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THE ROLE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE ANDEAN INITIATIVE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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CHRISTOPHER P. MOOSMANN, CPT(P), USA B.S., United States Military Academy, 1981

> Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1992

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THE ANDEAN INITIATIVE, by Captain Christopher P. Moosmann, USA, 161 pages.

This study analyzes the security assistance programs which support the President's Andean Initiative, as a part of his overall "war on drugs." The study describes the conditions in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru which foster coca growing, and the local police and military agencies with counterdrug responsibilities. The thesis examines the nature of security assistance, and how various security assistance programs support the goal of supply reduction. Congressional changes to security assistance legislation are also examined.

The findings reveal that problems of corruption, weak economies, and poor institutional development in the Andean countries limit the effectiveness of American security assistance in reducing the flow of cocaine into the United States.

The study concludes that American security assistance is unlikely to contribute to a reduction of the supply of cocaine into the United States. The nature and perception of the drug problem in the Andean Region, together with wide-spread local corruption, negate the intended effects of security assistance. The study also concludes that the national security threat posed by illicit drugs cannot be eliminated by supply-side measures.

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This is obviously not an individual effort. There are many folks who assisted me during the research, writing, and editing phases of this thesis. First on the list I thank my committee, LTC (Ret) Roland Dutton, LTC Steven Smallwood, and Dr. Harold Orrenstein, for their reading, coaching, and assistance, and patience. They taught me about both the process and the content, but the final responsibility for the thesis is mine.

A big thanks and share of the credit also belongs to my wife, Susan, and daughter Rene', who gave freely of their time so I could pursue this. Without their support and patience I never could have done this.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The international trade in drugs is a major threat to our national security. No threat does more damage to our national values and institutions, and the domestic violence generated by the trade in drugs is all to familiar.

President George Bush, in <u>National Security Strategy</u> of the United States, 1991.

The subject of this thesis is the effect of the Department of Defense's (DoD) efforts on reducing the supply of cocaine coming into the United States from the Andean Region. These actions are part of the President's Andean Initiative, one of the International Initiatives found in his National Drug Control Strategy. The thesis will examine DoD efforts to support the governments of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru and their efforts to interdict the flow of illicit drugs from these countries to the United States through the mechanism of security assistance.

BACKGROUND

During the 1980s America witnessed tremendous growth in the number of its citizens who used illegal drugs. As the level of drug abuse increased it became apparent that the increased levels of drug abuse and the violence associated with it aroused a great deal of anxiety about the high economic, social, and moral costs of drug consumption and abuse.

Citizens turned to both the state and federal governments for solutions to the problems caused by the availability and use of illicit drugs. Both responded with numerous programs aimed at reducing the domestic demand for illicit drugs and the supply of illicit drugs, whether at the source or in transit to the United States.

The problem of supply and domestic consumption of illicit drugs in the United States became so acute that President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive designating both the flow and the consumption of illicit drugs as a threat to national security. The intent of this NSDD was to focus the effort and resources of the federal government on reducing the domestic demand for illicit drugs and the available supply of drugs.

Numerous federal agencies (and various state and local agencies too) were involved in this effort against

illicit drugs. At the federal level, the Justice Department, State Department, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Customs Service, and other agencies and departments all shared responsibility for achieving the goals of supply and demand reduction.

In spite of the best efforts of these organizations, it became apparent that the flow and consumption of illicit drugs continued largely unimpeded. The number of drugrelated crimes continued to increase and hospital emergency rooms treated an increasing number of patients who were under the influence of illicit drugs. In the cities, gang activity and violence became associated with the purchase, selling, and consumption of illicit drugs, especially cocaine. An increasingly worried public and Congress looked for new "solutions" to help stem the tidal flow of illicit drugs into the country.

The Department of Defense was seen by many as one federal department whose potential contribution to the counterdrug effort had not been fully employed. Many perceived the Defense Department as ideally suited in many ways to play an active role in the campaign to reduce the illicit drug supply. It had the people, resources, and organizational capability that many other agencies lacked. The equipment and training of the military services were in

many cases suited to the unique demands of counterdrug operations.

The Department of Defense was reluctant to assume much of a role in this counterdrug effort. It had been participating in the effort by conducting limited surveillance and leasing equipment to civilian agencies such as DEA.

Part of DoD's reluctance to assume a greater role was partly because it perceived that it could only support a greater counterdrug role at the expense of its traditional role. Another reason was because DoD perceived this counterdrug role to be largely one of law enforcement. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen are not trained in law enforcement and the Posse Comitatus Act does not allow them to serve in a law enforcement role.

In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, PL 100-690. It was a large and wide-ranging piece of legislation which attempted to provide a comprehensive framework of legislation and funding to help combat the threat to American society posed by illicit drugs. Title IV of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 was the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, which amended key portions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and permitted DoD to assume a greater counterdrug role than previously assumed. The act also authorized funds for foreign assistance

programs, narcotics control activities, and military assistance for counterdrug efforts.

Pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, President Bush issued his National Drug Control Strategy in 1989 (as required by the law). The National Drug Control Strategy was a complex blueprint which contained several initiatives intended to reduce America's use of illicit drugs by targeting both the supply of and demand for illicit drugs. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of Defense published guidance to the Department's support of the President's strategy. A portion of President Bush's 1989 National Drug Control Strategy was devoted to international initiatives, i.e., what the United States could do either bilaterally or multilaterally to help stem the flow of illicit drugs into this country. The centerpiece of this portion of the President's overall strategy was a five-year, \$2.2 billion dollar plan (subsequently named the Andean Initiative) to reduce the supply of cocaine at the source.

The legislation, which authorized a greater DoD role, is fairly recent, yet enough time has elapsed to evaluate the impact of DoD's actions. It is possible to draw some tentative conclusions as to whether DoD can significantly contribute to the reduction of illicit drugs from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, three countries targeted

by the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 as key sources of cocaine imported into the Untied States.

EARLY INTERDICTION EFFORTS

The President's Andean Initiative is not the first attempt the United States has made to eliminate the supply of cocaine. For more than a decade America has attempted to orchestrate a combination of military and law enforcement operations to destroy cocaine production facilities, disrupt cocaine trafficking, and enforce coca eradication goals in the Andean Region.

The earliest American efforts began in Peru, where over 60 percent of the world's supply of coca leaf is grown and cultivated. Operation Green Sea was conducted in the Upper Huallaga Valley between 1979 and 1980. It targeted coca production facilities in an attempt to suppress the flow of cocaine by denying refiners and traffickers the coca leaves needed to make cocaine. While this program was effective in depressing coca production, the overall effect of the program was minimal because the military and law enforcement approach was punitive. The program offered nothing to the coca-growing peasants as an alternative to growing coca.¹

Operation Condor followed this effort in 1985 and 1986, using military assets to help transport Peruvian law enforcement officers to remote areas inaccessible by ground. The aim of the operation was to attack remote airstrips and cocaine processing facilities in an attempt to disrupt the flow of cocaine from its source in the jungle.²

The United States was also involved in the attempt to interdict supplies of cocaine-processing chemicals (precursor chemicals) in transit to their destination at processing locations. The intent was to reduce processing capacity by denying traffickers the necessary chemicals. Operation Piranha began in the late 1970s and attempted to interdict chemical supplies being shipped from Brazil to Bolivia. This concept of chemical interdiction was expanded in 1982 with Operation Chem Con and resulted in the seizure of several major cocaine laboratories.³

The first use of direct American military support in South America occurred in 1986 during Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia.⁴ For the first time, American forces were deployed to Bolivia at the request of the Bolivian government to assist Bolivian law enforcement efforts. The U.S. Army provided six UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and pilots to transport Bolivian law enforcement officers. The American contingent included 160 personnel to both pilot and support the helicopters. Operation Blast Furnace had a

tremendous impact on the price of coca leaves, which dropped from \$150 per carga (hundred weight) to \$25 per carga. The practical success of the program was offset by the political turmoil the presence of the US soldiers caused the Bolivian government. Operation Blast Furnace demonstrated that an overt, highly visible American presence would not be tolerated in the region.⁶

The successor to Operation Blast Furnace was Operation Snowcap. Originally initiated in Bolivia in November 1986, the program was later expanded to Peru and Ecuador. The premise of the program was that coca suppression was a law enforcement task for which the host government was responsible.

The United States provided six UH-1H Huey helicopters and a U.S. Army training team to Bolivia so that Bolivia could transport its own law enforcement personnel, trained by the United States, to remote areas to destroy cocaine production facilities. American agents from the DEA provided on-scene enforcement assistance while maintaining an acceptable low-profile presence. Operation Snowcap is on-going.⁷

US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Apart from Operation Blast Furnace, there has been no direct involvement of American military personnel in counter-narcotics operations in the Andean Region. There has been and continues to be a large degree of consensus among both American and Latin American officials that there should be no direct involvement of American military personnel in counterdrug activities. To the extent that this consensus remains stable, security assistance will remain the vehicle through which the United States pursues the military aspect of its fight to stem the flow of cocaine into this country.

During the development of the Andean Initiative the National Security Council considered and rejected a possible combat role for American forces in the region. American forces were to have a strictly advisory role; neither the American nor the host governments were anxious to have any direct American involvement. After the Andean Initiative was approved and made public, President Bush went to great lengths to reassure the American public that American military involvement was minimal. He stated that there was no combat role for American military forces and that they would not be permitted to accompany host nation forces on combat missions. The sensitivity of Latin American

governments and people to any American military presence is extremely high. What little military presence the United States has in the Andean Region has caused an increase in anti-American sentiment since the introduction of American personnel.*

SCOPE

The scope of this thesis is limited to security assistance programs with which the Department of Defense is primarily concerned, those involving the sale or transfer of defense-related goods or services. The thesis is also limited in time to examining those security assistance actions and programs authorized and implemented as a result of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988. It does not address any actions taken by the Defense Department to support the reduction of demand for illicit drugs in the United States.

While the Secretary of State is legally responsible for the Security Assistance Program and, therefore, also interested in its military aspects, not all aspects of security assistance are of equal interest to DoD. Programs such as the Economic Support Fund, PL 480 food aid, coca eradication, and Development Assistance are administered by

the State Department and are beyond the scope of this thesis.

Various other federal agencies are involved in the effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the country. The various programs of these agencies, which include DEA, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Border Patrol, are also beyond the scope of this thesis.

This thesis is limited to those actions taken by the United States acting either unilaterally or bilaterally with the illicit drug-producing countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. It does not include any counterdrug efforts taken by the United States as part of either a regional or international organization, such as the Organization of American States or the United Nations.

IMPORTANCE

The role of security assistance as an instrument of United States foreign policy is small from a budgetary perspective, but quite large when one considers the potential political impact for a nation either to receive or not receive American aid.

While there is a body of knowledge about security assistance programs and the associated legislative process, there appears to be little literature that attempts to

assess the impact of security assistance. It is not too difficult to find funding levels for security assistance programs by country, but just what the security assistance dollar purchases is less clear.

This thesis will add to the body of knowledge of security assistance by attempting to integrate some basic knowledge of security assistance with an assessment of the program in the recipient countries. This thesis may also be used as a reference for future research on the issues of security assistance and counterdrug operations in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.

SECONDARY QUESTIONS

In order to answer the research question, several other questions must be answered; the major ones being: what is security assistance and how does it further American foreign policy interests abroad?

Closely related to this is the question of what do the receiving countries need? Security assistance represents what the United States is willing to give or sell other countries, but this assistance may or may not reflect what the recipient needs or wants. Differences between American and foreign perspectives on wants and needs influence the effectiveness of the aid. The thesis will

determine the needs of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru from their perspective, as they relate to their efforts to halt the production of illicit drugs.

The thesis will also address whether or not the premises of the Security Assistance Program are compatible with the goal of reducing the flow of illicit drugs from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, as articulated through the Andean Strategy.

ASSUMPTIONS

The first assumption is that security assistance reflects political compromise. Security assistance programs do not reflect consensus among the participants, but the outcome of political battles stemming from conflicting viewpoints. Actors seldom receive everything they want because those involved have different views of and solutions to the problem. Each actor has a different base of power and can influence the process in different ways. No single actor is dominant enough to impose his view on the other actors for a protracted period of time.

The second assumption is that, regardless of the real or perceived effectiveness of the security assistance program in the effort against drugs, nothing about the program is sacrosanct. Because the program reflects

political compromise, the laws governing security assistance and security assistance funding can change in response to events.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

The following definitions are provided to facilitate understanding of key concepts used in this thesis.

Security Assistance:

Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

-JCS Publication 1-02

National Strategy:

The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to secure national objectives.

-JCS Publication 1-02

Drugs:

Illicit drugs, controlled substance analogs, drugs diverted from the licit market for illicit use.

> President's Commission on Organized Crime, <u>Report to the President</u> <u>America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug</u> <u>Trafficking, and Organized Crime</u>

Drug Abuse:

The illicit use of drugs. Drug abuse and drug use are interchangeable.

President's Commission on Organized Crime, Report to the President Drug Trafficking:

The cultivation, production, processing, transportation, distribution, or sale of drugs, as defined above.

> President's Commission on Organized Crime, Report to the President

Counterdrug:

The term used to describe (U.S.) Army support National Drug Control Efforts.

> Chief of Staff, Army Message 261702Z June 1991

Counternarcotics:

Author's definition of offensive actions undertaken by military, paramilitary, or law enforcement units or agencies to destroy plants used in drug production, drugs and/or drug processing facilities, equipment, or supplies, or to interdict the flow of drugs or drug processing chemicals between their sources and their destinations.

War on Drugs:

Author's definition of a colloquial phrase frequently found in the printed press. It is the implementation and execution of the President's national strategy to reduce the supply of and demand for illicit drugs in the United States.

METHODOLOGY

This thesis examines the impact of DoD security assistance programs on achieving a reduction of the supply of cocaine from the Andean Region.

To answer the major secondary questions about the nature of security assistance in general and its use and importance as a foreign policy instrument, the thesis uses a chronological approach to document the nature of security assistance and how it has been related to major foreign policy goals.

The question of the assistance given relative to the needs of the receiving countries will be addressed by comparing and contrasting needs and perceptions as expressed by the United States and the Andean countries. This portion of the thesis will assess the degree of congruence between American and Andean Region perceptions of the problem and the required remedies. To the extent that the United States and the Andean countries view illicit cocaine trafficking as a problem, one would expect programs structured to address American and host government viewpoints. These programs would also be supported in both rhetoric and action.

The thesis then uses the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, as amended, as the framework for describing what security assistance programs and actions are

permitted and prohibited under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the 1988 International Narcotics Control Act, as amended. This serves as the framework to analyze the pursuit of supply reduction policies with the cooperation of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.

The thesis begins by describing the illicit drug industry in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, which is the object of this unprecedented American effort. It provides the basis of understanding the environment within which the Andean Initiative must work, and the problems this environment fosters. The thesis then describes the Andean Initiative designed to combat the drug industry and drug trafficking organizations in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.

The overall effect of security assistance will then be evaluated against the goals agreed upon by President Bush and the presidents of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru at the socalled 'drug summit' attended by the four presidents in Cartagena, Colombia in February 1990.

Research on this thesis took place at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It is based on open-source material. Research material was also obtained from National Security Council working papers and unclassified summaries of classified portions of the Andean Initiative and its implementation.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There is an enormous amount of open-source literature documenting the problems of drug abuse both here in the United States and in the Andean Region. Much of this literature is written and published by the Federal Government. The Federal Government is the source of almost all statistics, such as those of cultivation and eradication. Numerous newspaper and magazine articles largely repeat the same information contained in government sources, while adding little independent verification, other than anecdotal information, to support the story reported.

Security assistance legislation, policies, and procedures are also fairly well-documented in open-source material. Most of this material was written by knowledgeable individuals working in the field of security assistance. Legislation and legislative histories were readily available on microfiche at the Combined Arms Research Library.

Less well documented are specific programs and actions taken as a result of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988. Numerous newspaper and magazine articles mention military aid to the Andean Region, but often without any analysis of the role the aid will play or a detailed description of the composition and distribution

of the aid. The literature reviewed includes Congressional testimony, articles from scholarly journals, media reports found in newspapers and magazines, government publications, and transcripts of foreign broadcasts and articles.

BOOKS

The Andean Initiative is not covered in books. Security assistance as a topic is discussed in a few books, but the majority of these focus on the political process and the political implications of security assistance. Almost all these books are written by authors involved or previously involved with security assistance. Many accept the conclusion that security assistance programs benefit the United States. This may be in part due to their professional association and involvement with the administration of security assistance programs.

Perhaps the best overall orientation to the subject of security assistance is found in <u>The Management of</u> <u>Security Assistance</u>, executive editor Larry Mortsolf. Written primarily as a handbook for personnel working in the security assistance field by security assistance experts, the book provides a useful but dated overview of security assistance, its history, and the details of program milestones for members of overseas security assistance offices.

The government's effort to combat illicit drugs is not well documented in books. This is likely because this effort is recent and there is insufficient knowledge to write anything meaningful about American efforts. There are several good books that document illicit drug trafficking. the illicit drug industry, and the impact of drug addiction in the Andean countries. Rensselaer W. Lee's The White Labyrinth is an excellent description of the drug problem in the Andean countries. It describes the economic and social effects of drug trafficking, and focuses attention on the efforts the Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian governments have undertaken to cope with the drug problem, and how those societies perceive the problem. It is also a good source of information about conflicts and competition between the military and the police in the Andean countries and how tensions between these groups sometimes prevent effective counterdrug operations.

Edmundo Morales' book <u>Cocaine: White Gold Rush in</u> <u>Peru</u> provides an excellent look into the sociological aspects of cocaine within Peruvian society. Morales, a native Peruvian, offers numerous insights into the cocaine culture obtained during his numerous trips to Peru and the Upper Huallaga Valley. This book is a useful source in helping one to understand the pervasive influence cocaine and the revenue it generates have over the coca leaf growers

and the country as a whole. Morales documents past attempts to curb and eliminate coca leaf cultivation and the difficulties past programs encountered.

ARTICLES

The thesis relies heavily on magazine and newspaper articles to document security assistance programs, as well as, the Andean Initiative. These articles establish not only what the security assistance programs were designed to do, but also how well they were accepted by the receiving country. Articles discussing the Andean Initiative focus on the suitability of American aid, as well as the overall wisdom and feasibility of the Andean Initiative itself.

Part of the problem encountered with these articles is consistency. Articles from different sources may refer to the same incident, but the facts presented are often different. It becomes difficult to follow the path of security assistance dollars because authors seldom use the same figures. This can be further complicated by the apparent lack of knowledge some reporters have about their subject. Reporters often use terms such as aid, economic aid, military aid, assistance, grants, and loans, without defining these terms for the reader. All money given to a country is called 'aid,' regardless of its funding source,

its intended use, or restrictions placed on its use. It is difficult to understand exactly what types of assistance the United States is giving to the Andean countries without first cross-checking the information in the articles with other sources. The articles are a means of documenting the short-term impact of security assistance on the Andean countries, as well as the evolution of Department of Defense involvement in counterdrug activities.

SCHOLARLY ARTICLES

This study also relies on several scholarly articles to further investigate and understand the dimensions of the illicit drug industry in the Andean Region. They also help to understand how the institutions of those countries might be able to translate American security assistance aid into effective action to reduce the supply of cocaine.

Rensselaer Lee's article, 'Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry,' provides good background information on the cocaine industry and how its interests and influence have pervaded the societies and institutions of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. He discusses the political and economic conditions in these countries which fostered the growth of the cocaine industry, along with the manner in which these countries have been transformed by and become

dependent upon the revenues generated by cocaine production and trafficking.

In a manner similar to Rensselaer Lee, Kevin Healy in "Coca, The State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982-1988," and Cynthia McClintock in "The War on Drugs, the Peruvian Case," both undertake a similar analysis of the effects of the cocaine industry on Bolivia and Peru respectively. Both articles provide background information on the aspects of the cocaine industry unique to their respective countries and the problems the Bolivian and Peruvian governments must overcome if they are to be successful in halting the cultivation and processing of the coca leaf and the subsequent production of cocaine.

As a starting point for understanding the complexity and the influence of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Raphael F. Perl's article, 'The US Congress, International Drug Policy, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,' provides a good orientation. His focus is primarily on the role of the Congress in the legislation and oversight of American drug policy. Much of his article discusses Congress' approach to its legislative and oversight responsibilities. Perl's discussion of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 illuminates the wide scope of the act. Of particular interest to this study was his discussion of Congressional concerns about the certification process, the process by

which the executive branch certifies countries as eligible to receive American assistance funds based on certain criteria.

CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES

There is no lack of Congressional sources which describe some aspect of the problem of drugs in America or the efforts the Federal Government is making to reduce the demand for illicit drugs in America and the supply of illicit drugs abroad. Nearly everyone agrees that the United States has a serious drug problem and that the Federal Government needs to do something about it.

There are numerous Congressional reports which deal with the military's role in drug interdiction, but most of them focus on those activities which support DoD's role as the lead federal agency in the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking. There were few reports which discuss DoD support to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; most of these country-specific reports relate DEA activities and operations in these countries. Specific information relating to the security assistance aspect of DoD's role is somewhat difficult to find.

One of the more useful documents is House Report 101-991, Union Calendar #584 from the Committee on

Government Operations. Titled <u>United States Anti-Narcotics</u> <u>Activities in the Andean Region</u>, it provides a focused review of the Andean Initiative and a critical assessment of the possibility of success given the programmatic and institutional problems discussed. The country-specific portions of this report document host-nation attitudes toward drug enforcement policies, economic and political problems, and a few details of American security assistance aid.

Two other reports are useful in understanding the legislative framework for security assistance aid to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The first is House Report 101-90 from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988. It provides an explanation of various elements of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, along with background reasons for changes to the law. The second report is House Report 101-342 from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989. Like House Report 101-90, this report highlights key legislative changes and the reasons for those changes.

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

A wide range of Congressional testimony was reviewed in an attempt to document how much and what types of defense-related goods and services were provided as security assistance to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The results were mixed at best. Testimony from civilians tends to focus on policy issues and the written record shows that members of Congress seldom request specific detailed information on how security assistance money would be spent. Testimony from military officers is the most specific and very useful when it is not censored for security reasons.

General Maxwell Thurman's testimony on 27 February 1990 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs contains numerous security deletions involving projected military support for the Andean countries, as well as results achieved as a result of American security assistance. His testimony provides a good description of how Southern Command supports the Andean Initiative.

Other testimony useful in piecing together the specifics of American security assistance is that of David Westrate, Assistant Administrator for Operations, DEA, and Stephen M. Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement

Policy and Support. Both individuals have testified numerous times before various committees.

FOREIGN SOURCES

Some use was made of foreign sources through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The intent was to obtain the host country's perspective in various issues and events.

FBIS material consists of translations of fairly short articles, transcripts of televised reports, and transcripts of radio reports. One must keep in mind that the use of such a service is not without potential pitfalls. One pitfall is a lack of familiarity with the source itself and whether or not it is representative of specific views or a more neutral observer of events. Some sources may be financed by the government, a political party, or a private concern and slant their coverage to suit their sponsors. Not all foreign sources are independent watchdogs. A second potential drawback is that the style of writing is different and prone to vague phrases and facts, something that makes it difficult to assess the reliability and neutrality of the piece. The final potential pitfall is the possibility of a bad translation. Though in all likelihood this is not the case, it can never be completely discounted.

GAPS IN THE LITERATURE

Although there exists a large amount of material which documents and describes the problem of illicit drug trafficking in the Andean Region, there is a noticeable lack of conceptual work linking viable strategies of supply reduction to actual reductions in the supply of cocaine. While the supply side emphasis of the Andean Initiative may make apparent sense, there are no models or conceptual works that suggest supply side activities will actually be effective in reducing the supply of cocaine. In the absence of such a concept, the Andean Initiative represents a policy of faith resting on arguments that seem to make sense, but which may or may not be valid.

Taking this one step further, there appear to be no efforts to determine on the theoretical level just what constitutes the effectiveness of security assistance. Outside of a dollar value attached to security assistance appropriations it is not clear on either a theoretical or practical level just how much or what the security assistance dollar buys. There is no model or method to measure the effectiveness of dollars spent on security assistance, and some may, therefore, rightly question just what is purchased. The process rests on the participants'

subjective value judgments; different values result in different views of effectiveness and utility. There seems to be little doubt among the participants in the security assistance process that this is a good program and deserves to be funded because it benefits the United States. Typical benefits cited include increased friendship and understanding between America and its neighbors, though it is not clear whether these benefits exist only in the minds of officials and politicians trying to defend the program before Congress.

Given this lack of a model to measure effectiveness of security assistance, this thesis can only begin to assess the effect of securi⁺ assistance in reducing the supply of cocaine by looking at macro-level performance indicators, such as the number of seizures and hectares of coca leaf destroyed and performance in reaching publicly stated goals of the Andean Initiative. Some of these may or may not be appropriate measures of success.

MILITARY LITERATURE

Military literature presents doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures to members of the military. Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, <u>Military</u> <u>Operations in Low Intensity Conflict</u> lists types of security

assistance activities without a detailed explanation of their utility or limitations.

Other military literature, such as professional military journals, tends to focus on the military's participation in the 'war on drugs' without discussing security assistance or providing a detailed examination of the issues involved in combating drugs at the source. While there are a number of articles by noted experts which discuss the relative merits of military participation in the effort to interdict and disrupt the flow of illicit drugs into this country, all are beyond the scope of this thesis because they are unrelated to security assistance programs.*

ENDNOTES

¹U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, <u>Operation Snowcap: Past</u>, <u>Present</u>, and <u>Future</u>, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 23 May 1990, 8.

³Ibid., 8.

³U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, <u>United States Anti-Narcotics</u> <u>Activities in the Andean Region</u>, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990, House Report 101-991, 13.

⁴The first time the US military supported host nation counter-narcotics efforts was in Operation OPBAT, initiated in 1982 in the Bahamas. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, <u>Operation Snowcap</u>, 8.

⁸U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, <u>Operation Snowcap</u>, 8, 17.

*Ibid., 8-9.

'Ibid.

*Richard L. Berke, 'Panel Said to Seek New Military Role in Fight on Drugs,' <u>New York Times</u>, 2 July 1989, 1d.; Ann Devroy, 'Bush Insists U.S. Troops Have Minimal Drug Role,' <u>Washington Post</u>, 12 September 1989, A28. For Latin American attitudes see James F. Smith, 'U.S. Rushes to Revive Cocaine Battle in Peru,' <u>Los Angeles Times</u>, 15 July 1989, 12f; 'Fujimori Allows US Military to Fight Drugs in Peru,' <u>Latin American Index</u> 20 8 August 1991, 57.

*See for example the following articles in the March 1990 edition of <u>Military Review</u>: Mark Hertling, Narcoterrorism: the New Unconventional War, 16-28; Jimmie F. Holt, "LIC in Central America: Training Implications for the US Army," 2-15; Donald J. Mabry, "Andean Drug Trafficking and the Military Option," 29-40; and Dan C. Meyer, "The Myth of Narcoterrorism in Latin America," 64-70.

CHAPTER 2

THE SOURCE

There are many different ways the United States has already tried to eliminate cocaine at its source. None have been very effective. The Andean Initiative is another attempt to do what no program has successfully done before: to stop cocaine from reaching the American market.

Previous failures may have been due to a poor understanding of the nature of the problem at its source those countries where coca is grown and processed into cocaine for shipment to the United States. A full understanding of the entire coca-growing environment may result in either a more pragmatic and realistic policy or the rejection of methods not suited to the local conditions at the source. The intent is not to examine whether it is American demand for cocaine or the relative abundance of coca in South America that is the cause of America's cocaine problem. Source is simply the location or region where coca

is grown and refined into cocaine; source does not mean the cause of America's cocaine problem.

This chapter will define the economic, political, and social environment which fosters coca growing and processing in the Andean Region. This understanding is necessary to evaluate the appropriateness and effectiveness of the security assistance component of the Andean Initiative. The first part of the chapter discusses cocaine production in general. At the lowest level of production, the plants are hardy and durable. Refining operations are easily moved, increasingly easier to hide, and difficult to locate and attack. The second part of the chapter addresses conditions in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru and identifies those police and military organizations charged with counterdrug responsibilities.

Coca and Cocaine Processing

Cocaine production begins with the coca plant. The coca plant itself is extremely hardy and durable. It grows in a wide range of ecological conditions; most of the tropical land areas in Central and South America will support the coca plant. While Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru account for 99 percent of the world's coca production, the

coca plant is also found in other tropical areas of the world such as India, Africa, Ceylon, and Indonesia.

The typical coca grower lives on a farm that provides land for both his subsistence and coca cultivation. He may have up to five acres for food, but as much as ten acres under cultivation for coca. If the farmer is lucky enough he may harvest his leaves up to ten times a year, or once every 35 days.² A mature, well-cultivated field can produce up to 60 arrobas per hectare per season (one arroba is twenty-five pounds); the average yield is 35 arrobas per season or 140 arrobas per year.³ The heartiness of the plant is attested by the fact that the plant can be harvested from three to six times per year (depending on climate, soil, and topography) and the plant has a productive life of up to 40 years.⁴

Coca growing is fairly easy. It does not take a lot of labor to produce a crop, and the multiple yields per year make coca growing an attractive way to earn a steady income. It is not limited to annual or semi-annual harvests like many legal cash crops. The relatively cheap and simple inputs required for coca growing attract poor farmers who lack capital for expensive machinery and inputs more characteristic of farming legal cash crops. Coca growing is not tied to an extensive farming infrastructure and can be quite mobile; it is very difficult to limit the expansion of

coca growing within the climatic regions that support coca growing.

Once coca leaves are harvested they are dried, most often by placing them outside. This prepares the leaves for the refinement process, when the alkaloid is extracted from the leaf and is sequentially refined into coca paste, cocaine base and finally into cocaine hydrochloride.

During refinement, dry leaves are placed in maceration pits, where the leaves are processed with either lime, potash, or sodium carbonate to extract the cocaine alkaloid. After a day, the leaves are soaked in kerosene, until all the alkaloids are dissolved in the kerosene. The leaves are removed and sulfuric acid is added to the kerosene mixture, forming cocaine sulfate. The kerosene is removed, more alkaline is added and cocaine paste forms in the pit.

Kerosene is added to the paste, forming cocaine crystals. The crystals are washed in alcohol and dissolved in acid, filtered, and dried. The dried substance is cocaine base, which is further refined, with either, acetone, and acid, into cocaine hydrochloride.

These operations are conducted in the coca-growing regions of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; the cocaine base is shipped to Colombia for refinement into cocaine. Producing cocaine base requires much unskilled labor, in addition to

chemicals, plastic sheeting, and other equipment. The facilities are small, mobile, easy to set up, dismantle, and move. They are difficult to locate. There are hundreds of these initial processing facilities in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, each one a potential target of law enforcement or military interdiction efforts. Targeting and destroying these labs may prevent traffickers from making cocaine base in coca growing regions. The sheer volume of raw coca leaves consumed makes it impracticable to make cocaine base in locations far away from the growing regions; it may be almost impossible to make it anywhere else..

To the extent that jungle labs can be targeted, destroyed, and prevented from reestablishing operations, interdiction might help reduce the supply of cocaine. The mobile nature of jungle labs and their easy replacement, if they are destroyed, make it highly unlikely that military and law enforcement actions against the labs, as envisioned by the Andean Initiative, will have any real effect on reducing the supply of cocaine at the source.

The final step of the refining process is the chemical transformation of the coca base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) at processing facilities known as "kitchens." All facilities that produce HCl need both a secure environment, free from attack or other interruptions, and a sufficient electrical supply to power the lights used

to dry the cocaine.⁵ These needs make these processing facilities somewhat stationary, large, and difficult to hide. Traffickers are increasingly able to set them up in jungles, where they are difficult to locate, difficult to approach undetected, and fairly easily replaced. They are lucrative targets for law enforcement officers, being key elements in the refinement and distribution process.

Colombia

The Colombian government faces numerous obstacles in combatting drug trafficking. These include the economic importance of drug trafficking, institutional corruption within the military and government, and challenges to government control by leftist guerrilla movements. Any successful reduction of the flow of cocaine through Colombia will first require a solution to these problems.

The Colombian drug trade commenced in the 1970s when it began to export marijuana to the United States. During the 1980s Colombia began to export cocaine to the growing American market. As this market continued to increase, drug traffickers organized themselves into cartels and developed the production, transportation, and distribution of cocaine into an international business on an almost unprecedented scale. Colombia's involvement in the supply of cocaine

centers around its role as a base for the major Cali and Medellin cocaine cartels, rather than as a country where coca is grown. There is some coca grown in Colombia, but it is of poorer quality, therefore, less desirable than coca grown in Bolivia or Peru.

The Colombian economy was not strong and stable during the 1980s. From 1984-1988 the GNP grew at an average annual rate of 3.8 percent. The legal economy relies on exports of coffee, oil, and coal.⁷ Coffee was long the dominant export, accounting for one-third of total exports in 1988, but international coffee prices collapsed in 1989. The International Coffee Agreement was allowed to expire and the United States expressed no desire to re-negotiate it.⁹ Colombia lost millions of export dollars because of this.⁹

Much of the population, however, lives at or below poverty level. The distribution of income is extremely skewed and wages have failed to keep pace with the cost of living.¹⁰ The deterioration of the Medellin industrial base during the 1970s and 1980s cost thousands of workers their jobs and significantly contributed to the decline of the area.¹¹

The economic situation of the country, combined with the explosive growth of the cocaine industry in the 1980s, has made the cocaine industry a significant economic influence. Cocaine trafficking and activities related to or

associated with cocaine trafficking have come to play a major part in the economic life of Colombia as the traditional economy fails to adequately provide for all citizens. Cocaine has supplanted coffee as the single most important source of foreign exchange. The cocaine industry accounts for an estimated 300,000 jobs; many other jobs exist to service the cocaine industry but are legal, legitimate means of employment.¹³ The cocaine industry created 28,000 new jobs in Medellin and brought 300 million dollars to the city.¹³ Both directly and indirectly the cocaine industry provides a large number of jobs to individuals who might otherwise remain jobless. As much as the government might detest cocaine and want to eliminate its illegal trafficking, it cannot easily replace the jobs and the dollars cocaine brings to Colombia.

The value of the cocaine trade is truly staggering. Estimates of annual cocaine revenues run as high as six billion dollars. Of that amount it is estimated that about \$1.5 billion comes back to Colombia and is easily absorbed into the Colombian economy because of liberal rules concerning bank deposits. This figure represents approximately 20 percent of Colombia's total export earnings.¹⁴

The wealth generated by the cocaine trade has created new opportunities for upward mobility in an economic

environment that would otherwise severely restrict this. Wages are higher than in the legal economy, even though huge profits are not made in Colombia, but in America, when the cocaine is sold at retail prices. The rapid accumulation of wealth has allowed those involved in cocaine trafficking and the cocaine industry to invest in legitimate enterprises such as agriculture and retail businesses. Cocaine money is increasingly difficult to separate from legitimate, legally earned money. The large sums of money involved also insure that there are always opportunists waiting to assume control of producing and trafficking organizations should something happen to the current leaders.¹⁸

The Colombian economy is a significant, but not the only, obstacle to successfully defeating cocaine traffickers and stopping the flow of cocaine into the United States. In addition to the Colombian economy, the country's political history and political environment are factors which have an impact on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the Andean Initiative. Colombia's political history has led to a situation where institutions of the central government may be working at cross-purposes. The government is fighting drug traffickers while simultaneously working to strengthen the institutions and legitimacy of the central government, weakened in part by drug-related terrorist-type attacks. It

may be that these goals cannot be pursued simultaneously, and effective institutions are a necessary prerequisite for a successful counterdrug plan. Using the military and police against drug traffickers raises fears of giving the military too much power; with increased power it could threaten the civilian government. Emphasizing a military solution to the drug problem may cause a loss of faith and confidence in government by the people. Part of the problem also stems from the fact that Colombia has never been able to control all of its territory.¹⁶

The seeds of discord go back to the 1940s and 1950s when an estimated 180,000 Colombians were killed while the Liberal and Conservative parties fought for power. The two parties eventually reached a negotiated settlement involving shared power. The agreement was a fairly stable one; the parties continued to share power up to 1986 even though the official agreement expired in 1974.

Both parties faced an internal challenge in the 1960s as they struggled to integrate opposition forces into the mainstream political process. Neither party was very successful and armed insurgency movements evolved from what were originally political opposition groups. The government was then forced to rely on the military to destroy the insurgents, but not without reservation and fear; the military was already a fairly strong and autonomous

institution capable of threatening the government's power. In spite of the best efforts of the military, it was never able to defeat the insurgents and the effort became a stalemate; meanwhile demands for political and social reform continued from opposition groups and put pressure on the government for change.

In 1982 President Belisario Betancur worked to end the violence fueled by conflicts between the military and the insurgents. His program of social and political reform, release of political prisoners, and amnesty for guerrillas resulted in a peace agreement in 1984 between the government and guerrilla groups. The military did not support attempts to bargain with the guerrillas.

This agreement was short-lived. Former insurgents who accepted the offer of amnesty were frequent targets for assassination, which fueled the enmity between the military and the guerrillas; both sides violated the cease-fire agreement previously negotiated. By 1986 the whole peace process was nullified.¹⁷

By this time cocaine traffickers had amassed substantial fortunes and economic interests. The latter began to coincide more and more with the military's counterinsurgent interests, as the cocaine traffickers invested their fortunes in large tracts of land where the insurgency movements happened to be active. The guerrillas

had in the past financed themselves by extorting money from the landowners. This now put the guerrillas in opposition to the drug traffickers, who were not willing to pay extortion money. More importantly, drug traffickers had vast sums of money they could use to eliminate the threats the guerrillas posed to their interests.

The natural alliance which evolved over time pitted the guerrillas against drug-financed paramilitary death squads, armed and manned by the military, and legitimized by large landowners.¹⁰

The impact of this was the corruption of the Colombian military,¹⁰ which sanctioned the death squads not because it supported the drug traffickers, but because it saw itself pursuing its mission of counterinsurgency and helping to defend the country against the insurgent threat. The military mission was counterinsurgency, not counternarcotics.²⁰ Money provided by drug traffickers allowed the military to pursue its perceived mission. Numerous military personnel were bought by drug traffickers and engaged in illegal killings; military corruption became an open secret.²¹

The political legacy is one of violence, corruption, and a desire by the military to eliminate the guerrilla threat. Citizens fear the violence and the threat of a strong military capable of threatening civilian rule; the

government is concerned about maintaining its legitimacy and support in the face of insurgent threats and drug-related violence. The interests of the military, government, and citizens are different, and American security assistance cannot address these diverse interests simultaneously; security assistance may be forcing the military to direct its attention away from what it believes to be its significant threat.

Further compounding the problem of corruption within the military is the corruption and inefficiency of the national police and the judiciary.²² Corruption is so pervasive that cocaine traffickers have compromised 'nearly every national institution to protect themselves.²³ This has important implications, since Colombian police organizations involved in counterdrug activities receive security assistance. The United States cannot expect a corrupt institution over which it has no control to work against the institution's own interests.

In late 1980 the Colombian National Police (CNP) was made responsible for the enforcement of narcotics laws. There was also a special anti-narcotics unit established within the CNP. The CNP is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as are the military services. Previously the responsibility for narcotics law enforcement was shared by

several agencies, such as the military and the Colombian equivalent of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

In 1987 anti-narcotics activities were further consolidated into the Directorate of Anti-Narcotics (DAN), a paramilitary organization consisting of about 2500 personnel organized into a ground, air, and intelligence element. In addition to DAN, there are two other CNP organizations with counterdrug responsibilities. The first is an investigative unit known as F-2, the second, an elite paramilitary group. Outside of the CNP, the Directorate of Administrative Security also supports counterdrug efforts. This organization is very similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.²⁴

Bolivia

The economic and political situation in Bolivia is much worse than in Colombia. Not only have economic conditions pushed the country further into dependence on the cocaine trade, but Bolivia lacks a democratic tradition of political stability and effective government control. These weaknesses are further compounded by a social aspect not present in Colombia: Bolivians have a cultural history tied to the social use of coca. Cocaine is not perceived as a problem or a threat in Bolivia, but many are fearful that

the elimination of coca will lead to increased political and economic instability there.

Bolivia is the world's second-largest coca producer, with 53,920 hectares cultivated in 1989. The primary growing region for illicit coca is the Chapare in eastern Bolivia. Significantly, most of the coca has historically been refined into cocaine in Colombia, but this may be changing. It is estimated that approximately 173 metric tons of cocaine were produced in Bolivia in 1989.²⁶

The legal Bolivian economy relies heavily on agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing sectors. A number of factors, both political and economic, combined during the early 1980s to send the economy into a severe crisis. From 1980-1985, GNP fell by 20 percent, per capita consumption decreased by 30 percent, and family income dropped 28 percent. The market for tin, Bolivia's primary export, collapsed in October 1985, and three months later the price of natural gas, another vital export, plummeted.²⁶ Legal exports fell 25 percent between 1984 and 1986 and unemployment doubled.²⁷ The shrinking of the economy was halted in 1987, when GNP grew by 2.7 percent; the economy grew an additional 2.5 percent in 1989.²⁰ The virtual collapse of the economy is reflected in the fact that the formal economy employs only an estimated 38 percent of the working population. The remaining 62 percent is employed in

the informal sector, which is heavily dependent on coca and cocaine.20

The Bolivian economy continues to suffer from the negative economic trends of the early 1980s. It has been characterized as the most coca-dependent economy in the region. In 1987 coca and cocaine exports accounted for an estimated \$1.5 billion in revenue for trafficking organizations. Of this amount, only \$600 million actually remained in Bolivia. Equally staggering, the revenues generated from the cocaine trade were nearly equal to 29 percent of the Bolivian GNP and approximately equal to the value of legal exports.³⁰ Some estimates put the value of cocaine exports as high as 50 to 100 percent of legal exports during the mid-1980s.³¹

Unemployment during the last decade rose 400 percent. In 1988 the estimate of urban unemployment was 24 percent. The inflation rate was out of control during the 1980s, reaching over 20,000 percent in August 1985.³² As the legal economy failed to provide jobs and opportunities, coca became an attractive alternative way to earn income. Employment in legal businesses which support the coca industry also increased.³³ Given the importance of cocaine to the Bolivian economy as a source of both jobs and foreign revenue, eliminating cocaine without providing for an economic substitute would ruin the country. The war on

drugs is, for Bolivia, a war on the largest sector of its economy.³⁴ Coca continues to bring higher prices to the grower than cocoa, coffee, or nuts.³⁹ Eliminating cocaine in Bolivia is not desirable for the Bolivians.³⁴ Maintaining good relations with the United States is desirable because without American support the Bolivians stand little chance of obtaining vital international loans and aid. The United States and Bolivia have diverging interests which are difficult to reconcile.

Bolivia's political system has a history of performance and effectiveness similar to that of its economic performance during the 1980s: it does not seem to work. This instability imposed a heavy toll on the legitimacy of state institutions, consequently, limiting their effectiveness in counterdrug activities.

The Bolivian military has frequently involved itself in the affairs of government and contributed to the high level of political instability. It has also been the government on several occasions. Portions of the armed forces supported a popular uprising in 1952, enabling Victor Paz Estenssoro to become president, a post he had won in 1951.

In 1964 Paz Estenssoro was deposed by the armed forces and replaced by an air force general. The military ruled the country from 1964 to 1969 and from 1971 to 1978.

In 1980 General Garcia Meza seized power after three years of political uncertainty and instability. His regime had close ties to the cocaine trade and quickly suffered from a lack of domestic and international support. This military government was replaced in 1982 by a civilian coalition government. Bolivia has not returned to military rule since.³⁷ Given the history of military rule in Bolivia, many Bolivians fear involving the military in counterdrug activities will increase the power and authority of the military and encourage a return to military rule.³⁸

Not only do many Bolivians fear the return of military rule, they question whether the corrupt military will be able to make any progress in reducing the supply of coca. One of the biggest institutional obstacles to progress is the dishonesty of military and law enforcement agencies.³⁰ Over and above corruption resulting from coca and cocaine, Bolivians see the military as evil because of abuses during the periods of military rule, supported in part by American aid during that period.⁴⁰

U.S. government studies document numerous examples of corruption, including accepting bribes, confiscating and then reselling precursor chemicals to other traffickers, providing advance information to traffickers on impending operations, and using American-provided vehicles to move precursor chemicals to illegal production sites.⁴¹ Police

officials actively try to get assigned to the Chapare so they can get payoffs.42

Allegations of corruption are not limited to soldiers and law enforcement personnel in the field. The United States has in the past accused top Bolivian government officials of dishonesty. In one such allegation the United States accused three top officials involved in counterdrug efforts of having links to cocaine traffickers. One, Colonel Faustine Rico Toro, was the former head of intelligence during General Garcia Meza's cocaine-backed regime in 1980. Bolivian officials attempted to dismiss the incident. One official was widely quoted as saying that the appointment of corrupt police officials was not a significant issue because "...since most are corrupt, it doesn't matter anyway."⁴³

Unlike Colombia, where citizens have experienced an unprecedented level of violence related to cocaine trafficking, Bolivia has been relatively free from violence. Bolivians see the cocaine problem differently than Colombians. The problem posed by cocaine trafficking does not interest the average Bolivian. Fighting problems posed by cocaine is a relatively low priority in view of the overall dire economic situation. The government's main focus is maintaining political stability and turning the economy around.⁴⁴ It is quite possible that the Bolivians

are attempting to create and maintain a facade of concern about the cocaine problem in order to continue to receive much-needed American assistance. Perhaps more importantly, they are doing just enough to keep the United States happy and satisfied with their actions.

The government is highly encouraged to take a lowpriority approach to fighting cocaine trafficking by the Bolivian coca growers union, the COB. Bolivia is somewhat unique in that it has an organized union capable of articulating growers' interests and concerns. It is a national pressure group fully integrated into the Bolivian political culture. At the local level, peasant unions are part of the community self-government.⁴⁵

The peasants' concerns are both economic and political. They are willing to support government efforts to combat cocaine trafficking, but only as long as the efforts do not weaken the economy and the government offers them a reasonable economic alternative.⁴⁰ The growers' political interests involve their liberties. They are worried about military involvement and the violence they feel would accompany military activities. They also fear being caught in the middle of a rivalry between the military and police; they want to avoid the fate of many Peruvians and Colombians caught between different police and military interests.⁴⁷

Eliminating coca is further complicated by the fact that it is an accepted, legal part of Bolivian Andean culture. It has social, medicinal, and ritualistic uses among various population groups and is legally grown in Bolivia's Yungas region.⁴⁰ When travellers land at the airport in La Paz, they are immediately given a coca tea (mate' de coca) to help them acclimatize to the altitude.

The Bolivian police agency charged with conducting counterdrug activities is the Rural Mobile Police (UMOPAR). There is a great deal of animosity between UMOPAR, which conducts counterdrug operations, and the Bolivian military, which supports UMOPAR. This animosity traces its roots back to the 1952 revolution, when the police supported the left and the military supported the status quo.**

This historical animosity has an impact on cooperation between the two institutions and the aid the United States provides. The military treats UMOPAR with contempt and resents the American aid given to UMOPAR.⁹⁰ The animosity is so great and the relationship so poisoned that the United States feels that it cannot expand the firepower of UMOPAR without provoking the Bolivian Army.⁹¹

Peru

Peru faces internal economic and institutional problems similar to those of both Colombia and Bolivia, which impede Peruvian efforts to reduce and eliminate coca cultivation. Like Colombia, Peru must contend with the lack of control over parts of its territory and the ability of insurgent groups to exploit this lack of control in ways detrimental to the government's interest. Like Bolivia, Peruvian social attitudes and practices do not support an aggressive counterdrug effort.

Cocaine and the coca bush are not newcomers to Peru. The coca bush has been cultivated for centuries; it has had both ritual and medicinal uses for over 2000 years. During the 16th century coca was widely used by miners to help them cope with the problems of hunger, fatigue, and high altitude sickness. Closer to the present, when the dangers of coca became apparent, international conventions in 1925 and 1931 limited coca leaf production to applications used within the pharmaceutical industry. By 1931, illicit trafficking in coca leaves had disappeared in Peru and licit production stabilized at about 10,000 metric tons per year.³²

In 1964 Peru ratified the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Peru established a state-owned monopoly, ENACO (Empresa Nacional de la Coca), with two purposes: 1)

to control the flow of coca leaves between producers and consumers; and 2) to monitor the legal production of coca. Peru also enacted a law in 1978 which fixed the number of growers licensed to grow coca at 25,000 and fixed the legal amount of coca under cultivation to 18,000 hectares.⁹³

Growing coca for prohibited purposes is illegal and trafficking is also illegal. Coca can be grown legally for traditional and some commercial purposes. The legal demand is satisfied with a production rate of about 18,000 metric tons, or about 15 percent of the total estimated 1989 coca crop. Legally-grown coca is cultivated in southeastern Peru. It is the demand for illicitly-grown coca that has pushed coca growing out of the traditional growing areas and into the Upper Huallaga Valley.⁵⁴

Similar to Bolivia, Peru suffers from an extremely weak economy, one which offers the average citizen legally employed almost no real hope for individual economic progress and upward mobility. The economic lure of coca growing offers the prospect of a steady income at relatively high rates compared with Peru's legal economy and cannot and should not be underestimated.

Cocaine exerts a pervasive influence on Peru's economy, generating approximately one billion dollars annually.³⁹ This is equivalent to a substantial percentage of Peru's legal exports, anywhere from 25 to 75 percent.⁵⁹

The economic crisis in Peru is very similar to that in Bolivia. In 1989 the inflation rate was 2,775 percent. Real wages decreased by more than 50 percent which made wages lower than 1970 levels, the second lowest only to Bolivia in South America. During the period 1988-1989, Peru experienced the largest drop in economic growth in Latin America when growth shrank 20 percent. It earned few foreign credits and defaulted on its 1.9 billion dollar foreign debt.*7

Faced with foreign debt and a shrinking legal economy, the importance of the coca trade to the Peruvian economy is apparent. It provides a source of employment, both directly and indirectly in related enterprises, and a means of obtaining foreign exchange that would otherwise be unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Dollars from the coca trade fund the reserves of the Central Bank.⁵⁰

In the face of this economic adversity, the coca trade has given the farmer a stable and profitable source of income. The coca trade benefits both the individual and the state. It is estimated that there are up to 300,000 families in the Upper Huallaga Valley associated with the coca trade⁵⁰ and that one million of Peru's twenty-two million citizens depend on the coca trade for their income.⁵⁰ It is further estimated that coca farmers gross between three and eleven times more by growing coca than

they do with legal crops (about \$3,900 per hectare), while the laborers in the Upper Huallaga Valley earn up to eight times what they could earn if they worked with legal crops.^{\$1}

The political challenge to Peru's government is a contest for territorial control and political legitimacy posed by Sendero Luminoso. This challenge is a serious threat to Peru's internal security. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is a Maoist-type insurgency that the government must battle and defeat. It has gained a strong foothold in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the heart of the illicit coca growing region. The government's ability to conduct counterdrug activities in the Upper Huallaga Valley is directly related to the strength and level of its activity. During recent years the Sendero Luminoso has been strong and active in the Upper Huallaga Valley and has effectively used terror and other means to hinder the government in its attempts to eradicate coca plants and to interdict the flow of coca and cocaine paste from Peru to Colombia. The Sendero Luminoso is exploiting the government's lack of control over the entire country (and the Upper Huallaga Valley in particular) to establish itself as a friend and protector of the coca growers and then playing to the growers' fears. The result of their campaign is a no-win situation for the Peruvian government in the

Upper Huallaga Valley. The government cannot attack the Sendero Luminoso without permitting the peasants to grow coca in order to maintain their support for the government, while at the same time it cannot destroy coca crops without alienating the growers and increasing support for the Sendero Luminoso.

The Sendero Luminoso is an extremely violent and ideologically rigid insurgency. Since 1980, the group has grown and expanded from the highlands, establishing cells throughout the country. It appeals to disaffected and oppressed people because the government has not improved either the economy or the standard of living in rural areas.⁴²

The situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley appears to be tailor-made for the Sendero Luminoso. It appeals to and obtains support from growers and workers because the government can offer no substantive economic reforms or improvements in the quality of life. It exists because the government cannot exert effective control over the country and the Upper Huallaga Valley. The Sendero Luminoso also garners support by protecting growers and laborers against the threats of both the United States and the Colombian traffickers.⁴³ Workers sent in to help eradicate coca plants (financed by the United States) have been murdered as a message not to interfere with the coca economy. The

Sendero Luminoso protects growers from traffickers by acting as an intermediary and forcing Colombian traffickers to pay more for coca; in return, the Sendero Luminoso receives a portion of the growers proceeds, which then finances its activities. It is estimated that it now controls at least 90 percent of the Upper Huallaga Valley.**

The dilemma for the government is acute. If it responds to the security threat and attempts to eliminate the Sendero Luminoso, it must do so in remote areas friendly to the Sendero Luminoso and at the expense of the war on drugs. The government cannot go after it if the government threatens to eliminate the population's economic livelihood. The government's dilemma in the Upper Huallaga Valley is that counterdrug and counterinsurgency strategies oppose each other. Peru apparently can pursue one or the other, but not both simultaneously.

Peru does not want to pursue the counterdrug aspect of the problem because it does not see cocaine as a problem in the same way as the United States. Given the poor economic conditions and a decade-old insurgency in which more than 16,000 lives have been lost, "most Peruvians see the drug threat as a distant one. Results from a 1990 poll showed that the issue of drugs was important to 4 percent or less of the population; 80 percent of the population named the economy and subversion as their first and second

concerns.** This can be attributed to three factors: 1) Peru is an exporter of coca, not cocaine, and there is none of the violence in Peru associated with the cocaine cartels in Colombia; 2) most of the trafficking occurs in the physically remote Upper Huallaga Valley, so most citizens are psychologically removed from the problem; and 3) the drug trade is a source of revenue and employment.*7 Rather than a problem, the vast majority of Peruvians likely view coca as an economic godsend and the economy's saving grace.

In Peru, counterdrug activities are the responsibility of the Guardia Civil (GC), a 550-man counterdrug force within the Peruvian National Police, which in turn is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. The GC has been trained and supplied by the United States and will receive a large portion of the American assistance under the Andean Initiative.

Closely tied to the economic condition is the issue of corruption, which is endemic to military and police institutions involved in counterdrug activities. As was the case in Bolivia, corruption is the means by which officials supplement their meager incomes.

The Peruvian military suffers from corruption, which calls into question its ability to participate effectively in the counterdrug efforts envisioned under the Andean Initiative. The March 1990 International Narcotics Strategy

Control Report notes that poor economic conditions make it likely that police and military officials will be bribed....

The issue of corruption is closely tied to the issue of the tension between the police and military. Since they have divergent views on the issues of counterdrug and counterinsurgency they are frequently at odds with each other.

In April 1989 the Upper Huallaga Valley was declared an emergency zone and placed under control of the military." The military has allowed the growers to grow coca in its attempt to separate the growers from the Sendero Luminoso. Such an environment is ripe for corruption. The police are required to obtain permission from the military to conduct counterdrug activities in the area; the police cannot execute an operation without prior coordination with and approval of the military. There have also been instances where military personnel have actively encouraged and participated in stoning DEA and Peruvian police.⁷⁰ Military personnel have also fired at DEA and police helicopters.

Conclusion

There are strong economic, political, and social forces at work in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru that, when

combined, raise serious questions about the ability of those countries to use effectively equipment and training provided as security assistance to conduct counterdrug operation to help reduce the flow of cocaine into the United States.

The nature of cocaine production, with its requirement for adequate supplies of raw materials, chemicals, and processing facilities, seems to make the industry vulnerable to interdiction. It is these facilities that the United States hopes host nations will locate, target, and destroy as one of several ways to interdict the illicit production and distribution of cocaine.

Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru depend, to varying degree.; upon the illicit cocaine trade to keep their economies afloat. All three countries suffered a series of economic downturns, resulting in misery for individual citizens and worries for foreign creditors. The boom in American demand for cocaine acted like a magnet for hundreds of thousands of people in need of jobs and desiring status and upward mobility that was otherwise out of their reach. Cocaine revenues provided the governments with an easy way to appease foreign creditors and keep the domestic economy afloat. The absence of economic alternatives forces the governments to continue to rely on the cocaine trade to keep their economies going.

Politically, Colombia and Peru are threatened by insurgencies; their militaries are more interested in fighting insurgents than drug traffickers, who pose no overt threat to the government; however in Colombia, drug-related terrorism threatens the legitimacy of the political system. The fight against insurgents has spawned a legacy of human rights abuses by all parties. This is further complicated by corruption in all three militaries, which have the opportunity to play both ends against the middle as they attempt to establish control over large areas of contested land.

The political history of Bolivia and Peru makes many citizens wary of expanding the power and capabilities of the military. They fear that strengthening the military will weaken their reborn democratic traditions and possibly lead to a return of military dictatorships.

Finally, social attitudes towards coca in these countries do not support an aggressive anti-coca stance by the governments. Coca is a legal, accepted part of life for many citizens. Many do not perceive cocaine to be a problem for their country and show little interest in or concern for counterdrug efforts.

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CHAPTER 3

THE RESPONSE

Just what is security assistance and what does it represent? News reports of the United States selling weapons or sending military advisors to foreign countries represent one highly visible part of security assistance, which is a series of related funds and programs designed to strengthen allies and friends and to further American interests abroad. The purpose of this chapter is to define security assistance, examine its history and nature, and see how it relates to our national strategy and national security.

Security Assistance Defined

Security assistance is a broad term that refers to a series of programs intended to further American interests abroad, primarily by improving the defensive capability of friendly nations through the provision of military and

economic aid. Security assistance programs are established and limited by laws enacted by Congress and implemented by the Executive Branch, primarily the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Since security assistance programs are the result of a political process, the programs are subject to change based upon the desires and preferences of Congress.

The legislative basis for security assistance programs is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA). Both the FAA and the AECA have been extensively modified since their initial approval to address Congressional concerns on a number of issues that developed since the original legislation was approved. The FAA and the AECA established appropriated and non-appropriated programs which govern the sale and transfer of military goods and services and the provision of economic aid to qualifying countries.

Security assistance includes the following programs:¹

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): Primarily a grant aid program, although there are some loans authorized under FMF. Recipients use the grants to purchase American equipment, services, and training.

Economic Support Fund (ESF): An all-grant program designed to stimulate economic development in recipient countries. This program is administered by the Agency for International Development of the U.S. State Department.

International Military Education and Training (IMET): A program that provides military and technical education to members of foreign military forces.

<u>Peacekeeping Operations</u> (PKO): A program which funds American contributions to international peacekeeping operations.

These four programs are the mainstay of the Security Assistance Program. The Foreign Military Financing Program is authorized by sections 23 and 24 of the AECA, while the other three programs are authorized by the FAA.²

The FAA also established other security assistance programs, including anti-terrorism assistance, the loan of American military equipment to foreign countries, and international narcotics control. International narcotics control programs finance law enforcement and counternarcotics activities (herbicide spraying and equipment maintenance, for example).³ The FAA also authorizes various programs governing both development and humanitarian assistance. These programs, while important aspects of American support for foreign countries, fall outside the definition of security assistance previously established.

The AECA also established other security assistance programs that do not require federal appropriations. For example, the AECA authorizes foreign military construction sales and the licensing of commercial arms sales to foreign governments.⁴ These programs do not require federal appropriations since they involve the cash sale of services and articles to foreign governments.

The History of Security Assistance

The United States has a history of using arms transfers to influence American interests. The earliest transfers date back to the Revolutionary War, when the French supplied the colonies with weapons. Since then, the United States has been involved with the transfer of arms or material to its allies and friends to help influence events in a manner favorable to the United States. It was not until after World War II that transfers of arms and material became an important part of American influence-building abroad.⁹

Prior to World War I the United States was not a major power on the international stage. From the beginning of World War I, the United States found itself being drawn closer towards the conflict. During the war, the United

States shipped a tremendous quantity of arms overseas to Europe to support the allies.

World War II saw the United States support its allies again with transfers of equipment both before and during the war. This program, known as Lend-Lease, resulted in more than fifty billion dollars worth of military equipment being either given or sold to allies.

World War II left the United States as the undisputed military, economic, and political power in the West, and it was to the United States that the rest of the non-communist world looked for aid and assistance.

In response to fighting occurring in Greece, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which stated that: 1) free people resisting outside pressure should be supported by the United States; 2) free people must work out their own destiny; and 3) economic and financial aid was essential to economic stability and an orderly political process. The Truman Doctrine established the principle of collective security and also initiated arms transfers free of charge to the receiving countries.

The European Recovery Plan, popularly known as the Marshall Plan, began in 1948. Primarily an economic plan, it sent 15 billion dollars to Europe during the period 1948-1952. As was the case with Greece, the United States realized that sending aid abroad was in America's best

interests. It strengthened allies who received the aid and demonstrated American resolve to support democratic values where they were threatened.

Under President Eisenhower, the thrust of foreign aid began to change. Foreign aid transfers became more and more military-oriented at the expense of economic aid programs. This was partly due to the Soviet military threat and partly to the fear of communist ideology. Events such as the Korean War in 1950, Egyptian initiatives to acquire Soviet arms in 1955 and the growing symbolic importance of Southwest Asia resulted in a more military-oriented approach to foreign aid. It was during this period that the concepts of internal security, civic action, and nation building were added to the lexicon of national security strategists.

The increased threat to American interests during the 1950s led to the Eisenhower Doctrine, according to which the United States reserved the right to employ force to assist any nation or groups of nations in the Middle East that requested American help. It was a pledge to help the countries of the Middle East in the event that they were attacked by a communist country. The intent of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to create some stability in the Middle East for the United States and its allies.

The Middle East remained a focus of the Kennedy Administration, but President Kennedy also showed interest

in Latin America. Kennedy did not want 'wars of national liberation' sponsored by the Soviet Union taking place in Latin America. He stressed the use of Special Forces, military advisors, and civic action programs as methods of effectively countering the ideological appeal of communism in Latin America. Kennedy did not want another Cuban revolution in the region. Under Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, the United States sent aid to Latin America to stimulate economic growth and help foster a stable social structure. The program never had a significant following and suffered from a lack of consistent political support; it could not compete for funds and attention against the Vietnam War and Johnson's War on Poverty. The program was inactive by the end of the 1960s.

The Johnson Administration used security assistance as an element of its strategy to support South Vietnam. During President Johnson's tenure, tremendous amounts of military equipment was provided to South Vietnam to help that country with its war effort.

During the Nixon Administration, the direction of foreign assistance received a new twist. As a result of the loss of the Vietnam War and American dissatisfaction with its involvement abroad, President Nixon announced the Nixon Doctrine. Instead of relying on the United States to send forces to respond to aggression, countries not party to a

defensive treaty with the United States would have to use their own forces for self-defense. The United States would provide material and economic support, but no American soldiers would take part in combat. In an effort to promote self-sufficiency on the part of recipient countries, the Nixon Administration stressed the use of sales of military equipment and services as opposed to the use of grant aid for those purposes. It was also during this time that the term 'security assistance' began to be used to describe the family of military and economic-related programs that the United States used to foster collective security abroad and to maintain influence and leverage in various countries around the world.

During President Ford's tenure, Congress began to assert itself and became more involved in the arms transfer process. Congress was concerned about what it perceived to be a large number of arms transfers, no doub* due in part to the Vietnam War nd the feeling that Congress should have been more critical about various funding requests from the President. In 1976, the Congress passed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which imposed restrictions on the President's ability to sell military goods and services to other countries. Among other things, it prohibited transfers or sales to countries which violated human rights. It also terminated assistance

grants, military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs), and established closer congressional oversight over arms transfers.

The high-level interest in human rights (as evidenced by the human rights provisions in the AECA) continued during the Carter Presidency. Under President Carter, arms transfers were considered an 'exceptional' action. Carter sought to de-emphasize the military aspect of foreign aid and to emphasize human rights. The Administration mandated that countries who received aid must be working to advance the cause of human rights. Carter, like Congress, was afraid of arms proliferation and the destabilizing effect arms transfers had on small countries.

President Carter's successor, President Reagan, turied the Carter Administration's policy around. President Reagan did not believe that arms transfers were exceptional action, but rather 'an essential element of our global defense policy and an indispensable component of U.S. foreign policy."

The objectives of security assistance programs have been to support U.S. global strategy as it changes and evolves based on the perception of the threat abroad and the political climate in America. As the history of security assistance demonstrates, program goals and objectives are often issue-oriented and can reflect the domestic political

environment as much as a perceived external threat to the United States or one of its allies. Just what the United States gains from security assistance is less clear.

The United States does not act from altruistic motives. Like any other sovereign nation, it seeks to further its own interests using the various means of power at its disposal. The enduring interests that the United States seeks to protect often appear self-serving, yet they are defined by America's political and economic system and reflect fundamental American values and culture. Political stability, physical security, economic strength, and democratic values are fundamental American qualities the United States attempts to foster in other countries, in part through security assistance. America perceives foreign governments who are democratic, stable, secure from attack or subversion, and economically strong to be in America's interest. Security assistance is a means of promoting these interests abroad when more direct means might be unacceptable to the United States or the host government. Security assistance reflects both the extent to which the United States is willing to further its interests abroad and the fact that it is essentially a political program with some military components. Security assistance reflects national strategic and political goals as well as American political reality. It is clear that successive

administrations believed that security assistance was a politically acceptable way to actively pursue American interests abroad when they felt other, more direct and overt methods were precluded. Congress has been generally supportive of administration goals and policies, if somewhat skeptical. What is less clear is the extent to which security assistance furthered American interests abroad. If it did in the past, does it continue to do so today?

The Andean Initiative

The Andean Initiative is the centerpiece of the international portion of the President's National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). As one of many initiatives contained within the NDCS, it competes for resources and political support. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of security assistance as an element of the Andean Initiative it is necessary to understand its background and purpose.

The Andean Initiative is an extremely complex and multi-faceted plan which emphasizes using the full range of host nation capabilities to eliminate coca and cocaine at their sources: the growing fields, the processing sites, and the transportation nodes. It relies on an integrated plan first to support host nations with training, materiel,

nation building assistance, intelligence support, and economic aid to strengthen host nation capabilities.⁴ Given this aid, host nations should then be capable of eliminating cocaine at its source. Closely allied to this is the belief that counterdrug activities are primarily a law enforcement effort and not a military operation. According to David Westrate of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 'Source area coca suppression is a law enforcement activity conducted in a paramilitary environment.''

The Andean Counterdrug Implementation Plan (The Andean Initiative) is classified secret. It was the result of a coordinated inter-agency effort to develop a detailed, workable plan which supported the overall goals of the NDCS.

The programs contained within the Andean Initiative are part of an even larger administration effort to encourage the development and strengthening of democratic regimes and institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean, and to encourage market-oriented economic reforms. The Andean Initiative emphasizes host nation economic growth and the strengthening of host nation democratic processes and institutions as complementary actions to the counternarcotic law enforcement efforts. The plan recognizes that a

healthy regional economy and viable economic alternatives to growing coca are required to ensure the long term success of the plan.¹⁰

The plan itself is not fixed and unchangeable. It is a 'living document' and is modified as necessary.¹¹ The plan as written in 1990 listed three primary objectives: 1) strengthening host nation political will and institutional capability; 2) increasing the effectiveness of host nation law enforcement and military action; and 3) significantly damaging trafficking organizations.¹² In 1991 a fourth objective, strengthening and diversifying host nation economies so they become less dependent on cocaine, was added.¹³

All of these objectives are important and are interrelated. The intent of the first is to create institutional conditions which will make long term success possible. The goal is to create conditions where the various host nation legislative, judicial, and executive institutions will be strong enough to ". . . disrupt the activities of, and ultimately dismantle the cocaine trafficking organizations."¹⁴

The second objective involves the provision of training, technical assistance, equipment, spare parts, and other goods and services to help governments compete against traffickers and insurgents armed with modern weapons and

utilizing advanced communications equipment.¹⁸ This objective acknowledges the governments' need for weapons and equipment at least on a level equal to that of their adversaries, as well as the ability to transport and sustain government forces in remote areas. In many cases government forces require training and education in tactical operations, weapons employment, and equipment maintenance.

The third objective, damaging drug trafficking organizations, applies to all three countries.¹⁶ Colombia is by far the most concerned about drug trafficking organizations, since most trafficking organizations operate from Colombia and are a threat to the government. There are few indications that Peruvian or Bolivian trafficking organizations are organized and functioning in either country. Colombian trafficking organizations seem to have effective control over coca sources in Peru and Bolivia as well. The emergence of strong Peruvian or Bolivian trafficking organizations would only further erode already weak governmental legitimacy. Damaging trafficking organizations depends on achieving the first two objectives of institutional stability and adequate training and support.

The fourth objective, the strengthening and diversification of legitimate economies, represents official recognition that the drug problem is at heart a question of

economics for campesinos and others who grow and sell coca to trafficking organizations. At the national level it is a question of keeping weak, legitimate economies alive. Host nation governments cannot eliminate coca at the source unless growers can earn legitimate profits from legitimate activities. Local economies must be strengthened and diversified to provide a real, long-term source of employment for those displaced out of the coca economy. As law enforcement and military actions take effect, it must be more profitable for growers and laborers to work in the legal economy than to work in the coca economy. If not, growers will find other ways to continue to farm coca until the economic incentive exists for them to stop growing coca and start growing other crops.

The President never envisioned or planned for the introduction of American combat units into either Colombia, Bolivia, or Peru as a part of the Andean Initiative. Assistance included training host nation forces, but there was no plan for either American soldiers to act in a combat role or for American trainers to accompany host nation troops on combat missiong.¹⁷

Each of the three objectives from the 1990 version of the Andean Implementation Plan contained sub-objectives. The Andean Counterdrug Implementation Plan listed a total of

twelve sub-objectives. These objectives and sub-objectives from the 1990 version are listed in Appendix A.

The 1990 NDCS also established the concept of certification with respect to counterdrug aid provided to foreign governments. The intent was to tie American counterdrug assistance to a foreign government's counterdrug performance. Certification holds foreign governments accountable for their performance in achieving specific goals and implementing specific programs.¹⁸ Certification by the President of compliance with applicable provisions of the law is necessary to continue to receive American aid. Appendix B provides a full discussion of certification timelines and penalties. In spite of the importance of the Andean Initiative, security assistance aid is contingent upon the President's certifying Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru as meeting the goals and provisions of counterdrug agreements. Neither Colombia, Bolivia, nor Peru can take American aid for granted.

Having established the legislative basis for security assistance and examined the Andean Initiative, the remainder of the chapter will look at how this has been translated into practice, what the Administration requested for security assistance, what Congress authorized and what it funded, and how the money was spent.

Not necessarily all money spent by the United States in support of counterdrug efforts is funded as security assistance programs. Other programs serve a security assistance function, often in a more indirect way. One must not confuse doctrinal, legal, and budgetary definitions of security assistance with a broader meaning of the term, which would include joint exercises, deployments, and other events which benefit host nations and further American interests. Deployments for training, for example, may be funded out of a Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) Operations and Maintenance account. The Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) budget includes a substantial amount of money appropriated for counterdrug purposes. SOUTHCOM executes missions which directly and indirectly support the Andean Initiative and is funded for these missions. SOUTHCOM is very much involved in the Andean Initiative; its budget directly and indirectly supports the Andean Initiative. It is extremely difficult to determine with any real accuracy just how much the United States is spending on security assistance to support the Andean Initiative.¹⁹ Budget numbers will therefore reflect what is available in print. The true amount is arguably higher.

The International Narcotics Control Act of 1988

The International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, Title IV of PL 100-690, The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, was enacted by Congress in November 1988. The impetus for the new Anti-Drug Abuse Act was a combination of factors, but work began in May 1988 when the Speaker of the House told committees with narcotics-related issues to prepare legislation by June. The International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 was reported out of the Committee on Foreign Affairs as H.R. 4841 for inclusion in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.²⁰ The Foreign Affairs Committee is one of 53 committees and subcommittees in the House of Representatives that have jurisdiction over some aspect of this issue.²¹

H.R. 4841 was the product of a long series of hearings conducted by the Committee as a follow-up to previously enacted legislation. H.R. 4841 included many recommendations that emerged from these hearings, as well as recommendations contained in numerous General Accounting Office (GAO) reports received by the committee.²² These recommendations were intended to strengthen the approach to the war on drugs and make efforts more effective.

H.R. 4841 contained new authorizations for program funding, changes to existing legislation to standardize the norms used in the certification process, and new

initiatives.²³ It is interesting to note that, in spite of the Committee's efforts and the overall efforts of the United States to reduce the flow of illicit drugs, the committee had a somewhat pessimistic view of the chances for success. H.R. 4841 notes that:

> The committee believes, however, that U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to increase their antinarcotics efforts are ultimately limited by the difficulty of dealing with sovereign countries, the boundaries of the U.S. leverage, the impact of narcotics-related corruption, the competition of other U.S. national security interests, and by the lack of a persuasive U.S. domestic commitment and effort. The committee bill reflects this historical experience.²⁴

The International Narcotics Control Act of 1988 authorized security assistance funding for counterdrug activities. It consisted of several subtitles; of direct relation to the theme of this thesis are: Subtitle C, Authorization and Earmarking; Subtitle D, Country-Specific Provisions; and Subtitle E, Annual Report and Certification Process. Other subtitles govern other narcotics-related matters.

Within Subtitle C, "Authorizations and Earmarking of Foreign Assistance," Congress earmarked \$1 million to arm defensively aircraft used in eradication or interdiction activities.²⁸ This earmark was first enacted in 1985 and has not changed. The intent was to provide a defensive capability to aircraft because aircraft supporting

counterdrug activities are vulnerable to ground fire. These funds had previously been used to arm two Colombian AC-47 aircraft with .50 caliber machine guns and to upgrade their onboard communications and navigation systems.²⁶

Section 4204 of Subtitle C contained several significant changes to the FAA pertaining to training. One of these changes authorized and earmarked \$2 million of IMET funds to train host nation forces in the operation and maintenance of equipment used in narcotics control. The money could also be used to pay the expenses of deploying DoD Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to foreign countries, at host nation request, to conduct counterdrug training.²⁷ This change permitted the training of either police or military units involved in counterdrug activities.

This section also established eligibility conditions for foreign countries to receive these IMET funds for counterdrug training. This section limited counterdrug IMET funds to those countries which 1) met the definition in paragraph 481(i) of the FAA of a major illicit drug producing or drug transit country; 2) had democratic governments; and 3) whose law enforcement agencies did not consistently and grossly violate internationally recognized standards of human rights, as defined by section 502(d)(1), FAA.²⁰

Perhaps the most significant change in this section was the waiver of prohibition on police training contained in Section 660 of the FAA,²⁰ which prohibits the use of MAP, IMET, ESF or any other funds authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act to be used

> . . . to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad.³⁰

The impact of this change was significant. Without it, the United States military was legally prohibited from training foreign police forces for whatever reason. Training the appropriate counterdrug police forces in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru in counterdrug activities was a key component of the Andean Initiative, in that it directly supported the first three objectives of the Andean Initiative.

The prohibition against training foreign police forces was included in the FAA because police forces in other countries often perform roles unacceptable to Congress. In many countries the police are a force of repression and control rather than a protector of liberties and an enforcer of the law. Congress emphasized the use of MTTs because it found that MTTs were able to teach Bolivian

units such basic skills as the use of a map and compass and other skills needed to successfully interdict drug trafficking operations.

Section 4205 of Subtitle C authorized the actual provision of military hardware to foreign governments for counterdrug use. Section 4205(b) waived the restrictions of paragraph 660(a), FAA with respect to grant military assistance to countries which met the three eligibility requirements listed above. This military assistance was authorized

> . . . for the procurement, for use in narcotics control, eradication, and interdiction efforts, of weapons or ammunition for foreign law enforcement agencies, or other units, that are organized for the specific purpose of narcotics enforcement.³¹

This section was written and enacted so the United States could equip units and forces which conducted counterdrug activities. Congress found that many foreign police forces and counterdrug units lacked the equipment to deal capably with the threat posed by well-armed traffickers. Some, such as the UMOPAR in Bolivia, had no weapons.³² Some members of Congress were concerned that this provision would become a means to provide counterinsurgency aid to Colombia and Peru. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs expected that military

assistance would strengthen host nation counterdrug capability, and not become a military-to-military program.³³

Subtitle C, section 4206 amended the FAA to permit the reallocation of security assistance funds in case of non-performance. The President was granted authority to suspend funds for countries not judged to have done enough to halt illicit drug production, and to reallocate those funds to countries which were effectively halting drug production.³⁴

Subtitle D of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, 'Provisions Relating to Specific Countries,' directed attention toward individual countries. In this section, Congress established specific targets, goals, and standards of performance for countries it was concerned about. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru all have specific provisions relating to them.

In order for Bolivia to receive any IMET, MAP, ESF, or FMS financing assistance in FY 89, the President had to certify to Congress that Bolivia made illicit coca growing and production illegal. Congress required Bolivia to: 1) establish its legal coca requirements; 2) license the number of hectares required for legal production; 3) make unlicensed coca production illegal; and 4) make it illegal to have or distribute coca leaf for other than legal purposes.³⁹ It also linked the 1 March annual certification

by the President, required by section 481 (h)(2)(A) of the FAA for release of the remaining 50 percent of Bolivia's appropriation, to additional Bolivian governmental actions. In order for the President to certify Bolivia, Congress required that: 1) Bolivia must have entered into an antinarcotics cooperation agreement with the United States; 2) Bolivia must have achieved the eradication goals in the agreement; and 3) Bolivia must have started a program of forced eradication of illicit coca. These requirements for certification could not be waived by the President.³⁴ The Bolivian section also included some specific provisions for developmental assistance.

Subtitle D, section 4303 discussed aid to Peru. It stated that the President had to give foremost consideration as to whether or not Peru had made 'substantial progress' in meeting coca eradication requirements during the previous year. It also prohibited any funding for projects by the Agency for International Development unless the project met certain conditions.³⁷

Authorizations for Colombia are written in section 4304. Congress authorized more than six members of the U.S. Armed Forces to be stationed in Colombia.³⁰ This allowed the U.S. Military Group in Colombia to effectively carry out its duties.³⁰

Colombia was authorized \$15 million in supplemental military assistance appropriations for fiscal year (FY) 1989. This appropriation was for defensive articles for the military to use in counterdrug activities.⁴⁰ This authorization was the result of a joint U.S.-Colombian review of maintenance and logistics problems in the Colombian military. The \$15 million represented one-half of the estimated \$30 million required for the Colombian military's most urgent needs.⁴¹

FY 1989 Funding

Congress passed PL 100-461, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Program Appropriation Act, 1989 on October 1, 1988. This appropriations act allocated money for several programs, including the FY 1989 security assistance program. The money appropriated under this act funded the security assistance provisions of the International Narcotics Control Act, Title IV of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. PL 100-461 authorized \$16.5 million in MAP funds for Bolivia, Ecuador, Jamaica and Colombia, with a limit of not more than \$5 million for any one country. \$3.5 million was appropriated to purchase weapons

and ammunition for foreign law enforcement agencies and paramilitary organizations with counterdrug responsibilities.⁴²

This money was allocated and Bolivia received \$5 million, Colombia received \$6 million, Peru received \$1.5 million, and the balance of the \$16.5 million went to Ecuador and Jamaica.

Bolivia received \$4.5 million in MAP funds and \$500,000 for law enforcement and narcotics enforcement agencies. The funds were allocated as follows:

- \$1.5 million to purchase 47 2%-ton trucks and
 \$1 million to purchase 37 High Mobility
 Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles for ground
 mobility of UMOPAR and army forces;
- \$1 million for riverine craft for use in the Chapare and along the Brazilian border;
- \$1 million to purchase pursuit aircraft used to interdict air transport of coca;
- 4) \$0.5 million to purchase machine guns, M-16 rifles, and ammunition. The machine guns were to arm UH-1 helicopters and river patrol boats defensively. The M-16 rifles were to arm police involved with counterdrug efforts.⁴³

Colombia received \$4 million in MAP funds for the military, \$1 million for law enforcement and narcotics enforcement agencies, and \$1 million to arm aircraft defensively.

The specific distribution included:

- \$1 million for weapons and ammunition for law enforcement and narcotics enforcement agencies;
- \$1 million to defensively arm AC-47 aircraft, used in assaults on drug laboratories;
- 3) \$2 million for helicopter operations, funding of maintenance training teams, and transportation costs of UH-60 and UH-1 helicopters from the United States to Colombia; and
- 4) \$2 million for field gear, weapons, and ammunition for army light assault companies. These companies would conduct operation against "narco-insurgents".**

None of the \$1.5 million for Peru went to the military. The entire amount went to counterdrug police forces: \$1 million funded the purchase of M-16 rifles and \$500,000 funded the purchase of M-16 rifle ammunition.*

In addition to this aid, the President, in August 1989, invoked his authority under the provisions of paragraph 506(a)(2) of the FAA to draw down defense articles from DoD stocks. The President used this drawdown authority to provide \$65 million in emergency military assistance to Colombia in response to heightened violence there.**

This military package provided the Colombians with a wide range of military equipment that went to several organizations involved in counterdrug efforts. The recipients and the amounts were: 47

Recipient	Amount	% Total
Colombian Air Force	\$20,515,743	31.6
Colombian Army	17,211,993	26.5
Colombian Navy	6,929,115	10.7
Colombian Marines	5,178,131	8.0
Colombian Military Intelligence	∋ 7,060	0.0
Colombian National Police	10,461,025	16.1
Dir. Administrative Security	466,827	0.7
Ministry of Justice	170,115	0.3
Shipping and Handling	4,059,991	6.2
Total	\$65,000,000	100.0

The types of items provided were helicopters, two C-130 aircraft, machine guns, weapons, ammunition, night vision equipment, jeeps, poncho liners, eight A-37 attack jets, spare parts, radios, ambulances, medical kits, dog tags, and training teams.⁴⁰ The aid package generated some controversy because some items were either not what the Colombians requested or not what they thought they would receive. Some Colombian organizations received a

disproportionate share of the aid compared to their overall contribution to the counterdrug effort.

The controversy centered around the amount and type of aid the Colombian National Police (CNP) received, because the Directorate of Anti-Narcotics (DAN) is subordinate to the CNP and has primary responsibility for counterdrug operations. The CNP received 16 percent of the emergency aid, but the chief of the CNP, Major General Miguel Gomez Padilla, said: 'The total package is more suitable for conventional warfare then the kind of struggle we are waging here against narcotics traffickers.'**

The police failed to receive many items they requested. They felt that intelligence equipment was most critical, but they received none. They requested items such as bomb detectors, phone call tracing equipment, scrambling equipment, and surveillance/tracking equipment, but received none of these. Other items they received they considered to be poor substitutes for their needs, for example, they received jeeps instead of sedans and large military-type radios instead of small radios.⁵⁰

This controversy stemmed from confusion over exactly what the Colombians wanted and a misunderstanding of what was available from DoD stocks. Many of the special items the Colombians requested were not stocked by DoD. DoD policy was to purchase such items as needed; consequently

DoD did not, as a matter of policy, have the communications gear and other special items in stock and available for drawdown. Other items the Colombians wanted were law enforcement related, not military related. These items were not available through DoD since DoD stocked only military items.⁹¹

International Narcotics Control Act of 1989

Little more than a year after the passage of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988, Congress passed the International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, PL 101-231. Like its predecessor, it attempted to strengthen and expand further the legislative basis of the government's counternarcotics activities.

The 1989 legislation was a response, in part, to the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), submitted to Congress as required by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The Administration submitted a \$125 million budget amendment for additional foreign aid for FY 1990, along with legislative amendments, to implement the NDCS. The 1989 legislation incorporated some of the Administration's requests. It also provided new incentives to help host nation governments

Section 2 of PL 101-231 dealt specifically with the Andean Initiative. The first section expressed the feeling of Congress that crop substitution and alternative employment opportunities for those areas dependent on illicit production of drugs were critical to the entire effort. It charged the Director of National Drug Control Policy to address the importance of economic development and assistance in the Andean Region.⁵³

Section 3 authorized security assistance for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The purpose of security assistance was the same as it was in the International Narcotics Control Act of 1988: 1) to enhance the ability of the governments concerned to control illicit narcotics production and trafficking; 2) to strengthen bilateral ties with the U.S.; and 3) to increase respect for human rights and the rule of law.

This section authorized the President to provide defense articles, services and IMET to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru under either the FMFP of the AECA or the IMET provisions of the FAA. It authorized up to \$6.5 million for education and training of law enforcement agencies or other units involved in counterdrug activities in the operation and maintenance of equipment used in those activities. This money was authorized to fund deployment of MTTs at host nation request to conduct individual and collective training

related to interdiction activities. Up to \$12.5 million was authorized to procure defense articles for units involved with counterdrug activities. This aid was authorized, notwithstanding restrictions on aid to foreign law enforcement agencies under section 660 FAA. Up to a total of \$125 million was authorized to be appropriated for FY 1990 to implement the military assistance section of PL 101-231.**

The provision of PL 100-690 that established the conditions of eligibility for assistance continued to apply: 1) the receiving country must have a democratic government; and 2) the law enforcement agencies within the country must not violate human rights.⁸⁹

Section 51(a) of the AECA, which governs the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF), was amended by Section 4 of PL 101-231. The amendment permitted the use of the SDAF to acquire items that were "particularly suited" for counterdrug activities and for the needs of the host nation.⁵⁰ The intent of this change was to allow the United States to procure, for counterdrug purposes, items the host nation needed, but which the United States did not maintain in DoD stocks. Common needs in this category are helicopters, communications equipment, and patrol boats for riverine operations.⁵⁷ Neither Congress nor the

Administration wanted to repeat the controversy and embarassment which surrounded the Colombian emergency aid package.

Section 5 modified the FAA and authorized the transfer of excess defense articles to Latin American and Caribbean countries to support counterdrug activities in those countries. It permitted the President to transfer up to \$10 million in excess equipment from DoD stocks to countries as long as those countries meet the established conditions of democratic governments, non-violation of human rights, and status as a major illicit drug producing country.**

FY 1990 Funding

The Administration initially requested \$32 million in FMFP funds and \$2.525 million for IMET funding for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru for FY 1990. These totals represented 0.64 percent of the total requested for FMFP authorizations and 4.6 percent of the total requested for IMET funding.**

These figures were the Administration's request before the formal announcement of the Andean Initiative. After the President announced the Andean Initiative, the Administration requested an additional \$125 million to fund

it. This supplemental request asked for an additional \$44.5 million in military assistance for Colombia, \$36.9 million for Bolivia, and \$38.9 million for Peru. Military assistance program totals for FY 1990 after the additional request were \$66 million for Colombia and \$44.4 million each for both Bolivia and Peru.⁴⁰ The \$125 million was appropriated in Section 602 of PL 101-167, the Foreign Operation, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1990.⁴¹ Of this amount, \$111.958 million was spent for FMFP and \$2.510 million was spent for IMET.⁴²

FY 1990 military assistance for Bolivia was to purchase spare parts, maintain equipment, and fund new initiatives. IMET funds were requested for professional military training and management and technical training of Bolivian personnel.**

Bolivia initially received \$33.228 million in FMFP money for counterdrug use. Of this total amount, \$5 million was reprogrammed from the Peruvian account because Peru failed to sign a counterdrug accord with the United States. In addition, President Bush again used his drawdown authority in paragraph 506(a)(2) of the FAA and provided an additional \$7.9 million to Bolivia. Bolivia's total for FY 1990 was \$46.028 million.**

Of this amount, \$14.9 million was spent on ground forces, \$2.7 million on riverine forces, and the balance went to the Bolivian Air Force. The ground forces received training and equipment. Two strike battalions were trained, and one engineering battalion was trained for civic action missions designed to improve the infrastructure. Two engineering companies, with well-drilling, quarry, and maintenance and logistics sections, were also trained. One supply and transportation battalion was provided with High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and 2%-ton trucks. FMFP funds were also used for personal equipment, weapons, ammunition, and fuel. The UMOPAR, spearhead of counterdrug efforts since 1988, received equipment and training by Special Forces personnel.**

The Bolivian Navy used the money to purchase boats for use on rivers, and to construct maintenance and berthing facilities for them. U.S. Navy SEALs conducted riverine training for Bolivian naval personnel assigned to the Blue Devils, the naval portion of the Special Force for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking (SFFANT).**

The Air Force used its funds primarily for the purchase of 16 UH-1 helicopters and spare parts. It acquired one C-130B aircraft and civilian support for the aircraft through the Presidential drawdown authority. The refurbished aircraft was for air interdiction.⁴⁷

Colombia received \$71.730 million in FMF grants in FY 1990.** This assistance was used to provide helicopter spare parts, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, individual equipment, as well as, medical training and medical evacuation capability.** The intent of this aid was to help the Colombians interdict the flow of precursor chemicals, raid processing laboratories, and gather intelligence, functions that had been primarily police functions.⁷⁰ Colombia also received equipment under the drawdown authority of the FAA. It received \$20 million in equipment and services, including C-130 aircraft, infantry weapons and ammunition, boats, vehicles, helicopters and aircraft spare parts, and individual troop equipment.⁷¹

Peru was scheduled to receive \$35.9 million in security assistance.⁷² This money was to finance a new forward operating base for counterdrug forces in the Upper Huallaga Valley, near the existing base in Santa Lucia. The United States was to provide counterinsurgency training and equipment for six Peruvian army battalions.⁷³ In addition, the money would have purchased six river patrol boats and refurbished twenty A-37 aircraft.⁷⁴

The military aid proposed by the United States generated controversy in Peru and was rejected by both former President Alan Garcia and his successor, President Alberto Fujimori.⁷⁵ Garcia was quoted as not being

interested in military aid because 'We don't believe in it.'⁷⁰ President Fujimori opposed military and police aid without what he considered to be adequate development assistance for coca growers.'⁷⁷ As a result of this disagreement, Peru received only \$1.5 million in military aid in FY 1990.'⁸⁰ This did not prohibit some American training of Peruvian police; 15-20 American Green Berets conducted training of National Police forces in antiguerrilla warfare in Mezamari in the Huallaga Valley.'⁷⁸ Colombia received \$30.9 million of the aid rejected by Peru.⁸⁰

The Document of Cartagena

On 15 February 1990, President Bush met with the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in Cartagena, Colombia. According to William J. Bennett, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the United States had two principal goals at the Cartagena Summit: to secure the commitment of the four nations to a long-term cooperative fight against illicit drugs; and to demonstrate the four nations' will and determination to fight against illicit drugs.⁶¹ The Document of Cartagena, signed by the four presidents, laid the framework for cooperative efforts to reduce illicit drugs. It established a comprehensive

anti-narcotics strategy for the region, while also acknowledging that the drug problem was not the same in each country. The Document of Cartagena included understandings on attacking illicit drugs, economic development, and diplomatic and public diplomacy initiatives.⁹²

The agreement made two very important points to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The first was that American aid was linked to Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian progress in their overall efforts to combat illicit drugs.

> This contribution by the United States would be made within the framework of actions against drug trafficking carried out by Andean Parties. The Andean Parties reiterate the importance of implementing or strengthening sound economic policies for the effective utilization of such a contribution.⁶³

The second major point was that human rights abuses were issues of concern to the United States and were intolerable. The United States served notice that it would watch how the Andean countries looked at human rights violations.

> Given that the Parties act within a framework of respect for human rights, they reaffirm that nothing would do more to undermine the war on drugs than disregard for human rights by participants in the effort.**

The portion of the agreement discussing the attack of illicit drugs at their source recognized that different conditions existed in each country. Each country had to determine for itself whether or not its armed forces would

participate in counterdrug efforts. Additional agreements for 'cooperation in accordance with their interests, needs, and priorities' could then be established.** The United States subsequently signed bilateral military agreements with Bolivia and Peru.**

The Bolivian agreement committed the United States to funding projects designed to improve the Bolivian military's counterdrug capability beginning in FY 1990. The Bolivians agreed to have the military participate in counterdrug actions. The agreement committed the United States to funding projects for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and for developing a national-level counterdrug infrastructure in Bolivia. These projects were funded in FY 1990 out of Bolivian FMFP funds. The agreement also specified principal missions of military units involved in counterdrug activities. These missions included operations against processing laboratories, riverine operations, air reconnaissance, air transport, and civic action.*⁷

The agreement made it clear that continued American aid was dependent on progress in attaining the goals of the program.

> Future provision of defense articles and services provided by the United States Government, however, for the program as a whole or for any element thereof will be based on: --The availability of funds provided by the United States Congress. --The progress shown in attaining objectives of this program, both by the timely rendering of this cooperation as well as by the accomplishment of the missions of the support or participation, assigned to the Bolivian Armed Forces.**

Absent from this annex was any specific wording about the quantification of program goals and objectives. Continued American aid was tied to program accomplishment without specifying the minimum acceptable level of accomplishment. No criteria for assessing success were set forth.

The military agreement with Peru reflected previous Peruvian concerns about the need for adequate economic aid and development assistance. It recognized that police and military units could conduct civic action projects in insecure areas, in addition to conducting traditional law enforcement and military activities. The United States agreed to fund the training and equipping of counterdrug and counterdrug support units. Peru agreed to use these units in its fight against illicit drugs. The agreement served

notice to Peru that it could not violate human rights and that continued American military aid was dependent on "reduction of drug production and trafficking, sustained economic policy performance and respect for human rights."" No objective criteria were established for assessing the overall success or failure of this program.

International Narcotics Control Act of 1990

Congress passed the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990, PL 101-623, on 21 Nov 1990. It authorized international narcotics activities for FY 1991 and amended existing legislation to reflect the intent of Congress and to provide for Congressional oversight. PL 101-623 further modified the legal basis for the programs that were a part of the Andean Initiative and the National Drug Control Strategy.

Section 2 of PL 101-623 authorized a total of \$300 million for Development Assistance and the Economic Support Fund for the Andean nations.⁹⁰ This reflected the view of Congress, as previously expressed, that economic and development assistance was required to wean the Andean countries away from their economic dependence on coca.

Security assistance for the Andean nations was authorized in Section 3. A total of \$118 million was

authorized for FMFP for FY 1991. No money was authorized for MAP; it was phased out in 1990.

The purpose of security assistance in this law was different than in the previous two International Narcotics Control Acts. This assistance now served four purposes; the three identified in the two recent International Narcotics Control Acts, and a fourth: 'to assist the armed forces of the Andean countries in their support roles for those countries' law enforcement agencies, which are charged with the main responsibility for the control of illicit narcotics production and trafficking."⁹¹

PL 101-623 permitted continued training assistance and provision of defense articles for law enforcement units involved in counterdrug activities. It limited to \$250 million the total amount of military and law enforcement assistance for the Andean countries, with sublimits of not more than \$175 million for the armed forces and not more than \$175 million for law enforcement agencies. Section 3 further defined assistance as being the sum of: 1) FMFP assistance; 2) money appropriated under the provisions of Part 1, Chapter 8 FAA, international narcotics control; 3) IMET funds; 4) the value of education & training provided under the drawdown authority of Section 506(a) FAA; and 5) the value of excess defense articles. It further limited

the value of excess defense articles transferred to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to \$60 million.**

Assistance provided to the Andean countries first required a Presidential certification that: 1) the host nation was implementing a program to reduce the flow of cocaine to the U.S. under the provisions of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the United States; 2) the host government did not violate human rights; and 3) the government had effective control over the 'police and military operations related to counterdrug and counterinsurgency activities."⁹³

FY 1991 Funding

In 1991, the Administration requested \$141.3 million in FMFP and IMET funding for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.**

Congress authorized no more than \$118 million for counterdrug efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in PL 101-513, Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act, 1991.^{**} The Appropriations Act allocated up to \$2 million for education and training on equipment used in counterdrug activities, and for deploying mobile training teams (MTTs) to train host nation military and police forces involved with counterdrug efforts.^{**} This was less than the previous year.

The Administration requested \$40.9 million in military assistance for Bolivia in FY 1991. This money was to continue to fund the programs initiated in FY 1990 and to continue to implement its agreement with Bolivia.

Bolivian President Jamie Paz Zamora personally approved the entry of 112 American military advisors into Bolivia in accordance with the May 1990 bilateral antinarcotics treaty. This approval set off protests and a oneday national strike; the protesters were concerned that the real targets of the war on drugs were the peasants, not the criminals.*7 Among the trainers, there were 50 carpenters, electricians, and plumbers for civic action projects in coca producing zones; 84 advisors for computerized technical exercise; 50-60 doctors, dentists, and veterinarians for military medical assistance; complete communications equipment; nine caterpillar tractors, eight road graders, eight trailer trucks, 29 trucks and four compactors; and patrol boats for the Navy. Training of the Army battalions was scheduled for 4 April to 15 July and 2 September to 30 November.**

The Bolivians saw the Army's role as providing logistical support to counterdrug forces. Any commitment of the Army however, required a separate decision by President Paz Zamora to do so, apparently due to domestic fears of militarization of the government's counterdrug efforts. The

government repeatedly stressed that the Army would operate against cocaine labs, not coca growing peasants.**

The Administration requested \$60.5 million in security assistance funds for Colombia.¹⁰⁰ This money was for the purchase of additional helicopters, vehicles, spare parts, medical training and medical evacuation capability, and individual soldier equipment.¹⁰¹

The Administration requested \$34.9 million in security assistance funding for Peru in FY 1991. Peru was in serious jeopardy of not receiving this money because of its poor performance in the war on drugs in 1990.¹⁰³ In May 1991, the United States and Peru signed a bilateral agreement on counterdrug activities that adequately addressed both American and Peruvian concerns. Two months later a military assistance annex was signed, removing previous barriers to providing security assistance.¹⁰³ These funds were to train two combat battalions, refurbish helicopters and Air Force jets, and create a river patrol force. American assistance included the use of U.S. Army lawyers to conduct instruction and training to help Peru improve its human rights performance.¹⁰⁴

FY 1991 security assistance also included money to finance civic action projects. These projects included road repair, bridge construction or repair, well drilling, and medical treatment. These were targeted at the Huallaga

Valley, where the provision of these services was quite poor. The threat posed by Sendero Luminoso in the area required that the work be done by military engineer units, not civilian construction firms.¹⁰⁵

Congress was not satisfied with the Peruvian military's human rights performance or its contribution to the war on drugs. Congress cut \$10 million from the Administration's security assistance request and tied the payment of the remaining \$24.9 million to improved human rights and counterdrug performance. The deletion of the \$10 million forced the cancellation of the training of the two combat battalions.¹⁰⁶

The Results

The United States uses various statistical measures to gauge its progress in reducing the flow of cocaine into the United States. The government can only estimate the amount of cocaine coming into the country based on estimates of coca production and refinement. Some of the statistics the government uses to judge its progress in the 'war on drugs' are: the number of cocaine seizures; the number of cocaine laboratories destroyed or confiscated; the number of hectares of coca under cultivation; and the amount of cocaine paste available for refining.

Bolivia had an estimated 52,900 hectares classified as harvestable cultivation in 1989. This number decreased

to 50,300 in 1990 and to an estimated 48,600 in 1991. The amount of harvestable coca appears to have declined, yet during the period 1989 to 1991 coca cultivation increased from an estimated 55,400 hectares to 55,600 hectares. Cultivation of mature coca leaf grew from 74,722 metric tons in 1989 to 79,100 metric tons in 1991. There were 42 metric tons of coca leaf seized in 1989 and 13 tons seized in 1990. Seizures of coca paste decreased from 10 metric tons in 1989 to 0 in 1990. Forty laboratories were destroyed in 1989, 33 in 1990, and 20 as of March 199.107 Security assistance, with its emphasis on training and equipping Bolivian counterdrug forces, appears to have had no positive effect on these statistical measures. Instead of increasing the number of seizures and destroying more laboratories, the Bolivians accomplished less, in spite of security assistance.

The statistics for Peru also suggest security assistance has had no positive effect on reducing the flow of cocaine into the United States. The hectares under cultivation increased from 1989 to 1991. Forty-nine cocaine laboratories were seized in 1989; none were seized in 1990 or thru March 1991.¹⁰⁰

The estimates for Colombia show a slight decrease in the harvestable cultivation, from 42,400 hecatres in 1989 to 38,400 hectares in 1991. Despite this decrease, the

estimated production of cocaine base/HCl increased from 58 to 65 metric tons. Seizures of cocaine base/HCl increased from 37 metric tons in 1989 to 53 metric tons in 1990. The government destroyed 452 cocaine laboratories in 1989 and 750 in 1990.¹⁰⁰ Security assistance may have contributed to these positive developments because it improved the Colombian Government's ability to conduct these types of operations. The Government of Colombia has, over the last several years, expressed its continued commitment to fighting cocaine trafficking. This commitment pre-dates the Andean Strategy; given the Government of Colombia's attitude toward cocaine trafficking, it seems unwise to attribute too much of these increases to security assistance.

The DEA acknowledged that the usual indicators for cocaine varied widely during 1990. In spite of an apparent shortage of cocaine at the wholesale level, cocaine supplies were plentiful at the end of the year.¹¹⁰ The DEA also reported Colombia was producing cocaine at the same level it was prior to the Colombian government's August 1989 effort to curb production.¹¹¹ These statements also suggest that efforts to stop cocaine at its source were unsuccessful in spite of American and host government efforts.

The current indicators of progress in reducing the flow of cocaine into the United States suggest security assistance has had little effect in reducing the amount of

cocaine entering the country. These figures are the best available, but they may not be adequate. They reflect short-term changes to a long-term problem; security assistance may take a few years to be effective.

Even if the figures are adequate measures, the lack of accurate reporting can be a problem; different sources show different numbers for the same statistic. It may be that the United States has yet to fully and realistically define the scope and magnitude of cocaine production and imports.

For example, the DEA asserts that Colombia seized 51 metric tons of cocaine and seized 300 cocaine laboratories in 1990,¹¹² but the State Department maintains that 53 tons of cocaine and 750 cocaine laboratories were seized.¹¹³ The DEA reports Peru destroyed 140 cocaine laboratories and seized 2677 kilograms of cocaine base and 233 kilograms of cocaine paste through October 1990.¹¹⁴ The State Department reports 0 laboratories destroyed in 1990, no seizures of cocaine paste, and seizures of 8.5 metric tons of cocaine HCl/base.¹¹⁹

Conclusion

In spite of the proclaimed importance of security assistance as an element of foreign policy, the consensus

among many involved is that it suffers from a lack of sufficient funding. Congress, for its part, is concerned that security assistance does not become a means of supporting governments without the United States receiving some benefit; many in Congress do not perceive any benefits to the U.S. from security assistance. Congress is also concerned that the United States does not support governments with poor human rights records or support governments that are not fully democratic.

Congress has consistently, if at times reluctantly, supported Administration requests for funding the security assistance portion of the Andean Initiative. Congress has also supported the President's Andean Initiative by authorizing changes to the legislation to allow the Executive Branch to better implement the Andean Initiative and to provide requested aid. Significant legislative changes include permitting the training of police forces and allowing the SDAF to procure counterdrug-specific equipment.

The use of host-nation militaries in support of the Andean Initiative was contingent upon American security assistance. The Andean countries, Bolivia and Peru in particular, are too poor and ill-equipped to attempt to interdict the flow of coca and cocaine to the United States without American aid and had no incentive to support the Andean Initiative. The United States provided military aid

to train and equip counterdrug units and military forces with a counterdrug mission. Further aid depends upon these countries assimilating this aid and using it to meet program goals and objectives agreed on by the United States and the countries involved.

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¹⁰Ibid.

"Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁸George Bush, <u>1991 National Drug Control Strategy</u> (The White House, 1991), 79.

¹⁴Ibid., 78.

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¹⁷Ann Devrory, 'Bush Insists U.S. Troops Have Minimal Drug Role,' <u>Washington Post</u> 12 September 1989 A281.

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¹⁶PL 101-231 <u>The International Narcotics Control Act of 1989</u> permits the transfer of excess defense articles to major illicit drug producing countries at no cost to the gaining country (103 Stat 1958). During 1991 the U.S. transferred one C-130 to Colombia and a second C-130 is in the process of being transferred. The U.S. also transferred 477 vehicles to Ecuador. If those were at no cost to the recipient, the U.S. paid the maintenance, transportation, and overhead costs. These costs of the Andean Initiative not openly reflected in Congressional Presentation Documents.

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³⁰U.S. Congress, House, <u>International Narcotics Control Act</u> of 1988, 6.

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⁴⁶U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, <u>Stopping the Flood of Cocaine With Operation Snowcap: Is It</u> <u>Working</u>? 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990. House Report 101-673, 74.

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**Treaster, 'U.S. Sending Wrong Equipment'.

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"U.S. Congress, House, <u>Stopping the Flood of Cocaine</u>, 82.

⁸²U.S. Congress, House, <u>International Narcotics Control Act</u> <u>of 1989</u>, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989. House Report 101-342, Part 1, 1-2.

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**PL 101-231, 103 Stat 1957.

*U.S. Congress, House, <u>International Narcotics Control Act</u> of 1989, 7-8.

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CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

The role of security assistance in the Andean Initiative is filled with uncertainty about its effectiveness. There appear to be too many institutional and political weakness in the Andean countries that negate any real contribution security assistance could make in reducing the supply of cocaine at its source. The issues of corruption, competing political priorities, and the importance of cocaine to the regional economy make any discussion of macro-level performance indicators, such as amounts of cocaine seized, numbers of labs destroyed, and hectares of coca destroyed, irrelevant.

Statistical indicators may serve the needs of law enforcement or other agencies but they are an insufficient measure of the effect of security assistance. They are apparently the best measures currently available, but appear to reflect short-term results, at the expense of true indicators of a long-term reduction of the cocaine supply.

Not knowing how much cocaine is available means there is no way to assess the effect of seizing 51 tons of cocaine; there is nothing to compare '51 tons' with to give it meaning. Without such a measure, it is difficult to quantify the effect of security assistance. The number of seizures may increase, but if production also increases, seizures may represent no more than a constant percentage of total production, with little or no impact on the supply of cocaine entering the United States. The uncertainty about the validity of current statistical measures of success, as well as the lack of consistency of reporting these measures, make it difficult to assess the impact of security assistance.

In the absence of relevant statistical measures, the nature of the assistance may offer some suggestions as to its potential to help reduce the flow of cocaine into the United States. Supplying items such as weapons, ammunition, radios, and night vision devices supports the counterdrug missions of the military and law enforcement agencies. Providing engineer equipment, trucks, and other means of transportation also supports the goal of supply reduction. Examples of equipment which is inappropriate for counterdrug efforts include the A-37 jets provided to Colombia; it is not clear how the jets increase or improve Colombians' ability to interdict cocaine shipments. The jets are also

expensive, an example of assistance that sounds impressively valuable, but is hardly suitable for counterdrug missions. From the unclassified sources available, the majority of the items and training provided as security assistance appear to be appropriate for counterdrug efforts.

If statistical measures are currently an insufficient basis for determining the effect of security assistance, and that most equipment and training supports counterdrug efforts, what can be said about the effect of security assistance on reducing the flow of cocaine into the United States? It is the state of the host nation, rather than any inherent merits of security assistance, that will determine the effectiveness of security assistance.

Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru are confronted with several serious internal problems. All three countries face formidable economic problems that magnify the appeal of growing coca and trafficking in cocaine. During the 1980s, economic growth was poor or non-existent. Past economic performance was so poor that foreign investors and international lending institutions remain leery of investing in these economies. Ill-conceived economic policies and the collapse of key export markets for legal crops resulted in periods of severe inflation and directly effected the average citizen. People turned to illegal cultivation and sale of coca as a way to earn a living and even prosper in

the absence of other reasonable, legal alternatives. The governments of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru came to rely on the foreign revenues coca sales provided, and coca became a significant economic influence in all three economies. All three countries rely on coca-generated dollars to keep their economies functioning. Any attempts to destroy coca or the cocaine trade target a vital component of the economy. If this component is destroyed or disrupted, the countries will plunge into an economic and political abyss.

Economic decline spawned a closely related problem: corruption. As purchasing power declined, public officials turned to extortion and bribes to supplement their incomes. The large amounts of money involved in the drug trade likely made corruption inevitable, but poor economic performance amplified the temptation for officials to take advantage of the easy money offered by the traffickers. Corruption is wide-spread throughout the various military and police organizations charged with counterdrug responsibilities. Drug traffickers view bribery as a business expense protecting their interests.

Economic problems are compounded by political problems, as the governments struggle to maintain their legitimacy in the face of economic and political challenges. All three countries share a weak democratic tradition, but, relatively speaking, Colombia is by far the strongest

democracy. Peru and Bolivia, emerging from the shadows of military dictatorships, are still establishing their democratic roots. Until these roots of democracy and civilian rule are fully internalized in the body politic, many citizens will continue to fear the military, whose legacy of poor economic performance, corruption, and human rights violations is not easily forgotten. Many citizens are cautious of any program which they believe expands the powers of the military and allows it to potentially threaten newly-found democratic traditions. People in the region are fearful security assistance will unnecessarily strengthen the militaries.

Peru and Colombia face internal threats from insurgent groups. The roots of these insurgencies are based on long-standing social and economic problems within segments of their societies. The respective governments and citizens view these insurgencies as the primary threat to the country. The threat from drugs, to the extent it registers as a threat, is far from the minds of the vast majority of citizens and governments. Drugs are not a daily concern for most citizens in the coca-producing countries and the governments struggle to maintain stability and legitimacy in the face of the insurgent threat. The insurgent problem is further complicated by the lack of government control over vast amounts of territory.

The military and police forces of Colombia and Peru are oriented on the insurgent threat. They lack the training, equipment, and often the will to pursue drug traffickers. They see the counterdrug mission as detracting from their primary mission of defending their country from threats to its political stability. In the case of Bolivia and Peru, the rivalry between the police and the Army over roles and missions inhibits cooperation in counterdrug efforts.

In order to be effective, security assistance must at least partially overcome these obstacles, but it is not clear whether such a goal can be achieved. All these conditions are intertwined and reinforce one another. No one issue is key; all must be solved together, and none is prone to quick solutions, because the fundamental economic and social views of the participants must change. What is clear is that without economic growth coca will remain a dominant influence on the economies, corruption will not subside, and the governments will find it increasingly difficult to maintain legitimacy and support. Fostering long-term economic growth will require American patience to endure short-term desires for success in exchange for the future benefit of reduced amounts of cocaine coming into the United States.

Security assistance provides military hardware, training and services to foreign countries. In Washington, D.C., it provides fuel for political debate. In spite of the sometimes controversial nature of security assistance and the Andean Initiative, Congress has supported it through, among other things, continued funding. Congress also changed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export and Control Act to allow the Executive Branch to better implement the plan and to respond to host government needs.

The supply-side strategy on which the Andean Initiative is based appears to rest on faulty assumptions. The lack of a conceptual basis for linking successful interdiction to a decreased demand suggests the plan is based on hope and optimism rather than a clear understanding of cause and effect. The Andean Initiative seems to assume the cocaine problem in the United States will disappear if cocaine does not reach the American market. In effect, there is an assumed linkage between the threat posed by drug abuse and the supply of illicit drugs. While this may make sense on the surface, it leads to the dangerous conclusion that preventing drugs from reaching America will somehow decrease the drug threat to America. This is a precarious and faulty line of reasoning. It is extremely misleading to believe the government can control any source of illicit

drugs in an attempt to curb drug abuse. The government cannot prevent trafficking organizations from establishing new sources of supply, either natural or synthetic. The economic incentive for the drug traffickers is too great for them to be deterred by government actions they believe they can corrupt or circumvent. Demand reduction is the only way to defeat the threat drug abuse poses to the United States. Equally important, the lack of a conceptual basis for the Andean Initiative means that the United States does not know how much assistance is enough, too much, or sufficient.

Over-reliance on interdiction as a means to stop the flow of cocaine at its source can create inflated expectations and apparent success based on traditional measures of effectiveness. If the cost of producing cocaine is, in fact, just one percent of its retail value, interdiction will have little impact on its availability. One could even argue that it would be cost-effective for traffickers to cooperate with authorities and allow authorities to 'raid' cocaine processing facilities, letting the governments point to 'successful' interdiction operations and remain eligible for continued American aid. The direct cost to the traffickers would be minimal; in the long run, both the government and the traffickers benefit.

The third chapter described the extensive efforts of the United States to reach agreements with the Andean

countries about the use of military and police forces to interdict the flow of cocaine. The United States and the governments of Bolivia and Peru signed military annexes to the Document of Cartagena outlining military measures designed to support interdicting cocaine. The absence of quantifiable goals for Bolivian and Peruvian efforts, combined with the economic and political problems in those countries, makes it unlikely the goals agreed to at the Cartagena Summit will be achieved.

Security assistance can provide equipment and training, but it cannot provide the will to act and it cannot counteract the effects of corruption. Once the United States equips and trains host nation agencies, it has little control over how that training and equipment is used. It might extract promises from the host governments about how they will use the training and equipment, but there will never be guarantees that promises will be kept. The United States must remember that host governments have plans and interests of their own. To the extent that American and host government goals are the same, the United States can reasonably expect security assistance to be used in line with American interests. If American and host government plans and priorities are divergent, the United States should not be surprised that its security assistance efforts fail to produce results which it desires. An analysis of

American and host government agendas in a given circumstance could likely provide a reasonable indication of likely success in achieving American goals. The use of security assistance in the Andean Initiative is not likely to produce the results the United States seeks. American and host government goals and agendas are not harmonious enough to insure that American equipment and training will be used to help reduce the supply of cocaine at its source.

American and host nation goals are not similar because they view the problem differently. American policies reflect the American view that weak economies and a lack of political stability is the common problem throughout the region. While Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru share some common problems, these three have significant differences which shape different goals for each country. Colombia faces drug-related terrorism, and, along with Peru, is concerned about its insurgent threat. Bolivia must keep the support of the coca growers' union. Economically, Peru and Bolivia need the revenue coca generates, but they also need American support for loans and grants from international lending organizations. Bolivia and Peru must satisfy both the demands of the United States and their own voters. The United States believes its assistance will lead to more arrests, seizures, and act as a negative incentive so coca growers will stop growing coca and start growing legal

crops. The host governments perceive cooperation on security assistance matters as a method to appease, to a certain extent, the United States and thereby able to maintain American support for badly-needed loans and grants. Security assistance also gives them equipment and training they would otherwise lack. In the case of Colombia and Peru, the training and equipment helps them to counter their internal security threat.

The evidence indicates that Bolivia and Peru suffer from so much corruption and lack of will to act that security assistance in those countries will not further American interests.¹ Until these factors are overcome, security assistance in the form of equipment transfers and in-country training should be halted.

No amount of security assistance, in the form of military training and hardware, can compensate for the influence of coca on the Andean economies. Coca is so central to the local economies that the use of security assistance to reduce the supply of cocaine is seen as a threat to the existence of hundreds of thousands of coca farmers in the region. Those farmers see security assistance as a militarization of American efforts which threaten their way of life. The host governments see American aid as a two-edged sword; it provides needed money and assistance, but it also obligates them to act contrary

to their interests. Bolivia and Peru need both the coca trade and security assistance. It is reasonable they will continue to encourage the American perception that they are making progress in the war on drugs in order to continue to receive security assistance.

A final consideration is the implication of transferring equipment and training to the Andean countries. These transfers may make those countries dependent upon the United States for continued supply of spare parts, additional maintenance training, and other forms of support. Security assistance provides hardware, but may not strengthen the militaries over the long run. The countries could not afford American assistance in the past, and without economic improvements they will likely be unable to do so in the future. The United States will have to decide whether or not to continue to provide such assistance. Rather than strengthening the host nation militaries, security assistance may instead be creating a long-range dependency on continued American aid. If the United States fails to support the investment it made in the host nations, it runs the risk of losing whatever support it enjoys in the Andean countries.

Until the larger systemic problems are corrected, it is unlikely that security assistance will help reduce the flow of cocaine to the United States. The United States

must remember that the effectiveness of its aid and assistance ultimately depends on how the recipient uses it. Security assistance can provide a means for change, but not the will.

If the United States is serious about its 'war on drugs,' it must be serious about its strategy to win the war and willing to modify those parts of the strategy that do not contribute to either demand or supply reduction. Given the conditions in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, security assistance stands little chance of helping to interdict the flow of cocaine into the United States. The money spent on security assistance would, in all reality, be better spent supporting demand reduction programs.

ENDNOTES

¹Recent events in Peru seem to support this view. President Fujimori, tired of the corruption and lack of political support for his reforms, fired the congress and the judiciary. The congress, in particular, was blocking his economic reforms and decrees which gave the army a free hand to fight the insurgency. Fujimori can now implement his economic reforms, and the army has fewer restrictions in fighting the insurgents. APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX A

The 1990 Andean Implementation Plan

The following is a verbatim extract of the 1990 Andean Implementation Plan, an unpublished National Security Council working paper. It describes the Plan's three broad objectives with their twelve sub-objectives.

I. Strengthen the political commitment and institutional capability of the Andean Governments to enable them to take the necessary steps to disrupt narcotics trafficking activities. The plan calls for a wide range of specific actions, from expanded public diplomacy in each country to encourage enactment of tougher drug laws in such areas as extradition and money laundering.

- A. Maintain/enhance political commitment of the senior leadership to move vigorously against drug trafficking. Sustaining a political commitment against the drug trafficking industry requires increased political incentives, coupled with the assistance of legal advisory teams; and public awareness and demand reduction activities. In fact, the <u>entire</u> U.S. assistance program serves to support host country political commitment.
- B. Strengthen governments' abilities to identify, apprehend, prosecute, extradite, and punish narcotics traffickers by supplying the necessary expertise, training, and resources to reorganize and streamline existing laws and criminal justice infrastructure.
- C. Strengthen the ability/resolve of judges to prosecute traffickers by providing resources to support enhanced training in investigative techniques and case preparation, as well as advice on protecting the judiciary from corruption. Support Colombia and Bolivia develop special drug judicial units or courts to manage major drug trafficking cases.

D. Provide better security for senior political, police, military and judicial officials so that they will not be intimidated in their jobs.
Additional protective equipment, training, personnel and intelligence are key to minimizing this major threat especially in Colombia, where intimidation is commonplace.

II. Increase the effectiveness of military and law enforcement activities against the cocaine industry in the three source countries. The principal trafficking infrastructure targets are summarized below. It should be noted that this objective involves the major portion of the U.S. assistance in FY 1990.

- A. Isolate key coca growing areas by effecting a system of roadblocks, riverine interdiction, and control of airfields used by traffickers. Lower priority in Colombia due to limited, low grade coca cultivation in widely scattered locations. Higher priority in Peru and Bolivia, where ninety percent of the world's coca leaf is grown.
- B. Block shipment of key precursor chemicals at the borders and within countries, with emphasis on riverine interdiction. Support for riverine operations is key for success in all three countries.
- C. Destroy labs and processing centers through higher quality information, coupled with more effective operational capabilities. The destruction of labs is being reemphasized in Peru and Bolivia to counter the growing vertical integration of their production industries.
- D. Control key air corridors and national air space by developing a detection and monitoring system, together with an effective air response capability. Surveys will be conducted to explore the most cost effective means for providing an air surveillance capability for Peru and Bolivia, as well as the rest of Colombia.

E. Focus eradication efforts in conjunction with alternative development. Such efforts will be most effective when the economic incentives to coca cultivation are reduced through law enforcement and other efforts. Economic assistance will be provided to Peru and Bolivia to assist those governments' efforts to provide legal income-earning alternatives to coca growers and workers. Bolivia will also receive balance of payments support to help replace foreign exchange earnings currently derived from the coca industry.

III. Inflict significant damage on the trafficking organizations which operate within three source countries by apprehending the trafficker leadership and disrupting or dismantling their operations.

- A. Identify and apprehend trafficking leaders and their key lieutenants. Improving host country intelligence collection capability and providing secure communications are essential.
- B. Impede transfer of drug-generated funds. This involves enlisting the banking community in efforts against money laundering.
- C. Seize financial and operational assets of traffickers in the U.S. and other countries within which they operate.

APPENDIX B

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APPENDIX B

Certification Procedures

This appendix outlines the certification procedures required before Congress will provide funds to U.S. government agencies to use in support of counter-drug programs. The source for this appendix is Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1990. Paragraph 481(h) of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, governs the annual certification process.

The FAA requires that fifty percent of the assistance allocated each year to each major illicit drug producing or drug transit country be withheld unless the President certifies the country is in compliance with its anti-drug treaty obligations to the United States.

Certification requires that the President determine and certify to Congress that a country, during the previous year, either cooperated with the US, or took steps to meet goals agreed to in an agreement with the United States. The intent of the agreement was to prevent the production, transportation, and sale of illicit drugs, as well as other related problems such as money laundering and bribery.

If, for some reason, the President can not certify that a country was in compliance with its treaty obligations, paragraph 481(h)(2)(A)(ii) permits him to certify the country based on the "vital national interests of the United States."

If the President does not make his certification, or if Congress, in a joint resolution disapproves the certification, several sanctions are imposed and remain in effect until the country is certified. These sanctions include the prohibition of obligating funds for assistance; no previously obligated funds may be expended for the country. In addition, US representatives to various multilateral development banks must vote against any loan requests made by the country concerned.

According to Perl in "The US Congress, International Drug Policy, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988," the suspension of US assistance applies to all types of assistance except for humanitarian and international narcotics control assistance. There are also some discretionary sanctions Congress can impose, such as enacting duty increases; denial of preferential tariffs to exports; curtailment of air transportation and air traffic between the US and the country involved; and US withdrawal from participation in pre-clearance customs agreements.

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