threat by encouraging separatist movements in Spain, in France, and elsewhere. Results from Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union will be especially instructive in this regard.

original position after having been displaced." In international security terms, instability implies a lack of enduring political, social, and economic institutions or consistent relations with neighbors. Eastern Europe has long had a history of failing to meet these definitions, and fear of new upheavals in this region and further to the east raises concerns throughout Western Europe, especially because the Soviet successor states are likely to be at least as vulnerable to instability as the Eastern Europeans. Questions about the results of nationalism have been a recurrent theme articulated by many experts, including Josef Joffe. Joffe's arguments will be presented in later chapters.

²⁷Marc Fisher, "'German Question' Bedevils European Unification Talks," from the Washington Post, printed in the San Jose Mercury News, December 8, 1991, 12A.

²⁸Manfred Woerner, "NATO's Major Political Tasks," speech at Detroit June 26, 1991, in Vital Speeches of the Day, August 15, 1991, 643.

Risks posed by instability throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are potentially the most dangerous of all. The large stockpile of nuclear weapons within the borders of these republics, the political leanings of which remain unpredictable, raises the potential for catastrophe in Europe. Former German Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, a staunch advocate of NATO and the American role in European security, has declared that, "We have a vested interest in having stability in [the former Soviet Union] increase hand in hand with internal progress."²⁹ This opinion has been echoed by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, who considers the American role in post-Cold War Europe to be as important as that following World War II, because of the risks posed by the new ex-Soviet republics - especially the nuclear ones. He calls the Americans "the biggest security trump that Europe has ever had."³⁰ The French, in reiterating their desire for an American military presence to remain in Europe, have also cited dangers from the former Soviet Union as motivating the desire for a continuing American role. As the French ambassador to the United States has stated,

...there is a feeling that [NATO] must be kept for reasons of military protection in case the situation changes and

²⁹Interview with Gerhard Stoltenberg, "The Bundeswehr Must not Economize Itself to Death," Die Welt, September 9, 1991, 6 (FBIS-WE, September 10, 1991, 11).

³⁰Interview with Douglas Hurd, "Do not Isolate Europe," Der Spiegel, October 28, 1991, 203-7 (FBIS-WE, October 29, 1991, 6).

a threat reappears. [W]hile making [changes to NATO's military structure], we must maintain a military doctrine which makes sense, we must make sure that, if a threat materializes again, there will be deterrence. [This] involves keeping some American nuclear arms in Europe, and protecting the French and British forces of deterrence....³¹

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has accurately described the threat posed by potential disorders in Eastern Europe, noting that in the Balkans, "[the] breakdown of authoritarian order freed people with long-frustrated separatist and irredentist impulses to pursue their national ambitions...a threat of disintegration looms."³² Yugoslavia exemplifies both the separatist and irredentist impulses. Irredentist sentiment is common throughout much of Eastern Europe - and part of Western Europe - as recent European public opinion has shown considerable support for this principle in a number of countries.³³ Stoltenberg has also expressed concern over the implications of a possible reignition of historic Balkan instability, as "this potential for conflict, given a critical development,

³¹Jacques Andreani, "France and European Challenges," speech before the World Affairs Council of Boston, October 8, 1991, 14-15.

³²International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1990-1991 (London: Pergammon-Brassey's, 1991), 13.

³³"What Europeans Think," Los Angeles Times, September 17, 1991, HB/C. This extensive public opinion survey, conducted by the Times Mirror Service, showed that territorial disputes remained important in the minds of many in Europe. Dissatisfaction with current borders ran at 39% in Germany, 48% in Spain, 52% in Bulgaria, and as high as 68% in Hungary.

can destabilize the international order in Europe and thus also endanger the bases for our existence."³⁴ German Foreign Minister Genscher, who has echoed his colleague's concerns, stated before the United Nations, "We want the Western Alliance (NATO) to continue its efforts to ensure stability throughout Europe in a changing political environment."³⁵ Britain's NATO representative has enumerated essentially the same threats to Europe from Eastern European uncertainties, including nationalism in an environment in which the transition to democracy is threatened by weak political institutions.³⁶

The potential spillover of refugees and conflict is of particular concern in Western Europe. Germany and Italy are already facing an accelerating influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe (and elsewhere). The numbers will increase if fighting in Yugoslavia continues and as economic hardships cause others to leave the former Eastern Bloc countries. It is therefore of great interest to the Western Europeans that they prevent the escalation of crises in Eastern Europe. The conflict over what course of action to take in Yugoslavia

³⁴"Stoltenberg Warns of Military Risks in Europe," Hamburg DPA, January 30, 1992, 1215 GMT (FBIS-WE February 3, 1992, 17).

³⁵Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The United States of Europe," speech before the United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 1991, in Vital Speeches of the Day, October 1, 1991, 9.

³⁶Sir Michael Alexander, "European Security and the CSCE," NATO Review, August 1991, 10.

within the EC and the WEU has reflected deep concern over becoming directly involved, yet fear of the consequences if the war continues. While the French and Germans have supported action by the EC and the UN, the British have been especially reluctant to enter a situation in which they could become entangled without hope for an easy exit.³⁷ This attitude reflects a general hesitancy by the British to involve themselves in the violence which has occurred in Eastern Europe; it appears that the British hope merely that closer cooperation with allies on security affairs may be able to prevent its spread.³⁸

Though the scenario of the Cold War becoming hot has been laid to rest, uncertainties resulting from political volatility and the presence of a vast nuclear arsenal in the former Soviet Union constitute a serious risk that has been considered by Western military planners. Some have even spoken of the dangers of a resurgent (post-Yeltsin) Russia. Prior to his resignation in January 1991, French Defence Minister Chevenement reiterated the need for a continued American presence on the continent, including nuclear weapons, to counter a possible resurgent Moscow-centered risk because

³⁷"EC Presidency Sets Terms for Peacekeeping Force," Paris AFP, September 17, 1991, 1408 GMT (FBIS-WE, September 18, 1991, 1-2).

³⁸Philip A.G. Sabin, British Strategic Priorities in the 1990's, Adelphi Paper 254 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1990), 19.

of the vast arsenal that remains in place - east and west of the Urals. In addition, the French rejected the London Declaration as unrealistically diminishing the effectiveness of Western nuclear deterrence in light of continued uncertainty about the former Soviet Union.³⁹ Former British Defence Secretary Tom King gave much the same assessment after the attempted coup in August 1991, rejecting more substantial defense cuts in the UK while the unstable Soviet Union maintained its large military arsenal, despite statements by Boris Yeltsin that Russia's nuclear missiles were no longer targeted on the UK.⁴⁰ As long as politics in Russia and the other former Soviet republics remain so fluid, Western European military planners will remain cautious. This uncertainty strengthens their desire to see American forces keep their active role in Europe, as well as the need for military alliances.

2. American Perspectives

American perspectives on the indigenous European threats are in many ways similar to those of the Western Europeans. Nevertheless, certain differences play important

³⁹Lothar Ruehl, "Eternal Peace in Europe is a Promise, not a Certainty," Interview with Jean-Pierre Chevenement in Die Welt, January 14, 1991, 7 (FBIS-WE, January 15, 1991, 39-40).

⁴⁰Simon Tisdall, Jonathan Steele, "Yeltsin Blunts Nuclear Threat; Russians to Turn Missiles away from all U.S. Cities," The Guardian, January 27, 1992, 1 (FBIS-WE, January 28, 1992, 2[annex]).

roles in American alliance strategy and strategic planning. Some senior American officials have expressed concern about continuing threats to the security of Western Europe. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, stated in a November 1991 interview that,

We've got a vital interest in staying involved in European security questions. Twice in this century we've had to go to war because we didn't have the capacity to influence events in Europe. We don't want to have that happen again.⁴¹

Cheney also indicated that his concerns were not American inventions, but reflective of similar feelings in Europe.

...a prominent European public official a couple of weeks ago explained to me privately that much as Europe wants to develop a new security identity, and as much as there's this desire to knit together the fabric of European identity in this regard, that the historic animosities are still just under the surface.⁴²

Some U.S. academics, including Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, believe that Western Europe left to its own devices will revert back to the old state system that created incentives for aggression. Mearsheimer calls "hypernationalism" the "single greatest democratic threat to peace" in Europe.⁴³ Some U.S. experts fear that this hypernationalism, left unchecked, could create conflicts that might force the United States to intervene militarily in

⁴¹Dick Cheney, interview by the San Diego Union, November 12, 1991, 3.

⁴²Ibid., 4.

⁴³John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, 36-37.

Europe once again. It is this threat (among others) which motivates some U.S. observers to favor the United States remaining institutionally involved in the security affairs of Europe.

In addition to this threat, the United States takes seriously risks posed by the former Soviet Union, both as a result of instability and in view of the long-term potential for military resurgence. Prominent Americans - administration officials and others - have stated that the greatest risk results from an uncertain future - economically, politically, and socially.⁴⁴ Such uncertainty has led writers and officials to refer to the former Soviet Union as a "Weimar republic."⁴⁵ Military forces of the ex-USSR could use the resulting turmoil to their advantage; the uncertainty and unpredictability of the European security environment necessitates the continued adherence to the four foundations of the national security strategy, especially forward presence.⁴⁶ Defense Secretary Cheney shares these concerns and also believes that the failure of democratic reforms could

⁴⁴This opinion is held by, among others, former President Nixon, who articulated his position at a recent Washington, D.C. speech. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush Cites Limits on Aid to Russia," New York Times, March 12, 1992, A1.

⁴⁵See for example Dick Cheney, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Secretary of Defense," Washington, DC, February 1992, 5.

⁴⁶John R. Galvin, statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 3, 1992, 1-2.

create instability that could spread beyond the borders of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and augment the unrest that already exists in Eastern Europe.⁴⁷

While most attention recently has been devoted to political aspects of instability in the former Soviet Union, the large CIS military arsenal remains a concern in the United States as well. Though the possibility has become increasingly remote, the reversibility of ex-Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe will be a topic of consideration as Eastern Europe faces an uncertain political future for as long as some of these forces remain. The question of capabilities vs. intentions cannot be ignored, and attention to CIS military capabilities has been responsible for much of the Pentagon's continuing efforts to modernize American forces.⁴⁸

Instability in Eastern Europe is of great importance to the United States because of the risk of its spreading into Western Europe. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment named instability as one of the key trends in the transitional

⁴⁷Dick Cheney, statement before the U.S. House Committee on the Budget, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., February 5, 1992, 11-14.

⁴⁸See for example, Colin Powell, The National Military Strategy, 1992, as well as the New York Times article regarding future military scenarios reportedly considered by Pentagon planners, in Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold War Era," New York Times, February 17, 1992, A1.

environment in Europe.⁴⁹ Secretary of State Baker in June 1991 concurred, stating,

In Central and Eastern Europe, . . . , devolution [of power from the national governments] is certainly the more prominent phenomenon. With the collapse of Communism, ethnicity has reemerged as a powerful political force, threatening to erect new divisions between countries and, even more acutely, within multinational states.⁵⁰

The President's National Security Strategy also reflects concern over the threats from regional conflicts, especially those in Eastern Europe.⁵¹

It is significant that not only do the Western Europeans and the Americans both continue to see serious security risks or threats in the future of Europe, but also that their assessments are essentially similar. Without such consistent assessments, re-nationalized military policies could develop, an outcome that most would find highly undesirable.⁵² Though nearly all acknowledge that the unifying Soviet threat of the Cold War era no longer exists in its old form, there remain many concerns in Europe that tend to point in the direction of a continued need for collective

⁴⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, Washington, DC, March 1991, 12-1.

⁵⁰James Baker, "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture from West to East," speech at Berlin, June 18, 1991, 4.

⁵¹George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, August 1991, 7.

⁵²Ian Gambles, Prospects for West European Security Cooperation, Adelphi Paper 244 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1989), 19.

defense. The next section examines security threats and challenges beyond Europe.

D. THREATS ORIGINATING OUTSIDE EUROPE

1. European Perspectives

Threats coming from outside Europe take a number of forms and are significant enough that some have referred to NATO's protective boundary as having shifted from facing the East to facing the South. As David Greenwood has observed,

...the collapse of the Eastern Bloc has been so precipitous and the instabilities across NATO's southern boundary - from the Maghreb to the Middle East - are so pervasive that the next several years could well be punctuated by periodic crises on Western Europe's perimeter.⁵³

In general these threats consist of terrorism, regional rivalries and instabilities, demographic pressures, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems - an issue potentially compounded by the existence of unemployed Russian scientists.

France, located geographically close to North Africa, and retaining important economic, cultural, and security ties with its former colonies, considers it important that any European security organization address its concerns to the south. The French are particularly concerned about threats from the Maghreb, especially Libya and Algeria, as reflected

⁵³David Greenwood, "Refashioning NATO's Defences," NATO Review, December 1990, 3.

in recent public opinion poll information.⁵⁴ The historical animosity of many Algerians toward France in the post-colonial phase, coupled with improving Algerian weapons technology (primarily imported), gives France concern over the relatively short distance separating the two countries. According to Diego Ruiz Palmer, France has developed

...an unusual sense of vulnerability to events outside its control. At the same time, the Gulf War has called attention to neglected emerging extra-European security risks, while feeding apprehensions that the conflict with Iraq could, in the long-term, develop into a wider scale confrontation between the West and the Muslim world.⁵⁵

France is placing more emphasis on preparedness for out-of-area contingencies such as the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War.⁵⁶ Potential threats from North Africa cause considerable concern in Italy as well.

For Germany, the out-of-area threats are not as imminent as they are for France. In addition Germany faces the constitutional debate over its Basic Law, which some have cited as prohibiting German military involvement in activities outside the NATO area. Former defense Minister Stoltenberg

⁵⁴Recent French polling data reflected in FBIS shows that the French public believes strongly that the threat has shifted from the East to the South by a 58-8% margin. Of those believing in a threat from the South, 22% consider the threat coming from Algeria (up from 6% in 1990). 52% consider Iraq the main threat. "Poll: Military Threat Perceived from South," Le Monde, September 20, 1991, 12 (FBIS-WE, October 25, 1991, 4).

⁵⁵Ruiz Palmer, 18.

⁵⁶Ibid., 3.

has nevertheless declared German interest in many of the same threats that preoccupy Germany's allies, such as demographic pressures and weapons proliferation.⁵⁷ Foreign Minister Genscher, while hesitant about the use of the *Bundeswehr* in alliance activities out-of-area, has suggested German participation in UN-sanctioned efforts as a first step, recognizing that Germany is affected by these threats and that German participation is essential as Germany's international role grows.⁵⁸

In the British case, geographical separation may account for a lower level of interest in some of the threats that concern the French and Germans. Though former Defence Secretary Tom King has acknowledged the potential emergence of North African demographic threats to Southern Europe, he says that "[t]he risk [posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World] has never been greater."⁵⁹ He has also mentioned the spread of ballistic missile technology, highlighted by Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War. The British have closely followed threats to regional stability by leaders like Hussein.

⁵⁷Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change: European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship in a Time of Change in Europe," speech in Bonn, April 10, 1991, 3-4.

⁵⁸"Right of Intervention Demanded," Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 24, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE, May 28, 1991, 7).

⁵⁹Peter Mulligan and John Winder, "King Wields Nuclear Shield," London Times, January 15, 1992, 5.

Various Europeans agree with these threat assessments. Though NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has stated that, "We do not need a threat...We have become nothing but an insurance company against risks," he quickly adds that NATO must provide insurance against dangers coming from the region spanning the Maghreb and the Middle East.⁶⁰ Additionally, the Rome NATO Summit enumerated risks for which the new strategic concept plans: the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage."⁶¹ In addition to the threats described above, France and the United Kingdom face threats to their ex-colonies, unlike most of their allies. Long a domestic problem, such threats may become more of an alliance issue, as allies help each other in combatting crises. Should this trend continue, no assessment of threats or risks to Europe will be complete without including colonial and post-colonial matters. In the British case, the 1982 Falklands War provides an excellent example. In that war, the British relied on the United States for intelligence information and on NATO navies to fill gaps left by Royal Navy ships involved in the war. France has been involved in disturbances or wars around the globe for many years,

⁶⁰Dietmar Seher and Ingo Preissler, "We Do Not Need a Threat," interview with Manfred Woerner, Berliner Zeitung, October 5-6, 1991, 5 (FBIS-WE, October 9, 1991, 1).

⁶¹North Atlantic Council, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," Rome, November 8, 1991, paragraph 19.

including most recently Zaire, where it cooperated with Belgium in an attempt to restore order and protect foreign nationals in the former Belgian colony. In this effort the United States aided the Europeans with transport aircraft. French interests stretch from sub-Saharan Africa to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and to North Africa and the Middle East.⁶²

2. American Perspectives

Though the details of the threat assessments in the United States generally agree with those in Europe, the U.S. tends to have a different outlook on them. The opinion that every threat must be examined in terms of the U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry has been replaced by the selectivity described in President Bush's Aspen Speech of August 1990.⁶³ Even in the new security environment, however, the United States is careful to analyze every potential threat for its possible implications for world stability. For this reason the scope of American threat assessment is broader than that of most of the West European allies; the French and the British take a more global perspective than do most other West European nations.

⁶²Ruiz Palmer, 25.

⁶³See George Bush, speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium, Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990.

American strategic planning and threat assessments have generally accepted that the U.S. will be unable to fight major wars alone and that coalition strategies will be required. The Iraqi case demonstrates that the U.S. must expend considerable effort to ensure that its allies perceive the threat as the U.S. does in order to form the coalition. Defense Secretary Cheney summarizes the American situation:

We have already seen that regional tensions, such as the conflict in the Gulf, can pose serious threats to our national interests. [Additionally, w]ithout democratic traditions for the peaceful resolution of political conflict, some new democracies have been threatened with civil violence, unrest, and war. Other threats, including terrorism, illegal drugs, and low-intensity conflict, can weaken the fabric of democratic societies.⁶⁴

To combat these threats, the United States would likely require coalition support, because the scope of operations might well exceed the limits of American power. The U.S. European commander, General John Galvin, added Africa to the list of regions where growing instability had the potential for escalation, and noted that operations such as the evacuations from Somalia and Liberia might require repetition.⁶⁵

Two other major areas of concern to the United States in the European as well as worldwide sense are proliferation

⁶⁴Dick Cheney, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Secretary of Defense," vi.

⁶⁵John R. Galvin, "Statement before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services," 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., March 7, 1991, 5.

and terrorism. Despite the efforts of supporters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime, numerous Third World countries could have a small, usable nuclear force by the year 2000. Coupled with developments in delivery systems, certain governments in North Africa and the Middle East might pose a profound threat to Southern Europe. Secretary of the Navy Garrett has listed terrorists and "modern-armed Third World regional bullies" as the major threats in the European and Middle Eastern theater⁶⁶, while House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin has enumerated opposition to regional aggressors, prevention of the spread of mass terror weapons, and fighting terrorism as challenges requiring military responses.⁶⁷

A wide range of potential risks and threats face the United States and its West European allies from outside Europe. The U.S., Britain, France, and Germany generally assess them similarly. It is increasingly clear that none would welcome the prospect of facing these challenges alone, even if any one country, including the United States, were capable of doing so.

⁶⁶H. Lawrence Garrett, III, "Secretary of the Navy's Posture Statement FY 1992-93," February 1991, 4.

⁶⁷See Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era," House Armed Services Committee, January 24, 1992. This paper is devoted to current and future threats facing the U.S. military.

E. CONCLUSION

In order to validate Walt's hypothesis, the threat would have to be assessed by the potential or actual allies as sufficient to warrant formation or continuation of an alliance. Though the single, unifying threat from the former Soviet Union no longer exists in its original form, there remain many threats and risks commonly accepted as serious by the Western allies, including the United States. Though some of the NATO members, particularly the United States, may not believe themselves directly threatened by certain specific dangers, long-standing political, economic, and cultural ties reinforce the institutional framework that has bound NATO's members since 1949-50. For the United States a unique consideration is the desire to avoid having to "rescue" Europe from itself for a third time. In the eyes of some American observers, the way to do so is through the perpetuation of NATO and its American leadership.

West European assessments generally accept that the potential threats are more in toto than they can handle without American assistance. Though the French most strongly wish to see a European security organization under their influence, they consider a continued military American presence in Europe necessary. Stoltenberg has asserted the

need for a sound structure to preserve Europe's stability and security,⁶⁸ and according to Tom King:

...the rapid and positive outcome of the military campaign [in the Persian Gulf War] proved that the principle of collective defence - on which the defence of Europe has been based for the last 4 decades - works.⁶⁹

American planners may anticipate that a Western security structure with U.S. participation will continue to be valued and supported by the West Europeans. Sustaining this structure, however, will require considerable domestic political effort, not only in the United States but also in the West European countries. The U.S. can continue to provide leadership to an alliance still faced with numerous threats and risks, but it must be more attentive to West European needs and sensitivities. Whether NATO will endure in its current form is discussed in a later chapter; the application of Walt's theory indicates that some security alliance involving Western Europe will survive.

⁶⁸Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change," 10.

⁶⁹King, 3.

III. PROSPECTS FOR WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE AUTONOMY

A. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter showed that significant threats remain that warrant the continuation of a defense alliance. As the world enters the post-Cold War era, however, serious questions are being asked about the need for collective defense, about who should provide it, and in what form it should be provided. The tight U.S.-European relationship has weakened now that the passing of the Soviet threat has let other issues come to the forefront. David Yost recognized in 1982 that

...even more serious for the long-term future of the [Atlantic Alliance] are the growing cleavages between the United States and West Europe as a whole on such basic issues as 'out of area' questions, detente, arms control, and East-West relations.⁷⁰

To this list can be added agricultural and other trade issues, dealing with the Third World, and immigration issues. Coupled with the shifting American attention toward other regions of the world among other factors, these considerations are leading Western Europe toward some type of security autonomy. The nations involved, primarily those comprising the European Community (EC), are attempting to devise a common defense

⁷⁰David S. Yost, "NATO's Political-Military Challenges," Current History, December 1982, 435.

structure. The December 1991 Maastricht Summit was the culmination of a lengthy period of negotiations aimed at creating monetary and political union among the EC's members. While declared a success by all participants, the Summit illustrated some of the difficulties involved in forging common policies among such a disparate membership. In the end, the EC announced that its members would work to strengthen the Western European Union (WEU) by "authorizing it to 'elaborate and implement' community decisions on defense issues." Those decisions, however, had to be compatible with existing commitments to NATO.⁷¹ This declaration shows that the Europeans have yet to determine how all sides can be satisfied with one structure, and how hard such an achievement will be to attain.

The question to be examined in this chapter concerns the prospects for the successful creation of an autonomous West European security organization. (Autonomous in this thesis means without the leadership of the United States, but it does not necessarily mean that a West European defense structure would not consult with the U.S. before undertaking military action - for example, in an "out-of-area" contingency beyond Europe.) European history reveals strands of nationalism, balance of power politics, and conceptions of the glorified

⁷¹Alan Riding, "Measured Steps Toward One Europe: What was Decided," New York Times, December 12, 1991, A8.

nation-state.⁷² As described in the previous chapter, the reemergence of these tendencies remains of concern both in the United States and in Europe. This possibility is one of the challenges that efforts toward European unity must overcome, especially in the security arena.

The three key organizations in the move toward defense autonomy are the EC, WEU, and NATO. While NATO has cemented the transatlantic partnership since 1950, the development of the EC and/or WEU could alter it. Such a result seems difficult to avoid entirely. This chapter examines the possibility that the West Europeans in the next several years will develop an autonomous defense organization under EC auspices. While its scope may be uncertain and limited as long as NATO endures, it will be important as a symbol of West European political unity.

This chapter is organized as follows. Its theoretical foundation is based on Josef Joffe's idea of "Europe's American pacifier," which concludes that the United States has been absolutely essential in overcoming the nationalistic disputes that would otherwise plague Western Europe. Consideration of European perspectives on defense autonomy follows, including subjects such as the need for a European defense identity, the role of the WEU, ties to NATO, and treatment of the U.S. by the West Europeans in the process.

⁷²Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 2.

A review and analysis of U.S. perspectives is next, covering historical support for European unity yet concern over weakening NATO and the American role. The chapter concludes with some findings and assessments.

B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

West European history is full of examples of wars between the states on the continent, shifting borders, and ethnic rivalries. Since 1945, however, this cycle has been muted (with the current exception of Yugoslavia). Josef Joffe has concluded that the reason for this stability in Western Europe has been the active presence of the United States. As Joffe writes, "...by extending its guarantee, the United States removed the prime structural cause of conflict among states - the search for an autonomous defense policy."⁷³ By looking at the history of the two world wars, one can clearly see the effects of this search for security in a series of shifting alliances which resulted in war. As Joffe observes, the United States removed the need for West European states to provide for their own security so that they could concentrate their energies on rebuilding after the Second World War.⁷⁴ The participation of the U.S. in European security ensured that the French and Germans could coexist peacefully,

⁷³Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, Spring 1984, 68.

⁷⁴Ibid., 72.

providing West European defense with a much sounder foundation as latent German capabilities were added to the picture and as French strengths could be directed at the Soviet Union rather than at West Germany. The threat from the East provided the motivating force for West European unity and gave the United States a sufficient reason for entangling itself in European security affairs. Without specific American participation, European squabbling could possibly have led to another chain of events resulting in further conflict.⁷⁵

According to Joffe, the participation of the United States has remained of vital interest. Even after years of peaceful association in NATO and the European Community, the departure of the United States could lead to a reversion to the old ways of European politics. Joffe quotes former West German defense minister Georg Leber, who in 1973 stated, "There is neither a political nor a military nor a psychological substitute for the American commitment in [Western Europe]."⁷⁶ The American commitment to Western Europe has allowed the Europeans to produce common political, economic, and social goods for themselves that they could not have otherwise produced because the costs of security would have been excessive. As Western Europe approaches some degree of security autonomy, the question of intra-European conflict arises anew. Political

⁷⁵Ibid., 75.

⁷⁶Ibid., 81.

relationships have changed, and the countries of Western Europe have declared that there can never be war among them again. Still, as bickering over unification treaties has occurred, some room for doubt remains over the long term. It is important, if one accepts Joffe's thesis, that the Europeans not entirely exclude the United States from Europe's security affairs. The questions and issues raised by Joffe are of particular importance at a time when the European Community considers its own defense.

C. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE AUTONOMY

1. The Need for a European Defense Identity

Various officials and observers have given justifications for the formation of an autonomous European defense pillar. These motivations range from those wishing to deepen the unity of the EC to those believing the U.S. commitment is losing its reliability. French President Francois Mitterrand has on a number of occasions expressed the feeling that the United States will not always be available to solve Europe's problems, meaning that the progress toward developing the WEU as West Europe's security pillar must continue.⁷⁷ In an effort to aid the union process, Italy has attempted to overcome British resistance to more closely

⁷⁷See for example Alain Chastagnol, "Mitterrand Ready to Share the Deterrent," Le Quotidien de Paris, January 11-12, 1992, 1 (FBIS-WE, February 6, 1992, 2).

integrated European security structures in a way that would be much more difficult for France or even Germany to accomplish. Historically more a follower than a leader, Italy can more objectively influence Britain toward European defense integration than can France or Germany. As a result, the Italians have been able to bring the British more closely in line with the "Europeanist" proposals. As Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis has stated, "The real aim of the Anglo-Italian [defense initiative of October 1991]... would enable Britain to accept the concept of a common defense policy."⁷⁸ This also shows Italy's sincere interest in the concept of an autonomous European security policy, and shows Italy's ability to fill a needed gap between Atlanticist and Europeanist positions.

Clearly there would be benefits to a strong European defense identity, some of which would include a more highly motivated participation in the common defense, the ability to act where the NATO Treaty has been interpreted to limit operations, and reducing the defense burden through more effective specialization.⁷⁹ In addition, the Europeans have to be prepared for the possibility of the United States

⁷⁸"De Michelis on Franco-German EC Initiative," interview in Le Figaro, October 17, 1991, 5 (FBIS-WE, October 21, 1991, 37).

⁷⁹Catherine Guicherd, A European Defense Identity: Challenge and Opportunity for NATO, CRS Report for Congress, June 12, 1991, 62.

pulling out of Europe militarily as the Europeans progress in building their own defense identity, eventually forcing the Europeans to take full responsibility. Though strong American support remains for NATO, budget constraints, the burden-sharing issue, and world changes could ultimately result in the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

An autonomous European defense identity would further deepen the integration process of the European Community. An economic heavyweight, it has been roundly criticized for failing to participate on the political scene with military power proportionate to its economic strength. Simply put, to be taken seriously by all interested parties as more than an economic power, the EC must close the gap between its economic and political-military significance.⁸⁰ As a full-fledged economic, political, and military power, German Foreign Minister Genscher feels that "the EC will increasingly become a bedrock of stability for the whole of Europe and a source of hope for Europe's nations."⁸¹ As Ian Gambles has observed,

As after the Second World War, there is much talk of a supranational structure of European security, a transcendence of national and international defence through the eventual evolution of the EC into an armed federation. The Europeanist impetus to cooperation and self-reliance, therefore, is not focused narrowly on defence integration within the Alliance, but more broadly

⁸⁰Guicherd, 11.

⁸¹Hans-Dietrich Genscher, speech at the meeting of the Western European Union at Luxembourg, March 23, 1990, in Statements & Speeches, March 30, 1990, 2.

on the re-examination of security in all its aspects right across the continent and beyond.⁸²

The Western European Union has been the focal point of the European defense pillar, whether as an autonomous organization, as one tied to the EC, or as a component of NATO. Long operationally dormant, the WEU was resurrected in 1984 with its first ministerial meetings, finally acting in the Red Sea in 1985 and in the Persian Gulf in 1987. In 1987, the WEU issued a platform on security interests which stated,

It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Alliance (NATO), to the benefit of Western security as a whole. This will enhance the European role in the Alliance and ensure a basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.⁸³

While it was clear in 1987 that Western Europeans were not contemplating the notion of a fully autonomous security identity, in 1990 French President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Kohl proposed that the WEU become the security arm of the EC's projected political union. Though too radical a proposal for some at first, the idea germinated to the point that it eventually gained considerable stature.⁸⁴

⁸²Ian Gambles, "European Security Integration in the 1990s," Chaillot Paper 3 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1991), 7.

⁸³Western European Union, "Platform on European Security Interests," The Hague, October 27, 1987, 5.

⁸⁴Guicherd, 12-15.

Foreign Ministers Dumas and Genscher further developed the concept of the WEU as a European security identity, through a letter of 4 February 1991 in which the two foresaw WEU in that mission, though still with ties to NATO. Questions such as the out-of-area role and Germany's role remained unanswered.⁸⁵ By the following March Dumas and Genscher pledged to strengthen EC-WEU ties, and by June, Dumas had expressed dissatisfaction with NATO's proposed Rapid Reaction Corps, saying that a WEU-based Rapid Reaction Force would better serve the needs of Europe.⁸⁶ In December 1991 the WEU issued a summarizing statement of one of the organization's goals:

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.⁸⁷

The need to create a single voice with which the Europeans can speak is a very important step toward political union. European opinions have historically come out as a cacophony of disparate voices in the absence of the American stabilizer, but for the EC and/or WEU to act effectively in

⁸⁵Steven Philip Kramer, "The French Question," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1991, 91-92.

⁸⁶Paris AFP, June 4, 1991, 1425 GMT (FBIS-WE, June 5, 1991, 2).

⁸⁷Western European Union, "Declaration of the Member States of Western European Union which are also members of the European Union of the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance," December 10, 1991, 3.

the international arena it will be necessary to speak as one entity. This issue has already been addressed by European leaders, who recognize the need to overcome history, including Chancellor Kohl who stated that, "Europe must finally speak with one voice on foreign and security policy."⁸⁸ The EC and WEU have also addressed the issue. WEU Secretary General Willem van Eekelen has noted the importance of the WEU members following through on the pledges of the Brussels Treaty to show the United States that the Europeans are serious about their own defense,⁸⁹ and EC Foreign Ministers have expressed the necessity of a joint defense policy complementing a common foreign policy.⁹⁰

Chancellor Kohl and Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis have echoed persistent calls by French President Mitterrand for a common European defense. Though Kohl has tried to straddle the fence between Europeanism and Atlanticism, he has said that, "A united Europe is not possible in the long term without a common European

⁸⁸Berlin ADN, October 12, 1991, 1116 GMT (FBIS-WE, October 15, 1991, 13).

⁸⁹Willem F. van Eekelen, "The Changing Transatlantic Relationship in a New Security Environment," Speech at Monterey, California, April 28, 1992.

⁹⁰Conference Des Representants des Gouvernements Des Etats Membres Union Politique, "Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Article J)," Projet De Traite Sur L'Union Europeenne, Brussels, December 18, 1991, Articles J.1-J.4.

defense."⁹¹ In Kohl's eyes, this formula would be compatible with membership in the Atlantic Alliance. De Michelis, who has also been known to shift his position on defense integration issues, has made a call for a completely independent military bloc, with an eventual EC/WEU merger as over the long term NATO fades away.⁹² This illustrates Italy's Europeanist interpretation of the October 1991 Anglo-Italian defense proposal.

Another key motivation for European defense autonomy has already been briefly mentioned - the uncertainty over the future of the American military commitment to Europe's security. There are many causes for this doubt: the reduction of the threat, U.S. defense budget tightening, signs of U.S. neo-isolationism. An older - though now arguably obsolete - reason is the vulnerability of the U.S. to nuclear attack. While there had been no previous reason to doubt that the United States would respond to a Soviet attack on Western Europe, the realization that the Soviets would eventually match the assured destruction capability of the U.S. shook the alliance.⁹³ The uncertainty aroused by this fundamental alteration of the balance has never been overcome, and coupled

⁹¹Paris AFP, November 14, 1991, 0829 GMT (FBIS-WE, November 14, 1991, 12).

⁹²Ferdinand Hennerbichler, "There Will Be an EC Military Alliance, interview with Gianni De Michelis, Wiener Zeitung, August 6, 1991, 3 (FBIS-WE, August 7, 1991, 25).

⁹³Kaplan, NATO and the United States, 169.

with other recent changes in the security environment, Mitterrand has pointed out that it is "inconceivable" that the U.S. will always stand on the front line for Europe; this necessitates a European ability for self-protection.⁹⁴ This recognition has important repercussions in the search for an autonomous defense policy and structure.

2. Plans for a European Force

The June 1991 meeting of WEU ministers resulted in a compromise over the future capabilities of a permanent WEU military force focusing, typically, on the opposing British and French poles. Though the French were pleased and the British uncertain about developing a WEU intervention force, the issue was far from settled, as events in the fall would soon demonstrate.⁹⁵ In early October 1991 the British and Italians announced a proposal that would form a WEU force that would complement NATO. This force, which would coordinate with NATO's political structures, would be used in scenarios occurring outside NATO's area of responsibility. On October 14, 1991, the French and Germans revealed a long-awaited proposal for the WEU, calling for a "European corps" to be formed around the Franco-German brigade, which could be

⁹⁴Craig R. Whitney, "NATO, Victim of Success, Searches for New Strategy," New York Times, October 24, 1990, 5.

⁹⁵John Palmer, "WEU Treads Path of Independence," The Guardian, June 28, 1991, 8 (FBIS-WE, July 3, 1991, 1(annex)).

supplemented with units from other WEU member states.⁹⁶ As French Foreign Minister Dumas stated,

...the goal is an authentic military instrument common to the member countries. France, with Germany, has shown that its actions match its words. The formation of a Franco-German army corps for European missions is the first concrete step towards a European defense.⁹⁷

Though the French and the Germans went to great lengths to assure NATO that this effort was intended as a complement to the Alliance, the British immediately called it a challenge to and duplication of NATO's functions. De Michelis, however, found no contradiction between the two proposals.⁹⁸

While the Italians, as well as the French and Germans, were satisfied with the course of events, it was clear that the stage was set for a confrontation with the British over the bridging of the gap between the two ideas. This debate has highlighted the ongoing disputes in Europe over the development of the European security identity. While the Franco-German proposal was pathbreaking, a great deal of work remains toward functioning compromises. Though the British and French have both announced their satisfaction with the security policy compromise reached at Maastricht, it remains

⁹⁶"The Franco-German Initiative on the European Foreign and Security Policy," Le Monde, October 17, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE, October 18, 1991, 22).

⁹⁷Roland Dumas, address to the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, Paris, February 4, 1992, 6.

⁹⁸Alan Riding, "Mitterrand Joins Kohl in Proposing a European Army," New York Times, October 17, 1991, A1.

to be seen whether the product was a workable structure or merely words that can be interpreted at the whim of the interested party.

3. The Importance of Retaining Ties to NATO

Understanding the importance of a continuing U.S. role in European security (whether to pacify Europe or to balance German power, among other reasons), and desiring to make WEU autonomous development as palatable for the UK (and the U.S.) as possible, the French and the Germans have endeavored to emphasize the WEU's continuing links with NATO. Though not yet structurally clear, these links serve a political purpose. The Genscher-Dumas March 1991 statement pledges an organic EC/WEU link without weakening NATO ties.⁹⁹ One proposed method of linking NATO with the WEU has been through the "double hatting" of national forces (a concept used by van Eekelen and the British), with the forces serving under the command of the organization appropriate for the crisis in question. Though NATO Secretary General Woerner believes the WEU's role is out-of-area, the French wing of the WEU wishes to be responsible for reacting within any part of Europe itself.¹⁰⁰ NATO has also tried to emphasize the importance

⁹⁹"Joint Statement by Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Roland Dumas," Berlin ADN, March 22, 1991, 1546 GMT (FBIS-WE, March 25, 1991, 1).

¹⁰⁰Ruediger Moniac, "A Two-Hat Concept for Europe's Security?" Die Welt, February 25, 1991, 8 (FBIS-WE, February 26, 1991, 1).

of the endurance of ties between the two security organizations in an attempt to prevent its own marginalization as European autonomy develops.¹⁰¹

The proponents of greater defense autonomy have asserted that the ongoing developments will present no threat to NATO's existence. Recent WEU communiqués have repeatedly emphasized the importance of compatibility and strong relations with NATO.¹⁰² Germany views the Franco-German proposal as making the WEU a component of the EC and a pillar of NATO, in which a coordinated European position created by the EC would be the position held by the Europeans in the North Atlantic Council.¹⁰³ Woerner has accepted the concept of a European army so long as it is "an army that can be used only if NATO does not act." He would recommend the assignment of NATO forces to the WEU in such an event.¹⁰⁴ Finally, considerable opposition has been raised by the British and others to the suggestion that the EC political union would ultimately assume the security guarantees of the Brussels

¹⁰¹Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Copenhagen, June 6-7, 1991, paragraph 3.

¹⁰²See the WEU Communiqués of Vianden (June 27, 1991), Bonn (November 18, 1991), and Paris (December 10, 1991).

¹⁰³Hamburg DPA, October 17, 1991, 1339 GMT (FBIS-WE, October 18, 1991, 6).

¹⁰⁴Manfred Woerner, interview with Madrid ABC, November 7, 1991, 38 (FBIS-WE, November 14, 1991, 4).

Treaty (through a merger with the WEU), because in their view this might eliminate NATO's *raison d'être*.¹⁰⁵

Another reason for maintaining ties to NATO lies in the continuing belief in the stabilizing role the U.S. plays in Europe. In apparent agreement with Joffe's hypothesis, Genscher has opposed a total American withdrawal because of the negative effects this would have on European stability.¹⁰⁶ The long-standing American security guarantee has preempted a considerable amount of discussion on autonomous European security efforts. As David Yost points out, "Discussions about West European nuclear deterrent cooperation may remain abstract and deferred to an uncertain future as long as U.S. commitments appear reasonably credible and reliable."¹⁰⁷ Nearly all in Europe remain convinced of the necessity of a continued American involvement in European security affairs. Though some wish for this presence to be more substantial than others, the notion of its significance cannot help but weaken European efforts to build an autonomous security identity.

¹⁰⁵Guicherd, 35.

¹⁰⁶Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The United States of Europe," speech at the United Nations, September 25, 1991, in Vital Speeches of the Day, October 1, 1991, 9.

¹⁰⁷David S. Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures," in Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European Security, ed. Beatrice Heuser (London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, 1991), 43.

4. Avoiding the Marginalization of the United States

Even more than considering American participation in European security vital, Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly labelled North American forces in Europe as "indispensable" for this purpose.¹⁰⁸ Former British Defence Secretary King opposes European drives for autonomy because "only U.S. capabilities can provide the ultimate guarantee of European security."¹⁰⁹ Should the Franco-German proposal lead to a strongly autonomous organization, the American role in European security affairs might be reduced. Not only would this cause British opposition, but it would compound Kohl's difficulties in attempting to straddle the two sides of the argument.

Not only the British - with their special relationship with the U.S. - but also the French and Germans have devoted considerable attention to avoiding marginalizing the U.S. while impressing the Americans with their own potential for action. As French security policy has developed, it has been careful to avoid forcing Germany to choose between Paris and Washington when conflicts arose, especially since 1983.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸This term has been used frequently by Kohl, as well as by French officials. See for example Berlin ADN, January 30, 1991, 1133 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 30, 1991, 7).

¹⁰⁹Tom King, "European Defence in a Changing World," Speech at Chatham House, June 19, 1991, 9.

¹¹⁰John G. Mason, "Mitterrand, the Socialists, and French Nuclear Policy," in Philippe G. LePrestre, ed., French Security Policy in a Disarming World: Domestic Challenges and

Though the motivations for this behavior may have altered with world events, Germany has still hesitated or attempted to moderate the impact of initiatives that could antagonize the U.S., and as Le Prestre has observed,

...the erosion of U.S. power makes France more susceptible to external constraints. To achieve greater European cooperation on European and defense matters, [and] to fend off U.S. protectionism, to define and pursue security interests that may contradict U.S. ones will require greater sensitivity and adaptation to her partners' concerns.¹¹¹

French strategic planning for the 1990s continues to take great care to avoid sending strong signals that would indicate the marginalization of the United States.¹¹²

Finally, because they are aware of the impact of the issue of burden-sharing on the U.S. Congress, West Europeans have made efforts to color European security autonomy as reducing the load on the U.S. WEU Secretary General van Eekelen has intimated that greater European exertions will lessen the burden on the United States through greater multi-national efforts as well as through arms control.¹¹³ Attention devoted to burden-sharing will strike a responsive

International Constraints (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 73.

¹¹¹Le Prestre, "The Lessons of Cohabitation," in Le Prestre, 42.

¹¹²Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic Options in the 1990's, Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), 24-5.

¹¹³Van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order: WEU's Contribution," NATO Review, August 1990, 21.

chord in a Congress which has long been dissatisfied with its assessment of European responsibility, using these determinations to call for a reduced U.S. commitment. At present, however, it is uncertain whether a greater European role will reduce or strengthen the U.S. commitment. It may, nevertheless, make the U.S. more amenable to the process of seeking greater West European security autonomy.

5. The WEU and the Out-of-Area Mission

As the threat has shifted away from the inter-German border and toward regional contingencies outside central Europe, the question of out-of-area roles and missions has grown in importance. Though not specifically barring out-of-area operations, the North Atlantic Treaty has been interpreted to do so. According to Article 6,

For the purpose of Article 5 [which provides the security guarantee to the members] an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.¹¹⁴

Treaty members remain hesitant to reinterpret or legislate changes to the treaty. One obvious solution to the out-of-area question has been the use of the WEU, either coordinated with, or directed by, NATO (perhaps also through an ad-hoc

¹¹⁴The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949, Article 6, in Kaplan, 220.

coalition as was used in Desert Storm). As part of a European autonomous security identity, however, the WEU would be under the direction of the EC, with only a limited coordinating role with NATO. Though van Eekelen has stated that the WEU was created to deal with problems internal to Europe¹¹⁵, the October 1991 Anglo-Italian proposal contemplates an out-of-area responsibility for the organization.

The Franco-German initiative, however, does not restrict the potential roles of the WEU, thereby allowing it the intra-European role that van Eekelen describes. Such missions, however, could raise strongly negative reactions from the Soviet Union's successors, especially Russia.¹¹⁶ Though it is unstated, it seems also to assume responsibility for coordinating European out-of-area contingency responses, such as occurred in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991 in the Persian Gulf. It is in this capacity that the Franco-German proposal would be acceptable to the UK, the Netherlands, and Portugal (and the U.S.), as usurping NATO's role would be unsatisfactory to these countries.¹¹⁷ Considering the constitutional issues in Germany, if other European countries were to agree on a European defense identity, linked to but

¹¹⁵Van Eekelen, "Future European Defence Co-Operation," 22.

¹¹⁶Gambles, 32.

¹¹⁷"Army Proposal Divides NATO," Defense News, October 21, 1991, 38.

not subsumed in political union, German parties might agree to a limited *Bundeswehr* out-of-area participation.¹¹⁸ While the sensitivity in Germany about any out-of-area role for the *Bundeswehr* seemingly undercuts Kohl's joint initiative with France, it also brings into question the extent of the proposal's intentions and shows the uncertain domestic political situation with which Kohl must contend as he stands with France. The out-of-area question deserves a great deal of study by the proponents of European defense autonomy. While the concept could serve as an additional aspect of European cooperation, it could also be the preserver of NATO and the U.S. role in European security. Uncertainty currently reigns.

6. Other Issue Areas

Several other areas are important in a survey of European perspectives toward defense autonomy. First, any structure must provide for a satisfactory degree of national sovereignty. One of the points of conflict for the British throughout the process of European integration has been avoiding a loss of decision-making power over their own resources to a bureaucracy in Brussels. The French, too, have insisted on national prerogatives in a number of issue areas,

¹¹⁸"NATO Comes to Terms with New Europe," London Times, 7 November 1991, p. 14.

especially nuclear weapons.¹¹⁹ This aspect appears to have been the subject of a compromise with the process of security integration leaving individual countries the masters of their own security policies when issues of European-wide interest are not at stake.¹²⁰ While this point will somewhat weaken European defense integration, the alternative could be the collapse of the project.

Second, Europe's ability to carry out military tasks independently has been the subject of much criticism. Kaplan is uncertain whether the WEU has the will to follow its rhetoric, or whether it will be an organization with any teeth.¹²¹ British NATO Ambassador Sir Michael Alexander has called attention to

...one major negative lesson to be learnt from the Gulf - the relative military impotence of Europe in dealing with the Gulf crisis...[O]ur effort was equivalent to just eight per cent of the American effort. Europe, though not a spectator, was not a full player either, and had to rely on the US effort in the Gulf to deal with a threat to world security.¹²²

Some soul-searching will have to take place throughout Europe, along with a reassessment of the will and desire of Europeans to lead. In the meantime, until a new opportunity arises for

¹¹⁹The prospects for West European nuclear cooperation will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

¹²⁰Guicherd, 29.

¹²¹Kaplan, 179.

¹²²Sir Michael Alexander, "European Security and the CSCE," NATO Review, August 1991, 13.

the Europeans to coordinate a significant military action, doubts will remain on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere as to whether an autonomous European defense organization is to be taken seriously. Gambles summarizes a widespread opinion:

As the European Community's experience in the Gulf War showed, world respect for Europe as a power in its own right is fatally undermined by its known inability to muster either the will to determine a common security policy or the capability to carry out a common military effort.¹²³

This consideration could affect the feasibility of the structure.

Third, as the driver of the initiative toward a European corps, France has had to utilize expert diplomatic skills to prevent its project from collapsing in the European political morass. The same characteristics that have made France a leader have also aroused opposition and irritation from other countries about French arrogance and apparent attempts to usurp the American position. France has deliberately taken a unique path toward West European security, and as Kaplan observes: "There was hardly an issue in the first decade [of NATO] that did not offend French sensibilities, if not disturb their sense of national interest or security."¹²⁴ This situation has essentially remained unchanged, though President Mitterrand throughout his term in

¹²³Gambles, 13.

¹²⁴Kaplan, 90.

office has attempted to come to more favorable terms with the U.S. and other European nations in security policy.

It is important to consider French behavior because of its importance in the development of a new defense structure. Mitterrand has often expressed anger over NATO attempts to strengthen itself at the expense of French efforts, and France has been in danger of losing the leadership role it has so assiduously strived to build. Still, France has attempted to soften its stance to the point that it is trying to improve relations with NATO, though still refusing to rejoin the military structure. These efforts are important for the development of an autonomous European security organization because of the reassurance they provide to the Atlanticist members of the EC about the link with North America. In their absence, the French would continue to be unable to reach accommodations with the British and Dutch, and the Germans would be much less willing partners.

A fourth issue which has yet to be resolved adequately regards the varying memberships in the European organizations. German writer Hans Ruhle has outlined some of the structural problems in the WEU's idea of a Rapid Reaction Force, beginning with questions about command, composition, and relative position compared to other structures already in place. Additionally, he points out that

A clear outline of European defence within a WEU framework is made more difficult by the different organisations to which European countries belong. Twelve are members of

the European Community, 14 are members of Nato and nine are members of the WEU.¹²⁵

Several of the countries are unsatisfied with their present situations. Britain and Germany have called for widening the EC to make it more inclusive of Europe, and Turkey, in particular, has revealed its interest in membership. Ireland, as an officially neutral state, has been hesitant about the EC's assumption of a military role, and has rejected participation in the WEU. France has strongly expressed its desire to deepen the EC union prior to widening, for fear of the dilution of its influence before solid progress toward integration has been achieved on its terms. Finally, as Ruhle points out,

As none of the interested countries, with the exception of France, is prepared to set up extra units for the WEU over and above troops already assigned to Nato, a military option for the WEU can only mean using Nato forces.¹²⁶

France and Germany have attempted to resolve these issues, realizing the requirement to satisfy NATO's needs and the confusion over membership. Unless these issues are adequately resolved, progress toward European defense union may be stifled in the relatively near future.

A final problem for resolution before European security autonomy can become a reality is Germany's Basic Law

¹²⁵Hans Ruhle, "European Alternative to NATO Force is still "a Hare-Brained Strategic Notion," Die Zeit, September 26, 1991, in The German Tribune, October 6, 1991, 5.

¹²⁶Ibid.

dispute over out-of-area military activity. Numerous German politicians, including Chancellor Kohl, have tried to gain support among Germany's parties for a political formula for out-of-area activity,¹²⁷ and Foreign Minister Genscher has called for the participation of German forces in UN peacekeeping activities. Progress does appear to have been made, even while the *Bundesrat* majority party, the SPD, has announced its opposition to the EC/WEU merger and out-of-area operations.¹²⁸ Without a move toward participation, the leading German role in the initiative may be seen as hollow and lose support from other Europeans. The German ability to participate as a full partner will be of particular importance to France.

D. BRITISH RESERVATIONS ABOUT EUROPEAN DEFENSE AUTONOMY

Britain, often somewhat separated from continental politics, has faced considerable internal debates about the role it should play in the economic and political aspects of European integration. Satisfied with its special relationship with the U.S. and not entirely trusting the motives and plans of the French and other Europeanists, yet wishing to be a part of the new Europe, the British have attempted to participate

¹²⁷Ian Murray, "NATO Corps Clash with Germans," London Times, May 16, 1991, 13.

¹²⁸Chapter Five will more fully explore German roles and attitudes to out-of-area issues, as well as toward future European security structures.

at arm's length in some key aspects of the process of European unification. In the defense realm, the British have expressed alarm at the prospects of the weakening of NATO and its Atlantic link, not wishing to entrust European stability and security to their continental allies. The 1991 Defence White Paper rejected the concept of a new identity and reaffirmed Britain's commitment to collective defense based on the Atlantic Alliance.

Building totally distinct Western European defence entities, involving the eventual absorption of the WEU by the Twelve, would be disruptive of NATO. It would erode the concept of NATO as a full partnership in which European and North American countries participated on the same basis. To follow this route would be to invite confusion and a less reliable defence than we have enjoyed over the last 40 years.¹²⁹

The British have been especially explicit in calling attention to the vagueness of the proposed interrelationships of the evolving European security structures. According to one unnamed Conservative Member of Parliament who opposes integration,

...it is essential that we make certain that we do not allow ourselves to be drawn into a European defence policy that will not work...Our entire future military and defence policy must not be subordinated and hijacked by people like Mr. Delors.¹³⁰

¹²⁹Secretary of State for Defence, "Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence for the 90s," July 1991, 39.

¹³⁰House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates on Defence (Hansard), October 14, 1991, 92.

French and German proposals have not pleased the British; Prime Minister Major has called for the WEU to be entirely autonomous, not only from NATO but also from the EC.¹³¹ Former Defence Secretary King has indicated that the WEU could take roles where NATO cannot or will not operate¹³², and that "...the WEU can serve as a bridge between the transatlantic security and defence structures of NATO and the developing common political and security policies of the Twelve."¹³³ The British have made clear their displeasure at not only the possibility that the WEU will duplicate NATO roles, but also that it has been so difficult to define its roles in the first place.

British opposition to a European system that would antagonize the United States and potentially lead to an American withdrawal has been discussed already. Above all else, failure to resolve this point could prevent any British agreement on an autonomous defense identity. As the London Times has editorialized,

Above all, Nato has no answer to France's continued and infuriating unilateralism...The Americans have good reason after the Gulf not to hasten the day when Europe speaks with "one voice" on defence. This voice would at present have to reflect Germany's anti-militarism and France's

¹³¹Hella Pick, "Major Draws Line on Defence Links," The Guardian, November 8, 1991, 11 (FBIS-WE, November 15, 1991, 3).

¹³²Carol Reed, Marc Rogers, and JAC Lewis, "Waking the Sleeping Beauty," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 4, 1992, 21.

¹³³"Statement on the Defence Estimates," 39.

anti-Americanism. Policies matter more than structures and Europe has a long way to go before resolving the argument over where to centre a chimerical "European defence strategy."¹³⁴

Progress has been made that shows British willingness to move toward integration, however. They recognized some of the negative aspects of American leadership during INF negotiations, as "[f]ailure to deal adequately with European concerns would confirm the impression of diminishing US interest in Europe."¹³⁵ While not ready to abandon the Americans, the British at that point did implicitly acknowledge some advantage in European-oriented structures. With the October 1991 British-Italian proposal, Britain seems to have accepted "a stronger European defence identity with the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy."¹³⁶ The French *air-sol longue portee* (ASLP) program has provided a great opportunity to unite symbolically with France in the defense field. As Yost observes, "The political arguments for cooperating with France on some version of the ASLP are essentially to promote West European defense cooperation and

¹³⁴"Now for the Hard Part," London Times, May 30, 1991, 18.

¹³⁵Gerald Frost, "British Foreign Policy: Dangers and Opportunities in an Era of Uncertainty," in British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990's (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1987), 27.

¹³⁶Quoted from the British-Italian defense proposal in George Brock and Michael Binyon, "Britain Accepts EC Goal of a United Policy on Defence," London Times, October 5, 1991, 7.

to diversify Britain's options."¹³⁷ The September 1991 U.S. cancellation of the SRAM-T program may further lead the British into the arms of the French, increasing the opportunity for the British to take the symbolic act of closer defense cooperation with France.

E. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Developments in Western Europe toward defense autonomy hold great implications for the United States. Having based its own security policy on containment since the end of World War II, the American defense establishment is completely reassessing its priorities under severe fiscal constraints. Americans remember having saved Europe from itself twice in the 20th Century, and the prospect of having to do so again is not particularly attractive. John Mearsheimer fears the reemergence of the old "hypernationalist" European state system that created the incentives for aggression much as does Joffe.¹³⁸ An interest in promoting European stability, along with deep economic and cultural ties that exist across the Atlantic, motivate the Bush Administration's desire to retain a substantial role in European security affairs. European efforts to displace U.S. leadership are thus viewed as short-

¹³⁷Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures," 27.

¹³⁸This recurring Mearsheimer theme is thoroughly described in John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," Atlantic Monthly, August 1990, 36-7.

sighted and ungrateful in some circles in the United States. Nevertheless, the changes in Europe may reinforce a shift in American attention toward other areas of the globe, primarily the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, Latin America, and the Far East. Much American trade and a growing percentage of America's ethnic mix have their backgrounds in these regions. Developments in Europe, therefore, are necessitating drastic changes in American strategic planning toward contingencies unrelated to the old Soviet threat.

Mindful of these changes, the Europeans cannot fail to devote attention to American interests. The United States has consistently proved itself to be the only nation that possesses the ability to operationalize all types of national power, most recently in the Persian Gulf War. Many in Europe, including Eastern Europe, believe that only a U.S. presence on the continent will prevent Europe from reverting to its old divisive ways. Finally, the special relationship the British have with the Americans makes it imperative that American interests be accommodated before the British will agree to the security integration which some see as completing the process of European unification. These factors give the United States some degree of leverage over events in Europe, though that influence level has decreased relative to that during the Cold War. As a result it is important to examine American views and concerns as Western Europe moves toward a more independent security structure.

1. Historical and Current Support for European Unity

The development of a "United States of Europe" was a great hope of some American Senators who voted to ratify the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and confirmed the decision to send American forces to Europe in 1950. For some this was an ideal which was important to fulfill; for others it reflected an isolationist desire that the Europeans become responsible for their own defense. Throughout the Cold War period, there was never much of a chance that the Europeans would attain this responsibility entirely. The U.S. has expressed support for European unity for many years, exemplified by a 1963 statement by President Kennedy.

Ever since the war the reconstruction and knitting together of Europe have been objectives of United States policy, for we have recognized with you that in unity lies strength. And we have also recognized with you that a strong Europe would be good not only for Europeans but for the world. America and Europe, working in full and effective partnership can find solutions to the urgent problems that confront all mankind in this crucial time.¹³⁹

President Bush has declared that, "A more united Europe offers the United States a more effective partner, prepared for larger responsibilities,"¹⁴⁰ and Secretary of State Baker has pledged U.S. support for European integration as long as it

¹³⁹Reprinted by the Eurogroup in "Western Defense: The European Role in NATO," Brussels, May 1988, 4.

¹⁴⁰Bush, cited in Reed, et al, 21.

strengthens the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁴¹ It is important to observe that U.S. support has only been extended to those efforts designed to solidify the European pillar of NATO. According to Catherine Guicherd, a French analyst,

While the United States kept calling for a stronger European contribution to NATO, it has been reluctant to grant the Europeans larger responsibilities for fear that this would undermine the alliance's effectiveness and unity.¹⁴²

Fortunately for U.S.-European relations President Bush has emphasized the need for good ties between the U.S. and the EC.

American officials have spoken often about the President's support for initiatives toward European defense autonomy, always ensuring that consideration is paid to NATO in the effort. U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney tried to back the Europeans as much as he could while protecting NATO by saying,

The United States believes that the emergence of a distinct European security identity within the context of transatlantic relations is compatible with NATO. For this reason, the United States is prepared to support arrangements needed for the expression of a common European security and defense policy.¹⁴³

Cheney has recognized the steady chain of events in Europe toward greater unity, yet sees the opportunity to ensure

¹⁴¹James A. Baker, "New Directions for the Atlantic Alliance," Speech at Copenhagen, June 6, 1991, in US Department of State Dispatch, June 10, 1991, 403.

¹⁴²Guicherd, 5.

¹⁴³Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1992, 16.

NATO's survival. Josef Joffe, on the other hand, has expressed concern over the lack of recent American participation in major European events such as the Maastricht Summit and the Yugoslav Civil War, fearing that "the United States will not be Number One in the world if it becomes irrelevant in Europe."¹⁴⁴

The United States has continued to press for the development of a strong European pillar in NATO. It sees the WEU fulfilling that role, bridging the gap between the EC and NATO. The WEU could also be responsible for out-of-area actions if it were subordinate to NATO. As Cheney has indicated,

I don't see anything within the NATO framework or the U.S. commitment to NATO that should be taken as an effort to discourage the Europeans developing their own out-of-area capabilities...There's no reason in the world they can't be dual-hatted and have dual assignments.¹⁴⁵

The U.S. voice in European security would remain influential, and the Atlantic link would stay strong under this structure. The United States has been forced periodically to mute its voice, however, because of the inherent opposition its opinions would engender, often a French reaction to what France considers American domineering. However, the Dutch, the Germans, the Portuguese, the British and others often

¹⁴⁴Josef Joffe, "America's in the Balcony as Europe Takes Center Stage," New York Times, December 22, 1991, E5.

¹⁴⁵Dick Cheney, interview with the San Diego Union, November 12, 1991, 5.

assert the Atlantic viewpoint. The United States has had to play the diplomatic game very carefully to ensure that its viewpoint is heard while not isolating itself from events. In February 1991, the State Department reportedly sent a memorandum to Europe that had counterproductive effects.¹⁴⁶ The U.S. will need more skill in the future if it is to avoid marginalization from European security affairs.

The burden-sharing issue, long a sore point among members of the U.S. Congress, remains an important factor in the U.S. analysis of European security progress. Dissatisfaction with European burden-sharing in the 1960s and 1970s led to a series of legislative attempts to force changes, culminating in the Mansfield Amendment and Resolution which, if passed, would have legislated the reduction of U.S. troops in Europe.¹⁴⁷ The Europeans have claimed that their recent efforts are designed to ease the U.S. burden, and many in the United States agree, saying the U.S. should pass the

¹⁴⁶According to John Newhouse and other journalists, some U.S. officials, concerned over a late 1990 British proposal that would have established the WEU as the European pillar in NATO, reacted by emphasizing their position that a "European security identity...would duplicate NATO's functions...[and] could lead to NATO's marginalization." The reportedly heavy-handed memorandum sent to convey this idea caused irritation and anger in Europe, leading to disavowal of the note by many American officials. See Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round: A Collective Nervous Breakdown," The New Yorker, September 2, 1991, 92.

¹⁴⁷See an extensive discussion of burden-sharing and the U.S. Senate in Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985).

burden entirely. Continued European and American addressing of the burden-sharing issue will aid the process of the harmonious development of a new European defense structure.¹⁴⁸

2. The Range of U.S. Capabilities

Even if the Europeans are able to agree among themselves on the structure of an independent defense organization, U.S. experts generally do not believe that such an organization will have the necessary capabilities to express Europe's will and protect the continent against all threats, at least in the immediately foreseeable future. This opinion, shared by many Europeans, serves to hamper European initiatives toward autonomy. As Guicherd notes, the Gulf War showed that Europe cannot handle the distant threat alone, as "only the United States has both the political will and the military means to confront an aggressor."¹⁴⁹ The National Security Strategy agrees, noting from the outset that the U.S. remains the only state with truly global strength - political, military, and economic.¹⁵⁰ The Europeans have attempted to remedy their deficiencies, especially through French bids to improve their space surveillance capabilities. Technological

¹⁴⁸The burden-sharing issue will be treated in more depth in Chapter 6.

¹⁴⁹Guicherd, 17.

¹⁵⁰George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, August 1991, 2.

weaknesses will also encourage more cooperative ventures, which have political benefits for European countries. As Guicherd concludes, however, "The limitations of European capabilities may be one of the most powerful arguments for a close coordination of WEU operations with those of other NATO allies."¹⁵¹

F. FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENTS

The United States must recognize and accept the fact that Western Europe is proceeding along the path toward a greater degree of defense autonomy. With many pitfalls along the way, the Europeans have made considerable progress in overcoming their historic nationalism and inability to deal diplomatically with each other to advance toward the surrendering of a significant amount of sovereignty. Though the Maastricht defense compromise was incomplete and somewhat ambiguous, it is important that all sides praised the progress made toward European unity. Far from what the French, desiring the leadership role in Europe, and the British, who favored little or no change in Alliance structure, originally wanted, the result so far has been the necessary compromise to promote wider and deeper cooperation.

Joffe's thesis that the Europeans cannot behave peacefully without the United States keeping them in order reflects a

¹⁵¹Guicherd, 50.

past vision of Europe. While disagreeing on a great many issues, the Europeans have shown themselves able to conduct a dialogue as long as necessary to produce an agreement while maintaining a professional, diplomatic atmosphere. They have also shown themselves more capable than in the early post-1945 era by taking the initiative on issues dealing with their own security. Still, the relative loss of power the United States has experienced in Europe may add to a somewhat anarchic situation on the continent. Agreements will not be easy, yet they will emerge eventually.

The development of an autonomous European defense identity has been characterized by several key conditions. First, French leadership coupled with German support has been crucial in producing a workable structure. The French ability to learn from past mistakes with regard to the role of the U.S. has allowed them to gain German support and forge compromises with the British. Second, Prime Minister Major's Europeanist leanings (in comparison with his predecessor's views) have allowed the British to become more a part of the integration process, and their participation has ensured that it will have more of an Atlanticist flavor than had they abstained.

Third, the actual future abilities of an EC-based WEU remain uncertain. Though Chancellor Kohl has stated his support for the French proposal, he has been careful to express his continued support for NATO. While these positions have allowed the French and British to enter into a

compromise, the German position seems to be one of trying to please everyone by adopting all sides as their own. This position cannot endure, as the French, the British, and the Americans will not accept it when it comes time to decide on the path to follow. It has been convenient to invoke German support for one's position when necessary; eventually this will not be possible. In addition, the Germans will have to resolve the out-of-area issue if they are to be true participants in an integrated European security structure.

Fourth, questions remain regarding the real military capabilities of the EC or the WEU. Events in the Persian Gulf did not reflect favorably on either, and the Yugoslavian Civil War has pointed to political impotence in the Community. Though he overstated the situation, there is some truth in Gambles's observation that, "each of the three major European powers acted exactly [in the Persian Gulf war] as one might have expected if the idea of European security integration had never been suggested at all."¹⁵² Issues to be resolved include force structure, command relationships, basing, missions, and political will. The generally unpopular question of the duplication of the tasks of NATO must be resolved as well.¹⁵³

¹⁵²Gambles, 41.

¹⁵³William Drozdiak, "NATO States, Ex-East Bloc Meet for Talks," Washington Post, March 11, 1992, A11.

Importantly, all the members of the EC, as well as other European states that wish to become members, accept the need to integrate more fully on a wide spectrum of issues. Public opinion and speeches by officials across the continent show that the drive toward unity is accelerating. Though the Maastricht Summit settled less than might have been hoped, the geographical, cultural, historical, political, and economic ties that bind the nations of Western Europe have ensured a process that will probably not reverse itself. Development of a fully capable and autonomous European security identity is still some years in the future, yet it will most likely come through the EC and WEU. The Atlantic link will probably not be broken, but it doubtless will be considerably altered.

For the United States, the implications could include marginalization from European security affairs. Forty-five years of pronounced support for European unity and billions of dollars in military aid will have helped to foster the process which costs the U.S. much of its influence. For many Americans, the loss of influence in Europe will not be a problem, as support grows for disengagement from Europe as part of an isolationist revival. For others, emphasis is shifting from the old European paradigm to areas of growing interest for the U.S. - the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, Latin America, and the Far East. For either group, events in Europe are not unfavorable. For some in the Bush Administration and others, however, the loss of U.S. influence

in Europe means a Europe bound to repeat the instability of its past, necessitating the eventual reintroduction of American troops onto the continent, or at least Europeans pursuing security policies at variance with worldwide U.S. interests.

European and American defense interests do not have to clash; compelled European support of U.S. positions is not the answer if they differ. Western Europe may well progress toward unity regardless of the United States, though the process and end results would be different depending on the character of U.S.-EC relations. Cultural, political, and economic relationships will perpetuate transatlantic ties; as both pillars of Atlantic defense generally hold similar views on security topics, there is no reason why some degree of European autonomy cannot have positive ramifications for the United States, such as easing the American burden. While U.S. strategic planning should continue to plan for NATO contingencies, it should also recognize that NATO's tasks are changing in conjunction with the decline of the traditional threat scenario (the possibility of short-warning aggression by Moscow).

IV. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR COOPERATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The last chapter showed the difficulties of the process of integrating the defense structures of Western Europe, yet also highlighted the importance of this action to the overall goal of European Political Union. One of the primary stumbling blocks toward a closer continental union is the loss of sovereignty that the participants must accept, and in that light the question of West European nuclear cooperation serves as a fine example of the costs and benefits of more thorough integration. This chapter examines the prospects for the British and French bringing their nuclear arsenals together in a West European defense entity.

Attempts at close European nuclear cooperation are not without precedent. The Multilateral Force talks of the early 1960s tried to bring together American, British, and French nuclear forces and to give each nation, along with Germany, a share of responsibility for their coordination and deployment. In the end, however, the plan failed because the system of control was considered unworkable and because the United States opposed losing control over its forces.¹⁵⁴ The French

¹⁵⁴Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 328.

plan to deploy Pluton missiles in West Germany in 1974-75 was changed after the Germans informally tried to gain some control over them and obtain a potential veto over their use.¹⁵⁵ French President Giscard d'Estaing attempted to soothe this blow to German-French relations as well as move France closer to NATO militarily with efforts implying French nuclear cooperation in 1975-76, but backed down in the face of strong domestic opposition.¹⁵⁶ In the 1980s there were numerous efforts at talks between the French and the Germans over some degree of consultation on nuclear use. In October 1987, President Mitterrand reaffirmed France's 1986 agreement to consult with the West Germans over the use of French pre-strategic nuclear weapons on German soil.¹⁵⁷

With the legacy of limited success in previous attempts at nuclear cooperation and an international environment in which the U.S. nuclear deterrent may not be as reliable (or as necessary) as it once was, West European nuclear cooperation is once again an issue of great interest. Indeed, EC

¹⁵⁵David S. Yost, "Franco-German Defence Cooperation," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (London: MacMillan, 1990), 235.

¹⁵⁶Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part I, Adelphi Paper 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1984/85), 8.

¹⁵⁷Edward Kolodziej, "British-French Nuclearization and European Denuclearization: Implications for U.S. Policy," in French Security Policy in a Disarming World: Domestic Challenges and International Constraints, ed. Philippe G. Le Prestre (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 136.

Commission President Jacques Delors has already addressed the need for a nuclear arm of political union:

...if we really reach a political entity made up of a certain number of nations which agree to have a common external policy on the main issues, then, in my mind, French nuclear weapons should be at the service of this common policy.¹⁵⁸

Though numerous factors tend to favor such cooperation, this chapter shows that it is unlikely that Western European nuclear cooperation will occur in the foreseeable future. Cooperation in this case means close British-French nuclear planning with conceptual, financial, and/or operational contributions from other West European allies, with the goal of ensuring nuclear deterrence for Western Europe.

Such nuclear cooperation will probably not occur for three primary reasons. First, too many national interests must be overcome, ranging from questions of national sovereignty to differing strategies. Second, various political and operational factors will constrain attempts to design and operate the force, such as the mechanism for control as well as the international relations implications pertaining primarily to the United States. Third, the role of Germany in a unified security structure remains uncertain. Domestic politics and attitudes toward nuclear weapons are highly polarized, and decisions taken toward cooperation by the

¹⁵⁸Jacques Delors, Paris Antenne-2 Television Network interview, January 5, 1992, 1100 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 6, 1992, 8-11).

nuclear powers may create political controversy in Germany. There is also the question of participation by Germany and the implications of this effort.

The basic plan for this chapter is as follows. It examines each of the three primary reasons hindering the development of a unified West European nuclear force, as well as mitigating factors and overall prospects. It then addresses the implications for the future U.S. role in European security as new structures are developed.

B. PROBLEMS IN COOPERATION

1. National Interests

Any attempt to integrate policies among nations must first overcome or at least placate the national interests of the nations involved. Five areas in particular are of interest in the area of nuclear integration: national sovereignty, Great Power status, strategic cultures, domestic politics, and relationships with the United States.

Though the United States has provided, and according to West European leaders should continue to provide, the deterrent to protect Western Europe from attack, a national arsenal provides additional protection. For the British and the French, the concept of an ultimate deterrent, the insurance policy that provides a nation with the ability to strike and cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor, helps to ensure the security of the homeland. Sabin calls British

nuclear weapons the "ultimate national deterrent against attack upon the United Kingdom."¹⁵⁹ This force is necessary, according to the concept, because no nation can rely on a force not under national command for its protection. The *force de frappe* serves as the protection of the French sanctuary, as a guarantor of French vital interests. As President Mitterrand has stated, "France, in any case, will not use its nuclear capability other than for its own strategy of deterrence, and Europe as a whole will not take the risk of finding itself unprotected."¹⁶⁰ The question of national sovereignty affects the French and British willingness to accept a degree of non-national control or influence over their nuclear weapons, as both generally oppose this incursion into their national sovereignty.¹⁶¹

Closely related to the idea of national sovereignty is the status provided by the possession of nuclear weapons. France believes that its nuclear arsenal has conferred on it the status of being the third leading military power of the

¹⁵⁹Philip A.G. Sabin, British Strategic Priorities in the 1990's, Adelphi Paper 254 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1990), 8.

¹⁶⁰Francois Mitterrand, speech at The Hague, February 7, 1984, quoted in David S. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," French Politics & Society, Summer/Fall 1991, 151.

¹⁶¹John G. Mason, "Mitterrand, the Socialists, and French Nuclear Policy," in *Le Prestre*, 53.

world.¹⁶² Public and official support for the French nuclear force remains strong, as

France stands out as the Western country with the strongest public consensus in support of nuclear deterrence...French officials have been consistent in upholding the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence as a means of preventing war and assuring France's independence and international status.¹⁶³

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan described the importance to Britain of nuclear weapons in the 1950s:

The independent contribution...gives us a better position in the world, it gives us a better position with respect to the United States. It puts us where we ought to be, in the position of a Great Power.¹⁶⁴

The possession of nuclear weapons gives both the British and the French somewhat more political leverage vis-a-vis the United States, adding to their perceived status as Great Powers.

Another national obstacle to the integration of British and French nuclear forces resides in the differences

¹⁶²This attitude has been expressed by numerous French leaders, including Francois Mitterrand, in "Interview with President Francois Mitterrand," Bulletin d'Information, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, May 22, 1989, 6, in Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic Options in the 1990s, Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), 15.

¹⁶³Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?" Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1990, 493.

¹⁶⁴Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 84, in John Roper, "Nuclear Policies: Different Approaches to Similar Objectives," in Franco-British Defence Cooperation: A New Entente Cordiale? eds. Yves Boyer, Pierre Lellouche, and John Roper (London: Routledge, 1989), 8.

in the strategies and strategic cultures of the countries. A joint West European nuclear force would have to fall under one strategic plan that resulted at least from a consensus between the nuclear participants, not to mention from all the other voices within the security organization as a whole. This would only be brought about with great difficulty, however, owing to the vastly different allegiances and meanings the British and the French hold for their forces. British strategy begins with NATO, and it is within this fundamental setting that British policies must be understood. The United Kingdom has devoted its forces to NATO - with ultimate authority remaining in London - and it participates completely in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). Additionally, the British readily accept (and have historically contributed to the formulation of) American strategic concepts for the use of nuclear weapons.

The French, on the other hand, have been fiercely independent about the use of their nuclear forces. They have constructed notably different scenarios for their use of forces, including an earlier and larger use of pre-strategic, and then strategic, weapons. France has also refused to participate in the NPG in order to retain its complete freedom in nuclear planning.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, the differing

¹⁶⁵Roper, 13.

strategic cultures between the British and French could compound the challenge of closer cooperation, though the NATO allies have managed to overcome this problem in many areas.

Domestic politics will play a large role in hampering the coordination and merging of the French and British nuclear arsenals. While the *force de frappe* retains its support across most of the French political spectrum, anti-nuclear strains are strong in the UK's Labour opposition.¹⁶⁶ Should Labour come to power, it is unlikely that any accommodation will be reached with France that fails to address nuclear disarmament. In addition to differences over the possession of nuclear weapons, Labour has also expressed opposition to the possibility of "first use" and supported requirements to consult with Germany before any nuclear use.¹⁶⁷ Such

¹⁶⁶Debates over nuclear policies are more frequent in Britain's House of Commons than in France's National Assembly. Though there is a great deal of interest in cooperating with France on a variety of issues, it is often difficult to forge common positions from which to negotiate with France because of the internal debates. Uncertainty remains regarding the outcomes of questions dealing with Britain's nuclear role, including the Trident program, TASM, and disarmament. See House of Commons (Hansard), Parliamentary Debates on Nuclear Defence, Vol. 201, No. 39, January 14, 1992. In addition, the development of Labour's position toward nuclear weapons is a key factor in cooperation. Though Labour, as a whole, has retreated from the unilateral nuclear disarmament stance of much of the 1980s, many in the party still support the notion. For a review of Labour's security policies, see Bruce George, The British Labour Party and Defense, Washington Paper 153 (New York: Praeger, 1991).

¹⁶⁷Freedman, "Britain's Nuclear Commitment to Germany," in British-German Defence Cooperation: Partners within the Alliance, eds. Karl Kaiser and John Roper (London: Jane's, 1988), 198.

policies, depending on their precise formulation, could compound the conflicts in strategy discussed above and further complicate British nuclear cooperation with France. Domestic political constraints in the United Kingdom will exacerbate the British government's difficulties in reaching agreement with a French government in which nearly all players favor a strong nuclear force. Debating the utility of nuclear weapons may result in no accord at all.

One final component of national interests that separates the British and the French involves the relationship of each with the U.S. Though the French and the Americans have enjoyed relatively close security relations over the years, some on each side still consider the other too self-important or somehow pursuing policies harmful to European interests. France has repeatedly attempted to reduce American influence in Europe and replace it with its own in the security arena. While the French have relied on the American nuclear umbrella to deter the Soviets from attacking Europe, they still feel that their own forces are more reliable because they are protecting European territory (their own). France has tried to spread this attitude throughout Western Europe in efforts to enhance the "European Pillar," with France as its center.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," Survival, July/August 1991, 333-4.

The United Kingdom, in contrast, considers a close relationship with the United States of the utmost national interest and strongly opposes any association with France that would threaten this relationship.

For 40 years, the UK has tried to have the best of both world, by maintaining this privileged bilateral security relationship stemming from the close Anglo-American cooperation which developed during World War II, while at the same time becoming part of the integration process in Europe. If NATO is superseded by a new security arrangement involving bilateral links between the United States and an integrated European force organized under the EC or WEU, then this special relationship may come under even greater pressure.¹⁶⁹

This is an essential feature of any military integration plan involving the UK. A West European defense identity, including a nuclear cooperative effort, must account for the importance of the Atlantic link. Nuclear integration has been hindered in part because the French have not addressed this concern sufficiently.

2. Political and Operational Considerations

A second group of reasons why Western European nuclear cooperation is unlikely (or, at least, likely to be difficult) for the foreseeable future concerns the political and operational points that would be involved in cooperating. In this context five main ideas are covered: the second decision center, control problems, cooperative motivations, initiative,

¹⁶⁹Sabin, 37-38.

and the reactions of other nations to a British-French nuclear relationship.

The notion of a second decision center means that an aggressor will have to consider the reactions of more than one opponent when planning aggression. In this case, not only are possible American responses to an attack important, but the British and French responses may also be both severe and different from those of the U.S., complicating the aggressor's decision-making process and (it is hoped) deterring him more effectively. This rationale has been utilized for the creation of both the British and French arsenals, and continues to be valid in the eyes of their creators. The French rely on "proportionate deterrence," a term also adopted by the British, to show how they add to Western deterrence. According to one French scholar, "French retaliation...relies on the enemy's *inability to predict* whether French conventional and especially nuclear forces will actually be used."¹⁷⁰ As the United States pulls a large portion of its forces and equipment out of Europe, some French and British officials believe that their nuclear arsenals must assume Europe's nuclear guarantee.¹⁷¹ If American weapons were

¹⁷⁰Andre Brigot, "A Neighbor's Fears: Enduring Issues in Franco-German Relations," in Le Prestre, 96.

¹⁷¹The January 14, 1992 House of Commons Debate also specifically addressed the importance of the British second decision center because of the potential loss of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Parliamentary Debates, 887.

removed from the equation, however, the second decision center notion could serve to help perpetuate the wedge between French and British cooperation.

In addition to the strategic reasons why nuclear integration is unlikely, there are practical reasons as well. Under any realistic cooperative regime, the national governments providing the weapons would consult before any were used. It is here that time considerations come into play, for in the event of war, especially if a nuclear attack had already been launched by an aggressor, there would little (or no) time for extensive consultations before responding. Even if cooperative agreements were in place, the time might not be available to implement them.¹⁷²

Similarly, questions remain regarding the mechanisms through which multilateral or central West European control would be exercised. According to Brigot, nuclear cooperation is unlikely because "nuclear logic limits considerably sharing sovereignty, whoever the partners may be."¹⁷³ The logic to which he refers includes the placement of forces, their control, and the guarantees and use of the deterrent. Additionally, once hostilities had begun, operational coordination with France might be difficult because of years

¹⁷²Yost, "French Nuclear Targeting," in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, eds. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 147.

¹⁷³Brigot, 102.

of weakened communications ties between the French and NATO, complicating attempts at coordination (though numerous bilateral arrangements are in place). Finally, while there are similarities between a number of British and American systems, this is often not the case with the French, which could require extensive modifications to the command, control, and communications equipment if integration were sufficiently deep.

One must consider the motives for deciding whether to cooperate or not. Though they sternly oppose weakening the Atlantic link, the British also deem it necessary to participate to a reasonable extent in the process of Western European integration. One aspect of this entails participation in military procurement projects, an aspect of policy that may be applicable to nuclear forces at some point. In deciding whether to cooperate, however, the British must determine whether cooperative ventures represent good military judgment or political expedience. British decision-making toward the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) program was affected by these considerations. The challenge of keeping a fine line in which military and political needs are both satisfied would always affect nuclear cooperation; an integrated force depending on national inputs would remain subject to the military vs. political debates of the national leadership, resulting in choices based on domestic politics as

well as the national interest. The ASLP is especially interesting in this regard.¹⁷⁴

Deficiencies in leadership and initiative, crucial to effective world organizations but present in West European countries in uncertain quantities, could play an important role in hindering Western European nuclear integration. Though the French have long attempted to lead the Western Europeans toward political and military union on their terms, French leadership initiatives have sometimes antagonized potential followers. On the other hand, the British have generally been content to follow the American lead. The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War once again showed American initiative, as the U.S. was the only nation able to build the necessary political and military coalitions to perform the task.¹⁷⁵ Initiative and leadership are essential, or attempts at West European military integration in general, and nuclear force integration in particular, are doomed to fail.

¹⁷⁴"Anglo/French Defence Cooperation," report of the Defence Committee of the House of Commons, Session 1991-92, November 27, 1991, shows a wide range of areas of bilateral cooperation, including some in the nuclear field (exercises, procurement, planning) and considers cooperation with France "undervalued." In addition, British and French officials have recently discussed potential cooperation on SSBN operations, procurement, and the ASLP, though some reservations have been noted. See Charles Miller, "UK, France Discuss Nuclear Defense Cooperation," Press Association, January 16, 1992, 1137 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 16, 1992, 2).

¹⁷⁵Freedman, "The Gulf War and the New World Order," Survival, May/June 1991, 199.

The final political concern that makes West European nuclear integration difficult (or unlikely) is the reaction of other interested nations. For other European nations, especially those who might be happier with lessened U.S. influence, a coordinated French-British nuclear relationship might seem like the creation of a new hegemony in Europe, a "second tier" of a NATO-like oligarchy.¹⁷⁶ For smaller nations which had come to count on the stabilizing and leading influence of the United States for the past forty-five years, such an occurrence would be less than favorable. Hoping for more influence themselves, these nations might not only be disappointed but also wish for a return to American leadership, as many feel that only the American extended deterrent can truly protect them.¹⁷⁷

Mitterrand's January 1992 statement about a European nuclear doctrine may well have been motivated out of concern that other Western Europeans were beginning to feel left out of the integration process by France, with a corresponding reduction in their input to form a West European defense

¹⁷⁶Stefano Silvestri, "Search for a European Pillar," in NATO in the 5th Decade, eds. Keith Dunn and Stephen Flanagan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990), 89.

¹⁷⁷One example of this viewpoint can be found in Thomas Enders, Holger H. Mey, and Michael Ruhle, "Germany, Extended Deterrence, and the Nuclear Debate," draft of March 1991, 9.

identity.¹⁷⁸ The appearance of a new hegemonic relationship would cast a dark shadow on the new defense union right from the start and dim prospects for long term success. American support or opposition toward West European nuclear cooperation is also very important to the prospects for its success, as questions about the U.S. role in European security affairs affect nuclear cooperation just as they do the West European security identity in general. Concern for the potential marginalization of the U.S. will continue to influence this debate.

3. The Role of Germany

Though Chapter Five of this thesis is devoted to Germany's role in the development of new West European security structures, it is necessary here to emphasize those factors which specifically affect the possibility of a European nuclear deterrent. This section discusses four areas: anti-nuclear sentiment, neutralism, German attitudes toward the nuclear deterrent, and attitudes of others toward German participation in nuclear policy.

¹⁷⁸Mitterrand said, "[France and Britain] have a clear doctrine for their national defense. Is it possible to imagine a European doctrine? That question will very quickly become one of the major issues in the construction of a common European defence." Allocution Prononcee par Monsieur Francois Mitterrand, lors de l'ouverture des rencontres nationales pour l'Europe, au Palais des Congres, Paris, January 10, 1992, 9 of text furnished by the Service de Presse, Presidence de la Republique. This unexpected statement could be one of a series of steps taken to regain French leadership in the process of designing the new West European defense structure.

The anti-nuclear movement in Germany is well-developed and powerful. Though successive Bonn governments have accepted and desired U.S. nuclear protection, they have done so representing a public that has increasingly held ambivalent or opposing views. Since U.S. theater nuclear weapons have been deployed primarily in Germany and have been planned for the defense of Germany, a loss of German support for them will largely undermine the nuclear policies in place in Western Europe. As a result, the German voice at defense union meetings might oppose the policies of the British and the French regarding nuclear forces. President Bush's September 1991 initiative reducing nuclear forces and the subsequent NPG meeting in Taormina in October satisfied certain domestic political needs of the Kohl government, but public support for the continued maintenance of the remaining air-launched nuclear weapons in Germany is uncertain.¹⁷⁹

The French decision to deploy the Hades missile system strained France's relations with some German experts, officials, and politicians, and weakened the coherence of European defense efforts. The SPD quickly announced strong opposition to a system which could hypothetically be used on German territory.¹⁸⁰ As public opposition grew, France, not

¹⁷⁹Helga Haftendorn, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Allied Strategy," in Dunn and Flanagan, 129.

¹⁸⁰Berlin ADN, July 27, 1991, 1450 GMT (FBIS-WE, July 31, 1991, 9).

normally hesitant about taking national security decisions despite foreign criticism¹⁸¹, eventually deferred the deployment and reduced total numbers.¹⁸² The effects of this reversal remain to be seen.

Opposition to nuclear weapons is related to another possible path for German foreign policy - neutralism. Though the Kohl government remains firmly committed to the Atlantic Alliance, there has been a great deal of support (especially from certain circles within the SPD, though it still professes loyalty to NATO) for a neutralist German policy, with Germany playing a major international political role without true allies.¹⁸³ Germany's current pro-Western stance could change if some of the pressures affecting other parts of Europe should cross its borders, such as religious problems, regional differences, or nationalism.¹⁸⁴ Such pressures (and

¹⁸¹Yost, "France," in The Allies and Arms Control, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Harald Von Riekhoff, and John Roper (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 185.

¹⁸²"French Try to Clear Nuclear Uncertainties," San Jose Mercury News, September 12, 1991, 8C. The Hades program, originally calling for 120 missiles for 60 launchers, has been cut to a total of 30 missiles. See Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures," in Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European Security, ed. Beatrice Heuser (London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, 1991), 30.

¹⁸³Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher, "West German Arms Control Policy," in West European Arms Control Policy, ed. Robbin Laird (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 110.

¹⁸⁴William Odom, "Challenges to NATO Strategy: Implications for the 1990s - Task 2" (Fairfax, VA: National Security Research, 1990), 6.

disagreements with EC partners about how to deal with them) could force Germany away from Western European organizations and weaken efforts at defense integration, thus weakening prospects for any integration of European nuclear forces.

Other German attitudes toward nuclear deterrence will compound the difficulty of creating an integrated force. The first problem concerns German participation, because if nuclear planning is to reflect German political interests to any significant degree, Germany must ensure that its voice is heard.¹⁸⁵ Though Germany as a whole is losing interest in nuclear weapons, it remains important that its interests not be ignored; yet voicing its concerns may complicate integrated European planning. Joffe makes it clear that the previous German role has become unsustainable when he says that the "Federal Republic will no longer act as a willing 'aircraft carrier' of American nuclear weapons in Europe."¹⁸⁶ Any central West European nuclear force will have to take German interests into account and treat the Germans as more equal partners than before Germany's reunification.

¹⁸⁵Enders, Mey, and Ruhle, 21. In addition, Foreign Minister Genscher has signalled his support for Delors's statement that eventually French nuclear weapons should become part of a European arsenal, which would give Germany some influence over their disposition and potential use. See "Genscher Supports Delors's Statements, Die Welt, January 8, 1992, 8 (FBIS-WE, January 8, 1992, 10).

¹⁸⁶Josef Joffe, "The Revisionists: Moscow, Bonn, and the European Balance," The National Interest, Fall 1989, 53.

Another point weakening European nuclear forces in general and hampering effective integration in particular is the German perception of the effectiveness of the British and French deterrents. As Enders, Mey, and Ruhle note, neither force is credible in an extended deterrence role, being satisfactory only for the protection of their own sanctuaries.¹⁸⁷ Such opinions damage the credibility of a French arsenal which, some Frenchmen have vaguely implied, might provide protection for Germany as a vital French interest. This also strengthens the hand of Americans who wish to retain a nuclear deterrent role in Europe, especially because some Germans remain interested in a counterweight to the large nuclear arsenal of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

As important as German participation in an integrated European defense organization is, true partnership involving Germany and nuclear weapons evokes considerable opposition from other Europeans, especially the French. There has been strong and repeated opposition to any conception of Germany having nuclear weapons or any control over nuclear weapons from Alliance partners, the Russians, and the Germans themselves¹⁸⁸, even though the lack of this participation weakens integrated security structures. France also fears the

¹⁸⁷Enders, Mey, and Ruhle, 9.

¹⁸⁸Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?" 503.

possibility of foreign policy marginalization as German political influence in Europe and globally increases.¹⁸⁹ Clearly the most powerful conventional military as well as economic force west of Russia, however, Germany must play a large role in ensuring the West European structure's legitimacy and effectiveness. Otherwise, Germany could turn against the integration process, and the U.S. could oppose such a process that prevented full German participation.

C. PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION

Viewed from the perspective already discussed, prospects for nuclear cooperation in Western Europe seem exceedingly bleak. However, a number of factors tend to work in favor of increased, rather than decreased, integration. The first is economics. It is highly, if not prohibitively, expensive to maintain an independent nuclear arsenal in addition to effective conventional forces. Economic pressures have added to the difficulty of France maintaining the nuclear and conventional forces that it has in the past. The easing of the financial burden that cooperation would provide may force France in that direction.¹⁹⁰ Even the vaunted French IRBM force has been affected, with the S-45 mobile missile system

¹⁸⁹Yost, "France in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990-1991, 115.

¹⁹⁰A.W. DePorte, "French Security Policy," in Le Prestre, 10.

being scrapped in July 1991 for budgetary reasons.¹⁹¹ This is especially significant as a step beyond the cutbacks in the Hades as well as other programs.

The United Kingdom has been even more severely affected by tight budgets. British conventional forces are already being reduced and strong opposition has been raised to SLBM modernization as well as to air-launched missile systems. The British, however, have experience in using cooperative efforts to reduce the financial burden to themselves, as the Trident program shows. At the same time as participation further cemented British-American relations, the program brought the economic advantages of cooperation in procurement to the British.¹⁹² Cooperation in the ASLP program may offer additional opportunities for economic benefits. It is clear that economic considerations point strongly toward cooperation and integration for the British as well as the French.

Other factors favor integration. Increased specialization would benefit NATO. Such efforts could be complemented by an integrated West European nuclear force. The advantages of specialization are clear from an economic point of view, but

¹⁹¹Perhaps significantly, the French Senate Defense Committee has said that the missile could become the backbone of a European deterrent, which could justify its cost. See JAC Lewis, "French Bid to Give S-45 a Euro Role," Jane's Defence Weekly, November 30, 1991, 1025.

¹⁹²Ministry of Defence, The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force (London: Ministry of Defence Open Government Document 80/23, July 1980), 19.

the benefits of cooperation in the political arena have been many as well. It is after years of coordinated policy efforts that NATO stands after the Warsaw Pact has fallen. The Western Europeans share so many common interests that cooperation should be possible, especially as efforts are underway in earnest to create an integrated West European defense structure. Cooperation produces synergy, but until now national interests have prevented taking advantage of this benefit. Finally, results from the Gulf conflict show the benefits of cooperation, when nations of similar outlook worked together to meld their abilities against common opposition. The lessons of the EC's disunity in the Gulf War should help instruct the Europeans in the benefits of unity as they progress toward economic and political integration.

Though logic suggests that nuclear integration would benefit Western Europe in some ways, it would be unrealistic to say that the evidence based on these factors carries more weight than the factors discouraging integration. National sovereignty and related national interests will not be supplanted by the "European good" unless sufficient national sovereignty can be retained and the integration process serves other national interests. Though it would by no means be a rapid process, the political and operational problems precluding integration could be overcome by more careful analysis and diplomatic expertise. There may be ways to shape a European security organization to include substantial German

influence while maintaining a robust deterrent force, given sufficient time and effort. National interests are another question, however. Considering the importance nuclear weapons hold for their possessors, cooperation in the nuclear arena would imply that great political, psychological, and military gulfs had been overcome so that the participants could integrate something of the highest value to them.¹⁹³

According to Yost,

[France's] preoccupations with autonomy and...France's interest in maximizing uncertainties in the interests of deterrent credibility [have hampered its ability to consult with Germany]. France's refusal to engage in consultations on nuclear employment questions with Germany and other allies lessens the credibility of French professions of interest in building a West European defence identity and placing French nuclear forces at the service of this entity.¹⁹⁴

It is clear that until political integration takes place, it is premature even to consider the integration of European nuclear forces. Considering the multitude of problems involved in political integration, and the fact that plans for defense integration are only at the earliest stages, it is apparent that for the foreseeable future there will be no close cooperation of West European nuclear forces.

¹⁹³Peter Nailor, "The Difficulties of Nuclear Cooperation," in Boyer, 32.

¹⁹⁴Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures," 42.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Any fundamental shift in the structure of European security carries great significance for the foreign and military policy of the United States. Though this chapter has argued that Western European nuclear integration will not happen for the foreseeable future, the reasons behind the efforts being made toward integration in this area as well as European economic and political integration in general will necessitate basic reassessments of U.S. relations with Europe. This section of the chapter briefly analyzes some important issue areas affected by European integration with an eye toward future nuclear strategic planning for the United States. Many of these issue areas are related to more general topics concerning the development of a West European security identity and its implications for U.S. planning, which are discussed in other chapters. This section concentrates on two specifically nuclear considerations: the reshaping of the nuclear roles of NATO and/or the WEU, and the challenge of controlling potential nuclear escalation in a conflict.

1. Nuclear Roles in the Reshaping of NATO and/or the WEU

The alliance structures are in a period of major transition. NATO has already begun to transform itself toward the post-Cold War era, attempting to define new roles in European security. The concept of existential deterrence has many more followers. The Western European Union is on the

fringes of power, as Europeanists and Atlanticists attempt to find its place in West European integration as well as its relationship to NATO. Efforts toward integrating European nuclear forces could fit nicely into a strengthened WEU, but this would institutionalize nuclear forces in an organization over which the United States has little influence. Whereas under current structures the U.S. can count on coordination with the British through the NPG and JSTPS, a combined British-French arsenal under WEU auspices might present American nuclear planning with the need to consider scenarios in which the European arsenal played an autonomous role. Should the EC gain a nuclear arsenal in this way, it is possible that NATO's nuclear role would lose some of its centrality in allied planning, perhaps reducing its deterrent effect, especially as the U.S. reduces its European forces.

As the United States withdraws large portions of its forces from Europe, its whole European posture changes. The U.S. role may become one of ensuring the stability of Europe by a token presence and political relationships, in order to keep Eastern Europe under some form of control as well as providing a counterweight to a Germany which could choose an independent path.¹⁹⁵ The role of American nuclear forces, then, becomes one of a very distant threat. Should the U.S. choose or be forced to remove its nuclear forces from Europe

¹⁹⁵Odom, 3.

in their entirety, nuclear deterrence may become what some have called "declaratory extended deterrence," less credible than extended deterrence based in part on an in-theater nuclear presence.¹⁹⁶ The entire face of nuclear deterrence and of the Atlantic Alliance will be shaped by efforts to integrate and reconfigure West European security structures.

2. Control over Nuclear Escalation

The concept of nuclear weapons under the control of allies other than the U.S. itself has always been of great concern to the United States because of the uncertainties involved regarding their control and possible use.¹⁹⁷ The smaller nuclear powers do not share the thoroughly debated and modelled deterrence strategies that the U.S. has created. French strategies that diverge widely from Anglo-American strategies by emphasizing threats of earlier and less limited use than are envisaged by Britain and the U.S. cause concern that in the event of war SACEUR might lose escalation control because France might usurp the initiative and begin a large scale nuclear war.¹⁹⁸

While nuclear force integration in Europe could moderate the French strategies more toward American views,

¹⁹⁶Yost, "U.S. Military Power and Alliance Relations," Annals, AAPSS, September 1991, 87.

¹⁹⁷Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 306.

¹⁹⁸Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part II, 20.

having another large institutionalized control point for nuclear weapons would force a reassessment of American nuclear strategy. The delicate nuclear balances that have existed could be upset by an assertive EC or WEU armed with nuclear weapons should tensions arise again there, and uncertainty would exist over nuclear use in contingencies outside Europe. The United States would likely be forced to negotiate strategy with the European organization to try to coordinate planning and control, and this would give the Europeans additional leverage over the U.S. In sum, efforts to unite British and French nuclear forces, however far they may progress, will have substantial implications for American strategic planning.

E. CONCLUSION

It seems clear that any potential nuclear force integration in Western Europe is a far-reaching proposition for both European integration and American strategic planning. It would certainly be the apex of West European integration, completing the final act of establishing an autonomous defense identity. Still, the many advantages of integrating West European nuclear forces will likely be outweighed by the disadvantages and obstacles into the foreseeable future. National interests and questions over national sovereignty will prevent accord on more technical and political issues from catalyzing integration. The role of Germany, the strongest economic power in Western Europe, will remain

uncertain for some time to come, further clouding true European integration in the security field.

Regardless of the end result, the United States faces great challenges in its strategic planning. It will play some role in the reshaping of European security structures, but this role will depend greatly on the extent of cooperation among the Europeans, as well as the fear of general instability. The U.S. must continue to address these issues because the stakes are very high. Careful attention to nuclear weapons has kept the peace for forty-five years; further close attention will (it is hoped) perpetuate it.

V. GERMANY AND WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY

A. INTRODUCTION

November 9, 1989 represented the true end of the postwar period for many of the world's nations. For Germany, which would have been the central front battlefield had war occurred, the collapse of the Berlin Wall ultimately led to the restoration of full national sovereignty and all the resulting privileges and responsibilities. The Federal Republic of Germany, which had defined much of its security policy in close collaboration with the United States in NATO, suddenly found itself with a much more influential voice, at the same time as domestic opposition in the U.S. to a large military effort in the post-Cold War era increased. Quickly developing, however, was a German political debacle over not only the proper role of German military power but also over what type of West European security structure Germany should back.

While for many years the Federal Republic had been obliged to accede to the leadership of the U.S. (and certain European powers) in formulating its security policy, the reunified Germany in short order became the pivotal actor in any European multinational structure. A leader in the EC, Germany's role has been critical to the endurance of NATO, the

WEU, and CSCE as well. While the Paris-Bonn axis has been the driving force for greater European integration (the European identity), the Bonn-Washington axis has become the cornerstone of the transatlantic link. Germany's recognition of its multiple roles has required complicated political maneuvering, which has often led to questions about Germany's true motives and reliability.

While France has led the way toward a more significant European identity, and while Britain has underscored the importance of close ties with the U.S., Germany will play the key role in the development of future West European security structures. A position provided by population and economic might, Germany's status also depends on the actions of the leading political parties as well as trends in public opinion. Since Germany's role is so important, this chapter specifically addresses the principal factors that will possibly influence its positions in the near future on these security issues. Specifically, it begins by examining briefly German "assertiveness" in foreign policy, as this idea not only colors much of Germany's security policy, but also affects relations with allies. Next, the chapter considers the attitudes of Germany's leading political parties on two essential questions: the development and interrelationships of West European security structures, and the out-of-area question. Next is an analysis of public opinion trends with respect to the use of military force, alliances, and the

future of U.S. forces in Germany. The chapter concludes with an overall look at the direction German security policy is taking.

B. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY "ASSERTIVENESS"

Germany has taken a much more active role in European affairs in the time since the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification. Partly a result of the strength of the unified nation, this role also results from what Germany has perceived as a lack of leadership from its European partners. The Yugoslav crisis has been the most obvious example of what has been called by some German "assertiveness" in foreign policy - that is, bucking the mainstream opinion and forging its own course, in this case with recognition of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.¹⁹⁹ At the same time, Germany has exercised much of the initiative in the development of integrated European structures, taking over from France in devising the compromises necessary to keep Britain involved in the process. The Germans have played an essential role not only in monetary union compromises but also in the development of a West European security identity.²⁰⁰ While Chancellor Kohl has attempted to dispel concerns that Germany is creating

¹⁹⁹David Binder, "As Bonn Talks Louder, Some in the U.S. Wince," New York Times, January 7, 1992, A2.

²⁰⁰Stephen Kinzer, "Germany Now Leading Campaign to Strengthen the European Community," New York Times, December 2, 1991.

a "Fourth Reich," Free Democratic Party (FDP) Chairman Otto Lambsdorff has stated that Germans "are being involved in solving problems they would not have dared to address before."²⁰¹

Germany has also become the leading U.S. ally in Europe. The "special relationship" with the U.K. has not weakened, but Germany is the dominant economic and political power on the continent, and the United States has chosen to work with it most closely in the security field. It is significant that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was launched as a U.S.-German initiative.²⁰² Not only does Germany fear the creation of a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe, but as one unnamed official also said, "We have greater responsibilities and a duty now to take a lead on occasion."²⁰³ The United States and Germany recognize the need each has for the other in European security affairs. While the U.S. needs Germany to legitimize the American role and the continuation of NATO, Germany feels that there is no substitute for the American military guarantee, neither in

²⁰¹Otto Lambsdorff, "Germany Needs U.S. Political Leadership," speech at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Washington, DC, February 25, 1992, in The Week in Germany, German Information Center, New York, February 28, 1992, 1.

²⁰²James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "US-German Joint Statement on the Transatlantic Community," statement in Washington, DC, October 2, 1991, in US Department of State Dispatch, October 7, 1991, 736.

²⁰³Ian Murray, "Genscher Offers Vision of Future to EC and NATO," London Times, January 9, 1992, 7.

French forces nor in a potential Franco-British nuclear umbrella.²⁰⁴ This growing partnership will significantly affect the development of European security structures and the future U.S. role in European security affairs.

The more active German role in foreign and security politics has aroused concern in some areas, particularly in France. France's fear of a new German powerhouse was evident in 1990, when the French attempted to slow German reunification. French anxiety appeared again in October 1991 during the discussion of the British-Italian and French-German defense proposals, when the French worried about the reliability of German support.²⁰⁵ President Mitterrand expressed annoyance and concern about the German role in Yugoslavia when he stated,

[the] scenario [of the redrawing of internal Yugoslav borders] did not occur because the desire for western unity between the Community countries in the end prevailed, but not without temporary hitches over individual countries' desires to assert their own interests there.²⁰⁶

French concerns have been echoed by others, including the British, who in some ways might also be attempting to "tie

²⁰⁴L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Germany: Key to a Continent (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1992), 26.

²⁰⁵"A la Recherche de l'Europe Perdue," The Economist, October 12, 1991, 56.

²⁰⁶Francois Mitterrand, "Europe's Future," speech at the Conference on "The Tribes of Europe," Paris, February 29, 1992, 5.

down Germany."²⁰⁷ It is likely to be some time before other countries have confidence in Germany's desire to work with its European partners for common goals, adding to the complexity of international relations in the interim.

C. GERMAN PARTY ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES

1. CSCE

A strengthened CSCE would be the embodiment of the "common European house" called for by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and taken up by German Foreign Minister Genscher. Genscher has reiterated his support for the goal of bringing "the whole of Europe ever closer together on the basis of the Charter of Paris" on a number of occasions. In his view, Europe's military alliances would become part of that process, effectively transforming them into components of a pan-European collective security arrangement.²⁰⁸ While Chancellor Kohl and the CDU/CSU union have also lent their support to the CSCE process, it has not occupied their attention to the extent that it has that of Genscher and the FDP and the Social Democrats (SPD).

²⁰⁷Spoken by an unnamed British ambassador in Europe, quoted in Marc Fisher, "'German Question' Bedevils European Unification Talks," Washington Post, December 8, 1991, in the San Jose Mercury News, December 8, 1991, 12A.

²⁰⁸Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Speech at the Meeting of the Western European Union, Luxembourg, March 23, 1990, in Statements & Speeches, March 30, 1990, 3.

The SPD's recent Congresses have expressed the party's desire to replace the previously established European security structures with a new European system not based on military power.²⁰⁹ The 1991 Congress called for the CSCE to be the base for a European peace order, with which existing institutions could be dovetailed.²¹⁰ SPD official Karsten Voigt has said that the party favors NATO being at the CSCE's disposal, as well as the NACC.²¹¹ These proposals for the CSCE would not only fundamentally alter Europe's military alliances, but could also effectively diminish American influence in European security affairs.

2. NATO

The CDU/CSU has remained a steadfast supporter of the Atlantic Alliance since the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1955. Chancellor Kohl has often repeated that "the security alliance between Europe and North America remains indispensable,"²¹² and has recently stated that,

²⁰⁹See for example the SPD position paper, "From the Confrontation of the Blocs to a European Security System," April 25, 1990, 1.

²¹⁰"SPD European Policy Perspectives and European Policy," Resolutions adopted by the Congress of the SPD, May 29, 1991, 1, 5.

²¹¹Berlin ADN, February 25, 1992, 1027 GMT (FBIS-WE, February 25, 1992, 17).

²¹²Helmut Kohl, "Europe - Every German's Future," speech at Davos, February 3, 1990, in Statements & Speeches, February 6, 1990, 2.

In [the] future, ... [the] freedom and security of Europe and also, therefore, of Germany can be safeguarded by this transatlantic alliance, which is why I would like to underline... that for us, it is a matter of course that this includes also a substantial presence of American troops in Europe."²¹³

NATO has been, and remains, the cornerstone of the CDU/CSU's security policy, even while it has lent support to a West European defense identity. Germany has also recently stated its desire to subordinate the "European" corps proposed by France and Germany to NATO.²¹⁴

Genscher and the FDP have also expressed the need for NATO as not only the cement of transatlantic solidarity that will ensure North American participation in the European house, but also as the organization that will ensure European stability during the transitions occurring in Eastern Europe.²¹⁵ NATO, through the NACC, would also provide the institutional framework for cooperation with the Central and Eastern European nations. While the SPD as a whole favors NATO becoming an arm of the CSCE, former Chancellor candidate Oskar Lafontaine called for NATO to extend its security

²¹³Helmut Kohl, "US-German Friendship Strengthens Atlantic Partnership," joint news conference with U.S. President George Bush, Washington, DC, March 22, 1992, in US Department of State Dispatch, March 23, 1992, 218.

²¹⁴Karl Lamers (CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman), "Of German Dodgery," Der Spiegel, March 16, 1992, 22-3 (FBIS-WE, March 17, 1992, 5).

²¹⁵Genscher, "The United States of Europe," 9.

guarantee to the Commonwealth of Independent States.²¹⁶ Quickly disavowed by other party officials, this proposal illustrates the internal split of the party, weakening its ability to influence national policy formation. It also shows the fluidity of efforts to redesign the architecture of European security - and raises questions about what role NATO will play in the foreseeable future.

3. The EC, The WEU, and the Franco-German Proposal for a European Corps

While continuing to support both NATO and the U.S. role, the Kohl government has also acknowledged the importance of addressing the security interests of the backers of the EC, the WEU, and the Franco-German proposal for a European corps. An important driver of the European identity, Kohl has tried to frame it in terms acceptable to the United States. It appears that Kohl "intends strengthening the European pillar without rendering the Atlantic Alliance superfluous."²¹⁷ This pillar would have its uses, including assuming some of the military burden from the U.S. and allowing Europe (either the EC or the WEU) to participate in a cohesive fashion in some future military eventuality, following the example of WEU naval coordination in the Persian Gulf in two recent

²¹⁶Martin Winter, Lafontaine Wants to Extend NATO Area," Frankfurter Rundschau, January 15, 1992, 1-2 (FBIS-WE, January 15, 1992, 8-9).

²¹⁷Jurgen Koar, "Agreement in Washington," The German Tribune, June 2, 1991, 3.

conflicts.²¹⁸ Additionally, a common European position could be developed in the WEU and then presented at North Atlantic Council sessions. It is significant that 65% of those identifying themselves as CDU/CSU supporters favored the idea of a European intervention force in a recent survey (as did 51% of SPD supporters).²¹⁹ This could cause a split within the CDU/CSU that could ultimately threaten its support for NATO.

The FDP has not expressed a great deal of interest in European security structures other than the CSCE. This is probably the result of two factors. First, the party's goal is a security system based on much more than military power, a system that a strengthened CSCE might provide, not the WEU as a component of the EC or as an autonomous entity. The Maastricht security articles agreed to by Germany can be seen as an expedient toward the ultimate CSCE-based security goal. Second, NATO remains the primary military organization in Europe, as the Alliance is the established organization with critical American participation. While the FDP has supported the concept of a European identity, it has done so as part of an overall campaign to bring Europe together within the CSCE

²¹⁸Jean-Paul Picaper, interview with Helmut Kohl, Le Figaro, November 14, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE, November 18, 1991, 13).

²¹⁹Ralf Zoll, "Public Opinion on Security Policy and Armed Forces: The German Case," presented at the International Meeting on the Future of Security in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of European Public Opinion, Brussels, December 16-17, 1991, 17.

framework. Additionally it has devoted considerable attention to the need for continued American participation, which would occur not through the EC or WEU, but through NATO and the CSCE.

The SPD has called for the WEU to move gradually toward the process of European political union. It would then be subject to the common security policy of the EC members, though each member would be able to debate policy in its own domestic format.²²⁰ Because it favors the ultimate goal of dovetailing defense organizations into the CSCE, however, the SPD is not likely to support strongly the strengthening of the WEU. Indeed, the party has expressed its opposition to the interventionary role for the organization envisioned in some quarters.²²¹

As a result of the SPD's stance, the FDP's lesser interest, and the CDU/CSU's ambivalence, support for the concept of a truly autonomous European defense identity seems weakened. While Kohl backs the idea of a European pillar for NATO, he has remained distant from French concepts of European activism, preferring that the Franco-German proposal for a European corps follow NATO guidance. Without clear German

²²⁰"SPD European Policy Perspectives and European Policy," 5.

²²¹Rainer Nahrendorf and Peter Henacher, "Engholm: We Can Not Return to Nationalism. SPD Demands changes in Maastricht Treaty," interview in Handelsblatt, March 5, 1992, 9 (FBIS-WE, March 16, 1992, 10).

support or even plausible definitions of the roles and missions of the WEU or the "European corps," it seems unlikely that either will gain strength without other changes in the European security environment - from either side of the Atlantic. This clearly demonstrates the political weight Germany now carries in Europe.

4. The Role of the United States

The role of the United States in European security affairs is uncertain as the post-Cold War world develops. Though European officials across the continent have emphasized the need for a continued American military presence for a variety of reasons, it is unclear how large that presence should be, where it should be located, or whether domestic American interests will permit it to remain in Europe. In general, the German point of view is that American forces are necessary to ensure the stability of a dangerous continent. As former Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg noted, only the link with North America can ensure security and stability in Europe.

For this purpose, a continued substantial presence of American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe will be required. At the same time it stands out clearly that security in Europe must never be defined as an exclusively European concern.²²²

²²²Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change: European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship in a Time of Change in Europe," speech in Bonn, April 10, 1991, 11.

Three-quarters of CDU/CSU supporters still believe in a strong U.S. role in Europe.²²³ The opinion is common that only the U.S. can provide a viable security guarantee, even while Western Europe strives to build its own defense identity. Regardless of the claims of some Frenchmen that France's nuclear arsenal could provide a sufficient deterrent, "there seems to be an abiding consensus that no realistic substitute is available for the deterrent role of U.S. nuclear weapons."²²⁴ This reinforces the attitude that the United States is the only consistent friend Germany has.²²⁵

As previously discussed, Foreign Minister Genscher has indicated his desire for the continuation of NATO and the U.S. role in Europe to stabilize the region. The presence of American forces in Germany remains an open question, however. The FDP position on nuclear weapons is much less uncertain. Genscher has remarked that, "Land-based nuclear weapons can no longer be deployed on German soil."²²⁶ It is not entirely clear whether this position opposes the CDU/CSU line on

²²³Zoll, 17. Significantly, new Defense Minister Volker Ruehe is a strong supporter of the United States role in Germany, even more so than his predecessor.

²²⁴"German Perspectives on NATO and European Security," (Fairfax, VA: National Security Research, August 1991), 34-5.

²²⁵Frederick Kempe, "Germany is Seeking to Ease Concerns in U.S. over Its Reliability as an Ally," Wall Street Journal, February 4, 1992, 2.

²²⁶"Right of Intervention Demanded," Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 24, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE, May 28, 1991, 7).

nuclear weapons for dual-capable aircraft, it could add to the pressure on Kohl to modify his party's stance on the issue. It also reinforces the impression that Genscher ultimately wants U.S. forces and weapons to leave Germany. With the CDU/CSU showing electoral weakness and German public opinion strengthening against its position on U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany, Genscher is gaining increasing power over the development of German security policy, decreasing the likelihood of a long-term American military and nuclear presence in Germany.

SPD positions would seem to deny the need for U.S. forces in Germany. The party has made its position on nuclear weapons clear: it favors their total withdrawal from Europe. As Lafontaine stated early in 1990, "Unity...means liberation from chemical and atomic weapons and renunciation of low-level military flights."²²⁷ He followed this statement with a pledge to order the withdrawal of all chemical weapons (which the U.S. removed in 1990) and nuclear weapons from German territory if he became Chancellor. Lafontaine's position was formalized into party policy shortly thereafter when the SPD position paper repeated 1988 resolutions to rid Germany and Europe of nuclear weapons through a ban on short-range nuclear

²²⁷"Lafontaine: Kohl Policy Detrimental to Unity," This Week in Germany, March 2, 1990, 2.

forces and all land- and air-based nuclear weapons.²²⁸ In addition the party continued its call for the transformation of European military forces into units incapable of aggression, through logistics, armaments, and operational changes.²²⁹ Such alterations would substantially transform and reduce the U.S. military presence.

The future of the U.S. military presence in Germany is considered later in this chapter. Political circles in Germany clearly believe that the U.S. role has fundamentally changed. It will be difficult for Kohl to maintain support for a large American military presence in Germany, even if he can produce a consensus on the U.S. role in Europe in general. One factor that may moderate mass public and elite opinion against U.S. forces in Germany, however, is the economic impact of their leaving. Already there have been calls for their retention to prevent the collapse of certain local economies. It remains to be seen how important such calls will be compared to those desiring an end to U.S. "occupation."

²²⁸"From the Confrontation of the Blocs to a European Security System," 3,6.

²²⁹"Frieden und Abrüstung in Europa," Resolution on Peace and Disarmament Policy adopted at the SPD Party Congress at Munster from 30th August to 2nd September 1988, 1.

D. THE OUT-OF-AREA QUESTION

Dealing with out-of-area issues is fundamental not only to sorting out the various options for future West European security, but also to ensuring that Germany's influence is commensurate with its economic power. Germany has already faced considerable international criticism regarding its reluctance to participate to a greater extent in the Persian Gulf War and for its hesitation in answering the out-of-area question in general. As a prominent U.S. expert on German affairs, Ronald Asmus, has noted,

A stable European peace structure and German-American relationship cannot be built if Germany is inclined toward pacifism, is reluctant to acknowledge geopolitical realities, or is unwilling to share the burdens of international security.²³⁰

The CDU/CSU has favored the involvement of German forces in out-of-area missions to a greater degree than the other main parties. Party officials recognize that an "enormous crisis of credibility" for Germany will result if it fails to participate at least in UN peacekeeping tasks²³¹, and most wish to allow the *Bundeswehr* to operate beyond UN missions.²³² Gerhard Stoltenberg, who had favored German

²³⁰Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners in Leadership?" Survival, November/December 1991, 564.

²³¹"Do Not Gamble Away the Seat in the Security Council," Frankfurter Allgemeine, March 3, 1992, 4 (FBIS-WE, March 3, 1992, 11).

²³²"Parties at Odds on *Bundeswehr* UN Deployment; Coalition: SPD Should Give up Resistance to German Participation in Military Operations," Sueddeutsche Zeitung,

participation in military missions called for by the European Political Union (EPU), was forced to back down from formalizing the policy by strong opposition from both the FDP and SPD.²³³ Volker Ruehe, the new defense minister, has previously expressed his support for a change in the Basic Law to allow for German participation in all UN activities, and is likely to maintain the pressure to allow a wider range of out-of-area operations. Not all in the CDU/CSU favor altering the Basic Law, however, because of the possibility that specifically legislating the permissibility of UN missions could remove all the ambiguity and outlaw other missions.²³⁴ It seems clear that not even the conservative CDU/CSU has resolved all its own questions.

The FDP, which originally opposed even the use of German forces in UN peacekeeping (the so-called "blue helmet") operations, ultimately shifted its position to favor such missions if the Basic Law were amended to permit them.²³⁵ Genscher has come out in favor of such a solution to this

January 17, 1992, 2 (FBIS-WE, February 5, 1992, 14).

²³³"Obsolete Mindset: Serious Defeat for Defense Minister Stoltenberg; Cabinet Turns Down his Strategic Reflections," Der Spiegel, February 24, 1992, 107-9 (FBIS-WE, March 5, 1992, 9-10).

²³⁴Lamers, 5.

²³⁵Hans-Georg Atzinger and Thomas-Durrell Young, "Emerging German Security Policy - The Dispute on 'Out of Area' Employments" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 10, 1992), 27.

question, and his pressure forced Stoltenberg to back down with his proposal to allow even greater German participation in out-of-area activities. FDP security expert Jurgen Koppelin also opposes such an initiative, because he feels that it would imply that all European security tasks would become *Bundeswehr* missions.²³⁶ Genscher's personal political strength and the party's importance to the ruling coalition make it unlikely that Kohl will soon gain support for out-of-area missions beyond peacekeeping under UN auspices.

The SPD has been the most adamant in opposing out-of-area operations. Following from their positions on the European security alliances, the SPD would support "blue helmet" missions only if the Basic Law permitted them, and participants in such operations would only be allowed to protect themselves.²³⁷ SPD security spokesman Walter Kolbow has on numerous occasions opposed Stoltenberg on the out-of-area question, reiterating the party's insistence on carefully circumscribed "blue helmet" missions only.²³⁸ The SPD's position on out-of-area operations cannot be ignored by the CDU/CSU. Any attempt to amend the Basic Law must satisfy the

²³⁶"SPD and FDP Reject Military Plans," Sueddeutsche Zeitung, February 13, 1992, 2 (FBIS-WE, February 13, 1992, 30).

²³⁷The May 1991 Party Congress finally assented to the concept of German participation in UN peacekeeping operations. See Atzinger, 29-30.

²³⁸See for example, "SPD and FDP Reject Military Plans," 29.

SPD, because it currently controls the *Bundesrat*, making the possibility of permitting operations of the type favored by the CDU/CSU virtually nonexistent in the foreseeable future.

The out-of-area question is important because of its impact on Germany's ability to play a key role in the designing of the new West European security architecture. Far from being resolved, the issue raises concerns among Germany's allies about its reliability. Germany's ability to participate in out-of-area activities would seem crucial to any viable mission for the European corps outlined in the October 1991 Franco-German proposal, as well as to the WEU. The question has become much more prominent recently. It is certain to influence considerably the relations between Germany and its European partners; it could significantly handicap any autonomous West European defense entity; and it could weaken the growing U.S.-German partnership.

E. TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION

1. The Use of Military Force

Public opinion is playing an ever-greater role in the security politics of the Federal Republic. While the public long felt secure about the government's handling of security policy and about the protection of Germany by the United States, defense and arms control are becoming areas of greater

public interest.²³⁹ As the threat has receded, Germans have felt less need for military forces. One poll found a general delegitimization of security policy in which less than 20% of Germans considered there to be any threat to Germany at all.²⁴⁰ A certain degree of pacifism has entered the German population's attitude; the trend is to see peace as an absolute value. This was an important factor in determining Germany's behavior during the Persian Gulf War.²⁴¹ While there has been support for joint European defense decision-making, the German population has opposed a European Rapid Deployment Force²⁴², as well as providing only ambivalent backing to UN military operations outside the NATO area.²⁴³ Indicative of general German attitudes toward the use of military force, Germans have expressed support for non-military out-of-area missions (unlike the Gulf experience)²⁴⁴, and even more importantly, a recent poll

²³⁹Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher, "West German Arms Control Policy," in West European Arms Control Policy, ed. Robbin Laird (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 98.

²⁴⁰Zoll, 6.

²⁴¹Atzinger, 10.

²⁴²Zoll, 15.

²⁴³Renate Koecher, "Lots of Inflammable Material in the Debate on the Constitution: The Social State, Plebiscite, the Right to Housing, and Kindergarten," Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 4, 1991, 5 (FBIS-WE, January 3, 1992, 15).

²⁴⁴Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence," statement before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,

showed that support for military defense was no more than 60% even in responding to an attack on their own territory.²⁴⁵

2. Attitudes Toward European Alliances

Since the late 1980s, not only have German attitudes changed from giving unquestioning support to NATO, but they have also left decision-makers with very ambiguous impressions that make the drawing of trends quite difficult. An early 1990 poll showed that support for neutrality had matched that favoring staying in the Atlantic Alliance, while other surveys showed similarly ambivalent results.²⁴⁶ While Germans favored joint European defense decision-making, only 40% felt that defense should be a priority of the EC.²⁴⁷ In addition, while a majority of Germans continues to believe that NATO is essential for German security, the trend has been toward decreasing support for this position, including only 35% in the former East Germany.²⁴⁸ Most of these same Germans seem to have adopted the FDP and SPD position that the CSCE should

January 29, 1992, 15.

²⁴⁵Zoll, 27.

²⁴⁶Wolfgang G. Gibowski and Holli A. Semetko, "Public Opinion in the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Two Nation Study," Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, March 1990, 4.

²⁴⁷Asmus, "Germany in Transition," 20.

²⁴⁸Ibid., 4.

be the primary organization for shaping the future European political order.²⁴⁹

Even though most Germans no longer consider there to be threats to their security, as time goes on the international environment will certainly change. One factor that could help perpetuate support for NATO is recognition of new threats, such as those from the Third World or possibly instability.²⁵⁰ Nevertheless, support for NATO in the foreseeable future is unlikely to regain the levels it held for most of the Cold War period, and this has already forced an American reappraisal of the U.S. security role in Europe. After all, as Josef Joffe notes,

Dependents do not seek to inflict their will on patron powers when the threat is high. Conversely, the hold of protectors over clients will inevitably loosen as their demand for security dwindles.²⁵¹

3. Attitudes Toward U.S. Forces and Nuclear Weapons

German public opinion has shown a steep recent decline in support for the retention of American forces in Germany. Far different from a period in which the U.S. was considered the protector of the Federal Republic of Germany, much of the backing for the American military presence now comes from

²⁴⁹Zoll, 11.

²⁵⁰Hans-Joachim Veen, "The New Security Architecture for Europe in the Public Opinion of the United Germany Seen by Public Opinion Polls," Brussels, November 12, 1990, 15.

²⁵¹Josef Joffe, "The Revisionists: Moscow, Bonn, and the European Balance," The National Interest, Fall 1989, 53.

those who fear the substantial economic consequences of the withdrawal of U.S. forces. A late 1991 (post-Soviet coup) poll showed that 57% of Germans favored the total withdrawal of U.S. forces, while 70% favored a complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany.²⁵² These numbers are consistent with results from polls in the late 1980s, which showed increasing support for nuclear disarmament as well as opposition to what came to be seen as a U.S. occupation of Germany, especially in light of the reduced threat.²⁵³

Young Germans who cannot easily appreciate American efforts on Germany's behalf after the Second World War are likely to form a substantial bloc of opinion opposing the American presence in Germany in the near future. There is a strong sentiment that the Germans "want their country back." After so many years of "occupation" by foreign military forces and limited sovereignty, the opportunity has finally come for Germany to control its own destiny. The trends shown not only in attitudes toward military operations and European alliances, but also toward the presence of American forces and nuclear weapons, may accelerate, with serious implications for efforts develop a new West European defense identity.

²⁵²Asmus, "Germany in Transition," 5.

²⁵³Jenonne Walker, "Keeping America in Europe," Foreign Policy, Summer 1991, 133.

F. CONCLUSIONS

For all the pronouncements of the Kohl government that Germany intends to support fully the Atlantic Alliance, as well as European integration, it is clear that he faces challenges to his policies on many fronts. Not only the opposition Social Democrats, but also the coalition partner Free Democrats are much less convinced than the CDU/CSU of the efficacy of military force in the post-Cold War era, increasing the difficulty of achieving a consensus on German participation in out-of-area missions. At the same time, while Kohl has taken part in, and supported, the efforts of the CSCE, his adamant support for NATO as well as for the EC stands out in contrast to the opinions of both the SPD and FDP. There exists no clear consensus about the future of security policy for Germany; the opinion polls come the closest to producing one, but even their results show considerable ambivalence in many areas. As Joffe has observed,

Given the [limited] new security consensus, the best American pleas for strategic stability count for little if no significant political force in West Germany is willing to carry them forward as its own.²⁵⁴

Germany's hesitations about coming to grips with new security requirements threaten the ability of the projected European political union to form a cohesive security policy, because the out-of-area question and Germany's growing

²⁵⁴Joffe, 53.

opposition to military force could paralyze numerous decision-making bodies. In addition, ambivalent support for American security interests and increasing opposition to an American military presence will add to the challenges facing U.S. decision-makers in defining a new U.S. role in European security affairs, strengthening the position of those who favor a larger withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Times have changed in Europe, especially in Germany. Joffe's 1989 observation is all the more apt today:

West German society, as all the polls indicate with ever more dramatic numbers, is no longer willing to carry yesterday's military burden - be it nuclear weapons stationed on German soil, long terms of military service, the traditional peace-time strength of the *Bundeswehr* of 496,000 men, or the environmental toll of Allied forces in the Federal Republic.²⁵⁵

The domestic costs of reunification have diverted public attention from security issues, and promise to do so for some time. Still, Germany is such an important driver of European integration that it cannot afford either to sit on the sidelines or assume it can participate in the projected European political union and avoid particular consequences when it chooses. Clear-cut German policies will be essential as the development of a West European defense identity progresses.

²⁵⁵Ibid., 49.

VI. THE FUTURE OF NATO

A. INTRODUCTION

As the result of changes in the global security environment portrayed in previous chapters, the guardian of post-War Western security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), finds its continued existence in question. For the United States, the implication could be the loss of much of the influence it has possessed in Western Europe throughout the Cold War period. Lawrence Kaplan stated in 1988 that, "...if the alliance still had meaning for most of its members, it rested on the importance of maintaining a balance of power between East and West."²⁵⁶ With the transformation of the East-West relationship, this pillar no longer exists. It is therefore necessary to determine if Kaplan was (or will be) correct, and if NATO will follow the Warsaw Pact into oblivion, or if there is more to NATO and its ability to adapt than Kaplan's statement implies.

American strategic planning has arrived at a significant crossroad, as the 1992 political campaign shows. Much of the latitude American decision-makers will have is being shaped in Western Europe; nevertheless, how the Administration and

²⁵⁶Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 100.

Congress proceed is not only crucial but yet to be determined completely. One thing is clear: "There will be no encompassing paradigm of thought and action to rival those that dominated the past 40 years."²⁵⁷ The result will be a much more decentralized and disaggregated American strategic planning approach than has existed for many years.

Progress toward an autonomous defense identity examined in chapter three will also play an important role in determining West European influence on the transformation and survival of NATO. An autonomous West European security structure could help satisfy those in the U.S. Congress clamoring for greater burden-sharing" by the European allies, or make the maintenance of NATO appear less necessary. From the days of the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution, when the United States decided permanently to commit itself to the defense of Western Europe, the U.S. has officially supported the concept of Western Europe's being able to defend itself, while the idea has generally left many Europeans feeling somewhat insecure. As North Atlantic Assembly Deputy Secretary General Simon Lunn has observed, "Americans saw [NATO] as a means to create a more viable and independent Europe which would mean a diminished American involvement; Europeans viewed it as a

²⁵⁷Robert E. Hunter, "Starting at Zero: U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1990's," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1992, 30.

means of ensuring American involvement."²⁵⁸ Though George Kennan saw the post-War Atlantic framework developing into a cooperative arrangement,²⁵⁹ forces were already at work to turn the idea of West European self-defense into an American commitment. Since NATO's founding the goal of West European self-defense has been periodically reiterated, yet the American backbone of the Alliance has never wavered.

This chapter deals with the future of U.S. influence in European security affairs after the Cold War. As this role has historically depended overwhelmingly on the Atlantic Alliance, the analysis attempts to forecast the likely future of NATO as a significant actor in European security. This effort begins by considering the theoretical basis for the cohesion and endurance of NATO, drawing upon the theories of Stephen Walt and others that explain the forces that may help perpetuate NATO or lead to its undoing. Next, attention is given to the major issues facing NATO. European perspectives on NATO's endurance follow, with due attention to "Europeanist" and "Atlanticist" views. Next come American views, both those of the Administration and of Congress, which is increasingly gaining strength in security policy decision-making. Finally, the chapter analyzes the forces driving NATO's future development, in order to assess NATO's chances

²⁵⁸Simon Lunn, Burden-Sharing in NATO (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 9.

²⁵⁹Kaplan, 26.

of survival as the leading provider of the security of Western Europe.

B. MAJOR ISSUES FACING NATO

Recognizing the severe challenges to the existence of the North Atlantic Alliance, its leaders and backers have reiterated their support for its endurance and have moved to adapt it to the post-Cold War period. At NATO's June 1991 ministerial meeting in Copenhagen, the Alliance's four fundamental security tasks were reiterated: "to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe; to serve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations; to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state; and to preserve the strategic balance within Europe."²⁶⁰ These efforts highlight several key issues in NATO's attempt to move forward - the transition toward a greater political role, new uses for the Alliance, and the question of expansion.

Though NATO is officially a political alliance with military functions, and though the political side of the Alliance has played an important role, the post-Cold War period has seen concerted attempts to heighten NATO's

²⁶⁰North Atlantic Council, "NATO's Core Security Functions," statement issued at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Copenhagen, June 6-7, 1991, paragraph 6.

political profile. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher foreshadowed the need for change in 1988 when he stated,

In guaranteeing our security, we must rely less and less on a strategy of deterrence alone. The foundations of security must be widened. This imposes new demands on both our political thinking and our military structures.²⁶¹

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has signalled American willingness to participate in the needed redirection of NATO while accepting and working with a new European security identity.²⁶² It is uncertain, however, whether NATO will be seen as the best organization to handle the political tasks.

New military tasks constitute a second general issue area for a transformed NATO. Meetings at the ministerial level and above since the London Summit of July 1990 have attempted to produce a new security agenda, provisionally revealed in the new strategic concept at Rome in November 1991. This document listed "multi-faceted" and "multi-directional" risks to allied security from Eastern European instability, nuclear proliferation, and aggressors to Europe's south as more likely contingencies requiring rapid Alliance responses.²⁶³ Such

²⁶¹Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "New Approaches to East-West Security Cooperation," speech at Potsdam June 11, 1988, in Statements & Speeches, June 13, 1988, 5.

²⁶²James Baker, "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture from West to East," speech at Berlin, June 18, 1991, 6.

²⁶³North Atlantic Council, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," North Atlantic Council meeting communique, Rome, November 7, 1991, paragraphs 9-13.

issues raise the question of out-of-area operations, a concept gingerly treated by the Alliance and one that might require a reinterpretation of Articles 5 and 6 of its Charter. As NATO Secretary General Woerner has stated,

Obviously, the hopes of some commentators that the Alliance will become a global policeman or seek to form an alternative UN Security Council, a concert of the great powers to deter and punish aggressors, will be disappointed. Yet the Alliance cannot afford to remain passive either. The Gulf crisis demonstrates that the United Nations can work only if there is the political will and international solidarity to make it work. The Alliance's active solidarity is a significant element in fostering a wider sense of urgency and collective responsibility.²⁶⁴

A number of officials have called for the WEU to serve as NATO's "out-of-area bridge,"²⁶⁵ handling the functions for NATO that on which an Alliance consensus has been unable to be achieved. The use of NATO's transportation and coordination capabilities in delivering aid to Russia is the first post-Cold War example of humanitarian assistance.²⁶⁶ The development and implementation of a new and broadened security

²⁶⁴Manfred Woerner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era," NATO Review, February 1991, 9.

²⁶⁵See for example the 1991 British defense White Paper, the Statement on the Defence Estimates, London, July 1991, 39, which describes one possible arrangement among the various providers of European security. In this formulation, the WEU would be a link between the EC and NATO, and forces for WEU-specific tasks outside NATO areas of responsibility could come under a "double hatting" style of command.

²⁶⁶"NATO Deploys to Russia," Defense News, December 23, 1991, 2.

agenda are essential if NATO is to survive the end of the Cold War and remain influential in European security affairs.

A third major issue facing NATO concerns expansion. An important, and as yet unresolved, issue deals with distinguishing the security functions of NATO, the EC, and the WEU. While the problem of differences in the membership of the WEU and the EC may be partially addressed by the accession of Greece to the WEU and the potential accessions of Norway and Denmark to the EC, gaps remain. The June 1991 NATO communique emphasized the importance of accounting for those NATO members not part of the EC or WEU.²⁶⁷ As all the European security organizations evolve, NATO can serve an important function by providing the links between the North American and West European states during the transformation of European defense organizations and beyond. The interest of the former Eastern Bloc countries, revealed by (among others) Vaclav Havel's March 1991 speech to NATO, has certainly been a boon for NATO,²⁶⁸ bolstering the argument that NATO can adapt to the future. As State Department European expert Stephen Flanagan has observed,

At the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991, it was clear that liaison states were anxious to give real content to [security dialogue]. All of the Eastern foreign ministers attending the

²⁶⁷North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Copenhagen, June 7, 1991, paragraph 3.

²⁶⁸Vaclav Havel, statement at NATO headquarters, March 21, 1991, 8.

meeting...made it clear that they believed NATO remained the most effective security institution in Europe today.²⁶⁹

The future relationship of NATO and the former Soviet republics is a special case. In late December 1991 Boris Yeltsin expressed interest in Russia's joining NATO,²⁷⁰ causing dissension in Western Europe. Former German Defense Minister Stoltenberg quickly announced his opposition to the prospect, saying CSCE would be a much more logical place for the new republics to be.²⁷¹ A top SPD official, Oskar Lafontaine, however, raised the possibility of extending NATO's security guarantee in exchange for the republics' giving up their nuclear weapons. Such a policy would also allow for the use of German soldiers outside the old NATO area.²⁷² Though this idea was quickly rejected by other SPD leaders, it highlighted the debate about handling the new republics and showed how complex the issue of expansion is for NATO. As with some other issues, expansion might work toward the maintenance of the Alliance or toward its weakening.

²⁶⁹Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, 148.

²⁷⁰Michael Evans and George Brock, "Yeltsin Wants Russia to Join NATO," London Times, December 29, 1991, 1.

²⁷¹Siegmar Schelling, "Great Concern about Passing on of Nuclear Know-How," Welt am Sonntag, Hamburg, December 29, 1991, 2 (FBIS-WE, December 30, 1991, 7-8).

²⁷²Martin Winter, "Lafontaine Wants to Extend NATO Area," Frankfurter Rundschau, January 15, 1992, 1-2 (FBIS-WE January 15, 1992, 8-9).

C. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

1. The Europeanists

Defining Europeans as "Europeanists" and "Atlanticists" is not always a certain undertaking, often depending on the issue under consideration. In this thesis, Europeanists are those who favor a European security identity which would claim the leading role in European security affairs from NATO the European Community (EC) and/or the WEU. It should first be noted that Europeanists do not, in general, recommend the immediate and complete pullout of U.S. forces from Europe or the dissolution of NATO. Rather, Europeans favoring this approach envisage a lessening of NATO's role, a large part of which would become the responsibility of West Europeans. The Europeanist perspective generally begins with a recognition of important problems that NATO faces: NATO is a product of the Cold War; it requires a new defense posture to prevent itself from being counterproductive by insisting on methods used in the old order; the Alliance cannot handle out-of-area issues; U.S. pre-eminence remains; and the Alliance cannot easily handle problems dealing with Eastern Europe.²⁷³ In addition, Europeans have recognized a reduction in the amount of attention the United States is willing or able to devote to the Alliance. As one allied official has observed,

²⁷³Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 199-200.

"With all the problems you have in the United States at home, how much will any American President after George Bush care about emphasizing the security role of the United States in Europe?"²⁷⁴

A commonly held view is that NATO only addressed the Soviet threat, and as a result has become superfluous. While EC Commission President Jacques Delors saw the Gulf War as an "object lesson," on the limitations of the EC, he has emphasized the importance of "the Community determining its own course of action on matters outside the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty."²⁷⁵ From a Europeanist viewpoint, the foundation of the Treaty rested largely on countering the Soviet threat, and as a result the Europeans should assume the responsibility for new challenges that were not foreseen when the Alliance was founded. Though he reasserts the continued need for NATO, French Ambassador to the U.S. Jacques Andreani parsimoniously summarizes much of the feeling toward the Alliance: "NATO protects the allied countries against dangers which have become non-existent and does not protect them against the new fears."²⁷⁶ Italian Foreign Minister De

²⁷⁴Anonymous official cited in Craig R. Whitney, "NATO, Victim of Success, Searches for New Strategy," New York Times, October 26, 1991, 5.

²⁷⁵Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," Survival, March/April 1991, 99,109.

²⁷⁶Jacques Andreani, "France and European Challenges," speech before the World Affairs Council of Boston, October 8, 1991, 13.

Michelis, an increasingly influential figure in the building of a new security structure, has called for a new and independent European force, because he expects NATO to fade away with the completion of its mission.²⁷⁷

Without the Soviet threat, the Europeanists claim the EC should have much of the influence over security affairs in Europe the U.S. has long held through NATO. This American influence irritates sensitivities, especially among the French. David Yost has written that one possible motivation, among others, for President Mitterrand's 1990 announcement that France would withdraw most of its forces from Germany is that "Mitterrand wants to have his hands as free as possible for new European arrangements and to avoid being drawn into NATO decision processes that France could not control."²⁷⁸ This assessment was confirmed after both the Rome and Maastricht Summits by Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Dumas, who after reacting angrily to NATO's having ensured its position of primacy in European security, reemphasized that France would have to continue to assert its position and

²⁷⁷Ferdinand Hennerbichler, "There Will Be No EC Military Alliance," interview with De Michelis, Wiener Zeitung, August 6, 1991, 3 (FBIS-WE, August 7, 1991, 25).

²⁷⁸David S. Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," Survival, July/August 1991, 333.

stature in Europe by avoiding reintegration into NATO's military structure.²⁷⁹

Former State Department official Jenonne Walker has summarized some of the Europeanist points when she argues that although most West Europeans want the U.S. to remain in Europe militarily to guard against the re-emergence of a Moscow-directed threat or some new European hegemon, "America is not a European power. [T]he United States has no more right to participate in European Community decision making than Europe does in America's."²⁸⁰ Walker deplores any U.S.-French leadership contest as likely to backfire for the U.S. and further reduce both its and NATO's influence.²⁸¹ The results of this struggle, which involves all the major actors of West European security, will be important in shaping NATO's future.

The crux of the preceding arguments is the notion that NATO reflects the old order and has outlived most of its usefulness. The result has been intensified efforts to forge new relationships in alternate organizations, primarily the WEU, while working with NATO. The Dumas-Genscher letter of February 1991 brought Genscher in line with the concept of the WEU as the European security identity, though it would still

²⁷⁹Michael Evans, "Outmaneuvered Mitterrand Walks out of NATO Meeting in a Huff," London Times, November 9, 1991, 1.

²⁸⁰Jenonne Walker, "Keeping America in Europe," Foreign Policy, Summer 1991, 129-130.

²⁸¹Ibid., 140-1.

be tied to NATO as the Alliance's European pillar.²⁸² The October 1991 Franco-German initiative indicated that an "organic link" should be established between the WEU and the EC and that the WEU's role should complement that of NATO. France's problem in gaining widespread acceptance of the plan has been convincing more Atlanticist EC members to accept a more Europeanist position.²⁸³ The French were particularly angered by NATO's announcement of its new Rapid Reaction Corps, feeling that not only had the Alliance usurped a responsibility that should belong to the Europeans alone, but that such a force had no strategic or political objectives.²⁸⁴ France's displeasure with NATO's ability to retain a prominent role in European security affairs apparently was a factor in the French decision to boycott the April 1992 meeting of the defense ministers of North Atlantic Cooperation Council countries.²⁸⁵

²⁸²Steven Philip Kramer, "The French Question," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1991, 91-2.

²⁸³"Paris and Bonn Push for EC Superpower Role," London Times, October 17, 1991, 10.

²⁸⁴Dumas and Mitterrand both expressed outrage at the creation of the RRF as inappropriate for changing strategic circumstances. Both, however, reaffirmed the need for continued NATO links. See Paris AFP, June 4, 1991, 1425 GMT (FBIS-WE June 5, 1991, 2), and "Mitterrand, at Lille, Expresses Displeasure with NATO Resolutions: Multilateral Response Force and Role of UK," Frankfurter Allgemeine, June 14, 1991, 2 (FBIS-WE June 14, 1991, 2).

²⁸⁵William Drozdiak, "NATO States, Ex-East Bloc Meet for Talks," Washington Post, March 11, 1992, A16.

The German SPD has expressed its opinion that collective defense is now out of place, more appropriately replaced by collective security that could in time be provided by the CSCE.²⁸⁶ SPD leader Karsten Voigt recently called for the integration of the European security structures, including NATO, under the umbrella of the CSCE.²⁸⁷ The French and Germans (to a limited extent) have traversed a tricky diplomatic road in trying to create the new West European defense identity, having decided upon the need for drastic change while assuaging the fears of others that their plans will drive the U.S. out of Europe and leave France and Germany (or worse, only Germany) with hegemony.

Even those strongly opposing NATO's continued dominance feel that it would be unwise for the Alliance suddenly to disband. Several reasons explain this attitude. First, there is the political necessity of compromise. The French, unable to persuade their European partners to accept a structure of their own creation, have had to grant negotiations concessions to those backing NATO. Second, it is almost universally recognized that not only has NATO demonstrated an ability to safeguard the peace and adapt to change when necessary, but that there is not yet a

²⁸⁶SPD Party Congress, "SPD European Policy Perspectives and European Policy," Resolutions adopted May 29, 1991, 1.

²⁸⁷Berlin ADN, February 25, 1992, 1027 GMT (FBIS-WE, February 25, 1992, 17).

satisfactory alternative. As Jacques Delors has stated, "The NATO infrastructure has demonstrated its quality and the WEU must rely on it for a long time yet."²⁸⁸

Third, it has been strongly emphasized that any new security structure should have solid links with the Alliance. Dumas and Genscher, subsequent to their February 1991 letter, pledged that an organic WEU/EC link would not weaken NATO's ties.²⁸⁹ Even former French Prime Minister Edith Cresson, who made a number of irritating comments both to the British and Americans, said,

The Americans must not be worried by the fact that we are thinking about a defense system within Europe. We are very much in favor of keeping the very friendly and close links that we have within the Atlantic Alliance.²⁹⁰

Genscher has emphasized the importance of NATO and of American and Canadian participation for European solidarity, and he has stated the desire for the Alliance "to continue its efforts to ensure stability throughout Europe in a changing political environment."²⁹¹

²⁸⁸Jacques Delors, "Let Us Now Give an Army to the Europe That Is Being Born," La Repubblica, March 31-April 1, 1991, 1,16 (FBIS-WE April 5, 1991, 3).

²⁸⁹Joint statement by Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Roland Dumas, Berlin ADN, March 22, 1991, 1546 GMT (FBIS-WE, March 25, 1991, 1).

²⁹⁰Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. and France Are at Odds over a NATO Army," New York Times, May 28, 1991, 5.

²⁹¹Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The United States of Europe," speech at the United Nations, September 25, 1991, in Vital Speeches of the Day, October 1, 1991, 9.

One possible interpretation of Genscher's statement could be that he sees NATO as a stabilizing transitional vehicle until the CSCE structure has been strengthened. A similar transitional motivation could reflect the opinions of many Europeans, including WEU Secretary General van Eekelen, who has stated that NATO should last until new European security arrangements can provide sufficient numbers of EC/WEU troops to replace the Americans, which would be well into the future.²⁹² Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis believes that, "NATO's role is precisely to prevent a climate of instability and to heal divisions that may arise in the delicate political and economic transformation inside Central and East Europe." In the end, however, he feels European security will depend on the CSCE.²⁹³ This view is echoed by the German SPD, which has long proclaimed its desire for the CSCE to assume the primary role in providing European security.²⁹⁴

French Foreign Minister Dumas illustrates the ambiguity that remains among Europeanists toward NATO and its

²⁹²Willem van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order: WEU's Contribution," NATO Review, August 1990, 20.

²⁹³Alessandro Politi, interview with Gianni De Michelis, in Defense News, January 13, 1992, 30.

²⁹⁴National Security Research, "German Perspectives on NATO and European Security," Technical report, August 1991, 43.

relationship with the EC and other organizations when he states,

I want it to be clearly understood: France does not wish to call into question the provisions of the Washington treaty which it believes are ideally suited to the trans-Atlantic defense relationship.²⁹⁵

Many Europeanists clearly wish for a pan-European organization to assume the leading role in European security affairs. They generally feel that NATO and the American role reflect an old order that no longer exists, and that their transformations will not reflect a stronger, unified Western Europe. Still, the Europeanists feel that they are not yet ready for complete security autonomy, and recognize that there will be good reasons to maintain strong transatlantic ties.

2. The Atlanticists

Working alongside the Europeanists in European policy-making bodies are those Atlanticists who feel that NATO must continue to be the hallmark of West European security. They feel that while a European defense identity is important, it can not supersede or duplicate NATO, and should in fact be subordinate to NATO. Atlanticists, most commonly in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands but present throughout West European governments, have worked to develop the European pillar in NATO, and find many of the actions of Europeanists detrimental to NATO. These actions, the Atlanticists feel,

²⁹⁵Roland Dumas, address at the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, Paris, February 4, 1992, 5.

could result in the United States pulling out of Europe entirely. As a London Times editorial points out,

If France is not prepared to take cooperation seriously, Europe will remain a dependent in NATO, not the serious and reliable ally America has been seeking ever since President Kennedy first coined the phrase "European pillar" in 1962. That is no longer tolerable to the US Congress.²⁹⁶

Atlanticists favor a synthesis of NATO and the EC/WEU. Ian Gambles provides the foundation for Atlanticist views on a new European security identity: "...no European country now has the independence in security policy necessary to back up a national foreign policy in the way that the United States can."²⁹⁷ Atlanticists feel that even together the West Europeans will be unsuccessful unless the U.S. participates.

Like the Europeanists, Atlanticists credit NATO with having kept the peace in Europe since World War II. Former German Defense Minister Stoltenberg aptly summarizes the past and future contributions of the Alliance in stating,

Since NATO is the only fully functioning instrument of collective defence in Europe, the Alliance is the guarantor of stability, ensuring lasting security in the dynamic process of change...[I]t stands out clearly that security in Europe must never be defined as an exclusively European concern...The Alliance has a stability function that goes far beyond the NATO territory proper, and this has long since been realized by the governments of our neighbours in Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe...It is in the best interests of the European

²⁹⁶London Times, editorial, May 30, 1991, 18.

²⁹⁷Ian Gambles, "European Security Integration in the 1990's," Chaillot Paper 3 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, November 1991), 13.

partners to let the United States fully participate in European affairs on an institutional basis.²⁹⁸

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, one of the pivotal figures in designing the new security architecture, has often repeated that, "...the actual presence of North American forces in western Europe and on German soil will remain an indispensable guarantee of transatlantic ties."²⁹⁹ Though Kohl has been instrumental as a driving force in the October 1991 Franco-German proposal, he has attempted to satisfy both Europeanists and Atlanticists, keeping ties with Paris and Washington as warm as possible. Should Kohl turn away from NATO, it seems clear that the Alliance could no longer be viable; similarly, without Kohl, the French plans would stall.

British views have been the most Atlanticist of all the allies, providing staunch support for NATO and opposing any attempt to usurp its position. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd has been outspoken on the need for NATO to continue guaranteeing Europe's security, especially as no other organization appears viable as yet. Hurd, who has remarked, "We cannot afford to exchange a suit of armor for a husk,"³⁰⁰

²⁹⁸Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change: European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship in a Time of Change in Europe," speech to the Eurogroup in Rome, April 10, 1991, 10-11.

²⁹⁹Helmut Kohl, "The Agenda of German Politics for the Nineties," speech in Washington, DC, May 20, 1991, in Statements & Speeches, June 6, 1991, 3.

³⁰⁰Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO's Difficult Career Change," New York Times, June 9, 1991, E3.

has strenuously opposed any move which could cost West Europe the United States, which he calls "the biggest security trump that Europe has ever had."³⁰¹ Hurd, Prime Minister John Major, and former Defence Secretary Tom King have all made statements opposing the duplication of NATO functions.

A large role for the United States and NATO in Europe is to stand as a bulwark against instability, fulfilling a task that no other single country can. Josef Joffe's seminal article, "Europe's American Pacifier," reflects an important opinion that without the American presence the Europeans might return to their old prewar ways of conflict. As Joffe observed, "...by extending its guarantee, the United States removed the prime structural cause of conflict among states - the search for an autonomous defense policy."³⁰² British Conservatives have based much of their defense policy for the 1990s on this view, believing that while European cooperation is important, the transatlantic tie helps prevent disputes within Europe.³⁰³ NATO's past and future roles remain because, "Locking national armed forces into an international

³⁰¹Douglas Hurd, "Do Not Isolate Europe," interview by Olaf Ihlán and Lutz Krusche in Der Spiegel, October 28, 1991, 203-7 (FBIS-WE, October 29, 1991, 6).

³⁰²Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, Spring 1984, 68.

³⁰³Gerald Frost, "British Foreign Policy: Dangers and Opportunities in an Era of Uncertainty," in British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990s (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1987), 25.

military structure both generates habits of cooperation and severely impedes any regression to a nationalistic military posture."³⁰⁴

NATO has attempted to assume the role of the keeper of European stability. The Rome Summit sought to work toward a new European security architecture encompassing NATO, CSCE, the EC, the WEU, and the Council of Europe, the combination which could best prevent instability.³⁰⁵ The German Christian Social Union's (CSU) defense platform calls NATO essential: "During the period of upheaval, NATO alone is capable of safeguarding peace in Europe and the world. The WEU...is not an alternative to NATO."³⁰⁶ In addition, some judge that without a continuing NATO and the U.S. guarantee, the risks of nuclear proliferation within Europe could increase. The German revulsion to owning its own nuclear weapons could change if the American guarantee were lost and unsatisfyingly replaced by the British and French arsenals.³⁰⁷ Others could have similar changes of attitude in such an event. A great deal of concern currently exists

³⁰⁴Gambles, 36.

³⁰⁵North Atlantic Council, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," North Atlantic Council Meeting, Rome, November 8, 1991, paragraph 3.

³⁰⁶"Text of CSU 12-point Foreign, Security Program," Hamburg DPA, January 12, 1992, 0700 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 13, 1992, 17).

³⁰⁷Brian Beedham, "Defence Survey," The Economist, September 1, 1990, 18.

throughout Europe as the post-Cold War period develops. Concern over separatist movements, ethnic cross-border tensions, and doubts about potential long-term German foreign policy choices support the arguments of Atlanticists that the United States still has a role to play, and bolster NATO's credentials for the 1990s.

Atlanticists point out that NATO has successfully adapted to a number of challenges, both political and military, and is already in the process of doing so again. One effort is to adapt the WEU to be the Alliance's out-of-area bridge. This could provide a more plausible military rationale for the WEU (as well as for NATO), strengthen the links among NATO, the EC, and the WEU, and perhaps even encourage French movement back toward the military organs of the Alliance. In addition, the WEU link could help Germany with its out-of-area question, although the debate is currently centered on UN missions. The use of the WEU as NATO's out-of-area bridge could serve alliance cohesion in another way. Those in Europe dissatisfied with the lack of European security independence could use this mission to reclaim some. As noted earlier, the 1991 British Defence White Paper says, "...the WEU can serve as a bridge between the transatlantic security and defence structures of NATO and the developing common political and security policies of the

Twelve."³⁰⁸ Foreign Secretary Hurd has called for an independent European force capability within NATO that could be used by the WEU for "certain circumstances."³⁰⁹ In either case, the Europeans, through either the EC or the WEU or both would develop some degree of an autonomous capability for use in issues of direct concern to them. As a result they could feel less constrained by American pressure, making them feel more like partners and improving the transatlantic relationship.

NATO is to become a more important forum for European security issues, with the Rome Summit declaring the Alliance the "essential forum" for consultation.³¹⁰ The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a discussion forum consisting of the North Atlantic Council members plus the members of the former Warsaw Pact (including the Baltic republics and the Soviet successor states), has already become more active. Genscher has discussed using it to bring the former Soviet republics into NATO in order to prevent a security vacuum from developing in Central and Eastern Europe

³⁰⁸Secretary of State for Defence, "Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence for the 90's," London, July 1991, 39.

³⁰⁹Geoff Meade, "Hurd Addresses EC on 'Defence Identity,'" London Press Association, March 26, 1991, 1942 GMT (FBIS-WE, March 27, 1991, 1).

³¹⁰"Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," paragraph 6.

by nations excluded from NATO and the WEU.³¹¹ The NACC could become the leading actor for the Alliance of the 1990s, providing it with the political role for which it has called. In contrast to the CSCE this political grouping would have established military teeth. The March 1992 meeting of the NACC broached the idea of using NATO forces for peacekeeping duties in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, perhaps foreshadowing the organization's role in Europe's future security structure.³¹²

The Atlanticist version of the future of NATO differs from that of the Europeanists in its emphasis on the primacy of NATO and in its belief that the Alliance, which has been so instrumental in protecting Western Europe, can successfully adapt to a new world order. Military rationales do remain, including one scenario dealing with a resurgent post-Yeltsin Russia³¹³ (not likely to be a NACC topic), but more probably dealing with other intra-European contingencies or Third World contingencies. Both Atlanticists and Europeanists want NATO to endure and the Americans to stay, though for differing

³¹¹Berlin ADN, January 3, 1992, 1208 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 6, 1992, 1).

³¹²Drozdiak, A11.

³¹³See Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold War Era," New York Times, February 17, 1992, 1. This article outlines the newly released Pentagon scenarios for future conflicts, one of which deals with "an aggressive Russian government...seen as demanding autonomy for Russians in the Baltic republics."

purposes. Recent months have seen especially strident attempts, such as at the Rome NATO Summit, to reassure the United States of its importance to Europe.

D. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

The conclusion of the Cold War has left many American policy-makers unsure of the next steps to take. The Bush Administration, trained in the East-West order and accustomed to incremental change, has slowly attempted to produce a framework for future relations with the new Europe. Though the Soviet threat is gone and could only return after a long hiatus, the world is full of new threats, many of which, lacking the constraints of bipolarity, are more likely to produce conflicts. Defense Secretary Cheney has attempted to focus attention on the issues currently facing NATO: force reductions; increased readiness, mobility, sustainability, and efficiency; long-term planning; specialization; and burden-sharing.³¹⁴ Each of these issues is playing an important role in relations between the United States and its European allies. NATO's survival is no longer a foregone conclusion in the minds of American policy-makers; many influential officials (including 1992 Presidential candidates) behave as

³¹⁴Dick Cheney, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," January 1991, 8-9. The Defense Secretary's 1992 report emphasized the continued importance of collective defense through NATO as well as the Alliance's adaptability, altering its military forces toward flexibility, mobility, and multinationality.

if they consider NATO an unnecessary American burden. If the Alliance is to survive, the U.S. government must decide that survival is in the American national interest. This will require a new rationale for NATO, which could be a variation of the old one, or a totally new one, possibly based on the out-of-area role.³¹⁵ The decisions taken in the next few years by Americans will greatly influence whether NATO will survive or collapse.

NATO supporters claim that new tasks will adapt its mission in the transformed world, including serving as the central transatlantic security forum. This concept has been forwarded by Secretary of State Baker on a number of occasions, and it represents one method by which to preserve American influence in European security affairs.³¹⁶ This task, however, is unlikely to garner the support necessary to maintain large numbers of U.S. troops in Europe. A second possible task for the new NATO could be acting as the coordinator for out-of-area missions, an idea much like that of the British. During the Gulf War, the Defense Planning Committee coordinated out-of-area planning, and the NATO structure and resources were used for the protection of

³¹⁵Robert A. Levine, "European Security in the 1990s: Uncertain Prospects and Prudent Policies," RAND Note N-3240-RC (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), 30.

³¹⁶Joint statement of James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, May 10, 1991, US Department of State Dispatch, May 13, 1991, 346.

Turkey.³¹⁷ Logistic support drawn from established NATO channels was particularly important to the successful prosecution of the war effort.³¹⁸ This concept has been extrapolated to the planned use of NATO bases as forward staging areas for the use of American forces elsewhere.³¹⁹ This new military rationale may be crucial to NATO's survival.

Opposing instability and any possible Russian resurgence are third possible future missions for American forces in NATO. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger repeated Joffe's argument to the Eurogroup in 1991 when he stated,

The U.S. presence is the best insurance against the rivalries inherent to Europe's nation-state system - rivalries which have the potential of going military as long as that nation-state system has not been subsumed once and for all into a truly unitary structure.³²⁰

While this could also ultimately provide the military rationale which RAND analyst Robert Levine considers necessary

³¹⁷William H. Taft, IV, "European Security: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War," NATO Review, June 1991, 8.

³¹⁸For a discussion of the role of NATO during the Gulf crisis see Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," Survival, May/June 1991, 246-259.

³¹⁹Jan S. Breemer, "U.S. Forces in Europe: The Search for a Mission," in Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy, eds. James J. Tritton and Paul N. Stockton (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1991), 158-9.

³²⁰Lawrence S. Eagleburger, presentation at the Eurogroup Conference on "New Security Challenges and the Future Role of the Alliance," June 25, 1991, 3-4, quoted in Hahn, 44.

for the support of the American people,³²¹ the threat will have to be put into terms which more clearly spell out the danger to the U.S. before public, and hence Congressional, support, will be forthcoming. Though the concept is gaining popularity within NACC and administration circles, Jan Breemer has considered it to be inappropriate for the United States to pursue military roles in Eastern Europe, as that should be under the purview of the Europeans themselves.³²² This would preclude such contingencies coming under the NATO aegis. Clearly, much policy development remains for the U.S. government on relations with Eastern Europe.

As an additional task, NATO could be used for focusing allied cooperation in the 1990s and beyond. Though intra-alliance relations have periodically been shaky, NATO, with the Western world's key military and political powers, has provided a most effective forum to address many world problems. More than a security forum, NATO has been a political roundtable in which the U.S. and its European allies promote cooperation and solve problems. President Bush has already pledged his support for Western Europe's "historic march toward greater economic and political unity," which

³²¹Levine, "Keeping U.S. Troops in Europe: The Real Reason Why," RAND Note N-3085-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, September 1990), 4.

³²²Breemer, 152.

includes a pillar in NATO.³²³ Such support is important if the U.S. intends to continue forming coalitions for emerging non-traditional threat scenarios. As former National Security Adviser Brzezinski observes, "Though America is today admittedly the world's only superpower, global conditions are too complex and America's domestic health too precarious to sustain a worldwide Pax Americana."³²⁴

The U.S. government has recognized the need for NATO to adapt in another way - ensuring more attention is devoted to allied interests. Without the Soviet threat dominating the Alliance agenda, the U.S. must devote its attention to other key political issues in Europe. For example, military policies must be subordinated to American political support of Germany, because if Germany should turn on the United States, NATO will fall.³²⁵ The United States so far appears to have followed this advice, but it must also recognize the need to relinquish some of its leadership. As foreign affairs writer Michael Brenner notes, "The allies' acceptance of larger responsibilities needs to be matched by an American readiness to let go of the exceptional powers it has enjoyed as

³²³George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, August 1991, 3.

³²⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, 20.

³²⁵Mary FitzGerald, et al., Challenges to NATO Strategy - Implications for the 1990's, National Security Research, August 1990, 165.

paramount leader of the Alliance."³²⁶ One issue discussed already includes the possibility of SACEUR being a European in the future, while the substantial nuclear arms cuts announced by President Bush in September, 1991 were in part an answer to European public opinion, though other motives existed.³²⁷ These important Alliance maintenance steps may not, however, satisfy a domestically-minded Congress.

The U.S. Congress has gained a great deal of power over foreign policy and defense decision-making in recent years. Since the foreign policy consensus evaporated with the Vietnam War, the Administration has been unable to count on almost automatic support for its foreign policy decisions. In the 1990s, with budgetary considerations coming to the forefront over almost all other areas, the power of the purse has given Congress almost unprecedented influence over security policy. As public opinion shifts on Alliance matters, vote-conscious Congress will shift with it, with a corresponding impact on NATO's future.

Many of the arguments used to support NATO fall upon deaf ears in the United States. Walter Hahn pinpoints the public's attitude:

³²⁶Michael Brenner, "The Alliance: A Gulf Post-Mortem," International Affairs, October 1991, 678.

³²⁷"Bush Orders Dramatic Cuts in Nation's Atomic Weapons," San Jose Mercury News, September 28, 1991, 1A (from the Los Angeles Times).

The problem, beyond a prevailing American popular disinterest in history lessons, is that under the best of circumstances broad 'historic purpose' alone is not likely to generate a strong and unblinking beacon of strategic self-interest, especially at a time of relative scarcity of resources.³²⁸

Though President Bush and others have strained to make a convincing case for their views, the chances of this gaining public support for a significant military role in Europe seem slight. At this year's Wehrkunde conference on security policy, leading U.S. Senators informed the Europeans of the American public's waning interest in NATO. According to Republican William Cohen, "The prevailing and popular view in the United States is that NATO is no longer relevant, necessary or affordable,"³²⁹ while Indiana's Richard Lugar of warned of the impact of stalled trade talks as follows:

I don't think the Europeans understand how far they have to move on trade. If they don't back down, it could undermine NATO and American participation in the alliance. We're heading to a precipice that Europeans really don't understand.³³⁰

Vice President Quayle contributed to the furor over the linking of economic and security policies, and was obliged later to attempt to show that America's defense commitment

³²⁸Walter Hahn, "The U.S. and NATO: Strategic Readjustments?" Global Affairs, Fall 1991, 60.

³²⁹Marc Fisher, "U.S. Officials Take Tough New Line on Europe," International Herald Tribune, February 10, 1992, 1.

³³⁰Ibid.

remained strong even in the face of GATT difficulties.³³¹ The entry of the trade issue into NATO could be most threatening to the Alliance's future, especially as it plays to American protectionist attitudes.

Historically, the Senate has never been completely satisfied with the American defense relationship with Europe. As Simon Lunn has observed, "The assumption that NATO is a gift that the United States makes to the Europeans is never far from the surface of any Congressional discussion of the Alliance."³³² With the price of the gift so high today, the Senate is seriously questioning the benefits the costs provide. As a result a series of new strategic concepts has been issued by Congressmen anxious to redirect American defense thinking away from a narrow and expensive European focus.

Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn in early 1990 presented his vision of future U.S. military strategy, with consideration for a lesser role in Europe.

American troops in Europe can and should play a stabilizing role during this period of transition. Nevertheless, the greatly lengthened warning time of a credible Soviet conventional attack against NATO allows the U.S. to reduce the size of our standing armies defending well forward and to emphasize reinforcement instead. I agree...that we should start planning on a

³³¹Craig R. Whitney, "Quayle, Ending European Trip, Lobbies for a New Trade Accord," New York Times, February 12, 1992, A4.

³³²Lunn, 9.

residual force in Europe on the order of 75,000 to 100,000 troops within five years.³³³

Before the debate is concluded, this figure may be significantly lower. Republican Senator John McCain, while emphasizing that the U.S. cannot withdraw from Europe, has said that "Europe is now capable of assuming primary responsibility for its own defense, and this allows major cuts in the U.S. forces deployed in Europe." In addition, he says that remaining forces in Europe should not be assigned to NATO on a full-time basis.³³⁴ Rep. Aspin's analysis of the threat largely omits Europe.³³⁵ Clearly it is the opinion of many influential members of both parties in the Congress that the U.S. role in Europe is too large for the changing times, and that more responsibility should be assumed by the Europeans. Congress has already acted to limit U.S. forces in Europe, passing a 100,000 cap with the Fiscal 1992 Defense Authorization Act and cutting U.S. contributions to the NATO Infrastructure Fund.³³⁶ The end is probably not yet in sight.

³³³Sam Nunn, "Sen. Nunn on Vision of Military," New York Times, April 20, 1990, B6.

³³⁴John McCain, "Matching a Peace Dividend with National Security - A New Strategy for the 1990's," Congressional Record, November 26, 1991, S18528-S18536.

³³⁵Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era."

³³⁶David C. Morrison, "Bringing Them Home," National Journal, December 7, 1991, 2956-7.

This analysis has already alluded to the ever-present burden-sharing issue, whose lid may now be unreplaceable. The opening of the debate on the Fiscal Year 1993 defense budget saw a barrage of anger at the issue from both Houses, including Senator Riegle's call for an end to the "hemorrhage" of money out of the United States.³³⁷ James Tritten writes that it should be apparent that the President could never convince Congress to fund reconstitution, a fundamental component of the new national military strategy, if the Europeans did not do so themselves.³³⁸ Canada's recent decision to remove its combat forces from Europe is sure to weaken the argument that the U.S. should leave substantial forces there.³³⁹ Congressional irritation runs deep, and the Administration so far has been unable to convince Congress of the value of maintaining large forces in Europe. Without a more effective effort, Congressionally-mandated cuts could be drastic (nearly total), haphazard, and potentially destabilizing.

What attempts have been made by the Administration to convince Congress of NATO's importance have dealt with the

³³⁷Philip Finnegan, "Allies' Burden-Sharing Issue Rankles Congress," Defense News, February 10, 1992, 8.

³³⁸James J. Tritten, America Promises to Come Back: Our New National Strategy (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School), October 1991, 45.

³³⁹Clyde Farnsworth, "Ottawa to Pull Out Combat Force from Europe by the End of 1994," New York Times, February 27, 1992, A7.

need to avoid the marginalization of the U.S. in European security affairs. Secretary of Defense Cheney's statement that, "NATO is the mechanism by which the United States has been involved and will stay involved in the questions of European security,"³⁴⁰ not only emphasizes both the U.S. commitment to Europe and its intention that NATO retain its leading role in European security affairs, but it also informs Congress about the Administration's desires. Secretary of State Baker has emphasized, "The strength of the Euro-Atlantic community depends on cooperation between the community and the United States keeping pace with European integration and institutional development."³⁴¹

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council may become an integral part of Europe's post-Cold War development, contributing to the work of the CSCE while enhancing European security. As Baker has stated, the NACC can serve the roles of primary consultative body between NATO and the Eastern European liaison states, overseer of the liaison program, and European crisis manager.³⁴² Congress will have to be convinced of the worthiness of the NACC, but it should be less

³⁴⁰Alan Riding, "U.S., Wary of European Corps, Seeks Assurance on NATO Role," New York Times, October 20, 1991, 12.

³⁴¹Baker, "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture," 7.

³⁴²James Baker, "US Commitment to Strengthening Euro-Atlantic Cooperation," intervention before the NACC, Brussels, December 20, 1991, in US Department of State Dispatch, December 23, 1991, 903.

costly to the U.S. while showing the administration's ability to adapt to the changing security environment. It may be too late, however. Such descriptions of the need for a strong role in Europe may not succeed in swaying a Congressional movement gaining momentum in Washington and across the country. Significantly, it remains unclear whether the difficulty the Administration is having gaining support for its case is due to its own persuasive weakness arguing a strong case, whether the case is really too weak to be supported, or whether no case can be strong enough given the other forces influencing the decisions.

E. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Drivers of NATO's Future

The questions posed at the beginning of this chapter asked if NATO can carry on beyond the end of the Cold War and, if it can, whether it can function with any effectiveness. Several factors are at play in determining the answers to these questions: the progress of European integration, European public support for NATO, the foreign policy role of Germany, and American domestic politics. First, the progress of European integration and its relationship to NATO are of great importance. Clearly, were the Europeans on a more united path toward an EC-based security identity, NATO's position would be even weaker. The communiques of the November 1991 NATO Summit in Rome and the December 1991 EC

Summit at Maastricht, while producing important statements of agreement and cooperation, showed significant gulfs remaining between the Europeanist and Atlanticist points of view, primarily between the French and British on the organizational relationships.³⁴³

Second, unambiguous public support for NATO no longer seems to exist in Western Europe. A recent poll in the United Kingdom showed that respondents considered European military integration more important than military links with the United States by almost a 3:1 margin.³⁴⁴ Though the poll was unspecific with regard to NATO, it would seem likely that the British public has taken a more Europeanist turn, which could ultimately affect the British government's security policies. The French have long opposed what they often portray as American "dominance" in Europe, and efforts to assert French leadership in Europe draw great support from domestic constituencies. A European defense identity based on the WEU and the EC would be more popular than French reintegration into NATO's military structure.

³⁴³Ian Murray, "UK and France Fail to Heal Defence Rift," London Times, October 30, 1991, 12.

³⁴⁴Robin Oakley, "Support for Europe Reaches Highest Level since 1945," London Times, December 7, 1991, 4. In addition, another poll showed 57% of those surveyed supporting "fully integrated armed services to defend Europe," with only 31% opposed. Nigel Dudley, "British Cautious on Unity," The European, March 26 - April 1, 1992, 2 (FBIS-WE, March 31, 1992, 7 [annex]).

Germany is the critical European actor in the formation or maintenance of any security structure.³⁴⁵ Constituting the swing vote between the U.K. and France, it is becoming a stronger European link for the U.S. Trends from recent public opinion polls taken in Germany, however, show that the disintegration of the Soviet threat has eliminated much of NATO's rationale and support. A post-Soviet coup RAND study shows a decline in the belief that NATO is important for preserving the peace, lessened support for the presence of U.S. troops in Germany, and little backing for military missions in alliances to which Germany belongs. Nevertheless, interest in continued, close ties with the United States remains strong, as does membership in NATO as opposed to some other structure.³⁴⁶ Above all, Germans have a very limited interest in military tasks now that the Soviet threat is gone. Still, the domestic political situation with regard to security policy remains muddled in Germany. According to Joffe, the Right and Left seem to be drawing together toward

³⁴⁵Much of the following section summarizes some of the key aspects of Germany's post-reunification and post-Soviet coup security policies that were analyzed more thoroughly in the previous chapter.

³⁴⁶Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and International Reticence," statement before the U.S. Congress, House Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East, January 29, 1992. For more detailed survey information, see Ralf Zoll, "Public Opinion on Security and Armed Forces: The German Case," from the International Meeting on the Future of Security in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of European Public Opinion, presented at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 16-17, 1991.

a position supporting the continuation of NATO.³⁴⁷ Though Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly reconfirmed Germany's commitment to full participation in the Western military structure, the question of German neutrality exists, and significant anti-military sentiments throughout the population could prevent Germany from taking part in the revamping of NATO in the near future.

Ultimately, the question of NATO's survivability will probably be answered in the United States. The public's attention is increasingly turning toward domestic issues.³⁴⁸ When major actions are undertaken overseas, they are often performed with the attitude that the U.S. is again providing a free service to the international community. As Brenner concludes from the Gulf War, "...the [United States] was united in the conviction that Americans were undertaking a sacrifice for the sake of partners who were unwilling to contribute to the common cause on a scale commensurate with their stake."³⁴⁹ Such an attitude is sure to lessen public support for NATO, and it inflames those in Congress who use the burden-sharing issue as a stick against the West

³⁴⁷Josef Joffe, "The Postmodern Alliance," Sueddeutsche Zeitung, February 10, 1992, 4 (FBIS-WE, February 11, 1992, 13).

³⁴⁸This interpretation has been reported by various public opinion surveys, including R.W. Apple, Jr., "Majority in Poll Fault Focus by Bush on Global Policy but Back New Order," New York Times, October 11, 1991, A8.

³⁴⁹Brenner, 665-6.

Europeans. Congress, however, does not need much additional ammunition, as domestic pressure has affected foreign aid, defense, and international trade. The exchanges at the 1992 Wehrkunde conference in Munich highlight how politically sensitive economic protectionism is, as well as the stakes involved in the security arena. The potential failure of the Uruguay Round of GATT could have profound implications not only on economic relations with Europe but also on foreign and security relations.

2. Conclusion

A French spokesman was essentially correct when he stated, "We all support the presence of U.S. forces in Europe; it is not we Europeans who are pushing the U.S. out of Europe."³⁵⁰ Cultural, economic, and historic ties have all contributed to the endurance of NATO; the institutional framework and bureaucratic momentum that exist provide a daunting test to any challenger. As Hugh De Santis recently noted:

Sentiment reinforces NATOphilia. Over the years, policymakers, pundits, and political analysts have grown attached to an institution they have been quick to defend against detractors during periods when its cohesion has been challenged from within and without the Alliance.³⁵¹

³⁵⁰Alan Cowell, "Bush Challenges Partners in NATO over Role of U.S.," New York Times, November 8, 1991, 1. Interestingly, the spokesman carefully used the term "Europe" rather than "France."

³⁵¹Hugh De Santis, "The Graying of NATO," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1991, 52.

This may soon change. Though powerful forces preserve the established alliance, equally powerful forces - more than the loss of the Soviet threat - could lead to its demise.

It is important to recognize that many complex and unpredictable factors are influencing the development of the new European security architecture. In addition, there are other important factors that have only lightly been touched upon that will have influence over NATO's future, such as the actions of other European countries and the role of international economics. The Europe of today could not have been predicted even three years ago; the concept of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council would have stretched even the most flexible imagination. Such a short period of time is too brief to allow the creation of thoroughly thought-out policies.

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established, the U.S. Congress had no intention of providing a permanent, large-scale U.S. military force to Europe (nor did the Truman Administration). That presence is now likely to be sharply diminished, perhaps back to the level and type initially envisaged by the Congress. The United States is likely to have a great deal influence over the future course of the Alliance; hopefully, the piecemeal pullout being mandated by the U.S. Congress will proceed along with a careful revision of U.S. national security strategy. Otherwise, the United States may once again have failed to

learn from history and have found itself sorry for having
disarmed in a world that fails to live up to a peaceful
billing.

VII. ANALYSIS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS

A. THEORIES OF ALLIANCE FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE

One of the first questions asked in this thesis was whether it was worthwhile to consider how the alliance relationships would develop in Europe. Without the Soviet threat, some might argue, there may no longer be a rationale for any alliances in Europe. The traditional threat that promoted West European cohesion and American participation in European security affairs no longer exists. Many political theorists have argued that alliances cannot endure without a direct threat. As noted in Chapter One, Stephen Walt posits that balancing the threat is the prime motivator for the formation of alliances.

As Chapter Two demonstrated, however, many threats remain in the post-Cold War world, of varied types and degrees of severity. While not possessing the potential for worldwide catastrophe of a superpower nuclear war, these threats are conceivably more serious because of the greater likelihood of their escalation into shooting wars. While West European allies do not necessarily view threats from as global a perspective as the United States, in many ways concepts regarding foreseeable risks and threats are similar on both sides of the Atlantic. The risks and threats described in the

second chapter ensure the need for continued cooperation between the U.S. and Europe, in order to provide for a stable, collaborative, well-defended Europe as the transitional European political landscape is redesigned, and as countries on Europe's periphery become progressively better armed.

At the same time, other reasons for the success of NATO add to the hopes of those who wish to strengthen other West European alliances. NATO has institutionalized the participation of the U.S. in European affairs, within and beyond the security arena. It has also provided a stable security framework for the collaboration of the West European nations, as the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of the EC, closely followed the Alliance's founding. NATO has become much more than a collective defense body. It has served as the central forum for political discussion as the European security environment has changed since the 1940s, especially very recently. American participation has given the West Europeans confidence as well as economic flexibility to rebuild into the economic power the EC has become. At the same time, the West Europeans have come to recognize the need to assume more responsibility for their own defense. Because no one European state can handle all potential contingencies alone, many have proposed strengthening the WEU to speak for the EC on security matters.

For the United States, the atmosphere of cooperation and mutual participation that has been developed is important for future scenarios. Unable to act unilaterally as it could when it was more relatively dominant in many fields, the U.S. will need the assistance of its allies in the future more than before. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has recognized the need for ad hoc coalitions in upcoming military contingencies, even while formal alliances will remain fundamental to American military strategy.³⁵² On both sides of the Atlantic, the common values and history of close relationships and cooperation will not only help NATO last, but will also promote the process of European security integration.

B. THE INTERACTIONS OF THE EVOLVING ORGANIZATIONS

1. The Need for Europe to Provide for Its Own Defense

The burden-sharing issue has been significant since the founding of the North Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. Senate especially, but others in the U.S. government as well, have at times shown considerable irritation about what they feel is a "free ride" by the Europeans, allowing them to concentrate on economic growth while the U.S. burdens itself with huge defense budgets. In recent Congressional testimony, a Defense Department expert on European security affairs highlighted

³⁵²General Colin Powell, The National Military Strategy. Washington, DC, 1992, 8.

some of the current restructuring, stating, "our new forces will enable the allies to increase their NATO roles and responsibilities for European security."³⁵³ The Europeans have long tried to emphasize their contributions to their own defense to convince the United States of their seriousness. With a substantial U.S. withdrawal already in progress, the Europeans - even as all the West European nations are also reducing their defense budgets and forces - must now assume a great deal more of the burden. The Europeans have acknowledged this need, and have taken steps to satisfy it, reflected in the development of new security organizations.

2. The European Community, The Western European Union, and the French-German Proposal for a European Corps

As the vehicle of European integration, the EC plays a pivotal role in the overall process, including that involving new military structures. The WEU, which includes nine of the twelve EC members, occupies a critical position between the EC and NATO and its established collective defense capabilities. While the WEU has often reaffirmed its enduring link with NATO, it is possible that -if some of the hindrances toward closer cooperation are overcome - the WEU will grow much closer to the EC. Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis has spoken of either a merger or a clear institutional link

³⁵³George Bader, "U.S. Military Presence in Europe," statement before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, April 1, 1992, 2.

existing between the EC and WEU by 1998.³⁵⁴ As the U.S. role in Europe becomes less pre-eminent, the WEU will have to fill some of the vacuum, even though its independent military capabilities are in the early stages of development. This will be an important factor governing U.S. alliance relationships, and it illustrates the continuing need for NATO.

The Franco-German proposal for a European corps, on the other hand, seems to have no distinct mission. Created by politicians without significant military input, the corps idea serves French needs by institutionalizing autonomy from U.S. influence. The Germans, in contrast, wish to subordinate the corps to NATO. In addition, the German Basic Law crisis over the out-of-area question, which is discussed in Chapter Five, seem further to complicate the realization of an initiative already losing both steam and direction, as out-of-area missions seem fundamental to the corp's existence. As the WEU develops, the "Eurocorps" may fade out as an independent option, other than providing for continued Franco-German bilateral cooperation. The important point, then, will be the coexistence of NATO and the WEU.

³⁵⁴Andreas Unterberger, interview with Gianni De Michelis, Die Presse, March 23, 1992, 3 (FBIS-WE, March 25, 1992, 8).

3. Rise of the NACC and the NATO/CSCE Links

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was born from the changes in Eastern Europe. Arising from uncharted territory, the NACC is widely seen on both sides of the Atlantic as able to contribute to the continued progress of the Eastern Europeans (including the former Soviet republics) toward economic, political, and military reform, resulting (it is hoped) in stability in the region. According to James Baker,

NATO, through the NACC, can concretely provide expertise and operational experience in defense and security affairs that will help our liaison partners make the transition to durable democratic systems. Working together with our new partners, we can implement a successful NACC program that will contribute to security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic community.³⁵⁵

The United States saw the Council as providing a new and necessary role for NATO, while the French have tried to limit the scope of the organization's activities because they have seen NACC as a way to perpetuate American influence. NACC has been an important forum for addressing the concerns of the East European countries, while at the same time linking them (loosely) to the American-led NATO security structure.

NATO, transforming itself into an organ that can act effectively in the post-Cold War world, seems to have found new rationales that can complement its institutional strength.

³⁵⁵James Baker, intervention at the NACC ministerial meeting, Brussels, March 10, 1992, in US Department of State Dispatch, March 16, 1992, 202.

In addition it provides an avenue for the U.S. to maintain a role in European security affairs and ease some of its fears about potential European instability. As for the CSCE, it seems likely that the NACC may overlap with some of its roles, including perhaps that of a security forum. It seems unavoidable that an organization that has some enforcement capabilities and well-established bureaucratic structures will relegate one paralyzed by the need for consensus and lacking effective institutional structures to a more limited role. Still, the U.S. will continue to support the goals and process of CSCE, such as crisis-prevention and management, even while it strives to solidify the role NACC is building. Ultimately, NATO and the NACC may be able to work with the EC and WEU (the European pillar) in constructing a regime based on collective security within Europe and collective defense against risks and threats from outside Europe, which leaves Europe most of the responsibility but keeps the U.S. tied into Europe to provide the support the Europeans may need in a crisis.

C. EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

Obviously, the problem of intra-European squabbling remains, slowing the process of integration while personalities and domestic constituencies are satisfied. One important feature of changes in Europe is common to the U.S. (and Canada): the need to cut defense spending. This section briefly summarizes the attitudes of the key European actors

toward designing a new European security architecture and the role of the United States.

1. Germany

As noted in Chapter Five, German foreign and security policies are still in transition, as internal political disputes threaten not only to hinder German initiatives in European and international affairs, but also to undermine Germany's reliability in the eyes of its allies - including the U.S. Foreign Minister Genscher's goal, and that of a large segment of the German population, is that the CSCE assume the dominant role in European security. NATO and the NACC, as well as European-only institutions such as the EC and WEU, would ultimately become components of the CSCE.³⁵⁶ The NATO and U.S. roles have nevertheless been reemphasized, as both are seen as essential for stability in Europe. Efforts to tie other structures to NATO may also be attempts to draw France back toward the military structure.

Even though Germany's leadership role is based mainly on its economic power, the out-of-area question and the legislated (and treaty-mandated) drawdown of the *Bundeswehr* threaten to weaken Germany's leadership role in Europe and

³⁵⁶Genscher has called for CSCE collaboration with the WEU or NATO for "peace-preserving measures." Additionally, he has called for CSCE blue and green helmet forces. See "Text of Speech by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Opening of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki," Berlin ADN, March 24, 1992, 1453 GMT (FBIS-WE, March 25, 1992, 2).

restrict its ability to carry out significant military operations. German military officers have already expressed concern over the deteriorating state of Germany's military capabilities, while the out-of-area dispute has paralyzed many of Germany's leading policy-makers within domestic politics. As both trends are unlikely to change in the near future, German decision-makers will have to consider their impact on Germany's role in Europe.

2. France

France, which has long asserted its independence in political and military decision-making, finds itself on the verge of isolating itself from European decisions and institutions. Having attempted to establish security structures in their own image, first the WEU and most recently the Franco-German proposal for a European corps, the French have encountered opposition from those who find French leadership undesirable and fear the withdrawal of the United States from Europe. With the Socialist government suffering from paralysis owing to adverse election results and opinion poll findings, Mitterrand can no longer claim a clear mandate for his own policies.

France is, nevertheless, a powerful player in the European integration process, and its opinions and attitudes toward the new West European security architecture carry weight. First, France still fears the possibility of a

resurgent Germany. As a result, the French have exerted great effort toward tying Germany into Western security structures, with some degree of success. Second, the French feel that the United States will sharply, perhaps even completely, curtail its military presence in Europe, necessitating the West Europeans developing their own autonomous military capabilities. While NATO remains essential in a supporting role, European security will depend on the interactions of the EC (European Political Union [EPU]), CSCE, and NATO.³⁵⁷ While France and the U.S. share the same ultimate goals, i.e. peace and stability in Europe, they have disagreed on the vehicles to be used for achieving them. In this regard, the French have opposed any expansion of NACC activities for fear that NACC might become an instrument of American dominance in European security affairs and undermine NATO's ability to perform its core functions. The French believe it is time for the Europeans to assume responsibility for their own defense.

3. The United Kingdom

The British find themselves in a transitional position as well. Long satisfied with the "special relationship" with the United States, they have been among the most steadfast supporters of the "Atlanticist" position. As Labour expert Bruce George recently told Parliament,

³⁵⁷Roland Dumas, address to the Institute of Higher Defense Studies, Paris, February 4, 1992, 4-6 (Text furnished by the French Embassy in Washington).

[It is] vital not to push the Americans out of Europe by over-accentuating the Europeanness of defense. We must keep North America involved in European security because we are kith and kin and belong to the same political traditions as Canada and the United States.³⁵⁸

Still, the British have adopted more "Europeanist" leanings. Public opinion, as described in Chapter Three, has shown greater support for the concept of a European identity, including in military forces. Prime Minister Major, more independent after winning a general election in his own right, will be able to stand for more Europeanist positions than did his predecessor.

The British recognize the accession of Germany to the role of leading partner of the United States in Europe. They do not, however, feel that this diminishes the special relationship or compromises the need for NATO and the American role in Europe. The British support the several security organizations developing in Europe and do not seem concerned about the overlap in their roles and missions. The British-Italian proposal of October 1991 showed British interest in more European defense ideas, while not duplicating NATO missions. This initiative is important in showing Britain's interest in protecting established and proven structures while participating fully in the move toward European integration.

³⁵⁸Bruce George, House of Common Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) on Maastricht, December 19, 1991, 509.

D. THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AFFAIRS

Though for different reasons, all of the American allies in Europe have called for a continuing American presence and role in European security affairs. Ranging from the German view - that American forces are necessary to ensure stability - to that of the French - that the United States is essential in providing last-resort insurance for contingencies beyond the EC/WEU's capabilities - there is a consensus that the U.S. needs to remain engaged in Europe. In the United States, however, a debate rages about the type of engagement and about whether any engagement is still needed as the European (and world) security environments have changed.

1. World Involvement

The American role is changing, as the distribution of world power shifts. While the U.S. is and will for some time at least remain the world's most powerful nation, the nature of its power and its ability to use that power have changed. According to Joseph Nye,

...the critical question for the future United States is not whether it will start the next century as a superpower with the largest supply of resources, but to what extent it will be able to control the political environment and to get other nations to do what it wants.³⁵⁹

The United States has long championed the assumption by the West Europeans of more responsibility for their own

³⁵⁹Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 175.

defense. The U.S. nonetheless wishes to keep engaged in the security affairs of Europe, with a certain degree of influence. Isolationism has been emphatically rejected by the Administration. As Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has observed,

I would like to make the case today that what we did to win the Cold War is in fact very much relevant to the challenges we are now facing at home and abroad, and that we must ignore the siren song of those who urge us to 'come home' and set aside the burden of world leadership which was thrust upon us 50 years ago this December.³⁶⁰

At the same time, the U.S. has recognized that it has a continuing commitment to the defense of Western Europe, and the ways of operationalizing that commitment after the demise of the Soviet Union have been the focal point of the ongoing American debate. As President Bush has stated,

We agreed that NATO remains the bedrock of European peace and there is no substitute for our Atlantic link, anchored by a strong American military presence in Europe - which the Chancellor and I both agreed must be maintained.³⁶¹

The Administration has had a difficult time in convincing Congress of the need for 150,000 troops.³⁶² The number now

³⁶⁰Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "Engagement vs. Withdrawal: US Foreign Policy After the Cold War," remarks at a Business Week symposium at Washington, DC, October 3, 1991, in US Department of State Dispatch, October 7, 1991, 738.

³⁶¹George Bush, news conference with Helmut Kohl at Washington, DC, March 22, 1992, in US Department of State Dispatch, March 23, 1992, 217.

³⁶²For a review of recent Congressional debate on the subject see Pat Towell, "Army's Cutback Procedures Win Unexpected Support," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 7, 1992, 553.

seems likely to drop; but the importance of the commitment remains, as the Administration has demonstrated in various recent strategic planning documents.

The specific number of American forces may not be as important as some say. While 150,000 appears to be a significant figure for the Germans, as well as being the Administration's target, it is more important that the number be based on an assessment of the capabilities required to carry out missions for which American forces could realistically be assigned. Is 150,000 necessary to ensure European stability? The U.S. seems less eager to make that point than it once was, as the argument has been joined by those trying to determine what the connection between such a presence and the prevention of conflict between Hungary and Romania would be, for example. More likely, the Pentagon will push for those forces needed for prepositioning in Europe to be used in the Middle East or elsewhere, though this is obviously politically sensitive in European capitals. George Bader has recently testified to a number of missions for American forces in Europe:

[U.S. forces in Europe] will demonstrate U.S. commitment, deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access to overseas facilities and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability.³⁶³

³⁶³Bader, 2.

2. U.S. Public Opinion

The views of the American public will be particularly important not only in the 1992 campaign season but also in the future, as recent scandals have increased the public's displeasure with the federal government that has grown over the years. As a result, it is necessary to examine recent public opinion trends that will affect the future of the American security role in Europe. First, by a 5:1 margin, Americans believe that the country needs to concentrate more on domestic issues than foreign policy, even while a slight majority favored continuing world involvement by the U.S.³⁶⁴ At the same time, there has been a loss of confidence in the global leadership role of the United States, as only 30% believed that it would be the leader of the free world and only 63% thought the country would even still be a superpower in the year 2000.³⁶⁵

³⁶⁴Gallup Poll taken January 6-9, 1992, in Richard J. Cattani, "America in the World," Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1992, 18.

³⁶⁵"Opinion Outlook," National Journal, December 14, 1991, 3046. 39% of Americans believed leadership would be exercised by the triad of the U.S., Japan, and Europe. Much of the loss of confidence in American leadership, as compared with results from 1986 surveys, stems from economic weakness, as the trade and budget deficits have increased while Japan and Germany have gained economic strength. See John Rielly (President of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations), "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the '90s," Foreign Policy, Spring 1991, 80.

Second, even while Americans overwhelmingly supported a continued military alliance with Europe³⁶⁶, the number of those favoring a reduced commitment to Europe grew by substantial amounts, doubling (from 11 to 22%) in a survey of the mass public, and up four times (from 13 to 57%) in the opinions of "leaders" of public opinion compared with a poll taken in 1987.³⁶⁷ Third, and perhaps ominously, 30% of the public and 41% of leaders felt that the most serious threat in the future would come from economic competition with Europe, and a significant minority of both samples believed that the EC exercised unfair trading practices.³⁶⁸ The results of such surveys could have a substantial impact on the shaping of the political agenda, as they show a large tilt in public attitudes in the wake of the Cold War.

3. Congress and the American Role in European Security

Congressional activism in security policy, significant not only because of the demands of public opinion but also because of a perceived lack of executive branch initiative, has already made the long-term maintenance of the Administration's goals for force levels in Europe uncertain.

³⁶⁶The public supported this position by a margin of 5:1 in an October 5-7, 1991 CBS/New York Times poll. Cattani, 18.

³⁶⁷Rielly, 86-7. The leadership sample in the survey consisted of 377 individuals who work with international and security issues from Congress, the Administration, business, communications, education, and foreign policy institutes.

³⁶⁸Ibid., 86, 95.

It already seems probable that troop levels will fall below 150,000, so the question becomes what a reasonably stable end point might be. Some have called for 75,000-100,000, but the final number could be much less, especially if momentum based on budget-cutting and burden-sharing accelerates. Some believe that if force levels drop much below 75,000, force cutting momentum could take them to zero. This would change the entire American posture in Europe, with a large loss of influence.

Though budget-cutting and burden-sharing issues are sufficiently strong considerations to cause force levels to drop substantially, the increased salience of trade issues is a new factor in the equation. Disputes over protectionism and the future of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) threaten to upset the economic, political, and military relations between the U.S. and its European allies. Though efforts are being made to rescue the Round, the potential for failure is great. Though it is by no means certain, the definite possibility exists that a failed GATT could aggravate protectionist impulses and damage transatlantic relations. The trade-security linkage discussed in Chapter Six could become very real in such a scenario, generating its own momentum.

4. The Future U.S. Role in European Security Affairs

Though it might have appeared for some time that European efforts to develop a specific security identity were attempts to drive the U.S. out of European security affairs, the Europeans have made concerted efforts to convince the U.S. that their intentions are otherwise. Each ally, including France, has spoken clearly of the need for a continued American presence in Europe to fulfill important roles. The Europeans in the EC and WEU are attempting to address the burden-sharing issue by designing their own defense identity, which would be associated with NATO in one of several potential frameworks. At the same time, this identity is consistent with the process of forging European Political Union. As a result, while the United States has not been excluded from the European table by the Europeans (the U.S. is a full member of the CSCE and will communicate with the WEU and the EC; and NATO and the NACC will continue to function), the United States may no longer possess the dominant role in European security affairs that it held since the period from 1949-1950 to 1989-1991.

Does this mean the U.S. will be marginalized? The answer depends on the decisions taken by the U.S. government. Most Europeans do not wish to marginalize the United States. Indeed, the greater risk may be one of U.S. withdrawal. Though the Administration has often repeated the need for the United States to remain actively involved in European security

affairs, its arguments have not, so far, succeeded in convincing a skeptical Congress that feels that the President has not developed a clear, long-term strategy for the U.S. in Europe (or the world). As a result, Congress has taken the initiative and acted (based on tight budgets, the end of the Soviet threat, and the need to devote attention to other regions) to legislate large troop cuts and a diminished U.S. role in Europe.

While much of this decision-making is entirely appropriate, given changes in the security environment, the danger is that short-sightedness will reduce the American role too far and too fast. Though the Administration has been accused of an inability to respond to drastic world changes with new thinking, responding sharply to the consequences of the business cycle is hardly long-term strategic vision. In addition, to require that the Pentagon produce specific threat scenarios to justify a U.S. military presence in Europe is unreasonable. The world has shown itself to be a dangerous place for hundreds and thousands of years. To draw inward and assume there is no longer any reason for forces in Europe is short-sighted and potentially costly.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁹There are a number of prominent Americans who have argued in favor of some variety of such a neoisolationist attitude. Pat Buchanan's "America First" campaign is a particularly newsworthy example. Hobart Rowen quotes Buchanan: "George Bush...is a globalist, and we are nationalists. He believes in some *pax universalis*. We believe in the old Republic. He would put America's wealth and power at the service of some vague new world order. We

The United States needs a policy that works with the main European and transatlantic institutions to address not only security issues but also their domestic implications. In order to avoid "marginalization" from European security affairs, the U.S. must take an active, reasonable, and bipartisan role in the transitions taking place in Europe. Otherwise, marginalization may occur not too far in the future.

will put America first." "America First: A Misguided Idea," Washington Post, December 22, 1991, H1.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been to determine whether the development of a West European defense identity could result in the marginalization of the United States in European security affairs. The Cold War has ended and changing power distributions are altering the face of world security politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc has instigated reappraisals of the defense policies of nations around the world, and NATO's strategy has been fundamentally recast. At the same time, these events have raised questions about the goals of American security policy and whether it remains appropriate for the U.S. to play a major role in European security affairs.

Since NATO was created to meet the threat of the Soviet Union (containing Germany was a deliberate side effect), the demise of the Soviet threat has induced questions about whether NATO retains a reason for being. Indeed, this concern raises other questions about whether any military alliance is justified in Europe. Walt's balance of the threat theory seems to justify military alliances in Europe, and his thesis is strengthened by numerous additional factors regarding institutional cooperation, culture, and the momentum of European political union. Consideration of the foreseeable risks alone provides a daunting picture of instability which

could be more likely to erupt into conflict without the stabilizing role of the superpower rivalry of the Cold War. In view of risks, ranging from ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around Europe's periphery, West Europeans have reason to desire continued military cooperation, with or without American participation.

West European defense autonomy should not be expected in the very near future. While in principle many West Europeans long for such status, many obstacles remain to be overcome in the process, especially issues of national sovereignty and domestic politics that hinder agreement. Though the Maastricht Summit led to an accord on security policy, the agreed treaty formulas were vague and left the adherents free to attach whatever interpretations that they pleased. Still, it is significant that the British and others have moved far toward more "Europeanist" positions, and that the "Europeanists" - especially France - have attempted to soothe the concerns of the "Atlanticists" that the U.S. may be forced out of its position of influence and that small countries may be faced with a new hegemony based on France or a Franco-German partnership leading the European political union. The development of the WEU is critical toward both a West European security identity and the continued role of NATO.

The issue of West European nuclear cooperation is a critical subset of the search for West European defense

autonomy. Several historical examples exist of attempts to promote closer nuclear cooperation, but each has failed, with minor exceptions. The British and the French have made efforts toward limited cooperation, but wide gulfs remain. In this instance, national sovereignty is at the heart of the issue, because of the symbolic value of nuclear weapons. If close nuclear cooperation came to pass, it would take place after all significant hurdles toward political and military union had already been cleared in Western Europe.

No discussion of West European security policy can be complete without specific attention to Germany's role. The newly-reunified economic powerhouse occupies a pivotal spot in the processes of economic, political, and military integration. Both the Bonn-Paris and Bonn-Washington axes will continue to play a large role. Significantly, however, the domestic political and economic climate is such that Germany has had difficulty devoting sufficient attention to these issues, as mounting unification costs magnify German problems in reaching a defense consensus. The weight of Germany is so great, however, that should Germany ever decide to lean strongly toward the Atlanticist or Europeanist view, the other could be gravely weakened. At present, however, perceived German ambivalence has engendered questions by its allies about its motives and reliability.

All of the above considerations are affecting NATO's attempts to influence and fit into the changing European

security landscape. The Alliance has formulated a new military and security strategy to adapt to the changes. The development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has not only been a strong political response to the needs of Eastern Europe, but it has also set up a formidable barrier to those who would wish to limit severely NATO's future role. As nearly all influential European officials (East and West) have called for the maintenance of NATO and an American role in European security affairs, it falls upon the U.S. government to decide what it wishes America's mission to be. While the Bush Administration has strenuously supported NATO and a substantial American military presence in Europe, many members of Congress have taken opposing positions. As tight budgets, isolationism, and protectionism may have greater influence on future American political agendas, there is more than a minor chance that the American role will be reduced to a token one, especially if the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations remain stalemated.

While at one time it might have seemed that West European efforts to develop a defense and security identity were equivalent to attempts to drive the U.S. out of European security affairs, it seems that more than anything else the key driver toward such marginalization might be the actions of the U.S. Congress. American public and elite opinion has shifted away from previously high levels of support for NATO, and this could encourage Congress to adopt anti-European

attitudes which might jeopardize American influence in Europe. As a result, the United States could run the risk of entering the 21st Century with a haphazard strategy that forgets that conflicts and wars are typical features of international politics. It is to be hoped that a more thorough analysis of European history and security policy will lead to more effective and timely strategic planning.

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