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ROLE OF SECURITY FORCES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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The author has analyzed seven salient issues concerned with the role of security forces in counterinsurgency: contribution of security force operations towards national strategy of counterinsurgency and LIC; timing of employment of security forces and the nature of response; type of forces suitable for counterinsurgency operations; civic action and the security forces role in its elimination of external support, especially from adjacent states; efficacy of employing security forces in combatting insurgency in another country; effect of national and international public opinion on actions of security forces.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> . . . military power [in revolutionary war] plays essentially a secondary role; the decisive factor is the population, which is both the strongest force in the struggle as well as its primary object.(1)
>
> --- Peter Paret.

The revolutionary myth dominates all modern international affairs. Limited forms of war can no longer be seen as evidence of limited aims: they have become a tactical means towards strategic ends. A combination of politics and force has now become almost inevitable. Condit and Cooper in their research in 1971 accounted for 57 internal conflicts during the 20th Century.(2) Insurgency evidently has become one of the most common and subtle forms of modern conflict.

Consequently, counterinsurgency has been thrust upon governments as a major pre-occupation. Studies of most insurgencies and counterinsurgencies indicate that the struggle primarily has been directed towards winning the hearts and minds of people. However, in almost every counterinsurgency the security forces have played a

a significant role. Used adroitly, they have proved to be very effective; whereas their injudicious employment has benefitted the insurgents instead.

Primary Thesis Question

The primary question of my thesis, therefore is: How can the security forces accomplish their role in counterinsurgency?

Background

Expression of dissent and resistance, a human reaction to the established order, is an age old phenomenon in the long and checkered history of mankind. Individuals and groups who felt aggrieved or oppressed and could not achieve their aims by peaceful means, resorted to violence. The spectrum of forces affecting national and international politics has greatly broadened since World War II. While acquisition of nuclear weapons by various powers has increased chances of mutually assured destruction, insurgency and terrorism in various forms have given a new dimension to low level violence. It has become a new strategy for attainment of political aims. Although subversion and insurgency have been known for centuries, they have seldom been used to better effect than during the last 40-50 years.

Two-third of the world's nations are less than 40 years old and were created out of colonial territories that were ethnically diverse and economically dependent. Often lacking indigenous merchant and professional classes, most of these young nations had limited means of establishing an honest, stable and efficient government. The abilities of police, administrative, judicial and in some cases even military organizations were also limited by lack of training, mobility and striking power. Many nations lacked well developed internal transportation systems. This prevented governments from maintaining an effective presence throughout their territories and created potential bastions for insurgents.

Dealing with these insurgents therefore, has become a major pre-occupation of most governments. Philosophies of counterinsurgency have developed with experience gained by nations and doctrine has accordingly varied, depending on the existing environment. Counterinsurgency is strategic rather than tactical in nature. It invokes the art of harmonizing the application of numerous pressures in tackling a complex problem. Counterinsurgency operations need to have an integrated approach of all the government machinery. Military operations are just one, though a very vital component. Political parties, civil administration, intelligence agencies, social reformers, intellectuals and the media have to be brought under one organization to combat insurgency.

Operations launched by security forces to contain and then eliminate the option of violence as a means to achieving political aims by insurgent groups, represent the military component of counterinsurgency operations. Needless to say that military operations may often be an essential prerequisite for mounting political and economic programs.

Having first established the fact that the security forces play a positive role in combatting insurgency, I will proceed to address certain important issues which relate to the employment of security forces.

Salient Issues

Though the thesis deals primarily with counterinsurgency, it would be prudent to briefly discuss important aspects of insurgency at first. The knowledge and understanding of insurgency is extremely essential to the security forces involved in counterinsurgency operations. I will therefore, touch upon the nature and types of insurgencies, known models and their development, and organization of insurgent infrastructure.

The first main issue which I would like to address is whether the security force operations contribute towards the national strategy of combatting insurgency. That they do, is

probably easy to establish. What is more difficult to elucidate, is how they go about achieving this task.

The second issue relates to the "timing." When should the security forces be employed? Should it be a total involvement right from the beginning or should it be a graduated response? The question connected to this is the type of forces suitable for counterinsurgency. Is it the police, the army or the para-military forces or an altogether separate force?

The next issue is the business of "civic action." Should the role of the security forces be restricted to combat or extended to civic action? What is the likely fallout of this, especially in terms of transition --- the transition from a conventional to an unconventional environment, which is an eternal dilemma facing the security forces.

One of the elements of insurgency is "external support." If the origin of this support happens to be from a country or area located just across the border, it leads to serious problems, especially for the security forces. The fifth issue I would like to address is the elimination of this external support, both by active and passive means.

The sixth question relates to intervention by foreign security forces. What is the efficacy of employing security forces in combatting insurgency in another country?

The next issue concerns "public opinion." National and international public opinion often dictate the employment and actions of the security forces. How can the security forces overcome this complex problem, within the environs of the media, law and human rights?

End Notes

Chapter 1

1. Paret, P. The French Army and La Guerre Revolutionnaire. p 59, (as cited by John Baylis in "Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies," p 138.

2. McLaurin, R. D. and Miller, R. Urban Counterinsurgency: Case Studies and Implications for U.S. Military Forces. U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland,: Technical Memorandum, October 1989, p 16.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

> . . . like insurgency, the central objective [in a counterinsurgency] must be civilian loyalty, which can only be secured by an interlocking system of actions on different planes, which isolates the insurgents from the population, and which secures the allegiance of the people.(1)
>
> --- John Baylis.

While carrying out a review of literature for this thesis, I divided my research for ease of concentration on three aspects:

(a) Meaning / Definition of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.

(b) Insurgency: nature and types of insurgencies; known models of insurgencies; and insurgent infrastructure.

(c) Counterinsurgency: as part of national strategy and military aspects of counterinsurgency.

Definitions

Guerilla Warfare

> Guerrilla warfare by tradition is a weapon of protest employed to rectify real or imagined wrongs levied on a people either by a foreign invader or by the ruling government. As such,it may be employed independently or it may be used to complement orthodox military operations. . . . In either capacity the importance of its role has varied considerably through history.(2)

This is how guerrilla warfare has been described in Encyclopedia Britannica.

Insurgency

Insurgency as defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication (Pub) 1-02,(3) "is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict." This definition has been accepted as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine by the U.S. Army and Air Force.(4)

The British Army definition varies very slightly. According to the Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) Handbook of their Staff College, "insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of illegal measures, including the use of force."(5)

Insurgency has also been described as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employ political resources, organizational skills, propaganda, or demonstrations and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspects of the political system the ruling authorities consider illegitimate.(6)

Counterinsurgency

Although, logically one can surmise that counterinsurgency is the exact opposite of insurgency, it is bound by different parameters. David Galula points out that counterinsurgency is "a distinct form of warfare with its own laws, principles, tactics, and strategy, and these are not the obverse of those applicable to insurgency."(7)

JCS Pub 1-02 and the CRW Handbook, both define counterinsurgency as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Accordingly, counterinsurgency can also be stated as all measures of government activity to combat insurgency by civilian, military, and police organizations in terms of economic development, political and administrative reforms and psychological warfare aimed at winning over the people.

Insurgency

Nature of Insurgencies

Understanding the nature of insurgency is undoubtedly an essential preliminary to its eradication. Revolutions to overthrow governments and regimes have occurred throughout history. In the 20th Century, revolutionary war has been waged in one form or the other, in all continents with regular success. The theory and practice have been adapted to a wide variety of situations. Although most practitioners of revolutionary war have been Communist, the doctrine has been applied successfully by non-Communist movements, too.

This brings us to the differences in various types of insurgencies. It is undoubtedly a difficult task to categorize insurgencies into water tight compartments. Bard O'Neill has attempted to identify six types of insurgent movements based on the ultimate goal of the insurgents and relating it to the aspects of political legitimacy. These are: secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, conservative, and reformist. Secessionist insurgents, such as the Eritreans in Ethiopia, reject the existing political community of which they are formally a part; they seek to withdraw from it and constitute a new autonomous political community. Revolutionary insurgents

seek to impose a new regime based on egalitarian values and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community (e.g., Marxist insurgents). While restorational insurgent movements also seek to displace the regime, the values and structures they champion are identified with a recent political order. The National Front for the Rescue of Afghanistan is an example. Although reactionary insurgents likewise seek to change the regime by reconstituting a past political order, their repristination relates to an idealized, golden age of the distant past in which religious values and authoritarian structures were predominant, (e.g., the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt). Conservative insurgents on the other hand, seek to maintain the existing regime in the face of pressures on the authorities to change it, (Protestant organizations in Ulster in 1970s.) Finally, reformist insurgents, such as the Kurds in Iraq have attempted to obtain more political, social and economic benefits without necessarily rejecting the political community, regime or authorities. They are primarily concerned with the policies that are considered discriminatory in their eyes.(8)

Beckett typifies modern insurgency into fairly convenient divisions of political, military, socio-economic, ideological, psychological and international dimensions.(9)

Another factor to be considered is the rural versus the urban scenario. The striking fact about urban insurgency is that it is neither as rare nor as marginal to outcomes as literature and general opinion suggest. One of the first theoretician -practitioners to emphasize the role of urban insurgents in a revolutionary movement was "Che" Guevara. His predecessors generally minimized the urban aspects of insurgency. As Guevara wrote, "the importance of a suburban struggle has usually been underestimated; it is really very great."(10) `Suburban' bands were infact guerrilla bands who closed in on cities and penetrated the surrounding country. They would then operate under the orders of the chiefs located in another zone. Guevara was merely recognizing the importance of the urban role in the Cuban revolution, a revolution that to this day, is understood by others almost exclusively in its rural context. According to him, urban insurgents must remain subordinate to the real leaders of the revolution who are in the countryside.(11)

Models of Insurgency

Field Manual (FM) 100-20 of the U.S. Army, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,(12) explains four general patterns of insurgency: subversive; critical cell; mass-oriented; and traditional insurgencies.

Subversive insurgents penetrate the political structure to control in and use it for their own purposes. They seek elective and appointed offices. They employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, and disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system to be incompetent. It may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response, which further undermines its legitimacy. A highly compartmented armed element normally carries out insurgent violence, while a political element guides the armed element and also maneuvers for control of the existing political structure. The Nazi rise to power in the 1930's is an example of this model.

In the critical-cell pattern, the insurgents also infiltrate government institutions. Their object is to destroy the system from within. The infiltrators operate both covertly and overtly. Normally, the insurgents seek to undermine institutional legitimacy and convince or coerce others to assist them. Their violence remains covert until the institutions are so weakened that the insurgency's superior organization seizes power, supported by armed force. The Russian revolution of October 1917, or the Leninist model, followed this pattern. The "foco" model is a variation of this pattern.

Mass-oriented insurgency aims to achieve political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Unlike those

in the two previous models, mass-oriented insurgents emphasize creating a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. They challenge that system and then destroy or supplant it. These insurgents patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas. They also construct a base of active and passive political supporters. Examples of this model include the communist revolution in China, the Vietcong insurgency and the "Sendoro Luminoso" (Shining Path) insurgency in Peru.

The traditional insurgency normally grows from very specific grievances. It springs from tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, or other similarly identifiable groups. These insurgents perceive that the government has denied the rights and interests of their group and work to establish or restore them. They seldom seek to overthrow the government or to control the whole society. These insurgencies may cease if the government accedes to the insurgents' demands, but the demands are usually so excessive that the government concedes its legitimacy along with them. The Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan are examples of this model.

No insurgency follows one pattern exclusively. Each develops unique characteristics appropriate to its own circumstances, and changes as situations vary. However,

in this century, the Maoist and the Foco models have been the most actively followed. With rapid urbanization, another model has emerged to suit its peculiar requirements. This urban insurgency model is primarily a variation or adaptation of the former models.

Mao's philosophy of guerrilla warfare has been well translated and commented by Brigadier General Griffith in Mao-Tse Tung on Guerrilla Warfare.(13) The basic policy of the Chinese Communist Party was to seize state power and the type of revolutionary guerrilla warfare advocated by Mao was the primary weapon used to achieve and establish this policy. Mao's thesis, Yu Chi Chan, written in 1937, was written for the Communist forces then based in Yenan, and envisaged a period of hardening and training in war for the more important postwar struggle. Mao-Tse Tung never spoke truer words than those quoted by General Griffith in his book: "The guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China but will be worldwide."

Mao advocated that revolutionary war needs to be conducted in three phases: (a) the pre-revolutionary phase or the strategic defensive, designed to expand the party organization and establish the infrastructure; (b) the insurgency phase or the strategic stalemate, during which the

party gains in strength and increases its influence over the people; (c) the limited war phase or the strategic counter offensive, in which the movement assumes a people's war against the government.(14)

In contrast to Lenin and Mao, who stressed the organization of parallel political and military structures, Guevara and Debray, in their books, Guerrilla Warfare, and Revolution in the Revolution, argued that the guerilla army was the revolution. The force provided the `focus' around which the people rallied.(15) According to them, instead of developing a comprehensive infrastructure in a prolonged pre-revolutionary, "strategic defensive" phase, a force of guerrillas moves into a suitable area and begins operations, constantly on the move to avoid detection and surprise by the enemy. This force provides a `focus' to which those sympathetic to the revolution rally in increasing numbers giving the revolution growing momentum and military power, in the face of which the regime crumbles. The theory proved attractive because the reduced emphasis on organization gave the promise of quick results and more ideological freedom.

The credibility of the Foco theory has fluctuated according to its success in various revolutionary movements. Although it succeeded in Cuba, it failed in Venezuela, Colombia, and Bolivia.

The Foco theory, originally developed for rural revolution, has also been adapted to form the core of a fourth approach to revolutionary war, that of the urban guerrilla. The complexity of modern life, the spread of urban areas and the ease with which they can be disrupted has undoubtedly encouraged the growth of urban guerrilla philosophies and tactics. The term "Urban Guerrilla" was popularized by Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian revolutionary, with his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, published in the 1960's.(16) What distinguishes urban guerrillas from terrorists is that they have a strategy for armed insurrection or political victory, however Utopian it may seem. They tend to follow the emphasis placed on military action in the Foco theory, believing "revolutionary action in itself generates revolutionary consciousness, organization, and conditions."(17)

Brian M. Jenkins, in his An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments, (18) says that urban guerrilla warfare is a form of political struggle like any other form of warfare. It can be a prelude, a substitute, or an accompaniment to rural guerrilla warfare, or to a conventional military contest. With the possible exception of Hungary in 1956, France in 1968, and Northern Ireland, urban guerrillas in the developed countries of the world have come nowhere near threatening the survival of any government. According to him, the urban strategy for the guerrillas consists of five stages,

each marked by different objectives, targets and tactics: a "violent propaganda stage," during which the guerrillas publicize their cause; an "organizational growth stage," during which the guerrillas concentrate on building their organization to prepare for the third phase, the "guerrilla offensive," during which the guerrillas challenge the police for control of the streets, followed by the "mobilization of the masses," during which the guerrillas turn their campaign into a mass movement, leading finally to the last stage, the "urban uprising."(19)

Insurgent Infrastructure

Infrastructure refers to the individuals and groups which organizationally constitute the `party, civil, and military elements' of an insurgency. Infrastructure is alternately known as parallel hierarchy, shadow government, and in older references, the underground.(20) In theory, infrastructure extends from the villages all the way to the national-level Central Committee, and includes the Military High Command as well. In Communist type insurgency models, Main Force guerrilla units are not considered part of the insurgent infrastructure. Though highly politicized, Main Force units are strictly military formations with combat missions. They do not respond to regional or district party committees.(21)

Although insurgent organizations vary in different models, and depend upon various operational areas and countries, by and large they conform to a generic model. Any counterinsurgent force would like to address itself to the organization of the insurgents, especially so at the functional level. The cell is the basic building block of insurgent infrastructure. Historically, cells are composed of a leader and two to seven members. The actual size of the cell is determined by its mission and the conditions under which it functions. They are normally assigned either by geographic area or by mission.(22)

To quote Bard O'Neill, "insurgency remains the principal form of conflict on our planet today." (23) Insurgency is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon having wide variations with respect to specific goals and strategies. Similarly, a variety of counterinsurgency strategies have developed over the years to combat these different models of insurgency.

Counterinsurgency

> Counterinsurgency is like . . . trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. It is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. The dog may not find the tomcat; if he does, the tomcat will escape up a tree; the dog will then chase the female cats in the alley. The answer is to put in a fiercer tomcat.(24)

Militarily, this is how Robert Thompson explains the equation of counterinsurgency with the security forces, in his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency. Robert Thompson has been considered as an authority on counterinsurgency operations, and many of his concepts have been incorporated as doctrine in the British Army. One of the purposes of the book was to show how the situation in Vietnam could be prevented elsewhere.

The author emphasizes that the insurgents must be defeated at the earliest possible moment, and that in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency the government must secure its base areas first and then work methodically outwards. He points out that the demonstration of the government's determination and capacity to win is the foundation of popular support, but that most search-and-clear operations, supported by artillery and planes, create more Communists than they kill. He also stresses that the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas. Thompson prescribed five principles designed as a guide to be followed by counterinsurgent forces: the government should have a clear political aim; it should function in accordance with law; it should have an overall plan containing not only the military measures but also the political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures needed;

it must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas; and in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, it must secure its base areas first.

Julian Paget in Counterinsurgency Operations, surmises that successful counterinsurgency campaigns are conducted in three phases: Phase One, a period wherein there is increasing lawlessness of some element of the population which is in conflict with the government; Phase Two, essentially a defensive phase in which the insurgents hold the initiative; Phase Three, the final stage in which the security forces have gained the initiative and bring pressure to bear upon the insurgents. At this point the emergency may be ended and a political solution to the problem is possible.(25)

Paget establishes certain essential requirements for counterinsurgency forces, if they are to operate successfully. These requirements include: (a) civil-military understanding; (b) a joint command and control structure; (c) good intelligence; (d) mobility; and (e) training.(26) In a sense, these are the broad, general principles upon which any counterinsurgency campaign must be based.

One consistent theme expounded by Paget throughout his book is the necessity for complete integration of the Civil

Administration, the Armed Forces and the Police into one coordinated team, working from a common plan in close cooperation rather than in isolation. He shows how this was accomplished, as he sums up the secret of the success of the British Army in those campaigns: to the military professional, the possession of a plan is standard operating procedure, but teamwork in carrying it out involves competent leadership and direction. These factors, which are essential to any successful conventional military operation, are no less requirements for counterinsurgency operations conducted under civil, military, or police command and control.

In The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, John McCuen, comprehensively treats the subject of counter-revolutionary war in its psychological, political, as well as military aspects. His main point is that the principles adopted by the insurgents must be put into "reverse" by the government.(27) His theory is developed from the viewpoint of the indigenous government dealing with an insurgency, not from the viewpoint of any supporting government wondering how to apply its often irrelevant power and resources.

McCuen hypothesizes that while the solution to defeating revolutionary warfare is the application of its strategy in reverse, it is also true that revolutionary principles are equally applicable to counter-revolutionary

warfare. The counter-revolutionaries must establish their own strategic bases and then expand them to cover the country. By unifying their psycho-politico-military operations, they must mobilize popular and outside support so that they can expand the tempo of the struggle and defeat the revolutionary organization in whatever forms or combinations of warfare it chooses to adopt. Since the revolutionaries will try to preserve their organization by withdrawing from base to base and from phase to phase, the counter-revolutionary objectives should be to expand any advantage gained by maintaining contact, retaining the initiative and rolling back the revolutionary organization. It is important to anticipate the changes in revolutionary operations and strategy and therefore apply their principles in "reverse" so as to defeat the enemy with his own weapons on his own battlefield.

Frank Kitson is another expert (besides Robert Thompson), whose thoughts and writings have greatly influenced British Army doctrine of counterinsurgency. He has blended his vast knowledge and experience of insurgency and counterinsurgency while putting across his views in his books, Low Intensity Operations, and Bunch of Five. The basic fundamentals for success in low intensity operations stressed by him have also been adopted in great measure in U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine. These basic fundamentals include the absolute requirement for an effective intelligence system

interfacing closely with operational units; integration of military, police and civil planning as well as activities at all levels; availability of a highly disciplined, immediately deployed reserve; and the maintenance of a cadre of experts in the long lead time skills of psychological operations, civil affairs and unconventional warfare.(28)

Kitson's contribution lies more in his suggestions on the imaginative application of these fundamentals. He discusses the role of the security forces as viewed both by the civilian authorities and the security forces themselves. The necessity for the integration of intelligence and operations is his most important lesson and perhaps the one least appreciated by the conventional soldier. His approach to the question of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations is best explained when he describes the process as a sort of game, "based on intense mental activity allied to a determination to find things out and an ability to regard everything on its merits without regard to customs, doctrine or drill."(29)

David Galula, in his Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, sets out to define the laws of counter-revolutionary warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics. He observes that an insurgency can reach a high degree of

development by legal and peaceful means, atleast in countries where political opposition is tolerated. Thus, pre-emptive moves on part of the counterinsurgent are severely limited. The most effective step he can take is to try to eliminate or alleviate the conditions propitious for an insurgency.(30)

With his wealth of experience, he explains that from a counterinsurgent's point of view, a revolutionary war can be divided into two periods. First is the "cold revolutionary war," when the insurgents' activity remains on the whole legal and non-violent. The second period is the "hot revolutionary war," when the insurgents' activity becomes openly illegal and violent. In dealing with the insurgents in these periods, he advocates four general courses of action, which however are not mutually exclusive: (a) the counterinsurgent may act directly on the insurgent; (b) he may act indirectly on the conditions that are prevalent in an insurgency; (c) he may infiltrate the insurgent movement and try to make it ineffective; (d) he may build up or reinforce his political machine.

He writes that not until the political machine has been rebuilt from the population upward and mobilized in support of the regime can the insurgency be successfully crushed. The inescapable conclusion is that the overall responsibility should stay with the civilian power at every possible level.

In his opinion, if there is a shortage of trusted officials, nothing prevents filling the gap with military personnel serving in a civilian capacity --- "if worse comes to worst, the fiction, at least, should be preserved."(31)

Another analysis of the French experience, is given by Peter Paret in his French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria. He analyzes the French doctrine of "guerre revolutionnaire," which was formulated by French officers, whose experiences in Indochina led them to seek new ways of countering anticolonial insurrections. Recognizing the interdependence of the guerrilla, the civil population, and social administration, the French theorists submit that the Army must therefore control the total administration of an area subjected to insurrection. They believed that once the large-scale fighting in the area was ended, and the area was secured from outside attacks, the slow work of administrative organization could proceed. He also notes that the French experience was almost military in character.(32)

Roger Trinquier, in Modern Warfare: a French View of Counterinsurgency, provides a radical opinion, which is interesting. While developing strategic and tactical rules for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, he remarks that it is essential to make use of all the weapons the enemy employs; otherwise the army could no longer fulfill its

mission, nor could it defend itself. However, he emphasizes the fact that in revolutionary war, allegiance of the civilian population becomes one of the most vital objectives of the whole struggle. "Military tactics and hardware are all well and good, but they are really quite useless if one has lost the confidence of the population among whom one is fighting."(33)

From the review of literature, one feature that stands out prominently is the significance of the role of the security forces in counterinsurgency. The insurgents view the security forces as the arm of the government, which has to be neutralized in order for them to gain control. They normally use selective violence and terror to intimidate the security forces and provoke them to undertake repressive measures, thus alienating the population. Although the overall focus of the government is political, it also has to depend on the security forces for achieving its aim of garnering legitimacy. It is a means of providing confidence among the public and ensuring security for the developmental programs being planned and executed by the government. Most of the literature zeroes on to the fact, that gaining public support and public opinion are equally, if not more important, than winning the physical battle over the insurgents.

Research Methodology

Besides studying these works, which included views and theories of famous practitioners and analysts, I reviewed several monographs and theses on the subject of revolutionary warfare. I also surveyed various articles in professional journals, which highlighted specific aspects concerned with this study. I shall refer to these as I progress in this paper, and when I discuss specific issues in the detailed analysis as part of Chapter 4.

I considered two options for carrying out my research. First, was to analyze a few case studies and compare them but this may not have given me all the answers to my anticipated questions. The second option was to take up my questions separately and try to obtain possible solutions by researching relevant insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns. I decided to design my research on a combination approach.

Accordingly, I studied the cases of Algeria, Uruguay, Northern Ireland, and Vietnam to form a foundation for my thesis. While Uruguay and Northern Ireland were urban oriented insurgencies, the other two had a rural bias. Thereafter, I followed the second option ie I studied specific issues and discussed what concepts, policies and doctrines are adopted by various countries to deal with the same.

End Notes

Chapter 2

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21. Ibid., p 4.

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CHAPTER 3

CASES

The four cases being represented in this study have been chosen to provide some representation of geographical dispersion, as well as differences in conflict duration and intensity. One case each has been taken from Asia, Africa, Europe and America. Linkages between urban and rural insurgency, degree of external support, and political motivation of the insurgent were some of the other factors considered while selecting these cases.

The cause for the Uruguayan insurgency was to bring about "political change," wherein the motivation was to bring about some change in the political order in an existing state. The basic cause in the Algerian case was "anticolonial," in which the motivation was to secure the independence of a territory. In the case of Northern Ireland, initially the stated cause was "integration" since the insurgents contested the legitimacy of one state and desired to integrate with another existing state; however, later this cause shifted to more of a political one and to a degree,

became one of secession. The Vietnam case was rather complex, and within it one could find evidence of each of the three causes mentioned above.

In this chapter, I intend to briefly lay out the cases so as to set the stage for analysis of salient issues. I shall cover the background, then highlight the insurgency and counterinsurgency in each case. Thereafter, I shall analyze the outcome, especially as it relates to the role of the security forces in counterinsurgency.

Uruguay

(1963-1972)

The Tupamaro insurgency was a leftist movement based in the cities of Uruguay. Formed in early 1963, it emerged in 1968 as a force determined to capitalize on the economic turmoil that had swept the country. Its dream of seeking a socialist society was shattered by the well trained military force in a swift campaign in 1972. The Tupamaro case is a classic example of urban guerrilla strategy, tactics, organization and activities, which had great initial success but its disregard to several basic principles of insurgency led to its downfall.

Background

Uruguay was considered a model democracy in the 1940's and 1950's. South America's smallest republic, wedged between Brazil on the North and West and Argentina on the South and West, Uruguay had nearly three million inhabitants unevenly distributed within the country; almost one half of them live in Montevideo, the capital and largest city. A tradition of free public education, including the university level, resulted in a 91 per cent literacy rate, amongst the highest in the world.

The nation's prosperity and social benefits came from a lopsided economy, dependent on fluctuations of world markets for Uruguayan cattle, meat, wool, skins and wheat. During the two World Wars and Korean conflict, the world's demand for these was high, but after 1955 the markets and the prices slumped.

The score or more of the state industrial and trade corporations, employing one-quarter of Uruguay's labor force were inefficient and corrupt. Inflation, added to lower and middle class unemployment, caused widespread unrest. Yet at first this unrest was confined mainly to Montevideo and other urban areas. Farmers still ate, but more and more factory workers suffered and the middle classes were also miserable. Since Uruguay had few slums, any anti-government or revolutionary movement had to be a middle class phenomenon.

Insurgency

Origin

The Tupamaro movement developed in Uruguay in the early 1960's as an outgrowth of the sugar workers' trade union movement by Raul Sendic Antonaccio, a member of the Uruguayan Socialist party. During 1962 and 1963, the group which later came to be known as the Tupamaros, or "trouble makers," was created. (Tupac Amaru was an Indian rebel in Peru).

Composition

Although the Tupamaro leadership was bourgeois, the members were of mixed background. Some were cane cutters, others were political leftists, while much support came from students, professionals, low-grade civil servants and public employees. The Tupamaros were overwhelmingly Uruguayan in national origin. Of the 648 Tupamaros captured between December 1966 and June 1972, only 1.8 per cent were foreigners.(1)

Causes

The Tupamaros were convinced that three important processes were at work in the Uruguayan economy. First, they believed that the workings of Uruguayan economy and its institutions were so deficient that the nation's crisis, was worsening day by day. Second, that the capitalists had tended to enrich themselves through an income redistribution mechanism that worked in favor of the already wealthy. Third, that stagnation and inflation had had a very detrimental effect on the country's international economic relations, like, growing foreign debt and balance of payment problems.

Ideological Objectives

There were two major objectives in the Tupamaros ideology: the creation of an independent, nationalist identity for Uruguayan society and the implementation of socialism as a

socio-economic system for the nation. The Tupamaros were aware that politically, economically, and even culturally Uruguay depended heavily on the axes Brazil-Argentina and Great Britain-United States.(2) Moreover, the Tupamaros saw the nation run by a small group of wealthy Uruguayans whose education, value-orientation and political affiliation linked them more closely with Europe and the US. It was against these two targets, the domination by foreign powers and the oppression by the oligarchy inside the country, that the Tupamaros directed their struggle.

Strategy

The use of political violence was seen not only as a perfectly legitimate, but also as the most efficient way to gain power and thus implement the ideology's ultimate objectives. Given Uruguay's geographic and demographic peculiarities, this violence was to be channeled through the application of urban guerrilla warfare. The military strategies were designed to: discredit, weaken and destroy the monopoly of the use of force and the legitimacy of the Uruguayan government, and to create power duality ie muster relative immunity from government control and have the power to operate within the same territory. These military strategies were linked with the political strategies of aggregate and sectoral mobilization to increase their power base and legitimacy. Power seizure was considered a political process facilitated by military successes of the guerrillas.(3)

Organization

The Movement for National Liberation (known by its Spanish initials, MLN), was a flexible organization to accomplish the necessary commando-type and service-type functions. Basically pyramidical in nature, the main operational units were the cell, the column, the executive committee, and national convention.

Activities

Tupamaro operations began on a crusading note, but the organization was literally "underground." They bought or rented houses, established entrances to their underground lines of communications, camouflaged these entrances, and resold or leased the residences to unsuspecting "hosts." They constructed an elaborate system of hideouts and established underground bunkers in nearby rural areas. The "crusading" of the Tupamaros involved exposing corruption in government.

Armed action was initiated in July 1963 with a raid on a Swiss Rifle Club, followed by a few bank robberies. At this stage, the government did not take them seriously. From 1965 to 1967, the Tupamaros concentrated on gaining publicity and funds. Toward the end of 1967, after a wave of violence in Montevideo, the government was forced to take action. On August 8, 1968, after a series of armed robberies and acts of sabotage, the Tupamaros kidnapped Dr Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, director of the state power company. Later kidnappings

included international personalities to embarrass the government and demonstrate Tupamaro impunity. In late 1969, the Tupamaros executed a police agent and thereafter began resorting to selective assassination. Another novel feature was to rob banks, discover documents to expose ministers, business magnates and public figures.

Counterinsurgency

The kidnapping and murder of Dan Mitrione, a USAID police advisor, followed by the kidnapping of the British ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Jackson contributed to a loss of sympathy for the Tupamaros and caused a change in the public perception.(4) The Tupamaros' continued success during 1970 produced increasingly harsh repressive measures by presidential decree. As the Tupamaros had hoped, the Uruguayan Congress immediately granted President Pacheco sweeping powers, including the power to suspend civil rights. Press censorship to deny publicity, detention without trial and military involvement in civil government succeeded when a benevolent but irresolute administration had failed. In late 1971, the armed forces made their move against the Tupamaros. Intelligence focused on tracking the insurgents. The police found themselves doing military duties, trying to guard the city against internal attacks. The military, by contrast, were doing police work, trying to root out the subversive

apparatus. The army watched suspects, letting one lead to another. Through this process, the military developed solid information about the Tupamaros, their operations and their hideouts.

The primary mission of the armed forces was to ensure that the elections were held on November 28, 1971, which they accomplished. The people voted against the left and allowed the same party to continue in power. The results were obviously disastrous for the Tupamaros. Abandoning large scale raids and kidnappings, the Tupamaros reverted to selective terrorism. In early 1972, newly elected President Juan Maria Bordaberry declared a state of internal war and suspension of civil rights, and gave greater freedom of action to the armed forces. These actions empowered the military and police to conduct searches and make arrests without warrants, hold suspects for indefinite periods and give them to the military rather than the civilian courts when authorities were ready to charge them formally. The results were dramatic. Through strong-arm techniques, President Bordaberry managed to crush the Tupamaros within six months. Numerous insurgent leaders were captured and much of the support organization destroyed. On June 27, in what amounted to a coup d'etat, Bordaberry dissolved congress.(5) After the takeover, the armed forces virtually assumed responsibility for managing the country. On September 1, Raul Sendic was wounded and

captured. By October, more than 2,400 suspects were in prison and over 300 hideouts were discovered. The Tupamaros insurgency was practically eliminated.

Outcome and the Role of the Security Forces

The Tupamaros made an original and important contribution to the theory and history of revolutionary warfare. They established the viability of revolutionary action within urban societies, given appropriate strategic, organizational and tactical schemes. However, its ultimate failure also reiterated a fact that a revolutionary struggle, whether violent or not, is essentially a political struggle; it need not be won by eliminating government officials.

What makes interesting study is the fact that the security forces flouted all the principles and rules of counterinsurgency, and yet succeeded in defeating the insurgents. With the military virtually in total control, martial law was the order of the day and civil liberties were non-existent. And yet the people did not seem to complain. The reasons were probably two-fold: firstly, the after-effects of the violence spewed by the insurgents, had not washed off on the citizenry, who probably considered the military repression to be of a relatively milder magnitude; secondly, it was the speed with which the security forces launched their operations and took control of the situation.

Algeria

(1954-1962)

Fighting in Algeria erupted suddenly on November 1, 1954, with the announcement of the War of Independence by the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN). The major security challenge in Algeria was not urban struggle, although the "Battle of Algiers" was one of the most publicized eras of the insurgency. Muslim Algerians sought better status, then moved toward identification with the insurgent goal of independence. The French responded to the challenge of urban insurgency and created population and resources control systems that reestablished an acceptable level of security in the major cities, especially Algiers. However, the operations failed to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. The French granted Algerian independence in 1962. This case demonstrated that one can win militarily and still lose politically.

Background

Algeria had been under French control since 1830. Large numbers of French citizens had moved to Algeria, the Northern territories of which were considered an integral part of France.

Less than half of the European population of Algeria was actually of French descent. This ethnically European population was 11 percent of the total Algerian population of approximately 10 million, the rest being Arabs.(6)

While in theory the Algerians were French citizens and enjoyed the rights thereof, in practice this was never the case politically, economically, or socially. Algeria was always administered for the benefit of the ethnically French "colons" or "settlers." The Governor General, appointed by the French cabinet had complete executive and administrative power. A typical colonial dual economy existed, with the settlers far better off, while most of the Arab population suffered economic privation. Three quarters of the settlers lived in the larger cities, while only 20 percent of the Muslims inhabited them.

While there had always been some resistance to the French, no systematic, militant, or organized opposition appeared before the end of World War I. After the War, as the number of educated Arabs grew, a group of them pressed for changes that would integrate the Muslim Algerians into the French community. However, the settlers successfully resisted every attempt at integration, often using their political leverage. The Arab moderates were eclipsed by strident voices and the emergence of the hardcore Algerian nationalists.

Origin

In 1947, one of the Muslim nationalist parties, the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), established a Special Organization (OS) of militants. The French discovered this underground movement and rounded up the leaders and their members. The captured leaders escaped and went to France and Switzerland. They formed the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA), which later became the FLN.

Political Goal

Politically, the group believed in a one party system as the best way to achieve unity of action and purpose. They favored democratic centralization and collective leadership within the party and they rejected the concept of a single party ruler or charismatic leader. The primary theme centered around the broad masses of a nation and the equal redistribution of wealth. The main political goal of the revolution was national independence and the restoration of the sovereign democratic and social Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles. The FLN objectives were: (a) political reorganization by restoring national revolutionary movement; and (b) rallying of the Algerian people around the goal to remove the colonial system.(7)

Development

The organization and the rebellion passed through three distinct phases: establishment of regions and sub-regions; small guerrilla warfare activities; and large scale military operations. In the early stages of the revolution, guerrilla action was uncoordinated; however, as time progressed, the FLN acquired more military hardware and began to use coordinated hit and run tactics. Later, terrorism took the form of intimidation, assassination and indiscriminate bombing.

Strategy

The strategy of insurgency was subordinated to the requirements of the overall liberation of Algeria from French control. The strategy of the FLN was to defeat the French on the battlefield, but it was understood that psychological operations (PSYOP) must play an important role. Thus, the FLN was active in propaganda in the United States, in France, in the United Nations, in neighboring countries, and inside Algeria itself. Because international attention could effectively be focused only on Algiers, the capital played a critical PSYOP role. The FLN intended to accomplish several objectives in Algiers: (a) to demonstrate the inability of the French to establish peace, by carrying out continued violence; (b) to dispirit the French people by attriting French personnel and equipment; (c) to alienate the population from France, by provoking overreaction of the French security

forces; (d) to reinforce the psychological mobilization of the population against France, by strikes and violence; and (e) to communicate a perception of national solidarity against continued French control to the rest of the world, by demonstrations and strikes, news of which would be transmitted by the media present in Algiers.(8)

Counterinsurgency

For the French, Algeria was a part of France. Premier Mendes-France declared of Algeria: "Ici, c'est la France!"(9) Ahead of reform, every succeeding French Government set as its number one priority "first to win the fighting war." Since the last one hundred years, French policy had been indecisive regarding outright annexation of Algeria or granting it some degree of autonomy. As it turned out, other than defeating the immediate insurgency, no definite national aim was spelled out for combatting the revolution as such.

The problem was originally defined as the putting down of a minor revolt by a group of political dissidents. Thus, the problem became one of maintaining state power. Only by 1957, did the government recognize the magnitude of the problem and started to develop meaningful counterinsurgency tactics.(10)

Resources

At the outset of the revolution, the French presence in Algeria consisted of only 55,000 troops. By late 1956, the numbers increased to 750,000. These included Algerian Muslim auxiliaries. The insurgency also led to the assignment of seven brigades of criminal police in Algiers.

Strategy

French strategy assumed that the rebellion could be contained and defeated by capturing the loyalty and controlling the physical life of the Algerian population. It envisioned a series of measures to (a) improve the social, educational, and economic position while stressing France's role in it; (b) establish government control over food, transportation, medicine and education; (c) resettle elements of population; (d) collect and rapidly exploit all relevant information; and (e) indoctrinate controlled populations.

Conduct

General Directive Number 1, issued by the Resident Minister of Algeria, 19 May 1956, defined the Army's role as "bringing together two local communities and restoring their confidence in each other and in the mother country."(11) But as the situation worsened in Algiers, the Army was ordered to end rebel terror by any means. This they did by the only means they had. They got information by brutal interrogation

methods, carried out summary executions and innocent people were tortured but troops discovered the bomb caches, arrested the leaders, and by October 1957, they had put down the revolt in Algiers.(12)

Initially, operations were mostly reactive. During the first 15 months of the revolution, the Army resorted to small-scale combing operations. Several battalions were massed to encircle and search an area where guerrilla action had taken place, while the Gendarmerie arrested all known nationalists. Later, with the introduction of the "quadrillage" system, operations were launched with good intelligence.(13)

Within Algeria, both the civil administration and the security forces worked for the Governor General. The role of the military and the police over-lapped in many instances. In small towns, the police force took its orders from the army even before the revolution. After 1954, the role of the army was expanded to include the enforcement of law in conjunction with the police. Responsibility for maintaining law and order remained with the national police until direct intervention of the 10th Paratroop Division in Algiers in 1957. Once martial law was declared in 1958, the military commander in Algeria was designated as the senior decisionmaker,(14) and hence the primacy of civil power did not prevail till the insurgency was quelled. There was a visible reduction of civil liberties and

restrictive measures were not applied impartially. The principle of "collective responsibility" was introduced, whereby when telegraph poles were felled or a local dignitary was murdered, the whole Arab community was held responsible.(15)

Intelligence

The Territorial Surveillance Directorate (DST) operated on a broad intelligence mandate. It identified and captured urban insurgents, assisted the police and army. The DST was directed by the Directorate General of National Security in Paris.(16) Coordination between intelligence agencies was lacking. At the grassroots level, intelligence was gathered by an unusual technique followed as part of the "quadrillage." Whereabouts of any one in the "casbah" was available in a matter of minutes. Information was mainly extracted by torturing prisoners.

External Support

Both sides received military and diplomatic support. The FLN were supplied arms and ammunition from Egypt and Yugoslavia, while Morocco and Tunisia provided sanctuaries and military assistance across the border. France got its support from NATO allies and military supplies from USA.(17) The military constructed barriers along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders to effectively block access of rebels.

Outcome and Role of the Security Forces

The Government failed to define the exact extent of the insurgency and developed an unbalanced strategy ie it focused its attention towards resolving the military aspects of the revolution. The plan built on one of the existing government strengths, which was its military. It isolated the insurgents from the local populace and external support, and destroyed the insurgents. However, it did not exploit its administrative strength to bring development and prosperity.

Counterinsurgency effort was controlled by the military and the civil primacy was lost. Coordination between intelligence agencies was lacking and brutal methods of interrogation further alienated the people. The counterinsurgency strategy failed to address the issue of deep rooted belligerence between the settlers and the Muslims, and it initially ignored the political aspects. Most of all, the military failed to recognize the ultimate damaging effects of getting involved politically.

Strictly from the point of view of military operations, the security force response was swift, unswerving and effective, especially in Algiers. The deployment of the Paratroop Division was not simply a placing of military personnel and equipment. It was designed to effect complete

control of the city's population and resources. The army turned its attention to destroying the FLN infrastructure in the city and particularly the bomb network. Results were evident within a matter of just two weeks.

The security forces won the military war against the insurgents. However, the magnitude of the problem was not seen immediately and the security forces became over confident. They introduced their own brand of counter-revolutionary warfare, and imposed new methods of population and resources control. But were these truly effective? I shall analyze them later in Chapter 4.

Northern Ireland

The establishment of the Irish Republic in 1920 left the six northeastern counties grouped together, with a parliament and government of their own, still under the British Crown. There has never been any reconciliation of island rivalries. After 1969, the conflict has sustained a high level of tension and violence between the two communities and between each community and the British government. Militant groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) acting in the name of the Catholic community, and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), its Protestant counterpart, have resorted to arms. British troops, who were called to reduce tensions, themselves became the target of both militant groups. Terrorism has been frequently used as an effective tool by the groups and there has been an escalation of violence ever since. The solution to this problem is nowhere in sight.

Background

Historic Northern Ireland, called Ulster, comprises 17 percent of the island of Ireland. As part of the United Kingdom (UK), the province enjoyed a measure of self-rule that varied from legislative to administrative functions. A dozen members of the provincial government were represented in the

British parliament. The unicameral parliament of Northern Ireland, with 52 members was located in Stormont. The terms of the 1921 partition left the Protestants in control of the government in Stormont. This control lasted for about 50 years until 1972, when "direct rule" was imposed by Britain. Due to increased disorder in the province, the British government assumed executive powers and all laws were made at Westminster.(18)

The two religious communities of Northern Ireland were also divided by social and political fences which only enhanced the demarcation lines. Separate schools, different employment patterns, and preferences for living in separate neighborhoods reinforced mutual alienation. Catholics seemed to be more heavily represented in unskilled labor and other menial areas. A minority in the legislature and in the security forces, the Catholics saw themselves as excluded from power.

The relatively peaceful conditions of the 1950's and 1960's are attributed by some to the unprecedented prosperity that Northern Ireland experienced during World War II and the post-war period. Economic growth provided only an interim period of peace, however, it did not remove deeply rooted Catholic fears about the Province's future. Catholics demanded a number of institutional and social changes. The failure of the government to respond to these demands produced political tension, which erupted into violence in 1969.

Insurgency

History has shown that the conflict in Northern Ireland is divided along religious lines. The majority of Protestants are Unionist while the Catholics are Nationalists. Despite this sectarian split, the conflict has been and is really political. In particular, the IRA has political ambitions and can be classified as a nationalist terrorist group.

IRA Goals

First and foremost, the IRA wants to form a united Irish state. It calls for not only the removal of the government of Northern Ireland, but also the replacement of the government of the Republic of Ireland. It advocates the formation of a democratic socialist republic. Although reunification is the long-term goal, the IRA realizes that the short-term goal of British withdrawal must come first. To gain British withdrawal the IRA has targeted the British government, British troops and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Another goal is the release of all political and IRA prisoners. It is also aware of the benefits of propaganda and has appealed to the international community.(19)

Organization

In January 1970, after enduring efforts to gain support for an active role in the North, the disgruntled members of

members of the Northern province split from the main body of the IRA and created the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The main body was called the Official IRA (OIRA). After the break-up of the IRA, the PIRA was organized into two brigades, Belfast and Londonderry. The Belfast Brigade had three battalions, each with about 100 men. Despite the delineation of the PIRA structure, organization was of a skeletal nature. Use of a cell structure prevented hostile penetration into the IRA organization.(20) British authorities estimate current PIRA strength at 400 to 500, or less than half of their mid-1970s number. Active support is reckoned to be around ten times that, while passive support is estimated at 50,000.(21)

The UDA, a semi-covert Protestant paramilitary organization, was formed in September 1971. Its task was to protect Protestant neighborhoods against IRA activity. Besides retaliating against IRA operations, the UDA also intimidated the Catholic community to put a wedge between it and the PIRA.

Strategy

The PIRA had no grand design for an urban guerrilla campaign. Its strategy was simple: to make the North ungovernable by either Stormont or London. The planners of PIRA waged their war in anticipation that a protracted war of attrition and terrorism through continuous disruption of daily

life, law and order, would lead to the disintegration of the province. This would bring about a political change, and ultimately, evacuation of British forces. The IRA successfully penetrated the native society and instilled fear as well as respect. Continuous intimidation of the population achieved at least two objectives: first, it put a wedge between the British forces and the population; and second, the IRA gained a recognized status of power in the Catholic community as a protector.

Terrorist Activities

Terrorism was employed against British troops, but it was also used against rival groups to gain influence and consolidate power within the community. Intimidation was intended to isolate the British forces and therefore prevent them from gathering information from the general population. Intimidation even penetrated the judicial system where jurors and juries, as well as witnesses, were threatened. IRA violence established the organization as the arbitrator of power in the community. The IRA managed to raise funds, secure sanctuaries, obtain logistical support like food and transportation, and deliver information.

Initial actions consisted of bombings and rioting. Later acts included assassinations and rocket attacks. Some of the major terrorists acts were the assassination of Lord

Mountbatten and the death of 18 soldiers in Warrenpoint in 1979, hunger strikes of 1981, attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1984, rocket attack on a police station in Newry in 1985, and bombings in Enniskillen in 1987.

Counterinsurgency

British Government Goals

Since 1969, the cornerstones of the British Government's goals have been to maintain peace and order, and maintain a functioning government in Northern Ireland, that is linked with Great Britain. Twelve years later, the British Government outlined its goals, which were four-fold: the first goal was to retain a legitimate government in place in the face of terrorist threat; second, the government would maintain control of the crisis; third, the government would deter future incidents; and the fourth goal was to save lives. These goals involved maintaining an effective government and defeating the IRA.(22)

Anti-terrorist Organization

Over the past 20 years, the British Army has been the prime tool for maintaining peace and order in Northern Ireland. In addition to the British Army, several local security forces have played a role in Ulster, including the RUC and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a branch of the

British Army that functioned as a militia force. The UDR consisted of both full and part-time members. It became operational in 1970, and consisted of 25 percent full-time duty personnel. The troops were members of the armed forces of the Crown and were subjected to military discipline, but it was a civilian force.(23)

Anti-terrorist Strategy

The British Army's mission in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1972 was to end the violence in the province and to maintain peace in the community. Consequently, the army tried to keep the two warring communities apart. This mission and goal were feasible in the context of marches and demonstrations. During riots, however, the British Army was generally targeted. The overall objectives of the British military in the province were: (a) to provide support to the civilian authority in Stormont; (b) to isolate the terrorists; and (c) to arrest or kill the hard core gunmen of the IRA.

Direct Rule in March 1972 reflected the failure of the first objective, after all attempts to preserve law and order collapsed. When the Army realized that it had become the target, all hopes to put a wedge between the community and the terrorists disappeared. With the failure of the second goal, the third task could not be achieved, lacking the cooperation of the populace.

The spirit of the IRA remained unbroken, but more effective British policies and actions reduced the IRA's ability to conduct a continuous campaign of terrorism in Northern Ireland. After the re-establishment of Direct Rule in 1972, the atrocities and campaign of terrorism spread to England, and particularly to soft targets there.

Outcome and Role of the Security Forces

The British long recognized that the resolution to the Northern Ireland problem was political and not military. British efforts were intended to create the psychological climate in which such a solution might emerge, through reducing violence in the province. While the British approach to conflict resolution did not produce a satisfactory solution, the campaign to reduce terrorism certainly had substantial success, and the security situation in the province improved significantly. On the other hand, none of the IRA goals have been achieved, except to keep the insurgency alive.

Although the security forces have before them a well entrenched urban insurgency, they are forced to treat it no more than a law and order problem. Their approach towards counterinsurgency operations has been shaped and influenced by the daunting pressure of public support. On the job training has improved coordination and civil-military affairs.

Vietnam

In the 25 years of conflict in Indochina, that culminated in a communist victory in 1975, one can identify four distinct phases. They are the revolution against French colonial domination, 1946-1954; the insurgency North Vietnam directed in South Vietnam, 1954-1964; American involvement in the war, 1964-1973; and withdrawal/defeat, 1973-1975. In this case, I shall cover the period of the Second Indochina War from 1954 onwards. Hence I shall confine my discussion to the pattern of North Vietnamese insurgency and counterinsurgency operations conducted by South Vietnam and America.

Background

The Republic of Vietnam, commonly known as South Vietnam, had a total population of approximately 14 million. The majority of the people lived in the fertile delta of the Mekong river, which is located at the southern end of the country. Some 85 percent of the population were engaged in agriculture, with rice being the principal crop. The population could be classified as Buddhists, Catholics, and members of sects as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. The social structure of the Vietnamese had been strongly influenced by the Chinese

family tradition. The social structure in villages was based upon the extended family group. Colonial economic demands resulted in new burdens being placed upon the peasants without the provision of corresponding rewards. The situation tended to arouse the traditional resentments with which the Vietnamese reacted to foreign domination. It also paved the way towards aspiration for independence.

Following their defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the French found themselves in an untenable position and they were obliged to enter negotiations at an international conference convened in Geneva, Switzerland. In the settlement, the independence of Vietnam from the French Union was agreed to and the country was divided into a "people's democracy" in the North, allied with the Communist bloc and an autocratic republic, which was pro-Western. The Geneva Agreement provided for the eventual reunification of the country through popular elections.(24)

After the cease-fire and the division of the country at the 17th parallel, there was some exchange of population between the North and South. Supporters of the Viet Minh were permitted to move North and vice versa. There was evidence that the Viet Minh took advantage of this exchange and left behind 6,000 to 8,000 troops, who hid large quantities of weapons and supplies and kept their hideouts intact.

Evidence that the North Vietnamese Communists never intended to abandon the struggle for unification was manifested by the creation of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (To-Quoc). In 1960, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF/SVN) was also formed under the control of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.

Insurgency

Strategy

North Vietnam's strategic objective, which was not to change until final victory in 1975, was reunification of Vietnam under control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). When the First Indochina conflict ended, North Vietnam had one of the best armies in Asia. That army, called the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), was founded by Nguyen Giap during the last days of World War II. By 1975, it had grown to a total strength of more than 650,000. The PAVN improved upon the Mao Tse Tung doctrine and tactics as the war progressed. Revolutionary warfare strategy as practised by the PAVN and the Viet Cong had two elements: political and armed. Those two elements had to operate together, neither could be successful alone. That strategy also stressed the protracted nature of revolutionary warfare and the necessity of organizing and mobilizing all of the people.(25)

Organization

The military arm of the insurgent organization, the Viet Cong, was composed of three different organizations. The Chu Luc was the regular guerrilla force and functioned as a mobile regular army. It moved from area to area and fought when it had the advantage. The regional troops, the Dia Phuong Quon, lived in their own villages and operated within a specific geographic region. The members of the local militia, the Du Kich, remained in their villages and farmed their land. They provided supplies and aid to both regular and regional troops when needed.

During the initial period of the insurgency from August 1956 to about January 1960, the insurgent operations were characterized by stepping up underground resistance. The apparatus that had existed in the days of the struggle against the French was reactivated. Organization of underground cells was undertaken and the collection of intelligence information was increased. Logistical bases containing arms, ammunition, and other supplies were established in strategic locations.

Other activities were characteristic of an insurgent movement prior to the introduction of armed guerrillas, such as terror, coercion, kidnapping, and assassination. The insurgents staged a few commando type raids, too. The pattern of assassination of leaders such as mayors, police officials,

policemen, and leaders of civilian organizations, became clear in 1957 and continued to be a problem for the security forces in the ensuing years.

Perhaps the most significant activity of the Viet Cong during this period was the gaining of administrative control over a substantial number of villages. At the end of 1962, the Communists had extended their control to 80 percent of the countryside.(26) With the beginning of 1960, the Viet Cong stepped up the pace to guerrilla warfare with an attack on a South Vietnamese arms and ammunition storage area. Using standard guerrilla tactics, the Viet Cong continued ambushes and surprise assaults, and made use of captured arms and equipment.

Conventional tactics were introduced in early 1963, and by 1964, the insurgents were making some attacks with regiment sized units. The rate of infiltration from the North also increased dramatically, as the conflict reached new levels of intensity between 1963 and 1965. Internal political problems in the South Vietnamese government provided the Viet Cong with additional opportunities for exploitation. The Viet Cong with better leadership, tactics and morale, invariably prevailed over the ARVN forces in combat engagements. By 1965, Viet Cong dominance reached a point which the ARVN could not control. Thus U.S. combat troops were introduced.

For most of the period 1954-1965, the government of South Vietnam was headed by Ngo Dinh Diem and his closest family members. Diem was a Catholic, who was appointed as Prime Minister by the Emperor Bao Dai. He refused to agree to `free' elections with the North to reunify the country, since South Vietnam had never agreed to the terms of the Geneva cease fire. The agenda of his government did not extend much beyond consolidation of his own power. It proceeded to build a strong military and police structure that was designed to protect Diem and his family rather than to defeat the insurgency. There was little consideration for the needs of the peasant population. In fact many government actions alienated the people, thus giving the Communists opportunities to win their support.

Land reform was a major issue since much of the land had been consolidated under a relatively few wealthy landowners under French rule. Diem failed to carry out appropriate land reforms as he courted favor with the wealthy landowners, who had influence in Saigon. He also abolished the practice of electing local officials by popular vote, and appointed his own officials instead. This struck down a practice which had existed in Vietnamese society for over 500 years.

Agrovilles

In the late 1950's Diem started a program of building "agrovilles." These were government villages, which were fortified with barbed wire and bamboo fences to which the population was to be relocated. The "strategic hamlet" program under the American direction in the 1960's was a continuation of this effort. The purpose of the agrovilles was to isolate the population from the Viet Cong and provide them with a measure of security. The agrovilles caused considerable discontent because: the peasants were required to build these villages without pay or compensation; the peasants were moved from their traditional villages and away from ancient burial grounds considered sacred; and the large scale movement of villages disrupted the traditional social patterns in existence for centuries.

The efforts of the government to root out and defeat the insurgency lacked direction and focus. US assistance was not much help. The military buildup focused primarily on creating a conventional army capability in the image of the US Army. US aid was channeled primarily into the police and military apparatus of South Vietnam. Little of this aid was used to provide schools, medical care or other tangible social services. The government and the US mission concentrated far too much on security matters and bot on the root causes of discontent.

From 1961 to 1964, as the US advisory group built up from around 700 advisors to over 16,000, resentment of another foreign power grew. Furthermore, US advisors tended to look down on the Vietnamese military as inferior. Vietnamese commanders were seldom fully cooperative with their American advisors. This friction hampered any attempt to bring about unity of effort to defeat the insurgency. Later, when the US got involved in combat operations, the US Army considered the RAVN lacking in the attributes of mobility and firepower, necessary for executing the concept. As Krepinevich put it, "better to allow such forces to conduct the `other' war, while the US Army went in search of the `real' war."(27)

US Strategy

The US strategy consisted of two parts. The first part was the air offensive in the North, coupled with the diplomatic peace overtures designed to persuade Hanoi to cease and desist in its bid to take over South Vietnam. The other part, the fundamental one, was the ground war in the South. The consequences of the conscious decision to give first priority to the defeat of the enemy regular forces in the field, using American forces almost exclusively, were wide ranging with adverse ramifications. The decision: (a) diverted US attention and precious resources away from the primary task of developing South Vietnamese forces; (b) presented Hanoi with a propaganda prize ie the Americans;

(c) played into the hands of Hanoi's overall political strategy of inflicting maximum casualties on US forces and wearing down American will and determination to stay on course; (d) damaged South Vietnamese forces psychologically by inferring that they were not competent; and finally (e) it consumed time that could not be retrieved. Americans at home lost patience with the war, lost confidence in their leaders, and American popular support frittered away in South Vietnam.(28)

Outcome and Role of the Security Forces

The government response from both the US and South Vietnam were inadequate and misdirected. The infusion of high technology weapons, heavy firepower, and helicopter mobility from the US was focused too much on security and not the root causes of the insurgency. The ARVN became overly dependent on this assistance and refused to operate without it in the jungle, where the Viet Cong was. The Americans achieved some success in regular combat operations, but lost the political war. As a result, North Vietnam gained control of the South.

The US Army refused to recognize the nature of the conflict. For them, search and destroy missions, and attrition warfare remained the highest priority, while the Viet Cong undercut their base and penetrated the ARVN, on whom

they relied to fight the "other" war. The Army violated many principal canons of counterinsurgency warfare. Most of all it never achieved the basic objective of guaranteeing security to the population. When the Marine Corps did develop a moderately successful procedure, called "Combined Action Platoons" or CAPS, the Army leadership forced them to stop.

Andrew Krepinevich in The Army and Vietnam, blames the strict adherence to the "concept" of the US Army for fighting wars. He describes the concept as "an ineradicable fixation of the Army on European-type war --- a prodigious consumption of resources to avoid the spillage of American blood, and a strong preference for firepower and attrition." On the other hand, Harry Summers in On Strategy: the Vietnam War in Context, is of the view that the North Vietnamese expansion and aggression was the main "center of gravity," and that the military commanders were prevented from concentrating on it. Instead, the Army was distracted by its involvement in counterinsurgency and nation-building, tasks which should have been left to the South Vietnamese government and the ARVN.

In my opinion, the Army lost Vietnam because it refused to fight the counterinsurgency war. This has a different implication as regards to intervention in a third country, which I shall discuss in Chapters 4 and 5.

End Notes

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

> A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence.(1)
>
> --- Mao Tse Tung.

In this chapter I shall analyze salient issues pertaining to counterinsurgency. I have divided the chapter into seven sections, wherein I shall discuss each issue. The sections are laid out as follows:

(a) Section I. Contribution of security force operations towards national strategy of counterinsurgency.

(b) Section II. Timing of employment of security forces and the nature of response.

(c) Section III. Type of forces suitable for counterinsurgency operations.

(d) Section IV. Civic action and the security forces role in it.

(e) Section V. Elimination of external support, especially from adjacent states.

(f) Section VI. Efficacy of employing security forces in combatting insurgency in another country.

(g) Section VII. Effect of national and international public opinion on actions of security forces.

Section I

Do the SF operations contribute towards the national strategy of combatting insurgency, and if so, how ?

After analyzing several counterinsurgency campaigns, it is evident that they most definitely do, provided they are employed judiciously. The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved, which will have to be countered by the use of legal force.(2)

The second half of the question asks how this can be done, and this is the difficult part. At this stage suffice it to say that the security forces should act in support of the government and fight insurgency only in a lawful and constitutional way. Any attempt to operate on its own design and not in the overall political continuum could prove disastrous in the long run. It may win the battle but may lose the war. The French military action in Algeria highlights this point.

"Guerre Revolutionnaire" was more than the French phrase for revolutionary war; it described a diagnosis and a prescription for what an influential group of French career soldiers saw as the chief illness of the modern world --- Western failure to meet the challenge of atheistic Communist subversion. Politically very conservative, they drew on a mystical Catholicism and an unshaken faith in the civilizing mission of French colonialism. Communism had outflanked Western defenses from the South, and if not stopped, it would destroy Western civilization. It had spread from Soviet Union to China and Indochina, and also won a victory in Egypt. The latest battleground was Algeria.

Their prescription mirrored what the theorists took to be revolutionary doctrine at that point. First, renewed faith in the counter crusade against communism was essential; an expanded program of psychological warfare to promulgate the renewed faith and to expose the evil of communism was the next step; a parallel program of social and economic action must also deal with problems like education, public health, and poverty; lastly, reorganizing and reorienting armed forces, some into mobile anti-guerrilla units and others into quasi-governmental garrison forces, was the military part of the prescription, which in effect shifted administrative power from civilian to military hands. Only on one point did the theorists of "guerre revolutionnaire" disagree --- on the

use of terror and torture. Applied in the Algerian war, the methods of "guerre revolutionnaire" were not ineffective, in the battle of Algiers as well as in the countryside; but they also led to deep division in France itself.(3)

The British, unlike the French, faced Maoist revolutionary warfare only once, on a small scale in Malaya, although the tactics used against them in Palestine, Cyprus, and Kenya bore certain similarities. The British response had none of the ideological fervor of "guerre revolutionnaire", but was instead more like that of their colonial tradition at its best: tight integration of civil and military authority, minimum force with police instead of army used when possible, good intelligence of the kind produced by "special branch" operatives, administrative tidiness on such matters as the resettlement of civilians in habitable, sanitary camps, and a general readiness to negotiate for something less than total victory. On the military side, British colonial experience showed again its capacity to train effective local forces, a patient view of the time required for success, and a preference for the employment of small, highly skilled troops in well-planned operations rather than massive use of large numbers and heavy firepower.

The American response to revolutionary war is closely linked to Vietnam. A successful effort in support of the

Philippine government against the Huk rebellion had created a measure of confidence among American civilian and military leaders that such wars could be won by the correct attitudes and tactics. Disdain had been expressed for the French performance in Indochina, where the Americans had also provided considerable material assistance. In the event, American confidence proved to be misplaced. Neither the U.S. Department of State nor the various agencies showed sufficient capacity to deal with fundamental political problems. The Americans had no civilian organization comparable to the British or the French colonial services and this hampered their operations against the revolutionary forces of the Viet Cong.(4) The counterinsurgency effort was almost purely a military approach, targeted on an enemy presumed to be the mirror image of American combat units.

In the examples illustrated above, one can find distinct differences in approach adopted by security forces to combat insurgency. Whether it contributed towards the national strategy was obvious by the results. What then is the generally accepted concept of counterinsurgency?

At the national level, the concept of counterinsurgency is primarily two faceted: (a) preventive actions to maintain an environment in which insurgency does not take root and (b) proactive actions to defeat an established insurgency.

For the purpose of the thesis I shall concentrate on the latter scenario. The overall national strategy for counterinsurgency is "winning the hearts and minds of the people" and this is accomplished in the social, political and the economic arenas. These arenas are all encompassing and include a vast array of programs like educational, literacy and cultural programs. To achieve the national objective, the military is but a cog in the wheel. The question here is how they fit into the big picture?

While political objectives are pre-eminent in both conventional war and counterinsurgency, the Clausewitzian imperative still holds: "the defeat of enemy armed forces does not automatically lead to the attainment of the political objective."(5) Instead, the key is eradication of conditions conducive to violence and instability. In all cases, political, psychological, and economic methods must be fully integrated with military force. As Frank Kitson has noted, "insurgency is not primarily a military activity."(6) Thus the symbolic impact and psychological message of every use of force is greater than the tangible and direct effect.

Since most modern counterinsurgency is far from being a purely military problem, it is necessary for the security forces to formulate a response that takes this into account. Thus it has been said that the French campaign in Algeria was

really seven separate conflicts being fought simultaneously, of which only one was the "fighting war" itself. The others were primarily political struggles between and within the French, Algerian and Settlers, which raged not only in Algeria and metropolitan France but across the wider global political stage.

It may be useful to highlight some of the distinctive characteristics of low intensity operations. A number of LIC studies indicate that they share several common features which distinguish them significantly from conventional wars. First, is the political nature of conflicts and operations which limits the use of force. It ensures that the final outcome will be determined by political, not military considerations. Second, is the level of combat which is normally at platoon or below. Pitched battles involving battalion sized forces occur very rarely. In many cases, political constraints set limits on the levels of violence, too. Third, is the clandestine nature of the insurgent which makes him elusive and difficult to spot. As Kitson has observed, "the task of defeating the enemy consists mainly of finding him."(7) Fourth, is the employment of un-conventional methods of warfare. The Army needs to acquire the patience demanded by protracted operations and to develop innovative methods for bringing the insurgents to battle on equal terms in extremes of terrain and climate.(8)

Section II

When should the security forces be employed ? Should it be a total involvement right from the beginning or should it be a graduated response ?

The involvement of the security forces will possibly have to match the stage of the insurgent movement and their actions within that period. In Phase I, while the insurgent movement is most vulnerable and has not yet developed an ability to conduct extensive armed actions, the security forces should concentrate on penetrating the covert infrastructure. During Phase II, when the insurgents resort to guerrilla activities, the security forces must conduct offensive operations primarily aimed at the insurgent infrastructure. If the insurgency reaches Phase III, when the insurgent forces rely on conventional operations, the security forces must obviously conduct normal military operations against the insurgent armed forces. Graduated response on the other hand, would mean matching the insurgent action with an adequate response commensurate with the situation. Thus, in Phase I, law enforcement or police action can fully counter subversive acts. In Phase II, where the insurgents initiate sporadic violent acts against public authorities, small unit operations by police or para-military forces can cope with

the situation. But as guerilla action rises in frequency and intensity, the armed forces come in.

Within their own territories, each army's responsibilities at the lower end of the scale differ according to national law, tradition and organization. In France there are several levels of force available to the government before the use of the military need be contemplated. In the USA the jurisdictional confusion is awesome, and state governors are required to employ their National Guard before appealing for federal military assistance. But in Britain, where there are strict controls on the issue of arms to the police, and where the Territorial Army may not, by law, be used for internal security operations, any serious escalation of violence is likely to result in the regular army being ordered into action. Consequently, exposure to domestic conflict is uneven.

A point to be debated is the role of the police vis a vis the army. The ability of the local police in a developing threat is governed by their strength, equipment and morale. It may, however, be policy to limit the weapons available to the police and the degree of force that can be used; this may avoid damaging by the use of force, the concept of local policing by consent and do much to preserve a moderate image. If the strength of the police, in men and weapons, is high,

then need for military intervention may be averted or postponed. If the police are less strong in this regard, the range of riot, crime and disorder with which they can deal unaided will be restricted.(9)

An interesting case is the support provided by the Canadian Army to the police forces in Quebec in October 1970. The Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), an underground radical movement committed to the creation of an independent state of Quebec, carried out kidnappings and the Army was called to assist the police forces, who were stretched to the limit. The Quebec Provincial Cabinet passed an Order-in-Council placing all police and military forces under the command of the director of the Quebec Provincial Police. The federal government also passed the War Measures Act, giving soldiers and police sweeping powers of arrest, search and seizure without warrants and detention without trial. However, the armed forces carried out no arrests on their own, but left that task to the police. The crisis was a watershed in Canadian military history as it attuned the military to their Internal Security duties and responsibilities.(10)

What then is the Army's real role? The British Army found in Northern Ireland that operations took a policing character, wherein the capture or arrest of individuals was more important than killing them; indeed killing them was

politically unacceptable. Troops might have to adapt from acting as soldiers in a traditional ambush, able to "shoot to kill," to acting as "peace officers," enforcing the law in others --- and both in the same campaign. Political and legal constraints often left the initiative in the hands of the opposition, who would strike at will, while the Army had to wait until the crime had been committed before being permitted to act. This understandably produced frustration for the soldiers and also a certain degree of civil-military friction.(11)

The army's contribution to fighting subversion and insurgency usually falls under one of two headings: in the first place, the army has got to provide units which are trained, organized and equipped to carry out the sort of operations given to them; and secondly it is responsible for producing properly educated commanders and staff officers capable of advising the government and its various agencies at every level, on how best to conduct the campaign.

It must be understood that the insurgents are likely to employ a combination of political, economic, psychological and military measures, so the government will have to do likewise to defeat them. Though army officers may regard non-military action required as being the business of civil authorities, they will regard it as being his business, because

it is being used for operational reasons. At every level the civil authorities will rightly expect the soldier to know how to use non-military forms of action as part of operational plans. Kitson explains that:

> This point is not always understood by the soldier, whose recollections of fighting insurgency usually start from a point where they arrived in a district to find that the local administrator and policeman knew all about the business, whereas they knew nothing.(12)

The primary task of the soldier is to defend his people against external aggression. In his secondary role, he is required to aid the civil power when called upon to do so. The calling out of the troops is the last resort of the government to maintain order. This implies that troops should be called out only when there is no other alternative, and when the normal civil agencies of the government have not been able to cope with the situation. This is an unpleasant assignment for the soldier, but he has to be increasingly prepared to face this unpalatable task, especially in societies, where violence erupts so frequently.

However, the frequent use of the army has certain inherent dangers: (a) the army is being asked to do a job for which it is not adequately trained, especially when it has to

deal with its own citizenry; (b) troops employed on these duties lose out on training time and this can adversely affect their operational preparedness; (c) frequent use of the army in this role erodes the deterrent effect, and in the process, the army may be forced to use greater force than it would have otherwise done; (d) through prolonged and frequent deployment on such duties the strong bond of discipline in the army may weaken; and (e) constant failures of the civil administration may erode the moral authority of the government, and the soldier may begin to lose confidence or even respect for the civil authorities.(13)

Section III

The next question related to the one in the above section, is the type of forces suitable for counterinsurgency. Should a separate force be created for the purpose or are the regular forces adequate ?

A special force is certainly the ideal solution but will it be enough for all circumstances. Depending on the size of the Army and its commitments, counterinsurgency expertise may not be confined to a single specialized unit or even to a relatively small number of units. The whole Army or at least the combat arms may be required to acquire the necessary skills for counterinsurgency. Special or elite forces may be used for high payoff targets and their employment will be in a different realm altogether.

It is absolutely essential for armies to adapt themselves to the conditions of low intensity conflict. The British and the Israeli armies did so effectively by modifying conventional small-unit tactics and techniques to suit the political and military conditions of the operational environment.(14) Armies, particularly their commanders, must learn from their experience and adapt accordingly. Latitude must be given to theatre, local and even relatively junior

commanders to develop doctrines and tactics appropriate to the situation. Emphasis must be laid on small-unit leadership, intelligence, surprise, and mobility, thereby attempting to beat the insurgents at their own game. And finally, the armies must be aware of the political context in which its military operations are being conducted, so as to tailor their actions accordingly.

Other than the police and the military, many countries have a "third force" to deal with internal disorders and violence. These could be in the form of "para military" or "guard" forces. Some countries have a gendarmerie or paramilitary police reserve which may have the specific task of maintaining public order. If such forces exist, they can provide an important relief to the civil police during the tense early stages, while at the same time allowing the latter to concentrate on the prevention of crime. This can have an important stabilizing effect. If the rule of the law can be seen to be upheld, moderate men are more likely to rally behind the government with a beneficial effect on public opinion. On the other hand, the intervention of inadequately trained riot squads can do considerable damage to both the security situation and the image of the police. The existence of such forces provides the government with a viable alternative for employment against insurgent groups. The need for such a force has been felt by many governments to maintain

the uniqeness of the police force in its routine tasks of maintaining law and order. John Alderson puts this succinctly:

> The difference between the quasi-military and the civil policeman is that the civil policeman should have no enemies. People may be criminals, they may be violent, but they are not enemies to be destroyed. Once that kind of language gets into the police vocabulary, it begins to change attitudes.(15)

Tc reinforce the above sentiment, a similar practice is followed in India as well. The security forces address the members of the so called revolutionary / insurgent groups as "terrorists", "underground or UG's", "insurgents", or simply as "misguided elements of society", but never as the "enemy."

Paramilitary thinking and developments in Britain received a stimulus in the 1970s when there was a rise in violent activities in Northern Ireland. The debate was whether Britain needed a "continental-style" paramilitary force midway between the police and the army (like the French riot police, the Compagines Republicaines de Securite [CRS]) to deal with particular demonstrations, strikes and terrorists; or needed a civil defense force for policing needs in the event of an outbreak nuclear war. Another significant consideration was more effective crime-fighting in a period

of rising crime and a shortage of police officers. The rapid escalation of events in Northern Ireland, especially the introduction of the army onto the streets, and the formation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary's SPG, resulted in a corresponding development in the paramilitary solution, in terms both of paramilitary techniques of crowd control and of the use of paramilitary equipment and weapons. Northern Ireland had become a testing ground for a whole range of paramilitary techniques, equipment and weaponry.(16)

Local population is a potential source of strength in counter revolutionary warfare. In many counterinsurgency campaigns, governments have attempted to mobilize their support by forming "auxiliary forces." When soundly based, sensibly organized and properly coordinated with other units, these forces have proved indispensable and indeed on occasions the key to successful campaigns. Although the nature of these forces may differ between campaigns, commanders and staff officers need to understand the characteristics of these forces and the requirements and problems associated with their raising.

Auxiliary forces are important for four reasons: commitment, numbers, intelligence, and fighting skills. (a) Provided the overall concept of the campaign is right, the formation of auxiliary forces encourages the population

to commit itself to the government cause. Once people have assumed the responsibilities associated with membership of an auxiliary force, especially when the government trusts them with weapons for the defense of their own village, they are more likely than not to keep faith. (b) Auxiliary forces are formed to help meet the manpower requirement in an expensive counterinsurgency environment. They are particularly useful for defensive operations, releasing the more mobile, better trained regular troops for offensive operations. (c) Properly organized auxiliary forces have a fund of background information and, if well tasked, may even produce contact intelligence. They are more likely to pick up information from the network of informal contacts that link villagers with both government and insurgent forces, than are regular troops who are not native to the area. (d) In certain skills such as tracking, patrolling, observation, use of ground, and communicating with the local population, properly directed auxiliaries can be most effective.(17)

A wide variety of organizations and units can be described as auxiliary forces, and there are no stereotyped categories. Each environment must be studied on its merits to decide the need and potential for auxiliary forces to supplement other security forces. The British developed a highly effective "Border Scout" organization in Borneo in 1963-66. Formation of "Village Home Guards" was done

successfully in Kenya (Kikuyu Guard), Malaya (Home Guard), Algeria (Harkis), and to some degree in Vietnam (Popular Force). "Self Defense Force Mobile Units" were used in Malaya, and a similar force (Firquat) operated in upto company strength in Oman. The most ambitious, but potentially the most effective use of auxiliaries involves the employment of "reformed terrorists". The technique was developed towards the end of the campaign in Malaya as the Special Operational Volunteer Force (SOVF) and also in Rhodesia as the Rhodesian Selous Scouts.(18)

Section IV

Should the role of the security forces be restricted to combat or extended to civic action ?

Civic action, humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), disaster relief, and other such developmental programs all relate to the care of civilians, so why should they be of concern to the military? The answer is that civilians have a significant impact on military operations in both peace and war. In wartime, civilians are obstacles to military combat operations, however, civilians are objectives of military operations, since mobilizing public support is a major politico-military objective in low intensity conflict. Civic action, HCA, and disaster relief are especially important in LIC since they can help mobilize the public support required for mission success.

The ultimate objective in counterinsurgency is to maintain political control, and effective political control requires the legitimacy of public support. Without a measure of public support, no insurgency can achieve legitimacy and is doomed to failure. Because civil affairs is responsible for civilian support in military operations, it has the primary responsibility for mobilizing the public support necessary

for legitimacy in LIC. Civic action has proven to be a major means of mobilizing public support for legitimacy in LIC. To paraphrase one of Mao's metaphors, civic action can help deny the insurgent fish a sea in which to swim. Civic action includes all projects which contribute to the economic, social or political development of an indigenous population. They are referred to as military civic action when conducted by military forces.

Civic assistance is a step towards winning the hearts and minds of the people and has proved to be fairly effective in a number of counterinsurgency operations all over. However, the effectiveness of civic action programs may only be local or even be used to advantage by the insurgents instead. The psychological attitude of the security forces and the feelings of the receivers assumes great importance.

Civic action can be carried out most effectively as a team effort by civil and military authorities. Police action will be required to break the hold of the terrorists on the population. Territorial operations must dominate the surrounding area and support local self-defense forces. Troops can assist in required construction. The administration must quickly gain close person to person contact with the population. Joint civic action teams in each village and town seem to be the best answer.(19)

One of the successful ingredients of civic action programs is a "self help" effort from the population. It should not be permitted to become a one-sided aid, which may prove to be counter productive in the end.

The composition of the civic action teams must depend on the local conditions and the degree of control over the people which the revolutionaries have achieved. Where the affected area is isolated, where there is no adequate civil administration, or where revolutionary terrorism has destroyed civil control, the teams will have to be predominantly military. In other cases, the balance between members should be weighted towards the civilian side to facilitate rapid transfer of administration to civilian control and to reduce troop requirements, which undoubtedly will be critical.

In any event, the skills required on the teams are approximately the same; a team chief to supervise the administrative and legal functions in the village, a military adviser to organize a self-defense force of militia and auxiliary police (at first these functions should be combined), a doctor or medical assistant, an engineer, a teacher, an agricultural adviser, and a communications specialist. Predominantly military teams usually will not require the protection of additional troops. Shortages of qualified people are likely to make it necessary for various team members to be dual hatted.(20)

When a civic action team moves into a village, it must first break rebel control of the people. It will be faced with the dilemma of isolating the rebels without alienating the relatively uncommitted villagers. The second major objective must be to offer the people security from terrorism and intimidation. The British in Malaya and the French in Indochina and Algeria found that one could not get the population's support unless one first ensured their security.

Once reasonable security has been established in the village, team members ought to organize in earnest by training the people within their respective fields of competence. Their aims will be to organize around themselves, loyal groups who are interested in their particular specialties, to train local people to assume the administrative functions, and to win the popular support by improving living conditions. The best example of civic action applied through counter organization is the French employment of Special Administrative Sections (SAS) in rural Algeria. The SAS, however, were largely military teams, whose efforts were unfortunately negated by the overall brutality unleashed by the security forces earlier. The British also employed a broad civic action program in Malaya. It was an effective joint civil-military effort; however, civic action teams were not used as such. Also it was not oriented directly on counter organization of the population except as was necessary for self defense and local administration.

Civic action and HCA have proven to be important tools in achieving U.S. security objectives in LIC. Civic action was the central component of U.S. nation building activities conducted by the Special Action Forces (SAF) during the 1960's. There were SAFs in Asia, Latin America and Africa to support friendly governments threatened by communist insurgencies. These SAFs integrated Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and PSYOP in counterinsurgency support and were active until the early 1970's, when they were dismantled and withdrawn at the same time U.S. forces were withdrawn from Vietnam.(21)

SAF Asia was probably the most active of the SAFs. It sent teams of SF, CA, and PSYOP personnel to advise and assist the Philippine military forces in conducting military civic action. These combined U.S.-Philippine military civic action programs included medical and engineering projects now categorized as HCA. These civic action programs helped mobilize public support for the government and its military forces, denying legitimacy to the insurgents. Since then, U.S. CA teams have provided civic action and HCA in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America.

Two broad categories of civic action exist: mitigating and developmental. In mitigating civic action, military forces provide products and services. A cost/benefit relationship is established in which benefits produced by the

military outweigh the costs associated with its operations. In conflict zones, mitigating civic action provides essential services to the populace until such time as the civilian government can assume these tasks. It is designed to have a short term psychological impact on the recipients, so military activity does not result in the greater alienation of the people from the government. Developmental civic action, on the other hand, is the achievement of long term positive payoffs. Programs range from major road building projects to long term health care provided on a regular basis, to military support for local development projects such as school construction, with participation by national and local government agencies.(22)

To be successful, the military cannot get too far ahead of their civilian counterparts, for theirs is a support role, however active they may have become. Only in this way does civic action strengthen the moral legitimacy of the civil governmental system.

Not all is rosy as it looks in provision of civic action by military forces. Some civic action programs can apparently be a deterrent to insurgency, but there can be pitfalls, especially if the public is not educated to hold the armed forces in high regard. At worst, such imposed civic action can alienate the population on which it is forced; at

best such top-down, outside-in penetration can result in populations coming tc passively accept and expect services from government and military without a concomitant self-help effort.

Another negative fallout can occur when counterinsurgent forces see themselves as protectors of the helpless, givers of light and health. The backward citizens who receive these blessings, whose pitifully inadequate, shockingly corrupt administrative and political system have been supplanted for the cause, are quite patently children in charge of foster parents. With love and affection, the forces monopolize the lives of people. This familiar psychological attitude can seldom be separated from the feeling that the people so tended are irremediably inferior. The French army denied that there were any racist elements in its view, yet the atmosphere was charged with racial overtones; the firm but kind protector was doing what he thought was right for his charges whether they agreed or not.(23)

Another interesting concept put forward by Regina Gaillard is the case for separating civic actions from military operations in LIC.(24) Since its early conceptual development during the Kennedy administration, military civic action has been tied directly to military counterinsurgency and LIC doctrine and funding. The author finds the linkage to

be a major detriment in successfully implementing U.S. strategy in Latin America and calls for a separate "development corps", to provide civic action and HCA in the future. It is apparent that civic actions by U.S. troops are often perceived to be part of a hidden LIC agenda. "The problem of military civic action is that the objective remains strategic --- it's never just `do goodism'."(25)

Section V

How can external support (to an insurgency) from adjacent states be eliminated?

Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent, whatever his administrative structures. This advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or at least, to complicate operations for his opponent. According to David Galula, "The role of geography, a large one in an ordinary war, may be overriding in a revolutionary war."(26)

The length of the borders, particularly if the neighboring countries are sympathetic to the insurgents, as was the case in Greece, Indochina, and Algeria, favors the insurgent. A high proportion of coastline to inland borders helps the counterinsurgent because maritime traffic can be controlled with a limited amount of technical means, which the counterinsurgent possesses or is usually able to acquire. It was cheaper in money and manpower to suppress smuggling along

the coast of Algeria than along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders, where the French Army had to build, maintain, and man an artificial fence.

Military support short of direct intervention, in particular, cannot be absorbed in a significant amount by the insurgent until his forces have reached a certain level of development. The initial military phase of an insurgency, whether terrorism or guerrilla warfare, requires little in the way of equipment, arms, ammunition, and explosives. These can usually be found locally or smuggled in. When the time comes, however, for the insurgent to pass from guerrilla warfare to a higher form of operations, to create a regular army, the need for much larger and more varied supplies becomes acute. Either he is able to capture it from the counterinsurgent, or it must come from the outside. If not, the development of the insurgent military establishment is impossible.

The Communists in China received little or no support from abroad until Manchuria was occupied by the Soviet Army; the arms and equipment of the Japanese Kwantung Army were turned over to 100,000 soldiers from the People's Liberation Army, who had crossed into Manchuria.(27) In Indochina, the turning point occurred in 1950, when the Vietminh began receiving aid from Red China. Until then, they had been unable to develop their forces and to stage large scale

operations, not because they suffered from manpower problems, but because their primitive arsenals could not fill their needs, and they could not capture significant amounts of French weapons. In Algeria, the French naval blockade and the sealing of the borders prevented the flow of supplies to Algeria from Tunisia and Morocco, where large rebel stocks had been accumulated. The situation of the FLN forces after 1959 had become so critical that most of their automatic weapons were buried for lack of ammunition.

How then can the security forces eliminate external support being provided to the insurgents? One of the options the security forces have is to destroy the insurgent bases if they happen to be located outside the territory under governmental jurisdiction.

> If regular forces are to have strategic initiative they must render the enemy's main rear bases insecure, and in some cases, the regular armies must be prepared to cross borders to do it.(28)

This statement of Sir Robert Thompson, though desirable from the security forces point of view, may not easily gain the approval of political superiors. Although there are illustrations available about such actions, present day world

opinion may be a different cup of tea. The British certainly did this in Borneo. Admittedly, these border infractions were kept very quiet. Gurkha troops were used, fighting at night and with "khukries," so that there was a maximum amount of terror for the enemy and as little as possible telltale expenditure of ammunition. Such raids also helped spoil future action by the insurgents. Rhodesia, for example, made such long sorties into rebel infested neighboring territory in particular circumstances.

A second option is the use of air forces in resorting to bombing. Unlike earlier times, when bombing raids caused too much collateral damage, modern air forces have the advantage of sophisticated weapons, including laser guided systems. One of the best examples of cross border raids was the American penetration of Cambodia in 1970, which evidently gained an almost two year respite. Notwithstanding the air force being a surgical instrument in cross border operations, its use will be determined by politicians, based on the prevailing national and world opinion.

This brings us to the efficacy of "barrier defenses", which is yet another option, albeit a passive one as compared to the two mentioned above. Large-scale fixed field defenses were a standard aspect of conventional warfare. However, it is worth examining if field barrier defenses can be a

useful tactic or a strategy for armed forces to employ in counterinsurgency operations. In the Middle East, barrier defenses have been used in the 50's, 60's, and 70's: The Hornbeam and Damavand Lines in the Dhofar province of Oman; the Morice Line in Algeria; and the Moroccan field defenses, which separate the Western Saharan territories from Algeria and Mauritania. While there are obvious differences between the three, mainly in the nature of the terrain and length, it is in the operational and tactical level that these three defenses match. Both the Hornbeam/Damavand and Morice lines, served a very similar purpose, namely cutting off rebels based in a safe haven from the population.(29)

Standard tactics for prevention of infiltration were based on the stationing of troops in border areas to conduct a wide variety of patrols, both foot and vehicle, to spot, corner and destroy enemy bands. Such a method, even when rigorously implemented, was never fully able to prevent troops from slipping through. The breakthrough came with the idea of an electrical fence, which could alert troops of the areas of penetration, and thus make their task much easier. The construction of a boundary road meant that troops could carry out their patrols and pursuits with greater speed. With the laying of deep, anti-personnel minefields, the barrier was complete.

Unlike the Maginot or the Bar Lev Lines, the barriers themselves were not important. When one looked at the construction of the Moroccan defenses or even the Hornbeam Line, they were neither necessarily impressive, nor were they prestigious targets. The breaking of such a defense was thus equally unimportant; what was important was that the attacker "stumbled over a tripwire", which alerted the defender, who could then mobilize reaction forces.(30) If the line can be actively defended by patrols and observation, then it becomes very useful, but without such tactics, it is financially costly and will have little result.

But the barrier possesses the serious defect of all defensive organizations. There is no secret about its location; the enemy can observe it functioning and detect its weaknesses, as Trinquier noted in Algeria.(31) At irregular intervals, sporadic attacks in small force, never pressed to a culmination, are enough to immobilize large numbers of troops. Moreover, the ease with which these forays can be repulsed develops a false sense of security, which can be very dangerous. The defender must never permit himself to be decoyed. The enemy will profit from these repeated forays to maintain the offensive spirit of their troops and to study reactions. Only when they have assembled the necessary men and material to force the barrier will they really attack.

No doubt the barrier has a certain value, but it has no effect on the combat potential the enemy can rally together with impunity along the frontiers. In the nineteenth century, when armed bands crossed the frontier, they were followed. If necessary, the country that gave them refuge was attacked and quite often brought to submission. Agreements among a few of the great powers were sufficient to localize a conflict. Today, because of the power of international organizations and the intricacies of world problems, this kind of intervention would lead to reactions throughout the entire world, and certainly to an unpredictable extension of the conflict.

A conventional attack against enemy bases by ground forces also presents disadvantages. The fact is that the crossing of the frontier of a state by a regularly constituted army is a "casus belli."(32) It is the equivalent of a declaration of war, and international usage would definitely designate it as an aggression. Without gaining any decisive advantage, one would considerably widen the dimensions of a battlefield which one finds difficult to manage, as it is. But above all, one would give the enemy unexpected support on the international plane, support awaiting only a favorable occasion to manifest itself openly.

Section VI

What is the efficacy of employing security forces in combatting insurgency in another country?

The experiences of the French in Algeria and the Americans in Vietnam can be compared to illustrate the point. Edgar Furniss in his paper on counterinsurgency remarks that, "Whatever the points of difference between the French and the American experiences, they all support a presumption against foreign intervention in domestic civil strife."(33)

Intervention in foreign revolutionary wars, whether as a metropolitan power seeking pacification or as a foreign ally of a besieged indigenous regime, is dangerous and injurious to the nation that intervenes and especially, to the armed forces that make the intervention. The complex challenges of such wars had, at least in the French experience, produced a whole cult of counterinsurgency with its own philosophy, strategic doctrine, theory of political warfare, civic action and all the rest. Military men become so dedicated to the successful realization of the goals of the counterinsurgency meta-strategy that their perception of national interests, the limits of strategic goals and political-military means, as well as of their place in the national political-military

hierarchy become distorted. This certainly was true to quite an extent in Algeria.

The French actions of intervention in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s provides an insight into their outlook towards this issue. The French format of intervention is based on the argument that political constraints are relatively less limiting. The ideal action is considered to be the pre-emptive pin-prick strike, seeking to nip the crisis in the bud, to avoid protracted warfare and the perennial risk of Vietnamization. As was seen, France sought to "africanize" part of the crisis resolution by relying on national armed forces which had been organized and trained in that perspective, reserving the French force of intervention for the least locally controllable problems.(34) However, in many cases the national armies (eg Zaire) proved incapable of dealing with the crisis, and the French army found itself to rely more frequently than expected on its own devices.

Another factor to be considered in the decision to intervene, is the degree of external support being provided to the insurgents. Is it limited to political or ideological orientation of the insurgents, or is indirect aggression occurring. The problems the French faced were those of a nation, which was viewed as foreign, and which had vested interests in pacification. In Vietnam, U.S. faced the problem

of a foreign power intervening on behalf of an incumbent government, in what was in part a civil war. If civil war is essentially a domestic struggle, the outcome of which is likely to be determined by the indigenous population and not foreign interveners, the lesson that emerged for the U.S. was that it should stay as far removed from the conflict as is compatible with its legal and moral commitments to aid the strife-torn state. Also, military intervention in the form of large numbers of advisors, who engage in combat and technical personnel who fly helicopters, establish communications and logistics centers in areas subject to attack should be avoided.(35)

The positive contributions of such interventions are probably offset by the negative effects of introducing large numbers of foreigners into a tense situation and of political escalation, as was the case in Vietnam, when the material and moral investment of the intervening state was threatened. Military and technical expertise and resources can win battles but they cannot win a counterinsurgency war, if the insurgents succeed in alienating the people from the counterinsurgency forces, and in exhausting the patience of metropolitan or foreign populations needed to support the war effort.

> Counterinsurgency wars are hard to win at best, and the introduction of conspicuous foreign elements on the side of the incumbent regime will probably do more harm than good. When in doubt, stay out.(36)

There may be some circumstances when military intervention may be considered feasible for legal, moral, and strategic reasons. Even then such interventions should be undertaken with the full understanding that the odds are against success.

It is altogether a different issue when it comes to the question of supporting in a third country, an insurgent movement, which is challenging the legitimacy of an incumbent regime. John Hunt succinctly brings this out, when he says:

> The United States, or another country supporting a domestic challenge to the legitimacy of an incumbent government, shares the challenger's requirement to meet the burden of persuasion. Even as the violent acts of the insurgents are widely perceived to be illegal, so may be the support to the insurgents by a third power. The supporting country must persuade its own citizens and the world at large, of the propriety of its actions. Thus, the supporting country is fully committed to the political efforts of the insurgents to gain the assent to legitimacy.(37)

Section VII

Effect of national and international public opinion on the actions of the security forces.

There has never been much doubt that the main characteristic, which distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle for men's minds. Only by succeeding in such a struggle with a large enough number of people can the rule of law be undermined and constitutional institutions be overthrown. For the insurgents, violence may play a greater or lesser part in the campaign, but it should be used very largely in support of ideas. Short term local support is not the same as long term objective of winning the hearts and minds of the people permanently. This is the ultimate aim of both sides in any counterinsurgency campaign.

There are two basic requirements to be met before the support of the local population can be won by the counterinsurgent forces, either in the short or the long term. Firstly, the government must demonstrate its ability to defeat the insurgents, for no one likes backing a loser, particularly in an insurgency. Secondly, the government must convince the population that it can and will protect its

supporters against the insurgents, for no one likes being shot as the reward for loyalty. According to Clausewitz, "Public opinion is ultimately gained by great victories."(38)

It has been seen in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and other such cases, that members of the public cannot stand up to terrorism unprotected. Certainly the use of force against terrorists must be carefully worked out in conjunction with measures designed to mitigate any unfavorable impact which it may have on people's attitudes, but it cannot be avoided altogether and a certain risk of polarization may have to be accepted in order that people should feel that something is being done to protect them. Of great importance, therefore, is the need to establish a suitable political atmosphere, within which the government measures can be introduced with the maximum likelihood of success.

Almost always at the outset of an insurgency, the government will be at a disadvantage because the insurgents will have expended a lot of time and effort on whipping up hostile opinion in order to get the trouble started. Although the government may have been trying to influence public opinion in the opposite direction, it is usual for some time to elapse before waverers start coming down on the government's side and longer still before enemy supporters start to change sides.

Furthermore the struggle once joined can go one way and then the other, and must be kept up until the end, which merely boils down to the issue of being a battle for men's minds. It is worth remembering that the propaganda battle has not only got to be won within the country in which the insurgency is taking place, but also in other places throughout the world where governments or individuals are in a position to give moral or material support to the insurgents.

There are really two separate aspects to the business of developing a frame of mind which rejects unconstitutional activity. The first part of the problem is to devise a system which ensures that the effect it will have on the people's opinion and attitudes is considered at all stages during the formulation and execution of policy. This depends primarily on making all those involved in devising and carrying out the government's campaign aware of the possible public attitudes to their ideas, statements and actions. It applies equally to people working out programs of economic development and to the soldiers on patrol.(39)

Good relations between the military forces and the population require considerable effort and forbearance. Counterinsurgency operations must be fought among the population, against an enemy, who intentionally uses the people as a shield.

The rebels will actually attempt to incite the governing authorities to commit excesses because of their reverse propaganda effect. It is all but impossible to tell enemy from neutral. The military should avoid the "shot gun" approach, ie accepting a few neutral civilian casualties to get a few rebels. It does not work this way because the few neutral casualties create ten-fold new rebels among their relatives and friends. The military should also avoid indiscriminate bombing, shelling, or killing of any kind. Although the population understands that innocent people are going to get killed in a war, they immediately recognize and resent a flagrant disregard of life and property.

This was quite evident in the British Army's action in Northern Ireland. Despite the positive effects of preventing civil war and containing violence, the Army tended to cause negative effects in the prevailing terrorist situation. The most significant negative effect was the alienation of the public, namely the Catholic minority which the IRA courts for support. As Brian Jenkins has written, when using the Army, a government is running the risk that an action of the troops may be seen as overreactive or that an error in judgement may cause further violence. This point was vividly proven in Northern Ireland. The Royal Scots using tear gas on rioters in 1970 in Belfast and the shootings on "Bloody Sunday" in 1972, stand as two examples of how overreaction and

mishandling of the situation can cause immense alienation and loss of necessary public support. Even today the animosity remains between the Army and the Catholic community.(40)

Another aspect which the government should consider is the possible public response to a controversial policy such as internment without trial. In Northern Ireland, this policy when enacted caused wide spread alienation, decayed public support for the military and rioting. The Thatcher government recognized the sensitivity and subsequently rejected calls for reenactment of the policy after the Enniskillen bombing and the Dungannon ambush. The Government realized that the enactment of the policy would only play into the hands of the IRA, and enhance support for the terrorist.

The security forces should take advantage of the lapses in insurgent propaganda as was demonstrated by the military in Uruguay. In 1971, the Tupamaros planned Operation Hot Summer to eliminate the profits derived from the tourist industry. It was a tactical success as it restricted the inflow of tourists, mainly from Brazil and Argentina, but it reduced the size of the summer labor force and produced a wave of public opinion against the Tupamaros from precisely that sector of the population whose support the insurgents sought.(41) The point to be noted, therefore, is that achieving popular

support by urban guerrillas also is an essential prerequisite for gaining political power. Although urban insurgents may not need as much popular support for their sustenance, they must be selective in their terror and careful to avoid collateral damage so as to obviate mass revulsion, that could push the people to support the government. The security forces launched a counter wave of terror against the insurgents and the population unwittingly gave its support, for the insurgents had crossed the threshold prior to that.

The reverse could equally be true. Modern preoccupation with moral problems affords excellent opportunities for enemy propaganda and most insurgents take full advantage of the situation. Any military unit which becomes too effective is likely to find itself labelled brutal and illdisciplined. Any individual whose performance poses a particular threat will be described as immoral and a war criminal. Accusations based on such considerations must be recognized for what they are, and fought tenaciously. Men and units can be put out of action by propaganda just as effectively as by bullets and it is necessary to defend them even when there is a risk in doing so. Failure to defend soldiers in this situation is little different to abandoning them in the face of conventional attack, because a barrage of adverse public opinion could be as damaging.(42)

End Notes

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

> . . . to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.(1)
>
> - Sun Tzu.

The purpose of the paper was to discuss the role of the security forces in counterinsurgency. In this chapter I shall summarize the findings of the four cases discussed and of the salient issues analyzed.

Summary of Cases

Three significant points of comparison and contrast have emerged from the study of the four cases. These are: (a) insurgent struggle is primarily a political struggle and so is the nature of counterinsurgent response; (b) it is of utmost importance, to both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, to quickly gain public support and to

ensure that it is retained throughout the struggle; (c) insurgencies cannot be neatly categorized by types and the doctrine to combat them will vary.

In Algeria and Vietnam, the success of the insurgencies bear the fact that the revolution was primarily political in nature, although the means used were aggressive no doubt. In response, the French and the Americans also looked for a military solution to create a pre-condition for any political effort that would follow. On the other hand, the Uruguayan and Irish insurgents resorted mainly to extreme violent means and tended to militarize their struggle. The government response, especially in the case of Northern Ireland was fundamentally political. The military was used effectively in Northern Ireland, and perhaps rather violently in Uruguay to quell the insurgency. Whereas the insurgency failed in Uruguay, it continues to be a stalemate in Northern Ireland. The cases evidently point out that the insurgent struggle and the counterinsurgent response are basically political in nature.

It was found that the gaining of public support was easily understood but its retention was invariably lacking, both by the insurgents and by the security forces as well as the government. In Uruguay and in Northern Ireland, the insurgents had the majority of the population supporting their

cause at the beginning of their movement, but the excessive acts of violence gradually turned them away. In Algeria, the repressive measures invoked by the security forces, especially in the battle of Algiers, permanently sealed any future attempt to gain public sympathy or support. The South Vietnamese government alienated the population during the Second Indochina war, and the Americans never really got down to address the "other war." Loss of public support in both cases, made it virtually impossible to win the fight against the insurgents.

A study of the four cases and a general survey of other insurgencies in the world bring out that insurgencies cannot be neatly categorized by types. As a consequence, there cannot be a set piece doctrine for counterinsurgency to suit every situation. It will have to vary according to the prevailing circumstances. As discussed in Chapter 2, Bard O'Neill and Brian Jenkins, amongst others have tried to separate types of insurgencies into several segments. Although these definitely merit consideration, they cannot be isolated into water tight compartments. To illustrate, the insurgency in Uruguay, was a combination of the Guevaran "foco" model and the "urban" insurgency model of Marighella.

The movement of the Tupamaros is relevant because it clearly presented a viable alternative to the widely held

doctrine that revolutionary wars and liberation struggles in Latin America and elsewhere were to be fought among the peasants and in the rugged countryside. Instead they chose to set up a guerrilla "foco" in the heart of a large metropolitan area. The Tupamaros sent across a message that an urban social movement can be a carrier of a revolutionary ideology and become an agent of societal change. The Tupamaros established an important precedent as to the manner in which an urban guerrilla group can cope with the reality of metropolitan life. They built a disciplined organization, devised a strategic scheme, developed ingenious tactics and accurately coordinated military and political activities.

The often discussed theories of revolutionary war, therefore, cannot be considered as a doctrine of universal applicability. Gerard Chaliand, from his experience of revolutionary wars in the 1960s and 1970s, notes that:

> . . . with the peculiar exception of Cuba [and perhaps Iran,] revolutionary war has been successful only in the Sinicized parts of Asia --- China and Vietnam. National identity and social cohesion are much weaker in the terrific, prolonged strain of waging revolutionary war. Elsewhere, revolutionary wars have collapsed in the face of determined repression, or split into ethnic, regional, or tribal factions whose hostility to one another seems stronger than the common revolutionary goal.(2)

Since 1945, rebel victory has been most likely against foreign occupation or a colonial regime, where national and racial feelings are mustered against a government of outsiders. Chances are also good against an unpopular and corrupt regime.

Summary of Salient Issues

The military has a definite role to play in counterinsurgency. It is primarily to provide security and restore confidence amongst the people. It is infact the government arm that acts as the "stick" for the insurgents, whereas amnesty and other political measures are the "carrot." Insurgency means violence is involved. This violence has to be met with resilience and counter-force, but not necessarily counter-violence. Use of force has to be controlled and should not indicate of an attitude of revenge.

The question of timing, as regards to the employment of the military, depends on when the insurgency has been clearly identified and discerned. It also depends on the nature of the problem. Almost invariably, it starts as a law and order problem, and such problems are historically a concern of the police. Military involvement is considered only once the situation gets out of control of the police. The decision to employ the military should be taken after deliberation, but

once the decision is taken by the government, there should not be any half-hearted measures. This does not imply a "reign of terror," or a "no holds barred" approach; the military still has to follow strict rules of engagement. The point to emphasize is that when the military sets out to undertake counterinsurgency operations, it must immediately gain the confidence of the public by its actions and provide them a distinct feeling of security.

Ideally, specialist forces may be best suited to combat insurgency, but resources may not permit to raise enough of such forces to deal with widespread insurgency. Their employment is normally restricted to anti-terrorist or counter-terrorist operations. What really is required is specialist training for the military and police forces. The training should be focused on the nature of insurgencies prevailing in the country. Training should include not only the tactical aspects of combatting the insurgents but also subjects like intelligence, media, law and civic action. The need is to train the entire police and military force, unless there is a third force available, like a para-military or such other force existing in the country. The idea of raising auxiliary forces should be given due consideration, too.

The important thing to remember is that all forces involved in counterinsurgency operations should learn to adapt

themselves to the situation and modify their actions to suit the political and military conditions of the operational environment. An army which is open to change or accustomed to making "ad hoc" adjustments to its tactics and methods will be more likely to adapt effectively than one which is inclined to operate only according to standard operating procedures. The army must be able to learn from on-the-job experience. Political sensitivity is another characteristic that can be instilled by proper training but, requires a degree of guidance and direction. It requires great self discipline, especially with respect to use of force.

The U.S. Army adapted for Vietnam with the energy and enthusiasm characteristic of the nation. In technological terms, adaptation was remarkable. But where the conflict was essentially political, the Americans seemed least successful in their efforts to adapt. Neither the American political nor military leadership ever seem to come to grips with the political context of counter revolutionary war. The Army devoted its attention almost solely to the military aspects of unconventional warfare. The British Army, however, adapted itself much more effectively to the conditions of low intensity warfare in Malaya and Kenya, although not particularly well domestically, in Northern Ireland.

Civic action is the foremost means of mobilizing public support for legitimacy in counterinsurgency. It is a vital step towards winning the "hearts and minds" of the people. Three features which stand out as being significant for effective civic action programs are: (a) it is a joint civil-military operation, with civilian leadership being maintained as a dominant partner. Military resources in terms of manpower, equipment, and expertise is essential; (b) security of the civil population by the military forces is mandatory. This will ensure that the work done during civic action is not undone by the influence of the insurgents or the credit for the good work done is not unnecessarily taken by the insurgents as it happened in Algeria; (c) "self help" effort from the population is necessary. The people should not take the assistance for granted or merely as "aid". Their participation will guarantee their whole hearted involvement and a sense of achievement, when the projects are completed. In turn, they will zealously guard these development projects and ensure that their hard work and labor is not lost or destroyed by the insurgents.

External assistance to an insurgency can be in the form of physical or moral support. The moral dimension is primarily in the political arena and for the government to solve, using its high offices like the State Department, international forums and the use of the media. It is the

physical aspect which concerns the security forces. Isolating the area from the insurgents is particularly important to the progress of the counterinsurgency effort. Out of the two options discussed in Chapter 4, the offensive one may undoubtedly be the more expedient because it destroys the insurgent bases, forces, equipment and hurts them most. However, it may not be the accepted form amongst the international community and may be against the norm in present day international environment. Hence, governments may permit the security forces to follow only the passive course ie the construction of barrier defenses. Although these have proved to be effective in many counterinsurgency cases eg Algeria and Oman, their cost effectiveness is questionable. The initiative is turned over to the insurgent and the isolation measure becomes truly defensive.

The ultimate answer is bilateral debate and negotiations amongst neighboring countries, with the permission to destroy the insurgent bases inside the other's territory. But this is easier said than done. This aspect continues to haunt the security forces and does not have any readymade solutions.

The analysis of cases and other counterinsurgency studies, as regards intervention by security forces in third countries, brings forth a fairly clear message. Physically

assisting another country with security forces in that country's counterinsurgency campaign will invariably lead to disaster. Generalization may not be justified as a prejudgement of all counterinsurgency operations, but the dangers of the intervening nation's internal common good are prohibitive. Instances of Algeria, Vietnam and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan stand as appropriate illustrations. The answer obviously lies in implementing programs such as security assistance, to include military training, economic and developmental aid in the form of civic action, HCA and the like.

Even at the expense of repetition, I would like to reiterate that the real battle between the insurgent and counter insurgent is that of winning the support of the local population. It is solely responsible for shaping public opinion at the local, national, and international level. This remains the center of gravity of the government to prove its legitimacy and hence the security forces cannot afford to lose sight of this fact while planning and executing their counterinsurgency campaign. Actions of security forces generate negative or positive public opinion. Uncontrolled or overly repressive actions can lead to negative public reaction as in Algeria.

However, the government can use the military to show its resolve against the terrorists. After two decades of violence and over 400 deaths of British soldiers, the British government remains steadfast in keeping troops in Ulster. By keeping troops in Northern Ireland, despite increased IRA attacks on servicemen, the government has voiced its resolve that the Army will remain until a permanent solution can be accomplished.(3)

The most severe potential consequence of low intensity conflict is the risk of politicization of the army concerned. This was demonstrated in a most pronounced fashion by the French Army in Algeria. In a vacuum created by a weak government at home, the Army moved into the realm of political and psychological action in a manner that superseded the authority of the civil power and placed the Army in opposition to it. The British experience, by contrast, has traditionally separated the civil and military power. Consequently it was never politicized to the same extent. Prolonged conflicts become politically volatile for the nation which has committed its army to fight in them. For democratic countries, the political will and wisdom of the government are likely to be the most significant factors.

End Notes

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