

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NATO'S NEW FRONT LINE: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN TIER

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August 1, 1992

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The author would like to thank Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, Colonel Philip Mock, and Colonel Ed McCarthy for their insightful and helpful comments on early drafts of the paper. The author is especially grateful for the many insights provided by the members of the Studies and Analysis Branch, Policy Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe that formed the foundation for the discussion contained in Chapters 4 and 5: Colonel Justis Graebner and Major Hans-Juergen Kasselmann of the *Bundeswehr;* Wing Commander Chris LeCornu (RAF); Lieutenant Colonel Joost de Graauw (RNLAF); Commander Andrew Coggins (USN); and Mr. Brian Witherden and his team at the SHAPE Technical Centre, The Hague. The author, alone, remains responsible for the opinions expressed.

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Information contained in this report is current as of June 30, 1992.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also be provided directly to the author by calling commercial (717) 245-3911 or DSN 242-3911.

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FOREWORD

As daily headlines attest, world attention is focused more and more on violent events along NATO's Southern Tier. Indeed, given the rising scale and intensity of violence in and around the Mediterranean Basin and the continued withdrawal of the Red Army from Central Europe, the center of gravity of the North Atlantic Alliance is shifting to the Southern Tier.

But, because of NATO's—as well as the United States'—past preoccupation with Central Europe, the Southern Tier has not received the level of attention it may have deserved. As a result, NATO and the United States are currently grappling with the new security conditions of this key region while simultaneously attempting to implement innovative strategic principles, adopting new operational concepts, and carrying out a massive reduction and restructuring of forces made possible by the end of the cold war.

The intent of this report, therefore, is to contribute to a greater understanding of the security conditions in the Southern Tier and the potential policy implications for NATO and the United States. Specifically, the study seeks to:

- Identify, analyze, and assess risks facing the Southern Tier.
- Assess the degree to which the Alliance's New Strategic Concept applies to the conditions of the Southern Tier and implications of any shortfalls.
- Evaluate the ability of the Alliance to execute emerging operational concepts under the conditions anticipated in those areas of the Southern Tier with the greatest potential for violence.

In digesting this report, the general reader may find the greatest benefit in reading the Introduction and Chapters 2, 4, and 6. Generalists, as well as specialists in the region or a specific area within the Southern Tier may also find Chapter 3

relevant. Those engaged in strategic or operational level planning may wish to examine in greater depth Chapters 4 and 5, as well as the detailed information contained in the appendices.

KARL W. ROBINSON
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KEY JUDGEMENTS

- Already extant centrifugal forces within the Alliance may be reinforced by events in the Southern Tier:

  - With the demise of the Alliance-wide threat posed by the Soviet Union, regional security issues have moved to the fore in NATO. In this new context, the Southern Tier is rapidly becoming NATO's new front line. As increasing attention is focused on the Southern Tier, the Central Region may resist loss of its heretofore preeminent status. At the same time, nations within the Southern Tier have long deferred to the Central Region and expect, what they perceive, is their just due. These potential tensions may well place a strain on the Alliance.

  - Within the Southern Tier, similar tensions are likely to emerge as a result of diverging perceptions of risk; particularly, between the nations of the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean.

- Turkey lies at the heart of both these issues. Turks, rightfully perhaps, perceive themselves surrounded by potential threats. At the same time, Turkey is at a crossroads, being pulled in two directions. On the one hand, Turkey sees itself as NATO's point man, as it tries to build bridges between Europe, the Middle East, and the new Central Asian Republics. Conversely, Turkey feels slighted by the European Community and underappreciated within NATO. Whether Turkey becomes the linchpin of, or the first step in the unraveling of, the Alliance may well depend on the ability of NATO to reassure Turkish sensitivities. If such Alliance support is not forthcoming, the United States may find itself unilaterally bearing the brunt of supporting Turkey in the increasingly important times ahead.

- Because of longstanding bias in NATO toward the Central Region and the current preoccupation of many Central European allies with issues such as German unification, the European Community, and the assimilation of emerging East European democracies, the United States may have to take the lead in developing the plans and capabilities required to meet emerging security requirements in the Southern Tier.

- Within the Southern Tier, new or rediscovered risks have emerged from the shadow of the Soviet empire. The origins of these dangers—instability, economic underdevelopment, ethnic animosities, and unbridled nationalism—do not lend themselves to short-term resolution. Nor do they lend themselves to military solutions. But, because policy makers may be unable to redress the root causes of these problems before the onset of violence, military force may be required to arrest the symptoms. The military means employed to confront these issues will vary considerably from past experience and will require new and innovative approaches to the application of military power.

- While the level of risk has decreased, the likelihood of violence has increased. Indeed, civil wars engulf Yugoslavia and ethnic violence is rampant throughout the Transcaucasus. This, as well as other potential violence threatens to spill over onto NATO territory. For the foreseeable future, the Balkans and eastern Anatolia will face the greatest level of risk within the Alliance. While not inconsiderable, hazards posed by these conflicts do not threaten the survival of NATO or any of its members in the same manner as over the last 40 years.

- Under anticipated conditions, the Alliance may not be able to implement the new strategic concept of reduced forward presence in the Balkans or eastern Anatolia. Despite reduced risks and recent improvements, indigenous forces do not possess sufficient force generation capabilities to meet all potential risks. NATO must still be able to reinforce the

Southern Tier—at the very least as an expression of Alliance cohesion or resolve, but, more importantly, to reinforce Greek and, especially, Turkish security. Given anticipated circumstances, such reinforcement may be difficult to achieve. Improvements will be required in strategic lift, strategic mobility of reinforcements, and improved infrastructure within the Southern Tier to receive, forward, and integrate reinforcements.

- Emerging operational concepts based on light screening forces forward that yield territory, wear down an opponent, and allow for the decisive use of operational level maneuver to defeat an attacker may not be appropriate for operations in the Balkans or eastern Anatolia. Low intensity conflict—which is the more likely form of operations in the Southern Tier—does not lend itself to such a concept. And, given the lack of operational depth, harsh terrain, force generation capabilities, and sustainment difficulties, such an operational concept would be difficult to execute in the conduct of mid-intensity operations in the Balkans or eastern Anatolia. Alternative concepts will have to be pursued.

SUMMARY

An improved security environment exists in Europe, but the eventual state of this environment is much less clear than many initially anticipated. Along NATO's Southern Tier, dangers long overshadowed are emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union. As circumstances in Yugoslavia, convulsions in the Middle East, and a vortex of instability and uncertainty surrounding the disintegration of the Soviet empire clearly indicate, conventional military risks remain. Given the confluence of dynamic ethnic, cultural, and religious forces and the unbridled nationalism currently manifested throughout this turbulent region, potential for crises and violence that could spill over onto NATO territory is considerable.

The rising tide of instability in the Southern Tier and concomitant ebb of the Soviet threat in Central Europe may lead to the center of gravity of the Alliance shifting to the Mediterranean. NATO and U.S. policy makers must turn their attention, therefore, to the growing number and intensity of security issues facing the Southern Tier. Concurrently, military planners will have to reorient existing plans and thinking long dominated by planning for the Central Region to the complexities of the Southern Tier.

In examining the new security conditions and potential options for change, NATO and U.S. policy makers must guard against the regionalization of security issues within the Southern Tier which could jeopardize cohesion within NATO. Such an outcome is not beyond question, as a number of centrifugal forces are at work. Differing perceptions of levels and directions of risk may tend to pull NATO members of the Southern Tier in different directions. At the same time, risks within the Alliance are more differentiated than in the past when each member faced threats posed by the Warsaw Pact. Certainly, during the cold war, Central Europe clearly was the focus of the Alliance, but a degree of shared risk still existed that bound members more closely. The cold war threat is no longer credible, and clearly, in the eyes of many NATO

members along the Southern Tier, NATO's center of gravity has shifted to the Southern Tier.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the threat of a massive armored offensive in Italy, the Balkans, and northeastern Anatolia has disappeared. Nonetheless, the Southern Tier will face a host of risks, and those risks may differ markedly from the past. Many of these more ambiguous risks will not lend themselves to the application of military force: unstable governments, mass migration, Islamic radicalism, and economic dislocation, for example, largely defy purely military solutions. Nonetheless, violence within the Mediterranean basin will involve U.S and NATO security interests and may well require some form of military response. But, the means of exercising such force may be distinctly different from much past NATO planning. Force levels and structures of potential foes, rugged terrain in many areas, and lack of infrastructure and lines of communication required to sustain modern mechanized units may result in a reversion to more manpower intensive operations or more limited types of warfare.

While the risk of crises or confrontations requiring the use of national or NATO military forces may be high, the degree of potential risk is considerably reduced relative to past threats. As currently anticipated, NATO's *overall* military capabilities should be sufficient to balance future risks along the Southern Tier. This assessment does not imply that envisaged risks are insignificant or that any future operations will be easy.

Reduced forward presence, a key element of "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," is based on a number of critical assumptions: (1) individual nations and NATO, as a whole, will be able to generate and mass air, ground, and sea forces from throughout the Alliance in sufficient strength and time to preserve or restore the territorial integrity of its threatened members; (2) the size, readiness, and availability of indigenous forces can be reduced from current levels and greater reliance placed on mobilizable and reconstituted units; (3) the Alliance may rely more heavily on intra- and interregional (such as the Allied Command Europe [ACE] Rapid Reaction Corps [ARRC]) as well as external

reinforcements that will be predominantly multinational in composition. Whether these assumptions apply to all areas of the Southern Tier is open to question.

To create more suitable conditions for reliance on reduced forward presence the Alliance must take action to: compensate for lack of strategic depth, increase strategic lift capabilities, furnish units with greater strategic mobility, improve infrastructure, and provide modern command and control arrangements capable of integrating multinational reinforcements, to name but a few of the more important issues. Individually, these concerns are not insurmountable, but taken in sum, particularly in a time of reduced defense budgets, they are significant.

Future operational planning will become more complicated as planners will face a wider range of potential operations—in terms of variety, location, intensity (low, mid, and high), duration, and degree of risk—and will have to adapt themselves to the more ambiguous risks of the future. Planners must consider whether the emerging operational principle of counterconcentration applies throughout the Southern Tier. Lack of strategic and operational depth and terrain conditions in the Balkans will constrain planners from using an operational concept that trades space for time. Conversely, sufficient operational depth exists in eastern Anatolia and a defense in depth is possible, but the combination of severe terrain, harsh climate, and lack of adequate infrastructure may effectively preclude large scale operational level maneuver of mechanized forces. In short, Alliance planners may not be able to adopt the concept of counterconcentration to the degree that many initially anticipated.

A shift in NATO's center of gravity to the Southern Tier offers the United States considerable challenges, as well as opportunities. Perhaps the most difficult test the United States may face is to bolster NATO backing of Turkey. Turkey has long deferred to the Central Region because of the Soviet threat facing that region. With the rising risks along Turkey's frontiers in eastern Anatolia, Turks may justifiably believe that more attention should be directed to their security concerns.

The Alliance may not respond as strongly as Turkey believes necessary. As the threat from the Soviet Union swiftly dissipated, nations in Central and Western Europe have diverted their attention to redressing internal problems that exist in their societies (e.g., German unification, domestic economic problems, integration of immigrants) and the will to support Turkey may not be sufficient to satisfy Turkish expectations.

Perceived isolation from Europe could come at a time when Turkey is pulled by attractions from the Middle East and Asia. Presently attempting to build bridges between Europe and the Middle East, as well as the newly emerging republics of Central Asia, Turkey could render tremendous service to the Alliance, as well as to Europe, by contributing to the stability of these volatile regions. Conversely, should Turkish sensitivities be further aggravated, in a worst case scenario Turkey could draw away from Europe and reorient toward the east. Such a move could have significant ramifications for Turkey's relations with the Atlantic Alliance, and, particularly, Greece.

In the absence of strong backing from NATO, Turkey could call upon the United States for increased support. And, given longstanding U.S.-Turkish relations and the stakes involved, the United States certainly would have to respond. If the United States is not able to marshall adequate support for Turkey within the Alliance, the United States may find itself shouldering a large portion of the responsibilities for support of Turkey in an increasingly volatile part of the world. Alternatively, if Turkey perceives itself isolated and concludes, for whatever reason, that adequate support will not be forthcoming, it may increasingly strike out on its own and act in ways not always consistent with Alliance or U.S. goals. To avoid either situation, the United States should take steps now to ensure that the Alliance addresses Turkish security concerns.

The United States may be able to take the lead in addressing the issues considered in this study and exert influence over the development of new security arrangements in the Southern Tier. Advance planning that identifies potential crises and prepares means to avert (preferably) or manage (if

required) them will go a long way toward improving capabilities within the Southern Tier.

On the other hand, leadership opportunities come at a cost. In a time of shrinking defense budgets, the United States may have to make hard decisions on resource allocation if the more critical shortfalls in the Southern Tier are to be remedied. American political capital will also have to be expended to ensure allied participation in the resolution of these problems, when their focus—political as well as fiscal—may be diverted by pressing internal factors.

Challenges presented within the Southern Tier are manifold and will not be easily resolved. But, if the United States intends to exert a positive influence over the future development of the security conditions in this critical area of the world, it must seize the moment and provide the leadership necessary to sustain the process of revising the security conditions along the Southern Tier.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Historically, NATO has focused its efforts on the defense of the Central Region. As a result, areas outside of Central Europe have not always received the level of attention they deserved. In the new security conditions in Europe, however, greater attention needs to be paid to the Southern Region where the Alliance faces a broad range of explosive issues. Indeed, the Southern Region, largest geographically of the three NATO land commands, could become the key strategic arena for NATO.

The Southern Region also borders on the Mediterranean basin which lies at the confluence of dynamic political, economic, ethnic, cultural, and religious forces, each a potential powder keg capable of setting off a major crisis.[1] And, when aggregated or combined with rabid nationalism and irredentism currently manifested throughout much of the region, these forces hold tremendous potential for crises and violence. Historically, such conditions, particularly in the Balkans, have led to violence, sometimes on a continental scale.[2] One need only review daily headlines to comprehend that NATO's Southern Tier is currently the most volatile region of the world: civil war in Yugoslavia, perceived threats posed by immigration and religious radicalism in the Maghreb, bloody spasms in the Transcaucasus, and the continuing instability in the Middle East. For the next decade, the likelihood of assault on the "New World Order" from within the Southern Region will remain high.

Surely any such conflict within the Mediterranean basin will involve U.S. and NATO security interests and may well require some form of military response. Thus, U.S. and NATO planners can no longer afford to concentrate their efforts on the Central Region, but must turn their attention to strategic and operational planning for Southern Europe. Given the relative

lack of attention paid previously to the Southern Tier and the perceived lack of NATO-wide threat, it may be difficult to redirect NATO's focus to the Southern Region. The United States, because of its strong national interests that extend beyond Europe into North Africa, the Middle East, Russia, and the new Central Asian republics may have to take the lead in examining future security concerns of the Southern Region and in developing capabilities needed to meet emerging security requirements.

Scope.

The geographic bounds of the area under consideration will extend beyond those normally considered to comprise NATO's Southern Region[3] and will include the entire southern flank of Europe, reaching from the Atlantic coast of Portugal, across the northern coast of the Mediterranean (to include France) to Turkey's eastern and southern borders. This report will address not only Europe, but also the southern littoral of the Mediterranean basin, to include the Maghreb.[4] Moreover, the study will consider risks from Iran, Iraq, and Syria, states traditionally considered part of the Middle East, but which potentially pose direct threats to Turkey, as well as indirect risks to other members of the Alliance. As a convenient shorthand, this expanded geographic region will be referred to as NATO's Southern Tier or the Southern Tier in order to distinguish it clearly from the formally delimited Southern Region of NATO (see Map 1). Although the report addresses the entire Southern Tier, the primary focus of the discussion on operational considerations—for reasons made clear in the text—will be on the Balkans and along Turkey's easterr. and southeastern borders.

In examining the growing importance to NATO of the Southern Tier, the study will first address potential risks to the area, including some not normally considered in military or operational terms (for example, such North-South issues as immigration, ethnic differences, and religion), but which will affect military planning for future operations. The report will then outline anticipated NATO capabilities within the region, and, in conjurction with emerging NATO strategic and



Map 1. The Southern Tier.

operational concepts, will analyze and assess capabilities versus potential risks. Finally, the report will offer conclusions on future planning options and directions which future NATO and U.S. planning should take.

CHAPTER 2

POTENTIAL RISKS ALONG NATO'S SOUTHERN TIER: BROAD TRENDS

With the demise of the Warsaw Pact (WTO) and the accelerating disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the once massive, monolithic Communist threat of the cold war has vanished. These circumstances have led many observers to conclude NATO no longer faces a clearly identifiable, let alone quantifiable, threat to its security. While this perception may be accurate in the Central Region where the threat from the WTO and the Soviet Union took primacy in the past 40 years, such may not be the case elsewhere. Emerging from the shadow of the cold war within NATO's Southern Tier, for example, are the many longstanding animosities that have been suppressed, but barely, for the past 45 years. Old transnational risks—terrorism, ethnic based conflicts, and radical nationalism—are once again on the rise. (See Map 2.)

At the same time, nations within the Southern Tier will face a host of risks markedly different from those that preoccupied NATO planners in the Central Region in the past. Moreover, these more ambiguous risks will not lend themselves readily to the application of military force. Unstable governments, mass migration, Islamic radicalism, and economic dislocation, for example, are but a few of the myriad issues currently confronting Southern Europe which largely defy purely military solutions.

Instability.

In many nations of the Mediterranean basin, democratic institutions are politically and socially feeble or fragile.[5] Many of these nations also face economic and demographic pressures that further exacerbate political difficulties. To



Map 2. Potential Flashpoints in the Southern Tier.

reduce internal pressures, some states along NATO's Southern Tier sometimes bleed off tensions through the adoption of pan-Arab, pan-Islamic, or anti-Western foreign policies that focus beyond the state (and its inherent problems) and concentrate on an outside foe.[6] Such policies tend to be defined in a zero-sum manner, conflictive, oftentimes exacerbating old wounds (for example, such "North-South" issues as economic, religious, and cultural disparities or past colonial relationships), and pose risks for several members of the Alliance, particularly old colonial powers, such as France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

Many of these 'regional' issues tend to upset not only "North-South" relations, but the delicate equilibrium of relationships within the "South," as well. Oftentimes national leaders, competing for regional leadership of various causes, become captives of their rhetoric, and fuel tensions within the region. In addition, territorial interests clash or economic disparities within a subregion feed frustrations.[7] These conflicts contribute to instability within the region which frequently leads to violence. And, it must be recalled, many supposedly "regional" conflicts of the past exerted influence well beyond the region and had implications for U.S., as well as European, security interests.[8]

Finally, the process of statal disintegration further contributes to instability with the Southern Tier, where the breakup and subsequent civil war in Yugoslavia serves, perhaps, as the most prominent example. However, the break-up of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have also unleashed considerable instabilities within the region as an ever increasing number of competing republics emerge on the international scene.[9]

Immigration and Mass Migration.

Along NATO's Southern Tier, population growth, lack of economic development, and demographic dislocations are contributing to an increasing wave of immigration throughout the Mediterranean basin from poorer to more prosperous nations. For example, African populations are projected to

grow at a rate of 2.7 percent in the years 1985-2000 and by 2.9 percent in the following 25 years. The population in Egypt, for example, is expected to double from 55 to 100 million within the next 25 years and the population of the Maghreb is expected to more than double (from 54-127 million) by 2025.[10] Alone, such population growth presents a daunting challenge to the nations of the Mediterranean's southern littoral. When combined with the current bleak economic opportunities and forecasts of low economic growth, a potential time bomb exists as it is unlikely governments in the area will be able to absorb such population increases into their economies. In Egypt, for example, where unemployment already hovers around 20+ percent, 60 percent of the population is under the age of 20 years. Unemployment in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco ranges from 21.4 percent to 16.1 percent to 13.9 percent, respectively.[11] The nations of North Africa simply cannot absorb such population growth and the impetus for migration will be strong. As several of the North African nations have long historical and cultural ties with the nations of Southern Europe, a strong push for immigration to these nations is inevitable.

Because of their own economic conditions, many European nations lack the resources to invest in the Southern Tier and economic imbalances are likely to increase, leading, in turn, to intensified immigration. While European nations have been able to withstand past flows, many states may soon reach the limits of their ability to support, politically, further migrations. Moreover, the discussion thus far fails to take into account additional population shifts from Asia, the flow of more acceptable (i.e., white and Christian) refugees and immigrants from Eastern Europe, or the fact that many of the labor markets in Southern Europe are nearing saturation.[12] Should economic dislocations continue, many nations in Southern Europe may be unable to maintain their own social welfare programs and current levels of spending for either citizens or immigrants. Calls are already being heard throughout Europe for limits on immigration and anti-immigrant rhetoric, as well as violence, has been on the increase.[13]

Even within Southern Europe, pressure of immigration between the "have" and "have not" nations is increasing. At the

same time, the ongoing war in what was Yugoslavia has created 250,000 refugees that have obtained asylum in Central Europe and an estimated 1-1.5 million people that are internal refugees. Moreover, the number could approach 3 million refugees if violence spreads to Kosovo or Macedonia.[14] Nor do these significant numbers take into account potential immigration from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. All in all, the numbers of people involved is staggering and European nations are reaching the saturation point.

When the perceived saturation point of immigration is reached, nations concerned will undoubtedly attempt to curtail further entry.[15] Nations will also likely take further steps to prevent illegal immigration which will continue to grow as states clamp down on legal immigration. As the recent Italian reaction to an influx of Albanians indicates, such decisions may well require military action to prevent a flood of economic refugees, or paramilitary support of police forces to ensure forcible repatriation of refugees.[16] Conversely, the Italian example also shows the nonviolent manner in which military forces may be employed: Italy deployed approximately 800 army and navy personnel to Albania to distribute approximately 120,000 tons of emergency supplies donated by Italy and the European Community.[17]

A different twist in the immigration issue concerns Turkey, as substantial numbers of Turkish citizens live abroad. Throughout the 1960s-1980s, Turkey provided a ready pool of workers for the industrial expansion of Central and Western Europe. These workers were welcomed at the time; indeed, the German term, *Gastarbeiter*, is literally translated as "guest worker." In the economic boom of the time, "guests" took on a more permanent status as workers brought their families to live with them and established substantial Turkish minorities in many of the industrialized nations of Western Europe.[18] With the economic contractions of the late 1980s and 1990s, however, many of these "guests" are now perceived as a burden on an increasingly stressed social welfare system and are no longer as welcome. Recent calls for reductions in the numbers of new immigrants, or outright expulsion of foreign workers in many Central and Western European nations[19]

could create animosity in Turkey that could have significant ramifications for the Alliance, in general, and security concerns in the Southern Tier, in particular.

Islamic Radicalism.

Current worries about immigration are exacerbated by rising fears of Islamic radicalism in North Africa. For example, Moslem radicals in Algeria, led by the Islamic Salvation Front, scored a strong victory in the first round of national elections in December 1991. As a result, more moderate members of the Algerian electorate took to the streets to protest fundamentalist programs. For the moment, religious radicals apparently have been forestalled by a military action that overturned the election results.[20] The issue has not been resolved, however, and the Islamic Salvation Front has vowed to continue its struggle for power. Indeed, violence in Algeria has been on the rise and the assassination of President Mohammed Boudiaf on June 29, 1992, portends further escalation of the crisis.[21] Nor is the situation in Algeria unique. Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Morocco face similar challenges.[22] Should Moslem radicals prevail and press their strict agenda, more moderate segments of society may seek to immigrate, and France, with its long association with Algeria and Tunisia, is the prime target for their final destination.

European nations are concerned not only with Moslem activities in North Africa. With the recent spread of the civil war in what used to be Yugoslavia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the struggle in the Balkans has taken on religious overtones as Christian Serbians have attacked largely Moslem Bosnians and threatened ethnic, and largely Moslem, Albanians in Kosovo.[23] Further complicating the situation, Turkey has reiterated its historical responsibilities established under international treaty, to the security and physical well-being of Moslems in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. These conditions have raised, in the eyes of Italian observers, the specter of the "...creation of a hotbed of Islamic radicalism in Europe."[24]

Many nations within the Southern Tier are also concerned about the more militant aspects of Moslem radicalism. While a modern day *jihad* (or "holy war") is highly unlikely, some nations fear radicalization of their Moslem populations, while others are concerned about increased terrorism inspired by Islamic fundamentalists in pursuit of their political agenda.[25] Even in a scenario where Islamic fundamentalists do not gain power, their activities could generate considerable instability along the Southern Tier.

While it is unlikely that any significant, overt hostile or military activities might be directed against an Alliance member, lesser, but still significant, actions such as the "peaceful" use of mass action or mass immigration (a la the Mariel boat lift from Cuba to the United States in 1980), might require a military response. And, even though an Alliance military response might not be required, the United States might provide political support to a particular ally. Such support could affect adversely U.S. relations with non-European allies.[26] Given the past history of radical Islamic groups, more violent scenarios are certainly possible.

Terrorism.

Long a problem within the Southern Tier, terrorism continues largely unabated throughout the region. Whether Basque separatists (ETA) in Spain; Corsican separatists in France; ongoing organized crime campaign of intimidation in Italy; National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) or Popular Revolutionary Struggle (ELA) in Greece; Gray Wolves, Dev Sol or Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey; Palestinian or state- sponsored terrorism in the Mideast and Maghreb; terrorist organizations continue to exert no little influence within the Southern Tier.[27] Additionally, the disintegration of Yugoslavia or the various states of the Transcaucasus region could allow old ethnic hatreds to spawn new terrorist groups. At present, none of these organizations poses a significant threat to national, NATO, or U.S. interests in the region. But, given instabilities within the region, growth in terrorist activities is likely.

At the same time, these groups pose a threat to U.S. personnel and property within the region, where terrorist activities are sometimes designed to drive Americans from a particular country or deny the United States access to key areas of the region.[28] In the past, terrorists attacks against U.S. personnel or property sometimes resulted in a military response.[29] Military action may be required in the future, as well. Consequently, while not posing a serious risk, conventional terrorist activities will continue to prove nettlesome to Alliance military planners. National, and possibly Alliance, resources within the Southern Tier, therefore, will continue to be devoted to counterterrorist efforts; perhaps, in a time of shrinking defense budgets, at the expense of conventional forces.

Mass Casualty Weapons.

On the other hand, continued proliferation of ballistic missile technology, as well as mass casualty weapons, may pose a considerable long-term risk to the Alliance. Presently, several nations within the Southern Tier possess tactical ballistic missiles (Appendix A) and Libya has obtained missiles from China that are capable of striking Italy.[30] Moreover, according to press reports, U.S. intelligence estimates project that by the year 2000, at least 22 nations—including Libya and Iran—may possess *intercontinental* ballistic missiles.[31] The potential for the increased distribution of such ballistic missile capabilities is underscored by the recent revelation that, in April 1990, U.S. reconnaissance satellites discovered fixed missile launching facilities in Mauritania, on Africa's Atlantic coast. Subsequent investigations revealed, according to U.S. press reports, Iraq had negotiated the establishment of an unrestricted missile test range.[32] Recent trends (1990) have led Aaron Karp of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to note a slowing of national acquisition of ballistic missile technology, largely due to costs involved. That said, recent experience with Iraqi research and development efforts clearly indicates that nations with sufficient drive and willingness to spend resources at the expense of their populations have the capacity to acquire ballistic missile technology.[33]

Coupled with the expansion of ballistic missile capabilities throughout the world is the alarming prospect of matching these delivery systems with mass casualty producing weapons, particularly nuclear devices. The experience with the near success of Iraqi efforts to develop an atomic bomb that have come to light since the end of the Persian Gulf War is perhaps the best known and most frightening development.[34] Less well known, but equally disturbing are reports that Algeria may be developing its own nuclear program or has been cooperating with Iraq. And, while Iran claims not to have a nuclear program, evidence indicates that it has aggressively pursued the development of a nuclear weapons project over the past 5 years and recently has been reported trying to purchase a nuclear warhead.[35] Finally, statements from Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev concerning Kazakhstan's retention of its portion of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, identifies itself as an Asian country intent on building better relations with Arab states, and his proposed tour of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan have done little to allay fears of an "Islamic Bomb."[36]

Even should a potential foe be unable to mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile delivery system, the mere existence of a nuclear device could clearly have a decisive effect on a future crisis in the Southern Tier. For example, would Saudi Arabia have requested U.S. assistance in August 1990 if Iraq possessed a nuclear device, or if Saddam Hussein had explicitly engaged in nuclear extortion? Definitive answers to such hypothetical questions cannot be known, but, at the very least, already complicated Saudi and U.S. decision making would have been significantly more complex. The same could undoubtedly be said in any future crisis within the Southern Tier should an opponent possess nuclear capabilities. Finally, it must be pointed out that this discussion has focused only on the use of a nuclear device which is the most difficult mass casualty weapon to acquire and utilize. No mention has been made of chemical or biological weapons, which possess considerable killing power, but which are relatively easier to manufacture and employ.[37]

Assessment.

The foregoing discussion makes it quite clear that for the foreseeable future the Southern Tier, as a whole, faces considerable instability and potential violence. At the same time, while the likelihood of violence may have increased, the degree of potential risk is considerably reduced when compared with the previous threats posed by the Warsaw Pact. This assessment does not imply that foreseeable risks are insignificant or that future operations will be easy.

Moreover, the risks do not lend themselves to quick or easy remedies. Political instability along the Southern Tier will remain a fact of life. Solid, dynamic political foundations need time to grow and sustain themselves. Current and anticipated national economic conditions and the already significant demographic explosion in many countries along the Southern Tier may not permit time needed for the growth of such institutions. Nor is external investment likely to bridge the gap until local economies can sustain their respective populations. The more developed nations of Europe are currently suffering through the global recession and find their fiscal resources strained to meet current requirements. Even if funds were available from either governments or private investors, the instability of many regimes would likely deter investment. Thus, more and more nations will find themselves in a "Catch-22" situation and an ever decreasing spiral of economic distress.

Nor are nationalism, ethnic strife, religious animosities, or terrorism likely to abate in the foreseeable future. As the ongoing civil war in Yugoslavia and conflicts in the Transcaucasus region amply demonstrate, ethnic and cultural differences still lead to violence. And, the scale of such violence is increasing, as groups obtain more modern and deadly weapons. Terrorists operate at relatively low levels in Western Europe, but the scale of terrorist activities grows as one goes east, culminating in the current insurgency being carried out in eastern Anatolia under the auspices of the PKK. The root causes under all of these issues run extremely deep and are not likely to be resolved easily or in the near term.

Given anticipated conditions along the Southern Tier and current European preoccupations, it is unlikely that political, economic, and social solutions can be applied effectively within foreseeable time constraints. If policy makers are unable to cure the "disease," military forces may be called upon to cope with the symptoms when a conflict spills over NATO borders or public opinion drives policy makers to take some form of action. This conclusion does not argue that policy makers have (or will) abrogated their responsibilities, but that conditions may exceed their ability to cope with many of the intractable problems that have been identified.

Military planners must, therefore, be prepared to confront these issues. This will prove no easy task. Many of the risks facing the Southern Tier will vary considerably from past experience, and planners may face a *tabula rasa* from which to draw guidance. Countering instability wrought by mass migrations, religious fundamentalism, or terrorism will require dramatically different conceptual approaches to planning and conducting military operations. Moreover, the qualities of these issues will vary considerably within the diverse regions that make up the Southern Tier. For that reason, the report will now turn to an examination of regional security concerns.

CHAPTER 3

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS WITHIN NATO'S SOUTHERN TIER

While the overarching and more ambiguous trends identified in the last chapter pose considerable challenges in and of themselves, they do not solely occupy security planners. Considerable and, perhaps, more concrete dangers also face a number of NATO members within the Southern Tier. Because of the diversity of the region and the variety of risks, not all issues apply equally across the Mediterranean basin. The following discussion of more specific risks will, therefore, be addressed on a regional or national basis, as appropriate.

Iberia.

In December 1991, all surface ships of the Russian[38] Navy returned to their home ports and the previous worldwide presence of the former Soviet Navy literally evaporated. Although limited deployments of the Black Sea Fleet resumed in early February 1992, it is apparent that the struggle between Russia and Ukraine over eventual control of the fleet has not been resolved and readiness levels will undoubtedly degrade.[39] How long it may take to restore the previous readiness standards is not known, but would surely take considerable time, particularly the longer the fleet remains in port. Moreover, the ultimate division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine could also limit the number of surface ships available for deployment in either the Mediterranean Sea or the Atlantic Ocean. The combination of these circumstances could greatly reduce potential risks to Portugal and Spain and significantly affect their defense spending in the near and medium term.

While the threat posed by the former Soviet empire may be greatly reduced, potential risks to the security of the Alliance

and its individual members in this area remain. In the words of Jorge Dezcaller, Director General for External Affairs for Africa and the Middle East of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The events in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe may catch our attention more than events in the South. But the Maghreb as it stands now is a potential time bomb and we must not forget it."[40] As a result, many Spaniards view themselves on the front line of issues in the Mediterranean.[41] In addition to the issues of immigration and Islamic radicalism addressed above, the Spanish government is also concerned about threats to its economic status. For example, Spain currently imports one half of its natural gas from Algeria and is contemplating construction of a large diameter gas pipeline from Algeria, through Morocco, and across the Straits of Gibraltar, thus increasing its dependence on Algerian resources. That Spain might become dependent upon the good graces of a radical or anti-Western Islamic regime is a cause of Spanish concern.[42]

The Spanish government also has long expressed concerns about its continued sovereignty over the cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast. Importantly, in addition to threats from the Maghreb, Spain also perceives a lack of NATO commitment to assist Spain should these cities be threatened.[43] Finally, Spaniards are agitated over continued British control of Gibraltar and perceived slow progress in resolving the important issue of the reestablishing full Spanish sovereignty.[44] Each of these issues is significant in its own right, but when combined with the fact that Spain does not participate in NATO's integrated command structure, they could considerably complicate coordination of activities in this vital area.[45]

Portugal shares Spanish perceptions of an absence of any threat from the former Soviet Union. And, like their Spanish compatriots they are concerned about risks posed by instability within the Maghreb.[46] While recognizing that none of the nations within the Maghreb currently possess credible offensive capabilities, the Portuguese have not ruled out the necessity to prepare defenses to account for any instabilities within the Maghreb that might spill over into the Iberian

Peninsula. At the same time, the Portuguese are concerned about their lines of communication to sub-Saharan Africa, where they have considerable economic ties, as well as control of the strategic Azores and Madeira Islands.[47]

Italy.

The demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, and the breakup of the Soviet empire have virtually eliminated the threat of a major ground assault against northern Italy. That said, the ongoing disintegration of Yugoslavia and the violence it has spawned could spill over onto Italian territory. Moreover, some Slovene minorities in Trieste have begun agitating for bilingualism and improved treatment in northeast Italy, and, especially, Trieste. At the same time, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), a right-wing, quasi-fascist party, has countered with demands for return of Istria and Dalmatia, with their substantial ethnic Italian minorities and Italians displaced from these regions after World War II are calling for renegotiation of post-World War II settlements with Zagreb and Ljubljana.[48] While it is unlikely that these various splinter groups could create significant difficulties, historical example does not offer much solace.[49]

On the other hand, Italian policy makers are concerned about potential threats posed by Libya. As indicated earlier, Libya possesses limited ballistic missile technology and has launched missiles toward Italian territory in the past. Moreover, Libya possesses highly sophisticated, long-range bombers (SU-24 Fencers) capable of striking the Italian mainland which causes additional anxiety.[50] While the threats posed by Libya may be small on a European scale, Italians perceive a much higher level of threat. Moreover, Italians view the combination of Libya's chemical weapons stockpiles, its long quest for a nuclear device, and Ghadaffi's violent rhetoric and oftentimes erratic behavior as sufficient cause for concern.[51]

Italy also faces many of the nonmilitary risks that apply across the Southern Tier that could require some form of military action. Undoubtedly, Italian armed forces are capable

of containing such activities, but other nations may wish to contribute to Italian efforts as a demonstration of Alliance cohesion and solidarity. Conversely, given reduced levels of risk, Italy may wish to consider employing its forces outside traditional areas of operation. NATO and U.S. military planners must, therefore, examine the implications of Italy's changed circumstances.

The Balkans.

Historically, the Balkan Peninsula has seethed with ethnic violence, nationalistic fervor, and cultural animosities. And, today, for a multitude of reasons, the Balkans has assumed once again its role as the powder keg of Europe. Many of the original borders drawn up in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires failed to recognize ethnic and nationalist aspirations. As a result, many of the ethnic tensions that directly led to the outbreak of World War I went unresolved and nationalism and irredentism remained rampant in the inter-war era. Nor were many of these issues satisfied by the settlements following World War II.[52] Instead, ethnic and nationalist feelings simmered barely below the surface, kept just under bursting point by the bipolarity of the cold war, the strict control of Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, and the military power of the Soviet Union. With the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in the region and the demise of the Soviet Union, however, the thin veneer of control has been shattered.

Perhaps the most obvious risk to stability and security in the Balkans lies in what used to be the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The apparently unending civil war in that erstwhile nation has unleashed ethnic violence on a national scale initially by Serbia against Croatia and Slovenia that has spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The secession of Macedonia from the Yugoslav Federation or internal strife within Serbia (that is, in Kosovo or Vojvodina) could spark further violence that could spill across the borders of the former Yugoslavia.[53] Although the United Nations has efforts underway to establish peacekeeping forces, these endeavors have not proven successful to date.[54] Until such time that the future becomes clearer, therefore, national and NATO military

planners must remain cognizant of the dangers posed by the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Even should the disintegration of Yugoslavia continue on a more peaceful basis, not all problems within the Balkans will be resolved. For example, the reemergence of the 'Macedonia Question' could once again engage the attention of Serbia, 'the Republic of Skopje' (Macedonia), Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Since the time of ancient Greece, this region—and its seemingly eternal ethnic conflicts—has been a continuous source of international tensions. Nor have these sensitivities attenuated over time. As recent reports clearly indicate, Greek sensitivities concerning the 'Macedonian Question,' in general, and the use of the word Macedonia, in particular, remain highly charged.[55] The situation is further complicated by Albanian claims to portions of Macedonia and rising Greek-Albanian tensions.[56]

Enduring problems between Greece and Turkey will pose challenges to military planners as they come to grips with the security issues of the next decade. Greek and Turkish animosities have been finely honed over the centuries and show no signs of abating in the near term. The 'Macedonia Question', feuds over common borders in Thrace, sovereignty issues in the Aegean Sea, the recent restatement of Turkish security guarantees to Moslem populations in the Balkans, and the festering wound of Cyprus further exacerbate an already tense situation.[57] Moreover, Greece and Turkey are engaged in keen competition over influence in Bulgaria that will place the other as the 'odd man out' in the Balkans.[58]

Greco-Turk difficulties are magnified in Turkish eyes by perceived mistreatment from its European allies, as well as the perceived preferential treatment of Greece. For example, Turkey has been struggling to meet EC requirements since 1963 and Turkey's formal application for EC membership has languished without action since 1987. On the other hand, Greece entered the EC in 1981. Turkish frustrations have been aggravated recently by consideration for membership of several Northern and Central European states, as well as former members of the Warsaw Pact.[59] A WEU acceptance of Greece's application without a similar admittance of Turkey

into the WEU membership will undoubtedly further rankle Ankara. Even should Greece not be accepted, it is likely that the WEU will accept membership from former Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) states (e.g., Finland, Austria, and Sweden) which have recently applied. That such a membership would be offered to a neutral before a solid NATO partner like Turkey would likely be viewed as a tremendous affront to Turkey. Finally, Germany's hesitation in reinforcing Turkey during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM and the recent halt of German arms assistance are taken as further evidence of eroding support of Turkey, which increasingly feels itself isolated on NATO's front line.[60]

Whether such animosities could actually lead to conflict between the two states cannot be forecast. What is known is that these issues have severely complicated Alliance or U.S. efforts to construct a comprehensive security structure in the region over the past 20 years. Greek withdrawal and pseudo-return to the integrated military structure of NATO in 1980 and the failure to reestablish an adequate command and control organization in the area are but two of many key examples of the difficulties military planners and commanders have faced.[61] These difficulties show no signs of early resolution and will plague planners as they attempt to adjust to the new strategic setting on the Southern Tier.

Despite the potential for conflict within the Balkans, it must be recognized that important initiatives have been taken to defuse some of the tensions. Bulgaria, in particular, has taken considerable steps to allay the fears of its neighbors.[62] For example, on October 7, 1991, Bulgaria concluded a friendship treaty with Greece and signed a military agreement with Turkey concerning notification and observation of military exercises along their mutual borders. Additionally, President Zhelyu Zhelev proposed hosting a round of arms reductions discussions in Sofia involving Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey; Greece and Turkey have so far responded positively.[63] Moreover, the new Demirel government in Turkey seems amenable to negotiations for improving relations.[64] Despite these positive signs, the Balkans still contain a volatile mix of ethnic, tribal, and national hatreds that have repeatedly

engulfed Europe in war over the past several centuries and hold considerable potential for further violence.

Eastern Anatolia.

The Balkans are not the only pressure cooker within the Southern Tier. The area on Turkey's southern and eastern borders is also fraught with risk. Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has removed the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Turkey, the newly independent republics in the Transcaucasus region—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—represent considerable instability on Turkey's eastern border. At the same time, past conflicts between Turkey and its northeastern neighbors do not provide an optimistic start for future relations.[65] While the possibility of a deliberate incursion into Turkey from Georgia or Armenia is extremely remote, the possibility of local violence in either (or both) republic(s) spilling over into Turkey is high. Moreover, the Turkish government quickly recognized Azerbaijan and has sought to establish close ties with its Turkic brethren. Given the animosities between the Azerbaijanis and the Georgians, the Georgians and the Armenians, and the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis, as well as historical Turkish-Armenian animosities, it is possible that Turkey could be drawn eventually into a potential conflict that erupts in the Transcaucasus.[66]

Indeed, Armenians and Azerbaijanis remain locked in a 4-year ethnic struggle over control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region (largely ethnic Armenian, but located in Azerbaijan). That struggle has expanded to include Nakechevan (part of Azerbaijan, but separated from it by Armenian territory).[67] As a result of Armenian military actions, Turkey has threatened to send forces into Nakechevan. The Commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Forces, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, in turn, has warned Turkey against military intervention in the conflict, and it appears that both Turkey and the CIS have bolstered security forces along the Turkish frontier.[68] At the same time, Iran, which has been trying to mediate the conflict, has condemned Armenian aggression and has indicated—according to mediator Mahmoud Vaezi—that "The Islamic Republic of Iran will not

accept any change in the borders of these republics."[69] To complicate matters further, Armenia recently signed a security pact with five other republics[70] that could turn a local conflict into a major regional confrontation that would have significant repercussions for Turkey and NATO.

Nor are Turkish security concerns focused solely on the Transcaucasus. Since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the post-World War I division of the Middle East between France and Great Britain, the Turks have been largely content with their territorial situation. Turkey, however, found itself surrounded by neighbors either dissatisfied with the post-World War I settlements or who harbored expansionist designs.[71] For example, tensions between Syria and Turkey precede Syrian independence, hearkening back to the loss of the key port of Iskenderun (formerly Alexandretta) and its surrounding Hatay Province. The loss of this area has clouded Turko-Syrian relations for over 50 years.[72] Syria's role as a Soviet client state over the past 30 years and Turkish membership in NATO only compounded these problems. More recently, continued Syrian support of Kurdish guerrillas has increased friction between the two nations and Turkey has given Syria less than veiled warnings to prevent further Kurdish activities from Syria.[73]

Finally, water, a very sensitive issue in the arid Middle East, could become a source of considerable tension between the two nations. Indeed, in the mid-1970s this issue had already surfaced when Turkey reduced the flow of water into Syria to fill reservoirs in a recently completed dam system. Moreover, water and Kurdish issues have been intertwined since 1987 when, in a security protocol, Syria promised to prevent Syrian-based Kurds from attacking Turkey in return for a Turkish guarantee of water. As such attacks have not abated, water could become a significant lever and, hence, source of tension in Turko-Syrian relations. Indeed, upon completion of the giant Ataturk Dam in the mid-1990s, Turkey could divert up to one half of the current flow of the Euphrates River into Syria, giving the Turks a potential strangle hold on Syria.[74]

Similar to Syria, strained Turkish-Iraqi relations preceded an independent Iraq. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, the

boundary between Turkey and Iraq remained undefined, subject to direct negotiations between Turkey and Great Britain, acting as the trustee for Iraq. The Turks became convinced that Britain deliberately fomented revolt among the Kurdish tribes within the region to cement British control over the oil fields at Mosul in Northern Iraq. Negotiations resolved the issue peacefully in 1926 and relations within the area remained calm until World War II.[75] Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey remained quite high until the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, and increasingly radical Iraqi rhetoric in the 1960s. Relations sagged further in the mid-1970s when Turkey restricted water flow of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, but rebounded with the completion of the Iraqi-Turkish oil pipelines in 1977. Throughout the course of the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey maintained a policy of strict neutrality between the two states. Relations improved to the point that the Iraqis granted permission for the Turks to carry out cross-border operations into Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish and Armenian terrorists.[76] However, Iraqi support of anti-Iranian Kurds (in response to Iranian support of anti-Iraqi Kurds) in its long war with Iran resulted in all Kurdish groups (including anti-Turkey) receiving arms. Moreover, Iraqi promises of increased autonomy for its Kurds alarmed Turkey, which fears any form of Kurdish sovereignty.[77] Finally, recent Turkish backing of coalition operations against Iraq in OPERATION DESERT STORM and support of OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT will undoubtedly sour relations between the two nations for the foreseeable future.

Turkish relations with Iran have generally been quite good, until lately.[78] That said, issues loom on the horizon that could overshadow future relations. Particularly important from the Turkish standpoint is the issue of the Kurds. Iran supported and provided arms to anti-Iraqi Kurdish groups who did not distinguish between Iraq and Turkey. And, although the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, Kurdish groups based in Iran did not cease operations against Turkey. Moreover, Iran has denied Turkish requests for "hot pursuit" or cross-border operations into Iran. The Turkish belief that Iran allows the PKK to operate two clandestine radio stations that broadcast into Turkey has not improved relations between the two states.[79]

Iran's continuing recovery from a debilitating decade of revolution and war has resulted in a more vigorous foreign policy. At the same time, Tehran has been active proselytizing Shiite fundamentalism, particularly in the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union. These activities conflict with recent Turkish diplomatic and cultural initiatives in the region as both nations vie to fill the vacuum left in the Moslem republics of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, interests collide in the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, where the current contest for influence represents a microcosm of the intricate complexities involved in the region. The Azeris are ethnically and culturally Turkic, but are predominantly Shiite Moslems. Thus, both Turkey and Iran claim a natural kinship, as well as "responsibility" for guiding the new republic. Perhaps, as important, each nation understands that access in Azerbaijan could be converted into increased influence in the remaining Moslem republics.[80]

Additionally, Iranian leaders may view the introduction of western and secular ideas as inimical to their fundamentalist crusade, as well as an expansion of their area of influence. Moreover, Iran has a substantial Azeri population of its own and the Iranian leadership may fear that Turkish secular ideas, culture, and influence could infect their own population. Access to the rich oil fields of Azerbaijan certainly plays no small part in the increasing competition between the two states. Finally, the recent and substantial Iranian arms buildup has caused concern not only in Turkey, but throughout the Middle East.[81]

Assessments.

The disappearance of the massive, Alliance-wide threat from the Soviet Union has also resulted in regional security concerns, particularly of the Southern Tier, moving to the fore within the Alliance. But, at the same time, the horizon is not danger free, for national and regional risks have emerged from the shadow of the receding Soviet threat. And, unlike the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact—high risk, but low likelihood of violence—such is not the case today, where circumstances have been reversed. Indeed, violence already engulfs Yugoslavia and Transcaucasus.

Granted, levels of risk do not threaten the existence of any NATO member or U.S. ally. Even should some form of border incursion or spillover from civil war occur, the ability to respond effectively is considered within anticipated capabilities of the Alliance. This does not mean, however, that risks are inconsiderable or that only limited capabilities to respond will be required. For example, containing the ongoing civil war in Yugoslavia could require forces beyond those available in Italy or Greece. At the same time, risks facing Turkey are considerable. And, while Turkey could likely handle individual risks, it is not difficult to envisage a scenario where Turkey could be confronted with multiple defense requirements that, when taken in aggregate, could require considerable reinforcements.

Thus, risks more focused on the regional level do not obviate the requirement for Alliance-wide participation in regional issues. Indeed, the violence that has emerged in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia has engaged the attention of all of Europe and the United States. Moreover, any future conflict may still require an Alliance response to demonstrate resolve and cohesion.

As importantly, in light of new and more diverse hazards and planned reductions in national force structures, nations must reevaluate their existing deployment plans and determine whether forces will be made available for rapid reaction forces, intraregional or interregional reinforcements. All of this must be accomplished at the same time that the Alliance and its individual members commence implementation of new strategic concepts, follow through with current plans for force structures, and adapt operational plans to conform to the new conditions.

Given the current circumstances in Yugoslavia, the ongoing convulsions in the Middle East, and the vortex of instability and uncertainties swirling around the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the risks that may result in the application of military means appear greatest in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia. Therefore, the strategic and operational level planning considerations of those potential areas of operation will be the primary object of the more detailed analysis that follows.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

In November 1991, NATO promulgated "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" and, subsequently in December 1991, the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) approved the "Military Committee's Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept" (MC-400).[82] These documents will obviously drive the future military strategic planning of the Alliance. The development of these documents and their contents are well known and, generally, do not require detailed elaboration here.[83] Suffice to say, the Alliance will retain the strategic objective of preserving peace within Europe through primarily political, as well as military means. The role of NATO military forces remains largely unchanged: "to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states...."[84]

The conceptual approach to implementing the strategic objectives of the Alliance has changed significantly, however, as nuclear weapons become truly "weapons of last resort" and conventional forces make the transition from "Forward Defense" to "reduced forward presence."[85] Although clearly a matter of significance, nuclear issues within the Southern Tier fall outside the scope of this report and will not be addressed here. Instead, discussion will focus on the strategic concept of reduced forward presence and its key subsidiary and complementary components.

Reduced Forward Presence.

The ability of the Alliance to move to a reduced forward presence is based on several key assumptions. First, perceived levels of risk must be lower than in the past conditions of the cold war. Second, anticipated warning times must be extended relative to past experience. Third, as a consequence of the first two assumptions, overall national and Alliance force levels may be reduced. Fourth, levels of active

units can be reduced and greater reliance placed on mobilizable forces. Fifth, the geographic distribution of forces can be altered to reduce concentrations in proximity to borders.[86]

These conditions then provide the basis for the further assumption that the Alliance will be able to generate sufficient forces to meet future requirements. These forces will be drawn from active, mobilizable, and reconstituted units, as well as from intra-European and external reinforcements. The mix and force generation capabilities of these forces must be adequate to deter or defend against a limited attack with little warning. With longer warning, force generation capabilities must be sufficient to respond to a larger scale attack and maintain or restore the territorial integrity of the Alliance.[87] In short, the Alliance must be able to build up both personnel and material to counter any force generation capability considered to pose a potential risk to Alliance security.

At the same time, the ability to generate forces is not enough. Those forces must also be capable of being moved to the threatened point in time to deter. preferably, or defend, as required. Under the tenets of reduced forward presence, therefore, individual nations must be able to compensate for reduced numbers of forces and peacetime dispersal, and the Alliance must be able to introduce reinforcements, largely multinational, in sufficient size and time to effect operations under conditions favorable to the Alliance. Moreover, sufficient strategic depth must be available either to trade space for time to build up requisite combat power or to execute strategic and operational concepts. Whether these assumptions and pre-conditions apply across the Southern Tier will be examined below.

Factors Affecting NATO Force Generation Capabilities.

Assuming the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is ratified, indigenous force levels in NATO's Southern Tier will be capped by the ceilings contained in the treaty.[88] Nonetheless, ceilings were set high enough that current levels of equipment holdings of battle tanks, armored

combat vehicles, and artillery will largely be retained. Additionally, it appears that, with the exception of Italy, much of the equipment will be held in active units. On the other hand, numbers of fixed wing aircraft and attack helicopters will likely be well below the ceilings set in the CFE Treaty.[89] Moreover, the majority of nations in NATO's Southern Tier are already in the midst of dramatic reductions in the size of their armed forces.[90]

With the demise of the cold war and the reduced threat facing many nations in the Southern Tier, such force reductions are not without justification. For the most part, it appears that many NATO nations in the Southern Tier will have adequate forces to address the levels of risk that are anticipated. Should reductions continue beyond levels currently contemplated, this conclusion may have to be revisited. On the other hand, as indicated earlier, the levels of risk in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia may require the maintenance of current force levels.

Force generation capabilities are based on more than simply numbers, however. Quality of the equipment must also be factored into the force generation equation. In the case of the Southern Tier, much equipment is obsolete or falls far short of the requirements of modern warfare.[91] Additionally, the integration of equipment into force structures also affects combat force potential. Finally, as indicated earlier, the ability to move units through space and time to arrive at the proper point at the right time is also important.(See Appendix B, for more detailed information on NATO force generation capabilities.)

Reinforcements.

While NATO nations in the Southern Tier will likely have adequate forces to meet most local threats, certain risks in the region, particularly those facing Turkey, may be sufficient to require reinforcements from within the Alliance. Moreover, reinforcements will be necessary, if for no other reason, to demonstrate Alliance cohesion and solidarity. For the foreseeable future, therefore, NATO military authorities must plan for the reinforcement of the Southern Tier. The forces

beyond national forces available for strategic reinforcement will fall under three general categories: intraregional, interregional, and external reinforcements.

Intraregional reinforcements must be prepared to execute operations throughout their region. For example, Portuguese, Italian, Greek, and Turkish forces would have to be prepared for employment in areas not heretofore planned. Such a concept would also include the employment of Spanish and French forces that are currently not fully integrated into the Alliance's military structure. In either case, planning will be considerably more complicated than today. Such a requirement also presupposes that forces would be sufficiently trained for employment in a wide variety of roles, missions, terrain, and climates; that they possess sufficient readiness and availability, as well as strategic and operational mobility to carry out long distance movements; and that logistics support structures are available to sustain the forces once they arrive in the area of operations. These circumstances do not apply at present and are not anticipated in the near term.[92]

Interregional reinforcements, such as the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps or additional reinforcements from the Central Region (for example, units from the U.S. forward presence), will also be an important element in any future defense of the Southern Tier. Such forces would serve as a demonstration of Alliance solidarity and cohesion, as well as bring key military capabilities to a future battlefield. Similar to intraregional reinforcements, capabilities do not exist at present within key areas of the Southern Tier to ensure the rapid introduction and sustainment of such forces. While planning for the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps for such contingencies has commenced at SHAPE,[93] it may be some time before adequate planning and coordination have been carried out and suitable infrastructure improvements completed to achieve the requisite capabilities.

External reinforcements will remain critical for NATO's capabilities to mass forces in the Southern Region. As in the past, external reinforcements would come largely from the United States and could take two possible forms. First, reinforcements could come from units based in the United States. Such reinforcements could be taken from units

assigned to the Contingency Force,[94] whose deployment could follow the example of the early flow of units during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD: for example, aerial deployment of elements of XVIIIth Airborne Corps (82nd Airborne and/or 101st Air Assault Division) with concurrent deployment of the equipment of heavy division(s) by sea and personnel by air. Second, in the absence of a threat to NATO's Central Region, units from Central Europe could be deployed to support operations. Another European based option could be to transport equipment contained in Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets (POMCUS) to the area of crisis to be met by personnel deploying by air from the United States. Either of the two European based options could be constrained, however, should one or more host or transit nations object to the movement of U.S. equipment.

Future planning for reinforcement of the Southern Region must also ensure that adequate levels of combat support and combat service support formations and systems are included. Combat forces alone, as underscored again in DESERT SHIELD/STORM, are not sufficient; the logistics support must be available to support forces and operations.[95] Moreover, these forces may be operating far from home stations or previously anticipated areas of employment and may require increased support capabilities to adequately sustain the force. And, within many portions of the Southern Tier, infrastructure or host nation support may not be developed sufficiently. Certainly, planners need to analyze carefully sustainment requirements and capabilities and develop operational plans in accordance with these constraints.

Multinational Forces.

A further factor affecting force generation capabilities is NATO's decision to rely extensively on multinational formations.[96] While such an approach holds considerable political attraction—individual nations can have smaller force structures; multinational formations provide clear evidence of Alliance resolve—the ability to translate political appeal into practical military reality presents daunting challenges.

Within the Southern Tier, circumstances will complicate efforts at creating multinational structures. The geographic separation of the various nations impedes frequent, close contact between commanders and staffs, much less among units of a multinational corps or division. Additionally, France and Spain do not belong to NATO's integrated military structure. How to include formations from these nations without infringing upon longstanding national prerogatives will require lengthy consideration and, perhaps, complicated command and control arrangements. Finally, planners must face the reality of Greek-Turkish animosity. Constructing a multinational formation, such as the envisaged Mutlinational Corps South, containing Greek and Turkish units could well be a herculean task.

Reinforcements from outside the Southern Tier will also be composed mostly of multinational formations. ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, for example, may have as many as 9 participants and ACE Immediate Reaction Forces may contain participants from as many as 13 different nations.[97] Only recently have Alliance planners been able to turn to the complexities of integrating such reinforcements, much less the multiple nationalities involved, into a coherent whole. How to incorporate these forces into defensive plans for the Southern Tier will require considerable time.

As planners come to grips with this formidable task they will need to address a wide variety of issues. First order questions should include: number and organization of multinational formations (both within and outside the Southern Tier); wartime operational control arrangements, to include command relationships between AMF and ACE rapid reaction forces; the sequencing of reinforcements into the region; and how best to integrate the various national doctrines. Secondary issues should address interoperability, standardization, and rationalization of forces; with particular attention to ammunition and sustainment requirements. Certainly, these issues are not all inclusive, but they do represent the types of questions that hold greater immediacy.

Effects of Arms Control Agreements.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) establishes ceilings on items of treaty limited equipment (TLE) both in Europe, as a whole, and within various subregions. Because of the subregional ceilings contained in the treaty, the ability of the Alliance to reinforce Northern Greece/Turkish Thrace or eastern Anatolia with additional forces may be constrained. Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, Greece, Turkey, and Norway, for example, are limited to 4,700 battle tanks and 6,000 pieces of artillery in active units. These nations are expected to fill their entitlements of TLE; therefore, little or no room remains for the stationing of additional units in those countries.[98]

Moreover, the prepositioning or storage of equipment in Designated Permanent Storage Sites in Greece or Turkey is also prohibited under the CFE Treaty.[99] Equipment could be stored, but would have to be declared as equipment held in active units, which would require a commensurate reduction in equipment held in Greek or Turkish units. Therefore, while theoretically possible, such an option holds little appeal.

A temporary exclusion rule permits the introduction of additional TLE into Greece and Turkey, but the numbers are limited (459 battle tanks, 723 armored combat vehicles [ACVs], and 420 artillery pieces). Moreover, a further treaty provision limits the number of TLE that a single state may accept to no more than one third of the total (for example, 152 battle tanks).[100] Thus, potential reinforcement of Northern Greece, for example, by components of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps such as a U.S. mechanized division (270 tanks) would exceed the provisions of the exclusion rule. Similar conditions would also apply to areas of Turkey covered under the treaty.

Not all of Turkey is contained within the zone of application of the CFE Treaty, however. Indeed, architects of the CFE Treaty recognized the security environment surrounding Turkey and excluded roughly the southeastern quarter of the country facing Syria, Iraq, and Iran from ceilings contained in the treaty.[101] Thus, it might be possible to introduce units into or store equipment in this exclusion zone area in peacetime or

time of crisis. The current lack of adequate facilities and infrastructure in this area would require considerable effort and expense to realize such an option. Whether such resources will be available in a time of decreasing defense expenditures remains to be seen. More importantly, perhaps, the area contained in the exclusion zone has been the scene of considerable unrest due to PKK attacks against Turkey. Finally, Turkish authorities recently have been reluctant to continue negotiations over possible storage of equipment in the exclusion zone.[102] Despite the difficulties involved, the ability to store equipment or introduce units into this area in a time of crisis should be pursued.

Nor is the CFE Treaty the only arms control agreement that potentially constrains military activities. In November 1990 the (then) 35 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) also signed the Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). Although the document contains numerous provisions that increase openness and transparency of military matters in Europe, the provision for prior notification of certain military activities is most relevant for this discussion. Under the conditions of this article, member states must provide a minimum of 42 days advance notification of any activity of land forces involving at least 13,000 troops or at least 300 battle tanks or an amphibious landing or parachute drop involving at least 3,000 troops.[103]

Obviously, a crisis might arise on short notice requiring forces to be deployed in numbers exceeding personnel limitations, but where the 42 days advance notification could not be given. Thus, states may find themselves in the uncomfortable position of either violating the CSBM or effectively responding to an emerging situation. Such a tension could conceivably constrain either individual states or NATO as a whole from responding in an effective manner. At the very least, national and Alliance decisionmaking could be made considerably more complex.

Strategic Movement.

As indicated earlier, the Alliance's New Strategic Concept will rely heavily upon intraregional, interregional, and external reinforcements to ensure capabilities necessary for effective reinforcements of forces.[104] The key question remains, however, whether reinforcements can arrive in sufficient numbers and time to influence effectively the outcome of events. Moreover, such a strategic concept for reinforcements presupposes the existence of adequate planning and achieving the right mix of sea lift, airlift, prepositioning of forces, and infrastructure to support such large scale movements.

Strategic mobility relies not only on the pooling of assets, but on effective planning, coordination, and interchange of information. Whether, after four decades of focusing on reinforcement of Central Europe, plans are adequate for reinforcement of the Southern Region is not known. However, given the instability within the region, a reassessment of the Alliance's ability to reinforce the Southern Tier deserves priority attention. If plans exist and are found wanting, considerable time, effort, and resources may be required to create, coordinate, and exercise such plans.

Undoubtedly, maritime movement of forces will remain the most effective mode for large scale introduction of forces into the Southern Tier. This conclusion presupposes, of course, that NATO forces have adequate warning and reaction time needed to respond effectively using sea transportation. Nor is time the only constraining factor. Some modern, fast sea lift ships were built to take maximum advantage of the advanced port capabilities and capacities of Western European ports. Such facilities are not widely available in Northern Greece or Turkey. Moreover, the infrastructure in ports and beyond might not be able to accommodate such a large influx of traffic.[105] Additionally, increasing trends towards larger and faster container ships may hinder flexibility, unit integrity, and immediate employability in the Southern Region where port capabilities and transportation networks beyond ports are limited. Again, if sufficient time is available, this may not present a problem; however, if time is not available, units may

have to be loaded in a less than effective manner or, if loaded most efficaciously, could be vulnerable until sufficient time has elapsed to reassemble a combat capable force.

Airlift will undoubtedly take up some of the slack from sea lift and will remain the fastest and most flexible component of strategic mobility. That said, the ability to introduce reinforcements rapidly into the Southern Tier by air may be constrained by existing and planned capabilities. At the moment, only the United States possesses a true strategic airlift capability, and that capability has not and will not be sufficient to meet all demands placed upon it. Moreover, the U.S. strategic transport fleet (C-141 and C-5 aircraft) is aging rapidly and will require replacement in the near term. The successor aircraft, the C-17, has run into difficulties in Congress and the question of whether the C-17 will be procured in sufficient time or numbers cannot be answered at this time.[106] In any case, the Alliance may find it necessary to establish a common pool of heavy lift aircraft if it expects to rely on strategic airlift for the rapid reinforcement of the Southern Region. Whether it will do so in a time of reduced budgets and the perceived absence of an Alliance-wide threat is open to question.

In addition to numbers of aircraft available, the ability to move heavy or outsized cargo is also an important issue to consider. For example, during the recent Gulf War, a lack of capability to move such cargo forced the Netherlands to lease Soviet IL-76 aircraft to transport Patriot air defense systems.[107] Without such an option in the future, NATO would be forced to rely on U.S. C-5 aircraft and, because of the finite numbers available, aircraft might have to be diverted from other, perhaps equally critical, missions.

As recent experience in transporting forces to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf Crisis indicates, substantial time may be required to introduce requisite forces to a potential area of operations. And, although the Gulf War example was a success, it may not prove accurate for future conditions. First, Saddam Hussein gave the coalition forces considerable time to complete reinforcements and build up forces. Any future opponent will undoubtedly learn from Saddam's mistake and

may not allow the luxury of an unimpeded buildup. Second, Saudi Arabia possesses ports and airfields among the most modern in the world.[108] Certainly, many of the areas where ACE and the U.S. Army may be required to fight in the future will not enjoy similar benefits.

Strategic Depth.

Even should means be found to achieve all of the capabilities outlined above, NATO still physically lacks strategic depth in northeast Italy, northern Greece, and Turkish Thrace. This lack of depth constrains NATO planners in several ways. First, it precludes the Alliance from using an operational concept in these three areas that trades space for time to reinforce the area after the outbreak of hostilities. Second, maneuver space, either strategic or operational, is largely nonexistent and constrains planning and execution of operations. Third, a lack of depth inhibits the establishment and organization of lines of communication needed to conduct an operational campaign based on large scale operational maneuver. Fourth, inadequate depth constrains the ability to establish sufficient logistics depots, stocks, etc., to support a campaign in northern Greece or Greek/Turkish Thrace. Finally, the lack of depth may result in NATO forces being exposed to long-range indirect fire throughout the depth of its position from the very outset of hostilities.

Assessments and Recommendations.

Given anticipated circumstances, the strategic concept of reduced forward presence cannot be applied in all areas of the Southern Tier. Indeed, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" recognized such a possibility,[109] but the consequences of this reality have not been fully appreciated. Certainly, repercussions will be significant and reach beyond the Southern Tier. For, as in the past, NATO military planners will still be required to generate and move sufficient NATO forces to the threatened point to defend successfully. Whether these conditions can be satisfied is an open question.

In light of anticipated security conditions in the Balkans, for example, Greece will have to maintain force generation capabilities roughly comparable to the past and circumstances in eastern Anatolia will permit little or no diminution in Turkish force generation capabilities. Indeed, some might argue that Turkish force generation capabilities in eastern Anatolia must be increased. While indigenous forces will, by and large, maintain current strengths of equipment, levels of modernization may not be sufficient. While individual nations within the Southern Tier, most notably Turkey, have taken considerable steps to modernize their forces, further steps will be required. And, given the economic conditions throughout the Southern Tier, substantial assistance will have to come from the remainder of the Alliance. The redistribution of equipment in the wake of the CFE Treaty (the so-called "Harmonization Effort") is a good start, but it is only that. Whether future redistribution of equipment is possible or outside funding will be available in the midst of widespread defense cutbacks remains to be seen.

Even with improved modernization capabilities, indigenous forces may not be sufficient to cope with the variety and scope of potential risks. External reinforcement of the Southern Tier from within Europe and the United States will still be required. In most cases, reinforcements may be limited to those necessary to demonstrate Alliance solidarity and cohesion. In the case of Turkey, however, substantial levels of reinforcements from within the Southern Tier, Central Europe, and the United States could be required for the defense of eastern Anatolia. Reinforcements, particularly from within Europe, will require strategic mobility that heretofore has not been required. Given ongoing restructuring of forces within the Alliance and the costs of acquiring sufficient strategic mobility, requisite capabilities may not emerge for a considerable time.

Much time and effort will have to be invested in planning for intra- and interregional reinforcement of the Southern Tier. With the exception of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, few NATO nations have any experience in the large scale movement of forces outside their traditional areas of responsibility. Certainly, because of the long Alliance focus

on reinforcement of the Central Region, few nations outside that area have extensive experience in the reception, forward movement, and integration of large scale reinforcements.

Even if adequate strategic mobility and planning are accomplished, potential reinforcements will be constrained by a lack of sufficient strategic lift. First, the Alliance will need to acquire suitable rapid sealift shipping. The Alliance will also have to improve its strategic airlift capabilities because there is no guarantee that adequate warning and reaction time will be available to permit large scale movement by sea—a shortfall that has long constrained military planners and which will continue for the foreseeable future as nations face shrinking defense budgets.

Considerable improvements in the infrastructure of key areas of the Southern Tier will also be required if reinforcements are to be received, moved, and sustained after their arrival. The costs of such improvements will be considerable. Shrinking national defense budgets and increased competition for limited NATO infrastructure funds (for example, U.S. requests for infrastructure funds to underwrite the maintenance of POMCUS) do not foreshadow a quick resolution of these issues.

Each of the obstacles identified above is not insurmountable. Improved capabilities for strategic air and sea lift can be procured. Port capacities and capabilities and infrastructure in the areas of the Southern Tier facing the greatest degree of risk can be improved. Reinforcement times could be further reduced through prepositioning of equipment. But each of these initiatives will take considerable resources—in terms of money, effort, and time—to resolve. Taken in sum, however, particularly in a time of reduced defense budgets, these concerns seriously call into question the Alliance's ability to reinforce eastern Anatolia effectively, the region of the Alliance that, for the foreseeable future, may face the greatest levels of risk.

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

New Conditions, New Concepts.

In the past, NATO nations in the Southern Region braced for a massive, highly mechanized Warsaw Pact air, ground, and sea offensive across the breadth of the Mediterranean Sea and its littorals. Military planners geared their operational plans to that reality. Current as well as foreseeable conditions make such an offensive appear farfetched. But, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and contraction and breakup of the Soviet Union do not remove the Southern Tier from harm's way. As indicated earlier, new or, in some cases, rediscovered security concerns are emerging from the shadow of the former Soviet empire.

Future operational planning will become more complicated. Planning operations to counter a massive offensive, in some ways, was relatively easy, as planners could focus singlemindedly on countering the overwhelming force of the Warsaw Pact. Such conditions will not likely be the case in the future. Planners will face a wide range of potential operations—in terms of variety, location, intensity, duration, and degree of risk—and will have to adapt themselves to the more ambiguous risks of the future.

Moreover, military planners are grappling with how to transform the overarching strategic concepts and principles contained in "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" into concrete operational plans. In crafting these plans, military staffs will rely on the broad operational concepts that have been emerging within Allied Command Europe. The most prominent of these concepts is the operational principle of counterconcentration which, in the words of General Klaus Naumann, *Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr*:

> calls for highly flexible and mobile forces, able to meet the main thrust of an attack where and when it occurs without attempting to cover every mile along the border in permanence. Future defence [sic] operations must aim at early reconnaissance of enemy force wherever they are, to channel their movements, set them up for battle, and finally defeat them at a location chosen by and favouring [sic] the defender....[110]

Whether such an operational concept, which also places a heavy emphasis on having sufficient forces immediately available to block any penetrations and, most importantly, extensive use of large scale maneuver of operational level reserves to deal an opponent a decisive defeat[111] is appropriate for the Southern Tier remains open to debate.

Future combat operations in the Southern Tier will likely fall under the classification of either low intensity or mid-intensity conflict.[112] Under the category of low intensity operations, armed forces could expect such missions as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and border security to prevent either spillover from a neighboring civil war or to prevent mass immigration. None of these types of operations lend themselves to the application of the principle of counterconcentration that looks to the employment of large scale operational level maneuver.

Moreover, none of these potential conflicts is likely to draw a substantial Alliance response that would provide the levels of forces necessary for the conduct of counterconcentration operations. Certainly, indigenous forces should be able to cope with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. And, although the deployment of rapid reaction forces might be required as a demonstration of NATO cohesion and resolve to prevent the spillover of ethnic violence or civil war, the level of response would likely fall well below the numbers of forces anticipated to be employed under counterconcentration operations. In short, as currently articulated, the operational principle of counterconcentration does not appear to apply to potential levels of violence at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

On the surface, conduct of mid-intensity operations in the Southern Tier would appear to lend themselves to the

application of the operational principle of counter-concentration. A closer examination of the anticipated conditions in the Southern Tier, particularly the Balkans and eastern Anatolia may not, however, support such a contention.

Terrain.

Terrain obviously plays a significant role in the success or failure of military operations. In attempting to develop plans for the defense of the Southern Tier based on counter-concentration, NATO planners must take into account the diverse terrain conditions that exist in the various geographical areas that compose this region. Most important, perhaps, is a lack of strategic and operational depth in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia which severely constrains NATO's ability to bring in large numbers of mechanized formations, conduct a mobile battle of large scale operational level maneuver, or to introduce large levels of reinforcements, particularly mechanized forces which require substantial space for the establishment of their logistics base.

Additional terrain constraints in areas most likely to see conflict further compound these problems. For example, the terrain in northern Greece is highly compartmented and severely constrains east-west lateral mobility that would be essential to a highly mobile defense envisaged under counterconcentration. Nor does the terrain favor a defense in depth. The terrain of Greek and Turkish Thrace is more conducive to mobile operations, but still lacks adequate operational depth. Moreover, few natural obstacles exist to establish a defense in depth. (See Map 3.) Such is not the case in eastern Anatolia, where NATO planners are faced with the opposite problem. Adequate operational depth is available and natural obstacles abound. But the combination of rugged terrain, severe weather, and lack of adequate infrastructure largely precludes the ability to carry out large scale mobile operations envisaged under the principle of counter-concentration along Turkey's eastern and southeastern borders. The terrain and climate along Turkey's southern border with Syria, however, are more hospitable, lend

Map 3. Northern Greece, Greek and Turkish Thrace.

themselves to a NATO defense, and operational level maneuver, although difficult, is possible. (See Map 4.)

The information outlined above does not argue that terrain in the Southern Tier precludes the adoption of counter-concentration, only that operational planners must take the terrain into account in the design of their operational concepts. NATO forces could compensate for these circumstances in a number of ways. For example, NATO could provide more and stronger forces for an initial defense along its forward borders. This defense could be bolstered through an increased reliance on barrier operations or increased use of tactical mobility. At the same time, NATO forces could use force multipliers (e.g., combat aircraft, attack helicopters, ATACMS, MLRS, etc.) to extend the battle deep into an opponent's rear area to destroy forces and disrupt the pace of operations. But planners must realize that such solutions come with a considerable price tag. Existing equipment within the Southern Tier would have to be modernized and additional, more modern equipment procured. On the other hand, some of these systems or capabilities could be made available by reinforcing units, but the costs of improving strategic mobility within the Alliance may prove prohibitive. Moreover, significant outlays of capital would be required to improve the state of infrastructure within Greece and Turkey. And, as indicated earlier, whether necessary funds will be made available during times of increasing fiscal constraints remains to be seen. (See Appendix D for a more detailed analysis of the terrain in this region.)

Operational Mobility.

The ability to execute the concept of counterconcentration hinges on forces possessing requisite levels of operational mobility. In the Balkans and eastern Anatolia, however, terrain hinders lateral movement and mobility. Additionally, road and rail networks in those areas may not be adequate to support large scale operational level movements. If the Alliance is to be able to overcome the difficulties of terrain, inadequate depth, and anticipated levels of reinforcements, then nations must take the requisite initiatives to provide the transportation assets necessary for adequate operational level mobility. Such



Map 4. Eastern Anatolia.

steps might include increased numbers and quality of land and air transportation assets, as well as improvements in cross country mobility and armored protection. Larger quantities of logistical supplies and increased levels of standardization may also be required. Improvements may be difficult to achieve in a future of constrained resources; but, if the Alliance is serious about implementing the concept of counterconcentration in the Balkans or eastern Turkey, funds will have to be allocated to ensure requisite capabilities.

Denying an opponent adequate operational mobility is also a potential means of improving one's own relative operational mobility. In this case, interdiction operations could be used throughout the depth of the battlefield to deny operational level mobility and barrier operations may be used to hinder tactical level maneuver. Such operations may be particularly important in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia. Conversely, planners must ensure possession of adequate quantities of NATO's countermine equipment and sufficient capabilities to execute their own mobility operations.

Operational Level Reserves.

NATO's intended reliance on counterconcentration hinges on adequate levels of operational reserves. Indigenous forces alone may not be adequate to provide sufficient operational level reserves. Thus, early arrival and employment of elements of the ACE Rapid Reaction Forces, as well as French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, or U.S. reinforcements could be critical. Such forces would contribute to the establishment of a strong initial defense, allow for the early creation of operational level reserves, and permit appropriate positioning of such reserves early in a campaign. For these steps to be accomplished, augmentation forces must arrive in sufficient time and strength to sustain the level of forces necessary to counter any level of aggression. As indicated earlier (Chapter 4), however, this may not be possible until the Alliance overcomes obstacles to its ability to reinforce the Southern Tier.

Even if adequate reinforcement capabilities are available, a number of key questions still remain to be answered. How

these reinforcements would be integrated with existing indigenous forces to form operational reserves will require considerable examination. For example, should indigenous forces be used to form operational reserves or should the preponderance of reserves come from reinforcing units? What might this do for Alliance cohesion? How might arriving reinforcements be sequenced into a defensive concept? What type of forces should be used: the mix between heavy forces, anti-tank systems, attack helicopters, artillery, etc.? How will the challenges of multinational forces be addressed? These as well as many other more difficult questions have no easy answers, but will have to be addressed.

Air Operations.

The principle of counterconcentration also applies to air forces which offer a potential means of supplementing, or complementing, operational reserves. Indeed, given their inherent strategic mobility, considerable firepower, and ability to mass combat power at critical points in a battle or campaign, aircraft may be the primary means of providing operational reserves early in a crisis along the Southern Tier. For the foreseeable future, therefore, military planners will undoubtedly rely heavily on air power in the design of their operational concepts. Paradoxically, NATO nations indigenous to the Southern Region indicate that they will maintain fewer aircraft in the future (see Appendix B). Moreover, the eventual disposition of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing and the announced reduced presence of aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean could substantially reduce the number of U.S. aircraft available in the Southern Tier.[113]

Reinforcements. Reduced numbers of indigenous aircraft within the Southern Tier may be compensated through improved capabilities to introduce air rapid reaction forces and reinforcements. Moreover, greater numbers of reinforcements may be available than in the past due to the reduced threat in the Central Region that makes it possible to reprogram air assets previously intended for operations in Central Europe. The early arrival of air reinforcements in strength could have a significant deterrent effect in a crisis situation, as well as a

considerable operational effect should hostilities occur. And, because of conditions in the Southern Tier, effects of air power could be magnified.

On the other hand, limited numbers of airfields available in Greece and Turkey may constrain large scale introduction of air reinforcements. This condition could be offset through the use of bases in Crete, Italy, and, perhaps even France and Spain. Such operations would require considerable reliance on 'gas and go' operations or upon limited air-to-air refueling assets. Additionally, aircraft carrier based naval aircraft could be used to exploit the strategic and operational mobility of those platforms. Recent operations in support of OPERATION DESERT STORM indicate such operations are quite feasible.[114]

Given numbers of indigenous aircraft available and potential for reinforcements, it appears that short of conflict with major portions of some form of reconstituted Soviet Union or Russian empire (a highly unlikely possibility), NATO air forces should be able to handle anticipated air threats along the Southern Tier. That said, apportionment of air power between reconnaissance and surveillance, counterair operations (both defensive [DCA] and offensive [OCA]), air interdiction (AI), and offensive air support (OAS) will remain important considerations. Achieving the appropriate balance between aircraft performing OAS and AI/OCA missions will be especially important. Finally, crafting an effective integrated air defense network may be difficult within the Southern Tier, given the factors involved, particularly longstanding Greek-Turkish differences over Aegean air space.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Counterconcentration depends substantially on aerial surveillance and reconnaissance assets capable of identifying major enemy formations and dispositions. Adequate reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities that provide near real-time information (for example, Airborne Warning and Control Systems [AWACs] and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System [JSTARS] platforms) will, therefore, be a key prerequisite for conduct of both air and ground operations. Indeed, commanders at all levels in the Gulf War expressed a need for

increased reconnaissance capabilities.[115] Whether even limited numbers of existing reconnaissance aircraft are to be retained in a time of decreasing defense dollars remains to be seen.[116] Nations in the Southern Tier may wish to reconsider anticipated capabilities and requirements for reconnaissance and surveillance.

Counterair Operations. The establishment and maintenance of a favorable air situation has become the *sine qua non* of modern combat. Counterair operations take two basic forms: defensive counterair ([DCA] interception and destruction of aircraft using air defense interceptors or surface to air missiles [SAMs]) and offensive counterair ([OCA] destruction or degrading of an opponent's integrated air operations systems-C^3I, airfields, etc.). The mix of offensive and defensive air operations will vary over the course of hostilities. During increasing tensions of a crisis or after initial onset of hostilities, DCA operations may be the primary focus of the air effort. Once hostilities commence, however, it will also be important to reduce an opponent's effective sortie generation rate and some assets may have to shift from the DCA to OCA role.

Air Interdiction Operations. The ability to establish rapidly air superiority should give military planners considerable opportunities for the employment of air forces in support of ground operations. Given the terrain in potential operational areas, air interdiction operations should be exploited to the fullest. Limited numbers of extended, tenuous lines of communications offer lucrative targets that should be used as leverage to NATO's advantage. For example, in the early stages of hostilities, air power could be used to delay and disrupt the forward movement of reinforcements and sustainment. Later in the campaign, air interdiction efforts could be used to isolate units or areas, as well as attenuate combat power of formations prior to ground operations. As clearly demonstrated in the Gulf War, air interdiction efforts can reap substantial dividends and military planners must closely integrate air interdiction efforts into an overall operational plan. NATO must ensure that adequate numbers of aircraft—either

indigenous or reinforcing—capable of executing air interdiction missions are available.

Offensive Air Support Operations. NATO will likely continue to rely extensively on offensive air support of ground operations. This may be especially true prior to the arrival of substantial numbers of ground reinforcements. Whether adequate numbers of ground support aircraft would be available given competing demands will require considered analysis and assessment. On the other hand, if NATO air forces are able to establish rapidly a favorable air situation, it may be possible to shift portions of the OCA effort to OAS missions. A similar rationale applies to air interdiction efforts.

Perceived needs for close support aircraft could be reduced with the acquisition of additional deep attack assets such as MLRS, ATACMs, or combat helicopters. Numbers of such systems available within the region are limited at present, however. Nations have indicated procurement plans for purchase, but the expense of such systems may delay or even preclude the purchase of levels of equipment indicated in acquisition plans.[117]

Ground Based Air Defense. Even though NATO air forces should be able to establish a favorable air situation, nations will still need to possess sufficient ground based air defenses. In the Balkan front and eastern Anatolia, for example, geography and limited infrastructure provide an opponent with a small number of highly critical interdiction targets that will require protection. Given limited numbers of SAMs available and the need to protect operational deployments and movements, as well as static points, it may be necessary to reinforce the Southern Tier with air defense assets from outside the region.[118] To provide a suitable number of air defense systems will require considerable time to deploy the systems by sea or the expansion of the Alliance's capability to move systems by air. Either of these solutions may prove difficult.[119]

To provide adequate air defense coverage will require the close integration of air defense systems—both aircraft and SAMs—within the Southern Region. Efforts will be

complicated by the multiple ground systems available, inherent problems of interoperability, and multiple languages (both spoken and computer). Moreover, any interoperability problems between ground, air, and naval air defense systems will need to be identified and resolved. Finally, close cooperation between Greek and Turkish air defense systems—something that does not presently exist—needs to be ensured.

Naval Operations.

Under future conditions, it may also be possible to introduce naval forces into the counterconcentration equation. In the past, NATO naval forces rightfully focused on the threat posed by the Soviet Navy. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, and the likely division of the Black Sea Fleet between Ukraine and Russia, this threat has been significantly reduced.[120] Moreover, depending on the final disposition of ships, risks to NATO could be further reduced. In any event, the NATO naval forces along the Southern Tier will achieve a net gain.

Until such time that an agreement on the final disposition is hammered out, the operational readiness of the forces is likely to continue to suffer. Indeed, for several months, no ships of the former Soviet fleet left port and only limited deployments are currently underway.[121] How long this condition will continue cannot be determined at this time. However, in the intervening period, the readiness of these forces will continue to plummet and considerable time will be required to restore previous levels of operational proficiency.

Outside of the former Soviet Union, no other naval forces in the Southern Tier present a significant challenge to NATO or U.S. naval forces. That said, other, still potent, challenges remain. Increasing sophistication of missile technologies and high technology munitions, when combined with the limited maneuver room available in large segments of the Mediterranean, make it possible for smaller nations to procure sophisticated antishipping weapons that could pose a significant threat to U.S. or NATO naval forces. Moreover, as

the experience of the U.S.S. *Tripoli* and U.S.S. *Princeton* revealed during operations in the Persian Gulf, relatively low technology mine warfare can pose serious threats to ships and amphibious operations.[122] Finally, the acquisition of mini-submarines capable of effective operations in shallow waters such as the Mediterranean poses an additional threat.[123]

Even with such threats, as the recent operations in the Gulf War displayed, naval forces in any future conflict should be able to establish rapidly sea control in the area of operations. Such a condition would release the formidable assets available to naval forces, especially U.S. aircraft carriers to contribute to the conduct of the overall campaign.[124] A key point to remember, however, is that many of these options have not been available to NATO planners in the past because of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and the substantial requirement to maintain the North Atlantic sea lines of communications. NATO planners will, therefore, have to devote time and resources to refining the new skills.

In addition to increasing options available for naval operations, early acquisition of sea control will also allow naval forces to operate in close conjunction with air and land forces in the conduct of a true joint (or combined), tri-service campaign. If this is the case, naval planners may have to consider issues that may not have received much attention during the period of naval strategic thinking that focused on the forward projection of power against the Soviet Union. For example, if naval forces operate in relatively close proximity to land operations, naval planners will need to address defenses against ground or air launched anti-ship missiles with very short flight times.[125] Additionally, while operations in the eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea or the Black Sea may provide more operational room and flexibility than did the Arabian Gulf or the Red Sea during OPERATION DESERT STORM, naval forces may wish to study further the implications of large sea forces operating in constricted waters.

At the same time, naval planners may have to devote more thought to effective means of supporting land and air operations during the conduct of the overall campaign. The use

of SLCMs in the recent war against Iraq offers a more recent example, while use of long-range naval gunfire provides a more traditional case. Similarly, naval aviation personnel may wish to study the current mix of combat aircraft aboard aircraft carriers with a possible increase in the number of aircraft capable of directly supporting ground operations.

Finally, naval forces may have to devote time and consideration to less violent applications of maritime power. Peacekeeping operations, embargo enforcement, controlling potential mass migrations—concerns of many nations in the Southern Tier—are potential missions that naval planners may have to undertake in the foreseeable future.

Command and Control.

In any future conflict in the Southern Tier, operations may prove difficult to coordinate. Geography significantly complicates planning and operations, particularly the lack of contiguous land masses (i.e., the separation not only of Central Europe from the Southern Region, but also within the Southern Tier nations themselves: Iberia, Italy, Greece and Turkey) that would permit rapid land reinforcement. Even within a specific country, distances involved, rugged terrain, lack of adequate infrastructure, and absence of sufficient capabilities for modern command and control equipment, especially satellite communications, automated data processing, and command and control systems will complicate the planning and execution of operations.

This geographic situation is compounded by the complex command and control arrangements in the Southern Tier. The Straits of Gibraltar at the western end of the Mediterranean represents the juncture of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) and Allied Command Europe (ACE). As a result, Portugal falls under ACLANT, not AFSOUTH. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Spain and France are not integrated in the military structure of NATO. This condition is mitigated somewhat by the various coordination agreements between Spain and NATO, but they do not take the place of

full integration.[126] Command and control arrangements are further complicated by strains over British control of Gibraltar.

On the eastern end of the Mediterranean, longstanding difficulties between Turkey and Greece exert a significant effect on the existing command and control arrangements within the Southern Region. Although the obstacles to improvements are well known and considerable, steps should be taken to establish, *in peacetime*, one land headquarters and associated allied tactical air force to control a potential battlefield in Northern Greece similar to the past wartime relationship envisaged between LANDSOUTHCENT/7 ATAF. A second headquarters, again composed of a land element and associated ATAF, should be established to control operations in Greek/Turkish Thrace; that is, a relationship similar to LANDSOUTHEAST/6 ATAF. Finally, one headquarters to control the joint air/ground/sea campaign in the Balkan Front, in particular the critical juncture of Greek and Turkish forces is also required. At present, AFSOUTH in Naples—roughly 1000 kilometers away—is the first NATO headquarters that can perform this function.[127]

Joint and combined operations will take on increasing importance in the Southern Tier, where the Mediterranean and adjoining seas offer considerable flexibility in the employment of maritime forces in support of an overall campaign. Already complex command and control arrangements to support such operations will be further complicated by the introduction of reinforcements from within, as well as from outside the Southern Tier. For example, the proposed makeup of the ACE Rapid Reaction Forces could result in the introduction of forces from as many as 13 nations.[128] Even under the most optimistic of conditions, NATO C^3I networks and command and control procedures would operate under considerable stress.

At the same time, staff exercises, simulations, collaborative planning, and development of standard operating procedures are necessary for the planning, training, and eventual employment of multinational forces in the defense of a fellow member of the Alliance. Multinational forces engaging in combined training exercises are also important. While such activities are possible, they may be difficult to execute given

some of the longstanding animosities within the Southern Tier. And, in a period of shrinking defense budgets, combined training exercises will become increasingly more difficult to carry out. Moreover, because of the geographic separation of members of the Southern Region, as well as the distances involved, bringing in forces from outside the region, even for limited staff coordination, will be an expensive undertaking.

Despite the complexities involved, such training opportunities are possible, as demonstrated during two multinational exercises conducted in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1992. In the first instance, Exercise DRAGON HAMMER consisted of 5,000 personnel of the air, land, and maritime forces of six nations (Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and United States) commanded by a Spanish admiral conducting operations in the vicinity of Sardinia, as well as on the Italian mainland. Reserve component units from CONUS, as well as active component units stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, participated in the U.S. contingent.[129] The second example occurred in mid-June 1992 along the coast of Southern France, where 20,000 personnel from France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom carried out a simulated large scale rescue mission under the command of French General Michel Roquejeoffre.[130] As these two exercises indicate, such operations can be carried out and on a significant scale.

Assessments and Recommendations.

NATO planners must recognize and adjust to new conditions as they design their new operational plans and concepts for the Southern Tier. Despite considerable reductions in the scale of risk facing the Southern Tier, future operational planning will be more complex as planners will face greater ambiguity and have to manage a wider variety of hazards.

Emerging operational concepts rely heavily upon the ability to counterconcentrate forces at the decisive place and time. Anticipated circumstances in the Southern Tier, however, may not be appropriate for the application of such an operational

concept. Low intensity conflicts, the type more likely to occur in the Southern Tier, do not lend themselves to operations based on large scale maneuver of highly mechanized forces. Indeed, such operations can actually be counterproductive.

Theoretically, mid-intensity operations in the Southern Tier could utilize an operational concept based on counterconcentration. However, indigenous force levels and capabilities, terrain along borders, and lack of operational depth argue against a defense in the Balkans or eastern Anatolia based on light screening forces forward that yield territory, wear down an opponent, and allow for decisive commitment of operational reserves to defeat an attack. Moreover, such a concept highly depends upon rapid concentration of forces that permits the establishment of adequate operational reserves, as well as the strategic depth needed to introduce and maneuver these forces. Given existing capacities, the introduction of reinforcements necessary for the establishment of such operational reserves is questionable. It may not be appropriate, then, to attempt to implement the principle of counterconcentration in either the Balkans, or eastern Anatolia.

The preceding discussion does not imply that military planners have no options. To the contrary, given reduced risks, increased modernization, and anticipated reorganizations, planners will have considerably more flexibility than in the past. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain that will require new and innovative thinking. Perhaps most important is how to provide depth to the battlefield. Planners will have to design a concept that integrates long-range interdiction, fires, and limited maneuver with the terrain to extend "depth."

Additional initiatives should also be taken to improve capabilities of ground forces within the Southern Tier. For example, nations must take steps to provide the transportation assets necessary for adequate operational level mobility, to include increased numbers and quality of land and air transportation assets. Increased logistics stocks and standardization will also be required.

Provisions will also have to be made for adequate levels of operational reserves. The early arrival and employment of augmentation forces will be critical for establishment of a strong initial defense and creation of adequate operational level reserves. The integration of these augmentation forces will require considerable examination as military planners fashion new force structures, operational concepts, and employment options for operational reserves.

In the short term, air power offers the most effective means of providing depth to the battlefield, as well as providing for suitable operational level reserves. If sufficient numbers of aircraft can be brought to bear, terrain conditions, lack of depth, and shortage of adequate reserves can be offset, to a large degree. Indeed, air power holds the potential to turn the tables on an opponent by leveraging air power against terrain to deny an opponent the ability to move. Moreover, the ability to concentrate large numbers of aircraft to mass intense and highly lethal fires at the critical time and place offers NATO planners considerable flexibility, as well as potential advantage.

Existing command and control relationships in the Southern Tier will have to be reformed. Closer cooperation between Portugal, Spain, and France and AFSOUTH will be required. Steps must also be taken to resolve the longstanding problems between Greece and Turkey through the establishment of the appropriate land and air headquarters. The Alliance may have to devote considerable resources to rectify the lack of adequate infrastructure and absence of sufficient capabilities for modern command and control equipment, especially satellite communications, automated data processing, and command and control systems will complicate the planning and execution of operations.

Given the circumstances anticipated in the Southern Tier, particularly the unique conditions facing Greece and Turkey, the Alliance may have to devote considerable resources to overcome the obstacles currently facing the implementation of an operational concept based on counterconcentration. If these resources are lacking, as may well be the case in an era

of constrained defense budgets, alternative solutions to operational concepts will have to be explored.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

That a new and improved security environment exists within Europe is without question. The eventual conditions of this environment are much less clear, however, than many originally anticipated. Such is particularly the case along NATO's Southern Tier, where dangers long overshadowed are emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union. As the current circumstances in Yugoslavia, the ongoing convulsions in the Middle East, and the vortex of instability and uncertainties surrounding the disintegration of the Soviet empire clearly indicate, conventional military risks remain, particularly in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia. Indeed, given the confluence of dynamic ethnic, cultural, and religious forces and the rabid nationalism currently manifested throughout this turbulent region, the potential for crises and violence that could spill over onto NATO territory is considerable.

As a result of the rising tide of instability in the Southern Tier and concomitant ebb of the Soviet threat in Central Europe, the center of gravity of the Alliance is shifting to the Mediterranean. NATO and U.S. policy makers must turn their attention, therefore, to the growing number and intensity of security issues facing the Southern Tier. Concurrently, military planners will have to reorient existing plans and thinking long dominated by planning for the Central Region to the complexities of the Southern Tier.

In examining the new security conditions and potential options for change, NATO and U.S. policy makers must guard against the regionalization of security issues within the Southern Tier which could jeopardize cohesion within NATO. Such an outcome is not beyond question, as a number of centrifugal forces are at work. For example, the nations of the western Mediterranean are most concerned with potential risks emanating from the Maghreb. Italy, while concerned about the

Maghreb, is more concerned about Libya, Albania, and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Greece is likewise concerned with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but is concomitantly preoccupied with the "Macedonian Question" and long-strained relations with Turkey. Finally, Turkey is concerned with the Balkans, but remains most troubled by the ongoing violence in the Transcaucasus. All of these various security concerns tend to pull NATO members of the Southern Tier in different directions.

At the same time, risks within the Alliance are more differentiated than in the past when each member faced threats posed by the Warsaw Pact. Certainly, because of the massive Soviet presence in central and eastern Europe during the cold war, Central Europe clearly remained the primary focus of the Alliance, but a degree of shared risk still existed elsewhere in the Alliance that served to bind the members more closely together. Although the Soviet presence is still large, it is no longer credible and will have disappeared by the end of 1994. Clearly, in the eyes of many NATO members along the Southern Tier, the degree of risk facing the Southern Region is greater than in Central Europe and NATO's center of gravity has shifted to the Southern Region. Whether the nations in Central Europe will willingly relinquish their long held primacy remains to be seen and could be a considerable source of tension within the Alliance.

With the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the threat of a massive armored offensive in Italy, the Balkans, and northeastern Anatolia has largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the Southern Tier will face a host of risks, and those risks may differ markedly from the threat that preoccupied planners for the past 40 years. Moreover, many of these more ambiguous risks will not lend themselves readily to the application of military force. Unstable governments, mass migration, Islamic radicalism, and economic dislocation, for example, are but a few of the myriad security issues currently confronting Southern Europe, but which largely defy purely military solutions.

That said, at some point, violence within the Mediterranean basin will surely involve U.S. and NATO security interests and may well require some form of military response. But, even

when the application of military force may be appropriate, the means of exercising such force may be distinctly different from the majority of past NATO planning. Force levels and structures of potential foes, rugged terrain in many areas, and lack of infrastructure and lines of communication required to sustain modern mechanized units may result in a reversion to more manpower intensive operations or more limited types of warfare.

While the risk of crises or confrontations requiring the use of national or NATO military forces may be high, the degree of potential risk is considerably reduced relative to past threats. Aside from risks posed by a reconstituted former Soviet Union (a highly unlikely probability), NATO forces should be able to cope with the risks that remain. This assessment does not imply that envisaged risks are insignificant or that future operations will be easy. But it should be recognized that, as currently anticipated, NATO's *overall* military capabilities should be sufficient to balance future risks along the Southern Tier.

"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" represents NATO's clear recognition of these new circumstances. But, by its basic nature, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" is an overarching document that posits a broad conceptual approach to security. Given the diversity—geographic, security concerns, risks—within NATO, all elements of the new strategy may not apply evenly across the breadth of the Alliance. Such may be the case in the Southern Tier with attempts to move from "forward defense" to a "reduced forward presence."

Reduced forward presence is based on a number of critical assumptions: individual nations and NATO, as a whole, will be able to generate and mass air, ground, and sea forces from throughout the Alliance in sufficient strength and time to preserve or restore the territorial integrity of its threatened members. Additionally, the Alliance assumes the size, readiness, and availability of indigenous forces can be reduced from current levels and greater reliance placed on mobilizable and reconstituted units. Moreover, the Alliance presupposes being able to rely more heavily on intra- and interregional, as

well as external reinforcements that will be predominantly multinational in composition. Whether, under anticipated conditions, a strategic concept that relies on all these assumptions can be applied successfully in all areas of the Southern Tier is open to question.

If the Alliance is to rely on a strategic concept of reduced forward presence in the Southern Tier, then it must take the steps necessary create more suitable conditions: compensate for lack of strategic depth, increase strategic lift capabilities, furnish units with greater strategic mobility, improve infrastructure, and provide command and control arrangements capable of integrating not only multinational reinforcements, but indigenous forces, as well, to name but a few. When taken individually, these concerns, save the lack of adequate strategic depth, are not insurmountable, but will take considerable resources—money, effort, and time—to resolve. But, taken in sum, particularly in a time of reduced defense budgets, these concerns are significant. Certainly, more thought and discussion will have to be devoted to these issues.

The new security conditions and Alliance strategic concept will also require military authorities to adapt considerably operational plans. And, future operational planning will become more complicated as planners face a wider range of potential operations—in terms of variety, location, intensity (low, mid, and high), duration, and degree of risk—and have to adapt themselves to the more ambiguous risks of the future.

In designing future operational plans for defense of the Southern Tier, planners must consider whether the emerging operational principle of counterconcentration applies throughout the Southern Tier. For example, lack of strategic and operational depth in the Balkans, as well as terrain conditions, will certainly constrain planners from relying on an operational concept that trades space for time. Conversely, while sufficient operational depth exists in eastern Anatolia and a defense in depth is possible, the combination of severe terrain, harsh climate, and lack of adequate infrastructure may effectively preclude large scale operational level maneuver of mechanized forces. In short, Alliance planners may not be able

to adopt the concept of counterconcentration to the degree that many initially anticipated.

A shift in NATO's center of gravity to the Southern Tier offers the United States considerable challenges, as well as opportunities. Perhaps the most difficult test the United States may face is to bolster NATO's support of Turkey. Turkey has long deferred to the Central Region because of the Soviet threat facing that region. With the rising risks along Turkey's frontiers in eastern Anatolia, Turks may justifiably believe that more attention should be directed to their security concerns.

The Alliance may not respond as strongly as Turkey believes is necessary. As the threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization swiftly dissipated, euphoria swept through much of Central and Northern Europe, resulting in a perception of few, if any, residual risks facing the Alliance. Moreover, those nations may be forced to divert their attention to redressing internal problems that exist in their societies (e.g., German unification, economies, mass migration). Thus, the will to support Turkey may not be sufficient to satisfy Turkish expectations and the already considerable Turkish feelings of second class status within Europe may be compounded.

Feelings of increased isolation from Europe could come at a time when Turkey is pulled by attractions from the Middle East and Asia. Turkey is presently attempting to build bridges between Europe and the Middle East, as well as the newly emerging republics of Central Asia. In doing so, Turkey could render tremendous service to the Alliance and Europe, as a whole, by contributing to the stability of these volatile regions. Conversely, should Turkish sensitivities be further aggravated, Turkey could draw away from Europe and reorient toward the east. Such a move could have significant ramifications for Turkey's relations with the Atlantic Alliance, and particularly Greece. In the absence of strong backing from NATO, Turkey could call upon the United States for increased support. And, given longstanding U.S.-Turkish relations and the stakes involved, the United States certainly would have to respond. The United States may have to expend considerable political capital to garner sufficient Alliance support. And, if the United

States is not able to marshall adequate support for Turkey within the Alliance, it may find itself shouldering a large portion of the responsibilities for support of Turkey in a very volatile part of the world. Alternatively, if Turkey perceives itself isolated and concludes, for whatever reason, that adequate support will not be forthcoming, it may increasingly strike out on its own and act in ways not always consistent with either Alliance or U.S. goals. To avoid either of these situations, the United States should take steps now to ensure that the Alliance addresses Turkish security concerns.

Because of these conditions, the United States may be able to exert considerable influence over the development of new security arrangements in the Southern Tier. And, these arrangements may exert no little influence over NATO, as a whole, as the attention of the Alliance becomes more focused on the Southern Tier. Conditions should allow the United States to take the lead in addressing the issues identified in this study. Advance planning that identifies potential crises and prepares means to avert (preferably) or manage (if required) them, will go a long way toward improving capabilities within the Southern Tier and reinforcing the importance of the Alliance, as well as the United States.

On the other hand, these leadership opportunities do not come without cost. In a time of shrinking defense budgets, the United States may have to make some hard decisions on resource allocation if some of the more critical shortfalls in the Southern Tier are to be remedied. American political capital will also have to be expended to ensure NATO allies contribute to resolution of issues identified in this study, when their focus—political as well as fiscal—may be diverted by the pressing problems presented by the changing conditions in Central and Northern Europe.

Challenges presented within the Southern Tier are manifold and will not go away of their own accord. Nor will they be easily resolved. But, if the United States and NATO intend to exert a positive influence over the future development of the security conditions in this critical area of the world, they must take action quickly. Perhaps, more importantly, the United States must seize the moment and provide the leadership

necessary to start and sustain the process of revising the security arrangements in the Southern Tier.

ENDNOTES

1. As Roberto Aliboni points out, "The Mediterranean is not, therefore, a 'centre' naturally destined to breed solidarity, but a 'frontier' separating worlds that are culturally, economically, and politically very far apart—the Judeo-Christian and the Islamic; the developed and the underdeveloped; the democratic and the authoritarian." Roberto Aliboni, *European Security Across the Mediterranean*, Chaillot Papers No. 2, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union (WEU), March 1991. See also Bruce George, ed., *Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-1990*, Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group Limited, 1989, p. 131. It is interesting to note that 90 percent of all material used in support of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM came through the Mediterranean Basin. North Atlantic Assembly, Political Committee, PC SR(91)5, AI 262, Appendix A, p. 10. Hereafter all North Atlantic Assembly reports will be cited as NAA, committee document number, report number, page; e.g., the above citation would read: NAA, PC SR(91)5, AI 262, App. A, p. 10.

2. The long series of wars between Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the 16th-19th centuries, the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, and World War I immediately come to mind.

3. That is, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean Sea. The forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey officially fall under control of Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). Portugal falls under Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), a command subordinate to Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), although a brigade of ground forces has long been planned as reinforcements for Italy. Neither Spain nor France participate in NATO's integrated military structure, and thus do not belong to AFSOUTH. George, *Jane's NATO Handbook*, pp. 136-137 and pp. 151-152.

4. The Maghreb is normally considered to stretch along the northern littoral of Africa and includes Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, *Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*, New York: Harper, 1985, p. 117. Some might consider this portion of the Southern Tier to be "out of area" for NATO. It is important to recall that Article Six of the Washington Treaty stipulates that the Mediterranean Sea, to include the air space, is included in the NATO area. Thus, ground or naval forces afloat or air forces flying over the Mediterranean are protected by the Treaty. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, p. 377. It is likely that armed forces of Alliance members stationed in the Mediterranean would be affected even in cases where no direct attack against NATO territory has occurred. Therefore, this portion of

the Southern Tier should be considered in the NATO area for planning purposes.

5. Aliboni, *European Security Across the Mediterranean*, p. 10. Recent overturning of the democratic process in Algeria is but one pertinent example.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

7. Current enmity between Syria and Iraq, for example, is due in no small part to clashes over leadership of the Baathist Party. *Ibid.* pp. 13-14. An example of the first case is Syrian designs on Lebanon; the latter is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

8. *Ibid.* p. 29. Arab-Israeli conflicts, the war between Iran and Iraq, and the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait immediately come to mind.

9. Increasing tensions between Moldova and the "Republic of Dnestr," the relationship between Romania and Moldova, and the ongoing battles in the Transcaucasus region, respectively.

10. Inge R. Pinto-Dobering, *South-North Migration: The Challenge of the 1990s*, PSIS Occasional Paper, No. 2/1991, Geneva: Program for Strategic and International Security Studies, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1991, p. 13 and pp. 31-32.

11. Based on 1988 estimate of Egyptian unemployment of 22 percent in William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, eds., *Political Risk Yearbook*, Vol. II, *Middle East and North Africa*, New York: Frost and Sullivan, 1989, Egypt, p. FS-2. Pinto-Dobering, *South-North Migration*, p. 32 and p. 31, respectively. Some revealing charts on demographics and immigration in Northern Africa and Arabia can be found in Assembly of the Western European Union, Report of the 37th Ordinary Session, 1st part, "European Security and Threats Outside Europe—The Organization of Peace and Security in the Mediterranean Region and the Middle East," May 13, 1991, pp.6-7.

12. Aliboni, *European Security Across the Mediterranean*, p. 21.

13. France has recently scrutinized its immigration situation. See, for example, "Recent Statistics on Immigration Analyzed," *Le Monde* (Paris), November 7, 1991, p. 14 in *Foreign Brodacast Information Service* (*FBIS*)-WEU-91-242, December 17, 1991, pp. 22-24; or "Findings on Annual Report of Immigration," *Le Monde* (Paris), November 29, 1991, p. 10 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-002, January 3, 1992, p. 27-28. Nor is France alone in this regard. Belgium, Denmark, and Germany, long most tolerant of minorities and with liberal asylum laws, have begun to reassess their policies. See, for example, *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (International Edition),

December 4, 1991, p. 5; "Minister Proposes Tightening Immigration Law," *Berlinerske Tidende* (Copenhagen), November 12, 1991, p. 5, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-238, December 11, 1991, p. 35; and "Minister Cited on Asylum Law Change Need," *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, November 19, 1991, p. 4, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-236, December 9, 1991, p. 23, respectively. For a brief, but enlightening overview of the shift to the right in Europe and the hostile reaction against immigrants, see "Surge to the Right," *Time*, January 13, 1992, pp. 22-24. For a more detailed description of the situation in France, see Marie-Laure Colson, "Racism Slowly Eating Away at Public Opinion," *Liberation* (Paris), March 31, 1992, pp. 36-37 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-080, April 24, 1992, pp. 25-26. For an example of a French born Arab perspective, see William Drozdiak, "Muslims Change the Face of Marseille," *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1992, p. A38.

14. Jill Smolowe, "Land of Slaughter," *Time*, June 8, 1992, p. 36 and p. 32.

15. For example, on June 5, 1992, the Bundestag approved a new law that streamlined considerably asylum processing procedures that will allow the Federal Republic of Germany to deport more rapidly those who cannot substantiate political persecution in their home country. *DPA* (Hamburg) June 5, 1992, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-111, June 9, 1992, p. 19

16. See, for example, accounts of the Italian forcible deportation of Albanians in August 1991 (Alan Cowell, "Italy Breaks Pledge and Deports Albanian Emigres," *The New York Times*, August 18, 1991, p. 14.), as well as Turkish efforts against Kurdish and Turkoman refugees. "Military Said Ordered to Stop 3d Refugee Influx," *Gunaydin* (Istanbul), November 13, 1991, p. 8 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-222, November 18, 1991, pp. 42-43. Calls for limits on immigration will be discussed in greater detail below.

17. *ANSA* (Rome), January 1, 1992, in "Armed Forces to Continue Albania Relief Efforts," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-001, January 2, 1992, p. 9. These personnel are expected to be deployed until at least the latter half of 1992.

18. For example: Germany-1.5 million, Netherlands-167,000; France-123,000; Belgium-76,000. Western European Union Document 1271, "European Security and Threats Outside Europe," May 13, 1991, p. 7.

19. For a broad description see, for example, George J. Church, "Surge to the Right," *Time*, January 13, 1992, pp. 22-24 or William Drozdiak, "Immigration Issue Boosts Europe's Right," *The Washington Post*, November 26, 1991, p. A1. More specific examples may be found in "R.O.,""Criticisms of Bonn's Emigrant Policy Increases," *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, December 30, 1991, p. 4 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-011, January 16, 1992, p. 14; Edith Cresson, "A Republican State, A State Based on Law," *Le Monde* (Paris), February 29, 1992, p. 1,9 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-052, March

17, 1992, p. 22; Soren Kassebeer, "Engell Plans Tighter Controls of Refugees Applying for Danish Residence," *Berlingske Tidende* (Copenhagen), November 12, 1991, p. 5 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-238, December 11, 1991, p. 35; and *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (International Edition), December 4, 1991, p. 15, which discusses Belgian immigration policy.

20. Youssef Ibrahim, "Algiers Marchers Oppose Militants," *The New York Times*, January 3, 1992, p. A3. For details of the military's actions in overturning the election results, see Jonathan Randal, "Algerian Elections Canceled," *The Washington Post*, January 13, 1992, p. A1.

21. Jonathan C. Randal, "Threat of Showdown Appears to Ease in Algeria," *The Washington Post*, January 16, 1992, p. A17 and "Algeria Imposes Emergency Rule," *The Washington Post*, February 1992, p. A19. For recent violence and FIS activities, see "Algerian Opposition Signals Decision to Take Up Arms," *The Washington Post*, April 23, 1992, p. 41, and Jonathan C. Randal, "Crackdown in Algeria Slows [illegible] by Radicals," *The Washington Post*, May 10, 1992, p. A25. An account of Boudiaf's assassination can be found in Jonathan C. Randal, "Gunman Assassinates Algerian Leader in Spray of Bullets," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1992, p. A14.

22. Jonathan C. Randal, "Tunisia Faces Renewed Threat from Islamic Fundamentalists," *The Washington Post*, January 11, 1992, p. A15; Henry Munson, Jr., "Moslem Fundamentalists," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 26, Summer 1991, pp. 331-344; or Jonathan Farley, "The Maghreb's Islamic Challenge," *World Today* (London), Vol. 47, August/September 1991, pp. 148-151. For an opposing view see William E. Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism: No Long-Term Threat," *The Washington Post*, January 13, 1992, p. A17.

23. According to Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic of Serbia, if Kosovo attempts to breakaway from Serbia "they will be answered by force and most energetically." Robert L. Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 29, 1992, p. A14.

24. Croatian and Serbian designs on Bosnia-Herzegovina are outlined in Blaine Harden, "Serbs, Croats Agree to Carve Up Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, May 8, 1992, p. A17. Turkish security guarantees can be found in *Gunaydin* (Istanbul), September 10, 1991, p. 8 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-178, September 13, 1991, p. 29. Italian concerns are cited in *ANSA* (Rome), May 14, 1992, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-094, May 14, 1992, p. 34.

25. An example of concerns expressed over radicalization of Moslem populations can be found in *Paris Match*, December 19, 1991, p. 99; Jonathan C. Randal, "Tunisia Faces Renewed Threat From Islamic Fundamentalists," p. A15; and *El Pais* (Madrid), January 9, 1992, p. 18. For

examples of anxieties about increased terrorist activities, see "BKA Warns of Possible Hizballah 'Terrorism'," *ADN* (Berlin) January 11 1992, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-008, January 13, 1992, pp. 10-11, and Ruth Sinai, "Iran Sets Up African Bases as Guerrilla Training Sites," *The Patriot* (Harrisburg), January 15, 1992, p. A6. Although the source must be considered, recent ramblings from Libya's leadership do not ease European concerns. See "'Libya's Number Two' Warns of 'Holy War'," *AFP* (Paris), January 10, 1992 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-008, pp. 26-27. See also, George Lardner, Jr. and John M. Goshko, "Libya's Terrorist Training Camps," *The Washington Post*, February 27, 1992, p. A32.

26. For example, U.S. support for French or Spanish actions against a massive influx of immigrants could strain relations with Egypt, a key ally in the Middle East, which faces a severe demographic crisis and will continue to have a significant pool of immigrants.

27. For example, the ETA continues to strike in Spain. "Air Force Major Killed, 2 Injured by ETA," *RNE-1 Radio Network* (Madrid), January 8, 1992 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-006, January 9, 1992, p. 24 and *RNE-1 Radio Network*, "Madrid Explosion Kills Five; ETA Blamed," February 6, 1992 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-025, February 6, 1992, p. 19. Organized crime in Italy has stepped up its intimidation campaign: "De Michelis Comments" and "Group Claims Responsibility," both in *FBIS*-WEU-92-051, March 16, 1992, p. 29 and *ANSA* (Rome) March 20, 1992, in "Interior Minister Defends Warning on Unrest," *FBIS*-WEU-92-056, March 23, 1992, pp. 27-28. 718 people were killed by organized crime in 1991, a 28 percent increase. Daniele Mastrogiancomo, *La Repubblica*, (Rome), April 23, 1992, p. 19 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-093, May 13, 1992, pp. 39-40. In Greece, both the ELA and 1 May terrorist groups are again active. See, "ELA, 1 May Claim Attack," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-039, February 27, 1992, p. 24 and *Athens Elliniki Radhiofania Radio Network*, March 20, 1992 in "ELA Claims Responsibility for Athens Explosions." *FBIS*-WEU-92-056, March 23, 1992, p. 39. Turkish officials estimate 80 illegal organizations exist in Turkey. Hakan Aygun, "Islamic Jihad Number One," *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), October 30, 1991, p. 4 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-248, December 26, 1991, pp. 27-28. From January-May 1991, AFSOUTH recorded 42 terrorist incidents in Turkey. NAA, PC SR(91)5, AI 262, p. 9.

28. Dev Sol attacks in Turkey provide pertinent examples. For example, recent Turkish capture of Dev Sol materials revealed plans to attack NATO facilties and U.S. citizens. *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), May 6, 1992, p. 2 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-091, May 11, 1992, p. 58.

29. The April 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya is an excellent example.

30. "Fresh Nuclear Threat." *Daily Telegraph* (London), January 11, 1992, p. 12.

31. "The Common Defense," *Indianapolis Star*, January 14, 1992, p. 6.

32. Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation," *SIPRI Yearbook 1991, World Armaments and Disarmaments*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 321.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 318. While Karp gives partial credit for this slowdown to the Ballistic Missile Proliferation Missile Technology Control Regime, he also indicates that the significant costs associated with the research, development, and acquisition of ballistic missiles appears to be the driving force. This does not, however, preclude nations with sufficient funds from buying ready-made missiles from a willing seller, such as China (Libya and Saudi Arabia) or, perhaps, one of the breakaway republics of the former Soviet Union. For a more detailed description of ballistic missile proliferation, see *Ibid.*, pp. 317-343 or Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," *Adelphi Papers* No. 252, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1990.

34. This issue has received considerable press in recent months. See for example, Lothar Ruehl, "Traces of Uranium in Iraq Pose Riddles for Us—We are Worried," [Interview with Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency], *Die Welt* (Hamburg), January 13, 1992, p. 6 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-009, January 14, 1992, pp. 1-4. A briefer description of Iraqi capabilities, including the possibility that Iraq may in fact possess a nuclear device is contained in "Inspectors: 'Iraq Could Have a Bomb'," *USA Today*, January 9, 1992, p. 4.

35. "Algeria and the Bomb," *The Economist* (London), January 11, 1992, p. 38. Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein, "An Iranian Bomb," *The Washington Post*, January 12, 1992, p. C7 and Jack Nelson, "Fears Grow that Soviet A-Arms are on Market," *Los Angeles Times*, January 11, 1992, p. 1. Recently, reports surfaced that Iran purchased three tactical nuclear warheads from one of the Islamic ex-Soviet republics. Nelson, above, and "Algeria and the Bomb," *The Economist* (London), January 11, 1992, p. 38.

36. Nursultan's remarks and a commentary may be found in Dov Zakheim, "Islamic Nuclear Presence," *The Washington Times*, January 14, 1992, p. F3. Nor has his recent stand on the START Treaty provided solace. Although Nursultan agreed to adhere to the terms of START and the Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 20, 1992, he also reserved the right to redeploy missiles into Kazakhstan at the end of the 7 year implementation period. George Leopold, "But Nation Reserves Right to Redploy Nukes from Russia," *Defense News* (Washington, DC), May 25-31, 1992, p. 28.

37. The potential use of chemical weapons cannot be ruled out. Libya, for example, is reported to have currently as much as 100 tons of chemical weapons and continues to expand and disperse its stockpiles. Elaine

Sciolino with Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Agents Say Libya is Adding and Hiding Chemical Weapons," *The New York Times*, January 22, 1992, p. A1.

38. The precise ownership of the former Soviet Navy and its Black Sea Fleet have not yet been determined. For purposes of this study, the term Russian Navy will be used to reduce confusion until such time that the final disposition of the Black Sea Fleet has been determined.

39. Apparently all surface ships returned to their home ports and only a few missile firing or attack submarines remained on patrol. Christopher Drew, "U.S. Says Iran Buying Soviet Subs," *Chicago Tribune*, January 22, 1992, p. 1. Limited deployments have once again resumed. See Richard H.P. Sia, "Nine-ship flotilla of Black Sea Fleet reportedly at sea," *Baltimore Sun*, February 8, 1992, p. 4.

40. NAA, PC SR (91), AI 262, Annex C, p. 21.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

42. The Spanish believe that even a fundamentalist regime in Algeria would still sell natural gas to maintain its own economic health. Costs might increase, but supply would be available. On the other hand, the Spaniards believe that a fundamentalist-controlled Morocco could cut off the flow of natural gas with little economic pain. See P. Rodriguez, "Crisis in Algeria Threatens Gas Supply," *ABC* (Madrid), January 24, 1992, pp. 64-65 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-026, February 7, 1992, pp. 29-30. For general Spanish concerns in the Maghreb, see "A Time to Be Involved," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 18, 1992, pp. 653-654.

43. Vincente Blay Biosca and Rene Luria, "Spain's Contribution to the NATO Alliance," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 21, No. 7, July 1988, p. 776.

44. *Ibid.*, and "Spain's Military Role within the NATO Alliance," [interview with Spanish Ambassador to NATO, D. Jaime de Ojeda] *International Defense Review*, Vol. 21, No. 7, July 1988, p. 772.

45. Not only are the command and control arrangements complicated for the Southern Tier, but Spain and the Straits of Gibraltar lie at the confluence of ACLANT and ACE.

46. President Soares recently addressed these concerns with President Bush. See *RDP* (Lisbon), January 13, 1992, in "Soares Comments on U.S. Meeting with Bush," *FBIS*-WEU-92-010, January 15, 1992, p. 26.

47. For a brief but concise description of Portugal's most recent strategic appreciation see Eduardo Mascarenhas, "New Military Strategic

Concept Will Aim at Strengthening Power Projection," *Diario de Noticias* (Lisbon), November 5, 1991, pp. 4-5 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-229, November 27, 1991, pp. 36-38. For Portugal's view of the importance of Africa, see *Africa Confidentila*, (London), March 20, 1992, pp. 1-3 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-077, April 21, 1992, pp. 2-4.

48. For greater detail of these issues, see Roberto Bianchin, "Trieste Discovers Old Ghost," *La Repubblica* (Rome), January 17, 1992, p. 9 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-023, February 4, 1992, p. 34. A description of the MSI is in Vincent E. McHale, ed., *Political Parties in Europe: Albania-Norway*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983, pp. 581-583.

49. The Italian seizure of Fiume in 1920 offers a cogent example.

50. Information on Libyan aircraft holdings can be found in *The Military Balance, 1991-1992*, p. 113. Libya launched SCUD missiles at Sicily in April 1986 in retaliation for the U.S. bombing of Tripoli. Vincent Nigro, "Italy's Air Defense? Nonexistent?", *La Repubblica*, April 24, 1992, p. 11 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-082, April 28, 1992, pp. 31-32.

51. See, for example, "Ora l'Italia gli errori," *Voce Repubblicana* (Rome), April 3, 1992.

52. For a description of the post-World War I and post-World War II border settlements and their failure to resolve ethnic and nationalist problems in the region, see Barbara Jelavich, *The History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, Vol. II, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 121-136, 143-184, and 301-333.

53. For possible scenarios of such events, see Keatley, "Kosovo Could Trigger a Balkan War," p. A14 or Jason Feer, "Disorder in Serbia Could Elevate War in Region," *Defense News* (Washington, DC), June 22-28, 1992, p. 43.

54. The U.N. has planned to deploy over 14,000 peace-keepers to Yugoslavia. John F. Burns, "Many in Yugoslavia Fear UN's Effort Could Fail," *The New York Times*, February 29, 1992, p. A12. By May 1, 1992, roughly 8,000 observers were in place in the former Yugoslavia. Jill Smolowe, "Why Do They Keep On Killing," *Time*, May 11, 1992, p. 49. Whether peace will be maintained remains to be seen. See, for example, Blaine Harden, "Serbs, Croats, Agree to Carve Up Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, May 8, 1992, p. A17.

55. A Bulgarian Radio correspondent in Athens neatly summarized the conceptual differences between the various parties:

> Whereas Greece considers Macedonia exclusively in terms of a geographic concept, refusing to acknowledge its independence as

> a state [sic] Serbia does exactly the opposite. It recognizes the Macedonians, but not their [right to] independence. Bulgaria, however, recognizes Macedonian sovereignty, but not the existence of a [distinct] Macedonian nationality.

Bulgarian Radio, September 22, 1991, 11:40 A.M. in Kjell Engelbrekt, "Bulgaria: Setting New Priorities," *Report on Eastern Europe*, December 20, 1991, p. 4. For a brief historical overview of the Macedonian Question see Jelavich, *History of the Balkans. Volume II: Twentieth Century*, pp. 89-100 and 301-321. For recent Greek concerns over Macedonia and sensitivities concerning use of the term 'Macedonia' vs. the Republic of Skopje, see "Mitsotakis Warns Skopje on Territorial Claims" and "Elaborates Further on Macedonia" both in *FBIS*-WEU-91-222, November 1991, pp. 33-35; "Athens Breaks Off Talks with Skopje Delegation," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-003, January 6, 1992, p. 56, and Blaine Harden, "Greece Blocks Recognition of Macedonia," *The Washington Post*, June 10, 1992, p. A25.

56. *Athens Ellikniki Radhioifonia Radio Network*, December 31, 1991 in "Albania's Ali : 'Stirring Up Nonexistent Issues'," *FBIS*-WEU-92-002, January 3, 1992, p. 40; *Athens Ellikniki Radhioifonia Radio Network*, February 28, 1992, in "Spokesman Urges 'Calm' in Albanian Relations," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-041, March 2, 1992, p. 24; and *Athens Ellikniki Radhioifonia Radio Network*, February 20, 1992, in "Spokesman Denounces Albanian 'Propaganda'," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-035, February 21, 1992, p. 25. Tensions have reached the point where gunfire has been exchanged on the Greek-Albanian border. See *Athens Ellikniki Radhioifonia Radio Network*, February 27, 1992, in "Fire Exchanged With Albanian Patrol at Border," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-039, February 27, 1992, p. 24.

57. A brief overview of Greek-Turkish problems in the Balkans during this century, alone, can be found in George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th ed., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980, pp. 98-110; 146-147; and 161-166. One example of the seriousness of the Aegean issue can be found in Derya Sazak, "The Changing World and Turkey," *Milliyet* (Istanbul), December 12, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-014, January 22, 1992, p. 58, which notes that Turkey would view a Greek increase in its territorial water limits from 3 to 12 miles as a cause for war. Turkey recently reiterated its security responsibilities to Muslim populations in the region. See *Gunaydin* (Istanbul), September 10, 1992, p. 8 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-178, September 13, 1991, p. 29. Background on the clash over Cyprus can be found in Sydney N. Fisher and William Ochsenwald, *The Middle East: A History*, 4th ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990, pp. 498-501.

58. Both nations have engaged in considerable discussions over the past year in an effort to curry Bulgaria's favor and establish an alliance that will place the other at a disadvantage in the power politics of the Balkans. For example, Greece and Bulgaria signed a friendship treaty in October

1991. Turkey countered with a military agreement in December 1991. Greece, in turn, signed a similar agreement in January 1992. For an example of Greek concerns over Turkish entree in Bulgaria see K.I. Angelopoulos, "Seeking Roles and Influence in the Balkans," *I Kaathimerini* (Athens), November 17, 1991, p. 9 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-240, December 13, 1991, p. 41. For Turkish efforts to counter Greek influence in Bulgaria see, for example, "New Balance to be Established in Balkan Region," *Hurriyet* (Istanbul), December 14, 1991, p. 14 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-246, December 23, 1991, p. 53. Apparently, Bulgaria is doing an excellent job of playing both ends against the middle.

59. A synopsis of Turkish relations with the EC is contained in Fisher and Ochsenwald, *The Middle East*, p. 503. At present, Austria, Sweden, and Finland have applied for EC membership and Norway and Switzerland are seriously considering such a move. Hungary, Poland and CSFR are pushing for entry before the end of the decade. See, for example, William Drozdiak, "Finland Applies for EC Membership," *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1992, p. A20.

60. For examples of Turkish sensitivities over reinforcement during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, see *TRT Television Network* (Ankara), January 28, 1992 in "Leaders Hold Panel Discussion on Foreign Policy," *FBIS*-WEU-92-020, January 30, 1992, p. 27 and Marc Fisher, "Bonn Condemns Turkey for Attack on Kurds," *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1992, p. A23. For suspension of German arms assistance, see Chris Hedges, "Kurds in Turkey Seem to be Nearing Full-scale Revolt, *The New York Times*, March 30, 1992, p. A1 or Marc Fisher, "Bonn Extends Ban on Arms to Turkey," *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1992, p. A17.

61. Greece left the integrated military structure in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and theoretically returned in October 1980. Nearly 12 years later, however, Greece has yet to establish LANDSOUTHCENT or 7th ATAF (NATO ground and air headquarters, respectively), largely because of disputes with Turkey over terms of reference for the air space over the Aegean Sea. Robert MacDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean—Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, Part II," in *Adelphi Paper* No. 229, *Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988, pp. 76-77.

62. For an excellent overview of Bulgarian diplomatic efforts in 1991, see Engelbrekt, "Bulgaria: Setting New Priorities," pp. 3-8. For the apparent success of these efforts, see Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburgers's comments in "Eastern Europe's Surprise," *The Washington Post*, March 9, 1992, p. A16.

63. Engelbrekt, "Bulgaria: Setting New Priorities," p. 4; "Military Agreement Signed with Bulgaria," in *FBIS*-WEU-91-246, December 23,

1991, pp. 56-57; and Engelbrekt, p. 6, respectively. A Greek-Bulgarian defense pact, similar to the Bulgaria-Turkish agreement was signed on January 11, 1992. *Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network*, January 11, 1992, "Communique, Defense Pact Signed in Bulgaria," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-008, January 13, 1992, p. 40.

64. Interview in *To Vima Tis Kiriakis* (Athens), December 29, 1991, in "Bilateral Relations with Greece Discussed," in *FBIS*-WEU-92-002, January 3, 1992, p. 38.

65. See, for example, Hugh Faringdon, *Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers*, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 1989, pp. 211-212 and Fisher and Ochsenwald, *The Middle East*, pp. 381-384.

66. For Turkish concerns in the Transcaucasus, support of Azerbaijan, and animosity toward Armenia see, for example: Giovanni de Briganti and Umit Enginsoy, "Turkey Wants Stability in Former Soviet Republics," *Defense News* (Washington, DC), November 4, 1991, p. 6; "The Ankara-Baku-Moscow Triangle," *Milliyet* (Istanbul), November 26, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-231, December 2, 1991, p. 39; "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, *Turkiye* (Istanbul), December 13, 1991 in *FBIS*-WEU-01-243, December 18, 1991, p. 43; *Milliyet*, November 14, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-224, November 20, 1991, p. 61; and Blaine Harden, "Turkey Fears Pull of Caucasus War," *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1992, p. A17.

67. For a brief overview of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan see Margaret Shapiro, "In Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ethnic Scores Still Rankle," *The Washington Post*, June 10, 1992, p. A25. More details on the background to the conflict may be found in Paul A. Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 19-26. For an example of reports on recent fighting and internecine power struggles in Azerbaijan, see Margaret Shapiro, "Fighting Escalates Anew in Karabakh," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 1991, p. A31.

68. Eleanor Randolph, "Iran, Turkey Denounce Armenian 'Aggression'," *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1992, p. A25; Michael Dobbs, "Moldova, Russia Warn Neighbors of War Risks," *The Washington Post*, May 21, 1992, p. A35; and David Ljunggren, "C.I.S., Turks put security forces on alert," *The Washington Times*, May 22, 1992, p. 7.

69. Randolph, "Iran, Turkey Denounce Armenian 'Aggression'," p. A25.

70. *Ibid.*, p. A31.

71. For a brief overview of the secret wartime diplomacy and struggles between the Great Powers and indigenous independence movements

within the region, see Arthur Goldschmit, Jr., *A Concise History of the Middle East*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 187-197.

72. Under terms of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936, Alexandretta had been promised to Syria. However, the Turks took the issue to the League of Nations and applied diplomatic pressures against the French who, in the face of a resurgent Nazi Germany, needed Turkish support. The net result is that the French granted the Hatay region autonomy and local Turks attained a slight majority (22 out of 40 seats) in the legislature and asked for union with Turkey. The French, despite their treaty commitments to Syria, acquiesced in the Turkish annexation of the region. For a brief description of the events surrounding the annexation see Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, pp. 125-126 and pp. 319-321 or Fisher and Ochsenwald, *The Middle East*, pp. 413 and 422-423.

73. After the military crackdown in 1980, many Kurdish leaders escaped to Syria. The example of the Kurdish leader, Abdullah Ocalan, living in a restricted suburb of Damascus, driving a red Mercedes, with Syrian bodyguards as escorts, and using a seaside villa certainly cannot please Turkish leaders. Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 71 and "$1 Billion From Greece for the PKK," *NOKTA* (Istanbul), April 5, 1992, pp. 8-16 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-066, April 6, 1992, p. 40. Recently, Turkish authorities have warned Syria of their displeasure at continued Syrian support of the Kurds. See, for example, *Al-Hayah* (London), December 15, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-243, December 18, 1991, p. 41; *Anatolia* (Ankara), December 16, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-242, December 17, 1991, pp. 55-56; *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), December 28, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-001, January 2, 1992, p. 26; and, perhaps the strongest warning reported in *Cumhuriyet* (Ankara), January 8, 1992, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-014, January 22, 1992, pp. 52-53.

74. Fisher and Ochsenwald, *The Middle East*, p. 502 and G[illegible]er, *The Kurds in Turkey*, p. 99. Presently, water flow to Syria exceeds requirements set down in the Treaty of Lausanne. Thus, the flow of water could be reduced legally to treaty commitments. "$1 Billion From Greece for PKK," *FBIS*-WEU-92-066, April 6, 1992, p. 42.

75. Fisher and Ochsenwald, *The Middle East*, p. 412.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 502.

77. Stephen C. Pelletiere, *The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, pp. 185-187.

78. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey*, p. 100. Turkish seizure of a Greek-Cypriot ship laden with arms for Iran last year and Iran's rerouting of a proposed trans-European oil pipeline through Azerbaijan and Ukraine,

instead of Turkey, as originally agreed, are examples of recent rough spots in Turkish-Iranian relations. *Turkish Daily News*, April 28, 1992, p. 3 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-089, May 7, 1992, p. 43. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran recently concluded an oil deal that will increase Turkish purchases from 382,000 to 3 million tons per year. *Anatolia*, (Ankara), May 25, 1992 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-102, p. 57.

79. *Ibid.* See also, "$1 Billion From Greece to the PKK," *FBIS*-WEU-92-066, April 6, 1992, p. 40.

80. A concise description of the major elements of the emerging competition over Azerbaijan can be found in "Iran and Turkey Vie for Soviet Carcass," *Helsingin Sanomat* (Helsinki), November 29, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-251, December 31, 1991, pp. 57-58. See also "The Great Game, Chapter Two," *Newsweek*, February 3, 1992, pp. 28-29, for a wider view of competition in Central Asia.

81. "Iran and Turkey Vie for Soviet Carcass," *FBIS*-WEU-91-251, December 31, 1991, p. 58. Recent accounts of Iranian arms purchases may be found in Jack Nelson, "Arms Buildup Making Iran Top Gulf Power," *Los Angeles Times*, January 7, 1992, p. 1; Patrick Cockburn, "Russia helps Iran equip its warplanes from Iraq," *The Independent* (London), January 13, 1992, p. 8; Christopher Drew and Michael Arndt, "Arms Flow to Iran Concerns U.S.," *Chicago Tribune*, January 19, 1992, p. 1; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Gates Warns of Iranian Arms Drive," *The Washington Post*, March 28, 1992, p. 1. Of special concern has been Iran's acquisition of ships, patrol boats, and anti-ship missiles from China and threats from Iran's navy commander that "...his revamped fleet plans to 'control' the strait [of Hormuz] which joins the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman." Rown Scarborough, "China to Boost Iran's Navy," *The Washington Times*, April 22, 1992, p. 1.

82. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," November 7, 1991. The DPC approved the new Military Committee Document (MC 400) on December 13, 1991. Press Communique M-DPC-2(91)104, December 13, 1991. MC 400 is classified, but an unclassified precis of its contents can be found in *Basic Reports on European Arms Control*, No. 20, February 19,1992, pp. 6-7.

83. For background information on the development of the documents, see Michael Legge, "The Making of NATO's New Strategy," *NATO Review*, Vol. 39, No. 6, December 1991, pp. 9-14. For a pointed critique of NATO's new strategic concept, see Otfried Nassauer and Daniel Plesch, "NATO Strategy Review: Out of Step with Events," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1991, pp. 50-52.

84. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," p. 10.

85. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-13.

86. These assumptions are not overtly stated in the Alliance's new strategic concepts. They are derived from statements describing the new security conditions. See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," pp. 3, 11, and 12. To be fair, the Alliance's strategic concept recognizes that the geographic redistribution of forces may not be possible outside the Central Region. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

87. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

88. Overall and regional ceilings are contained in Articles IV and V, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 1991, pp. 7-10. Individual national ceilings were determined within the Alliance. Entitlements of treaty limited items of equipment (TLE) can be found in Barbara Starr, "Winners and Losers in CFE Shareout," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 6, 1991, p. 19. Although the provisions of the CFE Treaty apply to only five TLE (battle tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, fixed wing combat aircraft, and attack helicopters), these TLE form the basis of modern fighting units and ceilings will effectively limit the size of the overall armed forces of each nation.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 19, and "Italy Plans Smaller, Better Force," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, December 7, 1991, p. 1083.

90. See Appendix B, NATO Force Generation Capabilities, for a detailed description of the proposed force reductions and structures within the Southern Tier.

91. For brief descriptions of the various models of equipment held within the Southern Tier, see the respective national sections in *The Military Balance, 1991-1992*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991, *passim*.

92. For example, beyond the United States, few nations possess suitable strategic lift assets; ACE Rapid Reaction Forces, especially air and sea, are largely still a vague concept; indigenous units in the Southern Tier have little experience either beyond their national boundaries or operational concepts outside well known General Defense Plans (GDPs); and logistics support is a longstanding problem that will undoubtedly be more difficult at the end of 1,500-2,000 kilometer lines of communication; and, given the current mix of conscripts and regulars in some units, the ability to employ forces outside national territories is constrained.

93. Barbara Starr, "Commander of New Corps Named," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 25, 1992, p. 689.

94. A brief description of the force packages currently proposed can be found in *National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992, pp. 19-24.

95. See the discussion in Sir Kenneth Hayr, "Logistics in the Gulf War," *Proceedings of the Royal United Services Institute*, Autumn 1991, pp. 14-19.

96. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," pp. 14-15.

97. R. M. Wilde, "Multinational Forces—Integration for National Security," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, December 1991, p. 27 and David Miller, "The Proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Corps," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, December 1991, p. 29, respectively.

98. Ceilings are contained in Article V, Paragraph 1, Section A of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Entitlements can be found in Starr, "Winners and Losers in NATO CFE Shareout," p. 18.

99. Article IV, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

100. Article V, Paragraph 1, Section C of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

101. The exclusion zone is specified in Article II, Paragraph 1, Section B of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

102. The PKK has sought an independent Kurdish state since 1984, but has stepped up attacks in recent months. See, for example, Chris Hedges, "Kurds in Turkey Seem to be Nearing Full-Scale Revolt," *The New York Times*, March 30, 1992, p. A1. For Turkish reluctance to continue negotiations, see Nilufer Yalcin, "A Federal System Cannot Be Established in Turkey," *Milliyet* (Istanbul), January 22, 1992, p. 10 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-020, p. 28.

103. Section IV, Vienna Document on CSBMs, November 1990.

104. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," pp. 12 and 14.

105. Large capacity, container cargo handling capability is limited mostly to the ports of Piraeus, Izmir, and Mersin, all of which are located considerable distances from potential areas of operations. An important note is that Piraeus does not have a railroad connection available for the rapid trans-shipment of goods. M. Andronopoulos, "Beyond Skopje," *I Kathimerini* (Athens), April 19, 1992, in *FBIS*-WEU-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 37. For a description of Greek and Turkish ports and their capabilities,

Annual Report of Immigration," *Le Monde* (Paris), November 29, 1991, p. 10 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-002, January 3, 1992, p. 27-28. Nor is France alone in this regard. Belgium, Denmark, and Germany, long most tolerant of minorities and with liberal asylum laws, have begun to reassess their policies. See, for example, *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (International Edition),

see *Lloyd's Ports of the World*, London: Lloyd's of London Press, 1991, pp. 548-560 and 638-649, respectively.

106. Although the U.S. Air Force still plans to purchase 120 C-17s, it will purchase only 8 aircraft in FY93, instead of the planned 12. Moreover, the program is coming under increasing congressional criticism because of rising costs. *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 3, 1992, pp. 23-24.

107. Joris Jannsen Lok, "NATO 'should form an airlifter fleet'," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 23, 1991, p. 427.

108. *Lloyd's Ports of the World*, pp. 408-412, and Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book: 1991*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 274 describes ports and airfields available.

109. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," p. 12. But, it remains to be seen whether this recognition was mere lip service to satisfy the concerns of nations on NATO's northern and southern flanks. To prove a realistic commitment, nations within the Central Region must ensure that they have the capabilities to reinforce the Southern Tier rapidly.

110. General Klaus Dieter Naumann, "Mission and Structure of the *Bundeswehr*," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 36, No. 6/91, p. 61. Although "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" rightly does not expressly address the name of an operational concept, similar force characteristics and capabilities are identified in pp. 14-15.

111. Naumann, "Mission and Structure of the *Bundeswehr*," p. 61.

112. Descriptions of the levels of combat operations can be found in Headquarters, Department of the Army *Field Manual 100-5, Operations*, May 1986, pp. 1-5. Some might argue that with the demise of the threat from the WTO, only low intensity operations are possible in the Southern Tier. While such a case might be made for the western Mediterranean and Italy, the levels of risk facing Greece and, especially, Turkey justify planning for operations on such a scale.

113. The Spanish Government forced the withdrawal of the 401st TFW from Torrejon Air Base in 1991. In the wake of Congress' decision not to fund a new air base at Cretone, Italy, the 401st is presently homeless. Currently, elements of the 401st periodically rotate from CONUS bases to Europe. The decision to reduce U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean to less than one CVBG can be found in "Calmer Waters Force Changes," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, February 15, 1992, p. 241. Beyond the numbers of aircraft involved, is the fact that the aircraft involved are among the most modern and capable available in the Southern Tier.

aircraft from the Soviet Union to transport air defense assets to Turkey during the run-up to the Gulf War. Lok, "NATO 'should form airlifter fleet,'" p. 427.

120. "Russia, Ukraine agree to divide Black Sea Fleet," *Baltimore Sun*, June 2, 1992, p. 3. For an excellent synopsis of the struggle between Ukraine and Russia for the fleet, see Celestine Bohlen, "In Russia-Ukraine Fight Over Navy, Crimea Lies at Heart of Struggle," *The New York Times*, March 31, 1992, p. A6.

121. "Russia, Ukraine agree to divide Black Sea Fleet," *Baltimore Sun*, June 2, 1992, and Sia, "Nine-ship flotilla of Black Sea fleet reportedly at sea," p. 4.

122. R.W. Apple, Jr. "2 U.S. Ships Badly Damaged by Iraqi Mines in Persian Gulf," *The New York Times*, February 19, 1991, p. A1, 4.

123. For Iranian purchases of submarines and capabilities of such vessels, see Robert Holzer and Neil Munro, "Iran Speeds Rearming Process," *Defense News*, February 17, 1992, p. 1, 52.

124. Again, naval operations in the Gulf War provide an indication of the broad range of operations that could be undertaken. For example, naval forces in the Gulf carried out operations ranging from interception and search of vessels in support of the U.N. embargo; humanitarian rescue mission in Somalia; air interdiction; offensive and defensive counterair; close air support; recce/ECM; naval gunfire support; SLCMs; etc.

125. The British experience during the Falklands Conflict with the H.M.S. *Glamorgan*, struck by a ground launched missile, and H.M.S. *Sheffield*, struck by an air launched missile, is instructive. See David Brown, *The Royal Navy and the Falklands War*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987, pp. 318-320 and pp. 140-144, respectively, for details.

126. George, ed., *Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-1990*, pp. 136-137. For an overview of Spain's role in the Alliance military structure see Ojeda, "Spain's Military Role Within the NATO Alliance," and Biosca and Luira, "Spain's Contribution to the NATO Alliance," pp. 771-772 and 775-778, respectively.

127. For existing command and control arrangements and shortfalls, see George, ed., *NATO Handbook, 1989-1990*, pp. 136-138 and 140; MacDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean," pp. 72-77; and F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Southern Periphery: Greece and Turkey," in *Problems of Balkan Security*, Washington, DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1990, p. 181. Nor, apparently, have the difficulties in the Southern Region been resolved in the substantial overhaul of the NATO command structure

announced at the May 1992 meeting of the DPC. See "NATO Trims Command Structure," *Stars and Stripes* (Europe), May 29, 1992, p. 10.

128. That is: the AMF(L) currently contains 8 nations and is due to rise to 13 (Wilde, "Multinational Forces—Integration for National Security," p. 27) and 9 nations have expressed interest in contributing to the ARRC (Miller, "The Proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Corps," p. 29 and Miguel Gonzalez, "Spanish Contribution Will Consists of 24 Planes and 8,000 men," *El Pais* (Madrid), February 17, 1992, p. 14).

129. See "Far From Fulda: V Corps Focus Shifts South;" "New Wave: Dragon Hammer;" "Just Do It: An Exercise in Cross-Training;" and "Working with Things We've Never Seen;" all in *Army Times*, June 8, 1992, pp. 1, 13, and 14, respectively. An abbreviated version may be found in Steve Vogel, "NATO Looks Toward the South," *The Washington Post*, June 9, 1992, p. A12.

130. Charles Miller, "Europeans Mimic Military Mission Into Yugoslavia," *Defense News* (Washington, DC), June 22-28, 1992, p. 4.

APPENDIX A

BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY ALONG THE SOUTHERN TIER

Country	Type	Range (km)	Status	Launchers	Missiles
Egypt	Scud B	280	In service	12	>100
	Scud	600	R&D		
Iran	Nazeat	120	In service	?	>100
	Scud B	280	In service	4	100
Iraq*	Scud B	280	In service	?	360?
	Fahd	500	R&D		
	Al-Hussein	600	In service	70?	<500?
	Tamuz-1	*2000*	R&D		
Israel	Lance	120	In service	12	160
	Jericho-1	480	In service	?	50?
	Jericho-2	1450	R&D		
	Shavit (SLV)**	7500	In service	?	?
Libya	Scud	280	In service	80	>240
Saudi Arabia	CSS-2	2700	In service	12	120
Syria	SS-21	120	In service	12	36
	Scud B	280	In service	18	54
	M-9	600	Negotiating with PRC		

*Under terms of the UN cease-fire agreement, Iraq's stock of tactical ballistic missiles is to be destroyed. Although large numbers have been destroyed, authorities are unsure of the original numbers available.

**SLV=Space Launch Vehicle capable of boosting a satellite (or warhead) into space.

Source: Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation," *SIPRI Yearbook, 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Table 1. Ballistic Missile Technology Along the Southern Tier.

APPENDIX B

NATO FORCE GENERATION CAPABILITIES IN THE SOUTHERN TIER

Forces.

By and large, under the CFE Treaty, nations on NATO's Southern Tier will maintain their full TLE entitlements of tanks and artillery. Armored combat vehicles are not currently up to TLE entitlements, but several nations have procurement plans intended to close the gap.[1] Significant shortfalls will exist in terms of Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft (*FWCA*) and combat helicopters (See Table 2).

Maintaining entitlements of TLE does not equate, however, to retention of current levels of forces. Italy, for example, has already eliminated seven brigades from its army. Of the remaining 19 brigades, only 5 will be fully manned, 10 will be a mix of active and mobilizable formations at varying levels of readiness, and 4 will be cadre units suitable only for reconstitution. Italy has also abolished 4 of its 16 fighter or interceptor squadrons. Conversely, the Italian Navy will remain largely untouched.[2]

The French military will also be reduced. The French fighter fleet will fall from its current level of 450 aircraft to "'below 400'—390 initially," and procurement of the Rafale fighter has been delayed with the first full squadron not being available until the year 2000. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense announced a 20 percent cut in army personnel and critical moderization programs (e.g., Leclerc tank and Tiger antitank helicopter) have been reduced and deferred. Essentially, the French Army will be reduced to the equivalent of one armored/mechanized corps and one light corps.[3]

Under the existing Armed Forces Plan 2000, Spanish armed forces will be reduced from 257,000 to 158,000

personnel. The Spanish Army will bear the brunt of the cut-backs (40 percent reduction) and will decrease from 24 to 15 brigades. Fixed wing combat aircraft will diminish from 310 to 240 aircraft. Moreover, the People's Party is advocating reducing the military to 115,000 personnel.[4]

Current indications suggest Portugal, Greece, and Turkey are in the midst of considerable restructuring of their armed forces, but final force levels and structures are unclear at the moment. Apparently, Portuguese forces will remain largely unchanged, and, while Greek forces are undergoing considerable revision, numbers of personnel and equipment will remain largely the same. Turkey, on the other hand, will reduce its personnel strengths considerably (by roughly 190,000) with the Ground Forces Command bearing the brunt of the cuts (from roughly 487,000 to 350,000 personnel), but will maintain or increase its holdings of equipment to levels permitted under the CFE Treaty.[5]

Modernization.

Pure numbers of equipment provide only a partial picture of force generation capabilities. As important—and, perhaps, more so—is the quality of the equipment on hand. In the Southern Tier, much equipment is obsolete or falls far short of the requirements of modern warfare.[6] The importance of continued modernization of equipment throughout NATO's Southern Tier cannot, therefore, be overstated. An important first step in this modernization process has been the effort to transfer more modern equipment from the Central Region that would be subject to reductions under the terms of the CFE Treaty to the those nations holding less modern equipment (the so-called 'Harmonization Effort'). Under the terms of the proposal, the United States, Germany, Netherlands, and Italy will transfer roughly 2700 tanks, 1100 armored combat vehicles, and 330 artillery pieces, predominantly to nations on NATO's southern periphery.[7]

The 'Harmonization Effort' is, however, only a first step and further efforts must be made to upgrade existing forces to modern levels. Costs will be considerable and will occur in a

time of increasingly constrained defense budgets. Nonetheless, given the potential hot spots along the Southern Tier, further efforts need to be undertaken.[8]

Unit Structures.

While raw numbers of even modernized equipment are important, they hardly portray a full picture of force generation potential. Force structures which organize the equipment into coherent fighting units are of equal or greater importance. Analyzing national force structures in this period of great flux, however, is no easy task as nations grapple with the changed security environment, and in many cases reduced defense budgets. Moreover, it must be realized that force structures are strictly a national prerogative. That said, some outside observations might contribute constructively to the ongoing analysis at the national level.

For example, within the Southern Tier, a large number of distinct force structures exist.[9] This problem is compounded by the fact that within the existing force structure, as a whole, sufficient numbers of modern equipment (e.g., tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles) are not available to equip fully the existing skeletal structures. National security concerns might be better served if steps could be taken to reduce the diversity of these force structures and to consolidate key equipments in units more fully capable of exploiting the synergy that can be gained through concentration and massing of such forces. Additionally, nations could initiate action to make their force structures more compatible with potential intra- and interregional reinforcements. Recent Turkish announcements concerning personnel reductions, restructuring, and modernization are examples of the steps that could be taken.[10]

Readiness and Availability of NATO Forces.

Although strategic warning times for a European-wide crisis will be greatly extended over today, the amount of time that might be available for a crisis in the Southern Region may not be as long as anticipated in Central Europe.[11] Given the considerable instability in the Balkans; the breakaway

republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and those Middle Eastern nations bordering Turkey, reaction time in the Southern Tier may not be much different from the past. Therefore, the degree to which nations in the Southern Tier, as well as those nations contributing to NATO's Rapid Reaction Force, may reduce the readiness and availability levels of their forces may not be as much as some currently perceive. Indeed, longer availability times and greater reliance on mobilizable forces will be feasible only so long as they remain in balance with a potential opponent's capabilities.

Annex 1

NATO Nations Along the Southern Tier

Country	Battle Tanks	Armored Combat Vehicles	Artillery	Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopter
France	1306	3820	1291	800/699	352
Greece	1735	2534/1641	1878	650/469	18/0
Italy	1348/1246	3239	1955	800/699	142/168
Portugal	300/146	430/249	450/343	160/96	26/0
Spain	794	1588/1256	1310	310/242	71/28
Turkey*	1795/3783	3120/3560	3523/4187	750/511	43/5

* Areas along Turkey's southeastern borders are excluded from the limitations imposed under the CFE Treaty. The totals of equipment reflect, therefore, the sum of Turkey's entitlements and the equipment held in the so-called "exclusion zone."

Sources: Barbara Starr, "Winners and Losers in NATO's CFE Shareout," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 6, 1991, pp. 18-19 and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1991-1992*, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991, *passim*.

Table 2. Entitlements/Anticipated Holdings of CFE Treaty Limited Equipment.

APPENDIX C

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

Because of smaller numbers of national forces likely to be available and increased reliance on mobilizable forces that will extend readiness and availability times of many units, potential shortfalls in adequate numbers of forces might occur. Recognizing this possibility and desiring to offset potential gaps, NATO has indicated an increased reliance on multinational formations.[1] However, transforming the political appeal of multinational formations into practical military reality presents daunting challenges. The difficulties inherent in differing languages, procedures, equipment, ammunition, and repair parts—the long known and considerable problems of interoperability—immediately leap to mind. But, while these obstacles are significant, they can be overcome—given sufficient time, energy, and resources.

Circumstances in the Southern Tier, however, will complicate efforts to create multinational structures. The geographic separation of the various nations within the Southern Tier, for example, impedes frequent, close contact between commanders and staffs, much less among units of a multinational corps or division. Additionally, France and Spain, two key actors in the Southern Tier, do not belong to NATO's integrated military structure. How to include formations from these nations without infringing upon their longstanding national prerogatives will require lengthy consideration and, perhaps, complicated structures and command and control arrangements. Finally, planners must face the reality of continued Greek-Turkish animosity. Even since Greece's return to the integrated military structure in 1980, NATO has been unable to fashion an allied command and control structure in the Balkans that includes Greece and Turkey.[2] Constructing a multinational formation containing Greek and Turkish units could well be a herculean task.

Nor has the foregoing discussion touched on lesser, but still important, questions of multinational forces: command and control procedures, headquarters organizations, staff procedures, etc. Neither have critical matters of interoperability, rationalization, and standardization been addressed. While not insurmountable, the complex issues involved will undoubtedly require long and difficult deliberations. At the same time, the establishment and organization of future multinational units need not start from scratch. Existing experience embodied in either LANDJUT Corps (a Danish-German formation formerly assigned to Allied Forces Northern Europe [AFNORTH]), or U.S. VIIth Corps and German 12th Panzer Division in Central Europe can provide some useful insights. Within the Southern Region, itself, precedent exists in the longstanding cooperation between Italy and Portugal.[3]

Multinational forces from outside the Southern Tier also will have to be integrated into future planning. As in the past, the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Air and Land Forces (AMF[A] and AMF[L], respectively) will be available for rapid reinforcement in times of crisis. Additional multinational rapid reaction forces will be available to provide not only a political message, but also credible military capabilities.[4]

Only recently, however, have Alliance military planners been able to turn to the complexities of integrating national military forces and intraregional, interregional, and external multinational augmentation forces into a coherent whole. As they come to grips with this formidable task, planners will face a number of issues: number and organization of multinational formations (both within and from outside the Southern Tier); command and control arrangements for the various forces, to include the sequencing of reinforcements into the region and command relationships between AMF and ACE Rapid Reaction Forces; and how best to integrate the various national doctrines. Secondary issues should address interoperability, standardization, and rationalization of forces, with particular attention to ammunition and sustainment requirements. These issues are not all inclusive, but they do represent types of questions that hold greater immediacy.

U.S. participation in multinational forces remains unclear. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney indicated at the close of the May 1991 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee in Brussels that the United States might offer a heavy division based in CONUS. But, a final decision on U.S. participation in the Rapid Reaction Forces, and particularly the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), has not yet been announced.[5] The United States needs to consider seriously the contribution it may make to the organization emerging as the keystone organization of future NATO forces. If the United States is content to furnish only intelligence, logistics, or strategic lift assets to the Rapid Reaction Forces, then it may be able to exert only a passive or negative influence on the future employment of rapid reaction forces; i.e., deny access to key intelligence systems and information, logistics capabilities, or transportation assets.

On the other hand, if the United States desires a more positive role in the development and potential employment of rapid reaction forces, then it will have to provide ground combat forces to the ARRC. From a practical standpoint, only those nations which make such a contribution, and therefore share the risks, will be able to advocate effectively for their employment. A commensurate investment in ground combat formations will be required if the United States desires influence in decisions concerning the ARRC. This contribution may be particularly important in the Southern Region, where recent experience indicates that some NATO nations may hesitate to send rapid reaction forces.[6]

Multinational formations, perhaps smaller than at present and possibly organized along functional capabilities, will constitute an essential supporting element of NATO's approach to resolving or, preferably, averting crises.[7] This task will require multinational forces to demonstrate greater flexibility of employment than required of many past national forces. Such forces must also be able to demonstrate Alliance cohesion, resolve, and capabilities, but in an unprovocative and tempered approach; no easy feat. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that smaller standing allied national forces will require NATO to adopt a unique degree of cooperation among

its members, obliging standardization, interoperability and alterations in the current wartime command structure. All of these issues must be considered in the development of new concepts for employment of multinational forces.

APPENDIX D

OPERATIONAL LEVEL TERRAIN ANALYSIS

The Balkans.

Terrain in northern Greece is highly restricted, with compartments running generally north-south along major river valleys. This problem is compounded by a lack of east-west lateral movement or maneuver routes which further tends to isolate the main avenues of approach. Furthermore, limited operational depth is available for defensive operations; for example, as little as 50 kilometers along the approach to Thessaloniki. Traditional invasion routes follow the Monastir Gap from Yugoslavia into Central Greece, the Axios River Valley approach to Thessaloniki, and the Maritsa River to Alexandroupolis.[1] The terrain lends itself to a strong positional defense initially along the border. If, however, an initial defense is broached, few natural obstacles are available to support subsequent defensive operations, especially along the Thessaloniki and Alexandroupolis approaches. When coupled with the lack of operational depth, NATO forces might be forced into a series of shallow lines rather than being able to conduct a battle based on maneuver. (See Map 5.)

Terrain in Thrace is more conducive to mobile operations, but the lack of depth limits operational options. The terrain along the Turkish-Bulgarian border and, especially, the central portion of Turkish Thrace can be used for mobile defensive operations. However, lack of operational depth (roughly 100-150 kilometers) restricts options largely to the tactical level. At the same time, few natural obstacles exist to help shape the battlefield or to support a mobile defense based on maneuver. Similar to the conditions in the Axios River Valley approach to Thessaloniki, the built-up area of Istanbul further

Map 5. Northern Greece, Greek and Turkish Thrace.

complicates the problem of a defense in depth in the vicinity of the Turkish Straits.

Eastern Anatolia.

Terrain conditions in eastern Anatolia pose a different set of problems than those faced in the Balkans. First, Turkey faces potential opponents along its entire eastern and southern frontiers. To the east lie borders of roughly 600 kilometers with the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Armenia and approximately 400 kilometers with Iran. To the south, Turkey shares considerable borders with Iraq (about 300 kilometers) and Syria (roughly 700 kilometers). Secondly, the terrain along these borders, particularly along the eastern frontier, is among the most rugged in the world. Numerous mountain chains run generally east-west, rising from about 1,000 meters in the west to over 5,000 meters along the eastern borders.[2] Moreover, the terrain is extremely steep, highly compartmented, and cut by major water obstacles.

Compounding the demanding terrain are the harsh climatic conditions that prevail much of the year. Winter snows come early, stay late, and reach several meters in depth. Roads and passes are frequently blocked for much of the winter and spring thaws damage the gravel roads which constitute the bulk of the lines of communications. Winter also brings literally killing cold as temperatures in the eastern mountains plummet to as low as -40°F.[3] In combination, these conditions severely constrain options available to military planners in the design of operational concepts.

Traditional invasion routes from the *Transcaucasus* region generally follow the course of major river valleys that cut through the mountains. In the north, the major axis of advance follows the Coruh River from Batumi (Georgia) to Artvin and then branches to the northwest along the river to Trabzon on the Black Sea coast, or west to the plateaus of Central Turkey, or south to the strategic crossroads at Erzurum. (See Map 6.) Slightly to the south, two other traditional routes are available: along the axis Leninakan (Armenia)-Kars-oepruekoey-



Map 6. Eastern Anatolia.

Erzurum or the route from Yerevan (Armenia) to Erzurum along the Aras River and auto route E40.

Along the *Turkish-Iranian border*, operationally significant ingress routes from Iran are even more limited. An opponent would first have to seize the key choke point between the massifs of Mount Ararat (in excess of 5,000 meters) and Mount Alaca (3,500 meters) located at Dogubayazit. Having secured this key node, an attacker could proceed northwest generally along auto route E23 to Karakoese. At this point, he would have two options: continue northwest toward Erzurum or turn southwest along the valley of the Murat River toward Mus and, then, to Diyarbakir, Batman, or Bitlis. Further south, an approach from Khvoy (Iran) along the south shore of Lake Van to Van or Bitlis is also possible.

Terrain and weather conditions along most of the *Turkish-Iraqi border* are similar to those discussed above. With the exception of the northeast corner of Iraq's border with Turkey, large scale modern maneuver operations would be extremely difficult to mount or sustain. While military operations are possible to the north and northwest of Zakho (Iraq), it is difficult to discern an eventual operational or strategic objective that would justify offensive operations beyond the immediate border area. Moreover, any large scale mechanized operations would undoubtedly have to make use of Syrian territory to obtain adequate maneuver space. While possible, it is difficult to foresee a Syrian-Iraqi collaboration that would make such operations feasible. And, as daily news films during OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT clearly displayed, even this relatively 'moderate' terrain would present considerable challenges for large scale operational maneuver.

Extensive operations in the rugged and inhospitable terrain of eastern and southeastern Turkey certainly are fraught with risks for an attacker. The mountainous terrain and limited lines of communication favor a defender. That said, historical evidence suggests that a positional defense is subject to by-pass by less travelled routes. Moreover, helicopters can be used to by-pass or turn a more static defense.[4] Whether a potential attacker could sustain modern warfare given the lack of infrastructure in the region or whether sufficient numbers of

helicopters might be available remains to be seen. At the same time, limited lines of communication and the narrow, lengthy defiles through which they must pass provide lucrative interdiction targets. Nonetheless, military planners need to take these possibilities into consideration in the development of future operational concepts in the area.

The terrain and weather conditions along *Turkish borders with Syria* are more hospitable, but still present considerable challenges to a potential opponent. Relatively low in altitude compared to the eastern border region, elevations average between 200 meters along the Syrian border and gradually slope up to about 1,000 meters. Two mountain chains, however, traverse the eastern portion of the area, rising to approximately 1,500 meters in the east and 2,000 meters in the central portion of the region. These chains offer the most dominant terrain for a defense of the key city of Diyarbakir. A more substantial mountain chain (average peaks of roughly 2,500 meters, reaching heights of 3,000 meters) roughly parallels the Turkish-Syrian border at a distance of approximately 100 kilometers, arching from below Iskenderun to Maras to Adiyamin to Ergani to Mus.[5] (See Map 6.) These mountains would tend to contain any operations from continuing further north. This chain also protects the only east-west lateral road and rail communications in close proximity to Turkey's southern border.[6]

Rough broken ground covers most of this area. Outside of a few key river valleys, slopes normally exceed 8 percent, thus constraining mobile, maneuver warfare. Moreover, the region's two major river systems—Tigris and Euphrates—tend to run in deep gorges rather than broad valleys and cut perpendicular to the major mountain chains, contributing to significant terrain compartments.[7] Further to the west in the Hatay region, a steep spine down the center of the spur divides the region, although a narrow mountain defile provides access to the key port of Iskenderun.

On balance, the terrain along Turkey's southern frontier with Syria tends to favor a tactical defense. Operational level maneuver and counterconcentration are possible, but may be difficult to execute. Both attacker and defender would be

constrained by lack of modern infrastructure and limited lines of communication within and leading to the area of operations. However, terrain limits the defender's lateral operational level mobility and his ability to counterconcentrate forces may be considerably constrained. An attacker may not be similarly constrained, as the more open topography to the south may permit greater levels of cross country traffic and provide greater relative ability to transfer forces laterally.

APPENDIX ENDNOTES

APPENDIX B

1. The distribution of TLE entitlements can be found in Starr, "Winners and Losers in CFE Shareout," p. 19. For example, an outline of Turkey's modernizationa and procurement plans can be found in Giovanni de Briganti, "Turkey Continues to Modernize Its Armed Forces," *Defense News* (Washington, DC), November 11, 1991, p. 15.

2. Of Italy's planned 15 brigades, only 5 will be fully manned with volunteers. The remaining 10 brigades will be a mixture of volunteers and conscripts and will be available within 30-90 days. A third group, designated reserve and mobilization forces, will fall in on the remainder of the equipment and will be available after 90+ days. "Italy Plans Smaller, Better Forces," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, December 7, 1991, p. 1083. For more details of intended reductions, see "And the General Played the Mercenaries Card," a series of interviews in *La Repubblica* (Rome), October 31, 1991, November 5, 1991, and November 9, 1991, in *FBIS*-WEU-91-228, November 26, 1991, pp. 36-42.

3. Details are contained in Patrice-H. Desaubliaux, *Le Figaro* (Paris), March 10, 1992, p. 28 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-052, March 17, 1992, p. 18; "Pierre Joxe: Buying the Mirage 2000-5 Is 'Out of the Question'," *Liberation* (Paris), November 1, 1991, p. 35 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-221, November 15, 1991, pp. 14-15; Dominique Garraud, "The Leclerc Tank Goes on the Defensive," *Liberation* (Paris), January 15, 1992, p. 10 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-025, February 6, 1992, p. 14; "France to Delay Production of Tiger Helicopter and Le Triomphant Submarine," *Le Monde* (Paris), February 16-17, 1992, p. 8 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-036, February 24, 1992, pp. 22-23; Jacques Isnard, "Army to Lose One-Fifth of its Personnel," *Le Monde* (Paris), November 14, 1991, pp. 1,12 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-221, November 15, 1991, pp. 13-14.

4. "Charter for Change," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 18, 1992, pp. 655-656; "Air Force Builds in Flexibility," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 18, 1992, pp. 661-663; Starr, "Winners and Losers in the NATO CFE Share Out," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 6, 1991, pp. 18-19; and Cristina de la Hoz, "People's Party Proposes Halving Number of Troops and Air and Naval Forces," *ABC* (Madrid), April 20, 1992, p. 26 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-085, May 1, 1992, pp. 25-26.

5. Details of Portuguese efforts are in Eduardo Mascarenhas, "Heads of Armed Forces Launch New Military Model," *Diario de Noticias*, March 12, 1992, p. 2 in *FBIS*-WEU-92-072, April 14, 1992, p. 34-35. A not very detailed overview of Greek efforts is in "The Hellenic Armed Forces in a New Era," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 36, No. 7, December 1991, pp. 49-52.

Discussions of Turkish restructuring can be found in Ertugrul Ozkok, "Important Decisions in the Turkish Army," *Hurriyet* (Istanbul), August 2, 1991, p. 21 in *FBIS*- WEU-91-174, September 9, 1991, pp. 44-45; Interview with Defense Minister Barlas Dogu, *Tempo* (Istanbul), September 8-14, 1991, pp. 22-23 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-201, October 17, 1991, pp. 52-54; and Turan Yilmaz, "The First Step Toward Modernizing the Turkish Armed Forces," *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), December 13, 1991, p. 14 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-244, December 19, 1991, pp. 29-30.

6. For a breakout of the various models of equipment held within the Southern Tier, see the respective national sections contained in the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance: 1991-1992*, London: Brassey's, 1991, *passim*.

7. Starr, "Winners and Losers in NATO CFE Shareout," p. 19. It also appears that less equipment than anticipated will be available for transfer, largely due to failures to alter U.S. laws that currently constrain such transfers. Finally, even after transfers are complete, no nation in the region will possess the most modern main battle tanks.

8. In its December 1991 meeting, the DPC recognized the importance of continuing military assistance to Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. M-DPC-2(91)104, December 13, 1991, p. 4.

9. See various national descriptions in IISS, *The Military Balance*, *passim*.

10. See, for example, Ertugrul Ozkok, "Important Decisions in the Turkish Army," *Hurriyet*, August 2, 1991, p. 21 in *FBIS*-WEU-91-174, September 9, 1991, pp. 44-45; Giovanni de Briganti, "Turkey Continues to Modernize its Armed Forces," *Defense News*, November 11, 1991, p. 15; and Unit Enginsoy, "Turkey Plans Smaller, More Potent Army Based on Gulf Lessons," *Defense News*, January 20, 1992, p. 10.

11. NATO's new strategic concept specifically recognizes this condition. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," p. 12.

APPENDIX C ENDNOTES

1. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," pp. 14-15.

2. Greece left the integrated military structure in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and returned in October 1980, but under considerable conditions. Twelve years later, Greece still is not fully integrated into the military structure and no multinational NATO headquarters has been established in Greece. For an overview, see MacDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean," pp. 76-77.

3. A brief description of the VII Corps/12th Panzer Division relationship is found in LTG Frederick M. Franks and Major Alan T. Carver, "Building a NATO Corps," *Military Review*, July 1991, pp. 30-33. A description of the Danish-German Landjut Corps and Portuguese-Italian cooperation can be found in George, ed., *Jane's NATO Handbook*, pp. 129-130 and 136, respectively.

4. A first example of the use of multinational forces to compensate for reduced national forces and reinforce a threatened area is the decision of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, at its May 1991 meeting, to create a multinational, rapid reaction corps, commanded by a British officer. M-DPC-1(91)39, May 29, 1991, p. 3.

5. "Cold War Battle Orders Make Way For New NATO Era," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 8, 1991, p. 961. In September 1991 Admiral William Smith, U.S. Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee, indicated that the United States is considering whether "probably one of the Reserve divisions could be called up, if necessary, and provided to the Rapid Reaction Force." Interview with Admiral William Smith, "One on One," *Defense News*, September 23, 1991, p. 38. While the prospect of providing a heavy division is laudable, the United States may wish to reconsider assigning a division from the reserve forces, which may not be able to meet the reaction time lines anticipated for the Rapid Reaction Corps (roughly 5-7 days). Michael Mecham, "NATO's New Strategy Stresses Mobility for 'Crisis Management'," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, June 3, 1991, p. 23. Additional forces, such as an aviation or field artillery brigade or an armored cavalry regiment might also merit consideration for inclusion in the U.S. commitment to the Rapid Reaction Corps. No information on U.S. participation in Rapid Reaction Forces was announced at the latest DPC Meeting in May 1992.

6. For example, Germany balked at sending forces to support Turkey during the recent crisis in the Gulf. See, for example, Marc Fisher, "NATO to Send Warplanes to Defend Turkey's Border with Iraq," *The Washington Post*, January 3, 1991, p. A. 17 or Marc Fisher, "Germany Reluctant to Defend Turkey if Iraq Retaliates," *The Washington Post*, January 22, 1992, p. A20.

7. Final Communique, Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, M-DPC/NPG-1(91)38, May 29, 1991, p. 4.

APPENDIX D ENDNOTES

1. For example, the German *Wehrmacht* used all three of these approaches in its invasion of Greece in April 1941. A brief but excellent overview of the German campaign in Greece is found in Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-260, *The German Campaign in the Balkans (Spring 1941)*, Washington, DC, November 1953, pp. 70-118.

2. Unless otherwise indicated, information contained in this and the subsequent two paragraphs is drawn from Faringdon, *Strategic Geography*, pp. 208-212.

3. *Ibid.* and John C. Dewdney, *Turkey: An Introductory Geography*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, pp. 35-36. Snow coverage averages over 120 days per year.

4. Faringdon, *Strategic Geography*, p. 210.

5. Information is taken or derived from Dewdney, *Turkey: An Introductory Geography*, pp. 18 and 27.

6. In the western portion of the zone, the mountains do not screen the lines of communication, but alternate lines of communication are available from Sivas. Additionally, a rail line does run on a substantial length of the Turkish-Syrian border; however, in the event of hostilities it would not be available for Turkish use.

7. Information is taken or derived from Dewdney, *Turkey: An Introductory Geograpy*, pp. 30 and 202, respectively.

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