SSI | Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College

(2)

UKRAINE'S DEFENSE DILEMMA

David T. Twining

25pg



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S): ACN 92044	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION: Strategic Studies Institute; 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable): AWCI	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code): U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Bks Carlisle, PA 17013-5050	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION; 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS: PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

Ukraine's Defense Dilemma (U)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Twining, David T.

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Final	FROM _____ TO _____	92/07/25	24

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Ukraine; Commonwealth of Independent States; military-industrial combine; Russian Federation

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

As the second most populous and third largest of the former Soviet republics, what the Ukraine does and the defense and foreign policies it adopts are important to Western security interests. A founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, it is considered by many to have the best chance for economic self-sufficiency and prosperity of the 15 new states. It is also a valued member of the newly created Byelorussian-Ukrainian-Russian military-industrial combine with controls and develops key technologies associated with advanced weaponry. The author describes the Ukraine's problem of maintaining a military force structure sufficient to deter threats from the East without provoking Russian countermeasures. As the largest country separating the Russian Republic from Western Eurcpe, the Ukraine offers both a challenge and an opportunity for the West to influence Ukrainian policy options in a manner consistent with Europe's broad security interests.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS	Unclassified

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
Marianne P. Cowling	(717) 245-3234	AWCI

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 *Previous editions are obsolete.*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

UKRAINE'S DEFENSE DILEMMA

David T. Twining

August 25, 1992

******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

******

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and may be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed by calling the Director of Research via commercial (717)245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.

FOREWORD

Ukraine stands at a historic turning point, juxtaposed between the old command-administrative system of the former Soviet state and a democracy with a functioning private market economy. As the second most populous and the third largest of the former Soviet republics, what Kiev does and the defense and foreign policies it adopts are important to Western security interests. A founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), it is the country considered by many to have the best chance for economic self-sufficiency and prosperity of the 15 new states.

Ukraine is also a nuclear power. Leonid Kravchuk, former Communist Party functionary and the country's first popularly elected president, has insisted that Ukraine control the strategic nuclear missiles on Ukrainian soil, a demand acceded to following the July 6th Moscow summit of CIS heads of state. It is also a valued member of the newly created Byelorussian-Ukrainian-Russian military-industrial combine, which controls and develops key technologies associated with advanced weaponry. Additionally, Kiev's efforts to create independent military forces and to formulate a new military doctrine impact directly upon West European security structures and policies.

This study looks at Ukraine and the dilemma of its future defense policy. As the largest country separating the Russian Federation from Western Europe, it represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the West. In view of the uncertainties associated with the systemic transformation of the former USSR, the United States can be influential in shaping Ukrainian policy options in a manner consistent with the West's broad security interests. Indeed, the critical time for Western assistance and engagement may be at hand.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this study as a contribution to the debate on the evolution of the states of the former Soviet Union.

KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL DAVID T. TWINING is Director of Eurasian Commonwealth and Independent States in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, and is the author of *Strategic Surprise in the Age of Glasnost* (Transaction, 1992) and editor of *Beyond Glasnost: Soviet Reform and Security Issues* (Greenwood, 1993).

UKRAINE'S DEFENSE DILEMMA

Ukraine: Journey to Independence.

Ukraine historically has been a borderland separating religions, peoples, traditions and cultures. It is the birthplace of Russia and its principal religion, and its lands have been contested among Mongols, Poles, Russians, Germans and others. Today, Ukraine continues this tradition, but with an essential difference. The passing of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, codified what had already occurred in the hearts and minds of Ukrainians living within and beyond its post-1945 borders: true independence.

The Red Army's 1919 subjugation of the nascent Ukrainian People's Republic started the nation's long and costly journey to free itself from the grip of Soviet power. It included the 1922 union treaty, Stalin's deliberate famine of 1932-33, the "Great Terror" of 1936-38, the brutalities of both Russians and Germans during World War II, the incarceration of hundreds of thousands of her peoples following the war, and years of deliberate Sovietization and occupation. With the advent of the Gorbachev era and the approaching demise of the Soviet Union, this path led to the July 16, 1991, declaration of sovereignty; the August 24, 1991, declaration of independence; the epochal December 1, 1991, presidential election of Leonid Kravchuk and national referendum on independence; and finally, the December 5, 1991, unanimous decision by parliament to annul the 1922 treaty.

Ukrainian efforts to assert autonomy and sovereignty must be seen in light of this recent history, which compounds centuries of foreign conquest and subjugation. Indeed, Ukraine's deliberate journey to independence sounded the death knell of the Soviet Union itself. Leonid Kravchuk, after the December 1st referendum saw 90.3 percent of voters approve independence, noted, "A great historic event has occurred which I am confident will change not only the life of

the Ukraininan people but the face of the world. The Soviet Union has disintegrated."[1] With this development, Mikhail Gorbachev, by December 5th, knew the end was in sight: "I cannot visualize the union without the Ukraine."[2]

By December 8, 1991, two other republics joined Ukraine to form the Commonwealth of Independent States, and, on December 21st, they were joined by eight other former union republics. While Boris Yeltsin indisputably played a major role in these events, none could have occurred without Ukrainian participation. The 52 million strong state has the second largest population of the former USSR republics. Large numbers of its 11 million Russian inhabitants voted for independence, and it is widely recognized that Ukraine has the best chance for economic prosperity of all 15 republics.

In Search of Ukrainian National Security Policy.

The future of the new Ukrainian state, however, now stands at a critical point. As the key borderland republic of the former Soviet Union, the programs, policies and institutions that evolve there will not only largely determine its future, but they will have a great influence on that which transpires in the other former Soviet republics, particularly Russia. The conundrum within which it now finds itself involves national security in the broadest, strategic sense of the term. As the country proceeds in its quest for political autonomy and economic progress, five key factors will influence the evolution of Ukraine's national security policy. Additionally, all will serve to point the new state along a strategic course—either towards the future or back to the past:

Military Issues. Because military might had been a cent al policy of the Soviet era and was vital to the longevity of the Soviet state, it was to be expected that military affairs would dominate early Ukrainian-Soviet interaction.

Ukrainian assertiveness was demonstrated on October 22, 1991, when its parliament authorized the formation of a national army of 400,000 and a national guard of some 30,000 troops. This move occurred despite Mikhail Gorbachev's warning on the previous day that the "privitization" of military

equipment and personnel was an unconstitutional and dangerous act. To Konstantin Morozov, the newly promoted Defense Minister, "The course of history cannot be changed. The Ukraine will have its own armed forces."[3]

On October 24, 1991, the Ukrainian parliament turned its attention to nuclear matters. Parliament formally acknowledged Moscow's command of that portion of the USSR's nuclear arsenal based on Ukrainian soil, but it insisted on Kiev's right to jointly control its use.[4] This arsenal was comprised of some 1,420 strategic warheads, carried by 176 ICBMs, and 2,390 tactical warheads, along with 30 heavy bombers mounted with cruise missiles. This would make Ukraine the third most powerful nuclear state after the United States and Russia.[5] On October 26th, the country's parliament reaffirmed the principles contained in its July 16, 1991, sovereignty statement: it would neither receive, produce or acquire nuclear weaponry. Ukraine intended to become and remain a nonnuclear state.[6]

With the founding of the CIS on December 8, 1991, the disintegration of the USSR was irretrievably set into motion. On December 12th, it was announced that President Kravchuk had taken command of former union forces in the Kiev, Odessa and Carpathian military districts as well as the Black Sea Fleet.[7] The 1.5 million Soviet troops on Ukrainian soil, less those assigned to strategic deterrence missions, were now claimed by the new state.

Early in its formative stages, the Ukrainian parliament established firm control mechanisms for the new armed forces: the president as commander-in-chief, a Defense Council of senior state and military officals, a defense minister, and a senior defense staff. A national army, air force, and navy were to be created from the Soviet forces then on Ukrainian territory and forces returning from Eastern Europe. The republic's status as a neutral and nonnuclear state was consistently maintained.[8]

It was also clear that many details would have to be resolved before an independent Ukrainian force was to be a reality. First, the country's air defense was but a part of the

unified Soviet air defense network. Much would have to be done to provide an independent air defense which could distinguish friendly aircraft from nonfriendly intruders, monitor the airspace of a nation roughly the size of France, and supervise the more than 3,000 aircraft operating in Ukrainian airspace on a daily basis.[9]

For the newly created national guard, the republic's parliament assigned it the missions of defending constitutional rights and the nation's independence and sovereignty; protecting foreign embassies; conducting natural disaster relief efforts; and assisting the border guards. The first guard troops were sworn in on January 5, 1992, and training began 4 days later.[10] A National Security Service, based upon remnants of the USSR KGB, was also created, with military counterintelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence collection responsibilities.[11]

Leonid Kravchuk also moved quickly to form a Ukrainian navy based upon existing units of the Black Sea Fleet. According to a general representing the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, "The position of Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet is clear and understood. We believe that it is necessary to allocate to strategic forces only that portion of the fleet which accomplishes the appropriate missions. All remaining fleet assets must be transferred to the naval forces of Ukraine."[12]

Interest in the status of the fleet had been building since the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov passed through the Straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles on December 2, 1991. In mid-February 1992, six SU-24 bombers and crews were "hijacked" to Russia, in another apparent attempt to escape Ukraine's grasp. Nearly 400 ships, including 30 diesel submarines and 65 in reserve, 100,000 men, 400 aircraft based in Tuapse in Russia; Sevastopol, Odessa, and Balaklava in Ukraine; and Poti in Georgia, form the Black Sea Fleet.[13] Ukraine claims more than 80 percent of the fleet is considered nonstrategic in character.[14]

Ukrainian President Kravchuk acted on April 5, 1992, to prevent further diversions by claiming actual ownership of that portion of the fleet based in the Ukraine, leading Boris Yeltsin

to then claim the fleet as Russia's sole property. Further confrontation was averted by the two leaders on June 23, 1992, when they signed an 18-point accord which divided fleet assets.

The status of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal also provided the basis for disagreement with Moscow. While Ukraine, Byelorus and Kazakhstan agreed to dispatch all tactical nuclear warheads to Russia by July 1, 1992, for eventual dismantlement as part of the CIS Alma-Ata foundational agreement, Kravchuk suspended the transfer in March because he demanded guarantees that the weapons would be properly disposed of and their components protected. This halt eventually resulted in a protocol between Russia and Ukraine on April 16, 1992, which detailed procedures for the weapons' control, neutralization and destruction.

The strategic weapons problem was resolved in May, when Ukraine, Byelorus and Kazakhstan formally acknowledged that they would yield all nuclear arms by the year 2000 and ban them from their soil forever. The Lisbon agreement of May 23, 1992, was necessary for the United States and Russia to proceed to ratify and implement the 1991 START agreement on strategic weapons, as well as follow-on cuts agreed to at the June 1992 Washington summit. It would also leave Russia as the sole former Soviet nuclear state.[15] In a statement to NATO, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko observed that this voluntary cession of nuclear arms has warranted the granting of guarantees for his country from NATO and international bodies to protect it from any nuclear state.[16]

This concern with security guarantees for a nonnuclear Ukraine does not appear unreasonable, given the legacy the new state inherited and the extent to which military imperatives ruled the former Soviet Union. The nuclear material in these weapons is estimated to be worth at least $1 billion,[17] and Ukraine may properly assert that it paid its fair share of their costs. To lose this asset is not as troublesome as to gain a long-term strategic liability: a nuclear-armed Russia with which Ukraine continues to share a host of disagreements.

Social Issues. No nation's security is on a firm basis when its society is affected by serious fissures. For Ukrainians, these strains are familiar: the eastern and southern regions inhabited by large numbers of Russians with identifiable language and religious differences; western areas where Ukrainian nationalism is strong; and the Crimea, where conflict with Tatars claiming their ancestral homeland in a region heavily inhabited by Russians potentially destabilizes a situation already tense due to the controversy over the Black Sea Fleet.

Following the December 1, 1991, national election and independence referendum, many expected such tensions to surface openly. To Professor Roman Szporluk of Harvard University, "certain experts were expecting conflict—between western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine; between Ukraine and Russia; clashes with Jews, Poles. None of this took place."[18] Concern has also focused on the eastern and western diaspora of ethnic Ukrainians, including some 7 million in Russia who lack Ukrainian schools or other cultural attributes.[19] These conditions, however, still exist and they continue to contribute to Ukraine's uncertain future.

Societies that have undergone such trauma as in the Ukraine will require years, if not generations, before coherency, national purpose, and civility can be restored. Patience, both domestic and international, is a primary prerequisite, yet social and other pressures often preclude this necessary healing process. The danger of unchecked nationalism in a number of virulent forms persists, to include Rukh, the Ukrainian nationalist group, and the Republic Movement of Crimea, which advocates independence for the peninsula. Security, in its domestic as well as its external variants, may continue to prove elusive.

Economic Problems. Ukrainian national security is closely associated with economic stability and prosperity. While Ukraine produced 56 percent of the USSR's corn, 25 percent of its wheat, 47 percent of Soviet iron, and 23 percent of all coal, it depended almost completely on the USSR for natural gas, oil, and petroleum products.[20] At the same time, Ukraine's

abundant uranium deposits at Zheltyye Vody produced a large proportion of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons.[21] The resulting economic interdependence has served to limit national sovereignty in a real way.

Key to economic independence have been efforts to eliminate use of the ruble as the sole national currency. Soon after the formation of the CIS, Leonid Kravchuk expressed skepticism about the viability of a common "ruble zone" of commonwealth states. To Kravchuk, "The ruble zone can turn into a fiction. We could find ourselves in the ruble zone without any rubles."[22] While Ukraine made plans to issue its own currency, the hryvnya, based upon Canadian financing, ruble shortages did in fact occur throughout the former Soviet Union.

In March 1992, the Ukrainian parliament approved a plan to divorce the nation from the ruble and its attendent problems, including inflation, scarcity, and price instability. This program would effectively separate Ukraine from the economic structure of the other 10 CIS states, which authorities in Kiev saw as an advantage given the perilous state of the Russian economy. As an intermediate step, Ukraine has been using coupons for cash purchases of food and other basic necessities.[23]

In preparation for the introduction of the hryvnya, Ukraine authorities announced that the ruble will not be used for normal transactions starting July 1, 1992. Instead, reusable coupons will serve as an interim currency, with the ruble reserved for trade with other former USSR republics. Ukraine has also asserted its right to pay its share of the former Soviet Union's external debt, which in turn would give it claim to 16.37 percent of the USSR's assets.[24] The estimated $89 billion owed by the former Soviet Union, which Western banks have held, is still the collective responsibility of former member states.[25]

Economic issues will have a direct bearing on the future of Ukraine as a viable nation-state. International aid is tied to significant monetary and fiscal reforms imposed by the International Monetary Fund, and, unless Kiev cooperates in

this regard, Western assistance may be slow in arriving. Economic security is tightly intertwined within the fabric of national security, and much remains to be done before economic stability is achieved.

Environmental Challenges. The fact that the world's most serious nuclear power plant disaster occurred in the Ukraine has made environmental issues a top priority in any national security equation. The Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 is estimated to have cost between $10-20 billion.[26] The human cost in lives destroyed and disrupted, however, is truly incalculable.

Now, the concern is that any Western investment in Ukraine and in other former Soviet republics may be jeopardized by another environmental disaster of Chernobyl proportions. As an energy importer, Ukraine depends upon nuclear power for 40 percent of the state's electricity.[27] Ukraine neither has the financial strength to rehabilitate inadequate nuclear plants nor alternative energy sources beyond coal to substitute for nuclear generated electricity.

Some 16 Chernobyl-type graphite core reactors still operate in the former Soviet Union. The International Atomic Energy Agency views their safety as "a matter of great international concern." The 41 pressurized water reactors in operation and 31 additional reactors under construction are said to "lack important safety features which are basic to similar pressurized water reactors in the West," to include containment vessels to prevent accidental emissions.[28]

The Chernobyl disaster was officially credited with causing the deaths of 31 people. It sent clouds of radiation across Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the North Pole, and it resulted in a major evaluation of the safety and utility of nuclear power. The long-term consequences to citizens of Ukraine, and to their soil, water, and all living things, are yet to be fully realized. In May 1992, a series of fires in abandoned areas surrounding the Chernobyl power plant spread radiation contaminants to fields and settlements which had previously escaped the harmful effects.[29]

Such developments explain to a large extent Ukraine's antipathy towards all things nuclear, despite its continued dependence on nuclear power. Public outrage over the Chernobyl disaster, industrial pollution, and food and water contamination suggest that environmental issues will remain central to any Ukrainian conception of national security for the foreseeable future.

Political-Strategic Issues: The Crimea. No single issue has evoked such emotion as the status of the former Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, considered a "bastion of Soviet-style communism."[30] Party *nomenklatura* and military matters have long dominated the peninsula, and its 2.4 million inhabitants were subject to Moscow's firm hand. When Nikita Khrushchev gave the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 in commemoration of 300 years of Ukrainian-Russian friendship, this act was considered to be of little consequence because of the reality of Soviet rule and because the Crimea borders only the Ukraine, from which it receives some 80 percent of its electrical power.[31]

The independence of Ukraine and disputes over the ownership of former Soviet forces and property—notably the Black Sea Fleet—were further inflamed by an independence proclamation by the Crimean Supreme Soviet. A part of Russia since its incorporation by Catherine the Great in 1783, the Ukraine Supreme Soviet reaffirmed the Crimea as a part of the Ukrainian state on February 12, 1991. However, the Crimean Supreme Soviet on December 27, 1991, voted to establish the Republic of Crimea as an autonomous state with ill-defined powers. This act was followed by an April 29, 1992, Ukrainian law which established the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign and independent part of Ukraine.

Events did not stop at that point. Next, the Crimean Supreme Soviet passed an act proclaiming state independence on May 5th. Previous efforts granting the Crimea autonomous status within Ukraine were rejected. A national referendum on independence was planned for August 2, 1992, but was postponed until September to give the public more time to study the issue. The question to be voted upon

will be: "Are you in favor of an independent Republic of Crimea in a union with other states?"[32] On May 6th the Supreme Soviet reversed its stand and changed the constitution to reflect its position as a component of the Ukrainian state.

The Russian parliament then voted on May 21st to declare the 1954 cession of Crimea to Ukraine as void and it anulled Khrushchev's "gift" to Kiev. This move was rejected by the Ukraine parliament, which on June 4, 1992, declared the issue "a direct interference into the domestic affairs of Ukraine because, in accordance with the current Constitution and the legislation of Ukraine, the Crimea is its autonomous part."[33] The Crimean Supreme Soviet's May 6th compromise in which the peninsula reverted to Ukrainian control nonetheless asserted broad powers for the Crimea.

Complicating the dispute are the Crimea's demographics. The region is heavily Russian, with some 1.6 million Russians, 600,000 Ukrainians, and about 200,000 Tatars, a Muslim people deported by Stalin in 1944 for their questionable loyalty.[34] The Tatars do not recognize the legitimacy of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, and with support from the Ukrainian nationalist group Rukh, they seek an autonomous Tatar state within Ukraine. They advocate boycotting the upcoming referendum, and large numbers of Tatar peoples have emigrated to Crimea in recent months to reclaim the homeland their ancestors ruled from 1449 to 1783.

Ukraine President Kravchuk has encouraged the Tatar diaspora movement as a way of strengthening Ukraine's hold on this Russian-dominated region. In contrast, Moscow's support for the activist Republic Movement of Crimea is seen as a part of a larger Russian agenda to return the Crimea to Moscow's fold.[35] Beyond this, domestic political strains within a highly variegated Ukraine may shape political-strategic problems in a way which limits President Kravchuk's ultimate room to maneuver. According to Ukraine's parliamentary chairman, Ivan Plusch, Kravchuk believes "a leader should feel the nation and go with the nation."[36]

Neither Ukraine nor Russia have much to gain from a prolonged dispute over the Crimea. Given Ukraine's feeling of

strategic vulnerability associated with its declared intention to be nonnuclear, conflict over the Crimea may mask other, more irreconciliable differences—including the armed separatist movement in Trans-Dniester—which may influence the strategic direction of Ukrainian defense policy.

The factors of military issues, social issues, economic problems, environmental challenges, and political-strategic issues will prove decisive to the formulation of Ukraine's security policies. To a very large extent how they play out in the future depends on the willingness of Russia and Ukraine to challenge or to compromise, as well as the threat each perceives to their national interests.

Kiev's relationship with Moscow will continue to be decisively important for the foreseeable future. There is a widely held belief that Ukraine has not been taken seriously in its quest for independence and sovereignty. According to one account, "Like most Ukrainians, Kravchuk says he believes his country has been overshadowed in relations with the West by its giant neighbor to the north, Russia, and its maverick president, Boris Yeltsin."[37] To Kravchuk, Moscow has "imperial ambitions" over former Soviet territories that could become more pronounced when it achieves a nuclear monopoly by the year 2000.[38]

This feeling of insecurity has propelled Ukraine to act decisively to form a national army. It is an insecurity derived not only from its relations with and perceptions toward Moscow, but from other former Soviet republics as well. Indeed, "The major political driving force behind Ukraine's positions is the widely held sense among nationalists that an army represents a central attribute of statehood, and that Ukraine must struggle against any Commonwealth command that could become the nucleus of another Moscow-centered power."[39]

Given the widely held skepticism regarding the Commonwealth of Independent States as both a political and a military instrument of statehood, Kiev is confronted with a Russia committed to creating a modern, highly mobile rapid reaction-type army. In its final form, this army will number approximately 1.5 million, and it will primarily be professional,

based upon personal contracts. This force is to be in place within 6-8 years.[40] At the conclusion of this program of military revitalization and realignment Russia will emerge as the former USSR's sole nuclear power. Russia's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons continues to guide its defense policy, and Defense Minister Grachev has said that these weapons "would be used only to ensure sufficient defense if there is a threat from the outside, a threat that cannot be met by political means and by conventional forces."[41]

Beyond this imponderable situation, the resurrection of a Russian army is central to restoring Russia as a great power. According to Vice President Rutskoi, "Everybody should keep in mind the following, while restoring the Russian Army, we are restoring Great Russia."[42]

What then is the nature of the military threat confronting Russia, the largest and most powerful of the new states? To Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, this threat includes "the existence of powerful armed forces in some states, *mobilization possibilities* and a system of their deployment close to Russian borders as well as attempts at using political and economic pressure and military blackmail against Russia."[43] Ukraine, as Moscow's largest neighbor to the west, must ponder the significance of this statement.

Conundrum with a Twist.

Ukraine's defense dilemma is a renewed security conundrum with a historical twist. Should Kiev seek to build a large, modern army similar to the new Russian army, this action may be viewed as a threat to neighboring states which may find it necessary to replicate a similar military force. The security dilemma, that is, the tendency of states seeking more security to actually achieve less due to counter moves by opposing states, may well apply. This phenomenon fueled the cold war's arms race at an expense to U.S. taxpayers of $11 trillion; it also served to accelerate the Soviet collapse. Now, it

lies dormant at the feet of the new Eurasian nations of the former USSR which may fall into the same trap of buying less security at the expense of more arms if allowed to proceed unchecked.

The historical dimension is the legacy inherited by all new Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. This is a legacy which has seen military investment consume at least 30 percent of the USSR's gross output and occupy an estimated one-fifth of its workforce. To have a model such as this as the template for the future could direct defense policy back in time, to large, expensive armed forces poised to defend the state and its perceived interests at virtually all costs.

The Ukrainian desire for security guarantees reflects this awareness, that past patterns of military policy may reassert themselves in the new post-Soviet states. The security dilemma phenomenon will ensure that this costly, potentially dangerous situation does not bring security but social instability and economic dislocations which will do irretrievable harm to the new states. It is important at this significant moment to acknowledge that Kiev's commitment to democracy does not have to repeat past patterns of Soviet military threat and expenditure.

The West and international institutions bear a special responsibility to prevent the past from revisiting the future in the former Soviet Union. For the Ukraine at this critical period, its military, social, economic, environmental, and political-strategic insecurities need not direct its national security policy down this familiar path.

U.S. Policy Toward a New Ukraine.

For U.S. policy, the implications are twofold. First, it is essential that policymakers differentiate Ukraine from other new states of the former Soviet Union, particularly the Russian Federation. Russia, by its sheer size, population, military forces, and economic potential, dominates most interaction with the West. Russia retains the key components of the vast Soviet military-industrial complex, a disintegrating yet highly capable network of research and development, space, and

weapons manufacturing assets. Now, with Russia slated to become the sole nuclear-armed survivor of the former Soviet state, the prospect of Russia's domination of Western contacts, exchanges, aid, and the like obscures and complicates valid Ukrainian interests. Beyond this, for Kiev to appear second to Moscow is inevitable, yet offensive to Ukrainians proud of their newly acquired statehood. Ukraine can and should be differentiated from both the debris of the former USSR and from other newly emergent states.

A policy of differentiation, which is equally applicable to all new Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union, should also be matched by Western assistance targeted at Kiev's specific needs. These include aid in formulating a defense doctrine appropriate to an independent state; military training, where U.S. armed forces' schools have much to offer; management techniques and expertise; logistics and infrastructure support, in both conceptual and real terms; and personnel policies and programs, with the rule of law and due process central considerations.

Finally, U.S. military advice and assistance are appropriate and necessary if Ukraine is to adopt democratic approaches to civil-military relations and to national security matters. Security assistance, even if modest, can be an important psychological link to the larger issue of a continued U.S. military presence in Europe which guards against future instability and supports a European security regime grounded in existing institutions, especially NATO. Together, these and other links to the West may strengthen those factions both inside and outside Ukraine which fear the long-term effects of an excessive Ukrainian defense buildup.

It is vital that the United States help Ukraine avoid the trap of the security dilemma as it distances itself from an imposed authoritarian past. Policy differentiation and specific, targeted assistance, complemented by a U.S. military presence and role in European security affairs, will aid Kiev the most during this volatile transition period.

ENDNOTES

1. Fred Hiatt, "Ukraine Vote Leaves Union Shattered," *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1991, p. A1.

2. Chrystia Freeland, "Ukraine's Parliament Formalizes Independence," *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1991, p. A48.

3. Francis X. Clines, "Legislators Back Effort to Create a Ukrainian Army," *The New York Times*, October 23, 1991, p. A1.

4. "Ukraine Wants Voice in Use of Atomic Arms," *The New York Times*, October 25, 1991, p. A7.

5. Lyudmila Beletskaya and Aleksey Kucherenko, "Putting a Brave Face on It. Ukraine Still Has the Bomb," Moscow *Kommersant*, March 16-23, 1992, p. 22 in *FBIS*-SOV-92-057, March 24, 1992, p. 1.

6. "On the Nuclear-Free Status of the Ukraine," Statement of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet, Kiev *Pravda Ukrainy*, October 26, 1991, p. 1, in *JPRS*-UMA-91-032, December 17, 1991, p. 19-20.

7. "Kravchuk Assumes Command of Armed Forces," Moscow *TASS*, 1806 GMT, December 12, 1991, in *FBIS*-SOV-91-240, December 13, 1991, p. 71.

8. Sergey Balykov, "Parliament Legislates Armed Forces Structure," Moscow TASS, 1834 GMT, December 13, 1991, in *FBIS*-SOV-91-241, December 16, 1991, p. 68.

9. Aleksandr Gorobets, "Look After Combat Readiness," Kiev *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 2, 1991, p. 2, in *JPRS*-UMA-91-032, December 17, 1991, p. 17-18.

10. S. Shevtsov, "May Common Sense Prevail," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, January 24, 1992, p. 1, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-016, January 24, 1992; "National Guard Creation Under Way," Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 1200 GMT, December 28, 1991, in *FBIS*-SOV-91-250, December 30, 1991, p. 50.

11. Lyudmila Mavrina, "National Security Service Leaders Meet Press," Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 0100 GMT, April 19, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-076, April 20, 1992, p. 44.

12. N. Zaika, "Leader of Group of Experts on the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Lays Out the Position of His State on Strategic Forces," *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 6, 1992, p. 1, in *JPRS*-UMA-92-006, February 20, 1992, p. 15.

13. "Novosti" newscast, Moscow Television First Program Network, 2209 GMT, January 6, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-004, January 7, 1992, p. 60-61.

14. Gerald F. Seib and Natalia A. Feduschak, "Russia, Ukraine Will Go Head to Head Over Military Issues at C.I.S. Conference," *Wall Street Journal*, March 20, 1992, p. A6.

15. Don Oberdorfer, "3 Ex-Soviet States to Give Up A-Arms," *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1992, p. A1.

16. Aleksey Trotsenko, "Ukraine Confirms Nonnuclear Status to NATO," Moscow ITAR-TASS, 2002 GMT, June 3, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-108, June 4, 1992, p. 4.

17. Natalia A. Feduschak, "Ukraine Seeks To Get Control of Nuclear Arms," *Wall Street Journal*, March 26, 1992, p. A10.

18. James F. Clarity, "Free Ukraine's Nationalism: Will Pride Become Prejudice?," *The New York Times*, February 12, 1992, p. A10.

19. Volodymyr Teteruk, "Let Us Gather the Holy Trinity," Kiev *Holos Ukrayiny*, January 22, 1992, p. 8, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-022, February 3, 1992, p. 67-68.

20. "Ukrainian Candidate to Pursue Independence." *Carlisle Sentinel*, November 30, 1991, p. A6.

21. Ihor Herashchenko, "A Non-Nuclear Ukraine: Pro and Con," Kiev *Narodna hazeta*, October 1991, p. 5, in *JPRS*-UMA-91-032, December 17, 1991, p. 18-19.

22. Francis X. Clines, "Joint Command Is Planned for Atom Arms," *The New York Times*, December 31, 1991, p. A1.

23. "Ukraine's Parliament Approves Plan That Could End Nation's Use of Ruble," *Wall Street Journal*, March 25, 1992, p. A8.

24. "Ukraine to Limit Ruble Use," *Wall Street Journal*, June 1, 1992, p. A9; "Ukraine to Pay Its Share of Soviet Debt on Its Own," *Wall Street Journal*, January 30, 1992, p. A8.

25. "Ukraine Clears Way for Loans," *Wall Street Journal*, March 16, 1992, p. A11.

26. Paul Lewis, "U.S. and Six Plan Nuclear Cleanup in Eastern Europe," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1992, p. A1.

27. William Drozdiak, "Ukraine's Leader Says Russia Still Has 'Imperial Ambitions'," *The Washington Post*, June 18, 1992, p. A40.

28. Lewis, "U.S. and Six Plan Nuclear Cleanup," p. A14

29. "Fires Around Chernobyl Spreading Contamination," *Wall Street Journal*, May 5, 1992, p. A16.

30. "Ukraine: The Crimean Question," *The Economist*, January 11, 1992, p. 45-46.

31. *Ibid.*

32. "Referendum Planned for 2 Aug," Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 1700 GMT, May 5, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-088, May 6, 1992, p. 45; "Crimean Independence Referendum Postponed," Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 1600 GMT, June 25, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-124, June 26, 1992, p. 72.

33. "Deputies Reject Russian Decisions on Crimea," Kiev Radio Ukraine, 0000 GMT, June 4, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-109, June 5, 1992, p. 69.

34. Mikhail Kochetkov and Yevgeniy Menkes, "[Kravchuk] Holds News Conference at UN," Moscow ITAR-TASS, 0718 GMT, May 12, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-092, May 12, 1992, p. 47.

35. Chrystia Freeland, "Crimea: Caught in the Middle," *The Washington Post*, February 13, 1992, p. A33; Chrystyna Lapychak, "Ukraine Sees Crimean Move as Russian Ploy," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 26, 1992, p. 5.

36. Laurie Hays, "As He Builds a Nation, Ukraine Chief Becomes Thorn in Yeltsin's Side," *Wall Street Journal*, March 17, 1992, p. A10.

37. Chrystyna Lapychak, "Ukrainian President To Seek Security Pact In First Visit to U.S.," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 1, 1992, p. 6.

38. Drozdiak, "Ukraine's Leader Says," p. A40.

39. Serge Schmemann, "Friction Rises as Ukraine and Russia Clash Over Ex-Soviet Armed Forces," *The New York Times*, March 5, 1992, p. A3.

40. Mikhail Shevtsov, "Outlines Reforms," Moscow ITAR-TASS, 1435 GMT, May 30, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 26.

41. Daniel Sneider, "Turning Russia's Army Into a Lean Machine," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 1992, p. 7.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Roman Zadunaiskiy, "Grachev on Army's 'Sweeping Changes.' Threats," Moscow ITAR-TASS, 1417 GMT, June 1, 1992, in *FBIS*-SOV-92-106, June 2, 1992, p. 14.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft
Commandant

* * * * *

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director
Colonel Karl W. Robinson

Director of Research
Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Author
Colonel David T.Twining

Editor
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries
Mrs. Sandra L. Foote
Ms. Patricia A. Bonneau

* * * * *

Composition
Daniel B. Barnett