


AD-A256 021

(2)



The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

DTIC
ELECTE
OCT 7 1992
S C D

FUTURE UNITED STATES ROLE
IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

BY

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Moreno, OD
Senior Service College Fellow
University of Pittsburgh

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

26 August 1992



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92

1 1 8

403565

92-26558

95
12/8



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS			
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE						
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION US Army War College		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AWCA	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION			
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Future United States Role in European Security						
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Moreno, James A., LTC						
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Study Project		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1992 August 26		
15. PAGE COUNT 93						
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION						
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP				
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) See reverse for abstract						
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL HENRY L. VAN BREDERODE, LTC, AD			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717/245-3044		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCA	

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James A. Moreno, LTC, OD

TITLE: Future United States Role in European Security

DATE: 26 August 1992 PAGES: 90 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

During the period 1989-1991, there were tremendous changes in the European security environment. The United States and its European allies are now faced with questions concerning appropriate security structures to meet the needs of post-Cold War, post-Soviet Europe. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate about appropriate roles, missions and capabilities for U.S. military forces in Europe. The study considers security threats, risks and uncertainties pertaining to Europe; examines the response of the Bush administration to new security realities; and assesses the adaptation of the Atlantic Alliance to the absence of a direct threat. Both the United States and its NATO allies envision a continued significant U.S. military presence in Europe. The study also focuses on challenges from both sides of the Atlantic to the planned U.S. military role in Europe. Western Europeans have demonstrated increasing independence and assertiveness as they move toward the establishment of a European union and a common foreign and security policy. Americans have become increasingly focused inward on severe domestic problems. The appropriateness and implications of three different potential U.S. military roles in Europe are examined. The study concludes that a continued significant U.S. military presence in Europe is a sound hedging strategy for the United States during a period of tremendous change. The study also suggests compensating measures to enhance the effectiveness of a more modest U.S. military force, should a larger U.S. military presence in Europe not be acceptable.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

FUTURE UNITED STATES ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Moreno, OD
Senior Service College Fellow
Ridgway Center for International Security Studies
University of Pittsburgh

Doctor Phil Williams
Project Advisor
Director of Ridgway Center

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DTIC DOCUMENT AND SOURCE 1

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Special
A-1	

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James A. Moreno, LTC, OD

TITLE: Future United States Role in European Security

DATE: 26 August 1992 PAGES: 90 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

During the period 1989-1991, there were tremendous changes in the European security environment. The United States and its European allies are now faced with questions concerning appropriate security structures to meet the needs of post-Cold War, post-Soviet Europe. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate about appropriate roles, missions and capabilities for U.S. military forces in Europe. The study considers security threats, risks and uncertainties pertaining to Europe; examines the response of the Bush administration to new security realities; and assesses the adaptation of the Atlantic Alliance to the absence of a direct threat. Both the United States and its NATO allies envision a continued significant U.S. military presence in Europe. The study also focuses on challenges from both sides of the Atlantic to the planned U.S. military role in Europe. Western Europeans have demonstrated increasing independence and assertiveness as they move toward the establishment of a European union and a common foreign and security policy. Americans have become increasingly focused inward on severe domestic problems. The appropriateness and implications of three different potential U.S. military roles in Europe are examined. The study concludes that a continued significant U.S. military presence in Europe is a sound hedging strategy for the United States during a period of tremendous change. The study also suggests compensating measures to enhance the effectiveness of a more modest U.S. military force, should a larger U.S. military presence in Europe not be acceptable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT	ii
INTRODUCTION	1
NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	3
RESPONDING TO CHANGE: THE NATIONAL LEVEL	8
RESPONDING TO CHANGE: THE ALLIANCE DIMENSION	17
RESPONDING TO CHANGE: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION	24
DOMESTIC CHALLENGES TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY	40
FUTURE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY: THREE OPTIONS	47
CONCLUSION	72
ENDNOTES	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY	85

INTRODUCTION

During the period 1989-1991, there were tremendous changes in the European security environment: the Cold War ended, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Throughout the Cold War there were over 300,000 U.S. military troops in Western Europe poised to help defend the Atlantic Alliance against a possible Warsaw Pact attack. The United States and its European allies are now faced with questions concerning appropriate security structures to meet the needs of post-Cold War Europe. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate about appropriate future roles, missions and capabilities for U.S. military forces in Europe.

The paper begins with a discussion of the new security environment and includes an assessment of the threats, risks and uncertainties emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War, particularly those pertaining to Europe. Next, the paper examines the response of the Bush administration to new security realities. The development of a new national military strategy and force structure has been based in part on certain key assumptions and judgments by the Bush administration regarding the threat, the continued U.S. leadership role and the importance of Europe to American interests. The paper includes a discussion of those assumptions and judgments and an examination of the new U.S. military strategy and force structure, with particular emphasis on

roles, missions and capabilities planned for U.S. forces in Europe.

Following the discussion of these specifically U.S. policies, the paper examines NATO responses to the end of the Cold War. First, the new NATO strategic concept and force structure are examined. This is followed by a discussion of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which is intended to address the security concerns of NATO's former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The paper subsequently focuses on the increasing European independence and assertiveness in security matters exemplified by the European Community's progress toward European union and a common foreign and security policy. The roles of Great Britain, France and Germany in the establishment of a European defense identity and the determination of its relationship with NATO are particularly noteworthy. European views regarding the need for, and likelihood of, a continued U.S. military role in Europe are also presented.

Following the discussion of European responses, the paper examines U.S. domestic challenges to the Bush administration's European security policy. This section includes a review of recent calls for reduced defense spending and a greatly reduced U.S. military role in Europe. The views of presidential candidates, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and others are provided. The apparent lack of attention to foreign policy issues in the current presidential election suggests that the nation has become increasingly focused inward on its severe domestic problems.

Based in part on the foregoing discussion of U.S. and European

responses to the new security realities in Europe, the paper examines the appropriateness and implications of three different potential U.S. roles in European security:

Option I. The U.S. would participate fully in NATO with the U.S. troop presence in Europe set at the level planned by the Bush administration (150,000).

Option II. The U.S. would continue to be a full member in the Atlantic Alliance, but would withdraw all U.S. troops from Europe.

Option III. The U.S. would continue to participate in NATO as planned by the Bush administration, but would reduce the U.S. troop presence in Europe to a level well below 150,000.

NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For over forty years the United States focused its security efforts on the containment of the Soviet Union. American and allied forces in Europe faced a potentially aggressive enemy with over 100 divisions backed by tactical, theater and strategic nuclear weapons.¹ In this bipolar world the threat was well understood, and the lines were clearly drawn. The United States invested trillions of dollars in providing a military capability primarily focused on protecting Western Europe.²

During the period 1989 through 1991, there were tectonic shifts in Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Soviet domination over Central and Eastern Europe ended; the Berlin wall was torn down; Germany was reunited and permitted to remain a member of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist; and the Soviet Union collapsed. The members of the Atlantic Alliance extended a "hand of friendship"³ to former adversaries, who began the difficult process of transforming their governments from totalitarian to democratic and their economies from centrally managed to free market. Former members of the Warsaw Pact, including Czechoslovakia and Russia, expressed the desire to become members of NATO.⁴

During the same short period the United States fought in two regional wars unrelated to the traditional East - West rivalry. During Operation Just Cause, in a unilateral action, American forces from the United States and Panama deposed Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega and protected "American and Panamanian lives."⁵ In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States organized a diverse, ad hoc international coalition including European and Arab countries which first defended Saudi Arabia from potential Iraqi aggression (Operation Desert Shield) and then forcibly ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm). American forces from both the United States and Europe were deployed to Southwest Asia. In fact, the U.S. VII Corps from Germany provided the critical mobility and heavy "punch" considered necessary for successfully defeating the enemy armored formations in Iraq and Kuwait with minimal loss of American lives.⁶

Although primarily a defensive alliance during the Cold War focused on protecting member countries' territorial integrity, NATO also played a significant, if somewhat behind the scenes, role

during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis. The ACE Mobile Force air element was operationally deployed to Turkey. NATO also established a "Mediterranean Network," which was employed to coordinate the activities of over forty ships and a large number of AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control System) and maritime control aircraft.⁷ Other military forces from NATO member countries were deployed to the Gulf Region as part of a coalition, but not under NATO command and control. However, to quote General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, concerning these forces:

Of course, they used NATO rules of engagement and worked to NATO standards. They had trained together as NATO forces and enjoyed NATO interoperability and partnership. They had NATO readiness levels and used NATO's logistics and infrastructure. So, although they may have gone to the Gulf as a coalition and not as NATO, all the same that was about as close as you could come to the Alliance military itself going to the Gulf.⁸

The deployment of the U.S. VII Corps from Germany to Southwest Asia was greatly facilitated by the support provided by NATO allies in Europe. Host nation support groups loaded ammunition and other critical supplies. The German Army and German Railway System moved U.S. munitions and equipment to ports in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, where ships were loaded for movement to the Gulf. According to the VII Corps logistics plans officer during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the corps' deployment required 435 aircraft, 109 ships, 465 trains and 312 barges; lasted 97 days; and involved more than three million miles of organized convoys.⁹

Moreover, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United Nations, with

the concurrence of the Soviet Union, passed resolutions which authorized economic sanctions and military action, if necessary, to compel Iraq to withdraw its military forces from Kuwait. Passage of these sanctions would have been highly unlikely during the Cold War, given the Soviet Union's permanent membership and veto power on the Security Council and the fact that Iraq was an important Soviet client state.

While the old bipolar world was dangerous and expensive to secure, it also had a high degree of stability and predictability. The United States and its allies in NATO understood the threat and could logically determine the efforts needed to protect their vital interests. There were over 300,000 American troops stationed in Europe with thousands more in the United States available for reinforcement.¹⁰ There were American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe backed by strategic nuclear forces in the United States and on American submarines. In the Atlantic Alliance, members agreed that an attack on any ally would be considered an attack on all and would warrant such action as was deemed necessary, "...including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."¹¹ Significant forward deployed forces backed by reinforcements in the United States and a credible nuclear deterrent were important to the NATO strategy of "flexible response."¹² The stability and predictability of the bipolar structure also encouraged both sides to cooperate in lessening tensions and begin negotiating balanced force reductions.¹³

The new world is certainly less dangerous in many respects

than the old, but also less stable and predictable. Risks and uncertainties abound. Democratic and economic reforms in the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union have proven to be painful, disruptive and costly; their future success is by no means a certainty. Stability is threatened by potential food shortages, lack of employment, questionable control of nuclear weapons, disagreements over control of former Soviet military and naval forces, and the reemergence of old ethnic and religious differences.¹⁴ While NATO allies are no longer threatened with an attack by the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, there is still the potential for conflicts in the region to "spill over" into Western Europe. (The Yugoslavian civil war and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan are examples of crises which might eventually involve other countries in Western Europe.)¹⁵ Although no longer considered to be an adversary by Washington, Russia still retains sufficient strategic nuclear forces to destroy the United States.¹⁶

Other threats to security and stability in and around the Atlantic Region include the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the technology to make such weapons; possible actions by unfriendly nations, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya, which might threaten U.S. and allied interests; and drug trafficking and its associated problems.

RESPONDING TO CHANGE: THE NATIONAL LEVEL

President Bush's current security policy is based on the following assumptions and judgments:

- * While the Cold War is over, the world remains a dangerous place characterized by risk, uncertainty and the potential for the development of regional threats, such as the threat posed by Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis.¹⁷
- * For the foreseeable future the United States will remain the world's sole superpower with worldwide interests and the only nation fully capable of protecting those interests.¹⁸
- * While the United States does not seek hegemony, the judgment has been made that it continues to have a positive, world leadership role to play.¹⁹
- * Key to sustaining that leadership role is the maintenance of a strong defense capability which includes forward basing of troops (now referred to as forward presence) backed by a significant force projection capability.²⁰
- * Emphasis should be placed on the use of diplomatic means to solve problems, employing institutions such as the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

the European Community, the North Atlantic Atlantic Treaty Organization and its newly established North Atlantic Cooperation Council. While it is necessary and desirable for the United States to be able to act unilaterally if its interests are threatened, unilateral military efforts are expensive, in terms of both American lives and resources, and often lead to condemnation by the world community if prior consultation has not been accomplished. According to Secretary of State James Baker, the United States should increasingly conduct foreign relations as the leader of coalitions, sharing responsibilities and costs and advancing together on common problems. This is described as "American leadership through collective engagement."²¹

- * If diplomatic means fail, efforts must be made to employ existing alliances or form temporary ad hoc military coalitions prior to taking unilateral military action.

- * Western Europe, with its cultural, ethnic, and economic links to the United States, its commitment to a common set of Western values, its proximity to potential trouble spots in the Atlantic region, and its significant military capability, continues to play an essential role in America's security policy.²²

- * The Atlantic Alliance provides the United States with an

influential presence in Europe and a voice in shaping evolving European security structures.²³

- * NATO, as the world's only remaining functioning and fully capable military alliance, provides much needed stability in a Europe undergoing dramatic change. Thus the United States is currently very committed to NATO's continued existence and successful evolution to meet the security needs of post-Cold War Europe.²⁴

National Military Strategy

These assumptions and judgments are embodied in the new U.S. National Military Strategy. This was completed in February 1992 and took into consideration the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, and the fact that global war was now much less likely to occur. Developers of the new strategy assumed that the United States would retain its world leadership role as well as worldwide interests and cultural, political and economic links around the globe. The canonical contingency of a massive attack against the NATO allies in Europe by the Warsaw Pact has been replaced by instability and uncertainty as to where and when the next significant threat might arise and U.S. forces might be needed to protect American interests. Accordingly, there has been a "shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented and capable of responding decisively to

challenges of this decade."²⁵

The new National Military Strategy was built upon four key foundations initially outlined in the National Security Strategy of August 1991: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.²⁶

Strategic Deterrence and Defense: Despite recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives to reduce nuclear arsenals, U.S. military strategists recognized the large number of remaining nuclear weapons, uncertainty in the former Soviet Union, and the increasing number of potential hostile states developing weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the maintenance of a modern, fully capable and reliable strategic deterrent was assigned the "number one" defense priority of the United States. Also, due to the threat posed by global ballistic missile proliferation and by the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil, an important component of Strategic Deterrence and Defense was the provision of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).

Forward Presence: It was the judgment of current national leadership that U.S. forces deployed throughout the world would demonstrate U.S. commitment, lend credit to existing alliances, help maintain the system of collective defense while reducing the burden of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis-response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access abroad.

Crisis Response: One of the key demands of the new strategy

was for the capability to respond to regional crises. In time of crisis, U.S. forces must be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight unilaterally or as part of a combined effort. The U.S. leadership also recognized that while U.S. forces were responding to one regional crisis, other crises might arise in other areas. Thus, total U.S. forces must be maintained at levels sufficient to preclude vulnerabilities elsewhere.

Reconstitution: In the new military strategy, a U.S. military forces reconstitution capability was determined to be necessary to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. This capability was intended to deter any adversary from militarizing and, if deterrence failed, to provide the U.S. with a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution would include: the formation, training and fielding of new fighting units; the drawing on "cadre-type" units and "laid-up" military assets; the mobilization of previously trained or new manpower; and the activation of the industrial base on a large scale.

The strategy also emphasized the continued importance of arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility (worldwide deployment of forces on short notice), power projection both from the United States and forward deployed locations, technological superiority, and the use of decisive force once a decision for military action has been made.

The Base Force

The reformulation of national strategy has been accompanied by changes in force posture. These have centered around the concept of the base force. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, the base force acknowledged "the changing world order, domestic fiscal constraints, and the needs of our new military strategy."²⁷ In designing the base force, military planners took into account the importance of deterring aggression, providing a meaningful presence abroad, responding to regional crises and rebuilding a global warfighting capability.²⁸ The base force integrated active and reserve forces from each of the services into "an effective military force capable of responding across the spectrum of conflict."²⁹ Intended to be fielded by 1995, the base force will be a much smaller force than the 1991 force. (See Table I.)³⁰

Forward presence forces will be drawn predominantly from active component services. For regional crises, forces will also be drawn in large part from the active components, with essential support from the reserve components. In larger or more protracted crises, there will be increased reliance on reserve components. For force sizing purposes, the base force was subdivided into four conceptual force packages: Strategic Forces, Contingency Forces, Atlantic Forces, and Pacific Forces.

Strategic Forces: Strategic Forces will consist of a credible triad of modern, flexible and survivable systems: ballistic missile submarines, manned bombers, and land-based intercontinental

ballistic missiles, as well as defensive systems.

Atlantic Forces: The Atlantic Region includes Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia. The United States will maintain forward stationed and rotational forces in the Atlantic Region, a capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic Region and from the United States, and a means

Table I: Force Comparison

		FY1991	Base Force
STRATEGIC	Bombers	B52 & B1	B52H, B1, B2
	Missiles	1000	550
	Submarines	34	18
ARMY	Active	16 Divisions	12 Divisions
	Reserve	10 Divisions	6 Divisions
	Cadre		2 Divisions
NAVY	Ships	530 (15 CVBGs)	450 (12 CVBGs)
	Active	13 Air Wings	11 Air Wings
	Reserve	2 Air Wings	2 Air Wings
USMC	Active	3 MEFs	3 MEFs
	Reserve	1 Div/Wing	1 Div/Wing
AIR FORCE	Active	22 FWE	15 FWE
	Reserve	12 FWE	11 FWE

CVBG: Carrier Battle Group MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force
 FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent

to support deployment of large forces when needed.³¹ Forward presence forces in Europe will include an Army corps with two divisions, three-four Air Force fighter wings, two Navy carrier battle groups and two Marine amphibious ready groups to support a new NATO strategy (discussed later in the paper).

The Army corps will be the foundation of a U.S.-led multinational corps and will provide a U.S. division committed to a German-led multinational corps, as well as forward based elements of NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Force (ARRF). As stated in the National Military Strategy:

The corps is the fundamental Army unit capable of credible theater warfighting possessing organic logistics, communications, and intelligence infrastructure. It can conduct combat operations in Europe, project viable power elsewhere, and support the arrival of reinforcing units from the CONUS (continental U.S.) should the (European) continental situation change. A corps, with two divisions, is the minimum Army force suitable to serve this purpose.³²

Active forces based in the United States intended principally to respond to crises in the Atlantic Region will include: a reinforcing heavy Army corps with three divisions, each with a reserve "roundout" brigade; two Air Force fighter wings; one Marine Expeditionary Force; and four Navy carrier battle groups. In addition, U.S. elements of the Belgian Tri-national Corps will come from CONUS. Finally, six Army reserve divisions and eleven Air Force fighter wings, available for worldwide deployment, will augment efforts in the Atlantic Region, if needed.³³

Contingency Forces: Contingency forces will be fully-trained,

highly-ready forces that will be rapidly deliverable and initially self-sufficient. They will include forward stationed and deployed Army, Navy, Marine and Air Forces; special operations forces; and U.S.-based units. U.S.-based contingency forces will include an airborne corps headquarters, five Army divisions (including light and heavy ground forces capabilities), seven Air Force fighter wings, and one Marine Expeditionary Force.³⁴

Pacific Forces: Forward presence forces will be primarily maritime. Air Forces will be reduced to two-three fighter wing equivalents in Korea and Japan. Army forces will be reduced to less than one division. For addition information on Pacific Forces see the National Military Strategy.³⁵

Continued Importance of Western Europe

The response of the Bush administration to new security realities can be summarized as follows: The world remains a dangerous place characterized by instability, risk and uncertainty. Collective approaches to solving problems (American leadership through collective engagement) are preferred to acting unilaterally. However, as the world's sole remaining superpower, the United States must be prepared to protect its interests worldwide. Key to being prepared is a strong U.S. defense employing a regional military strategy which includes the forward basing of troops and a significant force projection capability from both the United States and overseas bases.

Western Europe continues to play an essential role in the U.S.

security concept. The plans for 150,000 U.S. troops based in Europe, as part of NATO, recognize the greatly reduced threat, yet demonstrate the U.S. commitment to European security, enable the U.S. to work collectively with its European allies, provide the U.S. with influence in Europe, and contribute to stability in a Europe undergoing tremendous change. NATO, the only fully capable and effective military alliance in Europe, is adapting to new realities and also contributes to stability in Europe. The significant roles of European-based U.S. forces and other NATO allies in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis demonstrated the potential value of having U.S. forces and other NATO allies respond rapidly from Europe for so-called "out of area" crises and conflicts in the Atlantic Region.

RESPONDING TO CHANGE: THE ALLIANCE DIMENSION

There have been two fundamental European responses to the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. First, there has been the adaptation of the Atlantic Alliance to new security realities. NATO has developed a new strategic concept and a greatly reduced, multinational force structure. Prominent in the new NATO is a continued significant U.S. role and military presence in Europe. NATO has also created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation with former adversaries on security related matters. The second fundamental European response has been an increased independence

and assertiveness on the part of Western Europeans who desire to take greater responsibility in providing for their own security. The creation of a European union with a common foreign and security policy and a defense force is key to the European Community's taking greater control of security and defense in Europe. Of course, this leads to questions about the continued importance of NATO and the U.S. military presence in Europe.

In a time of turbulence and rapid change in Europe, many Europeans continue to support the Atlantic Alliance and a continued significant United States role in European security. European members of NATO have worked closely with the United States and Canada to revise NATO's military strategy and force structure and to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to improve consultation and cooperation with former adversaries. Referring to an expected long term existence of enormous stocks of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the successor republics of the former Soviet Union, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated in May 1992 that, as long as such risks remain, a "substantial presence of North American forces in Western Europe and Germany remains indispensable for the security of our two nations (Germany and the United States)"³⁶

New Alliance Strategic Concept

In NATO's recently announced new strategic concept, the allies recognized the need to transform the alliance "to reflect the new,

more promising era in Europe."³⁷ They acknowledged the profound changes that had taken place in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as the demise of the Warsaw Pact. German unification within NATO, the movement of the European Community toward the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity (ESI), and the enhancement of the role of the Western European Union (WEU) were also considered to be important for European security. In the new strategic concept, the allies stated: "The development of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole."³⁸

In the new strategy a number of fundamental principles were retained, including the purely defensive purpose of the alliance, the defense of alliance frontiers, the assurance of territorial integrity and political independence of member states, the indivisibility of allies' security (an attack on one is an attack on all), and the continuing need for North American conventional forces and U.S. nuclear forces in Europe.³⁹ While the allies agreed to maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, they also recognized that those forces could be maintained at significantly reduced levels. Moreover, they agreed to move away from the concept of forward defense towards a "reduced forward presence and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect reduced

reliance on nuclear weapons."⁴⁰ The past "single and massive global threat (was seen to have) given way to diverse and multi-directional risks."⁴¹

Appropriate peacetime missions for the NATO's military forces could include participation in confidence-building activities, verification of arms control agreements, and participation in United Nations missions. In the event of crises "which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces (could) complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution."⁴² Finally, the allies agreed that while general war in Europe had become unlikely, it could not be ruled out. The alliance's military forces "...have to provide the essential insurance against political risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace."⁴³

New NATO Force Structure

In the new strategic concept the allies agreed: to reduce the overall size, and in many cases the readiness, of their military forces; to replace the in-line linear defense posture of the central region with a peacetime geographical distribution of forces to ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the alliance; and to enhance flexibility, mobility and augmentation capabilities of NATO forces.⁴⁴ Conventional forces

would include immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defense forces, and augmentation forces.⁴⁵ The allies would increasingly rely on multinational forces to demonstrate resolve, enhance cohesion, reinforce the transatlantic partnership, strengthen the European pillar, and make more efficient use of scarce defense resources.⁴⁶

At the time of this writing, while many details about the new NATO military force structure were classified or still being developed, the following preliminary information about that structure had been obtained from unclassified sources. The NATO Future Force Structure (MC 317) approved by Alliance Defense Ministers at the December 1991 NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting called for NATO nations to field seven corps in the current AFCENT/BALTAP (Central and Baltic Approachs) region.⁴⁷ All but one of the corps would be multinational. The corps would be organized as follows:

- * A Belgian-led corps consisting of four Belgian brigades, a German brigade, and a U.S. brigade (continental U.S.-based);
- * A German-led corps consisting of two German divisions and one U.S. division;
- * A German-led corps consisting of one German division and one Netherlands division (plus a U.K. armored division if not deployed with the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps);
- * A Netherlands-led corps consisting of one Netherlands division and one German division;
- * A U.S.-led corps consisting of one U.S. division and one

German division;

- * A German corps under national control in the eastern portion of Germany; and
- * The existing Corps LANDJUT (Allied Forces, Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein) in the BALTAP (Baltic Approaches) area consisting of one German division and one Danish division.

In addition, NATO decided to establish an ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) for deployment ACE-wide. The ARRC would be able to deploy an operational force of up to four divisions tailored to a specific military and political requirement. ARRC forces would be chosen from a peacetime structure of seven divisions, including two U.K. divisions, one Central Region multinational division, and one Southern Region multinational division. The ARRC would be commanded initially by a British general with a multinational headquarters and was expected to be fully operational by 1995.⁴⁸

A newly merged headquarters, Land Forces Central Region (LANDCENT), would be composed of the former Northern Army Group and Central Army Group. In the Central Region NATO force levels were expected to be reduced by 20-30 percent.⁴⁹

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council

Highly indicative of NATO's intention to adjust to new realities was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991. By April 1992 the Council consisted of the foreign ministers of NATO countries, less France,

and countries of the former Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact; its purpose was "to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe."⁵⁰ Participants agreed that their efforts should contribute to strengthening the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They also acknowledged that security in the new era was based on a broad concept that encompassed political, economic, social and environmental aspects, as well as defense, and that "an interlocking network in which institutions such as the CSCE, the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other, can best safeguard the freedom, security, and prosperity of all European and North American states."⁵¹

During the April 1992 NACC meeting, representatives discussed a variety of issues, including military aid to the Eastern countries and the potential for joint military exercises for peacekeeping and crisis management. They also gave consideration to conducting future seminars and discussions on topics such as the role of armed forces in democratic societies, military budgeting and equipment procurement, environmental protection, military involvement in humanitarian aid, and air traffic management. Additional topics brought up at the April meeting included Russia's expectation to field a roughly 1.2 million-man military force, the consolidation and destruction of Soviet short-range nuclear weapons, Poland's concern about the continued presence of Soviet soldiers on its soil, Estonia's concern for security of its

borders, and Ukrainian and Russian differences over destruction of nuclear weapons and the division of military equipmemnt.⁵²

RESPONDING TO CHANGE: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

While no Europeans have suggested that the United States military forces ought to remain in Europe indefinitely, some, particularly the French, have suggested that the withdrawal of U.S. forces in the near future is inevitable due to the lack of a credible threat to American interests in Europe and domestic pressure in the United States to reduce defense spending.⁵³ This view lends support to the assertion that Europeans ought to "push harder" to develop a common foreign and security policy with a defense component within the European Community, while accepting a reduction in the importance of NATO and the United States in European security and defense matters.

Movement Toward European Union

A new independence and assertiveness on the part of Western Europeans is understandable when one considers that the Cold War has ended, that there is no direct threat of military attack from the East, and that the European Community is proceeding on schedule toward open markets and internal borders in 1993 and, eventually, monetary and political union. As Western Europeans face internal domestic problems of unemployment and high levels of immigration, economic competition with the United States and Japan, and

instabilities and uncertainties in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, most are convinced that strengthening the European Community is the proper course of action for the future.

French President Francois Mitterrand described the European Community as being a "political and economic entity which has shown itself since 1957 to be an unfailing source of prosperity and progress... and it will be even more so once we have reached our objectives."⁵⁴ German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in describing Europe's future, stated:

Only the European Community can serve as the strong, dynamic nucleus and foundation of pan-European unification. It alone appears capable of giving Europe this quality, speaking with one voice in the world for the whole of Europe and adequately bringing this continent's weight to bear. To this end we must, however, endow it with the requisite structures and instruments. It is therefore essential to realize the vision of the founding fathers and develop the Community into a European Union.⁵⁵

Following the European Community's summit at Maastricht, the Netherlands, 9-10 December 1991, Chancellor Kohl described the Treaty on European Union signed at the summit as being "a decisive breakthrough," and said that "we are all at the end of a summit in which everyone can recognize that a new course in the process of European unification has been set." He also added that "the path to European union is now irreversible."⁵⁶

While the British were sceptical about some provisions of the Treaty on European Union, Prime Minister John Major was able to obtain concessions in key areas from his European counterparts. He convinced other EC members to agree that Britain could remain

outside the monetary union agreement until its Parliament made the final decision on whether to join. Britain also requested and received exemption from a European-wide program of improvements in working hours, minimum wages and working conditions.⁵⁷ The Economist noted that in the process "Mr Major used up a lot of his store of goodwill with other European leaders... Still, a notable victory it remains. For he has emerged with an agreement that probably reflects almost exactly the broadly pro-European yet warily sceptical attitude of most British voters."⁵⁸

In discussing the ratification efforts for the Treaty on European Union, due to go into effect on January 1, 1993, Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg stated:

... history shows that countries only survive by developing into larger activities, and political leaders need to work harder on conveying this vision. Some countries will have debates about particular aspects of the Maastricht terms, but the package will not be contested.⁵⁹

In a referendum held on June 2, 1992, Danish voters, concerned about their possible loss of national sovereignty, narrowly rejected the Maastricht Treaty. Technically, the treaty cannot go into effect unless all members of the European Community ratify it. The other eleven members decided to proceed with the ratification process and hoped that the Danes might accept the treaty at some later date.⁶⁰ In response to the Danish vote, German Chancellor Kohl remarked:

I regret that the Danish people pronounced themselves, by a narrow majority, against the treaty. At the same time, I affirm our

determination to continue unprejudiced on the road towards the establishment of the European union. There is no sensible alternative to a policy aimed at the unity of Europe - or else we risk a relapse into yesterday's rivalries.⁶¹

On June 18, 1992, Ireland became the first EC member to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, when sixty-nine percent of Irish voters decided to vote in favor of the treaty.⁶²

France and Germany took the lead in the development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the European Community. According to President Mitterrand, in 1990 Chancellor Kohl and he agreed to promote the goal of political union and proposed that the Community should move in four directions:

1. Ensure the unity and coherence of action by the union in economic, monetary and political domains;
2. Make the Community's institutions more efficient;
3. Reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the union; and
4. Define and implement a common policy on foreign affairs and defense.⁶³

In 1991 Chancellor Kohl stated that one of the main objectives of the European Community should be to

... frame a true common foreign and security policy ... It remains our conviction that unification is incomplete without fully including security policy and hence defense matters in the long term. Particularly the events of recent months have made it clear to us that we need an effective set of instruments in order to bring our common interests to bear even better in the world.⁶⁴

In a joint letter to the President of the EC's European

Council in October 1991, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand stressed the importance of continued negotiations on political union and a common foreign and security policy prior to the EC's Maastricht summit in December of that year, recognized a recent Anglo-Italian proposal in that area, and offered an alternative Franco-German initiative.⁶⁵ The British and Italians had proposed that the Western European Union (WEU) should become the main vehicle for Europe's defense identity; however, it should remain institutionally separate from the European Community. They also proposed that a European rapid reaction force should be used only outside the NATO area. The Franco-German plan called for the eventual creation of a European defense force, proposed that the WEU should take responsibility for coordinating Europe's defense policy, and saw the WEU as being an integral part of the process of European union.⁶⁶ As part of their initiative, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl also stated that Franco-German military cooperation would be strengthened beyond the existing joint brigade, that the resulting units could serve as the nucleus of a European corps, which could include the forces of other WEU member states, and that the new structure could also become the model for closer military cooperation between WEU member states.

The Franco-German initiative was not well received in the United States where the U.S. leadership viewed it as a possible attempt to undermine NATO and the U.S. role in European security. The U.S. ambassador in London, Raymond Seitz, reportedly made it clear that the U.S. could not accept NATO as being bypassed, or

duplicated, by a separate European army established under the EC or the WEU. He stated that the United States was "quite comfortable with the concept of a European defense identity," but only if it underpinned NATO and not if the aim was an alternative defense force.⁶⁷ At NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, President Bush openly expressed his concern when he told leaders of the Alliance's member nations: "Our premise is that the American role in the defense and affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by the European union ... If our premise is wrong, if, my friends, your aim is to provide (independently) for your own defense, the time to tell us is today."⁶⁸ The Alliance members' immediate responses to President Bush's concern were generally supportive of a continued presence of U.S. forces in Europe; however, a French spokesman reportedly stated, "We all support the presence of U.S. forces in Europe; it is not we Europeans who are pushing the U.S. out of Europe."⁶⁹

During the EC's Maastricht Summit on 9-10 December 1991, a compromise plan for the CFSP was reportedly negotiated which bridged the differences between the French and British positions. At the conclusion of the conference, Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain, portraying a victory for the British position, stated that the CFSP would be compatible with NATO and that the WEU would not be subordinated to the European Union. The French also announced that the summit on defense had been resolved in their favor. They said that the compromise CFSP text essentially reflected acceptance of the Franco-German initiative of October

1991, acknowledged a common EC defense identity, linked the WEU with the Union and NATO, would have the WEU implementing the defense policy of the Union, and included a 1996 revision clause that would allow deepening of the EC defense identity. They also said that the Union-WEU structure would be coherent with NATO, while creating a better equilibrium between the two pillars of the Alliance.⁷⁰

Reflecting increased European independence and assertiveness within the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states agreed in an enclosure to the CFSP text to "intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in the WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance."⁷¹ Joint or "bloc" actions within the Atlantic Alliance by a majority of European members who might also be committed to a separate EC security and defense agenda could contribute significantly to reducing the role and influence of the United States in European security and defense matters.

British Views

The British have continued generally to support NATO and a U.S. military presence in Europe. The Anglo-Italian initiative on the European defense identity was in line with the U.S. desire to keep NATO as the primary institution responsible for European defense. Moreover, by selecting one of their Army generals to command the new multinational ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the

British set an example of support for NATO's new strategy and military force structure.⁷² Although they have taken exception to some provisions of the Treaty on European Union, the British have also supported the progress of the European Community toward union. Perhaps in recognition of both the importance of a continued U.S. military role in Europe and the competitive aspects of evolving EC-NATO relations, John Goulden, British Assistant Undersecretary of State, stated at a NATO defense planning symposium in January 1992:

The mood in the U.S. is introspective. The case for maintaining a serious U.S. capability in Europe is harder to defend ... Predictions that the U.S. will withdraw from Europe can be self-fulfilling. Claims that Europeans can look after their own defence invite such a withdrawal ... We all know that while Europeans may be able to deal with some of their problems, an all-purpose security policy requires the U.S., not just as an ally of last resort but as a full participant. Any major European operation will, as far ahead as we can see, probably rely on specialized U.S. assets - airlift, intelligence, etc. ...⁷³

Later in his presentation Mr Goulden suggested that relations between the European defense identity and the Alliance, during a period when both were evolving, should be cooperative rather than confrontational. According to Mr Goulden,

The ideal is a process of gradual mutual adaptation with both NATO and the WEU taking account of developments in the other body. The outcome is unpredictable ... but looking well ahead, one interesting possibility would be that of a binary Euro-Atlantic Alliance between North America and the Western European Allies grounded around the WEU.⁷⁴

French Views

According to Jacques Andreani, French Ambassador to the United States, the French government supports alliance and cooperation between Europe and the United States, sees a future for the American role in Europe, and does not desire that the United States presence in Europe would disappear.⁷⁵ Mr Andreani has referred to two zones in Europe. One is the zone of the European Community and everything that is around it, where things are normal and the dominant trend is toward cooperation, integration, less barriers and common institutions. In this zone democratization is institutionalized. In the second zone, made up of the Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union, there is an opposite trend. In the words of Mr Andreani, "So why do we need Americans in Europe? We need them because of what's happening in the zone of insecurity."⁷⁶

However, the official French view regarding the future role of NATO reflects the continuing French desire to see a reduction in the leadership and influence of the United States in European affairs. Again according to Mr Andreani, while a strong and permanent security link between Western Europe and the United States should be maintained, it is not NATO that is important. When NATO was created in 1949, the European Community did not exist. NATO was established as an alliance between the United States and separate Western European national states. Now the states in the European Community can act together in the field of security and defense; NATO should be completely restructured. "The NATO of

tomorrow will take more the form of a balanced relationship between the United States and the European Community as such."⁷⁷

In pushing for ratification of the Treaty of European Union, the French government has demonstrated its desire not only to reduce the United States' role in Europe, but also to ensure that the recently reunified Germany is fully integrated into the European Community. According to French Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy,

If a single country fails to ratify the Maastricht treaty, one starts from scratch... It is a chance to build a Europe of peace. It is a chance for us to build it with Germany. Admit for one moment that the Maastricht treaty is not ratified by France and that, in the final analysis, Europe comes apart. In that case, Germany which today is integrated in Europe will be left to act as it sees fit.⁷⁸

Former French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement has expressed reservations about the implications of the Maastricht treaty for France:

I have the gravest doubts about what our country's foreign policy will mean after the treaty is passed. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (PESC) which is "compatible with NATO," to quote the treaty, risks being nothing more than window dressing for rallying to the new world order, because our partners will certainly bring us closer to NATO than we will lead them to the concept of a strictly European defense affirming the strategic autonomy of Europe vis-a-vis the United States.⁷⁹

Conflicting concerns about the roles of the United States and Germany in European security have created a dilemma for the French. In 1966, France decided to pursue a course more independent of the

United States and NATO by terminating its participation in the military component of the Atlantic Alliance. Many in France view the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to reduce significantly the U.S. role and influence in European security while enhancing the stature of France among other Europeans. However, the French also want to ensure that Germany will not renationalize its security efforts or assume the leadership role in Europe currently played by the United States. Thus, the French government is very much committed to a security partnership with Germany within the European Community. Yet, there are some in France who suspect that the French are simply "playing into the hands" of the Germans and other Western Europeans who want to draw France back into the NATO military alliance, which will continue to be dominated by the United States.

German Views

There are five key principles which characterize German views regarding European security.

1. The continued importance of the Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. presence in Europe. As mentioned earlier, Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stated that a substantial U.S. military presence in Europe remains indispensable as long as Germany continues to face risks associated with the tremendous stocks of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the successor republics of the former Soviet Union. Bundeswehr Inspector General Klaus Naumann has reportedly stated that the United States remains the most important partner

for Germany. It is his belief that only the United States can provide a nuclear protection guarantee if Germany continues to adhere to the principle of nonpossession of nuclear weapons. The guarantee is necessary because he believes that many new nuclear powers will emerge before the end of the century and the disintegrating Soviet Union presents great dangers for European security.⁸⁰

However, while the German government continues to support a U.S. military role in Germany, German public support for the continued presence of U.S. military forces has declined. In a recent survey, taking eastern and western Germans together, the percentage of those surveyed who were opposed to even a limited United States troop presence in the future had risen to 57 percent.⁸¹

2. Support for a European union which includes a common foreign and security policy. As discussed earlier, the development of a common foreign and security policy with a European defense component was a joint initiative by German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand. German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe has stated that there is the feeling in the United States that its forces were overextended in the past and that the Europeans and Japanese did too little. According to Mr Ruehe,

When I look at events in Los Angeles and elsewhere, this tendency will increase. It is important for us that Americans remain in Europe, because they are a component of what I would like to call the European security culture. But already it is becoming evident that there could be situations in which NATO is either not able or not willing to become

involved in Europe. For this reason, it is important to build up a European defense identity.⁸²

Implicit in Mr Ruehe's comments is the suggestion that Germany should be prepared in the future for the possibility of a much smaller U.S. military role in Europe or even the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

Moreover, the German leadership is sensitive to concerns on the part of other Europeans that a newly reunited Germany might renationalize its security policy and become the dominant military power in Central Europe. In this regard, Chancellor Kohl has called for a "European Germany, not a German Europe."⁸³ According to Mr Ruehe, "When one talks of leadership, one must think of the very successful system in the EC, where every country has just one vote... We (Germans) don't like to lead from the front. We like to lead from the middle of the crowd."⁸⁴

3. A desire to tie France ever more closely into a common defense strategy. According to Dominik von Wolff Metternich, while Germany has remained fully integrated into NATO and thus closely linked to the United States, its leaders have also been concerned about the independent character of the French nuclear arsenal and its possible employment over German territory. With French troops operating on German soil in case of aggression, the employment of French nuclear weapons without German sanction would become less likely. The creation of a Franco-German force in Germany would also guarantee a high number of French troops being locked into the defense of Germany.⁸⁵ Moreover, the existence of a joint European

force in Germany would help convince the French and other Europeans of Germany's commitment to European union and also help allay their fears that Germany might be interested in renationalizing its security policy.

4. The importance of dealing effectively with instabilities, risks and uncertainties in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In addition to concerns about the control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union, Chancellor Kohl has been concerned that Europe might face uncontrollable political developments and destabilizing new flows of refugees. In order to help insure success of political and economic reforms in the East, Germany has pledged the equivalent of \$47 billion to the former Soviet Union and a further \$65 billion to Central and Eastern Europe, including the states of the former East Germany.⁸⁶ Germany has also supported the efforts of the CSCE and NATO's new North Atlantic Cooperation Council.⁸⁷

5. The importance of Germany eventually assuming a greater role in defending German and allied interests, not only within the territorial limits of NATO, but also in so-called "out of area" situations. Sensitive to criticism by its allies about Germany's lack of direct military participation in combat during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stated that the Bundeswehr's responsibilities should not be restricted to UN Blue Helmet assignments. At the 33d conference of Bundeswehr commanders, Mr Kohl remarked, "Germany cannot and must not in the long term evade its duty to take part in operations to preserve and restore

world peace and international security."⁸⁸ Of course, while its allies have criticized Germany in the past for failing to participate militarily in crises, the actual deployment of German forces outside Germany for any reason could conjure up visions of the old nationalistic and aggressive Germany. Moreover, German Defense Minister Ruehe has stated that Germans had, over the last forty years, developed instincts of holding back that could not be ordered away from the top down. He believed that combat deployment of the Bundeswehr outside of Germany for UN missions would be out of the question for a long time to come.⁸⁹ According to the Bundeswehr's own figures, 56 percent of Germans are against their troops being used in UN-backed military operations and an even larger percentage, 69 percent, are against Germany's defending non-NATO European countries.⁹⁰

European Hedging Strategy

The two fundamental European responses to new security realities can best be characterized as a hedging strategy. On the one hand, NATO allies have adapted the Atlantic Alliance to meet the needs of the reduced threat and a desire to help address the security concerns of former adversaries. They have recognized that NATO and the United States military presence in Europe contribute to security and stability in a time of tremendous change. After all, NATO is the only fully capable and functioning military alliance in Europe. Also, the Europeans have realized, based on the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, that the U.S. military's specialized

capabilities in command, control, communications, intelligence, transportation and logistics, as well as its highly effective, lethal weapons systems, make an essential contribution to security that could not be matched by Europeans for the foreseeable future. Given the continued existence of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and their likely proliferation elsewhere, the U.S. nuclear deterrent is also reassuring, especially for Germany.

On the other hand, the Cold War is over and there is no longer a direct threat to the security of Western Europe. Many Europeans, especially the French, believe that the United States should no longer lead the Atlantic Alliance or retain significant influence in European security matters. There is also the expectation in some quarters that the United States will withdraw its military forces from Europe anyway because of an increased preoccupation with domestic problems and the need for savings in defense spending. The European Community (EC) is strong economically and proceeding vigorously toward economic, monetary and political union. Western Europeans should assume greater responsibility, risks and costs in providing for their own security. A European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) with a European defense force is the proper European approach to providing for European security.

Continued European support of NATO and the U.S. military presence in Europe can be thought of as a hedge or insurance policy against the possible failure of the European Community's new common foreign and security policy. A continued emphasis on NATO and the U.S. presence will buy time for Western Europeans to develop

effective security structures and defense forces; it will help discourage the emergence of new threats against Western Europe or Western European interests in the Atlantic Region before the Europeans are ready to respond effectively; and it will provide a useful "fall back" or reinforcement should the CFSP fail to develop successfully. At the same time, the EC's CFSP also provides the Western Europeans with a hedge or insurance policy against the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and the failure of NATO to remain relevant to Europe's security needs. Thus, simultaneously pursuing two, seemingly contradictory approaches to providing for their security appears to be a sound, risk averse hedging strategy for the Western Europeans.

DOMESTIC CHALLENGES TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

While the Bush administration wants to maintain a significant role for the United States in European security and a substantial presence of U.S. military forces in Europe, European concerns about a possible withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe are nonetheless well founded. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, several key U.S. leaders have called for sharply reduced defense budgets and either a complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Europe or a reduction of European-based U.S. forces to levels well below those planned by the Bush administration.

Calls for U.S. Troop Reductions in Europe

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, has called for taking \$210 billion out of the defense budget over seven years.⁹¹ Democratic presidential candidate Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown, Jr, has called for the U.S. defense budget to be cut by fifty percent over five years and would leave only 1000 U.S. troops in Europe.⁹²

At NATO's annual Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, Germany, during February 1992, Senator William S. Cohen, Republican of Maine and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told the assembly of defense experts that the U.S. Congress may reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe to as low as 75,000. According to Senator Cohen, the "prevailing view" in the United States is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "is no longer necessary, relevant or affordable." He also said that the alliance will likely become a "mainly European organization."⁹³ Later in the meeting Senator Warren Rudman, Republican of New Hampshire, stated that the U.S. troop presence in Europe might be reduced to 60,000. Expressing American concerns over the U.S.-European Community stalemate over European agricultural subsidies, Vice President Dan Quayle told attendees at the conference: "Friends, we have got to get with it. Trade is a security issue."⁹⁴ After hearing several U.S. politicians warn of serious consequences if Europe did not cut its farm subsidies, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek called the American statements "exaggerated reproaches" and warned that a U.S. withdrawal from Europe could have the same kind of dire

consequences it had after World War I.⁹⁵

Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan has supported a strong defense, but opposed "overseas entanglements." A key part of his "America First" strategy was the belief that direct threats to American interests in Europe no longer exist and that U.S. troops overseas should be returned to the United States. In Mr Buchanan's words,

I will not ask our allies who have been freeloading off us for the entire Cold War to carry more of the burden of their own defense; I will tell them they have to carry more of the burden of their own defense because American forces are coming home. Why do we need 200,000 American troops in Bavaria when the Red Army is going home?⁹⁶

Governor Clinton's Position

Democratic presidential candidate Governor Bill Clinton has called for a U.S. foreign policy which is "based on a simple premise: America must lead the world we have done so much to make... I believe it is time for America to lead a global alliance for democracy..."⁹⁷ However, he believes that the United States cannot be strong abroad if it is weak at home. Mr Clinton fully supports U.S. assistance to Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union in their attempts to transform their economies and governments. He contends that the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of danger in the world. While forces originally designed to counter the Soviet threat can be substantially reduced, the level of defense spending must be based on "protecting our enduring interests and protecting our comparative advantage in

training, mobility and advanced military technology."⁹⁸ Mr Clinton also believes that while the United States will continue to reduce its nuclear arms in tandem with Russia and the other republics, it must retain a survivable nuclear force to deter any conceivable threat. Regarding collective security, he has stated:

At the outset, let me be clear: I will never turn over the security of the U.S. to the U.N. or any other international organization. We will never abandon our prerogative to act alone when our vital interests are at stake. Our motto in this era will be: together when we can, on our own when we must. But it is a failure of vision not to recognize that collective action can accomplish more than it could just a few years ago - - it is a failure of leadership not to make use of it.⁹⁹

Mr Clinton has also called for America's allies to take a more active role in the defense of their own regions. The United States should maintain its "ties to NATO, even as the Europeans play a stronger role both within NATO and in the evolution of future security arrangements for the continent."¹⁰⁰ He believes that U.S. defense spending should be cut by \$100 billion over five years and that U.S. troops in Europe should be reduced below 150,000 to perhaps as low as 75,000.¹⁰¹

Congressman Aspin's Threat-Based Approach

Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has stated that the development of the current United States security strategy and planned military force structure took into consideration the end of the Warsaw Pact and the end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, but not the demise of the Soviet

Union. He also contends that force sizing and structuring should be based on a realistic assessment of threats, instead of other justifications, such as the minimum requirements for a superpower, the need to match capabilities of other potential rivals around the world, or the minimum requirements to maintain organizational health.¹⁰²

According to Mr Aspin, "It is critical to identify threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them."¹⁰³ He considers the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis to be a defining event:

In many ways, Saddam Hussein is the prototype or model for the Post-Soviet threat... Iraq's seizure of Kuwait was a direct challenge to American vital interests. It threatened Western access to oil, it stood as a model for would-be aggressors, and it made real the dangers of nuclear proliferation. It also demonstrated that in a world where there is little risk of escalation to total war - the great inhibitor of the Cold War - wars are more, not less, likely.¹⁰⁴

Mr Aspin contends that the U.S. military force structure should be built from the bottom up based on a clear threat assessment.¹⁰⁵ He has nominated "the Iraq or the Iraq equivalent as a benchmark or unit of account of future threats."¹⁰⁶

According to the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, the long-term defense plan outlined by Mr Aspin would leave U.S. forces in the late 1990s large enough to conduct simultaneously "a massed ground war in the Middle East, an aerial defense against a North Korean attack and a minor intervention on the scale of the 1989 occupation of Panama."¹⁰⁷ A comparison of the current U.S.

conventional force with the force that would remain at the end of five years under President Bush's planned defense budget (the base force) and the counterproposal by Representative Aspin which would cut \$48 billion from Mr Bush's plan over the five years is shown in Table II.¹⁰⁸

On June 5, 1992, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a \$270 billion military budget for the fiscal year that begins October 1, 1992 (FY1993). The budget adopted by the House was approximately \$11 billion less than the Bush administration had proposed, would reduce the number of U.S. troops in Europe to 100,000 by 1995, and included a series of measures requiring American allies to shoulder a greater share of the burden for their own defense. The Senate was expected to approve a military budget of at least \$277 billion in the coming months.¹⁰⁹

U.S. Public Opinion

Noteworthy in the 1992 presidential campaign is an apparent lack of attention to foreign policy issues by both the candidates and the American public at large. The two nominees of their respective parties, President Bush and Governor Clinton, have similar views on national defense issues. Both support collective security, but believe that the United States must be capable of acting unilaterally to protect American interests when necessary. Both support NATO and a U.S. military presence in Europe, although Governor Clinton would accept a smaller troop presence in Europe than would President Bush.

Table II: Aspin verses Bush

	CURRENT	BUSH	ASPIN
ARMY			
Active divisions	16	12	9
Reserve divisions	10	6 ¹	6
MARINE CORPS			
Active divisions	3	2.3	2
Reserve divisions	1	1	1
AIR FORCE			
Active fighter wings	22	15	10
Reserve fighter wings	12	11	8
NAVY			
Ships (total)	528	450	340
Carriers ²	14	12	11
Attack submarines	87	80	40
Amphibious ships	65	50	50
SEALIFT			
Fast sealift ships	8	8 ³	24
Prepositioned ships	8	8 ³	24

¹ Does not include leadership cadre for two additional divisions

² Does not include one carrier for training

³ Does not include a pending proposal to spend \$3 billion for 20 or more additional sealift and prepositioning ships

NOTE: A division usually includes 17,000 to 20,000 troops; an Air Force fighter wing typically includes 72 airplanes.

SOURCE: House Armed Services Committee

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, there is no longer a clear monolithic threat to the United States. Understandably, the American public has focused its

attention on the overwhelming problems of unemployment, exorbitant health care costs, crumbling infrastructure, declining quality of public education, declining U.S. competitiveness in world markets, and the social and economic deprivation, racial discrimination, and lawlessness found in many inner-city areas of the United States. Many Americans have become increasingly disenchanted with the apparent inability or unwillingness of traditional Republican and Democratic politicians in Congress and the Executive Branch to take effective action toward solving the severe domestic problems facing the United States.

FUTURE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY: THREE OPTIONS

With its collective engagement strategy, regional military strategy and base force, the Bush administration has staked out a position for a continued prominent role for the United States in European security and a significant U.S. military presence in Europe (150,000 troops). However, as seen in the foregoing discussion, there are important challenges to this position from Europeans who desire to take greater responsibility in providing for their own security and from Americans who believe that there is less need for U.S. forces in Europe and that more attention and resources should be committed to solving problems at home. Thus, it is reasonable to look at various options for a future U.S. role in European security.

The appropriateness and implications of three different potential roles for the United States in European security will be examined:

Option I: The United States would participate fully in the NATO with the U.S. military presence in Europe set at the level planned by the Bush administration (150,000 troops).

Option II: The United States would continue to participate in the Atlantic Alliance, but would withdraw all U.S. forces from Europe.

Option III: The United States would continue to participate in NATO as planned by the Bush administration, but would reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe to a level well below 150,000 troops.

Six bases will be employed for comparing the options:

1. Collective Engagement - Secretary of State James Baker has argued that, as the most powerful democracy on earth, the United States should increasingly conduct its foreign policy as the leader of coalitions, rather than as a lone superpower. The U.S. should work with its partners to share responsibilities and costs, and to advance together on common problems.¹¹⁰ To what extent might the given option contribute to the implementation of a "collective engagement" strategy?

2. Influence - To what extent might the given option contribute to the ability of the United States to influence or

persuade Europeans to be more considerate of American views on security, political and economic matters?

3. Stability - To what extent might the given option contribute to maintaining stability in a Europe undergoing tremendous change?

4. Regional Strategy - The Bush administration defines the Atlantic Region to include Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia. This region includes the territory of NATO member states and other areas considered by NATO allies to be "out of area." The Bush administration would employ U.S. forces based in Western Europe, as well as in the United States and other areas, to protect American interests in the Atlantic Region. To what extent might the given option facilitate the implementation of the United States' regional military strategy?

5. European Support - How might the Europeans respond to implementation of the given option? To what extent would they support, tolerate or reject it?

6. U.S. Domestic Support - To what extent might the American public support the given option in light of the severe domestic problems facing the country?

OPTION I - The U.S. would participate fully in NATO with the U.S. troop presence set at the level planned by the Bush administration (150,000).

1. Collective Engagement - A continued full participation by

the United States in the political and military components of NATO in Europe would support an American collective engagement strategy. The provision of 150,000 U.S. troops to meet the U.S. contribution to NATO's newly negotiated strategy and multinational force structure would help demonstrate that the U.S. is committed to playing a significant partnership role in European security. The reduction of U.S. forces in Europe by more than fifty percent, of course, is part of an alliance-wide effort to reduce overall force levels in response to the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union.

U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council provides the U.S. with the opportunity to consult and cooperate with both its NATO allies and former adversaries on security related matters. The countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union welcome the efforts of the United States and its NATO allies to help them overcome the security vacuum existing in their region. The planned presence of U.S. troops would enable the United States to effectively participate in joint planning, joint training, joint crisis management exercises, joint arms control operations and joint peacekeeping operations with both NATO allies and former adversaries.

In future crises or conflicts where NATO allies might not agree to respond as an alliance, the formation of, and response by, ad hoc coalitions involving two or more NATO allies would be greatly facilitated by the past experiences of the U.S. and other

NATO allies having planned, worked and trained together using NATO facilities and procedures. A continued significant U.S. troop presence in Europe together with full U.S. participation in both the political and military components of NATO would also increase the likelihood that the United States would support collective efforts to solve problems in the Atlantic Region instead of relying on a unilateral U.S. "lone superpower" approach. It would help prevent the singularizaion of the United States in a "Fortress America."

Of course, a significant U.S. presence in Europe as part of NATO alone will not guarantee an effective U.S. collective engagement strategy in the Atlantic Region. NATO must adapt to new realities to continue to be relevant. It is doing so to a certain extent with its new strategy, new force structure and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO has also agreed to accept peacekeeping missions in Europe if asked by the CSCE, and if consensus were obtained among the NATO allies.¹¹ However, neither NATO nor any other security institution has determined effective approaches to resolving the complex new ethnic and religious conflicts in post-Cold War Europe and Central Asia, as exemplified by the situations in the former Yugoslavia and in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

2. Influence - A continued significant U.S. military presence in Europe (150,000 troops) and a continued U.S. participation in NATO would provide the United States with a greater level of influence in Europe than a lesser level or no U.S. military

presence would provide. Of course, the almost complete elimination of the threat of attack from the East, the demise of the Soviet Union and the success of the European Community have encouraged a greater independence and assertiveness on the part of Western Europeans, who feel less need to worry about the effects of their actions on United States' decisions concerning European security. Still, NATO provides the United States with the only effective forum for consultation with its allies on European security matters.

In order to have influence in European security, the United States must demonstrate a commitment to its European allies. One measure of that commitment is the level of U.S. ground troops in Europe, which could be less easily withdrawn than naval or air forces. A significant U.S. ground forces presence demonstrates a significant U.S. commitment and helps enhance U.S. influence in Europe.¹¹² The United States should retain the ability to express its views and promote its security interests as Western Europeans establish a closer European union with a common foreign and security policy and take greater responsibility in providing for their own security. The United States should seek to exert its influence as a partner in, rather than as leader of, the Atlantic Alliance.

3. Stability - A continued U.S. participation in NATO along with a significant U.S. military presence in Europe contributes to the maintenance of stability in a Europe undergoing tremendous change. Western Europeans have only recently begun the process of

establishing a common foreign and security policy for the European Community. While, in all likelihood, they will eventually take greater responsibility for their security, the ultimate establishment of a more independent European defense identity will probably not occur until much later in the decade. Many details must be worked out concerning the roles of NATO, the Western European Union, the European Community, a separate European army, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The U.S. military presence and nuclear deterrent help create a stable climate for orderly change in Europe. As discussed earlier, they provide Western Europeans with a hedge or insurance policy against their possible failure to implement successfully a common foreign and security policy and create an effective Western European defense force. The U.S. military presence helps discourage the reemergence of old nationalistic rivalries in Western Europe and helps prevent the development of unanticipated threats to allied interests elsewhere in the region. Therefore, it buys additional time for Western Europeans to take actions necessary to become more self-sufficient in providing collectively for their own security. Western Europeans are better enabled to make careful, deliberate decisions on future security structures without undue concerns for their immediate security needs. The same kind of reasoning also applies to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. While not having offered full NATO membership to former adversaries, the United States and its NATO allies have at least

offered to assist them in solving security problems and developing security structures to meet their needs.

The European hedging strategy also serves American interests. As long as Western Europeans are less than fully capable of protecting allied interests in the Atlantic Region, the United States will probably feel compelled to continue to play a dominant role in responding to major crises, either as leader of, and major force contributor to, ad hoc coalitions, or as a unilateral actor. The U.S. European-based force envisioned by Option I would provide the United States with the ability to perform this role. However, the United States prefers that its European allies participate more fully in collective responses to crises, and even take the lead in cases where European interests are more clearly at stake, such as the Yugoslavian crisis. Buying time for, and encouraging, the Western Europeans to become more reliable and effective security partners is a sound investment for the United States. It provides the United States with a hedge or insurance policy against two possible undesirable outcomes: (1) the premature failure of Western Europeans to take greater collective responsibility in providing for their own security, and (2) a domestically driven U.S. decision at some future date to withdraw all U.S. forces from Europe before the Western Europeans are capable of providing for their own security needs.

As long as individual countries believe that their security needs are being met, they will be less encouraged to renationalize their security efforts. For example, while Germany is surrounded by

countries with nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, France and Great Britain), it is able to derive at least some reassurance from the U.S. troop presence in Germany and the U.S. nuclear umbrella that it need not acquire its own nuclear capability. Likewise, smaller countries in Europe with lingering memories of the old nationalistic, hegemonic Germany are reassured by both the U.S. military presence in Europe and Germany's membership in the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

The failure of the European Community to develop a common foreign and security policy and establish an effective European defense force, if coupled with a withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Europe, could not only lead to the untimely demise of the Atlantic Alliance and the loss of American influence in Europe, but also encourage the reemergence of old Western European rivalries and the renationalization of security efforts.

4. Regional Strategy - Option I enables the United States to fully implement its military strategy for the Atlantic Region. It permits close consultation and cooperation with NATO allies on security matters. It provides the United States with a robust force in Europe capable of contributing significantly to the defense of Western Europe, as well as responding rapidly and effectively to crises throughout the Atlantic Region. The Army corps and naval, marine and air forces envisioned for the 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe is intended to be capable of sustained combat operations until reinforced by troops from the United States. Moreover, the two-division corps, normally under U.S. national command and

control in peacetime, would enable the United States to meet its agreed upon commitment to participate in NATO's new multinational force structure when appropriate and directed by the United States. If the NATO allies were unable to arrive at consensus for joint NATO action during a crisis, Option I would also give the United States the flexibility to act unilaterally or as part of an ad hoc coalition with certain allies as dictated by America's interests in the Atlantic Region.

The significant U.S. troop presence in Europe would also demonstrate the United States' commitment to security in the Atlantic Region and discourage the emergence of unanticipated threats. While some conflicts, such as the ethnic civil war in Yugoslavia, cannot be deterred, they can at least be contained locally while diplomatic approaches are taken to resolve the crises.

While the argument could reasonably be made that the United States might encounter political and legal difficulties in attempting to employ its European-based forces for so-called "out-of-area" missions, the close consultative and cooperative mechanisms of the Atlantic Alliance would be available to help overcome any difficulties in this area. Moreover, by consulting with its NATO allies, the United States would be in a better position to build a consensus among some or all allies for an appropriate joint response to a given conflict or crisis. A joint response might more favorably influence world opinion than would a hasty, unilateral U.S. response. In some cases, the interests of

the U.S. and its allies might conflict, and the United States would have to act alone. In these cases, the U.S. could employ its forces from the United States or elsewhere, in the unlikely event that U.S. European-based forces were unable to respond effectively.

5. European Support - By endorsing NATO's new strategy and force structure, European allies in the Atlantic Alliance have officially agreed to support the American role in European security envisioned by Option I, at least for the time being. Many Central and Eastern Europeans also believe that a continued significant U.S. military presence in Europe is important to promote peace and stability. However, the previously unchallenged U.S. leadership of the Atlantic Alliance is eroding as Western Europeans take greater responsibility for providing their own security in the aftermath of the Cold War. Some Western Europeans contend that the United States will soon withdraw its military forces from Europe, and, therefore, the Europeans will be left to provide for their own security. Also, as mentioned earlier, in at least one recent public opinion survey, the majority of Germans polled favored the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany.

The development of a European Community common foreign and security policy could ultimately lead to a separate, fully independent European defense force subordinate to the Western European Union and European Community. Another possibility could be NATO's evolution into a binary Euro-Atlantic alliance with both a North American pillar and a more independent European pillar. In this case, European allies in the European pillar might also be

subordinate to the WEU and implement the EC's security and defense policies. Most European forces in peacetime would probably remain under national command and control and, based on the individual decisions of allies concerned, could be employed unilaterally, in ad hoc coalitions, as part of a distinct European force under the WEU, or as part of a NATO force.

In a binary Euro-Atlantic alliance, European members of NATO would probably consult and seek consensus on security matters as a European "bloc" or caucus prior to consulting with North American allies. In this case the United States should anticipate losing a considerable amount of leadership and influence in European security matters even though it maintains a significant troop presence in Europe. However, the United States could probably still continue to play an important partnership role in the alliance.

The United States can increase the likelihood that it will continue to play a significant role in European security for the immediate future by doing at least five things:

- a. Meeting its obligations specified by NATO's new strategy and force structure recently agreed to by Alliance members. Over time, as the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community have the opportunity to respond to the needs of the post-Cold War, post-Soviet Union era, NATO's strategy and force structure will further evolve. Thus, the current requirement to station 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe should not be considered to be "locked in concrete." Under appropriate circumstances, the United States could effectively participate in a binary Euro-Atlantic alliance with

less than 150,000 European-based U.S. troops, provided the American contingent were organized as highly effective land, air and naval forces that supported NATO's strategy.

b. Demonstrating a willingness to play a greater partnership role, as opposed to a leadership role, in the Alliance.

c. Continuing to provide the unique American military capabilities to the Alliance (command, control, communications, intelligence, logistics and transportation).

d. Downplaying divisive links between European trade concessions and the American military presence in Europe.

e. Supporting European efforts to take greater responsibility in providing their own security, and encouraging them to do so within the Atlantic Alliance.

Just as many Europeans are anticipating the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, Americans should also accept the idea that eventually a U.S. military presence in Europe may be neither necessary nor acceptable to the Europeans. However, for the immediate future, the United States still has an important role to play in European security.

6. U.S. Domestic Support - The continued presence of 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe will probably become increasingly difficult to justify to the American public given the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, the apparent lack of a credible direct threat to U.S. interests in Europe, the efforts of Western

Europeans to take greater responsibility for their security, the unwillingness of Western Europeans to correct perceived unfair trade practices in world markets, and, especially, the overwhelming domestic problems facing the United States. There are many in government or running for public office, outside the Bush administration, who have called for significant reductions in both total defense spending and overseas troop stationing, and for application of the resulting "peace dividend" to help cure domestic ills. The calls have been somewhat muffled during the 1992 election year after it became clear that an unwelcomed side effect of a rapid military drawdown would be an unacceptable increase in the level of unemployment among former service members and former employees of defense contractors. Still, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. House of Representatives in June 1992 called for a reduction in President Bush's proposed 1993 defense budget from \$281 billion to \$270 billion and for the U.S. troop strength in Europe to be cut to 100,000 by 1995. It is also likely that calls for more significant reductions in defense spending will be made after the November 1992 national election.

OPTION II - The U.S. would continue to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance, but would withdraw all U.S. troops from Europe.

1. Collective Engagement - The withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe would put a United States' collective engagement strategy at risk. While consultation and cooperation with NATO

allies would be possible, the United States would probably lose much of its credibility if it were unwilling to participate in the military component of NATO in Europe and were seen by its allies as being less capable of defending American interests in the Atlantic Region.

There is also the possibility that NATO itself might not survive and Western Europeans would find themselves attempting to implement prematurely a common foreign and security policy with a defense component. As demonstrated by the recent Danish vote against ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, there may be resistance to closer European union on the part of some countries, who might decide instead to renationalize their security efforts. It is likely that Germany and France would increase their efforts to develop a European army and push for some variation of the EC's common foreign and security policy. With the U.S. military "out of the picture" in Europe, Great Britain would probably support and participate in the Franco-German efforts. After a period of turbulence and uncertainty, other members of the European Community would probably also follow suit.

The United States would not be able to participate effectively in many of the anticipated future activities of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council with NATO allies and former adversaries without a U.S. military presence in Europe: joint military planning, joint training, joint crisis management exercises, arms control operations and peacekeeping.

The capability of the United States and its European allies to

conduct effective joint military operations either as a part of NATO or as part of ad hoc coalitions would rapidly erode over time if opportunities to routinely plan, train and exercise together in Europe were lost.

A U.S. military withdrawal from Europe might also encourage U.S. domestic calls for a U.S. military withdrawal from the Far East. The result could easily be a singularization of the United States in a "Fortress America" and less American participation in collective approaches to solving problems.

2. Influence - After withdrawing all of its military forces from Europe, the United States would probably be seen by its allies as being much less committed to European security and would probably lose much of its voice and influence in European security matters. Also any "essential" U.S. leverage on economic issues could also be lost. NATO would probably play a greatly diminished role in Europe or even cease to exist, in which case the United States would no longer have an effective forum for consultation and cooperation with its European allies.

3. Stability - A withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Europe could contribute to decreased stability on the continent. Given the current uncertain prospects for success of a Western European common foreign and security policy and defense force, the security vacuum existing in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the potential threatening strategic nuclear arsenals in four of the former Soviet Republics, some Western European countries might consider renationalizing their

security efforts. Germany might question the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella if there were no remaining U.S. forces in Germany and decide that it needs to acquire nuclear weapons. A nuclear capable Germany could create additional destabilization in Europe.

4. Regional Strategy - The withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe would significantly limit the ability of the United States to implement its military strategy in the Atlantic Region. The resulting degradation or loss of NATO would make allied consultation and cooperation more difficult. The United States would be less capable of, and the American public probably less willing to, assist in the defense of Western Europe, should the need arise. Admittedly, a direct threat to Western Europe would probably require a number of years to emerge fully.

U.S. military forces would also be less capable of responding to crises and conflicts that threatened American interests elsewhere in the Atlantic Region, such as the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis. The end of an American military presence in Europe might also encourage potential adversaries in the region to question America's resolve and embolden them to take actions threatening to U.S. and allied interests.

5. European Support - Without a U.S. troop presence in Europe, many NATO allies would question the relevancy of the Atlantic Alliance. Clearly some Europeans, especially the French, favor a much smaller role for the United States in European security. Many in Western Europe believe that the United States will soon withdraw

its military forces from Europe and that Western Europeans should intensify their efforts to develop a common foreign and security policy and a separate European defense force. The continued leadership of Germany and France in this effort will be crucial to its ultimate success.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe could contribute to increased instability and, thus, might not be welcomed by many Western or Central and Eastern Europeans. As mentioned earlier, the German public has begun to show signs of increased intolerance for a continued U.S. troop presence in Germany. However, the German government might feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons for Germany if the American commitment to protect Germany from its nuclear capable neighbors were ever in doubt.

6. U.S. Domestic Support - The U.S. public would probably greatly welcome the savings in defense spending resulting from a total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and desire that the ensuing "peace dividend" be applied to help solve the country's dire domestic problems. The American people understood and appreciated the need for countering the direct threat to the United States and Western Europe during the Cold War. However, current concerns by the Bush administration about collective engagement, influence, instability, risks and uncertainty are more subtle and offer less compelling rationales for a continued significant U.S. military presence in Europe. Yet, there have been few calls by members of Congress, presidential candidates or so-called "defense experts" for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

Perhaps visions of Europe in 1917, 1941, and 1947-1951, as well as Kuwait in 1990-1991, are encouraging more moderate, less isolationist views about the importance of security in Europe and the rest of the Atlantic Region to the United States.

OPTION III - The U.S. would continue to participate in NATO, but would reduce the U.S. troop presence in Europe to a level well below 150,000. Without getting too specific, the force envisioned for this option would consist of, say, 50,000-100,000 U.S. troops and would be optimized to provide a useful mix of land, sea and air forces to satisfy, as much as possible, both NATO requirements and the need for the United States to act unilaterally, when desired. The ground force would be smaller than that required for a fully-manned, two-division Army corps envisioned for the Bush administration's base force, but could nonetheless include a corps headquarters and some forward deployed brigades of two divisions. The ground force would also include appropriate logistical and reception forces, and would maintain sufficient prepositioned equipment and supplies in Europe to support arriving "round-out" and reinforcing units from the United States, as well as support force project from both Europe and the United States to crises and conflicts in the Atlantic Region. Under this option, the United States would also continue to provide the unique American military capabilities discussed earlier for the Atlantic Alliance (command, control, communications, intelligence, logistics and transportation).

1. Collective Engagement - The continued participation by the United States in the political and military components of NATO in Europe would support an American collective engagement strategy. Opportunities for close consultation and cooperation with European allies would continue to be possible and would greatly facilitate effective collective political and military responses to future crises and conflicts. However, by reducing the European-based U.S. troop strength to a level well below 150,000, the U.S. would be unable to meet its current commitment to NATO's new multinational force structure.

Given the greatly reduced direct threat to Western Europe, the United States would probably be capable of participating in many of the activities of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. However, if the U.S. troop presence in Europe were reduced too dramatically, American opportunities for joint planning, joint training, joint exercises, joint arms control operations and joint peacekeeping operations with NATO allies and former adversaries might be severely restricted. This limitation could be overcome somewhat by frequent U.S. troop training rotations from the United States to Europe.

2. Influence - A lower U.S. troop level in Europe might also be construed by Europeans as signifying a reduced American commitment to European security and could contribute to diminished U.S. influence with NATO allies in European security matters. This effect could probably be overcome to a certain extent if the United States were to take at least three actions:

a. Demonstrate increased support to the Western Europeans as they attempt to assume greater responsibilities, costs and risks in providing for their own security.

b. Preposition additional combat equipment and supplies with U.S. reception forces in Europe. The ability to support a significant rapid response force from the United States would be reassuring to European allies.

c. Continue to provide unique U.S. specialized capabilities in command, control, communications, intelligence, logistics and transportation to the Atlantic Alliance. This would also demonstrate a continued U.S. commitment to European security and would be greatly appreciated by the European allies.

Ironically, a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe could also make Europeans value those forces which remain even more. As discussed earlier, Western Europeans probably value the continued U.S. military presence in Europe as a hedge or insurance policy against the possible failure of the European Community's new common foreign and security policy. Even a small U.S. troop presence in Europe would keep the United States closely linked to the security of Western Europe and the defense of allied interests in the Atlantic Region. It would help discourage unanticipated threats from emerging while the Western Europeans develop their security structures and would also be reassuring to a non-nuclear capable Germany. A significant reduction in U.S. European-based forces might cause Western Europeans to fear that the United States

intends to withdraw its remaining forces from Europe prematurely. To discourage this withdrawal, Western Europeans might become more considerate of American views on economic, political and security matters. The result would be an enhancement of U.S. influence in Europe.

3. Stability - A greatly reduced U.S. troop presence in Europe could contribute to stability as long as Europeans were convinced that their security needs were being met and no substantial threats would develop in the Atlantic Region. The continued provision of unique U.S. security capabilities discussed earlier and the continued extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over a non-nuclear Germany would help persuade NATO allies of the U.S. commitment to their security. Option III would probably enable the Western Europeans and Americans to pursue the hedging strategy, discussed earlier for Option I, intended to maintain adequate security in Europe while the Western Europeans continue to develop a common foreign and security policy and a capable European defense force. By reducing its troop presence in Europe gradually over time, the U.S. could also encourage Europeans to accept greater responsibilities, costs and risks in providing for their own security while still maintaining the strong transatlantic links inherent in NATO.

Even if Western Europeans were successful in establishing a common foreign and security policy and a separate European military force, a greatly reduced U.S. military presence in Europe might still persuade potential adversaries to believe that the world's

sole remaining superpower and past leader of the successful coalition against Iraq were less interested in the Atlantic Region. These adversaries might also question the resolve of Western Europeans to defend European interests without the strong leadership and assertiveness of the United States. This unpleasant scenario is highly speculative and need not occur as long as Western Europeans are sufficiently committed to providing for their own security and protecting their interests. However, their future success is highly uncertain. The effect in the interim could be a great deal of instability in the Atlantic Region.

4. Regional Strategy - Option III would enable the United States to continue its consultation and cooperation with NATO allies, but might greatly limit the implementation of its military strategy for the Atlantic Region. As mentioned earlier, a forward presence of less than 150,000 U.S. troops would keep the U.S. from meeting its commitments currently required by NATO's new strategy and multinational force structure. Also, if the small U.S. troop presence were incapable of effective self-defense, crisis response or force projection, it might become little more than a symbolic political presence in Europe.

If the small American force were to possess the unique U.S. specialized capabilities desired by Europeans, then the United States could probably support collective European military responses to conflicts and crises, but the U.S. force might not be capable of responding unilaterally, if directed. As mentioned earlier, this difficulty could be overcome somewhat if certain

compensating measures were taken to improve the ability of the United States to implement its military strategy for the Atlantic Region. In close coordination with its European allies, the U.S. could carefully construct its smaller European-based military force to include a mix of land, sea and air components more appropriate for the needs of the post-Cold War, post-Soviet Union security environment. The United States could also place additional military equipment and supplies in European forward bases and on U.S. ships in the Atlantic Region. It could acquire additional fast cargo ships and aircraft to improve force projection and reinforcement capabilities from both the United States and Europe. Instead of being inactivated, U.S. combat forces withdrawn from Europe could be restationed in the United States and prepared for crisis response missions in the Atlantic Region. The U.S. might also consider requesting permission to station additional U.S. forces in other countries in the Atlantic Region, such as Turkey.

5. European Support - Some European allies might at first object to a greatly reduced U.S. military presence in Europe, because it would mean that the United States could not meet its recently negotiated troop commitment to NATO. However, the U.S. could still demonstrate a commitment to European security while also encouraging Western Europeans to accept greater responsibilities, risks and costs for defending themselves. Many Western Europeans expect that the U.S. will reduce or end the American troop presence in Europe and, thus, are taking appropriate action to compensate for that eventuality. However, as mentioned

earlier, the German government favors a continued U.S. troop presence as long as a non-nuclear capable Germany is surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons.

6. U.S. Domestic Support - There appears to be wide support in the United States for the continued U.S. participation in NATO, but with a U.S. troop presence in Europe well below the 150,000 level. This is due primarily to a strong desire in the U.S. to reduce defense spending so that more resources can be devoted to solving domestic problems. There is also strong support in the United States for the view that the prosperous and highly competitive Western Europeans ought to accept greater responsibility and "burden sharing" in providing for their own security. However, the recent U.S. experience in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, as well as recent events in Yugoslavia and some of the republics of the former Soviet Union, have convinced many Americans that the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have not guaranteed that other unanticipated threats will not emerge. Thus, the United States and its allies ought to continue to maintain a hedge against future uncertainties. Moreover, while many Americans would probably support Secretary of State James Baker's collective engagement strategy and a limited partnership role for the United States in European security, they also believe that the United States should not be the world's policeman and that American lives should not be risked needlessly in conflicts, such as those in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, where U.S. interests are not directly affected.

CONCLUSION

The continued United States participation in the Atlantic Alliance and the stationing of 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe with the roles, missions and capabilities prescribed by the new U.S. National Military Strategy (Option I) would well serve the interests of both the United States and its European allies during the turbulent transition period following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. The envisioned U.S. military force would be capable of rapid and effective response, unilaterally, as part of an ad hoc coalition, or as part of a NATO force, to crises and conflicts in the Atlantic Region. The resulting demonstration of U.S. commitment would contribute to American influence in Europe and would serve as a hedge for both Europeans and Americans against instability and the emergence of unanticipated threats. The significant U.S. military presence in Europe would buy time for the Western Europeans to develop successfully a European union with a common foreign and security policy and a separate European defense force. Feeling less threatened individually, the Western European countries would be encouraged to invest the time, efforts and resources needed to ensure that collective approaches to European security work. The alternative, a renationalization of individual countries' security efforts and Germany's possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, is unacceptable.

Unfortunately, the United States will probably reduce U.S. force levels in Europe to well below 150,000 troops in the near future. This action will be taken in response to the belief on the part of many in the U.S. that American interests are no longer directly threatened in Europe, that Europeans are capable of defending themselves, that Europeans do not compete fairly with the United States in world economic markets, and that the United States must devote more attention and resources to solving domestic problems. This U.S. domestic pressure to reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe will be reinforced by the desire on the part of some Europeans, particularly the French, to reduce the role and influence of the United States in Europe, as well as increasing intolerance on the part of many Europeans to endure a continued U.S. military "occupation" when the threat has apparently vanished.

Thus, for the foreseeable future, the United States will probably maintain 50,000-100,000 U.S. troops in Europe and fully participate in the Atlantic Alliance (Option III). Most of the benefits provided by a larger troop presence would also occur, in many cases to a lesser extent, with the smaller force. The United States would still demonstrate a commitment to Europe and maintain influence in European affairs. The U.S. military commitment would contribute to stability and discourage the emergence of unanticipated threats, while the Western Europeans build more effective security structures.

The major shortcoming of Option III would be a reduced U.S. military capability to respond, either unilaterally or as part of

collective efforts, to crises and conflicts in the Atlantic Region. This disadvantage could be overcome to a certain extent by a careful tailoring of the European-based U.S. force, by the increased forward prepositioning of military equipment and supplies, by the stationing of additional U.S. forces elsewhere in the Atlantic Region, by the designation of additional U.S.-based forces for contingencies in the Atlantic Region, and by the acquisition of additional airlift and sealift assets.

With a smaller U.S. force in Europe, all of the compensating measures mentioned above would increase the readiness of the U.S. military to respond to conflicts and crises in the Atlantic Region. However, the two-division U.S. Army heavy armored corps and associated naval, marine and air forces prescribed for Option I would be capable of quickly initiating and sustaining combat operations without the immediate reinforcements needed for a smaller, less capable Option III force, and could be more rapidly projected to trouble spots in the Atlantic Region than could a similar force based in the United States.

Simply put, when compared with a smaller Option III force, the larger Option I force would demonstrate a greater U.S. commitment to European security, thus providing the United States with greater influence in Europe.¹¹³ The larger force would also be more capable of responding rapidly and effectively to crises in the region, thus providing a greater deterrent to the emergence of unanticipated threats. Moreover, the larger force would provide both the United States and its allies with a better hedge against

the security risks and uncertainties of the remainder of the decade than would a smaller U.S. European-based force.

One should not underestimate the value of a continued U.S. military presence in Europe to serve as a hedge against instability and the emergence of threats while Western Europeans develop their union and collective security structures. It is in the United States' national interest to work closely in partnership with its European allies to create a binary Euro-Atlantic alliance with both a North American pillar and a more capable, self-sufficient and independent European pillar, which implements the security policy of the European Community. If this outcome were achieved, then there would be less rationale for the continued stationing of a significant U.S. military force in Europe. The total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe (Option II) eventually might even become prudent.

ENDNOTES

1. Dick Cheney, Address by the Secretary of Defense to the Defense Orientation Association, Washington, D.C., 11 October 1991, p. 1.
2. The total Department of Defense budget authority for the years FY1986 - FY1992 alone totalled \$2.2 trillion in constant 1992 dollars. See Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1991), p. 110.
3. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (Brussels: NATO Information Service, July 1990). The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was established in December 1991 as a forum of consultation and cooperation with former adversaries on security and related matters. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation (Brussels: NATO Press Service, 20 December 1991).
4. Thomas L. Friedman, "Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO," New York Times, 21 December 1991, p. 5.
5. U.S. Department of the Army, The United States Army Posture Statement FY92/93, Washington, D.C., 15 February 1991, p. 9.
6. For an account of VII Corps' deployment from Europe to Saudi Arabia and its successful attack into Iraq see William L. Brame, Major, "From Garrison to Desert Offense in 97 Days," Army, February 1992, and Peter S. Kindsvatter, Lieutenant Colonel, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground Offensive," Military Review, February 1992.
7. John R. Galvin, General, SACEUR's Remarks to the Crisis Management Course at the NATO School (SHAPE), Oberammergau, Germany, 4 November 1991, p. 4.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Brame, pp. 28-35.
10. Dick Cheney and Colin Powell, "The President's Fiscal 1993 Defense Budget," Testimony by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at House Budget Committee Hearing, Washington, D.C., 4 February 1992, p. 18.
11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), p. 376 (hereafter referred to as NATO Facts and Figures).

12. For a discussion of the flexible response strategy see NATO Facts and Figures, pp. 72, 217-218.

13. In December 1967 the Atlantic Alliance completed "The Report on Future Tasks of the Alliance" or "Harmel Report," in which members agreed both to provide adequate capabilities for defense and deterrence and a positive approach to East - West relations aimed at solving problems, removing tensions and reducing armaments. This effort led to talks with Warsaw Pact countries on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe in 1973, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, and negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) begun in 1989. See NATO Facts and Figures, pp. 31-35, 72-73, and 240-241.

14. See Serge Schmemmann, "The Red Army Fights A Rearguard Action Against History," New York Times, 29 March 1992, sec. 4, p. 4; Tony Barber, "CIS tottering towards collapse over defence," The Independent (U.K.), 18 March 1992, p. 17; Serge Schmemmann, "Ukrainian Uses Summit to Berate Russians and Commonwealth," New York Times, 20 March 1992, pp. 1, 5; Henry Kissinger, "The New Russian Question," Newsweek, 10 February 1992; Thomas L. Friedman, "As the World Turns, U.S. Policy Stands Still," New York Times, 15 March 1992, pp. 4-2; John M. Broder and Stanley Meisler, "Terrifying Quest for A-Arms," Los Angeles Times, 19 January 1992, p. 1; Theodor Rothbart, "Spread of nuclear weapons a headache for Nato - Woerner," The German Tribune, 10 January 1992, p. 4; Gerald F. Seib, "C.I.A. Plans a 'Major' Effort to Prevent Proliferation of Chemical, Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street Journal, 13 December 1991, p. B6; Steven Greenhouse, "Bush Is Urged to Speak Up for Russia," New York Times, 16 March 1992, p. A6; and Thomas Friedman, "Nixon's 'Save Russia' Memo: Bush Feels the Sting," New York Times, 16 March 1992, p. A4.

15. See Andrew Borowiec, "Havel shows concern for security of E. Europe," Washington Times, 22 October 1991, p. 7; "Hungarian urges NATO to act in East European crisis," Baltimore Sun, 29 October 1991, p. 2; Julijana Majsilovic, "Yugoslav war spills into Hungary," Washington Times, 29 October 1991, p. 7; Mark Trevelyn, "Armenia and Ajerbaijan 'face war,'" The Independent (U.K.), 12 March 1992, p. 12; Blaine Harden, "Turkey Fears Pull of Caucasus War," Washington Post, 19 March 1992, p. 17; "Caucasus Shooting Resumes After Vance and Iran Efforts," New York Times, 21 March 1992, p. 4; and John F. Burns, "Yugoslav Cease-Fire Shaky as U.N. Forces Deploy," New York Times, 24 March 1992, p. A5.

16. Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, "US defense strategy in an era of uncertainty," International Defense Review, January 1992, p. 7.

17. Cheney and Powell, "The President's Fiscal 1993 Defense Budget," p. 9.

18. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), p. 2.
19. Dick Cheney, Address by the Secretary of Defense to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., 28 October 1991, p. 2. See also Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Spells Out U.S. Foreign Policy Stance," New York Times, 22 April 1992, p. A6, and Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (draft), 1992, p. 2.
20. Powell, National Military Strategy.
21. Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Spells Out U.S. Foreign Policy Stance," New York Times, 22 April 1992, p. A6.
22. Powell, National Military Strategy, pp. 2-3, and Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, pp. 6-7.
23. Christie Taylor, "Profile: NATO: U.S. Will Stay - Galvin advocates smaller force," Defense Media Review, 31 October 1991, p. 3.
24. John R. Galvin, General, "Soviet Disappearance: No Assurance of Peace, Stability," Statement by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 March 1992, in Defense Issues (Washington, D.C.: American Forces Information Service, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)), vol. 7, no. 8 (1992).
25. Powell, National Military Strategy, p. 1. The discussion in this section of the paper is a summarization of key elements of the National Military Strategy.
26. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, pp. 25-31.
27. Powell, National Military Strategy, p. 19.
28. Ibid., p. 17.
29. Ibid., p. 19.
30. Ibid., p. 19.
31. Ibid., p. 20.
32. Ibid., p. 21.
33. Ibid., p. 23.
34. Ibid., p. 23.

35. Ibid., p. 22.
36. Paul Lewis, "Kohl Presses Japan to Do More to Assist East European Lands," New York Times, 6 May 1992, pp. A1, A6.
37. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Alliance's Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, November 1991), p. 3.
38. Ibid., p. 3.
39. Ibid., p. 9.
40. Ibid., p. 10.
41. Ibid., p. 10.
42. Ibid., p. 10.
43. Ibid., p. 10.
44. Ibid., p. 11.
45. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
46. Ibid., p. 13.
47. Based on unclassified summary information obtained during a visit to the U.S. Mission at NATO, Brussels, February 1992.
48. Michael Evans, "Nato rapid reaction force ready for action by 1995," London Times, 15 April 1992, p. 10.
49. Brigitte Sauerwein, "Interview: 'Our new strategy is one of crisis response' SACEUR General John Galvin," International Defense Review, April 1992, p. 319.
50. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, p. 1.
51. Ibid., p. 29.
52. See Melissa Healy, "NATO Marks New Era in Europe," Los Angeles Times (Washington Edition), 2 April 1992, p. 2; Nicholas Doughty, "NATO, old foes may join forces," Washington Times, 2 April 1992, p. 9; and Peter Almond, "NATO set to lead security in Europe," Washington Times, 5 April 1992, p. 15.
53. William Drozdiak, "Tensions Between France and U.S. Said to Turn Allies Into Rivals," Washington Post, 22 January 1992, p. 25.

54. Francois Mitterrand, "The Europe We Want," in Axel Krause, Inside the New Europe (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 318.
55. Helmut Kohl, "Europe's Future," in Axel Krause, Inside the New Europe, p. 308.
56. German Information Center, "Kohl: Maastricht Summit 'A Great Success, an Irreversible Process,'" The Week in Germany, 13 December 1992, p. 1.
57. Craig R. Whitney, "Seen Again at Maastricht: Adam Smith's Invisible Hand," New York Times, 15 December 1991, p. E3.
58. "Britain On to the next campaign," The Economist, 14-20 December 1991, pp. 61-62.
59. Joseph Fitchett, "EC Quandry: Conveying the Spirit of Maastricht," International Herald Tribune, 10 February 1992, p. 5.
60. Craig R. Whitney, "Danish Voters Narrowly Reject Agreement on European Union," New York Times, 3 June 1992, pp. A1, A4, and Craig R. Whitney, "Europe to Press Union Votes Despite Denmark's Rejection," New York Times, 5 June 1992, p. A4.
61. Helmut Kohl, "Can Humpty be put back together again?" The European, 4-7 June 1992, p. 9.
62. James F. Clarity, "Ireland Approves Europeans' Treaty on Move to Union," New York Times, 20 June 1992, pp. 1, 5.
63. Francois Mitterrand, "The Europe We Want," in Axel Krause, Inside the New Europe, p. 317.
64. Helmut Kohl, "Europe's Future," in Axel Krause, Inside the New Europe, p. 309.
65. Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand, "Letter to Rudd Lubbers, President of the European Council, on Political Union: Franco-German Initiative on Foreign, Security and Defence Policy," Europe Documents, 11 October 1991.
66. "The defence of Europe," London Financial Times, 31 October 1991, p. 14.
67. Hella Pick, "US rejects plan to establish European army," The Guardian (U.K.), 31 October 1991, p. 14.
68. Alan Cowell, "Bush Challenges Partners in NATO Over Role of U.S.," New York Times, 8 November 1991, pp. 1, 4.
69. Ibid.

70. American Embassy Brussels, CFSP at Maastricht: Sequence of Events and Texts of Documents, unclassified message, dated 171804Z December 1991.

71. Ibid.

72. Barbara Starr, "Commander of new corps named," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 April 1992, p. 689.

73. U.S. Mission, U.S. NATO Brussels, NATO Defense Planning Symposium - - John Goulden, UK FCO, Presentation on European Security Identity, unclassified message, dated 031202Z February 1992.

74. Ibid.

75. "Q&A: Jacques Andreani: France's Ambassador to the United States," San Diego Union Tribune, 5 April 1992, p. C6.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Pierre Beregovoy, French Prime Minister, interviewed by Henri-Francois de Virieu, Alain Duhamel, Jean-Marie Colombani, and Albert du Roy on the "Hour of Truth" program - live, Paris Antenne-2 Television Network in French, 1000 GMT 10 May 1992, in U.S. Government Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report West Europe, 1992, no. 091 (Future references to this source will be abbreviated in the form: FBIS-WEU-92-091), 11 May 1992, p. 31.

79. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, former French Defense Minister, interviewed by Joseph Mace-Scaron, "Chevenement: 'A Reorganization is Taking Place,'" Le Figaro (Paris), in French, 2-3 May 1992, p. 6., in FBIS-WEU-92-092, 12 May 1992, p. 29.

80. Klaus Naumann, Bundeswehr Inspector General, Remarks at the 33d Bundeswehr commanders' conference, Leipzig-Markkleeberg, 12 May 1992, Berlin ADN, in German, 1119 GMT 12 May 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-093, 13 May 1992, p. 23.

81. John Tagliabue, "In Germany, West Plus East Means Policy Shifts," New York Times, 1 March 1992, p. 5.

82. Volker Ruehe, German Defense Minister, interviewed by Udo Bergdoll and Stefan-Andreas Casdorf, "'Instincts Can't Be Dismissed by Orders:' Ruehe States UN Role for the Army Cannot Be Realized," Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), in German, 8 May 1992, p. 9, in FBIS-WEU-92-098, 20 May 1992, p. 19.

83. James O. Jackson, "The New Germany Flexes Its Muscles," Time, 13 April 1992, p. 35.

84. Ibid., p. 36.
85. Dominik von Wolff Metternich, "The Franco-German Brigade: A German Perspective," The RUSI Journal, Autumn 1991, pp. 44-48.
86. Paul Lewis, "Kohl Presses Japan to Do More to Assist East European Lands," New York Times, 6 May 1992, pp. A1, A6.
87. Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, interviewed by Udo Bergdoll, "There Is Absolutely No Alternative to the European Path," Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), in German, 19 May 1992, p. 8, in FBIS-WEU-92-097, 19 May 1992, p. 8.
88. Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor, Address to the 33d conference of Bundeswehr commanders, Leipzig-Markkleeberg, 12 May 1992, Berlin ADN, in German, 0953 GMT, 12 May 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-092, 12 May 1992, p. 20.
89. Volker Ruehe, German Defense Minister, "Ruehe Criticizes Former Policies at Defense Ministry: Future of Bundeswehr; UN Missions and EFA," Frankfurter Allgemeine (Frankfurt/Main), in German, 9 May 1992, p. 2, in FBIS-WEU-92-094, 14 May 1992, p. 23.
90. Tony Paterson, "Germany muzzles its dogs of war," The European, 28-31 May 1992, p. 12.
91. Michael Putzel, "Battle joined on 'peace dividend,'" The Boston Globe, 12 January 1992, p. 1.
92. Don Oberdorfer, "Democrats Offer Broad Themes for U.S. Role in Post-Cold War Era," Washington Post, 15 March 1992, p. 20, and Norman Kempster, "U.S. Candidates' Stand on Foreign Issues," Los Angeles Times, 17 March 1992, p. C-6.
93. Marc Fisher, "Europeans Told of U.S. Isolation," Washington Post, 10 February 1992, p. 1.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Kempster, "U.S. Candidates' Stand on Foreign Issues," p. C-6.
97. Bill Clinton, Arkansas Governor, Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1 April 1992, p. 2.
98. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
99. Ibid., p. 9.
100. Ibid., p. 10.

101. Don Oberdorfer, "Democrats Offer Broad Themes for U.S. Role in Post-Cold War Era," Washington Post, 15 March 1992, p. 20.

102. Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," Paper for Presentation Before the Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, D.C., 6 January 1992.

103. Ibid., p. 6.

104. Ibid., p. 7.

105. Les Aspin, "Aspin Says Ground-Up Review Needed to Shape U.S. Forces" (Washington, D.C.: House Armed Services Committee News Release, 24 January 1992).

106. Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era," Paper for Presentation Before the Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, Crystal City, Virginia, 24 January 1992, p. 8.

107. Pat Towell, "Planning the Nation's Defense," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 February 1992, p. 478.

108. Ibid.

109. "House Version Trims Bush's Military Budget," New York Times, 6 June 1992, p. 7.

110. Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Spells Out U.S. Foreign Policy Stance," New York Times, 22 April 1992, p. A6.

111. Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Sees a Peacekeeping Role in Operations in Eastern Europe," New York Times, 5 June 1992, pp. A1, A4.

112. John R. Galvin, General, Statement by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 March 1992, in Defense Issues, vol. 7, no. 8, 1992, 27 March 1992. See also Rosemary Sawyer, "Galvin denies U.S. seeks role of 'policeman,'" European Stars & Stripes, 20 March 1992, p. 1.

113. As mentioned earlier, the loss of U.S. influence in Europe caused by a reduction in the U.S. European-based troop presence could be offset somewhat if the Western Europeans were to place increased value on the smaller residual U.S. force left in Europe. Thus, the United States could acquire additional offsetting influence not due to the European belief that the U.S. were less committed to Europe, but due to concerns that the U.S. might prematurely withdraw all of its forces from Europe. It could well be in the interest of the Western Europeans to keep the United States closely linked with, and committed to the security of, Western Europe during the turbulent post-Cold War, post-Soviet

Union transition period. A residual U.S. troop presence in Europe would ensure a continued credible U.S. commitment to Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Almond, Peter. "NATO set to lead security in Europe." Washington Times, 5 April 1992, p. 15.
- American Embassy Brussels. CFSP at Maastricht: Sequence of Events and Texts of Documents. Unclassified message, dated 171804Z December 1991.
- Aspin, Les, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era." Paper for Presentation Before the Meeting of the Association of the United States Army. Crystal City, Virginia, 24 January 1992.
- _____. "Aspin Says Ground-Up Review Needed to Shape U.S. Forces." House Armed Services Committee News Release, 24 January 1992.
- _____. "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces." Paper for Presentation Before the Atlantic Council of the United States. Washington, D.C., 6 January 1992.
- Barber, Tony. "CIS tottering towards collapse over defence." The Independent (U.K.), 18 March 1992, p. 17.
- Beregovoy, Pierre, French Prime Minister. Interviewed by Henri-Francois de Virieu, Alain Duhamel, Jean-Marie Colombani, and Albert du Roy on the "Hour of Truth" program - live, Paris Antenne-2 Television Network in French, 1000 GMT 10 May 1992. In U.S. Government Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report West Europe, 1992, no. 091 (Future references to this source will be abbreviated in the form: FBIS-WEU-92-091), 11 May 1992, p. 31.
- Borowiec, Andrew. "Havel shows concern for security of E. Europe." Washington Times, 22 October 1991, p. 7.
- Brame, William L., Major. "From Garrison to Desert Offense in 97 Days." Army, February 1992, pp. 28-31, 34-35.
- "Britain On to the next campaign." The Economist, 14-20 December 1991, pp. 61-62.
- Broder, John M., and Stanley Meisler. "Terrifying Quest for A-Arms." Los Angeles Times, 19 January 1992, p. 1.
- Burns, John F. "Yugoslav Cease-Fire Shaky as U.N. Forces Deploy." New York Times, 24 March 1992, p. A5.

- Bush, George. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991.
- "Caucasus Shooting Resumes After Vance and Iran Efforts." New York Times, 21 March 1992, p. 4.
- Cheney, Dick. Address by the Secretary of Defense to the Defense Orientation Association. Washington, D.C., 11 October 1991.
- _____. Address by the Secretary of Defense to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Washington, D.C., 28 October 1991, p. 2.
- _____. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1991.
- _____. "US defense strategy in an era of uncertainty." International Defense Review, January 1992, p. 7.
- _____, and Colin Powell. "The President's Fiscal 1993 Defense Budget." Testimony by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at House Budget Committee Hearing. Washington, D.C., 4 February 1992.
- Chevenement, Jean-Pierre, former French Defense Minister. Interviewed by Joseph Mace-Scaron. "Chevenement: 'A Reorganization is Taking Place.'" Le Figaro (Paris), in French, 2-3 May 1992, p. 6. In FBIS-WEU-92-092, 12 May 1992, p. 29.
- Clarity, James F. "Ireland Approves Europeans' Treaty on Move to Union." New York Times, 20 June 1992, pp. 1, 5.
- Clinton, Bill, Arkansas Governor. Remarks Prepared for Delivery to the Foreign Policy Association. New York, 1 April 1992, p. 2.
- Cowell, Alan. "Bush Challenges Partners in NATO Over Role of U.S." New York Times, 8 November 1991, pp. 1, 4.
- Doughty, Nicholas. "NATO, old foes may join forces." Washington Times, 2 April 1992, p. 9.
- Drozdiak, William. "Tensions Between France and U.S. Said to Turn Allies Into Rivals." Washington Post, 22 January 1992, p. 25.
- Evans, Michael. "Nato rapid reaction force ready for action by 1995." London Times, 15 April 1992, p. 10.

- Fisher, Marc. "Europeans Told of U.S. Isolation." Washington Post, 10 February 1992, p. 1.
- Fitchett, Joseph. "EC Quandry: Conveying the Spirit of Maastricht." International Herald Tribune, 10 February 1992, p. 5.
- Friedman, Thomas L. "As the World Turns, U.S. Policy Stands Still." New York Times, 15 March 1992, pp. 4-2.
- _____. "Baker Spells Out U.S. Foreign Policy Stance." New York Times, 22 April 1992, p. A6.
- _____. "Nixon's 'Save Russia' Memo: Bush Feels the Sting." New York Times, 16 March 1992, p. A4.
- _____. "Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO." New York Times, 21 December 1991, p. 5.
- Galvin, John R., General. SACEUR's Remarks to the Crisis Management Course at the NATO School (SHAPE). Oberammergau, Germany, 4 November 1991, p. 4.
- _____. "Soviet Disappearance: No Assurance of Peace, Stability." Statement by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, to the Senate Armed Services Committee. 3 March 1992. In Defense Issues. Washington, D.C.: American Forces Information Service, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), vol. 7, no. 8, 1992.
- German Information Center. "Kohl: Maastricht Summit 'A Great Success, an Irreversible Process.'" The Week in Germany, 13 December 1992, p. 1.
- Greenhouse, Steven. "Bush Is Urged to Speak Up for Russia." New York Times, 16 March 1992, p. A6.
- Harden, Blaine. "Turkey Fears Pull of Caucasus War." Washington Post, 19 March 1992, p. 17.
- Healy, Melissa. "NATO Marks New Era in Europe." Los Angeles Times (Washington Edition), 2 April 1992, p. 2.
- "House Version Trims Bush's Military Budget." New York Times, 6 June 1992, p. 7.
- "Hungarian urges NATO to act in East European crisis." Baltimore Sun, 29 October 1991, p. 2.
- Jackson, James O. "The New Germany Flexes Its Muscles." Time, 13 April 1992, pp. 34-36.
- Kempster, Norman. "U.S. Candidates' Stand on Foreign Issues." Los

Angeles Times, 17 March 1992, p. C-6.

Kindsvatter, Peter S., Lieutenant Colonel. "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground Offensive." Military Review, February 1992, pp. 16-37.

Kinkel, Klaus, German Foreign Minister. Interviewed by Udo Bergdoll. "There Is Absolutely No Alternative to the European Path." Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), in German, 19 May 1992, p. 8. In FBIS-WEU-92-097, 19 May 1992, p. 8.

Kissinger, Henry. "The New Russian Question." Newsweek, 10 February 1992.

Kohl, Helmut. Address by German Chancellor to the 33d Conference of Bundeswehr Commanders. Leipzig-Markkleeberg, 12 May 1992. Berlin ADN, in German, 0953 GMT, 12 May 1992. In FBIS-WEU-92-092, 12 May 1992, p. 20.

_____. "Can Humpty be put back together again?" The European, 4-7 June 1992, p. 9.

_____, and Francois Mitterrand. "Letter to Rudd Lubbers, President of the European Council, on Political Union: Franco-German Initiative on Foreign, Security and Defence Policy." Europe Documents, 11 October 1991.

Krause, Axel. Inside the New Europe. New York: Harper Collins, 1991.

Lewis, Paul. "Kohl Presses Japan to Do More to Assist East European Lands." New York Times, 6 May 1992, pp. A1, A6.

Majsilovic, Julijana. "Yugoslav war spills into Hungary." Washington Times, 29 October 1991, p. 7.

Metternich, Dominik von Wolff. "The Franco-German Brigade: A German Perspective." The RUSI Journal, Autumn 1991, pp. 44-48.

Naumann, Klaus. Remarks by Bundeswehr Inspector General at the 33d Bundeswehr Commanders' Conference. Leipzig-Markkleeberg, 12 May 1992. Berlin ADN, in German, 1119 GMT 12 May 1992. In FBIS-WEU-92-093, 13 May 1992, p. 23.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, November 1991.

_____. London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Brussels: NATO Information Service, July 1990.

_____. North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue.

Partnership and Cooperation. Brussels: NATO Press Service, 20 December 1991.

_____. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Facts and Figures. Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989.

Oberdorfer, Don. "Democrats Offer Broad Themes for U.S. Role in Post-Cold War Era." Washington Post, 15 March 1992, p. 20.

Paterson, Tony. "Germany muzzles its dogs of war." The European, 28-31 May 1992, p. 12.

Pick, Hella. "US rejects plan to establish European army." The Guardian (U.K.), 31 October 1991, p. 14.

Powell, Colin L., General, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy (draft). 1992.

Putzel, Michael. "Battle joined on 'peace dividend.'" The Boston Globe, 12 January 1992, p. 1.

"Q&A: Jacques Andreani: France's Ambassador to the United States." San Diego Union Tribune, 5 April 1992, p. C6.

Rothbart, Theodor. "Spread of nuclear weapons a headache for Nato - Woerner." The German Tribune, 10 January 1992, p. 4.

Ruehe, Volker, German Defense Minister. Interviewed by Udo Bergdoll and Stefan-Andreas Casdorf. "'Instincts Can't Be Dismissed by Orders:' Ruehe States UN Role for the Army Cannot Be Realized." Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), in German, 8 May 1992, p. 9. In FBIS-WEU-92-098, 20 May 1992, pp. 18-20.

_____. "Ruehe Criticizes Former Policies at Defense Ministry: Future of Bundeswehr; UN Missions and EFA." Frankfurter Allgemeine (Frankfurt/Main), in German, 9 May 1992, p. 2. In FBIS-WEU-92-094, 14 May 1992, p. 23.

Sauerwein, Brigitte. "Interview: 'Our new strategy is one of crisis response' SACEUR General John Galvin." International Defense Review, April 1992, p. 319.

Sawyer, Rosemary. "Galvin denies U.S. seeks role of 'policeman.'" European Stars & Stripes, 20 March 1992, p. 1.

Schmemann, Serge. "The Red Army Fights A Rearguard Action Against History." New York Times, 29 March 1992, sec. 4, p. 4.

_____. "Ukrainian Uses Summit to Berate Russians and Commonwealth." New York Times, 20 March 1992, p. 1.

Seib, Gerald F. "C.I.A. Plans a 'Major' Effort to Prevent

Proliferation of Chemical, Nuclear Weapons." Wall Street Journal, 13 December 1991, p. B6.

Starr, Barbara. "Commander of new corps named." Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 April 1992, p. 689.

Tagliabue, John. "In Germany, West Plus East Means Policy Shifts." New York Times, 1 March 1992, p. 5.

Taylor, Christie. "Profile: NATO: U.S. Will Stay - Galvin advocates smaller force." Defense Media Review, 31 October 1991, p. 3.

"The defence of Europe." London Financial Times, 31 October 1991, p. 14.

Towell, Pat. "Planning the Nation's Defense." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 February 1992, p. 478.

Trevelyn, Mark. "Armenia and Ajerbaijan 'face war.'" The Independent (U.K.), 12 March 1992, p. 12.

U.S. Department of the Army. The United States Army Posture Statement FY92/93. Washington, D.C., 15 February 1991.

U.S. Mission, U.S. NATO Brussels. NATO Defense Planning Symposium - John Goulden, UK FCO, Presentation on European Security Identity. Unclassified Message. 031202Z February 1992.

Whitney, Craig R. "Danish Voters Narrowly Reject Agreement on European Union." New York Times, 3 June 1992, pp. A1, A4.

_____. "Europe to Press Union Votes Despite Denmark's Rejection." New York Times, 5 June 1992, p. A4.

_____. "NATO Sees a Peacekeeping Role In Operations in Eastern Europe." New York Times, 5 June 1992, pp. A1, A4.

_____. "Seen Again at Maastricht: Adam Smith's Invisible Hand." New York Times, 15 December 1991, p. E3.