

**AD-A255 201**




**U.S. Army Research Institute  
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**

**Research Report 1623**

# **1991 Survey of Mobilized Reservists: Attitudes and Experiences During Operation Desert Storm**


**Beverly C. Harris, Timothy W. Elig,  
and Laurel W. Oliver, editors**  
U.S. Army Research Institute



**July 1992**

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**92-24740**



15P8

92 9 04 008

## **DISCLAIMER NOTICE**

**THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY  
PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED  
TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT  
NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT  
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.**

# U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction  
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

**EDGAR M. JOHNSON**  
Technical Director

**MICHAEL D. SHALER**  
COL, AR  
Commanding

Technical review by

Tanya J. Guthrie  
Jacquelyn Scarville

Accession For	
NTIS CRAZI	
DTIC TAB	
Unannounced	
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability	
Dist	
A-1	

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

## NOTICES

**DISTRIBUTION:** Primary distribution of this report has been made by ARI. Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, ATTN: PERI-POX, 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600.

**FINAL DISPOSITION:** This report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

**NOTE:** The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved DATE 10-19-78	
<small>Sub-reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing the instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.</small>				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 1992, July	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final Mar 91 - Mar 92		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 1991 Survey of Mobilized Reservists: Attitudes and Experiences During Operation Desert Storm		5. FUNDING NUMBERS 63007A 792 2104 T01		
6. AUTHOR(S) Harris, Beverly C.; Elig, Timothy W.; and Oliver, Laurel W. (editors)				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 5001 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria, VA 22333-5600		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ARI Research Report 1623		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) --		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER --		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES --				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE --		
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) <p>This report summarizes the findings of the 1991 Survey of Mobilized Reservists (Initial STAMP) conducted in March and April of 1991. This survey provided immediate information on the experiences, attitudes, and career intentions of Reserve Component soldiers mobilized for Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS). A total of 618 (51%) responded to the survey; 59% of the respondents submitted written comments ranging from one sentence to several typewritten pages. Chapters in this report focus on the impact of mobilization on civilian employment, income, and education; mobilization/demobilization experiences during ODS; attitudes about leadership, training, and family issues, particularly related to morale, retention, and readiness; a summary of written comments; and conclusions and implications of the research. Reservists responding to Initial STAMP were satisfied with their overall Army experience and felt that the mobilization went well. They felt that they were adequately trained and prepared to perform their mission. They were also confident that they could perform well in combat. They expressed less satisfaction with the way they were treated, the leadership, and the information (Continued)</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS U.S. Army reserves      Mobilization      Morale Army National Guard      Leadership      Readiness Attitudes      Retention      Individual Ready Reserves			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 95	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified			16. PRICE CODE --	
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited

13. ABSTRACT (Continued)

they were given from their leaders and the Army. Based on written comments, Reservists indicated that the problems they experienced negatively influenced morale and would, in turn, negatively influence retention and future readiness. Implications for changes that could improve future mobilizations are discussed.

**Research Report 1623**

**1991 Survey of Mobilized Reservists:  
Attitudes and Experiences During  
Operation Desert Storm**

**Beverly C. Harris, Timothy W. Elig,  
and Laurel W. Oliver, editors**

**U.S. Army Research Institute**

**Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Technical Area  
Timothy W. Elig, Acting Chief**

**Manpower and Personnel Research Division  
Zita M. Simutis, Director**

**U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences  
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600**

**Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel  
Department of the Army**

**July 1992**

---

**Army Project Number  
2Q263007A792**

**Manpower and Personnel**


Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

## FOREWORD

The Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Technical Area (MPPRTA) of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) performs research on manpower and personnel issues of particular significance to the U.S. Army. In 1990, MPPRTA conducted the Army Career Satisfaction Survey (ACSS) to provide timely information on soldiers' attitudes and concerns about downsizing the Army. During Operation Desert Storm (ODS), the Director of Military Personnel Management, Major General Stroup, tasked ARI to conduct an ACSS-like survey to provide additional information on downsizing and on the impact of ODS on both the Active and Reserve Components. In keeping with the mission of MPPRTA, this research focuses on the possible impact of ODS and downsizing on retention, morale, and future readiness. This research was authorized by a memorandum dated 5 February 1991. The tasking was designated as the 1991 Surveys of Total Army Military Personnel (STAMP) research effort.

This report documents the results of the first survey conducted under this tasking: The 1991 Survey of Mobilized Reservists (Initial STAMP). It includes six chapters that present the findings and their implications for morale, retention, and readiness. Results of the survey were briefed to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and the Director of Military Personnel Management in July 1991. Results were also briefed to other DCSPER directorates and the staffs of the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve (OCAR) and the Director, Army National Guard (ARNG).

The first survey targeted only mobilized Reserves to assess their immediate reaction to mobilization and their experiences during ODS. Results have been used in reports of the Army Inspector General and in lessons-learned reviews of mobilization policies and procedures for the drilling and inactive Reserves. Results have also been used by OCAR, ARNG, and the 54 state guards in recruiting and retention policy reviews and planning conferences. The American Red Cross is using results from this survey to plan the disbursement of \$13.5 million in a federally funded effort to reduce the personal financial burdens of mobilized Reservists from all services. This first survey also provided information for the development of the Main STAMP survey, which was sent to 50,000 Active and Reserve Component soldiers in December 1991. The STAMP effort is providing the only information available on mobilized Reservists' employment and financial experiences.

  
EDGAR M. JOHNSON  
Technical Director

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

---

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) research team particularly appreciates the assistance of two consultants: Colonel John Dussich, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR), who advised us on questions and issues relevant to the Reserve Component; and Alma Steinberg from the Training Systems Research Division at ARI, who provided helpful information on the content analysis of the written comments from Individual Ready Reserve soldiers at the mobilization stations. Others who were especially helpful in developing the questionnaire were Lieutenant Colonel Joe Kulbok, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; Captain Mark Scraba, National Guard Bureau; and Trueman Tremble, ARI.

Consortium research fellows Charles Middlestead, Brian Francis, and Elizabeth Palmer-Johnson, as well as Kim Heiser, Virginia Holliday, and David Bell in the Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Technical Area were also instrumental in the success of this project.



# 1991 SURVEY OF MOBILIZED RESERVISTS: ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

### Requirement:

In February 1991, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) was first tasked by the Director of Military Personnel Management (DMPM) to provide information on the attitudes and concerns of soldiers during and after Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Army policymakers were particularly interested in the impact of ODS and downsizing on retention, morale, and readiness. This tasking became the 1991 Surveys of Total Army Military Personnel (STAMP) research effort. Two surveys were developed to respond to the task. The first survey, the 1991 Survey of Mobilized Reservists (Initial STAMP), targeting Reserve Component soldiers mobilized for ODS, was in the field within 1 month of the effort's approval by the Chief of Staff, Army. Initial STAMP was designed to provide immediate information on the mobilization experiences and attitudes of Reservists and to aid in the development of the second survey, the 1991/1992 Survey of Total Army Military Personnel (Main STAMP). This report presents the findings from the first survey, Initial STAMP.

### Procedure:

Initial STAMP was a 124-item, six-page questionnaire sent to a small sample of Reserve Component soldiers mobilized for ODS. Questions were asked about mobilization/deployment experiences, attitudes toward the Army and ODS, and post-ODS career intentions. Respondents included 618 Reserve Component soldiers from the United States Army Reserve (USAR), the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Soldiers who responded were deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA), United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and within the Continental United States (CONUS). The overall response rate was 51%. A total of 363 (59%) of these respondents made written comments on the survey ranging from one line to several typewritten pages.

### Findings:

Chapters in this report focus on the effects of mobilization on employment, income, and education; mobilization experiences during ODS; leadership, training, and family issues; a summary of written comments; and conclusions and implications for morale, retention, and readiness.

Reserve soldiers responding to Initial STAMP were generally positive and satisfied with their overall Army experience. They thought that deployment went well and that they were adequately trained and confident that they could perform well in combat. Respondents also thought the jobs they were doing in ODS were important and that their work was appreciated. Many comments also indicated that the Reservists were proud of the Army and the United States and considered it an honor to serve in ODS.

Respondents were less positive about their leaders, with only about half agreeing that their leaders were concerned about them, worked well together as a team, or would perform well in combat. Only 40% felt that they had been treated as equals by the Active Component. About half indicated that their own morale was high and less than half agreed that unit morale was high. They were generally dissatisfied with the mail and the amount of information provided by the Army at all points in the process.

The comments received from over half of the respondents indicated that they were underutilized during their time in ODS, that they lacked important information, and that they were inequitably treated. The comments also indicated that some leaders lacked experience, training, and concern for their troops. The lack of meaningful work while deployed was perceived as particularly negative because Reservists had been taken from their civilian jobs and their families for what seemed to them no reason.

Soldiers indicated that the problems they encountered during mobilization and deployment negatively affected unit morale and readiness, and they thought these would, in turn, negatively influence retention and recruiting. The reasonably high correlations between survey items related to these problems and the outcomes of career intentions, unit morale, and unit readiness tend to support the statements made in the written comments.

#### Utilization of Findings:

The findings from this Initial STAMP survey of mobilized Reserve soldiers provided immediate feedback to Active and Reserve Component policymakers on Reserve soldiers' mobilization experiences and attitudes about ODS. Results have been included in Army Inspector General reports and used in lessons-learned reviews of mobilization policies and procedures for the drilling and inactive Reserves. USAR, ARNG, and the 54 state guards are using results from Initial STAMP in recruiting and retention policy reviews and planning conferences. The American Red Cross is using the results to plan the disbursement of \$13.5 million in a federally funded effort to reduce the personal financial burdens of mobilized Reservists from all services. The findings from Initial STAMP also provided information on issues to be included in the more extensive Main STAMP survey. The Main survey was sent to 50,000 Active and Reserve Component soldiers and focused not only on the impact of ODS but also on the impact

of downsizing the military. The results from both surveys will provide key information for the development of manpower policies and plans to improve the process for future mobilizations.

1991 SURVEY OF MOBILIZED RESERVISTS: ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES  
DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION TO THE 1991 SURVEYS OF TOTAL ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL (STAMP) . . . . .	1
Beverly C. Harris and Timothy W. Elig	
Background . . . . .	1
Method . . . . .	2
Results . . . . .	4
Plan of Report . . . . .	9
References . . . . .	10
EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION ON EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND EDUCATION . . . . .	11
Brian D. Francis	
Introduction . . . . .	11
Results . . . . .	11
Discussion . . . . .	14
MOBILIZATION EXPERIENCES OF RESERVE SOLDIERS . . . . .	15
Charles G. Middlestead	
Introduction . . . . .	15
Results . . . . .	15
Discussion . . . . .	27
RELATIONSHIP OF LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, AND FAMILY ISSUES TO RETENTION, MORALE, SATISFACTION, AND READINESS . . . . .	29
Laurel W. Oliver	
Introduction . . . . .	29
Data Analysis . . . . .	29
Results . . . . .	30
Discussion . . . . .	36
Summary Statement . . . . .	38
References . . . . .	39
SUMMARY OF WRITTEN COMMENTS . . . . .	41
Beverly C. Harris	
Introduction . . . . .	41
Method . . . . .	41
Results . . . . .	42
Discussion . . . . .	47
References . . . . .	49

## CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

INITIAL STAMP SURVEY OF MOBILIZED RESERVISTS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY . . . . .	51
Laurel W. Oliver, Beverly C. Harris, and Timothy W. Elig	
Summary of Findings . . . . .	51
Implications for the Army . . . . .	52
APPENDIX A. LIST OF ARMY AGENCIES AND OFFICES CONTRIBUTING TO STAMP . . . . .	A-1
B. SURVEY FORM 1: MOBILIZED ENLISTED PERSONNEL . . . . .	B-1
C. CHARTS FOR LEADERSHIP/CLIMATE, TRAINING, FAMILY/STRESS, AND OUTCOME MEASURES . . . . .	C-1

### LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Percentage of Respondents Compared to Units Mobilized and U.S. Population From Each Region of the United States . . . . .	5
2. Distribution of Respondents by Gender for Component and Location . . . . .	6
3. Distribution of Respondents by Personnel Group for Component and Location . . . . .	7
4. Distribution of Respondents From Each Reserve Component by Deployment Location . . . . .	8
5. Number of Officer and Enlisted Respondents Within Each Reserve Component Who Were Deployed to Each Location . . . . .	8
6. Percentage of Companies Providing Income or Benefits to Reserve Soldiers Mobilized for ODS . . . . .	13
7. Percentage of Respondents at Each Mobilization Stage at Time of Initial STAMP Survey . . . . .	15
8. Stage of Mobilization by Reserve Component and Location . . . . .	16

## CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
Table 9. Previous Mobilization Arrangements and Respondents' Evaluation of How Well Their Arrangements Worked by Percentages of Personnel Group . . . . .	17
10. Intercorrelations of Leadership Climate Items and Outcome Measures . . . . .	32
11. Intercorrelations of Training Items and Outcome Measures . . . . .	34
12. Intercorrelations of Family/Personal Items and Outcome Measures . . . . .	35
13. Binomial Effect Size Display (BESD) for Leader Concern-Unit Morale Correlation of $I = .52$ . . . . .	37
14. Percent of Soldiers Making Written Comments by Content Area . . . . .	42

### LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Percent of Initial STAMP respondents in each employment status . . . . .	12
2. Adequacy of banking services in ODS . . . . .	19
3. Accuracy of monthly pay in ODS . . . . .	20
4. Allotments in ODS handled as I wanted . . . . .	21
5. Availability of personnel records in ODS . . . . .	22
6. Availability of medical/dental records in ODS . . . . .	23
7. Availability of orders in ODS . . . . .	25
8. Availability of information in ODS . . . . .	26

1991 SURVEY OF MOBILIZED RESERVISTS: ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES  
DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE 1991 SURVEYS OF TOTAL ARMY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL (STAMP)

Beverly C. Harris and Timothy W. Elig

Background

Operation Desert Storm (ODS) was the first major military conflict for the United States since Vietnam and the first since the draft was discontinued in 1973. This conflict occurred during a period of extraordinary world change in Eastern Europe and the USSR. ODS also occurred when economic problems in the United States were causing severe budget cuts in both the public and private sectors of the economy. Many industries were experiencing layoffs and the military was planning a significant downsizing of the Armed Forces. Downsizing activities were put on hold during ODS but have resumed now that the war is over.

Problem

In 1990, the Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Technical Area (MPPRTA, formerly Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Group) at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) completed the Army Career Satisfaction Survey (ACSS), which provided timely information on soldiers' initial reactions to downsizing before Operation Desert Shield (Elig & Martell, 1990). As a follow-up to the results from ACSS, the Director of Military Personnel Management, MG Stroup, tasked ARI to provide information on soldiers' reactions to ODS and to downsizing after ODS. Army policymakers were particularly interested in the effect of the war on morale, retention, and readiness. This tasking led to the development of the Surveys of Total Army Military Personnel (STAMP) research effort, which was approved by the Army Chief of Staff in February 1991.

Purpose of Research Program

STAMP is a program of research to provide information to Army personnel officials to assist in formulating policies and procedures for demobilization and redeployment of troops after ODS and during the downsizing to follow. Through a coordinated effort, with cooperation and input from agencies and offices across the Army (see Appendix A), ARI developed two primary surveys and one supplemental survey to respond to the tasking:

1. The 1991 Survey of Mobilized Reservists (Initial STAMP) targeted only Army Reserve soldiers mobilized for ODS. The survey was designed to provide immediate information on mobilization and

demobilization experiences during ODS and on Reservists' attitudes and career intentions. It also provided information for the development of the Main STAMP Survey.

2. A special 2-page ODS supplement was developed to accompany the initial trial application of the Army Career Transition Survey (ACTS) given to all soldiers at the Transition Sites as they leave the Army. Questions centered on the extent to which ODS and downsizing influenced a soldier's decision to leave the Army. ACTS is a continuing research effort.
3. The 1991 Survey of Total Army Military Personnel (Main STAMP) surveyed over 50,000 Active and Reserve Component soldiers. Questions in Main STAMP focus more extensively on soldiers' experiences during ODS and also on their attitudes toward downsizing the Army.

#### Purpose of Initial STAMP

At the time of the STAMP tasking, there was little directly applicable information to accurately predict the impact of the ODS experience on the attitudes and career decisions of soldiers, particularly mobilized Reserve Component personnel. A mobilization on the scale required by ODS had not occurred since World War II (Binkin & Kaufmann, 1989; Kozlowski, Chao, Smith, Hedlund, & Walz, 1991). Exploratory research conducted two months after the initial deployment of troops to Southwest Asia (SWA) indicated that the Reserve Component experienced a variety of problems that were either unique to the Reserves or more prevalent than the same problems experienced by the Active Component (Harman, 1991; Oliver & Bell, 1991). Initial STAMP was designed to target mobilized Reserve soldiers. This report documents the results of Initial STAMP. This chapter provides the background and methodology for the survey as well as basic demographic information about the sample and the respondents.

#### Method

##### Subjects

At the time of this survey, approximately 145,000 Ready Reserve soldiers had been mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. About 95% of these soldiers were from the Army Reserve (USAR), the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR). Personnel records for these Reserve Component soldiers were transferred into the Active Component personnel files as they were called up.

Sampling plan. Because of sampling limitations, respondents in total cannot be said to be representative of mobilized Reservists overall. However, respondents in particular subgroups



are likely to provide relatively unbiased estimates for those particular subgroups. This is the result of the sampling strategy that emphasized having sufficient respondents in particular subgroups, rather than securing a random sample of all mobilized Reservists.

The sample was drawn as a non-proportional stratified random sample of Army Reservists (USAR and ARNG) on Active Duty on 28 February 1991, intending to exclude those soldiers deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA). The sample was stratified by military personnel classification (enlisted, commissioned officers, and warrant officers) and location of deployment (continental U.S. [CONUS], and other than CONUS [OCONUS], but not SWA). Random samples were drawn in differing proportions that were set to obtain nearly equal numbers of respondents in four strata:

(1) enlisted personnel OCONUS ( $n = 400$ , 6% sample); (2) enlisted personnel CONUS ( $n = 400$ , 0.8% sample); (3) commissioned officers OCONUS ( $n = 280$ , 37% sample); and (4) commissioned officers CONUS ( $n = 220$ , 8.8% sample). Because of the relatively low numbers of warrant officers, it was impossible to sample equal numbers of them from CONUS and OCONUS; nor were warrant officers sampled in sufficient numbers to provide respondents equal in number to enlisted and commissioned personnel. The sampling proportions for warrants were 100% for OCONUS ( $n = 20$ ) and only 3.8% for CONUS ( $n = 80$ ). In summary, more commissioned officers were sampled from OCONUS than from CONUS to cancel the imbalance in the warrant officer samples so that officers overall were equally sampled from CONUS and OCONUS. More enlisted were sampled than officers to obtain nearly equal numbers of respondents because of the expected lower response rate of enlisted personnel. The sample included 1400 mobilized Reserve soldiers (total enlisted, 800; total officers, 600).

Actual sample. The Enlisted Master File (EMF) and Officer Master File (OMF) which were available for sampling when the survey was mailed did not contain sufficient, accurate information to obtain a truly representative sample as outlined above. Problems arose from missing or inaccurate information in three types of fields. First, the desired sample was one containing only personnel mobilized from the drilling Reserve. This sample would exclude Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and retirees. However, the mobilization category was missing or unknown for so many mobilized Reservists that the obtained sample contained representatives from both the IRR and retirees. The desired sample was also intended to exclude individuals deployed to SWA. The sample does exclude those who could be identified as deployed to SWA based on two types of fields, location codes and unit addresses. However, the sample does, in fact, contain many soldiers who were deployed to SWA because of problems with location codes and addresses: (a) data fields were based on mobilization/training points for many individuals, not deployed location; and (b) zip codes in this file were 5-digit codes which did not include the additional 4-digit code used by Army Post Offices to assign APO's to SWA. As a result, many individuals

deployed to SWA were included in the sample because they had a 5-digit zip code shared with Europe.

### Survey Instrument

The six-page questionnaire contained 124 items. It was produced in-house as a machine scannable booklet with one full page for written comments. Two forms of the survey were produced, one for mobilized enlisted personnel and one for mobilized officer personnel. The categories for rank (Item 1) and current duty position (Item 96) were the only items that were different for the two forms. A copy of the enlisted form of the survey is included as Appendix B.

The surveys asked about soldiers' mobilization and demobilization experiences, their morale and career intentions, and their perceptions of unit morale, readiness, leadership, and training during ODS. Questions were developed using previous Army surveys, by consulting with content area experts and other agencies in the Department of the Army, and through interviews with Reserve Component personnel. Pilot tests of survey items were conducted with mobilized Reserve Component soldiers who were working in the local area. Based on the pilot test feedback, some wording of questions and instructions was changed.

### Procedure

The survey described above was mailed to the sample of 1400 Reserve soldiers in late March 1991. A cover letter from LTG William H. Reno, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, was included thanking soldiers for a job well done in ODS and encouraging participation in the STAMP survey. A short follow-up letter was sent out to those who had not responded by late April. Approximately 14% of the surveys were not deliverable because of incomplete or inaccurate address files resulting in an actual deliverable sample of 1202 mobilized Reserves (681 enlisted personnel and 521 officers).

## Results

### Respondents

Surveys were received from 618 soldiers. The overall response rate based on the deliverable surveys was 51%. The response rate for enlisted personnel was 42% ( $n = 284$ ). For officers, the response rate was 64% ( $n = 284$  for commissioned officers and 50 for warrant officers). The distribution of Initial STAMP respondents across regions of the U.S. is presented in Table 1 on the next page. Respondents were fairly representative of the overall geographic distribution of Army personnel. The overrepresentation from the West results from a high percentage of respondents from the state of Utah (13%), many of whom were medical personnel deployed to Europe.

Table 1

Percentage of Respondents Compared to Units Mobilized and U.S. Population From Each Region of the United States

Region	Survey Respondents	ARNG Units	USAR Units	US* Population (18-44)
Northeast	9.0	10.8	17.1	19.9
South	42.7	54.5	37.6	34.8
Midwest	17.4	18.8	29.4	26.6
West	30.1	12.8	9.4	21.7

\*Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990.

With the personnel file problems described above, the Initial STAMP sample may not be representative of all soldiers mobilized for ODS. However, the demographics of the respondents indicate that they included a fairly good cross-section of the Reserve Component.

Demographics on the 618 Initial STAMP respondents follow:

- 46% were enlisted (23% E-1 to E-4, 23% E-5 to E-9); 46% commissioned officers; and 8% warrant officers.
- 77% were male; 19% were female; 4% did not respond.
- 54% were USAR; 30%, ARNG; and 14%, IRR; 2% did not respond.
- 30% deployed to SWA; 26% went to Europe; 32% were sent to locations within CONUS; and 12% marked other.
- 24% were single; 65% were married; and 10% were separated, widowed, or divorced.
- 73% were called up with their unit; 18% were called individually; and 7% volunteered.
- 58% indicated that they provided over half the support for one or more people, not including spouses.
- 32% of the soldiers responding were still at their deployed site; 46% of the respondents were back to civilian life.
- Approximately 50% of the respondents were from medical specialties: nurses, dentists, medical doctors, medical corps/service personnel.

The process of the partial mobilization did not distribute Reserve Component personnel equally across all locations. This disparity is also reflected in the respondents. Table 2 provides the number of respondents for the Reserve Component and for deployed location by gender. Table 3 contains the number of respondents for Component and location by personnel group. Table 4 shows the distribution of each Reserve Component by location and Table 5 is a three-way frequency table showing the number of enlisted and officer personnel within each Reserve Component who were sent to each location.

Table 2

Distribution of Respondents by Gender for Component and Location

Reserve Component	Male	Female	Total
USAR	223	96	319
ARNG	164	15	179
IRR	79	5	84
Total	466	116	582

Deployed location	Male	Female	Total
SWA	167	11	178
USAREUR	109	44	153
CONUS	148	43	191
Other	14	10	24
Not Deployed	29	7	36
Total	467	115	582

Note: Total less than 618 because of missing data.

Table 3

Distribution of Respondents by Personnel Group for Component and Location

Reserve Component	Personnel Group			Total
	Enlisted	Commissioned	Warrant	
USAR	109	194	28	331
ARNG	97	71	15	183
IRR	71	12	3	86
Total	277	277	46	600

Deployed Location	Personnel Group			Total
	Enlisted	Commissioned	Warrant	
SWA	105	70	10	185
USAREUR	74	77	8	159
CONUS	53	120	22	195
Other	23	2	0	25
Not Deployed	18	9	9	36
Total	273	278	49	600

Note: Total less than 618 because of missing data.

Table 4

Distribution of Respondents From Each Reserve Component by Deployment Location

Reserve Component	Deployed Location			Total
	SWA	USAREUR	CONUS	
USAR	62	106	127	295
ARNG	120	3	41	164
IRR	4	51	23	78
Total	186	160	191	537

Note: Total less than 618 because of missing data.

Table 5

Number of Officer and Enlisted Respondents Within Each Reserve Component Who Were Deployed to Each Location

Reserve Component/Rank	Deployed Location		
	SWA	USAREUR	CONUS
U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)	62	105	127
Enlisted	34	22	28
Commissioned Officers	23	76	88
Warrant Officers	5	7	11
Army National Guard (ARNG)	119	3	41
Enlisted	68	1	14
Commissioned Officers	46	1	20
Warrant Officers	5	1	7
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)	4	51	23
Enlisted	3	51	11
Commissioned Officers	1	0	10
Warrant Officers	0	0	2

Note: Total less than 618 because of missing data.

As can be seen in Table 5, the majority of the Army National Guard (ARNG) respondents were deployed to SWA, while the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) respondents were sent to Europe and to locations within CONUS. The ARNG soldiers who went to SWA included proportionately more enlisted personnel, while those USAR deployed to Europe and CONUS included proportionately more officers. As a result of these disparities, subgroup analyses may be influenced by location, Reserve Component, and personnel group, simultaneously.

### Plan of Report

The remaining chapters in this volume present the findings from the Initial STAMP Survey. Chapter 2 describes the impact of mobilization on civilian employment, income, and education. In Chapter 3, information on mobilization/demobilization experiences and the extent that soldiers were prepared for mobilization is presented. Chapter 4 presents the major findings on leadership, training, and family issues, particularly as they relate to retention, morale, satisfaction, and readiness. Chapter 5 summarizes the written comments made by 59% of the respondents, and Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the preceding chapters and discusses the implications for future mobilizations. Two short summary reports are also available on Initial STAMP (Harris, 1992; Oliver, 1992).

## References

- Binkin, M., & Kaufmann, W. W. (1989). U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, realities, risks. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.
- Elig, T. W., & Martell, K. A. (1990). 1990 Army Career Satisfaction Survey, (ARI Special Report). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- Harman, J. (1991). Family support providers in the Army's Reserve Component (RC). Unpublished chapter in Community and Family Support Center Operation Desert Shield Phase I report.
- Harris, B. C. (1991). The 1991 Survey of Mobilized Reserve Soldiers: Comments on experiences in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Military Testing Association Conference (pp. 215-220). San Antonio, TX: Armstrong Laboratory Human Resources Directorate and USAF Occupational Measurement Squadron.
- Kozlowski, S. W. J., Chao, G. T., Smith, E. M., Hedlund, J. A., & Walz, P. M. (1991). Organizational downsizing: Individual and organizational implications and recommendations for action, (ARI Technical Report 929). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- Oliver, L. W., & Bell, S. A. (1991). Family support and services in the Army's Active Component, (ARI Research Note 91-22). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- Oliver, L. W. (1991). Attitudes of mobilized Army personnel toward leadership, training, and family issues. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Military Testing Association Conference (pp. 209-214). San Antonio, TX: Armstrong Laboratory Human Resources Directorate and USAF Occupational Measurement Squadron.



## 2. EFFECTS OF MOBILIZATION ON EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND EDUCATION

Brian D. Francis

### Introduction

The activation of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) for Operation Desert Storm (ODS) affected, to varying degrees, the civilian lives of those who were called up. For students, the interruption sometimes meant loss of credit for the current term and postponement of future training, even when tuition costs were recovered. For workers, the disruption ranged from a change of location to loss of employment.

Being activated provided an increase in income for some personnel (e.g., the 4% who were unemployed). On the other hand, those who left lucrative careers in the civilian sector (e.g., physicians) lost income while on Active Duty. On average, activated personnel lost income from participating in ODS--that is, they had been earning more in civilian life than they earned on Active Duty. A complete assessment concerning the extent of the impact on present and future earnings of Reserve personnel cannot be made with this initial survey. More detailed questions concerning this issue are included in the Main STAMP Survey. The results, presented below, are based on Initial STAMP data on the employment, income, and academic effects of ODS on activated Reserve soldiers.

### Results

#### Employment Impact

General. When called up, approximately two-thirds of the respondents held full-time jobs. Figure 1 shows the employment status of respondents. In describing employers' attitude toward the ARNG/USAR, 80% of the Initial STAMP respondents indicated their employer was supportive or very supportive before ODS, 14% responded their employer was less than supportive, and 5% did not know what the position of their employer was on this issue. Job security and benefits were expected to be commensurate with the size of the firm. Larger firms would have a larger pool of employees and could more easily tolerate the absence of a particular individual. However, in this sample, 42% of the Reservists were employed by organizations with fewer than 100 employees. Such organizations may have more difficulty continuing benefits and keeping positions open over extended periods of time for soldiers to return.




Figure 1: Percent of Initial STAMP respondents in each employment status

Self-Employed. Those respondents who were self-employed were not as secure as the full-time employees who worked for someone else. While only 6% of the total sample expected to lose their jobs, 29% of the self-employed soldiers expected to be unemployed upon deactivation. This result is not surprising, since activated self-employed respondents may have no one to take over for them while they are deployed. These people may lose customers or clients to their competition because they were not there to provide the service or to do the job. Upon return from ODS, those who were self-employed may be able to renew some previous contacts, or they may face the task of rebuilding from scratch. Activated Reservists were asked to rate their confidence in getting their old job or a better one within a month of being deactivated. In the overall sample, 93% expressed confidence in getting their old job back. For the self-employed, this percentage dropped to 75%.

#### Effects on Income

Just over one-half the respondents expected to regain their former monthly income within a month of being deactivated. Another third believed it would take up to 6 months and 12% anticipated a lag of over 6 months. This percentage was three times higher for the self-employed. Attainment of previous income, even within a short period of time, does not compensate for lost income while activated. Likewise, missed promotion opportunities cannot always be recompensed. To lessen the negative impact of the mobilization, some companies provided supplemental income and continued benefits for soldiers called up

for ODS. Of soldiers who were employed at call-up, 24% were fully compensated for the gap in pay between their military and civilian jobs and 16% were partially compensated for this gap. Over one-half the respondents retained health insurance and other benefits. As suggested above, those employed in large organizations were more likely to receive benefits. Percentages of companies providing various benefits are shown in Table 6 by company size. Again, it should be noted that 42% of the respondents were employed in firms with less than 100 employees.

Table 6

Percentage of Companies Providing Income or Benefits to Reserve Soldiers Mobilized for ODS

Company Size (no. of employees)	Partial Pay	Full Pay	Health Benefits	Other Benefits
1 - 10	11	11	23	14
11 - 100	7	9	32	35
101 - 500	5	12	38	28
500+	16	34	81	77

### Academic Impact

When an individual must withdraw prematurely from a training school or college, the institution must make a decision on how much credit to grant for the portion of the course completed and whether the student is entitled to a refund for tuition paid at the beginning of the term. Typically, a student who withdraws a few weeks into a new term could expect to receive a full tuition refund but no credit. Someone who had to leave a few weeks before the end of a term would receive full credit (possibly in return for extra assignments) but no refund. The worst-case scenario for a student would be to leave in the middle of a semester receiving neither credit nor reimbursement for tuition. Of the respondents to the Initial STAMP survey, 18% said they were in college or graduate school, and another 2.5% listed themselves as enrolled in some other kind of school. Overall, there were 127 respondents who were students at the time of call-up. Roughly two-thirds of these students will not receive credit but will get a full refund. Of those students who reported their semesters as being less than half completed, over 80% received a

full refund. Of those receiving full credit, over 80% replied that "almost all" (better than 3/4) of the semester was completed. These results seem to be consistent with standard practices of learning institutions. It appears, from these initial data, that activated personnel were treated no differently than civilians who withdraw from a training school or college. Still, it should be noted that this disruption in the academic careers of those enrolled may impede their overall progress six months to a year. Delays in completing educational programs carry unknown opportunity costs which can only be assessed in the future.

#### Effects Were Similar for All

When the Initial STAMP respondents were stratified by rank (personnel group), Reserve Component, deployment location, and region of domicile, there were wide variations in cumulative responses on the employment, income, and school questions. However, there were no substantial differences that suggested one group was affected differently from another by the mobilization for ODS.

#### Discussion

Overall, many soldiers mobilized for ODS lost income as a result of the call-up. While some organizations provided supplemental income and continued health benefits, smaller organizations were less likely or able to provide this support for their employees. Those soldiers who were self-employed at the time of mobilization tended to be more adversely affected by the call-up, and some of these could take a long time to recover from the effects of mobilization. The Initial STAMP Survey did not address issues such as the number of bankruptcies or the level of personal and/or professional impact of mobilization. Such factors have obvious implications for readiness and recruitment. The Main STAMP Survey includes questions to address the employment, income/compensation, and educational impact of mobilization in greater detail.

### 3. MOBILIZATION EXPERIENCES OF RESERVE SOLDIERS

Charles G. Middlestead

#### Introduction

An assessment of how prepared individuals were for mobilization and an evaluation of the mobilization process were important goals of Initial STAMP. Perceptions of the mobilization experience were obtained by a series of questions designed to gather attitudinal, logistical, and personnel services information during the various stages of mobilization for Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Information was also collected about pre-ODS mobilization arrangements and respondents' perceptions of how well these plans worked when they were used. Descriptive results are presented with comparisons by personnel group, by Reserve Component, and by deployment location, where appropriate.

#### Results

##### Mobilization/Demobilization Stage

The Initial STAMP survey was sent out in March 1991 at the end of ODS. Reserve soldiers who responded to the survey were at various stages of the mobilization process. Table 7 below indicates that most respondents had returned to civilian life or were still at their deployment location.

Table 7

Percentage of Respondents at Each Mobilization Stage  
at Time of Initial STAMP Survey

Stage	Percent at this Stage
Received my notification/alert	0.4
At a mobilization station	4.0
Have not deployed with my unit	2.0
At my final deployment location	32.4
Have been notified of demobilization	9.4
At a demobilization station	4.0
Have returned to civilian life	48.4

There were no significant differences between the percentages of enlisted and commissioned personnel at these stages, however, Table 8 indicates that there were differences by location and Reserve Component. As indicated, most of the Initial STAMP respondents who had returned to civilian life were originally deployed to Europe. Most who were still deployed or in the early stage of demobilization were in SWA.

Table 8

Stage of Mobilization by Reserve Component and Location

Deployment Location/ Component	Last Four Stages of the Mobilization Process			
	<u>Still Deployed</u>	<u>Received Demob Notif</u>	<u>At Demob Station</u>	<u>Back To Civilian</u>
SWA				
USAR	14.4	23.5	12.5	6.8
ARNG	42.8	37.3	8.3	6.5
IRR	.6	2.0	0.0	.8
Sub Total	57.8	62.8	20.8	14.1
USAREUR				
USAR	3.3	0.0	8.3	36.5
ARNG	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
IRR	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.0
Sub Total	4.4	0.0	8.3	55.5
CONUS				
USAR	30.6	25.5	25.0	17.1
ARNG	5.0	9.8	45.8	5.7
IRR	2.2	2.0	0.0	7.6
Sub Total	37.8	37.0	70.8	30.4
Totals	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Mobilization Arrangements

According to regulations, soldiers were supposed to keep their records up-to-date and have a plan in the event of mobilization. These plans included a family care plan, particularly important for soldiers with dependent children. Such arrangements were important because they presumably lessened the soldier's worries about his or her family, thus decreasing stress and increasing morale. One goal of these arrangements was improved readiness and performance.

Respondents were asked two series of questions about this aspect of mobilization planning: whether or not they had made such arrangements before ODS and how much they agreed with the statement, "my personal mobilization arrangements for ... worked very well." Overall, most respondents indicated that they had made such arrangements before Operation Desert Shield; and most of them felt that the arrangements worked very well. (Only respondents with families were included in analyses concerning family care plans.)

As indicated in Table 9, more officers than enlisted personnel said they had made such arrangements and agreed or strongly agreed that the arrangements had worked very well. The most noticeable difference between enlisted and commissioned officer respondents concerned making will arrangements. Twenty percent more officers than enlisted respondents had made arrangements for wills before mobilization.

Table 9

Previous Mobilization Arrangements and Respondents' Evaluation of How Well Their Arrangements Worked by Percentages of Personnel Group

Type of Arrangement	STAMP Respondents			
	Enlisted		Commissioned	
	Yes	Agreed Worked Well	Yes	Agreed Worked Well
Family plan	62.3	75.8	78.3	82.1
Will	47.5	70.8	67.6	85.3
Power of Attorney	51.1	70.8	56.1	86.3

Differences by location and Reserve Component. Generally, regardless of deployment location, respondents indicated that they had made family care plans. However, arrangements for wills and powers of attorney differed by location. Most of those deployed to SWA (62.5%) or CONUS (61.3%) had made arrangements for wills, while a smaller percentage of those deployed to USAREUR (48.4%) had. The same trend existed for powers of attorney: 60.5% and 54.5% of those deployed to SWA or CONUS, respectively, had made such arrangements. Only 45.1% of those deployed to USAREUR had made this arrangement.

Overall, there were no significant differences by deployment location for respondents' agreement that the family plans and powers of attorney had worked well. There were substantial differences between the percentages of those who agreed that arrangements for updating wills went well. Approximately 80% of those deployed to CONUS and SWA agreed that their arrangements for updating wills went well, but only 68.6% of those in USAREUR agreed.

The IRR respondents were significantly different in their responses for having arrangements and agreeing that these arrangements worked well. Less than 30% made such arrangements, and less than 60% agreed that the arrangements they made worked well. This was understandable because the IRR is a special group of the Reserves. They have left the Army to return to civilian life, but must stay on the roster as IRR for the remainder of their obligation. They do not drill, nor are they assigned to units. This group of individuals probably never expected to be called back to Active Duty during their tenure in the IRR.

### Personnel Services


Another aspect of mobilization concerned the personnel-related services that the Army provided its soldiers. In the present study, there were questions on financial services, the availability of personnel and medical records, and the availability of orders. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements concerning the adequacy of the above personnel services at various stages in the mobilization/demobilization process. (At several mobilization stages, attitudes toward adequacy of services were not measured because the services were not relevant at those stages.)

Financial services. Two general trends emerged from the series of questions related to financial services (see Figures 2 through 4). Enlisted respondents expressed less agreement than the commissioned officers that these services were adequate. Enlisted soldiers and officers at more advanced stages of the mobilization/demobilization process were more negative than those at earlier stages. At almost all stages, soldiers deployed to Europe were more negative about the handling of pay and allotments than soldiers deployed to SWA or within CONUS.

Personnel records. Figures 5 and 6 indicate that agreement that personnel and medical/dental records were available declined substantially during deployment. The ARNG were somewhat more positive than the USAR at all stages that their records were available.




# BANKING SERVICES WERE ADEQUATE



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Questions 38-40

Figure 2. Adequacy of banking services in ODS


# MY MONTHLY PAY WAS ACCURATE



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Questions 41-46

Figure 3. Accuracy of monthly pay in ODS


# MY ALLOTMENTS WERE HANDLED THE WAY I WANTED



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Questions 47-50

Figure 4. Allotments in ODS handled as I wanted


# MY MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS WERE AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Questions 55-59

Figure 5. Availability of personnel records in ODS

# MY MILITARY MEDICAL & DENTAL RECORDS WERE AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N-618  
Questions 60-65

Figure 6. Availability of medical/dental records in ODS

### Availability of Orders

As indicated in Figure 7, the majority (65%-75%) of the soldiers mobilized for ODS agreed that their orders were available when needed. Differences among subgroups tended to be minimal except for greater agreement on the part of ARNG respondents (except during deployment) and the usual more positive reaction from officers.


### Availability of Information

Initial STAMP included a series of questions which assessed soldiers' perceptions about information during ODS. Respondents were asked how much they agreed that they had received enough information from the Army to make decisions about their personal lives. This question was designed similarly to the personnel service questions in that respondents were asked to agree or disagree at several different mobilization stages (see Figure 8). Questions on mobilization and information also included items about whether the gaining command was present at the mobilization site, the adequacy of information from the gaining command, and satisfaction with mail delivery.

Overall, less than 50% of the respondents felt that the Army gave them enough information to make personal decisions at all stages of the mobilization/demobilization process. Enlisted respondents indicated less agreement than officers, and soldiers deployed to Europe were substantially more negative about receiving information than any other subgroup. Even after return to civilian life, the percentages of agreement did not improve substantially.

Questions about the gaining command and mail were not asked across mobilization stages. Respondents were simply asked to answer based upon their information at time of deployment. The presence of the gaining command at a mobilization site would presumably facilitate the mobilized soldier's transition onto Active Duty by providing information about the future deployment site. More officers than enlisted (49% versus 36%) indicated that the gaining command was present. Interestingly, 30% of the enlisted respondents indicated that they did not know if the gaining command was present. Most soldiers (53% enlisted and 67% officers) felt that the information they had received from the gaining command was adequate for deployment. Most soldiers were not very satisfied with mail delivery on Active Duty. Only 29% of enlisted personnel and 39% of commissioned officers agreed that they were satisfied with the mail, and only 18% of those deployed to SWA were satisfied.


# MY ORDERS WERE AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED



Source: ARI 1991 Initial Stamp, N=618  
Questions 51-54

Figure 7. Availability of orders in ODS

# THE ARMY GAVE ME ENOUGH INFORMATION TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT MY PERSONAL LIFE



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=6 18  
Questions 32-37

Figure 8. Availability of Information in ODS



### Integration with the Active Component

Two questions to measure soldiers' perceptions of how they integrated with the Active Component were analyzed. One question asked if they agreed that they were treated as equals by Active Duty soldiers and one question asked if they agreed that their unit worked well with the Active Component. Agreement was measured on a five-point Likert type scale in which 5 indicated "strongly agree" and 1 "strongly disagree."

Generally, regardless of rank, location of deployment, or source of mobilization, most soldiers did not agree that they were treated as equals. Only 39% of the respondents indicated agreement or strong agreement with this statement. This is one of the few questions that did not find enlisted personnel more negative than officers. In contrast, most respondents (67.9%) indicated agreement or strong agreement that their units had worked well with the Active Component.

### Discussion

Overall, the agreement on the availability of personnel services and records declined over the course of the mobilization/deployment process. The most critical factors in the process were the lack of information necessary to make personal decisions and the inequitable treatment by the Active Duty soldiers. These factors could potentially increase stress and uncertainty, decrease morale and unit cohesion, and negatively affect performance, readiness, and future recruitment.

#### 4. RELATIONSHIP OF LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, AND FAMILY ISSUES TO RETENTION, MORALE, SATISFACTION, AND READINESS

Laurel W. Oliver

##### Introduction

This section explores the relationship of survey items pertaining to respondents' perceptions of leadership/climate, opinions of the adequacy of their training, and concerns about stress and families to outcomes of interest to the Army. Although cause and effect cannot be assumed, the relationships among these clusters of items are of considerable interest and suggest implications for Army policymakers and planners.

Specifically, we wanted to know:

##### How the following variables:

- perceptions of leadership/climate
- opinions of training adequacy
- concerns about stress and families

##### related to the following outcomes:

- career intent (to remain in Reserve/Guard)
- perceptions of unit morale
- overall satisfaction with the Army
- perceptions of unit readiness

##### Data Analysis

The results reported below concern the leadership/climate, training, and stress/family items from the surveys for Initial STAMP. We obtained frequencies, means, and standard deviations for the sample as a whole and for subgroups, where appropriate. In addition, this section of the report includes zero-order correlations between the variables of interest and the outcome variables of career intent, unit morale, overall satisfaction with the Army, and perceived unit readiness. As noted earlier, officer results are based only on commissioned officers because we deleted the small number of warrant officers in the sample.

Appendix C (Figures 9 to 29) shows breakouts for various subgroups of each item used in the analyses for this chapter. The total sample was broken out by personnel group (whether enlisted personnel or officer), by deployment location (SWA, USAREUR, or CONUS), and by source of mobilization (USAR or ARNG). The percentages are usually given in terms of respondent agreement ("agreed" or "strongly agreed") with the statement shown at the top of the figure.

Small differences in percentages among groups are not important, and we will not comment on them. Figures 9-16 concern the leadership/climate items; Figures 17-19 concern training items; and Figures 20-25 concern stress/family items. Figures 26-29 show results for the outcome measures of career intent, perceived unit morale, overall satisfaction with the Army, and perceived unit readiness.

In general, there were relatively few differences among subgroups except for enlisted-officer comparisons. Officers invariably had more positive perceptions of their experiences and of the Army than did enlisted personnel--a frequent finding for Army attitudinal research.

For the findings presented here, we did not conduct statistical tests of differences between groups because of the nature of the sample as discussed in Chapter 1. Although correlations for a sample of this size are statistically significant at about .11 ( $p < .05$ ), we do not discuss correlations less than .34.

## Results

### Perceptions of Leadership/Climate

Figures 9, 10, and 11 depict respondents' perceptions of their leaders. Figure 9 concerns the technical competence of Reser" Guard leaders. In addition to the usual more positive perceptions of officers (63% of whom agreed or strongly agreed that their leaders were technically competent, compared to 42% of enlisted personnel who so agreed), there were some differences between people deployed to USAREUR and those deployed elsewhere. Of the USAREUR deployees, only 44% believed their leaders were technically competent, compared to 55% deployed to SWA and 62% deployed to CONUS locations.

Figure 10 shows that, overall, 58% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their supervisors were good leaders. Differences among the various groups of respondents were minimal. Figure 11 relates to how well leaders worked together as a team. Slightly less than half (49%) the total sample agreed with the statement, with the usual enlisted-officer differences. In contrast to their views of leaders working well together, respondents were more positive about how well their units worked together. As Figure 12 shows, 68% believed their units worked well together.

Figures 13, 14, and 15 illustrate the respondents' views of their relationships with others in the unit. These perceptions tended to be quite positive: 84% agreed there were people in the unit who could be counted on for help (Figure 13), and 89% agreed there were people in the unit with whom they could have fun and relax (Figure 15). Differences among groups on these two items were small. Somewhat fewer, 71%, thought there was someone in

their unit who would listen to their concerns about their military job/career (see Figure 14).

Table 10 on the next page contains the intercorrelations of the leadership/climate items from the survey. In general, the items tend to be rather highly correlated with each other as well as with the outcome measures. Five items (my work is appreciated, unit leaders work well as a team, confidence that leaders will perform well in combat, leaders are technically competent, and leaders are concerned about my welfare) tended to be fairly highly correlated (.34-.74) with many of the other leadership items as well as substantially correlated with the outcome measures of morale, satisfaction, and readiness (.34-.62).

Table 10 also contains the correlations of leadership/climate items with outcomes of interest to the Army. Career intent was measured on a 4-point scale from "I plan to leave upon completion of my enlistment/obligation" to "I plan to stay after I receive my retirement letter." Unit morale, overall satisfaction with the Army, and unit readiness were measured on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree with the following questions: (1) The morale in my unit is high; (2) Overall, I am very satisfied with my Army experience; and (3) My unit was well prepared to perform its assigned mission. Career intent was most highly correlated with leader concern for soldier welfare (.35) and leader concern for family welfare (.34). Overall satisfaction with the Army correlated moderately with soldiers' work being appreciated (.37), the presence of someone in the unit to listen to job concerns (.37), confidence that leaders would perform well in combat (.37), technical competence of leaders (.45), leader concern for soldier welfare (.42), and leader concern for family welfare (.39). Unit morale was more closely related to leadership/climate than the other outcomes, correlating .36 or higher with 11 of the 13 leadership items. Unit readiness was associated with many of these same items, correlating .35 or higher with nine of the 13 leadership items.

Two leadership items--RC leaders are technically competent and RC leaders are concerned about my welfare--had correlations ranging from .32 to .53 with the four outcome variables. These two items were also highly correlated with each other ( $r = .74$ ).

#### Opinions of Training Adequacy

Figures 16-19 in Appendix C depict the responses of mobilized personnel to questions concerning training adequacy. As Figure 16 shows, large percentages (generally 85% or more) of all groups believed they were well prepared to perform their duty assignments and had the technical skill to do their military jobs well. However, some respondents felt they needed more training--12% asserted they needed a "lot more" training, and 40% said they needed "a little more" training (see Figure 17).

Table 10

## Intercorrelations of Leadership Climate Items and Outcome Measures

Item #	LEADERSHIP/CLIMATE ITEMS											OUTCOME MEASURES				
	77	79	80	81	83	86	87	90	91	109	110	111	102	85	108	84
<u>Leadership/Climate</u>																
76-Work appreciated	.45	.36	.43	.30	.41	.34	.39	.36	.45	.35	.31	.28	.27	.42	.37	.45
77-Command had work ready when I arrived	.27	.27	.20	.29	.31	.38	.33	.37	.33	.33	.31	.31	.22	.37	.31	.43
79-Can count on people in unit for help			.65	.48	.41	.34	.34	.35	.29	.33	.41	.34	.23	.31	.28	.35
80-Someone in unit listen to job concerns				.49	.33	.35	.35	.31	.33	.43	.46	.38	.27	.36	.37	.29
81-People in unit to have fun/relax					.28	.23	.19	.30	.17	.16	.19	.23	.19	.22	.30	.30
83-Unit works well as team						.31	.58	.51	.44	.47	.42	.32	.25	.55	.31	.62
86-Immediate supervisor good leader							.53	.26	.50	.38	.36	.31	.15	.38	.31	.27
87-Unit leaders work well as team								.44	.66	.54	.52	.43	.24	.58	.34	.48
90-Confident unit perform well in combat									.57	.41	.36	.34	.31	.49	.28	.57
91-Confident leaders perform well in combat										.64	.57	.45	.25	.56	.37	.47
109-RC leaders technically competent											.74	.53	.32	.53	.45	.43
110-RC leaders concerned about my welfare												.67	.35	.52	.42	.36
111-RC concerned about my family													.34	.42	.39	.27
<u>Outcomes</u>																
102-Career intentions														.38	.37	.27
85-Unit morale high															.43	.54
108-Overall satisfaction																.31
84-Unit well prepared for mission																

Figure 18 summarizes the responses for three stages of training--before activation, at the mobilization station, and after deployment. Of those who received training, most respondents (71% to 81%) considered it adequate or very adequate. As can be seen in Figure 19, most respondents (69% overall) reported that their ODS tasks were similar or very similar to those they had trained for, especially if they had deployed to USAREUR (where 81% reported similar tasks).

Table 11 contains the intercorrelations of the training items, which tended to be moderately correlated with each other. The intercorrelations suggest that similarity of the tasks trained for prior to ODS was positively related to ratings of training adequacy and personal technical skill and inversely related to the need for more training to do the job well.

Although the training items were moderately correlated with each other, they were generally not highly correlated with the outcomes of interest. The highest correlations with outcome measures were: training adequacy at the mobilization station with unit morale (.35) and with unit readiness (.40); and training adequacy after deployment with unit morale (.34) and with unit readiness (.40). Perceptions that additional training was needed correlated negatively with all other training items with correlations ranging from -.34 to -.49.

#### Concerns about Stress and Families

Figures 20 to 25 in Appendix C depict findings related to stress and family concerns. (Those findings specific to families are based only on soldiers who had families.) Figure 20 indicates that 70% of the respondents experienced some to extreme stress in their military jobs at the time of the survey, with 57% reporting such stress for the year before. Figure 21 shows a similar pattern--more stress experienced now (79%) versus the year before (62%)--for family/personal stress. No substantial differences in family/personal stress occurred among subgroups. For job stress, there was a difference between those deployed to USAREUR (54% reported stress) and those deployed to SWA (81% reported stress). Some 57% of those surveyed agreed they were very worried about their families during deployment (see Figure 22). However, 63% agreed their families were well taken care of during deployment (see Figure 23).

Figure 24 shows that 47% of respondents agreed that Reserve/Guard leaders were concerned about their welfare and that 51% agreed that leaders were concerned about their families' welfare. Spouse support for being in the Reserve/Guard was reported by 72% of all married respondents (see Figure 25).

Intercorrelations of the family/stress survey items are presented in Table 12 on page 34. Most of the coefficients are low to modest in magnitude, although the perception of RC concern for families was correlated .47 with the belief that one's family

Table 11

## Intercorrelations of Training Items and Outcome Measures

Item #	97	98	99	100	101	<u>Outcome Measures</u>			
						102	85	108	84
<u>Training</u>									
78-Have technical skill to do job well	.32	.33	.30	-.49	.38	.19	.16	.21	.31
97-Training adequacy/ before activation		.57	.46	-.36	.41	.15	.13	.23	.26
98-Training adequacy/ mob station			.68	-.34	.32	.23	.35	.30	.40
99-Training adequacy/ after deployed				-.36	.27	.22	.34	.32	.40
100-Training needed to do job well					-.38	-.14	-.15	-.15	-.26
101-Similarity of tasks to pre-ODS training						.11	.19	.15	.28
<u>Outcome Measures</u>									
102-Career intentions							.38	.37	.27
85-Unit morale high								.43	.54
108-Overall satisfaction									.31
84-Unit well prepared for mission									

Table 12

## Intercorrelations of Family/Personal Items and Outcome Measures

Item #	88	92	93	94	95	106	111	<u>Outcome Measures</u>			
								102	85	108	84
<u>Stress/Family</u>											
69-Worried about family	.20	.13	.28	.13	.10	-.19	-.13	-.22	-.13	-.19	-.12
88-Family well taken care of		-.15	-.24	-.08	-.01	.23	.47	.24	.31	.30	.29
92-Stress now/military job			.37	.33	.16	-.06	-.25	-.10	-.22	-.26	-.18
93-Stress now/personal life				.17	.36	-.27	-.14	-.09	-.17	-.16	-.08
94-Stress year ago/military job					.47	.01	-.13	-.13	-.07	-.12	-.17
95-Stress year ago/personal life						-.08	-.02	-.03	.04	.02	-.02
106-Spouse support for being in RC							.22	.34	.22	.29	.14
111-RC concerned about my family								.34	.42	.39	.27
<u>Outccmes</u>											
102-Career intentions									.38	.37	.27
85-Unit morale high										.43	.54
108-Overall satisfaction											.31
84-Unit well prepared for misssion											



was well taken care of. RC concern for families was correlated .42 with unit morale and .39 with overall satisfaction. No family variables correlated .35 or higher with the career intent outcome, although spouse support and RC concern for families both correlated .34 with career intent. Unit readiness was not highly associated with any of the family/personal items. The reasonably high level of social support indicated by the perception that soldiers had people in their units they could count on for help (item 79), they could have fun with (item 81), and they could talk to about their job concerns (item 80) may be moderating the stress/outcome relationships reported in the correlations in Table 12. An examination of the interactions of these variables will be conducted in the Main STAMP analyses.

### Outcome Measures

Frequencies for the various subgroups on each of the four outcome variables are shown in Figures 26-29. Figure 26 reveals that 49% of enlisted personnel and 14% of officers intended to leave the Army after their current enlistment/obligation. Persons deployed to USAREUR also planned to leave after their current enlistment/obligation in greater numbers (45%) than did other groups (21% and 24% for those deployed to SWA and CONUS, respectively).

Figure 27 shows how the various groups evaluated unit morale. Overall, only 45% of respondents agreed that their unit morale was high, with relatively minor differences between groups. In Figure 28, 72% of respondents agreed that they were satisfied with their Army experience, again with no substantial differences among groups. Perceptions of readiness are summarized in Figure 29, with 75% of respondents agreeing their units were well prepared to perform their missions. Once again, no sizable group differences are apparent except for the officer (85% agreement) and enlisted (66% agreement) disparity.

### Discussion

#### Perceptions of Reserve/Guard Leadership

Overall leadership effectiveness unclear. In the absence of comparative data, it is difficult to make judgments concerning the effectiveness of Reserve/Guard leadership as viewed by mobilized personnel. However, the findings reported above suggest that there may be room for improvement in the area of leader technical competence and leader concern for soldier welfare which could improve unit morale, overall satisfaction, and unit readiness.

Good leadership combines technical competence with concern for people. The results also indicate that leader technical competence and leader concern for soldier welfare were highly associated with each other. This implies that good leadership has two facets--technical competence and concern for people--and

that the two aspects tend to be found together. The latter aspect (concern for people) is clearly analogous to the "consideration" dimension identified in the Ohio State leadership research (e.g., Schreisheim & Kerr, 1974). The other variable (technical competence) is not dissimilar to the Ohio State "structure" dimension and seems related to the task orientation component of unit cohesion (Siebold, 1990).

Effect of changing leader concern from low to high. In applying these findings to a possible strategy to improve unit morale, Rosenthal and Rubin (1982) have developed a technique called the Binomial Effect Size Display (BESD). This data display procedure illustrates the effect of a correlation between two variables on the success rate or improvement rate of the outcome variable involved. Using the BESD technique, Table 13 demonstrates the potential impact of enhancing one of the leadership characteristics--leader concern for soldier welfare--on unit morale. Table 13 depicts the effect of a correlation of .52 between leader concern and high unit morale. As the table shows, with a correlation of .52, 76% of the high morale units would be above the median on leader concern and only 24% below the median. This result indicates that changing the level of leader concern from low (below the median) to high (above the median) is associated with increasing unit morale from 24% to 76%--a sizable and very desirable increase. (This conclusion is based on the assumption that leader concern leads to high morale, rather than the reverse.)

Table 13

Binomial Effect Size Display (BESD) for Leader Concern-Unit Morale Correlation of  $r=.52$

Leader concern for soldier welfare	Unit Morale	
	High	Low
Above the median level	76%	24%
Below the median level	24%	76%

### Training Adequacy

Similarity of pre-ODS training to ODS jobs desirable. There was a definite tendency for similarity of tasks trained on before ODS to tasks assigned during ODS to have a positive relationship to perceived adequacy of training at all mobilization and demobilization stages as well as to have a negative relationship to perceived need for more training.

Some respondents felt the need for more training. The fact that more than half the respondents reported they needed more training suggests that training might be another area which the Reserve Component might wish to review, particularly when soldiers are utilized in unfamiliar jobs or tasks.

#### Concerns about Stress and Families

Most family-related items not highly correlated with outcomes. The family/personal items did not show as strong a relationship with each other or with the outcome measures as did the leadership items. However, the concern of the RC for families emerged as a rather important factor in terms of outcomes. As found in the Army Family Research Program (AFRP), spouse support seemed fairly important to career intentions (Bowen, 1989). These findings, however, do not preclude the possibility that different family/personal issues may be salient for subgroups of Army personnel who are at different family life stages. We did not explore this possibility.

Stress not highly associated with outcomes. Responses to the stress items indicated that both job and family stress had increased from a year ago. Although the stress items were related to each other, they tended not to be highly related to important outcome measures.

#### Summary Statement

We remind readers that the findings reported here are specific to the sample involved. Also, rank and component differences may confound differences between deployment locations since disproportionately more officers from USAR were deployed to USAREUR and CONUS and disproportionately more enlisted from ARNG went to SWA. However, the findings do not appear to be unreasonable in view of previous research on cohesion and leadership, the results of other ODS investigations, and findings from the AFRP. The area of leadership emerged as one which the Reserve/Guard might wish to review. The findings indicated that leadership combining technical competence with concern for soldier welfare results in favorable outcomes for the Army. Perceptions of training adequacy were also important for high unit morale and for high unit readiness. Leader concern for soldier and family welfare continued to demonstrate positive outcomes for the Army.

## References

- Bowen, G. L. (1989). Satisfaction with family life in the military. Armed Forces and Society, 15, 571-592.
- Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1982). A simple, general purpose display of magnitude of experimental effect. Journal of Educational Psychology, 74, 166-169.
- Schriesheim, C., & Kerr, S. (1974). Psychometric properties of the Ohio State leadership scales. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 756-765.
- Siebold, G. L. (1990). Cohesion in context. Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association (pp. 438-443). Orange Beach, AL. (Nov. 5-9, 1990)

## 5. SUMMARY OF WRITTEN COMMENTS

Beverly C. Harris

### Introduction

Over half of the Reserve soldiers responding to the Initial STAMP Survey made written comments to explain their answers on items in the survey or to offer additional information on their attitudes and mobilization experiences. As the Initial STAMP surveys were being returned, ARI was completing the analysis of a questionnaire administered to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) at mobilization stations (Steinberg, 1991; Wisher, Sabol, Sukenik, & Kern, 1991). Just over half of these IRR soldiers made written comments which provided additional insight into their problems at call-up.

Written comments on Initial STAMP were analyzed for three purposes: (a) to see if soldiers making comments were substantially different demographically or attitudinally from soldiers who did not make comments; (b) to see if the issues expressed in the written comments were consistent with the findings from the Initial STAMP multiple-choice survey items, and (c) to compare the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), Army National Guard (ARNG), and IRR comments made on Initial STAMP which was administered toward the end of ODS with comments made by the IRR soldiers at call-up (Steinberg, 1991). This paper presents a summary of the content analysis of these written comments.

### Method

A modified content analysis approach (Krippendorff, 1980) was used to examine the comments. The fourteen categories established in the earlier IRR analysis (Steinberg, 1991) were used as a starting point. A "comment" included all that the soldiers wrote about the content area: One word, one sentence, several sentences, or one paragraph which represented the theme of the content area. One soldier could have comments in multiple categories, but only one "comment" per category was recorded. A small random sample of comments from ten soldiers was coded by two additional raters with agreement on 74% of the comments. Based on the interrater disagreements, adjustments were made to exclude two IRR categories (Getting to Mob Center, Other In-processing) and to include two new categories (Leadership Problems and Career/Promotion Problems). Two subcategories, Attitudes toward Mobilization and Wasted Resources, were also added to already existing IRR categories. The final content categories are listed in Table 14 on page 40. After verbatim transcripts were made of all comments, they were coded using the final set of 14 categories. Because of time and resource constraints, only one psychologist was available for coding. Frequency distributions and chi-square analyses were used to compare the responses on survey items of soldiers making comments

with soldiers who did not make comments. Similarities and differences in the problems or content of the comments were also examined for the Reserve Components (USAR), (ARNG), and (IRR), for locations of deployment (SWA), (USAREUR), and (CONUS), and for commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers.

## Results

### Participants

Written comments were received from 363 (59%) of the 618 Reserve soldiers who responded to Initial STAMP.

### Thematic Content of Written Comments

Results of the content analysis are shown in Table 14. As indicated in Table 14, the percentages of respondents making comments in four categories (attitude toward the USAR/ARNG/IRR or mobilization; improper treatment by the Active Component soldiers; disorganization/lack of information/wasted resources; and, attitude toward the Army) were fairly consistent across Component, location, and rank.

Table 14

Percent of Soldiers Making Written Comments by Content Area

Content Area	Total	Reserve Component			Location			Enlisted Commiss.	
		USAR	ARNG	IRR	SWA	USAREUR	CONUS	Soldiers	Officers
Attitude toward the USAR/ARNG/IRR or mobilization	34%	34%	31%	35%	35%	34%	32%	35%	33%
Improper treatment	28%	31%	23%	27%	18%	26%	38%	25%	31%
Disorganization/lack of info/wasted resources	26%	25%	28%	33%	29%	25%	25%	30%	24%
Attitude toward the Army	16%	19%	14%	13%	14%	21%	18%	14%	20%
Leadership problems	16%	17%	21%	4%	27%	5%	15%	21%	12%
Financial problems	11%	15%	3%	6%	2%	16%	16%	7%	13%
Problems with call-up/mobilization/demob	11%	14%	6%	6%	12%	11%	7%	7%	13%
Training problems	10%	8%	2%	35%	5%	20%	8%	14%	6%
Career/promotion problems	6%	7%	6%	2%	6%	6%	8%	7%	6%
Loss of income, interference w/school	5%	6%	1%	10%	3%	9%	4%	7%	5%
Incorrect/missing records	3%	3%	0	8%	0	7%	2%	2%	3%
Family problems	3%	4%	2%	0	1%	2%	5%	1%	5%
Medical problems	2%	3%	0	0	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%
Other	22%	23%	26%	15%	24%	16%	24%	19%	26%

Note 1: Percentages based on the soldiers making written comments (n=363).

Note 2: Warrant officers are excluded because of small sample size.

Below is a short summary of the comments in each thematic content area.

Attitude toward the USAR/ARNG/IRR or mobilization. This is the category that received the most comments from Reserve soldiers (124 soldiers or 34%). Approximately 10% of the comments in this category were positive: Respondents were proud of the operation, glad they were a part of it, and thought their units performed well. Negative comments concerned the Reserve Component's lack of training, lack of discipline, and lack of equipment. Soldiers felt that the mobilization needed better planning to regulate the number of soldiers who were called up and to provide more personnel for in-processing. They also felt that the Army should make sure that soldiers were needed before they called Reserves and disrupted their lives. A major concern for the USAR and ARNG soldiers was that they expected to be mobilized and deployed as a unit. When the Army split up units and put fillers into units, unit morale and cohesion suffered. These Reserve soldiers thought that the demobilization process at the end of the war was too slow and that the process gave priority to Active Component soldiers. Soldiers in the Active Component were being sent home before Reserve Component soldiers even though the Reservists had civilian lives they put on hold for ODS.

Improper treatment. Reserve soldiers (102 or 28%) complained that, counter to their expectations, they were treated as second-class citizens or as basic trainees by the Active Component soldiers. Their ranks were not respected nor were they treated as competent soldiers. Reserve soldiers had believed they were part of the Total Army and expected to be treated like Active Duty soldiers once they were called up. Soldiers complained that housing, meals, and transportation were poor and not equal to facilities for the Active Component. A number of comments in this category concerned the rewards and benefits that were being given to the soldiers deployed to SWA. Many soldiers felt that deployment to SWA was the luck of the draw and that everyone mobilized had suffered the same disruption regardless of their location. They felt that benefits should apply to everyone mobilized and deployed in support of ODS.

Disorganization/lack of information/wasted resources. Soldiers (94 or 26%) commenting in this category emphasized the individual effects of inefficiency of in-processing and the lack of planning and coordination between mobilization and deployment. This inefficiency and poor coordination resulted in soldiers doing the same task numerous times, having to redo processing at different locations, and wasting time because in-processing personnel were not prepared or did not know the answer to questions concerning Reserve Component soldiers. The majority of soldiers' comments in this category concerned problems with receiving accurate, timely information. The information that was lacking related to the conduct of the war, to what was happening from moment to moment, and to what would happen to them. This

lack of information affected soldiers' ability to keep family and employers informed. Many soldiers also felt that they had nothing to do once they arrived at their duty station, or were assigned trivial tasks to fill time.

Attitude toward the Army. Fifty-eight soldiers (16%) made statements that expressed attitudes toward the Army. Approximately 30% of the comments in this category were totally positive about the Army, ODS, and about their participation; approximately 10% of the comments acknowledged some serious problems but still expressed pride in the Army and the way the Army carried out the operation. Negative attitudes related to soldier perceptions that the Army failed to show concern for its soldiers and to treat the Reserves as part of the Total Army. The problems expressed and coded into other specific content areas (poor planning, poor communication, inaccurate information, and breaking up units after mobilization) were perceived by the soldiers as the Army's not caring and not following through on its promises.

Leadership problems. In this category, 58 Reserve soldiers (16%) commented that their leaders were inexperienced, lacked training, and did not care about their troops. A few commented that leaders were more interested in their own promotions than in doing a good job. Failure by the leaders to disseminate information up and down the chain of command was also a problem. This failure to communicate was linked with statements that leaders did not know what was going on and did not care about others under their command. Soldiers did not think that their leaders had enough Active Duty experience or training to deal with the problems in ODS. As shown in Table 14, more enlisted soldiers, soldiers in the ARNG and USAR, and those soldiers deployed to SWA made comments on leadership problems than soldiers in other subgroups or locations.

Financial problems. The 40 soldiers (11%) who commented on financial problems expressed concerns about the pay system: Pay was not accurate, pay was delayed, or pay had not been received at all. A higher percentage of officers, soldiers from USAR, and soldiers deployed to Europe commented on financial problems (see Table 14).

Problems with call-up/mobilization/demobilization. Some 40 soldiers (11%) made comments in this category related to specific problems that they encountered at call-up or during mobilization and deployment. Problems included being split off from their units, having difficulty with transportation, and being unable to obtain adequate supplies, such as parts for vehicles and equipment, clothing, etc., at their location. As Table 14 indicates, a higher percentage of officers and USAR soldiers made comments in this category.

Training problems. The 36 soldiers (10%) who commented on training, indicated that the training was too elementary and did



not cover important topics, such as MOS-specific training, company drills, and desert-specific training. Reserve soldiers also commented on poorly trained instructors, the poor treatment by instructors, and the need for combined training with the Active Component. As shown in Table 14, more IRR soldiers, soldiers deployed to USAREUR, and enlisted soldiers commented on training problems than did soldiers in other subgroups or locations.

Career/promotion problems. Only 22 soldiers (6%) commented on career problems. The majority of these comments concerned problems with promotions while deployed. Promotions were delayed, not based on performance, or were impossible because of changing units. Soldiers also felt that Stop-Loss should not have affected those who were due for their Expiration of Term of Service (ETS). Complaints indicated that Active Duty soldiers were allowed to leave at ETS, but Reserve soldiers were not.

Loss of income/interference with school. Comments in this category from 18 soldiers (5%) focused on the drop in pay from their civilian jobs to their military jobs. Those who were self-employed before mobilization experienced significant financial hardships.

Incorrect/missing files, records, orders. Only 11 soldiers (3%) commented on missing or incorrect orders. Their primary concerns were with lost records and orders that stayed at the mobilization site instead of being sent to their deployed location.

Family problems. Again, only 11 soldiers (3%) commented on family problems. Those who did focused on the lack of close medical facilities and their families not being in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) and Civilian Health and Medical Payments for United States (CHAMPUS) system.

Medical problems. The small percentage of soldiers commenting in this category (2%) indicated that their primary concerns were the lack of available medical care and poor treatment by medical personnel.

Other comments. Over half the comments in this category were about the survey itself, e.g., survey items were not about the war, there were delays in receiving the survey, interviews not surveys needed, etc. Others included statements that did not fit into one of the substantive categories above.

#### Soldiers Who Made Comments Compared to Soldiers Who Did Not

Soldiers who made written comments were very similar to those who did not make comments. In fact, only 18 of the 124 survey items were significantly different for the two groups. Although they were equally satisfied with their Army experience,

differences indicated that the 59% who wrote comments were more negative about:

- The adequacy of the information they received at all stages in the mobilization, deployment, and demobilization process.
- The rating of unit morale.
- The equality of their treatment by the Active Component soldiers, and
- How well deployment of the troops went for ODS.

The similarities suggest that the comments were not coming from soldiers who were overly negative about the Reserves or about the Army. In fact, 16% of the soldiers making comments signed the sheets, and many volunteered to provide more information or assistance. The career intentions of the soldiers who made comments indicated that they were more definite about their career plans than soldiers who did not make comments. Soldiers making comments were more likely to leave after this enlistment/obligation (34% vs. 24%, respectively); but, they were also equally likely to stay after receiving their retirement letter (34% for both groups).

#### Comments Consistent with Survey Items

The written comments presented problems and issues consistent with the responses on the multiple-choice survey items reported throughout this report. Examples include problems with: (1) the mobilization process, (2) information dissemination at all stages of the mobilization/demobilization, (3) inequitable and disrespectful treatment of the Reserves by the Active Component soldiers, and (4) lack of meaningful work once activated. The problems with leadership expressed in the written comments by 16% of the respondents were also consistent with the responses on the survey items reported in Chapter 4 of this report. The written comments on this Initial STAMP Survey provided additional insight into the data from the survey responses. They also offered valuable information for reviewing and improving future mobilizations.

#### Comments Similar to IRR at Call-Up

The problems and concerns expressed by the USAR, ARNG, and IRR soldiers in this Initial STAMP Survey were very similar to those expressed by the IRR at call-up (Steinberg, 1991). The overall tone of the STAMP comments, however, was less negative. Despite the more positive tone, higher percentages of STAMP soldiers made comments in four categories: Disorganization/lack of information/wasted resources; improper treatment by the Active Component soldiers; attitudes toward the USAR/ARNG/IRR or mobilization; and, attitudes toward the Army. Leadership

problems, expressed by 16% of the Initial STAMP respondents, were not a main concern for the IRR at call-up. It is understandable that leadership problems were not a concern of the IRR at call-up because they did not, at that point, have leaders nor were they in a unit.

The IRR are a special category of Reserves who have left the Army to return to civilian life but remain on the rosters until completion of their obligation/enlistment. They do not work or train in units. As individuals, they may never have expected to be called back into the Army. The IRR study (Steinberg, 1991; Wisher, Sabol, Sukenik, & Kern, 1991) of approximately 3,000 IRR soldiers found them to be very negative at call-up. They resented "being treated like raw recruits," having to wait extremely long periods of time in lines to complete their processing, and the inexperience of those conducting the training at the mobilization sites. Of the Initial STAMP soldiers surveyed at the end of ODS, the IRR were more negative than the USAR and ARNG on several items:

- Adequacy of training at the mobilization site
- The amount of training they needed to do their job well
- Their own morale
- Their unit morale
- Their confidence in their unit's performance

The IRR at the end of ODS expressed some of the same concerns as expressed by the IRR at call-up. In addition, the expressed lack of confidence in their units and their perception of lower unit morale at the end of ODS signals a problem that may result from an "individual" being placed in a unit. With no prior experience with the unit, both the individual and the unit may suffer because of lack of confidence and trust in a time of increased demands for performance. It is not surprising that individual morale, unit morale, and unit readiness may be reduced. More extensive information on the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) is being collected in a special part of the Main STAMP Survey.

#### Discussion

After reviewing the entire set of comments, it appears that soldiers were taking the survey seriously and wanted to communicate what went wrong so the Army could fix it. The problems they encountered, especially the lack of communication, the lack of meaningful work, and the inequitable and disrespectful treatment demoralized, frustrated, and angered respondents. These problems were expressed by the IRR at call-up (Steinberg, 1991) and by the USAR, ARNG, and IRR at the end of Operation Desert Storm.

The comments indicated that the problems encountered did negatively influence individual and unit morale and cohesion. Soldiers thought that these problems, in turn, would negatively affect the career decisions of Reserve Component soldiers. The reasonably high, positive relationship of unit morale with career intentions reported in Chapter 4 supports this contention made in the comments.

## References

- Krippendorff, K. (1980). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. The Sage COMMTEXT Series (Vol. 5). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Steinberg, A. G. (1991). Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) call-up: Attitudes, motivation, and concerns (ARI Research Report 1594). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (DTIC No. AD-A239-362)
- Wisher, R. A., Sabol, M. A., Sukenik, H., & Kern, R. P. (1991). Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) call-up: Skill decay (ARI Research Report 1595). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (DTIC No. AD-A239-371)

## 6. INITIAL STAMP SURVEY OF MOBILIZED RESERVISTS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY

Laurel W. Oliver, Beverly C. Harris, and Timothy W. Elig

Initial STAMP was conducted to capture the attitudes and experiences of mobilized Reservists during ODS or as soon after the event as possible. It was intended to go to USAR and ARNG soldiers deployed to USAREUR and CONUS. However, because of file inaccuracies, the 618 respondents were from USAR, ARNG, and IRR. Some respondents were also deployed to SWA. Demographics of the respondents appear to be fairly representative of the mobilized Reserves. Because of mobilization and deployment patterns, however, soldiers were not distributed randomly by rank or across locations. For example, most ARNG personnel (the majority of whom in the sample were enlisted) deployed to SWA, while most USAR (most of whom in the sample were officers) deployed to USAREUR and CONUS. Thus there is a confounding of rank with location, a point which must be taken into account in interpreting findings. This chapter summarizes the findings of Initial STAMP and presents some implications of these findings.

### Summary of Findings

#### Economic factors

Many soldiers lost income when they were mobilized, especially if they were self-employed. Employees of smaller organizations were much less likely to receive supplemental income and continued health benefits than were employees of large organizations. Most soldiers who were students when they were called up either received credit for the semester or received a reimbursement of fees.

#### Mobilization process

Almost all the respondents were at their deployment location, were in the process of demobilization, or had returned to civilian life. Overall, a majority of soldiers had made mobilization plans (wills, powers-of-attorney, family care plans if appropriate); but the number of those doing so did not approach 100%, especially for enlisted soldiers. Evaluations of financial services (adequacy of banking services and accuracy of monthly pay and allotments) were positive for a majority of the respondents, but such evaluations became more negative as the soldier moved through the mobilization process with USAREUR deployees more negative than those deployed to other locations. Satisfaction with the availability of personnel and medical/dental records declined rather sharply for all groups during deployment. Orders were available to a majority of soldiers, but the overall percentage never exceeded three-fourths of the entire sample at any mobilization stage.

Perceptions of respondents concerning communication tended to be less than optimal. At most stages, less than half the total group believed they had enough information to make personal decisions, with ARNG respondents being consistently the most positive and those deployed to USAREUR always the most negative on the question. Most soldiers felt the information received from the gaining command was adequate, although almost a third of the enlisted personnel did not know if the gaining command was represented when they were deployed. Relatively small proportions of respondents felt mail delivery was adequate--only about 30% overall were satisfied, and only 18% of those deployed to SWA were satisfied.

Many soldiers did not feel they were well integrated into the Active Component. Only 39% of the respondents felt they were treated as equals by Active Duty soldiers, although 68% reported that their units worked well with the Active Component.

#### Leadership, training, and family issues

Positive attitudes toward leaders and their behaviors tended to be fairly strongly related to the outcomes of retention, morale, satisfaction, and readiness. Morale, in particular, had a strong positive relationship to leadership. Perceptions of training adequacy were also related to the outcomes, although less so than were perceptions of leadership. However, the overall attitudes toward training were more positive than toward leadership. In general, family factors were not very highly related to the measured outcomes, although leader concern for the soldier's welfare and leader concern for the welfare of the soldier's family were strongly related to positive outcomes.

#### Written comments

The written comments tended to support the survey results summarized above. Many soldiers emphasized that there were positive aspects to their experience, but respondents also felt the Army needed to remedy some of the problems they had encountered. The primary complaints related to deficient communication, lack of meaningful work, leader inexperience, lack of concern for soldiers, and inequitable treatment.

#### Implications for the Army

##### Economic Loss

Many soldiers suffered economic losses during mobilization. These losses could be minimized by preparing "business care plans" which describe arrangements made by self-employed individuals to sustain their businesses or practices in the event of mobilization. Reserve/Guard commanders could be responsible for the filing and updating of such plans as they now are for family care plans.

## Mobilization/Demobilization Process

The findings suggest a need for a more organized and efficient mobilization process to accomplish the in-processing of large numbers of Reserve soldiers. Improvements might include: (a) planning the call-up so that smaller numbers arrive at the same time; (b) increasing the number and training of personnel to handle in-processing to insure that they are knowledgeable about the Reserves; (c) making sure in-processing personnel have good interpersonal skills to work with the soldiers; and (d) streamlining in-processing to complete the procedure at one location.

## Communication

Communication problems were a primary concern during ODS. These problems included communication between the Army and the soldier and his/her family as well as communication between the deployed soldier and his/her family. Improving the dissemination of information up and down the chain of command, providing some information rather than waiting until a final decision is made, and communicating concern in situations of stress and uncertainty could improve morale and cohesion and reduce stress.

## Leadership

Leadership is a crucial element in the effective functioning of a military unit. The findings of this research underscore the need for the leader's possessing both technical competence and a strong concern for the soldier and the soldier's family. Competent leadership is critical to the outcomes of interest considered here (retention, morale, satisfaction, and readiness). The Army is, of course, well aware of the need for good leadership and expends much time, effort, and money to ensure that it is developed and practiced. Army policies, programs, and practices relating to leadership development and training might be reviewed to determine whether present efforts are sufficient or whether new initiatives are in order.

## Integration of Components

The difficulties of integrating the Reserve/Guard with the Active Component during mobilization could be lessened by increasing the amount of contact among the various Components. Combined training and drills may enhance leadership skills and unit cohesion as well as provide an opportunity for the components to gain more knowledge, respect, and trust for each other.

## Overall

Written comments showed that some Reserve soldiers concluded that the Army did not care about them, did not follow through on promises to maintain unit integrity, and did not believe in the



Total Army Concept. Comments indicated that soldiers were more positive when they were initially called up than they were at the time of the survey.

The Army could communicate concern and respect for the Reserve soldiers by the rapid dissemination of accurate information through the chain of command, more efficient processing at mobilization, better treatment of Reservists during mobilization and deployment, and better utilization of the Reserves once their lives have been disrupted. Actions by the Army which address the issues indicated by responses to the survey items and articulated in the written comments could contribute to raising morale, increasing retention, and improving readiness.

With the downsizing of the military, the Reserve Component may become even more important to the effective functioning and readiness of the Army. Treating these soldiers as a valuable part of the Total Army may be vital to ensuring the success of future mobilizations.

## APPENDIX A

### LIST OF ARMY AGENCIES AND OFFICES CONTRIBUTING TO STAMP

Academy of Health Sciences  
Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP)  
Center for Army Leadership  
Chaplaincy Services Support Agency  
Chief of Staff, Assessments & Initiatives Group (OCSA/CAIG)  
Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR)  
Community and Family Services Command (CFSC)  
Director of the Army National Guard (NGB)  
Headquarters, U.S. Army in Europe  
Inspector General  
National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve  
Offices of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and  
Reserve Affairs (ASA/M&RA)  
Surgeon General  
U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)  
U.S. Army Personnel Integration Command (USAPIC)  
U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC)  
U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM)  
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)

## APPENDIX B

### SURVEY FORM 1: MOBILIZED ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Survey Approval Authority: U.S. Army Personnel Integration Command  
Survey Control Number: ATNCAO-91-360  
RLCS MCLPC 3



# 1991 SURVEY OF TOTAL ARMY MILITARY PERSONNEL

## FORM 1 FOR MOBILIZED ENLISTED PERSONNEL

The Chief of Staff, Army, has directed that a study be conducted to help formulate Army personnel policies and plans. The U.S. Army Research Institute is conducting this survey of enlisted, warrant, and commissioned soldiers under the direction of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

Information collected in this survey will be used for research. Under no circumstances will any information about identifiable individuals be released to anyone. Your information will be combined with the information from many other soldiers to report how groups of soldiers feel about their Army careers and would react to various changes in personnel policy and regulations.

There is no risk for you in participating in this survey. Your participation is voluntary and you may choose not to answer any particular question.

This notification is to inform you of who is conducting this survey and what use will be made of the information being collected, in accordance with Public Law 93-573, the Privacy Act of 1974. This research is authorized by Acts of Congress which authorize recruitment and maintenance of military forces and authorize research to accomplish this goal. This authority is in 10 United States Code, Sections 137, 503, and 2358. The use of Social Security Numbers is authorized by Executive Order 9397.

THIS IS NOT A TEST, SO TAKE YOUR TIME.

SELECT ANSWERS THAT BEST FIT YOU.









UNLESS THE QUESTION SAYS TO MARK ALL THAT APPLY,  
MARK ONLY ONE ANSWER FOR EACH QUESTION.



MAKE HEAVY BLACK MARKS IN THE  
RESPONSE BOXES.

DO NOT MAKE ANY MARKS OUTSIDE  
OF THE RESPONSE BOXES.

IF YOU CHANGE YOUR MIND,  
ERASE COMPLETELY.

Right Mark	Wrong Marks
	
	
	
	

## **ABOUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE**

### **WHY ME?**

You have been selected at random to be part of a group of soldiers that represent all ranks in the Army. Enough soldiers were selected so that valid conclusions can be made about the views and intended behaviors of soldiers in the enlisted, warrant, and commissioned ranks. The survey results will not be valid if you get someone else to fill it out.

Some of you have participated in other ARI research efforts. Your responses are very important to us. We need to compare your current plans with your responses to earlier surveys.

### **CAN IT AFFECT ME?**

You were selected to represent the views of many soldiers in similar circumstances to you - your gender, time in service, location (CONUS, OCONUS), career field, etc. If you don't respond, it is not only your personal views but also the views of other soldiers like you that will not be considered. No decisions about you alone will be made from the survey, but survey results will influence policy changes that affect you and other soldiers like you.

### **WHY SO MANY SURVEYS? WHY ARE THEY SO LONG?**

Surveys are a major source of feedback to leaders about policy and practices. They are particularly important in times of rapid change.

While we try to limit the number of questions and the number of soldiers surveyed, we need to ask enough questions to be certain our conclusions are valid. Many items may look the same to you. We did this for two reasons. First, we need to ask the exact same questions used in several previous surveys in order to compare the views of soldiers surveyed at different times in the past. Second, by combining several similar questions we can get a more accurate measure than provided by just one question.

### **AREN'T SOME OF THE QUESTIONS VERY PERSONAL?**

Yes. Although people will have different views on what is or is not personal, most people will consider at least some of the questions to be very personal. We are asking these questions so that the Army can estimate the impact on soldiers of voluntary and non-voluntary separations. Good estimates can be made only if most soldiers answer all these questions. However, you can choose not to answer particular items. Please do not discard the entire survey because there are some particular items that you want to skip.

### **WHY SHOULD I BOTHER? DO SURVEYS CHANGE ANYTHING?**

Surveys often affect policy makers although survey respondents rarely see the direct impact. An Army Regulation or policy statement does not list the sources of information considered in its adoption. Policy changes often impact the future and those affected don't remember or know about a survey completed a few months or even years earlier. Your response counts.

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
ATTN: PERI-RGB(STAMP)  
5001 EISENHOWER AVENUE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22333-5600

## FORM 1 FOR MOBILIZED ENLISTED PERSONNEL

**B-3**

7. What is the highest level of college that you have completed to date?

☐ None  
☐ Up to 2 years of college, but no degree  
☐ Associate's degree  
☐ From 3 to 4 years of college, but no degree  
☐ Bachelor's degree  
☐ A year or more of graduate credit, but no graduate degree  
☐ Master's degree  
☐ Professional degree (MD, DDS, or JD)  
☐ Doctoral degree

8. Other than high school or college have you attended some other kind of school (for example vocational, technical, business, or secretarial)?

☐ No  
☐ Some, but no diploma or certificate awarded  
☐ Diploma or certificate awarded

9. Were you attending school when you were mobilized? If between semesters and you were registered for the next semester, answer yes.

☐ No - Go to question 11  
☐ Yes, college or graduate school  
☐ Yes, some other kind of school

- 10a. How much of the semester was completed when you were mobilized/federalized?

☐ Not yet started  
☐ Less than 1/4  
☐ Less than 1/2  
☐ Less than 3/4  
☐ Almost all

- 10b. Did/will you get credit for a complete semester?

☐ Does not apply - had not yet started semester  
☐ Don't know yet  
☐ No  
☐ Yes, but I will have to complete some assignments  
☐ Yes, credit for completed semester

- 10c. Did/will you get a refund of tuition and fees?

☐ Does not apply - I received credit for the semester  
☐ Does not apply - this school was free  
☐ Does not apply - had not yet paid  
☐ Don't know yet  
☐ No, I will not get a refund  
☐ Yes, but only partial  
☐ Yes, a full refund

11. Not counting you or a spouse, how many people depend on you for over half of their support?

☐ 0  
☐ 1  
☐ 2  
☐ 3  
☐ 4  
☐ 5  
☐ 6 or more

## II. YOUR CIVILIAN CAREER

12. Which of the following best describes your work situation when you were mobilized?

(Mark all that apply)

☐ Working full-time in a civilian job (not government)  
☐ Working part-time in a civilian job (not government)  
☐ Working full-time in a government civilian job  
☐ Working part-time in a government civilian job  
☐ Working full-time for the ARNG or USAR  
☐ Self-employed full-time in own business  
☐ Self-employed part-time in own business  
☐ Had a job, but was not at work because of temporary illness, strike, etc.  
☐ Unpaid worker (for example, in a family-run business)  
☐ Unemployed/laid-off  
☐ In school  
☐ Keeping house/homemaker  
☐ Retired  
☐ Other

13. How many permanent employees work for your employer?

☐ Does not apply - was not employed when mobilized  
☐ 1-10 permanent employees  
☐ 11-100 permanent employees  
☐ 101-500 permanent employees  
☐ Over 500 permanent employees

14. Before Desert Shield, how would you have described your employer's personnel policies about participation in Reserves/National Guard?

☐ Does not apply  
☐ Very supportive  
☐ Supportive  
☐ Neither supportive nor non-supportive  
☐ Non-supportive  
☐ Very non-supportive  
☐ Not sure that they had policies

15. Is/was your civilian job being held for you?

- ☐ Does not apply  
☐ Yes  
☐ No  
☐ Don't know

16. How confident are you that you will have your old job or a better job within a month of being demobilized?

- ☐ Does not apply  
☐ Not at all confident  
☐ Somewhat confident  
☐ Moderately confident  
☐ Very confident  
☐ Extremely confident

17. How soon after you are demobilized would you expect your monthly income to match your income before mobilization?

- ☐ Does not apply  
☐ Within a month  
☐ Within 2 or 3 months  
☐ Within 4 to 6 months  
☐ Within 7 to 12 months  
☐ Not for at least a year

18. During mobilization, has/did your civilian employer:  
(Mark all that apply)

- ☐ Fully made up any difference between your civilian pay and your military pay  
☐ Partially made up any difference between your civilian pay and your military pay  
☐ Continued your health benefits  
☐ Continued other benefits such as insurance

### III. YOUR MILITARY EXPERIENCES

19. Were you mobilized from:

- ☐ United States Army Reserve (USAR) unit  
☐ Army National Guard (ARNG) unit  
☐ Individual Ready Reserve  
☐ Inactive National Guard

20. Were you deployed to:

- ☐ Southwest Asia  
☐ USAREUR  
☐ CONUS  
☐ Other  
☐ I was not deployed

21. There are a number of steps in the mobilization/demobilization process. Please indicate where you are in the process right now.

- ☐ I have received my notification/alert  
☐ I am at a mobilization station  
☐ I am at a separate location/have not deployed with my unit  
☐ I am at my final deployed location  
☐ I have been notified of demobilization  
☐ I am at a demobilization station  
☐ I have returned to civilian life

22. How were you brought on active duty in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm?

- ☐ My unit was called up  
☐ I was called up individually  
☐ I volunteered

23. Were you deployed with a Reserve/Guard unit?

- ☐ Yes, with my regular unit  
☐ Yes, with a different unit assigned during mobilization  
☐ No  
☐ Does not apply

24. Were members of the gaining command present at your mobilization site?

- ☐ Yes  
☐ No  
☐ Don't know/not sure

25. Was the information you received from your gaining command adequate for deployment?

- ☐ Very adequate  
☐ Adequate  
☐ Fairly adequate  
☐ Inadequate  
☐ Very inadequate  
☐ Does not apply - didn't receive any information

26. Before Operation Desert Shield, had you made personal mobilization arrangements for the following:

- |                      | Yes                      | No                       | Not Applicable           |
|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Family care plan  | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| b. Up-to-date will   | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |                          |
| c. Power of attorney | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |                          |

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

Not Applicable  
Strongly Disagree  
Disagree  
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Agree  
Strongly Agree

My personal mobilization arrangements for ... worked very well.

- 29. Power of attorney
- 30. Up-to-date will
- 31. Family care plan


The Army gave/has given me enough information to make decisions about my personal life:

- 32. At alert
- 33. When activated
- 34. At mobilization station
- 35. After being deployed
- 36. At demobilization station
- 37. After return to civilian life


Banking services were/have been adequate:

- 38. At mobilization station
- 39. After being deployed
- 40. At demobilization station


My monthly pay was/has been accurate:

- 41. Before activation
- 42. When activated
- 43. At mobilization station
- 44. After being deployed
- 45. At demobilization station
- 46. After return to civilian life


My allotments were handled the way I wanted:

- 47. At mobilization station
- 48. After being deployed
- 49. At demobilization station
- 50. After return to civilian life


My orders were available when needed:

- 51. When activated
- 52. At mobilization station
- 53. After being deployed
- 54. At demobilization station


Not Applicable  
Strongly Disagree  
Disagree  
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Agree  
Strongly Agree

My military personnel records were/have been available when needed:

- 55. When activated
- 56. At mobilization station
- 57. After being deployed
- 58. At demobilization station
- 59. After return to civilian life


My military medical and dental records were/have been available when needed:

- 60. Before activation
- 61. When activated
- 62. At mobilization station
- 63. After being deployed
- 64. At demobilization station
- 65. After return to civilian life


If you have been deactivated, please answer the following for when you were deployed:

- 66. I am/was satisfied with the mail delivery on active duty.
- 67. Medical and dental services are/were easily available to me during deployment.
- 68. I have been treated as an equal by active duty soldiers.
- 69. I am/was very worried about my family during my deployment.
- 70. My morale was high during deployment.
- 71. I have/had enough time to do my military job right.
- 72. I have/had enough equipment/supplies to do my military job right.
- 73. Transportation is/was adequate to do my military job right.
- 74. I am/was well prepared to perform my duty assignment.
- 75. The military job I am/was doing on active duty is important.
- 76. I feel my work is/was appreciated during deployment.




Not Applicable  
Strongly Disagree  
Disagree  
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Agree  
Strongly Agree

77. My command was ready to put me to work when I arrived.  
78. I have/had the technical skill I need to do my military job well.


If you work/worked with your assigned company or other similar unit, answer questions about units for your assigned unit.

If you work/worked someplace else, answer these questions for the place where you work/worked:

79. There are/were people in my unit I could count on for help.  
80. I have/had someone in my unit who would listen and understand my concerns about my military job/career.  
81. I have/had people in my unit that I could have fun and relax with.  
82. My unit works/worked well with the active component.  
83. My unit works/worked well together as a team.  
84. My unit is/was well prepared to perform its assigned mission.  
85. The morale in my unit is/was high.  
86. My immediate supervisor is/was a good leader.  
87. The leaders in my unit work/worked well together as a team.  
88. During deployment, my family was well taken care of.


In the event of combat,

89. I was confident that I could perform well.  
90. I was confident that members of my unit could perform well.  
91. I was confident that my leaders could perform well.


What level of conflict/stress ...

Extremely High  
Very High  
High  
Moderate  
Slight  
None

92. ...are you experiencing now in your military job?  
93. ...are you experiencing now in your family and personal life?  
94. ...were you experiencing a year ago in your military job?  
95. ...were you experiencing a year ago in your family and personal life?


96. Which of the following best describes/described your duty position?

- ☐ Squad member  
☐ Squad/section leader  
☐ Platoon/section sergeant  
☐ First sergeant  
☐ CSM  
☐ Other

How adequate was the training you received to accomplish the tasks in your duty assignment?

Not Applicable—didn't receive training  
Very Inadequate  
Inadequate  
Adequate  
Very Adequate

97. Before being activated  
98. At the mobilization site  
99. After being deployed


100. How much more training did you need to do your wartime job well?

- ☐ None. I do my job well  
☐ A little more  
☐ A lot more

101. How similar are the tasks you do/did in your Operation Desert Shield/Storm duty assignment, compared to those you had trained for prior to activation?

- ☐ Very similar  
☐ Similar  
☐ Not too similar  
☐ Different  
☐ Very different

1784

Form Number 756-12-5-86

Page 5

SURVEY NETWORK™

9170

## IV. YOUR ARMY CAREER

102. Which of the following best describes your current career intentions with the Army Reserve/Guard?

- ☐ I plan to leave upon completion of this enlistment/obligation
- ☐ I plan to stay beyond this obligation, but not necessarily until retirement
- ☐ I plan to stay until I receive my retirement letter
- ☐ I plan to stay after I receive my retirement letter

103. How has your participation in Operation Desert Shield/Storm affected your plans to stay in the Reserve/Guard?

- ☐ I plan to stay longer
- ☐ I plan to leave sooner
- ☐ It has not changed my plans
- ☐ Not sure

104. If a good friend asked your advice about joining the Reserve/Guard, would you recommend they enlist?

- ☐ Definitely
- ☐ Probably
- ☐ Probably not
- ☐ Definitely not
- ☐ Not sure

105. What is your marital status?

- ☐ Single, never married
- ☐ Married, for the first time
- ☐ Remarried, was divorced or widowed
- ☐ Legally separated or filing for divorce
- ☐ Widowed
- ☐ Divorced

106. How supportive is your spouse/girlfriend/boyfriend of your being in the Army Reserve/Guard?

- ☐ Does not apply
- ☐ Very supportive
- ☐ Fairly supportive
- ☐ Mixed or neutral
- ☐ Fairly unsupportive
- ☐ Very unsupportive
- ☐ Don't know

Not Applicable  
Strongly Disagree  
Disagree  
Neither Agree nor Disagree  
Agree  
Strongly Agree

107. My parents are very supportive of my being in the Reserve/Guard

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

108. Overall, I am very satisfied with my Army experience

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

109. My Reserve/Guard leaders are technically competent

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

110. My Reserve/Guard leaders are concerned about my welfare

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

111. The Reserve/Guard is concerned about my family

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

112. I never thought the Army would send troops into combat while I was in the Army

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

113. I never expected to be called for active duty

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

114. The Army's imposition of stop-loss was fair

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

115. It would be fair to give promotion advantages to those deployed in Southwest Asia

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

116. It would be fair to protect from reductions-in-force (RIF) those deployed in Southwest Asia

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

117. Other operations like Desert Shield/Storm are very likely in the next 10 years

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

118. If I stayed in the Army till retirement, I would most likely at some point be in a combat zone

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

119. Deployment of the troops for Operation Desert Shield/Storm went well

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

I believe it was right that ...

120. I was called up for Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S)

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

121. The USAR was called up for ODS/S

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

122. The ARNG was called up for ODS/S

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

123. The Individual Ready Reserves were called up for ODS/S

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

124. Retirees were called up for ODS/S

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

1784

Page 6

4986

Form Number 756-12 5-88


SURVEY NETWORK™



# APPENDIX C

## CHARTS FOR LEADERSHIP/CLIMATE, TRAINING, FAMILY/STRESS, AND OUTCOME MEASURES


**HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT:  
MY RESERVE/GUARD LEADERS ARE  
TECHNICALLY COMPETENT?**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 109

Figure 9. Percent agreeing that Reserve/Guard leaders are technically competent


# **MY IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR IS / WAS A GOOD LEADER**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 86

Figure 10. Percent agreeing that immediate supervisor is a good leader


# THE LEADERS IN MY UNIT WORK/WORKE WELL TOGETHER AS A TEAM



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 87

Figure 11. Percent agreeing that leaders work well together as a team


# MY UNIT WORKS / WORKED WELL TOGETHER AS A TEAM



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 83

Figure 12. Percent agreeing that unit works well together as a team

# **THERE ARE/WERE PEOPLE IN MY UNIT I COULD COUNT ON FOR HELP**




Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 79

Figure 13. Percent agreeing there are people in unit to count on for help




**I HAVE/HAD SOMEONE IN MY UNIT WHO WOULD LISTEN  
AND UNDERSTAND MY CONCERNS ABOUT MY  
MILITARY JOB/CAREER**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 80

**Figure 14. Percent agreeing there are people in unit to listen  
to concerns about job/career**


# I HAVE/HAD PEOPLE IN MY UNIT THAT I COULD HAVE FUN AND RELAX WITH



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 81

Figure 15. Percent agreeing there are people in unit to have fun and relax with


**WERE YOU WELL PREPARED TO PERFORM  
YOUR DUTY ASSIGNMENT? DID YOU HAVE  
THE TECHNICAL SKILL TO DO IT WELL?**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Questions 74 & 78

Figure 16. Percent agreeing they were well prepared to perform duty assignment and had technical skill to do it well

# HOW MUCH MORE TRAINING DID YOU NEED TO DO YOUR WARTIME JOB WELL?



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 100

Figure 17. Amount of training needed to do wartime job well

# HOW ADEQUATE WAS THE TRAINING FOR YOUR DUTY ASS'T: A) BEFORE BEING ACTIVATED? B) AT THE MOBILIZATION SITE? C) AFTER BEING DEPLOYED?





Figure 18. Adequacy of training at different stages of mobilization


**HOW SIMILAR ARE THE TASKS YOU DO/DID IN YOUR  
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM DUTY ASSIGNMENT TO  
THOSE YOU HAD TRAINED FOR PRIOR TO ACTIVATION?**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 101

**Figure 19. Similarity of tasks in ODS to those you had trained for prior to activation**


**WHAT LEVEL OF CONFLICT/STRESS ARE YOU EXPERIENCING IN YOUR MILITARY JOB:  
A) NOW? VS. B) A YEAR AGO?**



Source ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
 Questions 92 & 94

**Figure 20. Level of conflict/stress in military job:  
now compared to a year ago**

# WHAT LEVEL OF CONFLICT/STRESS ARE YOU EXPERIENCING IN YOUR FAMILY/PERSONAL LIFE: A) NOW? VS. B) A YEAR AGO?




Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP N:618  
Questions 93 & 95

Figure 21. Level of conflict/stress in personal life:  
now compared to a year ago




# I AM/WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT MY FAMILY DURING MY DEPLOYMENT



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 69

Figure 22. Percent agreeing they were worried about their family during deployment

# **DURING DEPLOYMENT MY FAMILY WAS WELL TAKEN CARE OF**




Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 88

Figure 23. Percent agreeing that their family was well taken care of during deployment

HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENTS:

**MY RESERVE/GUARD LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT:**


**A) MY WELFARE? B) MY FAMILY?**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Questions 110 & 111

Figure 24. Percent agreeing that Reserve/Guard leaders were concerned about their welfare and family welfare


# **HOW SUPPORTIVE IS YOUR SPOUSE, GIRLFRIEND, OR BOYFRIEND OF YOUR BEING IN THE ARMY RESERVE/GUARD?**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 106

Figure 25. Support from spouse/significant other for being in Reserve/Guard


# WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BEST DESCRIBES YOUR CURRENT CAREER INTENTIONS WITH THE ARMY RESERVE/GUARD?



Source: ARI Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 102

Figure 26. Current career intentions with the Army Reserve/Guard


# THE MORALE IN MY UNIT IS / WAS HIGH



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 85

Figure 27. Percent agreeing that the level of unit morale was high


**HOW MUCH DO YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT:  
OVERALL, I AM SATISFIED WITH MY ARMY EXPERIENCE?**



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 108

**Figure 28. Overall satisfaction with Army experience**

# MY UNIT IS/WAS WELL PREPARED TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION



Source: ARI 1991 Initial STAMP, N=618  
Question 84

Figure 29. Percent agreeing that their unit was well prepared to perform its assigned mission