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This study analyzes the Peruvian Maoist Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) movement to discover an explanation for its survival and growth in power. The nature of the insurgency, to include the movement's goals, forms of warfare, ideology, strategy, organization and unity, popular support, and external support are analyzed within the context of the Peruvian environment and the government response. The author concludes that the Shining Path's survival and growth in power results from the movement's superior strategy, its organizational capability, and the government's response. The Shining Path has adapted Maoism to Peru's current realities. Its strategy, although controversial for its use of terrorism and sabotage of Peru's economic infrastructure, has proven successful to date. Most importantly, it has a cohesive organization that is remarkably adaptable. The Shining Path's external support network aids in politically isolating the Peruvian government internationally and provides significant funding from coca cultivation. The government's failure to recognize the nature of the insurgency, its seeking of a primarily military solution to the insurgency, and the brutal repression it has imposed has contributed to the Shining Path's success.

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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

WILLIAM G. GRAVES, MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, New York, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE SHINING PATH: THE SUCCESSFUL BLENDING OF MAO AND MARIATEGUI IN PERU by MAJ William G. Graves, USA, 226 pages.

This study analyzes the Peruvian Maoist Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) movement to discover an explanation for its survival and growth in power. The nature of the insurgency, to include the movement's goals, forms of warfare, ideology, strategy, organization and unity, popular support, and external support are analyzed within the context of the Peruvian environment and the government response. The author concludes that the Shining Path's survival and growth in power results from the movement's superior strategy, its organizational capability, and the government's response. The Shining Path has adapted Maoism to Peru's current realities. Its strategy, although controversial for its use of terrorism and sabotage of Peru's economic infrastructure, has proven successful to date. Most importantly, it has a cohesive organization that is remarkably adaptable. The Shining Path's external support network aids in politically isolating the Peruvian government internationally and provides significant funding from coca cultivation. The government's failure to recognize the nature of the insurgency, its seeking of a primarily military solution to the insurgency, and the brutal repression it has imposed has contributed to the Shining Path's success.

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At the beginning of this project I did not appreciate the importance of a page in which I could acknowledge help in my endeavor. At the conclusion of it, however, I have come to realize that a project of this magnitude does not have only one author. Many loyal friends, classmates, other officers dedicated to the understanding of the complex world of Latin America, and the members of my family have each had a hand in the research and preparation of this thesis.

I would like to thank Mary Jo Nelson of the Combined Arms Research Library at FT Leavenworth. Her dedication to supporting my research with inter-library loans of Spanish language materials was critical to the success of this study.

I especially would like to voice my thanks and respect to LTC Steven Smallwood. I learned more from him about the theory of revolutionary warfare, the Peruvian society, and the Shining Path than I thought possible. He dedicated long hours to developing my analysis of the Shining Path, and displayed a patience for which I am deeply indebted. This is as much his product as mine. LTC

Smallwood made this a rewarding venture.

I owe much to my wife, Sandra, for her patience and support during this long year, and I give thanks to my two daughters for not feeding their Raisan Bran to my computer.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of an untold number of friends and comrades. Many times I found materials in my box from friends that had run across material on Peru during their own research and took the time to support my effort. Many others, to whom I extend my thanks, gave of their personal time, some sent material to support my research, and all provided sound feedback on my analysis. COL Butler, of the LIC Proponencies Directorate, deserves special thanks for the hours spent in debate with me over different aspects of the Shining Path.

Although much credit for this product belongs to those that were instrumental in my successful completion of this study, any errors are entirely my own responsibility.

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CHAPTER 1

THESIS PARAMETERS

INTRODUCTION

I will conduct an analysis of the Maoist, rural-based Shining Path insurgency movement, known in Spanish as the *Sendero Luminoso*.¹ This investigation will attempt to answer the primary research question of "How has the Shining Path insurgency movement been able to survive and expand in Peru?". This analysis will focus on the movement's origins, the environment in which it originated and operates, the source of its power, the extent and nature of its popular support, its ideology, goals, strategy. The analytical framework for the research is that in Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare by Bard O'Neill.

BACKGROUND

In 1980, the Shining Path began its campaign of

¹The terms Shining Path, the Communist Party of Peru-Sendero Luminoso, and PCP will be introduced during this study and are to be considered synonymous.

violence in Peru. Originally not considered a threat to the survival of the Peruvian government, it is now challenging the legitimacy of the constituted government of the country. Over 20,000 deaths have been attributed to the struggle between the Shining Path and the Peruvian security forces since 1980 and over sixteen billion dollars damage has been done to the Peruvian economy. The government is failing in its counterinsurgency campaign. Although this movement is a Maoist, rural-based insurgency, it differs from the textbook models such that those familiar with the situation are unsure as to the current balance of forces and how the Peruvian government should proceed.

ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumption has been made to conduct this study:

-That the Shining Path is winning the insurgency.

This assumption is supported by the growth of the Shining Path from a localized movement in the Department of Ayacucho to one that is able to exert its influence in almost all of Peru's departments. The Shining Path maintains the initiative in the struggle and the government has yet to implement a successful strategy against the insurgents.

LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

Several significant obstacles stand as limitations

to my research.

One limitation is that the Shining Path is a recent and ongoing phenomenon. Twelve years have passed since the movement first surfaced. The movement has not been extensively studied outside of Latin America until about 1985 when it began to be recognized in international forums as a serious threat to the Peruvian government. This limits the amount of primary source material available in English.

The Shining Path has published few definitive documents on its organization, leadership, strategy, operations, or financing. This is the major limitation of this investigation.

The Peruvian government has not been open about its strategy, military operations, nor its enemy, the Shining Path. Much of the government's silence is due to the need for operational security, while the government also distrusts the international news media because of the criticism the government receives on its human rights record. Officers of the Peruvian military will discuss the Shining Path and their perceptions of its strengths, weaknesses, ideology and strategy in private, however.

Also, travel to Peru is not possible during this study.

My initial literature search supports my belief that sufficient material exists to overcome the limitations I have identified. A significant amount of study of the

Shining Path has been done in Latin America and is available in Spanish. The material written in Spanish will greatly assist in overcoming the lack of English resources. I have documents acquired during US military deployments to Peru. These include documents captured from a Shining Path safehouse in Lima which served as a residence for the leader of the Shining Path. Some of these documents provide valuable information on the Shining Path unavailable anywhere else.

This study will not examine the following issues in depth:

- The Peruvian government's counterinsurgency campaign.
- The counterdrug campaign being waged by the Peruvian and United States governments.
- The applicability of US counterinsurgency doctrine vis-a-vis the Shining Path.
- United States national interests in Peru.
- The utility of US forces conducting Foreign Internal Defense missions in Peru.

Also, I will limit the study of the Shining Path to 1980-1991.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is significant for a variety of reasons.

The Shining Path appears to be winning. Few insurgencies have been successful in this century. An

insurgency that after eleven years appears to be growing may provide some important lessons on revolutionary warfare.

The Shining Path is also an ideological anomaly in Latin America. The Shining Path does not follow the *foco*, or Cuban, insurgency model more often seen in the 1960s and 1970s. While it is normally categorized as a rural Maoist insurgency, it exhibits significant differences from the traditional Maoist model. The movement has not rigidly adhered to Maoist strategy, but instead adapted its strategy to changing conditions in Peru. The Shining Path has also woven the 1920s writings on Peruvian society of Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui into its ideological foundation, resulting in an ideology quite unique to Peru.

The insurgency may have a regional impact. The ethnic and cultural composition of the predominantly Indian and mestizo (of mixed white and Indian blood) Peru is similar to that of two other Andean countries, Bolivia and Ecuador. The potential exists for this insurgency to be replicated within other Andean countries.

This study is both significant and timely when viewed with respect to United States national objectives, which are promoting regional stability and reducing the flow of cocaine into the United States. Neither objective can be attained if the Shining Path wins. Finally, the counterdrug war that the United States is waging will result in almost \$100 million in equipment and training for the government of

Peru. Large numbers of American civilian and military personnel will participate in counterdrug-related operations within Peru. The nexus between the coca cultivation and guerrillas requires a greater understanding of the nature of the Shining Path and its strategy.

CHAPTER 2

SIGNIFICANT SCHOLARLY AND PRIMARY SOURCES

PERUVIAN SOCIETY

Much scholarly work is available on the systemic Peruvian social problems that have led to the current insurgency. Several quality works by Peruvian authors provide detailed insight on the social, economic and political conditions within Peruvian society.

Marxist Hugo Blanco's 1972 work, Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru, paints a vivid portrait of the educated, but frustrated, middle-class Peruvians who can find no avenue for advancement within the Peruvian society of the 1950s and 1960s. As members of this class, Blanco and his comrades struggle to reform the social and political structure of the society through political organization of the urban workers, the rural peasants and the university students. Land or Death identifies the Peruvian peasants' struggle for land ownership as the cause that results in the short-lived 1965 Peruvian insurgency. This insurgency contributed to the 1968 military *coup d'etat*, but little

resulted in the way of land reform or increased upward mobility for the middle class.

The 1968 Peruvian military coup and its subsequent attempt to make radical change in the social and political fabric of the nation resulted in international social scientists extensively studying Peruvian society and the Peruvian military. Abraham Lowenthal's 1975 The Peruvian Experiment is probably the most comprehensive work to date on the radical social reforms of the military rule of the 1968-1975 period. Energized by the 1965 insurgency, the military had recognized the vulnerability of Peru to insurgency due to the social and economic inequalities that existed in the society. The Peruvian Experiment documents the social engineering that the military attempted during its dictatorship to remedy the situation.

In Lowenthal's sequel, The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered, coauthored by Cynthia McClintock in 1983, he concludes that the initial success of the reforms did not accomplish the objectives sought by the military.

Hernando de Soto's The Other Path provides an excellent view of Peruvian government, its policies, and organization, and an analysis of the Peruvian society. De Soto studies the housing, commerce, and public transportation in the informal economy, and documents a dualism between a small formal sector and a large informal sector in each industry. The informal sector consists of lower and middle-

class groups that operate outside Peruvian law because the legal system creates insurmountable roadblocks to the legal formal economy. This, De Soto points out, has resulted in people having "gradually grown used to living outside the law."² His work illustrates the ineffectiveness and irrelevancy of much of the Peruvian bureaucracy.

Jose Carlos Mariategui's Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, written in 1928, articulates the semi-feudalistic social and economic conditions that prevailed within Peru in the early 1900s. Although Peruvian society has changed much since then, the Shining Path has adapted Mariategui's analysis to its revolutionary ideology. The significance of Mariategui's writings to an understanding of the ideology of the Shining Path can be seen in the full name of the Shining Path: "*el Partido Comunista del Peru por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui*," or, the Communist Party of Peru-- By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui.³

THE SHINING PATH

The two best-known writers on Peru and the Shining Path in the United States are David Scott Palmer and Cynthia

²Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 5.

³Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, The Washington Papers (New York: Praeger, 1990), 2.

McClintock. The vast majority of books and articles published in the United States reference these two writers' books and articles on the insurgency.

The works of McClintock that appear to be the most useful are "Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas" from Problems in Communism in 1983 and the 1984 World Politics' "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of the Sendero Luminoso."

The first article recounts in detail the conditions that existed in the 1970s and early 1980s that led to the formation of the Shining Path, its violent nature and the lack of knowledge about the organization. McClintock's second article attempts to document the reasons for the Andean peasants' support of the Shining Path against the government.

David Scott Palmer's writings are centered on Samuel Huntington's political development theory, resulting in conflict between a developed center and an undeveloped periphery, and James Davies "J-Curve" theory of rising expectations.⁴ Many of his conclusions are a result of his personal experiences in Peru.

There is currently a controversy in the United States academic world over the accuracy of the earlier writings of David Scott Palmer and Cynthia McClintock. I first found reference to it in an article by Andrew Wheat.

⁴Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, "The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and their 'Shining Path' of Peasant Rebellion," Bulletin of Latin American Research Vol. 10, No. 2, (1991): 150.

He identifies a significant problem facing the researcher in his article "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology". He writes that,

Without access to Sendero, writers recycle one another's work and frequently portray Sendero's ideology as a bizarre blend of Incan superstition and Chairman Mao's Little Red Book.⁵

Accuracy suffers and errors are compounded by repetition. This was further documented in Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique's "The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and their 'Shining Path' of Peasant Rebellion."

Several of the most respected English-speaking writers on the Shining Path today are Taylor Lewis in Great Britain and Ronald Berg, Henry Dietz, and Andrew Wheat in the United States.

At a time that writers such as Cynthia McClintock were writing that the Shining Path "were no longer a mere band of disillusioned provincial university students," Taylor Lewis was describing in detail the Communist Party of Peru-- Shining Path.⁶ He did not describe a group of disillusioned students, but rather, he documented the fact that the Shining Path was a radical Maoist political party that had resulted after two major fractures in the Communist Party of Peru. Lewis wrote his study Maoism in the Andes in

⁵Andrew Wheat, "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer 1990): 42.

⁶Cynthia McClintock, "Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas," Problems of Communism, Sept-Oct 1983, 19.

1983 after conducting research in Peru from 1980-1982. Long before many English-speaking writers had begun to write about the "cult" of the Shining Path, he detailed its political and military organization, ideology, strategy, and growth in the Peruvian Department of Ayacucho. Many later works by writers like Dietz and Wheat have confirmed Lewis' earlier claims.

Dietz' 1990 "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement" is an excellent overview on the Shining Path that continues with Taylor's lesson that the movement is an organized communist party, not a mystical group in the Andes espousing a return to the glory of the Incas. Although a comprehensive examination of the Shining Path, Dietz's work is especially strong in the areas of leadership and goals of the organization.

The "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology" is a detailed analysis of the ideology of the Shining Path. One of the shortfalls in many of the studies of the Shining Path is that the scholars state that the movement is "extremely Maoist" without explaining the significance of being "extremely Maoist."¹ Andrew Wheat's 1990 article defines the Maoist ideology of the Shining Path by defining Chinese Maoism and also the link to the writings of Mariategui. He explains the current ideology and identifies its differences

¹Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," World Politics 37 (Oct 84): 48.

from Chinese Maoism. One weakness of the Shining Path, according to Wheat, is that the Shining Path is attempting to apply Mariategui while not having "updated Mariategui to the present day, an obsolescence reflected in the Party's views on the state and the social classes."⁸

Several indepth studies have been completed recently. The RAND Corporation's study "The Shining Path and the Future of Peru" gives a complete analysis of the Shining Path's insurgency strategy, the weaknesses of the government, and the possibilities for the future. This 1990 RAND study is the second to be authored for that organization by Gordon H. McCormick.

One of the most current and most inclusive studies on the Shining Path is Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism. Published in 1990 by the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, the study is done by a former Peruvian criminal affairs prosecutor, Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano. Her work is one of the more complete studies of the Shining Path. Tarazona has conducted detailed research on the Shining Path, focusing on the movement's ideology, strategy, goals, and organization. Her study is well-documented and is devoid of any emotional references to "mysticism" or vague claims about the Shining Path.

Several post-graduate papers have been written on

⁸Wheat, 48.

the insurgent's and government's strategies, the role of the Peruvian military in modernizing and developing Peru, and the Peruvian use of civil defense forces in the defense of rural villages against the insurgents. The most valuable to my research was a master's thesis completed in 1986 by F.T. Jones at the Naval Postgraduate School, "Sendero Luminoso: Origins, Outlooks, and Implications". Jones' work studies the birth and initial years of the Shining Path using 1980-1985 material on the Shining Path. Though dated, Jones' analysis is insightful and provides a basis from which to conduct additional research.

Few Spanish-speaking writers have published works on the Shining Path in the United States or have had their writings translated into English. Many Peruvian writers have written on the Shining Path since it first surfaced as a violent political party in 1980. This has resulted in a lack of availability of extensive accounts of Shining Path activities and analyses of the different aspects of the movement from those most threatened by the movement. Few Peruvians have published in English in the United States, such as Gustavo Gorriti and anthropologist Edmundo Morales.

Gorriti, long a writer on the Shining Path in Spanish in his native Peru, has only recently begun to publish on the Shining Path in English. His 1990 "The War of the Philosopher-King" describes the formation and growth of the Shining Path, while the "Terror in the Andes: The

Flight of the Ashaninkas" documents a case of the Shining Path crushing Indian resistance in the Satipo region of Peru.

Another Peruvian who has published extensively on the Shining Path, but in Spanish, is Raul Gonzalez. Although his works are not readily accessible in the United States, several of his articles can be found in the 1990 anthology of Peruvian writings on the Shining Path, Sendero de Violencia.

This excellent work is a chronological collection of Peruvian accounts of the Shining Path from 1980-1989, and do not reflect any of the earlier images of "Incan mysticism" seen in the United States. These articles trace the surfacing of the Shining Path and its operations as they occurred over the past decade.

THE DRUG CONNECTION

Most writing on the connection between the cocaine traffickers and the Shining Path has been done by journalists in articles on the cocaine industry or the United States counter-drug war. Little is written specifically about the relationship between the Shining Path and the cocaine traffickers, and only recently has more been seen on the protection of the coca growers by the Shining Path. Authors acknowledge that accurate and indepth journalism is limited by the inability of journalists to

safely travel in such coca producing areas as the Upper Huallaga Valley and the Satipo region of Peru.

Edmundo Morales' Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru provides views of peasant social and economic conditions in Peru, and details the contradictions in Peruvian society that give rise to peasant participation in the Shining Path movement. The 1989 work by Morales is also the best source I have encountered in articulating the extent to which coca is imbedded in the Andean Indian culture. It also details the four social levels of the Peruvian *campesino* class and the social and economic contradictions that exist within these levels that are exploited by the insurgents. Morales denies the existence of a guerrilla-narcotrafficker, arguing that as the drug traffickers are a profit-motivated group, any relationship with the Shining Path would not be sought voluntarily.¹

Tarazona's Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, mentioned earlier, provides a much more detailed view of the Shining Path's seizure of control in the coca producing regions of Peru. She analyzes the strategy and operational techniques the movement uses to gain control of a region's coca production. The relationship the Shining Path assumes between the coca growers and the drug traffickers is analyzed, in addition to

¹Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989), 140.

the effects or benefits each party derives from such a relationship.

PROBLEM AREAS

Few primary documents published by the Shining Path are available through library searches. This is the major shortfall that my research effort has had to address. The collective leadership of the Shining Path has only given several interviews through the years and has generally shunned the press. Some material is available within the United States Army on the Shining Path due to Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) visits and training missions to Peru.

Another major gap in the current literature is whether or not the Shining Path is able to generate popular support for its movement. This is an area of controversy that impacts on the Shining Path's current success.

Finally, what of the movement's urban campaign, which is not easily explained by their Maoist ideology? Most discussions of this are cursory, while some dismiss it as a sign of the Shining Path's failure in the countryside. This requires additional research.

CHAPTER 3

THE ANALYTICAL MODEL AND APPROACH

My methods of research for this study were two-phased in my approach to the subject. The first was an intensive library search while the second consisted of Peruvian military and Shining Path documents, and supporting interviews.

I initially conducted a broad literature search to determine if sufficient materials existed on the Shining Path. Once I was satisfied that sufficient material was available, I began a detailed search in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College for indepth material on Peru and the Shining Path. Some of the computer data bases which proved useful are as follows:

- CARL Public Access Module
- Info Trac
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service CD-ROM Index
- Dissertation Abstracts (CD-ROM)
- Congressional Information Service (CD-ROM)

-National Technical Information Service (CD-ROM)

-PAIS Info Service

I also conducted a search for unclassified material through the Defense Technical Information Center which produced several good sources.

I refined my thesis question during the literature search. It became apparent that the Shining Path was conducting a successful insurgency such that those knowledgeable in Latin American insurgencies were not all in agreement as to the reasons for its success. I felt that the reasons for this success could be significant for the study of revolutionary warfare, and refocused the thesis question to look specifically at the Shining Path and the reasons for the movement's survival and expansion in Peru.

Inter-library loans from other libraries in the United States were used, especially to acquire sources published in Latin America and Europe. Few institutions in the United States appear to possess extensive materials on the Shining Path.

I next needed to decide on a framework for analysis of the Shining Path as an insurgency movement. I selected one early on in the research process to allow me to narrow my research focus. This was the second most important decision of the research process after the definition of the thesis question, as it would define many of the secondary research questions to be answered.

I selected the analysis framework of Bard O'Neill's Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Several different models were considered prior to selecting O'Neill's.

Jeffrey Ryan, in his published Ph.D. dissertation "The Dynamics of Latin America Insurgencies," presents one such model. According to Ryan, his model presents a mathematical rating system with which to explain "success and failure outcomes" and possible alternative outcomes.¹⁰ Ryan's model looks at four factors, Incorporation, Performance, Protection/Coercion, and External Factors, and comparatively rates both the government regime and the insurgents against them. Ryan's model, however, tries to assess the status of the four factors to each actor without adequately attempting to explain how the actor got to that condition. Insurgent ideology is not addressed. Performance does not address the insurgent's strategy. Popular support is rated under Incorporation, but is not analyzed at all. This model was discarded.

Max Manwaring has an excellent framework for analysis in his "A Model for the Analysis of Insurgencies." His model addresses four actors: the insurgents, the government, and the external support of each. The major limitations with this analysis framework for this study of

¹⁰Jeffery J. Ryan, "The Dynamics of Latin American Insurgencies: 1956-1986 (Venezuela, Peru, Cuba, El Salvador)" (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, 1989), 210.

the Shining Path are that Manwaring's model is focused from the view of prosecuting counterinsurgency and the fact that the focus is diffused. This study will not analyze the Peruvian government in depth, nor any external support it receives.

George K. Tahnam and Douglas S. Blaufarb offer another framework that the reader may find interesting. It provides seven military and seven non-military factors for analysis, but as the name of the unpublished work implies, "Fourteen Points: A Framework for Analysis of Counterinsurgency," the framework is for analysis of the government's counterinsurgency efforts. Anyone expanding on this investigation of the Shining Path to examine the Peruvian government's counterinsurgency efforts may want to consider this analytical framework.

The US Army's Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, also contains a framework for analysis of insurgencies in the manual's Appendix C. This framework, however, is much too broad for this study of the Shining Path. As the introduction of the framework states, "A study based upon this guide could fill several volumes."¹¹ Also, the framework never mentions the insurgent's strategy, and ideology is only mentioned in a

¹¹U.S. Army and Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, 1990), C-1.

cursory manner. This framework was not selected as both of these factors appear to be important to the understanding of the Shining Path.

I selected Bard O'Neill's framework for analysis from Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. I chose O'Neill's model because it focuses on the insurgent movement and the concepts of insurgent strategy, popular support, organization and examines ideology as part of the nature of the insurgency.

The search for an analytical framework identified the need to better understand the revolutionary concepts used by O'Neill and the writers on the Shining Path. I identified the popular protracted warfare as espoused by Mao and the concepts of Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui as necessary for analyzing the Shining Path.

My next step was to search out relevant Peruvian documents and conduct personal or telephonic interviews with qualified individuals that could provide answers to questions that the library search had generated.

I began this phase of research with Peruvian military documents and briefing notes from a combined U.S.-Peruvian Countersubversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange in which I participated between 15-20 June 1990 in Lima, Peru. Next, I searched out the relevant Peruvian documents that existed locally, in addition to those already in my possession. Several members of the Command and

General Staff College have participated in previous military exchanges with Peru and were returning for an Intelligence Subject Matter Expert Exchange at the beginning of my research. They were able to obtain documents valuable to this study, but not obtainable through any other means. Some of these documents are important to the analysis of the Shining Path's strategy and nexus with narcotraffickers.

I proceeded to check for additional, more detailed sources at the Regional Military Studies Office and the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Proponencies Directorate, both located at FT Leavenworth. The LIC Proponencies Directorate was a source of valuable material, to include a 42-page text of a 1988 interview of the leader of the Shining Path. The Chief of the LIC Proponencies Directorate, COL Steven Butler, provided information important to the understanding of the Shining Path.

I obtained numerous publications of the Shining Path through the inter-library loan program, and through a New York bookstore, Revolution Books. The latter sells materials provided to them by the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, which currently has offices in Berkley, New York and Washington, DC.¹² The most valuable of these

¹²The Peruvian military considers both Revolution Books and The Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru subordinate organizations of the *Movimiento Popular del Peru (MPP)*, a overseas Shining Path front organization. This organization is analyzed in more detail in Chapter Four of this study. *Defensa Interna: Movimientos Subversivos en el Peru*, [Internal Defense: Subversive

materials was Guerra Popular en el Peru: El Pensamiento Gonzalo. El Pensamiento Gonzalo means "Thoughts of Gonzalo," and is, according to the leader of the Shining Path, part of the basic ideological doctrine of the movement.¹³

Finally, I conducted interviews with individuals who could provide additional information important to this study or those that could clarify questions arising from the research. These individuals were either military personnel with recent experience in Peru or academicians and journalists that have written on Peru.

I believe that the second phase of my research compensates for the shortfall in primary sources available through the library search. The documents, other written materials, and interviews provided quality information not available through conventional library or military research methods. This information was important in sorting through conflicting information on the Shining Path published by both journalists and academicians.

Movements in Peru], Chorrillos, Peru: Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejercito Peruano, 1991, Section 22.

¹³"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," JPRS, 29 August 1988, 2, interview with Abimael Guzman by Luis Arce Borja and Janet Talavera, translated from Spanish, original source: El Diario, Lima, Peru, 24 July 1988, 1-22 and 27-47, and Luis Arce Borja, ed. Guerra Popular en el Peru: El Pensamiento Gonzalo (Brussels, Belgium: Privately printed, 1989), 9.

CHAPTER 4

THE NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY IN A PERUVIAN CONTEXT

To answer the question, "How the Shining Path has been able to survive and expand in Peru?" I return to the same framework for analysis that guided my research on the Shining Path. Bard O'Neill's framework is not all inclusive of the numerous variables that can be examined in an insurgency. Rather, this framework has prompted me to ask the key questions and organize my analysis of those "factors that can have a crucial bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgent conflict."¹⁴ It is through this progress that the answer to how the Shining Path has had such success may be found.

These factors include defining the nature of the insurgency, the environment, the insurgents' strategy, their organization and unity, popular support, external support provided to the insurgency, and the government response to the insurgency. These factors are all interrelated, one generating requirements on another. For example, the

¹⁴O'Neill, 10.

Shining Path strategy will be defined and analyzed against the requirements mandated by the nature of the insurgency and the environment. An analysis of the nature of the insurgency identifies the insurgents' goals, which in turn place specific demands upon the insurgent strategy. The physical and human environment is a major area for analysis, as "success or failure can be traced to the way insurgent and government strategies, plans, and policies are related to environmental characteristics."¹⁵ The lack of external support places additional requirements on an insurgent organization, and the strategy may depend upon a specific level of popular support for success. The interrelationship of these factors is the key to the analysis of the Shining Path.

NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY

"Except for power, all is illusion."
-Shining Path slogan¹⁶

To analyze an insurgent organization one must first understand the nature of the insurgency. This includes first identifying the type of insurgency, the true goals of the movement, and the forms of warfare employed by the

¹⁵Ibid, 53.

¹⁶"Fatal Attraction: Peru's Shining Path," NACLA Report on the Americas XXIV, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 9.

insurgents.¹⁷ Without knowing these elements, it is extremely difficult to accurately assess the strengths, weaknesses and the reasons for insurgent successes.

One problem that surfaces in analyzing the Shining Path insurgency movement is the conflicting accounts written about the Shining Path in many of the English-speaking articles in the 1980s, as was mentioned in Chapter 2 of this study. Terms such as "Pol Pot-like", "fanatic movement," and "terrorists" do much to muddy the understanding of the Shining Path and its goals. Ironically, even O'Neill states that the Shining Path's goal in Peru is not clear, "because Indian mysticism and symbols are extolled in what seems to be an attempt to synthesize traditionalism with egalitarianism."¹⁸ O'Neill's statement is erroneous, as later analysis will show, but it adds the problem of sifting through journalistic images that can mislead the analyst away from an accurate view of the insurgency.

Upon closer examination, however, the insurgent goal is well-defined and has not changed since the movement decided in 1978 to commence violent action in 1980 against the government. The Shining Path's struggle in Peru is an egalitarian insurgency that results from its members' belief

¹⁷O'Neill categorizes insurgencies as follows: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. The first four are all revolutionary because they seek to completely restructure the political system. O'Neill, 17-20.

¹⁸O'Neill. 22.

that the political system is illegitimate, as is the political community.¹⁹

Bard O'Neill defines an egalitarian insurgency movement as a movement that seeks,

to impose a new system based on the ultimate value of distributional equality and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political system.²⁰

The end-state that the Shining Path seeks is the People's Republic of the New Democracy. This, the insurgent leadership espouses, will be a dictatorship of the peasants, the workers, the lesser bourgeoisie, while being led by the proletariat. The Shining Path, however, consider its political party membership the proletariat and not the urban workers as in the case of Lenin.

The details of this People's Republic of the New Democracy are vague, with little exact definition of the social organization that would exist under this new political and social system. It can be argued that the Shining Path keeps this end-state deliberately vague from the masses, as members of the Shining Path repeatedly say,

It's not important that they [the masses] know

¹⁹Bard O'Neill defines the political system as "the salient values, rules, and structures that make up the basic framework guiding and limiting the making of binding decisions," and political community as consisting, "of those who interact on a regular basis in the process of making and executing binding decisions." The latter also includes those who passively accept the decisions. O'Neill, 13-14.

²⁰O'Neill, 18.

for what they are fighting, only that they are ready to fight.²¹

By publicizing only that part of the end-state that is appealing to the masses, such as land reform and freedom from exploitation, the masses are not alienated and are receptive to appeals from the Shining Path.

It does appear, however, that it would entail the creation of a primarily agrarian state with self-sufficient communities. Land reform is a major cornerstone of the transition to this new society. Abimael Guzman, the leader of the Shining Path, has emphasized that land will be handed over to the peasants in his vision of the People's Republic of the New Democracy. While the peasants may interpret this to mean land ownership, the Shining Path further defines handing the land over to the peasants as collective labor working state-controlled land.

In fact, all means of production would be seized by the state.²² By not permitting private ownership of any mean of production, the Shining Path hopes to destroy the cause of class differences and exploitation of the masses.

²¹Raul Gonzalez, "Coca y Subversion en el Huallaga." QueHacer 48 (September/October 1987): 71.

²²In his 1988 interview in the Peruvian newspaper, *El Diario*, Guzman stated that not all property will be confiscated, which contradicts Shining Path documents. He also did not explain which property will remain in private hands or why this was necessary. If this is true, it would seriously undercut the Shining Path's position that ownership must be eliminated to eliminate class exploitation.

Guzman also emphasized that one of the Shining Path's priorities in the final seizure of power will be to seek to preserve Peru's means of production, from destruction by the government forces. Which means of production, industrial, agricultural, or commercial will be protected during the final drive to topple the government is not clear.

Communalism would be the basis of this new society, which often results in observers concluding that the Shining Path desire to return to the communal society of the Incan era. Guzman dismisses this as absurd, and emphasizes the fact that the desired end-state is communism. This new state would allegedly result in social and political justice for the lower classes of Peruvian society, which have been traditionally exploited.

Another aspect of this future society is self-sufficiency. The Shining Path expect communities of the People's Republic of the New Democracy to be self-sufficient. A tenet of Mao's revolution in China, this concept of self-sufficiency is present throughout the Shining Path's organization and is also forced upon the villages in those areas of Peru controlled by the insurgents. These areas provide some indication of what the New Democracy will look like under the Shining Path. The Shining Path forces these villages to reduce agricultural production to subsistence level (and an additional quota for support of the Shining Path's military columns), in many the

insurgents do not allow the entry of medicines, and the villagers must create cottage industries of such items as shoes and clothing for barter with other villagers.

Total destruction of the current structure of Peruvian society is seen as necessary by the Shining Path to create the new government. Additionally, the Shining Path believes that most of the current societal elites, government bureaucrats, and military leaders are not capable of being reeducated after the Shining Path's seizure of power, and will therefore have to be killed. This would result in millions of deaths by the insurgents' own estimates.

The Shining Path dismisses any negotiated settlement. This is ideologically out of the question, given its rejection of the political system. The organization's position is,

the basic rule is that you sign at the bargaining table only what has been confirmed on the battlefield, because obviously no one hands over what he has not lost.

The Shining Path will only "negotiate" upon defeating the government, most likely to increase the legitimacy of their regime.

It also rejects participation in the electoral process. To participate in elections is to acknowledge the legitimacy of the political system. Thus, the only option

²³Ibid, 28.

consistent with the Shining Path's ideology is the destruction of the political system.

The Shining Path acknowledges that international isolation is a threat that the People's Republic of the New Democracy would face. The Shining Path's position that all international debt that Peru holds would be confiscated increases the likelihood of this action. Guzman argues that despite foreign nations' attempts to isolate the new government, critical items could still be bought in the international markets, although they would be expensive. His solutions for survival in the international world beyond this are vague, stating that reliance on the Shining Path's ideology will be the key;

No revolution can be planned completely from the outset; often we grope along and find temporary solutions or solutions for one moment. But we thus make headway. We accept this as well, because we believe that our fundamental weapon is ideology.²⁴

Ideology is everything to the Shining Path. This is an insurgent movement that is built from its ideology out. As Guzman stated,

the point is to have a just and correct ideological and political line, and there cannot be a just and correct political line unless there is a just and correct ideology. We thus believe that the key to everything is ideology.²⁵

Ideological purity thus has primacy over all other considerations.

²⁴Ibid, 38.

²⁵Ibid, 34.

The leadership of the Shining Path maintain ideological purity in the organization's operations by considering everything they do against the Shining Path's ideology. Committed to the concept of the dialectic, the insurgents evaluate every action in what is called "the two line struggle." This two line struggle is founded in the theory that out of the struggle between contradicting lines of action will end in an ideologically correct result. Therefore, everything is evaluated against the ideology to resolve the natural contradictions to develop what Guzman calls the "correct line." The Shining Path encourages discussion and debate during resolution of the contradictions. Once the correct line is decided no deviation or dissention is permitted because the result is ideologically correct.

The insurgents do not call themselves the Shining Path. They emphasize that they are members of the *Partido Comunista del Peru- por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui*, PCP (Communist Party of Peru-- by Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui). The phrase "*por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui*" was part of a sub-title of a Shining Path-sponsored student newspaper in the 1960s and 1970s, and came to identify this Maoist faction of the Peruvian Communist Party that developed in the Department of Ayacucho. It is from this phrase that the name Shining Path came to be associated with this movement.

The ideology of the Shining Path has its roots in the written works of Jose Carlos Mariategui, who the Shining Path claims as the father of the Communist Party of Peru. Mariategui, who died in 1930 at age 35, was a Marxist who believed that peasant revolution was the solution to Peruvian society's social injustices that were caused by both ethnic and class oppression. Mariategui also defined early twentieth century Peru as a semi-feudal state, one that needed liberal land reform and an acceptance of the Indian into Peruvian society in order to progress. Mariategui condemned the Spanish colonization of Peru for the feudalism and "slave economy" that was left, and for the destruction of the Incan communal society. He believed that the Incan communalism, which he also referred to as agrarian communism, was responsible for a more cohesive society than that brought about by the Spanish conquest. Mariategui turned to espousing a peasant and Indian revolution in the late 1920s as he became convinced that reform would not occur in Peru otherwise.

The Communist Party of Peru (PCP) was formed not long after Mariategui's death and has had a turbulent history since then. The first split in the party of significance to the study of the Shining Path occurred in 1964. The Party fractured into two major camps, a pro-Soviet PCP-Unity (*Unidad*) and a pro-China Maoist PCP-Red Flag (*Bandera Roja*) as a result of the 1963 Sino-Soviet

split.²⁶ PCP-Red Flag was led by Saternino Paredes, and in 1965 the PCP-Red Flag declared that Peruvian society was both semi-feudal and semi-colonial. The party also declared that it was advocating Mao's strategy of prolonged popular war starting in the countryside and ending in the city, and it wanted to directly transplant the experiences of revolutionary China.

The leader of the PCP-Red Flag faction in the Department of Ayacucho in the southern highlands was an intellectual by the name of Abimael Guzman Reynoso. Abimael Guzman was a charismatic university professor with a strong following among the mestizo university students. His arrival in Ayacucho brought dramatic changes to what was a lackluster faction of PCP-Red Flag, located far from the center of Peruvian society. Guzman began reorganizing and recruiting soon after arriving. According to Gustavo Gorriti, a fellow professor at the university,

His objective was clear: to use the university to recruit, educate, organize, and subsidize the growth of Communist cadres.²⁷

He began organizing in the poor neighborhoods, and convinced the university to create a high school which he staffed with communists and communist sympathizers. The high school

²⁶Some sources translate *Bandera Roja* as Red Banner.

²⁷Gustavo Gorriti, "The War of the Philosopher-King: the Strange Career of the Shining Path," New Republic, 18 June 1990, 18.

students became Guzman's new cadre. Those that returned to their villages were the beginning of rural infrastructure on which Guzman would continue to build. Out of those that Guzman could get enrolled in the university came his most ardent followers.

The Cuban-inspired *foco* insurgency of 1965 sparked great change in PCP-Red Flag. Abimael Guzman, attempting to create a military wing for PCP-Red Flag at the time, was sent to China by the Party to avoid arrest; the military was cracking down on all subversive organizations and Guzman's arrest appeared imminent. He spent over a year in China at a time in which the Cultural Revolution was beginning. While there he received ideological training and instruction on clandestine operations and guerrilla warfare. Upon Guzman's return to Peru he found the PCP-Red Flag in disarray. Some members had been arrested while many others had left to join the insurgency. He rapidly moved to secure control of the Ayacucho faction of PCP-Red Flag, and as Party legend has it, told his followers, "From now on, we'll stop bullshitting. From now on, we'll begin serious revolutionary work." It appears that his time in China significantly influenced Guzman.

Guzman rapidly gained power in the PCP-Red Flag. In 1969 the military government placed significant restrictions on the education program that granted a free high school education to all. Guzman's expansion of the PCP-Red Flag

was dependent upon the free education program in that the high school program fed the university large numbers of mestizos from the Sierra who were frustrated with the rigid class structure and social injustices of Peruvian society. Guzman was responsible for the protests and wave of violence that followed the military's announcement. The violence brought about not only Guzman's arrest, but also his break with Saturnino Paredes.

Guzman's role in the 1969 violence was only one manifestation of Guzman's growing power in the PCP-Red Flag. Conflict between Guzman and Paredes continued until 1971, when they mutually expelled each other from the Party. This left Guzman with his own party, albeit only the Ayacucho faction which was his base of power, and left him convinced that the Paredes's faction was not serious about revolutionary change and would only talk and not fight for it. As both of the factions continued to call themselves the PCP, they became known by their newspapers: Paredes' faction published Red Flag and Guzman's faction in Ayacucho had a newspaper that had a phrase below the title that read, "According to the Shining Path of Mariategui." Guzman's party thus became known as the Shining Path.

Guzman turned to strengthening and expanding his organization in the southern highlands. Whereas the pro-Soviet communist factions collaborated with the military government, Guzman worked to build a loyal and disciplined

cadre. Guzman decided that the Shining Path needed to be reorganized according to the teachings of Mariategui. By 1976 the Shining Path was undergoing significant changes. Guzman decided that the Party was already reorganized. He also began to take actions in preparation for the struggle with the government, such as moving substantial numbers of cadre out into the countryside to expand the proselytization and recruiting. The death of Mao and the fall of the "Gang of Four" had a profound effect on the Shining Path.

These changes in China brought about changes in the Shining Path's ideology. After years of support by the Chinese, the Shining Path was now alone. After a period of internal debate, the Shining Path declared that it was now the center of world revolution. The leadership moved to make changes that would prevent their downfall in the same way as had happened in China. Gorriti argues that these changes included organizing the Party along military lines in order to make the Party less "coup-prone."²⁸ It was decided that a "cultural revolution" should be an ongoing activity in the organization in order to keep the Party cleansed, and Guzman prepared the "Guiding Thoughts of Comrade Gonzalo" in an attempt to institutionalize the ideology to prevent the Party from being subverted from within.

So how do Mao and Mariategui come together in the

²⁸Ibid, 21.

ideology of the Shining Path? Mariategui's writings are used as proof that Peru is a semi-feudal state. They are also used to support the claim that only a revolution will bring about change. Mariategui validates the use of Maoism as a vehicle for revolutionary change. Mariategui's views on class oppression, problems with land ownership, and the greatness of the Incan "agrarian communism" are seemingly compatible with Maoism. The largest difference between Mariategui and Mao according to Andrew Wheat in his article "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology" is that Mariategui envisioned a revolutionary organization that would mobilize the Peruvian peasantry as an oppressed ethnic minority as well as an oppressed class. China did not have a ethnic problem. The Shining Path's ideology explains this away by declaring that racial discrimination is a symptom of class oppression.

Other differences exist. Mao often referred to the Party as the proletariat, as China did not have a significant industrial sector with its body of urban workers. The Shining Path, like Mao, often uses the term "proletariat" synonymously with the Party, despite the large urban population in Peru. Additionally, whereas Mao created a broad front of peasants, urban workers, and both petty and nationalist bourgeoisie, the Shining Path has restricted its focus to poor peasants, the poor shantytown residents, students, and the young, frustrated mestizos of the Sierras

that form its leadership. It has, for the most part, attacked "rich peasants" (the Shining Path has not defined what constitutes a rich peasant), and both the petty and greater bourgeoisie. Until the creation of urban front organizations in Lima starting in 1987, the Shining Path actions in this regard were significantly different than Mao's.

The insurgents have identified several primary enemies of their revolution. The first of these is the revisionists. These are those in society that "strive to falsify and distort scientific socialism to oppose the class struggle and the revolution."²⁹ The Shining Path consider the revisionists especially dangerous because their use of sham communist parties, worker parties, and other movements that divert attention away from the true class struggle.

Other important enemies of the revolution support the revisionists' attempts to destroy the revolution. These are yankee and social imperialism, the first of which denies the concept of class and works to maintain capitalism while the second pursues armed actions to achieve world hegemony.

The most important enemy of the Shining Path's revolution, however, is the Peruvian insurgent group *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru*, (MRTA). A foco-style movement that emerged in 1984, the MRTA is seen as an enemy

²⁹Ibid, 4.

for several reasons. Because the Shining Path declares that it has the true, scientific ideology, then all other competing groups are false pretenders. The MRTA has also committed actions, such as declaring a ceasefire with the government at the beginning of President Alan Garcia's term in 1985 and stating that negotiations might be possible under the correct terms, that has shown that the MRTA is willing to accept less than a total change in the political system. Probably most important though, is that there can be only one victorious insurgent group in the struggle against the government. The Shining Path intends to lead the victorious revolution.

One aspect of the nature of the Shining Path's insurgency that is misunderstood is the relationship of the Peruvian Incan heritage to the Communist Party of Peru's goals. The Shining Path is not seeking a return to the days of Incan communalism; it denies this in many documents. The heritage of the Incan past is embedded in the Peruvian culture, and is especially important to the Indian communities. The Shining Path capitalizes on this cultural heritage to aid the revolution in two significant ways, which will be addressed in more detail later in this study. The first of these is that it makes the Shining Path goal more appealing to the predominately Indian and mestizo Peruvian population. The agrarian-based communist society of the Shining Path has an appeal, given the Incan heritage.

The second is at a practical level. Shining Path uses Indian superstitions and beliefs that are embedded in the Incan heritage to its advantage in appealing to Indians for support or in the use of violence for the control of the Indian community.

The Shining Path has, by its own admission, adopted four primary forms of warfare with which to prosecute the insurgency:

we have instituted the four forms of warfare of popular war: 1)Guerrilla warfare with its two forms of attack and ambush; 2)Sabotage; 3)Selective annihilation; and 4)Armed propaganda and agitation.³⁰

Selective annihilation in this passage is best understood as selective terrorism. Armed propaganda is a powerful tool of the Shining Path. The insurgents' propaganda is propaganda by deed. Demonstrations of potency, such as the night the Shining Path plunged Lima into darkness by destroying power pylons and then displayed a large burning hammer and sickle on the mountainside to the city below. Armed strikes are a popular tactic of the insurgents. The Shining Path schedule an armed strike and expects all businesses and schools to remain closed, mass transportation to remain parked and all public activities canceled. This demand is enforced through violence.

Sabotage is used extensively. The Shining Path

³⁰Luis Arce Borja, ed., Guerra Popular en el Peru: El Pensamiento Gonzalo (Brussels, Belgium: Privately printed, 1989) 363. Translation done by myself.

targets its acts of sabotage against two primary targets, governmental services and the economic system. This is to demonstrate the inability of the government to provide for the people and to worsen the living conditions of the people.

Guerrilla warfare is used primarily in the Sierra. The Shining Path follows Mao's teachings, and has proven to be an elusive foe for the government.

The Shining Path is most known for its extensive use of terrorism. This is also one of the most controversial aspects of the insurgency. It is argued by many observers in the United States that the Shining Path's use of terrorism will deny it popular support and is the greatest weakness to the insurgency. The Shining Path's use of terrorism will be addressed more extensively later in this study.

The Shining Path relates its campaign of violence to the continuation of the Peruvians' historical use of violence to fight for their rights. Guzman cites the following examples: the Peruvian tribes that fought against the invading Incas; the uprisings against the Spanish conquistadors; and the war of independence from Spain.³¹ Shining Path propaganda calls upon the Peruvian people to violently fight against oppressors in the name of this

³¹Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 31.

heritage.

THE ENVIRONMENT

The animal closest to man is the Indian.

The skin of an Indian is very cheap.
-old Peruvian sayings

An analysis of the environment from which the Shining Path emerged and in which it continues to operate consists of two components. The first is the physical component, and consists of the terrain, the climate and the transportation-communications system. The second is the human component, consisting of those aspects of Peru's demography, socioeconomic conditions, political culture, and political system that "...provide opportunities for insurgents and place constraints on insurgent strategies as well."³²

Peru is a country that remains divided and polarized as a result of its geography and colonial heritage. Peru has resisted the integration of its population into one cohesive society. The friction in the society stems primarily from the legacy of the Spanish colonial rule and has resulted in racial discrimination, a rigid class structure, and governmental systems that do not serve all sectors of society.

Peru is racially diverse, with a mixed population of

³²O'Neill, 53,

white, mestizo, Indian, black, Japanese, and Chinese. The whites, which are primarily of European descent, constitute 15 percent of a total of 22 million people. Mestizos, represent approximately 38 percent of the total. Peruvian Indians, of which there are various groups, form the bulk of the population with 46 percent. Blacks, Japanese, and Chinese descendants together constitute only one percent of the population.

In Peru, a mestizo is not defined by the mixed Indian and white blood as in most of Latin America, nor is an Indian a person of pure Indian blood. Rather, according to Peruvian anthropologist Edmundo Morales,

The definitions of Indian and mestizo are based more on the degree of the Andean people's exposure to Western culture than to any substantive ethnic differences.³³

It is more of a distinction of culture than race. An Indian is one that has been traditionally tied to the land and is of Indian dress, customs, and language. A mestizo refers to a person with Indian blood that is of more western culture, dress, and speaks primarily Spanish. The mestizo also works as "a small farmer, artisan, industrial laborer, or as a member of other low income groups not attached to the land."³⁴

Peru is also not a linguistically homogeneous

³³Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989), 3.

³⁴Ibid.

country. Although Spanish is the dominant language, language differences have been a divisive factor in Peruvian society. Seventy percent of Peruvian society speak Spanish as a first language. Of the remaining thirty percent, an estimated twenty-five percent are Quechua speakers and the remaining five percent, located primarily in the altiplano near the Bolivian border, speak Aymara.

The divisive effects of cultural, racial and language differences should not be analyzed independently of other factors. Rather, these factors are interwoven into the rigid Peruvian class structure. When these are examined in the context of the physical geography, a picture of a fragmented country appears.

Peru is the fourth largest country in Latin America, covering over 1,285,200 square kilometers. Its terrain and climate is diverse and they have limited the economic and social integration of the country. Access to many parts of the country is restricted due to the limited transportation system. Rail lines exist primarily to transport mineral from the mines to the ports and little access by road exists to the interior of the country.

Peru is divided into three different geographic regions. The coastal region, or *la Costa*, is defined as the littoral and the western foothills of the Andes below 2,000 meters. The tropical rainforest in the Amazon basin in the interior and the mountain slopes below 2,000 meters on the

eastern side of the Andes is *la Selva*. The mountainous Andes region between the Costa and the Selva is *la Sierra*.

The Selva has traditionally been more integrated with the ports of Brazil because commerce was shipped via the Amazon river. With few transportation nets linking it to the Peruvian coast, the Indian tribes of the Selva have historically been ignored by the central government in Lima. Recently, however, large deposits of oil and natural gas have been discovered in the Selva. Environmental concerns and the Shining Path pose significant obstacles to the government's development of these resources.

The Costa, extending from the border with Ecuador in the north to the border with Chile in the south is a relatively narrow and arid coastal region. This coastal region, although arid, possesses the richest agricultural lands in the country and the most advanced agricultural technology. The agricultural products of the coastal region are products of large plantation-style ventures and produce primarily cash crops. This region has long been home to the majority of the population. The majority of large cities are located in the Costa, the most important of which is Lima.

Lima is the center of national power in Peru. Contiguous with the port of Callao, this metropolis is the center of government, commerce, industry, culture, communications, and transportation for Peru. With over

seven million people, Lima is also the home to the majority of whites.

The whites have traditionally been the elites of Peruvian society, dominating not only the wealth of society but also the political power. Although the traditional elites of Peruvian society were the landed oligarchy, today it consists of the bankers, and the elites of the industrial and commercial sectors of society. The military rule of 1968-1980 eliminated the last vestiges of the landed elite's power, which they used to wield from the Sierra.

The Sierra is a sharp contrast to the Costa. This mountainous region has traditionally been far from the minds of the elites on the coast. Remote and underdeveloped, this region has always suffered from a limited transportation and communications network. Quechua-speaking Indians form the vast majority of this region's population. The rest consist of mestizos, which are evenly distributed throughout Peru. A harsh environment, forty-five percent of the region is high, arid mountains devoid of any trees. Twenty-four percent is under a permanent snowcap, and eighteen percent consists of subtropical jungle. The latter is commonly called high jungle and the "eyebrows of the jungle." Only four percent of the Sierra is suitable for cultivation, and this area is extremely susceptible to periodic droughts.

The oppressive heritage of the Spanish conquest is most prominent in the Sierra. The Spaniards exploited the

rich mines in the mountains with the slave labor of the Indians and established large land holdings in the Sierra that also required large amounts of indigenous labor. After independence from Spain, which changed the lifestyle of the oppressed peasants little, labor-intensive plantations were created along the coast that produced cash crops for export.

To support the requirement for cheap labor, the debt peonage system was developed as part of the hacienda system to keep the Indian peasant tied to the land. It was a land tenure system in which the peasant remained indebted to the landowner and amounted to virtual serfdom. The hacienda system served as a mechanism of social control. Despite the plethora of laws passed in Peru to protect the Indian against exploitation and abuse the Indian was exploited, remained isolated, and kept in a state of dependency. Over time, an exploitive system called *gamonalismo* developed. It was an uncodified system that allowed for the exploitation of the Indian. It consisted of the landowners, the hierarchy of local public and private officials, intermediaries, and agents who exploited the Indian and his labor. These *gamonales*, as they were called, were free to ignore any law or regulation in the exploitation of the Indian without fear of action against them. The society supported the exploitation of the Indian.

What has resulted is a rigid and racist class structure with the whites on top and with the Indians viewed

as almost subhuman.³⁵ The mestizos rank above the Indians, but regardless of education or experience, they can never enter the upper levels of society due to their Indian blood and low-born class. Because the mestizos rank above the Indians in the society, some Indians try to hispanize themselves in dress, speech (Spanish instead of Quechua or Aymara), and education in order to pass as mestizo. These individuals are pejoratively called *cholos*.

Land reform is a continuing political issue in Peru. The traditional control of the best lands by the landed elites of society combined with the shortage of arable land in Peru and Peru's growing population in the twentieth century continued to aggravate the problem. One of Mariategui's famous Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality focuses on the problem of land ownership for the Indians. He argued that the problem of land ownership for the Indians would never be resolved until feudalism in Peru was destroyed.³⁶ Land seizures by organized groups of Indians and mestizos have become almost a tradition in Peru. In fact, some of Lima's modern neighborhoods, such as San Isidro, started from a land seizure in the early 1990s.

The military regime of 1968-1980 promised real land reform. Land reform laws were passed, but the results were

³⁵To call a white or a mestizo a *serrano*, or "of the Sierra," is a tremendous insult.

³⁶Mariategui, 32.

far from the expectations of the peasants. Instead of land ownership passing to the peasants, government-owned cooperatives were formed with the majority of productive land. The laborers that had previously worked the land as a sharecropper benefitted with a place in the cooperative, but the wage laborers no longer had the means with which to make a living. In those areas in which land was passed to private ownership, insufficient land was available and only a minority of peasants benefitted. In many areas of Peru, the land still had not been distributed by 1975 when the military regime's change in leadership began dismantling many of the reforms, to include the land reform program. Failed attempt at land reform created both an unfulfilled expectation in the peasants and it destroyed the last of the traditional land holdings on which the Indian communal lifestyle was based.

This accelerated the breakdown in the Sierra's traditional society that had begun in the 1950s and 1960s with the introduction of capitalist development. It also fueled an emigration from the highlands to the coastal urban centers in search of employment and, in the 1960s, to the high jungle which the government was opening up for settlement. The peasants that went to the coast went primarily to Lima, but there was no mechanism with which to integrate them into the urban society. Land seizures provided them living space on the outskirts of the city, but

the immigrants faced cultural alienation and racial prejudice in their new coastal communities.

The peasants that went to the interior went under a government program that promised them free agricultural lands in the lush green slopes and valleys of the eastern slopes of the Andes. The government had built the Marginal Highway to support this development, but had not realized that although the jungle is lush with vegetation it has extremely poor soil for agriculture. The government also provided little technical support to the highland peasants that were experienced at growing crops suitable for high altitudes and the crops generally failed. When the military government took over in 1968, they decreed that the majority of cleared land in the upper jungle would be used to graze cattle. Loans were provided to purchase the cattle, which died due to a lack of experience of the peasants and a poor breed of cattle for the environment. This happened at the same time that coca cultivation was beginning to be sought by the Colombian drug traffickers for the production of cocaine. The residents of the Upper Huallaga Valley, where most of the settlement had occurred, quickly turned to coca cultivation as the plant thrives in the climate and soil of that region.³¹ The result of this emigration was further resentment towards the government.

³¹It is ironic that what was to be President Belaunde's (1963-1968) model settlement region became the largest producer of coca in the world.

The expectations of the peasants also sparked large scale land invasions throughout the Sierra. These occurred in Piura (1972, 1973, 1978-79), Andahuaylas (1974), Cajamarca (1973-1974), Cusco (1977), and elsewhere.³⁸ Peasant organizations gained strength during this period and aligned themselves with the leftist political parties.

The majority of Peruvian society do not perceive that national government or the political system is there to represent them or resolve their problems. According to Tina Rosenberg,

The poor in Peru do not resort to the justice system because it is no help. People bribe officials because it is the only way to get anything done. They build homes and set up businesses illegally because to do so lawfully is almost impossible.³⁹

Politicians are seen only at election time, to secure the vote of the people. The police are not seen as there to serve them, but rather they bring problems and abuse. The government bureaucracy is perceived as serving only those with money and power.

As a result, the rural peasants, mine workers and urban industrial workers in Peru have a tradition of forming organizations such as community associations, unions, and worker organizations in order to solve some of their

³⁸Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru, (Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1983), 2.

³⁹Tina Rosenberg, "Beyond Elections," Foreign Policy 84 (Fall 1991): 78.

problems. This, such as in the case of the peasant community associations, has its roots in the Indian communal heritage. The Indian communal group, called the *ayllu*, consisted of a multi-family grouping that worked common lands and lived a communal lifestyle that had legal rights under the national law. The *ayllu* system, although in decline since the 1950s, was undercut by the breakdown in traditional society in the Sierra in the late 1960s. The concept of community organization is firmly embedded in the Peruvian culture, however, and not only manifests itself in the above examples, but also in the urban soup kitchens and shantytown associations that are self-help programs by the disadvantaged sectors of society.

Peru has suffered under several economic crises since 1975 which have exacerbated Peru's economic and social problems. The late 1970s brought the worst economic crisis to Peru since the War of the Pacific at the turn of the century. With the implementation of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved deflationary policy, the living standards of the population were severely depressed. Between October 1975 and August 1978 real wages fell by 35 percent. Urban unemployment rose to almost ten percent and urban underemployment to 39 percent. Prices rose 221 percent while the value of the Peruvian currency was devalued by 446 percent. Meanwhile, floods in northern Peru and droughts in the southern highlands that were caused by

the shift in the *El Nino* currents worsened the rural economy also.

Another economic crisis hit the Garcia administration in the late 1980s. The cumulative inflation over the five years of President Garcia's term was two million percent.⁴⁰ This period was marked by accelerating negative growth rates, the depletion of the foreign currency reserves, capital flight, and the growth of one of the highest per capita debts in Latin America. The economy was near collapse by 1990, when Alberto Fujimori assumed the post of president. He immediately instituted a severe austerity program that observers labeled "Fuji-shock" that not only brought inflation under control and brought about the return of capital investment, but also severely decreased the population's real purchasing power. Today, over half of the country's population lives in absolute poverty and 80 percent of the population is either unemployed or underemployed.

Peru's society, like most in Latin America, is a male-dominated society. This is even more pronounced in the Indian society of the Sierra. Women traditionally receive no school education in the highlands and do not learn Spanish. At community meetings the women normally sit on the floor and only observe; they are not permitted to

⁴⁰Rosenberg, Children of Cain, 192.

participate. The breakdown in traditional society further aggravated the lives of Peru's women. As large numbers of men left the Sierra to search for work in factories, mines, farm cooperatives, and the coca fields, the women were left to raise the family, work the fields, and tend to the livestock. This left the women to provide for the family without the traditional support of the Indian communal society. By 1988 one third of the Peruvian households were headed by women.⁴¹ These conditions have made the women more susceptible to the Shining Path's appeals. This issue will be discussed in further depth later in this study.

⁴¹Carol Andreas, "Women at War," NACLA Report on the Americas, XXIV, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 23.

CHAPTER 5

THE SHINING PATH'S ADAPTATION OF MAOISM

STRATEGY

It [the Shining Path] directs its principal brutality not against rightists- who "sharpen the contradictions," thus serving the revolution- but against the campesino organizers and labor leaders of the left, who "divert the campesinos' attention from the central task, which is the People's War."⁴²

The Shining Path has adopted the strategy of protracted popular war along the lines of Mao, but modified to the realities of Peru.

The leaders of the insurgency accept the premise that Mao's strategy of protracted popular war progresses through three phases. These phases are sequential, and consist of the strategic defensive, the strategic equilibrium (also translated as the strategic balance and strategic stalemate), and the strategic offensive. These phases differ with respect to the correlation of forces between the government and the insurgents.

⁴²Tina Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991) 151.

A protracted popular war strategy begins with the strategic defensive phase. The insurgency, just getting started in the countryside, is most vulnerable during this phase. The government has the advantage in the balance of forces, while the insurgents are expanding their political structure, their bases of support among the populace, and initiating limited violent actions against the government. The priority of the insurgents during this phase is political mobilization of the people at the village level and their isolation from the government. Due to their vulnerability, the insurgents concentrate on the construction of a clandestine parallel political hierarchy with which to contest the legitimacy of the government, and a network of clandestine support bases.

Guerrilla operations are the priority in the strategic equilibrium phase. Full-time guerrilla units are created, along with regional forces, to begin more aggressive actions against the government security forces to cause them to adopt a static defensive posture. In this phase, the political structure continues to work to create a parallel government. Although the guerrilla units still do not try to hold terrain, safe base areas are created in remote areas for the training of the expanding guerrilla forces and for the growing logistical system.

In the last phase, the strategic offensive, the guerrilla forces are converted to regular forces and conduct

conventional mobile warfare to topple the government apparatus and its military forces. These forces have the popular support of the masses and are still supported by some guerrilla operations.

This strategy begins in the countryside, gains strength and encircles the cities. The cities, which are the last bastions of the government, are cut off from the countryside. The revolutionaries' regular forces seize the cities after defeating the government's regular forces in conventional battles of position and movement.

Although insurgents should progress through these three phases sequentially, they may prematurely advance their actions into the next phase and find the need to revert to the previous phase. This strategy provides flexibility to the insurgent organization.

Some allege that the Shining Path is misapplying Maoism because this strategy is being applied against the realities of Mariategui's principally rural and less developed Peru. One example of such criticism is Andrew Wheat's claim that the "Shining Path's reluctance to update Mariategui's sixty-year-old analysis of Peru," means that the Shining Path's strategy "inevitably runs aground in predominately urban, contemporary Peru."⁴³ In 1988, Guzman vigorously defended the Shining Path's strategy, saying,

⁴³Andrew Wheat, "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer 1990): 50.

There are even those who say that we are misapplying Chairman Mao in an era to which he is no longer suited. All in all, they are chattering so much that it bears asking whether they know what they're talking about.⁴⁴

Mariategui is used to validate the Shining Path's use of Maoism as an ideology and basic strategy, but the Shining Path have demonstrated the ability to deliberately adapt Mao's strategy to the following modern Peruvian realities: two thirds of Peru's population is urban; Lima is the dominating economic and social center of Peru; Peru possesses a modern, conventional military; and Peru possesses a more technologically developed socio-economic system.

The urbanization of Peru has resulted in the creation of an urban front by the Shining Path. Guzman acknowledged that,

Here we already have a difference, a distinctive feature; it is both in the countryside and the city. We feel that this has to do with specific situations of ours. For example, Latin America has proportionally larger cities than other continents do. This is a fact about Latin America that cannot be ignored. Just look at the capital of Peru, which contains a high percentage of the country's population. We thus feel that the city cannot be set aside and that the war must also unfold there.⁴⁵

The urban areas were integrated into the Shining Path's strategy,

Since 1976 we have had a guideline for working

⁴⁴"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 15.

⁴⁵Ibid.

in the cities. Take over working-class neighborhoods and slums as bases [from which to encircle the cities].⁴⁶

The Shining Path established a separate regional committee to supervise the actions of the Lima metropolitan area and an urban organization for the mobilization of the masses was established, separate from the rural organization. Guzman also stated that the "center is in the countryside, but the center shifts for the insurrection. The center shifts to the city."⁴⁷ This requires the Shining Path to prepare the urban front for this final insurrection.

Guzman's statements also allude to the importance of Lima in Peru, which is cause for a change in Mao's strategy when applied to Peru. Whereas Mao's strategy was to transition his guerrilla army into conventional forces in order to defeat the government by destroying their army in the field, the Shining Path is preparing for an urban insurrection in Lima. The insurgents are encircling Lima not to lure the governmental forces into conventional battles, but to weaken the government and incite the poor sectors of Lima's population into a popular uprising against the government. As Guzman said,

Consequently, we have to prepare for the insurrection, which will be, in a nutshell, the takeover of the cities. We are planning and preparing for the insurrection because it is a necessity; otherwise we could not triumph

⁴⁶Ibid, 16.

⁴⁷Ibid, 17.

throughout the country.⁴⁸

This insurrection is not part of Mao's strategy, but is more an adaptation of a part of Lenin's strategy into the Shining Path's.

The Shining Path's urban operations, support this conclusion, as do the physical geography of Peru and the modern military forces Peru possesses. These urban operations indicate preparations for an insurrection occurring in Lima that concludes the Shining Path's struggle to seize power. This urban strategy will be discussed in detail later in this study. Additionally, the physical geography so isolates the majority of Peru from Lima as to militate against the formation of a conventional Shining Path army that marches on Lima for a final show-down with the Peruvian armed forces. The outskirts of Lima rise into the Andes, with the principal highway into the interior winding through restrictive mountain passes. A Shining Path army would encounter no favorable terrain on which to assemble for a march on Lima, and any such move would be quickly blocked. The Peruvian military, with modern equipment for waging a conventional war against its neighbors, would quickly destroy an assembled Shining Path field army.

The more developed socio-economic system in Peru has resulted in a different approach by the Shining Path for

⁴⁸"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 16.

politicizing the masses. Whereas the Chinese communist cadres politicized the masses by living in their villages and working side by side in the fields, proselytizing as they did, the Shining Path is politicizing the masses by exacerbating the economic problems and eliminating all avenues of peasant-worker participation in the current political system, in addition to traditional proselytizing. This "sharpens the contradictions" within society and makes the poorest of Peruvian society even more disenchanting with the elected government. It widens the gap between the rich and the rest of the population, further demonstrating to the educated mestizos that no hope for them exists in the current form of government.

The elimination of peasant-worker avenues of participation in the political system by the Shining Path is a key part of the insurgent strategy and deserves more examination. Peru's long heritage of peasant and urban worker organizations has provided these two sectors of society a limited political voice in society, but outside of the Peruvian political process that has traditionally excluded them. These organizations empower peasants, urban workers, shantytown residents, mine-worker federations and other similar groups with the ability to acquire services, benefits, or limited self-government through non-violent means. These organizations did not exist in Mao's China. The subversion or elimination of these organizations is a

key part of the Shining Path's strategy, as it reduces the people's options to whom they can voice their needs. It leaves the people with the choice of either the government or the Shining Path.

But reducing the options available to the masses is only one step in the Shining Path's strategy. The populace must be forced to make the choice between the government and the insurgents. The Shining Path employs sabotage and the selective use of terror to destroy the government presence within the villages, its ability to provide security and services, the destruction of non-governmental assistance programs, and to destroy the economy of the state in order to worsen the living conditions of Peru's poor. This exacerbates the living conditions of the masses to such a degree as to energize them into action, with the Shining Path organized to lead them against the government. This attack on Peru's socio-economic structure is key, according to Guzman,

We are sinking bureaucratic capitalism and for some time now have been undermining the local-boss foundation of the semi-feudal relations that hold together this entire structure. At the same time we have been striking blows at imperialism.⁴⁹

A side must be taken; neither the government nor the Shining Path accept neutrality as an option of the masses. This leaves the peasants and the workers with the choice of only the repressive government of empty promises or the Shining

⁴⁹Ibid, 22.

Path.

The Shining Path's strategy avoids the strength of the Peruvian government. The insurgents can be compared to the smaller boxer that wears down his larger opponent, while avoiding the larger opponent's blows, until it is the correct moment to maneuver inside the larger boxer's reach for the knock-out blow to the head. The Shining Path has spent the past twelve years of armed struggle organizing and growing in strength, undermining the government's strength and legitimacy, all the while organizing and preparing to lead a popular uprising that will topple the central government in Lima.

The Shining Path has defined a five stage strategic plan with which to conduct the prolonged popular war, leading to the eventual seizure of power:

- 1) Propaganda and agitation. (1978)*
- 2) Sabotage against the socio-economic system. (1980)
- 3) The generalization of violence and the development of guerrilla war. (Late 1981)
- 4) The conquest and expansion of bases of support. (1983)
- 5) The siege of the cities leading to the total collapse of the State.⁵⁰

*The annotated years are the general dates when the Shining Path initiated the stage.

This strategy has not changed in the past 12 years of armed struggle, and the Shining Path is presently still working to expand their bases of support in the fourth stage.

⁵⁰ Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru, (Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1983), 25.

The Shining Path have developed operational level plans with which to support their strategy. These plans consist of Grand Plans, with supporting phased Plans, which in turn are supported by Campaigns and Offensives. According to Peruvian military intelligence sources, the Shining Path's operational plans have unfolded as follows:⁵¹

<u>GRAND PLAN</u>	<u>PLAN</u>	<u>CAMPAIGN</u> ⁵²
I-Start-up Grand Plan (May 80-Dec 80)	-Plan to start the Armed Struggle(May 80-Jul 80)	
	-Plan to Start Guerrilla War(Jul 80-Dec 80)	
II-Grand Plan to Expand Guerrilla War (Jan 81-Jan 83)	-Plan to Open Guerrilla Zones to Gain Support Bases(Jan 81-May 81)	
	-Plan to Expand Guerrilla War(May 81-Jan 83)	
		-1st Campaign (May-Sep 81)
		-2nd Campaign (3 phases) (Jan 82-Apr 82)
		-3rd Campaign (2 phases) (Apr 82-Jan 83)
III-Grand Plan to Conquer		

⁵¹Esquema de los Grandes Planes Estrategicos-Tacticos Desarrollados por el PCP-SL, consists of a copy of the Peruvian military's outline of the Shining Path's phased operational plans from 17 May 1980 to 5 April 1991, with projected operations through September 1991; this record is claimed by the Peruvian Army to have been captured in June 1991 in a Shining Path safe-house in Lima, Peru.

⁵²The five parts of a campaign are Preparation, Initiation, Development, Conclusion, and Complementary Actions. Each offensive in the captured documents corresponds to a calendar month. Additionally, each campaign is named, and the documents record the number of Shining Path "actions" in each type plan and campaign.

Bases

- Plan to Defend, Develop and Build Support Bases (May 83-Feb 84)
 - 1st Campaign (May 83-Oct 83)
 - 2nd Campaign (Oct 83-Feb 84)
- Plan of the Great Leap (May 84-Sep 86)
 - 1st Campaign (May 84-Dec 84)
 - 2nd Campaign (Jan 85-Jun 85)
 - 3rd Campaign (Jul 85-Nov 85)
 - 4th Campaign (Dec 85-Oct 86)
 - 2 phases/4 offensives

IV-Grand Plan to Develop Bases (Nov 86-Jul 89)

- Pilot Plan (Nov 86-Jul 89)
 - 1st Campaign (Nov 86-Jun 87)
 - 5 parts/4 offensives
 - 2nd Campaign (Jun 87-Dec 87)
 - 4 parts/4 offensives
 - 3rd Campaign (Feb 88-Jul 89)
 - 2 sub-campaigns with 8 offensives

V-Grand Plan to Develop Bases in Order to Seize Power (Aug 89-?)

- Plan to Develop Bases in Order to Seize Power (Aug 89-?)
 - 1st Campaign (Aug 89-Feb 90)
 - 5 parts/3 offensives
 - 2nd Campaign (Feb 90-Dec 90)
 - 5 parts/4 offensives
 - 3rd Campaign (Jan 91-projected to Sep 91)-5 parts/4 offensives
- Plan to Build Towards the Seizure of Power (future plan)

The reason for this seemingly tedious record of the Shining Path's operational plans is to illustrate several key points about the insurgent organization. The first of which is that the Shining Path centrally controls the insurgency. One strategic plan coordinates all aspects of the insurgency and thereby maximizes the effect of each action toward one objective. As Guzman said,

We have learned how to wage war with a single strategic plan by applying the principle of strategic centralization and tactical decentralization. That is how we wage the war, with a single plan, with sections campaigns, operational strategic plans, tactical plans and specific plans for each action. But the key to all this is the single strategic plan. This is what enables us to wage war as a unit.⁵³

Captured documents indicate that the Shining Path identifies both political and military goals for each plan.⁵⁴

It is also apparent that the Shining Path does not follow a fixed time schedule. An examination of these documents indicate that the Shining Path does not have a designated length of time for a campaign or plan. Varying dramatically in length of time, additional offensives or campaigns are added until the plan has achieved its desired objective. This demonstrates a deliberateness and patience in the Shining Path that contributes to the organization's

⁵³"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 20.

⁵⁴Some of these are annotated on the document, Esquema de los Grandes Planes Estrategicos-Tacticos Desarrollados por el PCP-SL. This identifies the political and military "strategies," as they are called in the document, of many of the Grand Plans, Plans and Campaigns of the Shining Path since May 1983.

success. The record of Shining Path plans also supports the assertion that the Shining Path is indeed following its five stage strategy.

A brief examination of the Shining Path lines of operation and key decisions assist in demonstrating the organization's adherence to this strategic plan and some of the strengths in the Shining Path's ability to execute and adapt its plans.

The insurgent leaders learned from the 1965 failed *foco* insurgency. The Peruvian leftists that launched this abortive attempt to overthrow the government did so with little political preparation of the people. No proselytizing of the masses were done prior to the initiation of the armed struggle, nor preparation of the remote support areas. The insurgent leaders held press conferences at which they identified themselves and announced their plans for overthrowing the government. Newspaper advertisements identified the general locations of the guerrilla bases in the process of appealing for recruits to the cause. Meanwhile, the Maoist Red Flag faction watched the Peruvian Army defeat this insurgency in only two months. Guzman acknowledged that he and his followers in Ayacucho studied this failure, and this resulted in the deliberate preparations of the Shining Path prior to the initiation of the armed struggle.

Guzman's Shining Path conducted significant

preparations in the southern highlands around the Department of Ayacucho, in the central highlands of Cerro de Pasco and Junin, and in the Lima metropolitan area after its split from Red Flag in 1970. New followers were recruited, clandestine cells were established and communications networks put in place, with most of the preparations after 1977 becoming more clandestine. In Gordon McCormick's words,

With patience, and careful political work, Sendero managed to establish an impressive network of supporters and contacts before it ever made its first move against the government of Peru. This approach, with very few exceptions, has since been the hallmark of the organization.⁵⁵

One of the key reasons for the organizational success of the Shining Path during this period is that Guzman was not only a professor at the University of San Cristobal at Huamanga in Ayacucho, but he was named as the university's personnel director and "was able to control the faculty selection process."⁵⁶ This resulted in a radical faculty that indoctrinated and recruited a generation of student supporters. Many of these subsequently became secondary school teachers and university instructors and greatly assisted in the expansion of the Shining Path movement and establishing networks of supporters and sympathizers. Guzman greatly aided this process by gaining

⁵⁵McCormick, Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 5.

⁵⁶Ibid.

an influential position in the Peruvian national teachers union in which he had considerable influence in the teacher and university instructor assignment and hiring process. Through this Guzman was able to assign his loyal cadre throughout Peru in a calculated and planned manner.

No national publicity was sought during this time, and the security forces were apparently unaware of the fact that the Shining Path decided in 1978 to initiate the armed struggle in 1980. After this decision, preparations intensified and the Shining Path began a campaign of agitation and propaganda in the southern highlands around Ayacucho as the first stage of the insurgents' strategic plan.

The decision to initiate the armed struggle in 1980 is significant. This is one of the two most important decisions that insurgents must make.⁵⁷ If the armed struggle is begun prematurely, the government security forces have a much better chance at defeating the insurgents. Guzman claims that this decision was based upon the Peruvian military's 1978 decision to return to the barracks in 1980 and hand power back to civilian control through democratic elections.⁵⁸ It was calculated that it would take about a year and a half for the new civilian

⁵⁷The other critical decision is when the insurgents decide to launch the popular uprising against the government.

⁵⁸"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 18.

government to consolidate control over the country and with the military discredited after twelve years of rule, this would provide the Shining Path a period in which the government would be less effective in combatting an insurgency.

An additional benefit to the Shining Path was the fact that the same president that the military overthrew and sent into exile in his pajamas was returned to power in the 1980 elections. This resulted in the military remaining under tight control of the administration for the first two years of the insurgency and the Shining Path had to face only the civil security forces of the government during this period.

Prior to initiating the armed struggle, the Shining Path made final preparations. A party purge occurred in 1980 prior to the May initiation of armed actions, and eliminated those party members who did not support the initiation of the armed struggle against the government. The Shining Path also ran a clandestine military school for key party cadre.⁵⁹ This school, which occurred 2-19 April 1980, included training on Mao's theory of prolonged struggle, the formation and the development of the People's Guerrilla Army, tactics of guerrilla warfare, the application of Mao's

⁵⁹Osman Morote was the leader of this military school. He was one of the original founders of the party and, at the time of his capture by government security forces in June 1988, was believed to be the second-ranking member of the Shining Path and also its military commander.

theories of warfare to Peru's realities, and the plans for the initial months of armed struggle.⁶⁰

The initial eighteen months of the insurgency after the initiation of the campaign of violence in May 1980 was spent in a campaign of both violence and organization. The Shining Path committed many acts of sabotage against the country's economic infrastructure, especially against the electrical grids and communications facilities. In one six month period the government reported 220 attacks against the electrical system alone.⁶¹ Attacks against members and facilities of the Civil Guard were also numerous, and several attacks against military posts and news media facilities occurred.⁶²

Although most of the acts of violence occurred in the Shining Path's home region around the Department of Ayacucho in the southern highlands, an almost equal number of actions occurred in Lima. This trend continued throughout the early 1980s, demonstrating the importance that the Shining Path placed upon the urban front.

⁶⁰Defensa Interna: Movimientos Subversivos en el Peru, [Internal Defense: Subversive Movements in Peru], Chorrillos, Peru: Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejercito Peruano, 1991, Annex 1. This document provides a detailed account of the military school schedule by date and subjects addressed.

⁶¹Alvaro Rojas Samanez and Guillermo Blanco Woolcott, ed., Sendero de Violencia: Testimonios Periodisticos 1980-1989, (Lima, Peru: Colegio de Periodistas del Peru, 1990), 50.

⁶²The Civil Guard is now the National Police.

The Shining Path also worked extensively to expand its influence within the southern highlands, primarily in the Departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac. The clandestine political network was expanded, and the effort to proselytize the masses continued along with recruitment. Overt popular committees were established and in some areas the New Government was declared to be the legitimate government. The Shining Path opened new zones in which military columns could operate while receiving support and prepared to transition from sabotage and limited attacks on security forces to guerrilla war.

The Shining Path also prepared for the entry of the military into the struggle, and planned to exploit the military's actions. Interestingly, Guzman claims that one of the reasons that the popular committees were established overtly and areas declared under the control of the New Government early in the struggle was to entice the government into deploying the military. Guzman stated that,

we created a vacuum in the countryside and we had to create a New Government without having defeated large Armed Forces....If we had not done this...we would be sitting around waiting for the Armed Forces to arrive. We would have gotten bogged down.⁽¹⁾

From early on in the struggle it appears that evoking repression from the government was a key part of the Shining Path strategy.

⁽¹⁾"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 15.

The military was committed to fighting the Shining Path by the Belaunde government in late 1982, and caused the Shining Path to convene an expanded session of the Central Committee. This resulted in the institutionalization of the People's Guerrilla Army as the military wing of the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), the Grand Plan to Conquer Bases was prepared, and the decision was made to demonstrate the insurgent organization's potency against the military.

The level of violence spiraled upwards, and brutal excesses were committed on both sides. Guzman explained the reason for this,

they [the government] met with a response that they could never have imagined....Our problem was to deal a crushing blow to curb them, to make them understand that things were not going to be that easy....and that we were a tough nut to crack and that we were prepared to do anything, anything.⁶⁴

The Shining Path used the government's brutal repression to its advantage to expand the organization. Although the military believed that the Shining Path was crippled by late 1984 and turned its attention to the newly emerging MRTA, it is apparent that although the Shining Path had suffered military losses in the People's Guerrilla Army columns, the clandestine political apparatus had expanded its presence and the support network had expanded greatly.

The Shining Path also began to expand into other regions of Peru during this period. The area that next

⁶⁴Ibid, 19.

received priority was the Upper Huallaga Valley, in the Departments of San Martin and Huanuco. The insurgents began major political efforts in the valley beginning in December 1983, and transferred numbers of political cadres and unknown number of military leaders to the region over the next one to two years. The second-ranking member of the Shining Path, Osman Morote, was sent to the Upper Huallaga region in 1984 to take charge of this important region.

By the beginning of 1985 the insurgency existed in the Departments of Ayacucho, Apurimac, Huanaco, Huancavelica, San Martin, Cerro de Pasco, Junin, La Libertad, Cajamarca, and La Libertad. RAND's Gordon McCormick points out the importance of the earlier preparation of the Shining Path in these regions:

Although this move appeared to come on swiftly, in fact it represented many years of proselytizing and political education, much of which preceded the armed struggle in 1980.⁶⁵

The Grand Plan to Conquer Bases continued until late 1986, with the Shining Path gaining power in the Upper Huallaga area and increasing the level of activity in the central highlands and the southern highlands south of Ayacucho. Peruvian journalist Raul Gonzalez reported on the Shining Path activity in the beginning of 1986 and demonstrated that the Shining Path had established itself in the north in the Departments of San Martin and Huanuco (the

⁶⁵McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 18.

Upper Huallaga Valley region) and in the southern region of Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica. His analysis concluded that the Shining Path operations of 1985 and the beginning of 1986 were attempting to join these two regions by capturing control of the central highlands of the Departments of Junin and Cerro de Pasco.⁶⁶

These two departments are important for several reasons. Junin's Mantaro Valley is important because it is the breadbasket of Lima. Any attempt to reduce the availability of food to the cities, which has been a priority of the Shining Path since the mid-1980s, can be greatly assisted if the Mantaro Valley's agricultural production can be controlled. Additionally, the hydroelectric dam located in Junin provides the electricity to millions of Peruvians and a large section of the coastal region.

Other reasons also exist. Cerro de Pasco is the center of Peru's mining industry, and one of the principal roads into the interior passes through Junin. Also, control of this region would provide a relatively secure land bridge to the northern half of the country while physically separating the government from the interior of Peru. Thus, this move constituted a strategic line of action in the continuance of encirclement of the cities.

⁶⁶Raul Gonzalez, "Puno: El Corredor Senderista," QueHacer 39 (February/March 1986): 54-55.

By the end of 1984 the Shining Path had removed most of the government infrastructure in the highlands. Government bureaucrats left under threats or were killed, Civil Guard stations were attacked, forcing the government to abandon the outposts in outlying areas and maintain a presence in only the larger cities. This provided fertile ground for the rapid spread of the Shining Path throughout the Peruvian Andes.

The Shining Path continued to expand its influence throughout the Andes, attempting to control a highland corridor from Ecuadoran border to the border with Bolivia. The Shining Path met with failure, however, in the southern Department of Puno. Located on the border with Bolivia, the insurgents encountered strong worker and peasant federations. This, in conjunction with security forces that acted with considerably more restraint than those in other parts of the country, resulted in the Shining Path failing to gain a significant presence in the region.

The Shining Path's effort in the Lima/Callao urban area began long before the increase of priority the insurgents gave to this metropolitan area beginning in 1987. As will be discussed in detail later in this study, the Shining Path established a command and control structure for its political and military activities in and around the capital, and has conducted activities there since the first day of the armed struggle.

Many, such as American Henry Dietz, have argued that the Shining Path's increased urban effort is, in fact, a change in strategy to an urban insurgency due to failures in the countryside.⁶⁷ A study of the Shining Path's strategy and its operations prior to 1987 indicate that the Shining Path has most likely accomplished that which it sought in the rural areas prior to turning to Lima, rather than a sign of failure. Few real indicators of Shining Path failure in the rural areas exist for the 1985-1986 period.

The Shining Path strategy for the urban areas prior to 1987 was that of a supporting front. It served to publicize the movement in Peru in such a way as to demonstrate its potency. As McCormick explains,

The calculated drama of Sendero's urban operations gave the organization an immediate notoriety, an effect that could have taken years to cultivate had SL [the Shining Path] confined its activities to Peru's remote interior.⁶⁸

McCormick also argues that these urban operations struck directly at the societal elites psychologically, as their normal view was what occurred outside of Lima and the coastal region was of little concern to them. These operations also aided the Shining Path in defeating the urban opinion that the insurgency was merely an Indian problem.

⁶⁷Henry Dietz, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer 1990): 142-143.

⁶⁸McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 25.

The formation of the MRTA in 1984 gave an additional reason for the Shining Path's urban front. Prior to this, the Shining Path was the only significant revolutionary party actively fighting for the destruction of the government. The rise of the MRTA, which began its armed struggle against the government with spectacular urban actions in Lima, gave the Shining Path a competitor. The Shining Path increased its activities in the Lima-Callao area by the end of 1984 to support its claim to represent the urban poor with action.

This decision coincided with the rapid growth of Lima's population. By the end of 1984 large numbers of peasants were emigrating from the southern highlands because of an inability of the peasants to subsist and many to avoid being caught in the brutal violence of both the government security forces and the Shining Path. By mid-1985 Lima's population reached an estimated six million people, with over two million living in the shantytowns that ring Lima. This provided fertile ground for Shining Path recruitment.

But not all the peasants fled to Lima. Many settled in the Upper Huallaga Valley due to its growing reputation as a place where little effort with coca cultivation could provide a family with a better life than the sierras. This occurred at the same time that the Shining Path was representing the coca growers interests there and gaining control of the valley. The Shining Path had little trouble

with these new settlers, as they were already familiar with the power of the Shining Path.

The growth of the Shining Path in Lima and in the Upper Huallaga Valley is connected. By 1987 the Shining Path had consolidated its hold over the Upper Huallaga Valley and found itself with steady income of significant size. A convergence of favorable conditions occurred in 1987. Droughts in the southern sierra regions had increased the flow of immigrants into Lima, some of whom were members of the Shining Path clandestine political apparatus. The Upper Huallaga Valley was providing the insurgents with the funds necessary to dramatically expand the war against the government at the same time the Shining Path was initiating its Grand Plan to Develop Bases. The Shining Path had also developed into a significant force in Peru from Ecuador to Bolivia. Given the Shining Path's vision of a popular insurrection in the cities, 1987 proved to be the correct time to begin placing significantly more priority on political organization in the city.

The value of the funds provided by the coca trade cannot be underrated, (this support will be examined in detail later in this study). The conduct of an urban insurgency is financially expensive. The need for facilities such as safehouses, false identities, the subversion popular organizations or the creation of front organizations, and the payment of bribes requires

significant funds.

Additionally, there were national rumors of an impending military coup. The economic crisis was worsening, tensions were growing between the Garcia administration and the military over the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign, and there was "mounting popular dissatisfaction with the Garcia regime."⁶⁹ Many in Peru believed that the military would seize power in order to restore order, as it had done many times in its history, but most recently in 1968. If the Shining Path were to exploit such an action, one that would polarize much of the capital's population, it would need to act prior to a coup in order to "extend its presence under the comparative protection of Peru's constitution."⁷⁰ Attempting this after a military coup would be extremely more dangerous. This provided additional incentive for the Shining Path to shift priority to the urban front in 1987.

An urban-style insurgency is significantly different from that in a rural environment. The method of operation must be modified, communications adapted, and security

⁶⁹Ibid, 27. The tensions between the administration and the military worsened significantly after the military massacred hundreds of Shining Path members after the Lurigancho, El Fronton, and Santa Barbara prison uprisings in 1986. The military believed that it had President Garcia's backing for the action, but Garcia quickly attempted to distance himself from the incident and infuriated the military.

⁷⁰Ibid, 28.

measures increased. The city is the government's backyard, and unlike the countryside where there was little permanent presence of government security forces, the number and efficiency of the security forces in Lima was significantly greater.

The Shining Path had failures in Lima. The organization's initial targets were labor unions and other worker federations. These organizations, long established and with strong ties to legal political parties, proved relatively resistant to penetration. Members of the Shining Path operating in Lima were also vulnerable, with many being arrested. The most notable of these arrested was Osman Morote, the Shining Path's second-ranking member. Guzman pointed out the need for more success in the cities in his 1988 interview, "One of our limitations is insufficient workers, a serious limitation, a serious limitation we must say."¹

The Shining Path has not slowed its urban efforts since 1988, however. It created an urban front organization that has concentrated on developing both legal and clandestine organizations for support of the insurgency and mobilization of the masses. The Shining Path also made a significant decision to change the primary target in Lima from the labor organizations to the shantytowns. This has been successful for the Shining Path.

¹"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 31.

The Shining Path now targets the poorest shantytowns around Lima, because according to one issue of the pro-Shining Path and clandestinely published newspaper, *El Diario*,

More than 2,000 neighborhoods in metropolitan Lima will, in the plan to encircle the capital, be the inevitable stage of decisive battles.¹²

This move to control the shantytowns that ring Lima is key to the Shining Path strategy to encircle the city and topple the government with a popular uprising in the capital.

The Shining Path has been targeting the shantytowns since 1989, when its plan to control the Central Highway into Lima by controlling the labor unions of industries located in Huayan along the highway failed. The failure came from the resistance of the labor organizations and the fact that the Shining Path "proved its inability to meet and channel the needs of an emerging town" with participatory community organizations.¹³ The insurgents also found themselves vulnerable to the government security forces who were working with intelligence provided from the community.

After redirecting their efforts to the shantytowns, the insurgents found that they had to be selective in which shantytowns were targeted. Little success was found in

¹²"Shining Path Moves into Lima Suburbs," *JPRS*, 15 November 1991, 10, translated from Spanish, original source: *La Republica*, Lima, Peru, 3 November 1991, Sunday Supplement 6-7.

¹³*Ibid*, 37.

those shantytowns that were comprised primarily of peasants that had fled the violence in the Andes, such as shantytowns Huanta 1 and Huanta 2. Problems were also incurred in shantytowns with strong community associations.

The Shining Path now concentrates on communities that are not well-organized. It currently targets the following nine shantytown districts as priority efforts: San Juan de Lurigancho, Ate-Vitarte, Chaclacayo, Chosica, Villa Maria del Triunfo, Villa El Salvador, San Juan de Miraflores, Pachacamac, and San Martin de Porres.

There appears to be a calculated plan driving the Shining Path's urban operations. When examined on a map, the Shining Path is extending its operations into shantytowns along the Central Highway such that they are driving their control down the highway toward the heart of Lima. The Central Highway is Lima's link to the agricultural Mantaro Valley and many of Lima's industries are located along this highway, surrounded by shantytowns. The Shining Path has been working to sever this link to the interior through raids and ambushes, in addition to subversion of the shantytowns.

The insurgents also killed the community leader of the Fondo Bocanegra, and are working to gain control of it. This shantytown is near Lima's international airport and an adjacent military post. The Shining Path has virtual control over the shantytowns that surround the Miguel Castro

Castro prison located in the Canto Grande district in which over 250 Shining Path members are held.⁷⁴ Raucana, a community totally administered by the insurgents, is located only six miles from downtown Lima. The most important target of the Shining Path is reported to be the shantytown of Ate-Vitarte "due to its geographical location, its large industrial center, its access to roads, and its electrical production and distribution centers."⁷⁵

Many of the shantytowns are located inside ravines that extend into the mountains. The Shining Path has discovered that the key to destroying all resistance of the communities within these ravines is to seize control of the community at the mouth of the ravine. The insurgents place guards at the mouth of the ravine and control the passage of all residents. This control of access rapidly collapses the resistance of communities further up the ravine.

The insurgents carry out their operations to gain control of these shantytowns in a methodical manner. They selectively attack police stations and patrols until the police abandon the area. The representatives of the political parties are driven out or killed. The Shining Path's control is increased in the area, and political proselytizing and recruiting occur. Community organizations

⁷⁴Miguel Castro Castro prison, with the double Castro, is the correct name.

⁷⁵"Shining Path Moves into Lima Suburbs," 9.

are taken over or shut down by threat or violence.

Clandestine popular committees are created, and eventually they transition to overt popular committees when the Shining Path control is strong enough.

The Shining Path operations in the shantytowns have displayed some common trends. The insurgents are striving for control of the informal urban marketplaces. In San Juan de Lurigancho, which has over 900,000 residents, the Shining Path controls over 80 percent of the marketplaces.⁷⁶ Shopkeepers are forced to pay revolutionary taxes and in some marketplaces the Shining Path have been setting prices. They are also conducting a vicious campaign against the network of soup kitchens and children's milk kitchens that are run by women from the local communities. These women are killed, warehouses serving the kitchens blown up, and supply trucks hijacked by the Shining Path. The insurgents view these non-governmental assistance programs as a threat to the revolution because they alleviate the severe effects of the government austerity programs.

The Shining Path is also killing the leaders of the shantytown associations, such as the recent killing of Villa El Salvador's principal leader, Maria Elena Moyano. Since Villa El Salvador's establishment through an illegal land takeover in 1971, the shantytown association has established its "own government, schools, health clinics and an

⁷⁶"Shining Path's Urban Activities Studied," 35.

industrial park that is a model for Third World entrepreneurs."¹⁷ The Shining Path is destroying the shantytown residents' hope of attaining better living conditions through a peaceful process.

The killings are done with such violence as to destroy any resistance in the population towards the Shining Path. Maria Elena Moyano, for example, was shot and five pounds of dynamite left on her body to explode. Public executions are held. Some of the victims have been stoned to death.

What results is a vacuum into which the Shining Path is able to move to assume control. As one Lima newspaper reported,

The dismantling of neighborhood organizations, soup kitchens, mothers' clubs, and other local autonomous organizations in poor shantytowns has begun to produce results at an alarming speed and magnitude. Wherever the SL [Shining Path] deactivated, subdued, or infiltrated local organizations, it has silently progressed to subdue the residual resistance of remaining leaders.

The insurgents have established the overt Neighborhood Classist Movement front organization to coordinate and control the popular committees and other public activities.¹⁸ The Shining Path has also created the Teachers' Class Committee with numerous Shining Path

¹⁷Mary Powers, "Sendero Infiltrates Capital's Shantytowns," The Times of the Americas, 18 March 1992, 4.

¹⁸"Shining Path Moves into Lima Suburbs," 9.

¹⁹This is also translated from "Movimiento Clasista Barrial" as the Neighborhood Pro-Class Movement.

teachers. These teachers teach children in the shantytowns at Shining Path "popular schools," which results in long-term indoctrination of these children. A growing influence of the Shining Path within the capital's teachers union has also been reported.

As a consequence of these activities to date, the Shining Path has established firm control in some of these shantytowns and is rapidly expanding its control in others. Armed insurgent patrols roam through some shantytowns in daylight, with no threat from the government security forces. Likewise, nightly political sessions, or harangues, are held openly for the residents of these semi-secure Shining Path areas. The Shining Path organizes the community life for these residents, and is attempting to increase the self-sufficiency of these Shining Path-administered communities. Not only have an increasing number of overt popular committees been formed, a number of support bases have been declared.⁸⁰

More indicators exist that the Shining Path is preparing to incite violent clashes between the insurgents' organized shantytown residents and the government forces in Lima. In some areas the Shining Path appears to have stopped recruiting and is instead organizing the residents into popular movements and staging public protests and

⁸⁰The organization of the Shining Path, to include popular committees and support bases are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

demonstrations against the government that include hundreds of people, Shining Path banners and flags . In some districts,

the SL [Shining Path] rehearses its plan by holding mock subversive actions with night demonstrations and riots....⁸¹

Several of these demonstrations have resulted in clashes with the police. It is interesting that in a 7 August 1991 demonstration in which a clash with the police occurred, the Shining Path had placed women and children in the front of the demonstration. This was probably designed "seeking a massive confrontation with violent repression and dead pregnant mothers and...children."⁸²

Yet it appears that the Shining Path is still in a period of organization in Lima, despite the limited actions that are occurring. Most of the insurgents activities are being done not to attract attention nor to attack the government's forces, but to gain control of the populace in the poorest shantytowns and those in strategic locations.

Meanwhile, the Shining Path has not been idle in the countryside these past several years. It has continued to extend its control in the Sierra. The Shining Path has worked to extend its control to the remote valleys of the Ene River basin, the Tambo River, and the Apurimac River. In addition to setting up popular committees in these areas,

⁸¹"Shining Path Moves into Lima Suburbs," 9.

⁸²"Shining Path's Urban Activities Studied," 38.

the insurgents are forcing the Indians of these valleys to cultivate coca, and are brutally attacking those Indians that resist.

The insurgents are also continuing their offensive in the central highlands, especially in the Mantaro Valley region.

One aspect of the Shining Path's strategy in the countryside that has intensified in the past three years is its attempt to destroy the *rondas*. *Rondas* are civilian self-defense forces that the government is using as part of its counterinsurgency campaign against the Shining Path. The insurgents have repeatedly attacked these self-defense forces and their villages. Unlike many of the Shining Path's attacks in which a key person is brutally killed, the insurgents kill large numbers of villagers to leave a strong message to neighboring villages. In some cases, the Shining Path has killed all the residents present and their livestock. This strong of a response to the self-defense program is an indicator that the Shining Path view it as a threat to the success of the revolution. It is also consistent with the Shining Path's attempts to destroy all organizations that mobilize the masses that are not created or controlled by the Shining Path.

There are some indicators that the Shining Path believes it has transitioned from the strategic defensive to the strategic equilibrium. If so, then the transition occurred sometime in 1991, with the Shining Path's overseas

propaganda network providing the organization's assessment of the situation. One such assessment was provided by a Shining Path representative in late 1991 in London,

The revolution is at the stage of strategic balance. This means that the country already has been wiped out and it is time to begin the struggle against the high-level military units....⁸³

Other statements have been released out of the Shining Path office in Brussels referring to the strategic equilibrium. One, for example, stated that during the strategic equilibrium approximately 100,000 people will be killed in Peru. 1991 was the first year that the Shining Path has made such references to the strategic equilibrium. If the Shining Path leadership believes that the organization has reached this phase, then it should become apparent this year in the organization's military actions.

One of the recent concerns of the Shining Path's leadership as the socio-economic situation in Peru continues to erode is that the government will fall before the insurgents are prepared to seize power.⁸⁴ Guzman voiced this concern in his June 1988 interview in *El Diario*, and the gravity of this concern points to the seriousness that the Shining Path places not just on the downfall of the

⁸³Risk Assessment Weekly, Vol. 8, No. 43, interview of Shining Path representative in London, Arlington, VA: Business Risks International, 25 October 1991, 1-2.

⁸⁴"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 17, and McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 50.

government, but on the insurgent organization's ability to decisively seize power and create the People's Republic of the New Democracy.

The Shining Path's strategy does support the insurgent's goal of toppling the government in order to seize power to reorder society into an egalitarian society. The insurgents appear to have adapted Mao's strategy to the realities of contemporary Peru, although the mobilization of the masses through the destruction of the country's socio-economic systems is a new and controversial concept.

POPULAR SUPPORT

How do you explain the existence of a movement that has been waging a people's war for 8 years without international aid, unless it had the support of the masses?

-Abimael Guzman in a 1988 interview⁸⁵

One of the most controversial topics of discussion about the Shining Path is whether the insurgents have the support of the people. Many observers argue that the Shining Path's extensive use of terrorism as a form of warfare, especially because many of the insurgents' targets are the Indians for whom the insurgents claim to be fighting, denies the Shining Path the popular support of the people.

Yet many indicators conflict with this view. There have been few defectors from the insurgent movement. The

⁸⁵"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman."

government security forces have gotten little intelligence on the Shining Path from the indigenous people in the countryside. The organization has grown in size and influence in the last eleven and a half years. What is the Shining Path's plan for gaining the support of the people and why Peruvians would decide to support the insurgents?

How much popular support is needed to support the Shining Path's strategy? This study's previous examination of the Shining Path's strategy identified its intent to mobilize the masses by exacerbating the hardships on the poverty-stricken majority of Peruvian society through attacks on the socio-economic system. It does not intend to raise a large conventional field army nor will it need the large amounts of manpower to replace the casualties incurred in conventional battles of position and movement. The Shining Path seeks a cadre that is relatively small in number but great in its effect. Its nation-wide structure is still be vulnerable to the security forces and requires a significant number of sympathizers and the passive support of the population within which the insurgents operate. The examination of the Shining Path's strategy also demonstrates the need for the urban masses to rise up against the government for the revolution to end successfully.

Bard O'Neill identifies seven different methods with which insurgents may attempt to gain the popular support of the people, all of which are used by the Shining Path.

These are charismatic attraction, esoteric appeals, exoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government repression, demonstrations of potency, and coercion.⁸⁶

The Shining Path has clearly shaped the image of its leader, Abimael Guzman Reynoso, in an attempt to emphasize the infalibility of the movement to gain adherents to the movement's cause. Known as Presidente Gonzalo, a *nom de guerre* coming from the name of a Spanish conquistador, Guzman has been elevated to an almost supernatural status by the Shining Path. He has been falsely rumored to have died numerous times, which has given him an almost "cat of nine lives" image. When a video image of Guzman dancing at a party was shown on national television by the Fujimori administration to discredit him, it evoked the opposite reaction of his followers in the Canto Grande prison. Many were in tears to discover that he was still alive.

The care in which the organization portrays Guzman is seen in the drawings that are done of him. Upon completion of a picture of Guzman members of the Shining Path conduct a criticism of the work. If it is determined that he is not portrayed correctly then the work is redone. When Guzman, who has been labeled "the Fourth Sword of Marxism" after Marx, Lenin, and Mao, is portrayed with the other three communist leaders, Guzman is normally portrayed

⁸⁶O'Neill, 74-75.

full-length while only the heads or busts of the others are shown. This symbolizes the higher level of Guzman in comparison to the others. In keeping with the concept of the dialectic, each of the leaders was the synthesis that resulted out of the resolution of the communist leader prior and the contradictions he faced within the society. As each synthesis leads to a higher level of purity, Guzman is therefore on a purer level than Marx, Lenin, or Mao. He is also normally portrayed in a forward-looking stance as if he is looking to the future, with glasses and carrying books under one arm to portray intelligence and to reinforce the claim that he has possession of the scientific solution to Peru's problems.

This portrayal of Guzman as a "larger than life" figure is also compared by the Shining Path as keeping with the Peruvian heritage of strong leaders that have emerged to fight for the Indians. Examples such as Tupac Amaru, an Indian that rose up in the 1800s to lead an Indian rebellion and is firmly imbedded in the national culture as a champion of the exploited in Peru, are linked to Guzman. The result is that Guzman has become a symbol of the Shining Path's fight to destroy a corrupt and exploitive system and one that appeals to the poor sectors of society.

The insurgents also employ esoteric appeals to gain popular support. According to O'Neill, esoteric appeals

...seek to clarify environmental conditions by putting them in a theoretical context that has

neat, orderly interpretations and explanations for all perceived social, economic, and political "realities."⁸⁷

This method is directed principally at the intellectual sector of society. In the Shining Path's case, this has been primarily directed at the educated mestizos that have found their expectations blocked by the rigid class structure and racial discrimination in Peru and at the Peruvian youth of the high schools and universities that see little prospect for advancement in Peruvian society.

The Shining Path emphasizes the scientific nature of its ideology and its solution for the ills of society. Guzman emphasized the "scientific" nature of the Shining Path's ideology (and solutions for societal problems) in various passages at the beginning of his 1988 interview:

In short, Marx' great creation is the highest that the earth has seen or will see; it is the conception, the scientific ideology that for the first time endowed man,...with a theoretical and practical instrument for transforming the world...., it is ideology but it is scientific."⁸⁸

A phrase that is used by Guzman and repeated in other Shining Path documents is that of the "universal truth." The strength of this appeal can be seen in the predominance of educated mestizos and some whites in the leadership of the movement. This appeal was used extensively in the 1970s during the Shining Path's expansion in the southern

⁸⁷Ibid, 75.

⁸⁸"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 3.

highlands. Luis Kawata, one of the original founders of the movement and a charismatic university instructor, was especially effective at delivering this appeal. According to Gustavo Gorriti, a fellow instructor of Kawata at the University of San Cristobal at Huamanga in Ayacucho,

He [Kawata] was friendly, charismatic, rebellious. He had a standard Marxist lecture at the university, which in forty minutes knitted events from the Big Bang to class warfare in Ayacucho. That speech accounted for dozens of ecstatic conversions.¹⁹

The Shining Path provides a belief system to people that live in a society in which most of the society's institutions do not function. It is a belief system that not only explains the why of the problems, but also gives the people a solution.

Exoteric appeals, which the insurgents also employ, focus on concrete grievances, such as the lack of employment, low wages, inability to obtain an education, and the lack of medical care. This appeals to a broad section of Peruvian society, such as the mestizos that see education as the only route out of poverty, only to find that jobs as teachers, for example, pay less than subsistence wages. With over half of the population living in abject poverty, there are many grievances on which the Shining Path can base exoteric appeals.

One grievance the Shining Path has exploited is that of the coca grower, especially within the Upper Huallaga

¹⁹Gorriti, "The War of the Philosopher-King," 20.

Valley where approximately half the coca of Peru is grown. The growers were oppressed by many parties. This included both the Colombian traffickers with their strong-arm gangs that used violence to ensure a steady supply of coca was available at extremely low prices and the local Peruvian traffickers that converted the leaf into coca paste. The government eradication program also threatened the growers' livelihood. The Shining Path provided protection to the growers, eliminated the gangs in the valley, and set higher prices for the coca. This has provided the Shining Path a loyal following in the valley.

The Shining Path provides the peasant communities a responsive government where previously there had been none. The Shining Path imposes an almost puritanical order on the communities it controls and in doing so eliminates crime, spouse abuse, prostitution, drug abuse, and exploitation of the peasants. As Tina Rosenberg explained in her book, Children of Cain,

The reason for their silence [to protect the Shining Path] is twofold. On one side, Sendero's moralistic totalitarianism appeals to many. It keeps the men home with their families at night. It offers a crude system of justice to which the peasant can appeal, punishing those who pay the campesino too little or take his land.

That is more than the government ever does. The second reason a campesino might support Sendero is that to him the idea of tearing down the Peruvian state is eminently reasonable. What has the government ever brought but promises and trouble?¹¹

¹¹Rosenberg, 200.

The historical inability or unwillingness of the Peruvian government to provide for its people is exploited by the insurgents.

The Shining Path has special appeal to young women in Peru. The insurgent organization has been especially successful appealing to young Indian and mestizo women. Unlike many Peruvian political organization, the Shining Path does not merely make promises for gender equality, education for women, and opportunities for upward mobility. It provides these in its organization, with women occupying many key positions. It provides women education in its "popular schools." It provides equal opportunity for women within the communities that the Shining Path administers; it is not surprising that many of the "popular committees" that the Shining Path has established in these areas are led by women. The subject of women in the insurgent organization will be addressed in detail later in this study.

The Shining Path also uses terrorism to gain popular support. The insurgents selectively kill businessmen, government officials, and others that the Shining Path can explain are "exploiters" of the people. The influence of *gaminalismo* still exists, and many of Peru's poor can understand the Shining Path's explanation. The dynamiting of the local Civil Guard station does not meet with the peasants' disapproval; these are the same policemen that have been abuse to the Indians, corrupt, and have not

provided for the community's security. It is this attitude to which the selectivity of the terrorism appeals.

The Shining Path has been somewhat receptive to feedback when its terrorism begins to be counterproductive. The excesses of the 1983-1984 years resulted in the restriction of authority to commit certain acts, such as assassinations, to higher levels within the Party organization. The Shining Path normally gives one warning to intended victims, such as community leaders or local government bureaucrats, as a concession to the peasant culture.

A key part of the Shining Path's strategy to gain popular support is to provoke the government into repressive actions. The Shining Path uses the government repression to assist in polarization of society and to push more Peruvians to support the insurgency. Earlier in this study it was shown how the Shining Path declared the establishment of the New Government in some areas of the southern highlands in order to draw the military into the counterinsurgency. This was done on the assumption that the military's participation would result in repression and help politicize the peasants.

The recent April 6, 1992 dissolution of the elected government and the declaration of a national emergency by President Fujimori has been the goal of the Shining Path. The insurgents have been hoping that the military would suspend individual civil rights and in its attempt to root

out the insurgents would commit excesses that would turn more of the populace to support the insurgents.

Demonstration of potency is another method that the Shining Path has used since the start of the campaign of violence. The sabotaging of the electrical grid demonstrates the capability to strike at will and the impotence of the government to all the urban residents. The attacks on government offices and Civil Guard stations serve the same purpose. The Shining Path's urban activities in the early years of the insurgency were meant to demonstrate the potential of the movement. The insurgents conducted their urban operations in a manner to gain media coverage and the attention of the masses. One of the best examples of this is the incident in which the Shining Path sabotaged the electrical grid that served Lima. Once the lights went out the residents of Lima were able to see the large hammer and sickle burning on the side of the mountain overlooking the capital.

The Shining Path has built an image that is best expressed in the phrase that has become common in Peru, "the party has a thousand eyes and a thousand ears." This all-knowing and all-seeing image greatly assists in gaining the passive support of many Peruvians. Its acts of retribution against people who have assisted military patrols or spoken out against the Shining Path serve to maintain this image. Another example are the vicious attacks that the Shining

Path conducts attacks against villages that field civilian self-defense forces. The attacks are meant to deliver a message to neighboring villages to deter them assisting the government by joining the *ronda* program.

Lastly, coercion is a method with which to gain popular support, but is the least effective because of the resentment it causes in the populace and because it is effective only as long as the insurgents are present to threaten the people. The Shining Path uses coercion, especially on those sectors of society which can provide services to the organization, but would not normally do so willingly, for example, judges and prosecutors to gain the release of members of the insurgent organization, mine workers in order to procure explosives, and police officers to gain freedom from the coca eradication effort.

One strategy that effects the other methods of gaining popular support is the Shining Path's "propaganda by deed." Shining Path's successes increase the effectiveness of its recruiting effort and the level of popular support. In a society in which most systems do not work for the Indians and mestizos, the Shining Path's deeds increase the populace's willingness to support the insurgents. The government and the political parties make promises, but rarely fulfill them. The Shining Path, on the other hand, matches words and deeds. This is a powerful weapon for gaining support in Peru.

Additionally, the Shining Path is not attempting to gain the support of all sectors of society. It focuses its appeals to those Peruvians who live on the margins, the Peruvians who have no hope of an improved life. These are the people who the leaders of the Shining Path envision following them in an urban uprising. These are the people that will allow the Shining Path to continue to operate secretly both in the countryside and in the city.

CHAPTER 6

THE KEYS TO SUCCESS

ORGANIZATION AND UNITY

The 1978 overthrow of the Gang of Four haunts Sendero's leadership.¹¹

The Shining Path's adoption of a protracted war strategy places significant requirements on the insurgent organization. A large organization is necessary to expand the insurgency down to the local level in order to mobilize the masses and conduct guerrilla operations, to plan and coordinate long-term strategy and operations, maintain party discipline, and to sustain the movement. One of the Shining Path's most notable strengths is its organization. It has built an extensive, complex, and cohesive organization that performs these functions, while maintaining security.

The overthrow of the "Gang of Four" haunts the leadership of the Shining Path. The organization's leaders, especially Abimael Guzman, view the overthrow as the result of the Chinese Communist Party's failure to maintain

¹¹Andrew Wheat, "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 18 (Summer 1990): 42.

ideological purity within its ranks. Eventually, "revisionists" were able to ascend high enough in the organization to overthrow the leadership and divert the party from the correct ideological path, destroying the revolution. The greatest fear for the Shining Path leadership is that this fate awaits them, and will destroy their revolution from within.

To guard against this, the Shining Path leadership has maintained two principals above all others. The first is the ideological purity of its membership. It must be stressed that the Shining Path is a movement that is built from the ideology out. Ideological purity is valued over all operational concerns. No ideological dissension has been allowed since the party purges of 1979-1980.

The second is security. Despite the complexity of its organization and the difficulty of communications that results, the Shining Path operates within a highly compartmentalized cellular structure which limits its vulnerability to government penetration. It also maintains other significant security measures within such operational areas as recruiting and training that, although they constrain the organization's operations and expansion, maintain a cloak of secrecy around the organization.

The exact strength of the Shining Path is not known. Estimates vary widely. When Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori delivered his State of the Nation address on 28

July 1991, he stated that the Shining Path had approximately 3,000 militants. Another estimate comes from the American "Senderologist," David Scott Palmer, who estimates 6,000 cadre and 50,000 to 60,000 sympathizers as of 1991.⁹²

Enrique Bernales, the Peruvian socialist who chairs the Peruvian Senate committee monitoring political violence, categorizes the insurgent organization into three layers: party militants, "troops" of the People's Guerrilla Army, and those individuals that make up the active supporters of the organization. Only the party militants and troops in Bernales' estimates should be considered party members. He estimates the Shining Path's strength as follows:

Party militants	1,200
Troops	3,000
Support network	40,000-60,000 ⁹³

Other estimates of party members range from 1,500-15,000. We do know that the Shining Path decided to keep the total "vanguard" party membership small.

Numerical strength is not the best indicator of success for an organization, however. More important than numerical strength is the organization and composition of the insurgent movement. The Shining Path is an insurgent

⁹²David S. Palmer, "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem," in Uncomfortable Peace: Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Cold War World (Draft), ed. Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 1st page of Chapter 8.

⁹³"The Size of the Sendero Threat: Senator Bernales Disputes the President's Estimate," Latin American Weekly Report WR-91-31, 15 August 1991, 10.

organization that has proven amazingly adaptable and extremely well-organized. It functions with centralized control and decentralized execution, dictated by the organization's strict security measures and the slowness of clandestine communications. It implies that the party leadership recognize that,

local people are better able, on the whole to assess potential targets and the most effective times to attack than members of the national leadership, who may or may not have ever visited the area.⁹⁴

The Shining Path is the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), with its political and military wings, its popular organization, and a support network. A clandestine centralized control structure controls regional committees that have a degree of autonomy for all military and political actions within their regions and within the narrow guidelines of the central committee. The regional committees control an extensive and clandestine political network that extends down to the village level. They also control a military wing called the People's Guerrilla Army, that provides military forces to each level of the political wing. In addition, the regional committees have responsibility for the mass mobilization organizations within their regions, such as the overt Popular Committees. The dominant organization, however, is the political wing.

The centralized control structure consists of the

⁹⁴Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 57-58.

Central Committee (*Comite Central*), Politburo (*Buro Politico*), and the Secretariat (*Comite Permanente*). These organizations operate clandestinely and have eluded the Peruvian security forces since the party went underground prior to the initiation of violent actions in 1980. The exact delineation of authority and responsibilities between these three bodies is not known.

The Peruvian intelligence services have pieced together information on these organizations, especially since the capture of key Shining Path safehouses in Lima in 1990. Most of the members *nom de guerres* are known, as are many of the member's real identities.⁹⁵

The size and composition is also known. The Central Committee has at least 19 members (*titulares*), 3 substitutes (*suplentes*), and three candidates (*candidatos*). The Politburo consists of at least five known members and three substitutes; the members are the top five Central Committee members and the substitutes are the next three ranking members of the Central Committee. Finally, the Secretariat is composed of at least three members, with the *nom de*

⁹⁵*Estructura Organica del Aparato Politico de la Organizacion Terrorista del PCP-Sendero Luminoso*. Consists of an organizational chart of the Shining Path that includes the following: the major commands, committees, bureaus and major support organizations. This document was prepared by the Peruvian Army in 1991. It also includes the *nom de guerres* of the principal Shining Path leadership and some of the real names. Most of the real names are not legible on this copy of the document.

guerres of "Presidente Gonzalo" (Abimael Guzman), "Miriam", and "Feliciano". These individuals are also the three ranking members of both the Central Committee and the Politburo. As the central authority of the party, the Central Committee controls the plans, policies, and programs through not only the regional committees, but also through functional commissions (*comisiones*), central apparatus (*aparatos centrales*), and other party organs (*organismos partidarios*).

Three major commissions exist under the Central Committee's control to assist in the administration of the insurgent organization. The first is the *Control de Cuadros*, which is responsible for the clandestine political wing or main party structure. The second is the *Militar* (Military), which controls the People's Guerrilla Army and the military strategy. The last commission is for the *Republica Popular de la Nueva Democracia* (People's Republic of the New Democracy), RPND, and administers the mass organizations, such as the Popular Committees at the local village level, and the New Government structure that is established in semi-liberated zones. This commission is responsible for preparing the organization required to govern Peru according to the Party's ideology upon the Shining Path's seizure of power.

The other central apparatus and party organs that respond to the Central Committee consist of such

organizations as the following: Logistics Department, Department of Propaganda, Support Section, Translation Section. Additionally, elements to control the operations of the "generated organisms" are under the control of the Central Committee. This last entails controlling all support organizations, both internal and external to Peru, to include those cells responsible for the infiltration of Peruvian social and political organizations.⁹⁶

Although this complex structure centrally controls the policies, plans, and programs of the Shining Path, it is the regional committee that has the responsibility to conduct operations. The regional committees are geographically organized commands that are responsible for all political and military activities in their strategic zones. It appears that the regional committees have significant authority to conduct operations within their regions with a degree of autonomy, although within the narrow guidelines of the centrally determined ideology, policies, and strategy. This is consistent with the Shining

⁹⁶Frente Unico o Nuevo Estado. Consists of an organizational chart of the Shining Path semi-legal and legal support organizations done by the Peruvian Military in October 1990 based upon documents captured from a Shining Path safe-house. (1 page) The umbrella organization for these "generated organisms" is the *Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo* (MRDP), or the Revolutionary Movement for the Defense of the People, in English. It is also referred to in some Shining Path and Peruvian government documents as the *Frente Unico* (United Front) and *Nuevo Estado* (New State). Further references to this source will be Frente Unico.

Path philosophy of centralized control and decentralized execution, which is captured in the insurgent saying, "...in the party they teach us that we are not loose pearls, but rather a pearl necklace."⁹⁷

The Shining Path has long been known to have six regional committees, but according to recent Peruvian military documents the insurgent organization has organized an additional two regions since as early as 1989. These regional committees are organized as follows:⁹⁸

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY*</u>
1. Principal Regional Committee	Ayacucho, Apurimac, Huancavelica
2. Southern Regional Committee	Arequipa, Puno, Cusco, Tacna, Moquegue
3. Northern Regional Committee	Ancash, La Libertad, Piura, Cajamarca, Lambayeque
4. Metropolitan Regional Committee	Lima, Ica
5. Eastern Regional Committee	San Martin, Huanuco, Amazonas
6. Central Regional Committee	Junin, Cerro de Pasco
7. Middle-North Committee	Chancay-Huacho, Oyon Cajatambo, Barranca Huaral
8. Middle-South Committee	Yauyos, Canete

*All the areas listed are departments, except for those of the Middle-North and Middle-South Committees which are provinces.

These committees, which are essentially commands,

⁹⁷Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 58.

⁹⁸Estructura Organica del Aparato Politico de la Organizacion Terrorista del PCP-Sendero Luminoso.

were not formed all at the same time. The Principal Regional Committee was the first, with the birth of the Shining Path in the highlands of the Department of Ayacucho. By 1982, five strategic zones existed, consisting of what are now the first four in the above list. Their sequence of establishment is not known.⁹⁹ The northern strategic zone was established by the then second-in-command of the Shining Path, Osman Morote, at the end of 1983.¹⁰⁰ The central strategic zone was established sometime between 1982 and 1984, for the control of the provinces of Cerro de Pasco and Junin, which contain the strategically important Mantaro Valley with its hydroelectric power plant and food production, key mining regions, and transportation network to the interior.

In the two new regions, the responsibility of the Middle-North and Middle South Regional Committees, it appears that the Shining Path recognizes the importance of the upper jungle on the eastern slopes of the Andes and the

⁹⁹Taylor, 13. Several realignments have occurred over the years, resulting in several of the southern and central political departments (and sometimes individual provinces) being assigned to a different regional committee. The alignment shown in the text of this study is the most recent alignment available.

¹⁰⁰Its first name was the Northeastern Regional Committee, but was later redesignated the Eastern Committee. The importance of this strategic zone is in the vast coca cultivation that is ongoing in the Upper Huallaga Valley that stretches between the Departments of San Martin and Huanuco, and the fact that the MRTA was greatly expanding its influence in this valley beginning in 1984.

waterways of the interior, such as the Rio Marañon in the northeast. The upper jungle regions are well suited for the growth of coca plants and provide safe base areas for the insurgents, while much of the interior's economics depend on the waterways as a transportation network.

This is not to say that the Shining Path had no presence or activity in a region until a strategic zone was designated and a regional committee established in the zone. On the contrary, the Shining Path worked extensively trying to proselytize the peasants and workers in many of these regions years prior to the establishment of a strategic zone and a regional committee.¹⁰¹ The significance is that the Shining Path had a functioning system of command and control during the insurgency's years of cadre development prior to 1980 and in the years of expanding the armed struggle after 1980. The insurgent leadership expanded the major command structure both as it was required by the strategy, and as the organization could afford to expand given the requirements for qualified leadership and strict security.

These regional committees are staffed with a Secretary, Subsecretary, and at least five staff members.

¹⁰¹A good example is in Cerro de Pasco, where the Shining Path first started trying to mobilize the masses in 1975, a full 7-8 years prior to the establishment of a strategic zone. A full account of the Shining Path's efforts in Pasco between 1975 and 1980 can be found in Raul Gonzalez, "Los Mineros de Pasco: El Talon de Aquiles de Sendero," QueHacer, 40, April/May 1986, 20-22.

The staff members are responsible for the functional areas of military operations, logistics, security, agitation and propaganda, and administrative organization.

The regional committee links to its subordinate zonal committees are strictly limited for security reasons. It is thought that a regional committee has communications with a maximum of only eight other individuals.

The regional committees are the lowest level of command at which assassinations can be authorized. Candidates for assassination are nominated by subordinate levels and passed up with the purpose and justification for the killing, and the projected political impacts to the regional committee for a decision. This reservation of authority for assassination indicates that the Shining Path uses terror selectively. It is not known which level actually carries out the execution, except that it appears to be a column of the military arm in the area. The exception to this is in the Metropolitan Region.

The Metropolitan Regional Committee possesses four "special squads," which function as assassination and sabotage teams. Studies by the Peruvian Counterterrorist Directorate (DIRCOTE) reveal that there is a normal pattern in the employment of these teams.¹⁰² Each team normally has three to four members, except the fourth special squad,

¹⁰²Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 59.

which sometimes consists of only one person. These teams work directly for the Metropolitan Regional Committee and it appears that each has a separate function in an assassination mission.

The first special squad is the "annihilation" team. This team poses innocently on the street until the moment of attack. Normally, they will not have weapons until just prior to the attack, at which time a support cell will pass it weapons for the attack. The second special squad, the "assault" team, opens the attack by creating confusion in the area by throwing dynamite, for example. This provides the annihilation team the cover it needs to accomplish its attack and quickly escape. Meanwhile, the third special squad, the "containment" team, is ready in the area to counter any security forces that appear during the attack or the escape. The "razing" team is the fourth special squad, and moves in to deliver the *coup de grace* with a final shot to the head or chest and to leave a Shining Path placard on the body. Often this final mission is accomplished by a woman.

The Party apparatus exists clandestinely from the regional committee level down to the local level. Although debates of proposed policies are encouraged, it appears that those below the regional committee level are expected to execute the directives given them. Below each regional committee are zonal committees, with 4-6 zones being

controlled by a regional committee. Each zonal committee controls 3-4 subzonal committees, each of which controls an undetermined number of local committees. Each local committee is comprised of several cells. The local committee cells normally contain three individuals: the Secretary, Sub-secretary, and an information specialist. These operate clandestinely without the knowledge of the local population.

The People's Guerrilla Army, or *Ejercito Guerrillero Popular* (EGP), is composed of three types of forces: the principal force, the local force, and the base force. These correspond to "the classic guerrilla tripartition of main, regional, and local forces."¹⁰³ Additionally, the Popular Guerrilla Army receives its policy guidance from the Central Committee military commission, while operationally under the control of the regional committees.

Little is known of the exact composition and structure of these forces. An analysis of all available reports on the actions of the Shining Path's "armed columns," as they're referred to in many press reports, does reveal that the Shining Path has organized its military wing differently than many other Maoist insurgencies.

The three levels of forces--principal, local, and base forces--do, however, mirror the traditional structure

¹⁰³Marks, "Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru," 11.

of Maoist military forces. The base force consists of individuals from the village level that lead primarily civilian lives until mobilized by Shining Path cadre to support or conduct an operation. In the case of the Shining Path, the base force consists mostly of untrained villagers with the primary missions of vigilance and security. Additionally, the members of the base force are armed with machetes, hoes, slings, and sticks and may be mobilized, normally by coercion, to attack individuals or neighboring villages.¹⁰⁴

The local force consists of individuals from the local area that have received some training, and are cadred by more dedicated and trained members of the Shining Path. This force is normally mobile, without a fixed base. Its primary missions are security and control of the population, and minor armed actions. The local force responds to one or more local committees. Although the Shining Path cadre is armed with firearms, it appears that additional firearms are cached by the leadership of the unit until just prior to an operation. Even then, however, insufficient weapons exist

¹⁰⁴ Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru. Many of the Peruvian officers who were then serving in emergency zones would also use the term *masas*, (which translated are the masses or general population), interchangeably with the base force. They felt that the base force only existed conceptually as a military force; it was, in their view, the forced participation of villagers in violent actions.

for all members of the unit. Those individuals without firearms carry weapons similar to those of the base force.

Significantly more is known of the principal force. This force consists of full-time soldiers that are well-trained and all armed with regular weapons, such as pistols, carbines, assault rifles, and explosives. The principal force also consists of ideologically committed individuals, most of whom have been accepted into the party structure. The unit commanders are many times women, and are normally from the sierra, even in units outside the sierra such as the Upper Huallaga Valley.¹⁰⁵

These forces are organized into "columns" and are numbered or named within their zones of operations. The primary missions of these columns are ambushes and raids. The size of the columns vary according to the threat from government security forces, the concealment available in the region, and the success of the organization in recruiting and training process of dedicated party militants in the zone. In 1990, for example, the Peruvian Army reported that the column size of principal force units in the Department of Ayacucho was only 3-5 people with light weapons and 8-10 people, with similar weapons, per column in the central

¹⁰⁵Ibid. An example of this heavy influence of the sierra (or *andino*) leadership can be found in Arroyo's "*Encuentro: Sendero en el Alto Huallaga*," 34.

Andean Department of Junin.¹⁰⁶ In the Upper Huallaga Valley, however, the Shining Path was known to have 3-4 principal force battalions, of approximately 150 to 200 individuals each, by mid-1991. The units in the Upper Huallaga Valley are reported to possess more heavy weapons, such as machine guns, rocket launchers, and mortars. It is also rumored that the Shining Path units in the Upper Huallaga Valley now possess shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. These units do not function from fixed bases.

What appears to differ from other Maoist insurgencies are the lines of command between the clandestine party apparatus and the military wing. A traditional relationship in which the party is the dominant organization is one in which,

all military formations are controlled by party organizations. A district guerrilla unit, ...would report to and take orders from the district party apparatus.¹⁰⁷

In the case of the Shining Path, "Guerrilla Zones" are established within which the EGP operates. The establishment of Guerrilla Zones, however, do not appear to correspond to either zonal or subzonal committee boundaries. In Tom Marks' words, they are "...defined by operational

¹⁰⁶ Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

¹⁰⁷ Marks, "Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru," 11.

necessity and may straddle any number of SZ [subzones]."¹⁰⁸

The question arises of how the political apparatus tasks the EGP with missions. Is it through horizontal contact between the military units and the political apparatus or is it vertical, with a mission requirement passing to the regional committee for approval and the regional committee then directing the military unit to accomplish the mission through its communications network to the military column(s) in the Guerrilla Zone? This uncertainty in command and control procedures can be attributed to several factors. Little is known of the command and control of the EGP and its links to both the local Party apparatus and to the regional committee. The local force is known to respond to local committees, but the relationship of the base and principal forces is not clear. It is unknown if all EGP formations operate within the designated Guerrilla Zones, or if these are areas of responsibility for only principal force units. The latter appears to be the case, so the political structure in areas that do not have assigned a principal force unit could still call upon base and local forces. This is the most likely possibility, given that the Shining Path policy to restrict the rate of recruitment and training of its forces for security reasons. This would result in horizontal

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

communications for those priority areas that had an assigned principal force and other areas having to justify the diversion of one of these units to their zone or sub-zone to the regional command.

Another, but less supportable by the evidence available, is that the traditional parallel party-military relationship exists, but has yet to be uncovered. It does not appear that the EGP is sufficiently developed in size for this to be the case, except in limited safe base areas, such as in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the Ene River basin.

The Shining Path has followed, for the most part, its ideological tenet of self-sufficiency when addressing the issue of weapons and explosive procurement. Most of the organization's weapons have been seized from the government security forces, while the explosives are extorted or stolen from mining companies on a periodic basis.¹⁰⁹ These explosives, primarily consisting of commercial dynamite, are given to the Shining Path by mining company employees in exchange for the opportunity to continue mining operations.

The exception to this is in the Upper Huallaga Valley, where the insurgents have obtained higher quality weapons in greater quantities from the narcotraffickers.

¹⁰⁹ Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru. According to officers of the Peruvian Army's 2nd Military Region, some mining sites have a monthly quota of explosives to provide to the insurgents. As for theft, a Shining Path column stole 90,000 sticks of commercial dynamite in one raid alone.

These include mortars, machine guns, and possibly shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).¹¹⁰

If the Shining Path has acquired SAMs, this will be a significant change from the past. The insurgents have never displayed sophisticated weapons. They have remained content with a marginal quality advantage in weaponry over the security forces and civil defense forces. The Shining Path has traditionally obtained this advantage over the former with the use of explosives and the temporary massing of forces, and over the latter with the use of any kind of light firearms.

The third arm of the Shining Path under the regional commands is the organization of mass mobilization, called the *Frente Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo, FRDP*, (Revolutionary Front for the Defense of the People).¹¹¹ This consists of the Popular Committees at the local village level, and the New Government structure that is established in semi-liberated zones.¹¹² Although the Central

¹¹⁰Guzman said in his 1988 *El Diario* interview that there are three methods of securing weapons for the insurgency, "The main one is to wrest them from the enemy; the second, to manufacture them, and the third, to buy them."

¹¹¹"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 9. This has been translated in some sources as the People's Revolutionary Defense Front. This is the rural organization for mass mobilization and should not be confused with the Revolutionary Movement for the Defense of the People, (also translated as the People's Revolutionary Defense Movement), which is an urban organization.

¹¹²"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 9.

Committee's commission for the People's Republic of the New Democracy has responsibility for the supervision of mobilization of the masses, it is the regional committees that are responsible for the execution of the programs.

The establishment of a Popular Committee is a deliberate and planned action. Once a village has been targeted by the clandestine Party apparatus, contacts are first made with the village through relatives or acquaintances by Shining Path cadre. This begins a period that includes numerous actions to gain control of the village. The local leadership is targeted and removed by threatening violence, and if the threat is not heeded, by assassination. The benefits of Shining Path presence is demonstrated to the villagers, such as the protection of the village from crime, the helping with domestic chores, and the arbitration of domestic disputes. The power of the Shining Path is also demonstrated, by the punishing of criminals and conducting public "people's trials" of government bureaucrats or "exploitive" businessmen.

Eventually, sufficient followers are converted to the revolutionary cause to form a Popular Committee. The leadership of a Popular Committee normally consists of five individuals. These consist of a Political Commissar (*Comisario Secretario*), and four others responsible for security, production, communal matters, and organization. The Popular Committee operates overtly, and "...maintains

influence in part through its ability to call upon a *Sendero* armed column for support."¹¹³

It is the armed column of the EPG that normally commits any necessary acts of violence in the village. The villagers also eventually discover that informers exist within their midst (consisting of the members of the clandestine Party apparatus). This, the absence of a responsive government presence, and the Popular Committee's ability to call upon the local EPG unit,

...paralyzes attempts to fight back. Given the virtual absence or intermittent nature of the government's presence, there simply is no one to whom villagers have recourse.¹¹⁴

This solidifies the Popular Committee's control of the village and permits other open activities such as public harangues, the establishment of a base force unit, recruitment for the local force, and the establishment of "Popular School" for the political proselytizing of the people.

Once the regional committee determines that sufficient Popular Committees exist in a designated region, a "Support Base" is declared. This is not a physical location, site, or village. Rather, it is the network of villages that are now providing support to the insurgent

¹¹³Marks, "Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru," 9.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

movement in a coordinated manner. This support consists of 50 percent of the area's agricultural production, a security and intelligence network, and a population base from which to draw recruits and popular support.¹¹⁵

Additionally, once an area has a sufficient number of support bases and is reasonably secure from government influence, the regional committee declares the area under the control of the "New Government." This is to let the inhabitants know that the area is officially under the authority of the people and that the "self-rule" conducted through the Popular Committees is at the precursor stage to the People's Republic of the New Democracy. The New Government is a rural phenomena. Guzman stated in an interview in 1988, "We are developing the New Government only in the countryside. This will happen in the city in the final stage of the revolution."¹¹⁶

The urban equivalent organization for the mobilization of the masses is the *Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo (MRDP)*, or the Revolutionary Movement for the Defense of the People.¹¹⁷ This is made up of what

¹¹⁵Marks states in his "Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru" that the Peruvian Army knew of twenty Support Bases under the Principal Regional Committee's control in 1989.

¹¹⁶"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 10.

¹¹⁷Again, this is also known as the *Frente Unico* and the *Nuevo Estado*.

Guzman terms "generated organisms."¹¹⁸ These are Shining Path organizations that mobilize and politicize the urban masses. They also are charged with the subversion of legitimate unions and worker federations, and the provision of support and services to the Shining Path.

The size and breath of this organization cannot be understated. By 1990, the Shining Path had organized these generated organisms in such areas as the following: youth movements; women's organizations; neighborhood associations; workers federations; unions; student movements; judicial workers; artist groups; theater troupes; police; and university professors.¹¹⁹ The MRDP also includes an extensive and effective overseas support network, which will be examined separately in this study. The Peruvian intelligence services had, by 1990, identified twelve major organizations and over 40 subordinate organizations.¹²⁰ All appear to be organized by function and not geographically.

Peruvian intelligence services have discovered that many of these organizations have a corresponding and controlling apparatus under Central Committee control.¹²¹

¹¹⁸McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 11.

¹¹⁹Frente Unico.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Estructura Organica del Aparato Politico de la Organizacion Terrorista del PCP-Sendero Luminoso.

Therefore, it appears that although the regional committees would control these organizations within their respective regions, the central Party apparatus maintains a close rein on the activities of these organizations. Additionally, the majority of these organizations are under the operational control of the Metropolitan Regional Committee due to the predominately urban nature of this region and the current priority placed on the Lima area by the Shining Path.

These organizations can be classified into four major categories: mass mobilization; subversive; support; and cells controlling individual sympathizers in key positions. Some are legal front organizations while others function clandestinely. The organizations for mass mobilization operate openly and are clearly identified with the Shining Path and its objectives. The Shining Path began creating these legal organizations in 1986 in Lima. A sampling includes the following: Movement of Classist Workers (MOTC); the Revolutionary Student Front (FER); the Single Trade Union of Educated Workers of Peru; the Popular Women's Movement (MFP); the Workers Federation of Power and Light; the National Federation of Teachers of the Peruvian University; the Revolutionary Front of Secondary Students (FRES); and the Movement of Poor Peasants (MCP). This is not all inclusive by any means.

These legal front organizations provide the Shining Path several benefits. First, they begin to broaden the

narrow following of the Shining Path by appealing to greater sectors of society. Second, they directly challenge the Legal Left for representation of the disadvantaged of Peruvian society.¹²² Lastly, these legal front organizations openly challenge the government in order to evoke a repressive response. This would effect not only the Shining Path front organizations, but also the other popular movements of the left. A repressive response would undermine the legitimacy of the government and result in an increase in support for the insurgency.

The next type of organization under the MRDP are subversive organizations. The Shining Path uses clandestine cells to penetrate such organizations as shantytown associations, unions, student groups, and intellectual movements in order to gain control of the movement for use in the Shining Path's agitation and propaganda campaign or, if that fails, the cells serve to spot potential recruits for future use by the insurgency.

The MRDP includes support organizations. One example is *Socorro Popular del Peru* (Popular Aid of Peru). It was one of the most clandestine until its discovery by DIRCOTE in January 1988. Although *Socorro Popular* has sometimes been misidentified by some analysts as the

¹²²The "Legal Left" is the term given the collective body of leftist political parties that have traditionally represented the poor and disadvantaged of Peruvian society.

umbrella organization instead the MRDP, the evidence is clear that *Socorro Popular* is only one of the twelve known organizations under the MRDP.

Socorro Popular consists of at least three functional, clandestine sub-organizations: the Democratic Lawyers Association; the Democratic Students Association; and the Association of Families of Prisoners and Political Prisoners. The first, the Democratic Lawyers Association, has three subsections. One ensures that Shining Path detainees receive free legal services. Another is composed of law students and provides free legal advice and recruits other law students to the Shining Path. The last is an organization of judicial lay workers, clerks, and secretaries, for example. Though seemingly unimportant minor workers of the judicial system, they provide the insurgent movement important assistance by,

furnishing confidential information regarding prosecution plans in progress, by causing "accidental" delays within prosecution proceedings, and, even by "misplacing" or "losing" important files.¹²³

Little information is available about the activities of the Democratic Students Association, although if it is consistent with similar organizations then it would provide spotting of potential recruits and possibly provide teachers for clandestine Shining Path "Popular Schools" within the

¹²³Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 65-66.

urban shantytowns.

The largest of the three suborganizations is the Association of Families of Prisoners and Political Prisoners. According to Gabriela Tarazona, it "...reveals the true depth of Sendero Luminoso's functional organization; its primary goal is to provide aid of all sorts to incarcerated militants and their families."¹²⁴ With five functional sections, this organization keeps international human rights organizations informed of members detention and takes care of the families of the jailed Shining Path members with material, money and legal services. One example of the effectiveness of this section was related to a US Army officer by a Peruvian Army officer. Four hours after capturing a mid-level Shining Path leader in a remote area of Peru this Peruvian officer had received telephone calls from several international human rights organizations warning the officer that they knew of the individual's arrest and warned him that legal action would follow if the individual disappeared.

The care that the Shining Path can extend to its members and their families is seen in the responsibilities of the Fallen Heroes Section. This section cares for the needs of the families of those members of the insurgent organization killed in the revolution. This includes financial payments, legal aid, and other required services

¹²⁴Ibid, 64.

as needed. It is also responsible for continuing the indoctrination of these families, fostering the belief that the loss of their family members was for a good cause. The care with which the Shining Path displays towards the families of its fallen members is striking.

Other support organizations exist, although this study will not examine them all in detail. The *Movimiento Popular Bancario, MPB*, (Popular Banking Movement), provides both financial intelligence to the Shining Path and professional assistance in managing the organization's funds. Another is the *Movimiento Clasista de la Policia Nacional* (Classist Movement of the National Police). This clandestine organization provides intelligence support and targets policemen for corruption by the Shining Path.

The last category of functional support is that of the individual sympathizer who works in a position beneficial to the Shining Path. The support of this category is provided by individual sympathizers of the Shining Path that are more valuable to the insurgency by remaining in place. Individuals such as engineers, security officials, governmental officials can provide key information for the planning or evaluation of Shining Path operations. In one "particularly chilling case," the National Police psychologist with access to all the psychological evaluations of police officers working in the emergency zones (and their family backgrounds) turned out to

be an agent of the Shining Path. DIRCOTE arrested her in 1987, but it is presumed by the Peruvian government that the psychologist had passed large quantities of information on to the Shining Path. The contributions that these sympathizers provide to the Shining Path is incalculable.

Thus, there are three organizations overlaid in an area: the clandestine Party apparatus; the supporting units of the People's Guerrilla Army; and the network of mass organizations. All operate in a relatively well-coordinated effort under the control of their regional committee and in accordance to the guidance of the central party organs at the top. This is a complex organization, but it has shown the ability to react quickly.

One such operation is known to have occurred in April 1983. An attack was launched against the civilian population of the Andean village of Lucanamarca just after the initiation of the Peruvian Army's brutal counterinsurgency campaign. Almost 70 men, women and children were massacred. The importance of this incident is that Guzman claims that this was an operation not only ordered by the Central Committee level, but also planned and supervised by the Central Committee as well.¹²⁵ This operation demonstrates the capability to plan and execute

¹²⁵"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 19; and Gustavo Gorriti, "The War of the Philosopher-King: the Strange Career of the Shining Path." New Republic, 18 June 1990, 22.

operations rapidly when desired and the existence of efficient and effective communications network for command and control. Finally, there is no routine horizontal contact between cells or military columns. Contact only occurs during large operations, and then only horizontally by the cell and column leaders.

Guzman's statement that "...the party has a mass nature but it is not of the masses," gives a hint to the composition of the upper levels of the organization.¹²⁶ Remembering that as the vanguard party the PCP is also synonymous with the term proletariat, the organization is both elitist and highly selective. While the lower echelons of the organization are made up of a predominance of Indians with some mestizos, the vast majority of the party membership consists of educated mestizos. Additionally, the upper-level leadership is almost exclusively highly-educated mestizos who have been frustrated by Peruvian society.

The Shining Path is organized in a five-tiered hierarchy. Individuals serving the organization first enter at the lowest level, serving as a "sympathizer." Sympathizers provide support and services to the organization, and may serve as low-level couriers or hide weapons. They may be required to be active in organizations identified by the Shining Path and participate in demonstrations, but will rarely participate in armed

¹²⁶"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 13.

actions.

Selected individuals are advanced to the level of "activist." It is at the completion of training at this level that true membership in the PCP occurs. Candidates for this level must be spotted and recommended by two members of the organization. Recruitment is done clandestinely and is done only through this double recommendation system to reduce the chance of a government penetration of the organization. Any individual that actively goes in search of joining the movement is regarded with suspicion.¹²⁷

Activists spend one to two years doing propaganda tasks, undergoing ideological indoctrination, working in the popular education program, and organizing the masses for demonstrations or political harangues. The individual may be assigned to paint Shining Path slogans on walls and distribute leaflets and posters, while also receiving his or her indoctrination on the Shining Path political line, Marxism, the Thoughts of Gonzalo, and the principles of guerrilla warfare. For security reasons, contact with the rest of the organization is minimal during this period. This indoctrination period rarely lasts less than a year, and it also serves as a member's *bona fides* if the individual is later sent to prison. A background check is conducted

¹²⁷A detailed account of this recruitment and the subsequent training process is found in Lewis Taylor's Maoism in the Andes, 14-16.

through outside sources when a new member arrives in the Shining Path cell block at the Canto Grande prison. If the individuals background is not known, he is ideologically quizzed. According to Jose Renique,

Any cadre can determine how involved a person is in the party organization by analyzing his method of discussion, his style of argument, and his choice of words.¹²⁸

Activists conduct most open political actions, such as proselytization of the masses, instead of the more committed militants. This keeps the most dedicated and trained members of the force protected from the security forces' view. This also gives the Party, through the watchful eyes of its clandestine cells, an opportunity to evaluate the performance of the activist.

The activist is next assigned new trainers, who commence the technical training on weapons, tactics, and explosives. During this training the individual is taken out on training missions to attack soft targets, such as bridges and electricity pylons, for experience and to increase their confidence. The activist are not normally permitted to carry weapons during these missions, but the accompanying cadre are armed. Prior to the completion of this training, the individual's background is continued to be investigated.

¹²⁸Jose L. Renique, "The Revolution Behind Bars," NACLA Report on the Americas XXIV, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 18.

Once training is completed, the Shining Path's local committee decides if the individual will be accepted into the organization. If accepted, an oath of allegiance ceremony is held in the presence of several hooded leaders from the local committee. Prior to this oath the activist can quit the movement at any time; after it, he can not. This is the point of no return for the individual. After the oath ceremony, the individual is then assigned to a cell and becomes a member of the next level of the Shining Path's hierarchy: the militant level. Additionally, although an individual may have been in contact with the insurgent organization for up to two to three years, he or she has limited knowledge of other members of the Shining Path.

The militant and higher levels comprise the true membership of the Shining Path as both a military organization and as a political party. A militant must have demonstrated his or her commitment to the party by participating in a verifiable "terrorist act or a similarly violent, life-threatening ordeal."¹²⁹ This act of violence weds the individual to the organization and severely limits the government's ability to infiltrate the organization.

¹²⁹Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 67. This "bleeding" of Shining Path cadre was also repeated by senior Peruvian Army officers during the Counter-Subversive Operations seminars in which I participated in June 1990. They stressed its importance in breaking the individual away from the society and, being guilty of such a serious crime, would not contemplate defection to the government security forces.

The militants form the ranks of the People's Guerrilla Army, and serve as cadre in both the clandestine political structure and the clandestine support organizations. This level is characterized by their "unusually high commitment" and their belief that "...Sendero's ultimate success is of far greater importance than even their own lives."¹³⁰

The fourth level of individuals in the Shining Path hierarchy are the "mandos", or commanders.¹³¹ Commanders are assigned by geographic zone and sector and most have the assistance of a staff that, at a minimum, consists of a military chief and a political chief. The commanders constitute the lowest level within the Shining Path hierarchy at which debate of policy and operational plans are permitted. Commanders are selected only after careful evaluation of ideological purity and competence and the majority are from the Sierra. Commanders are known to control the regional committees, which are the movement's major commands, the regional committees' guerrilla zones, and the clandestine zonal committees. It appears that they are assigned to command principal force guerrilla columns.

The highest level in the Shining Path hierarchy consists of the members of the Communist Party of Peru's

¹³⁰Ibid, 69.

¹³¹These are also known as "cuadros".

Central Committee and are known as the "*cupula*".¹³² These individuals, led by Abimael Guzman Reynoso, direct all Shining Path activities through the regional committees while operating clandestinely. Normally they are mestizos, college graduates, intellectuals, and from families that owned land in the Sierra. This last factor, the Andean heritage, heavily influences the way this leadership ideologically interprets the reality of Peruvian life today. Also, this is a group frustrated by the Peruvian class structure and their inability to rise within the political system because of race and class discrimination, despite their education and intellect.

One method of communications that assists in alleviating the communications problems that result from the compartmentalized organization and the decentralized operations is the use of the newspaper *El Diario*. This newspaper, legally published in Lima until 1988, was long thought by government security forces to be a mouthpiece of the Shining Path. The security forces believed that the extensive and favorable coverage of the insurgent movement was a media through which the Shining Path could rapidly communicate to its membership.

After the first full Party Congress and the capture of the Shining Path's second-in-command, Osman Morote, in

¹³²This translates to the English word "cupola".

1988, *El Diario* published a 43-page interview with Abimael Guzman. This allowed the Shining Path to demonstrate to its membership that Guzman was still alive, that Morote's arrest would have little effect on the future of the organization, and provided a forum to disseminate to the PCP membership the results of the First Party Congress in such detail as could not be accomplished by other means.¹³³ Some have argued that "...the process of institutionalizing Gonzalo's thought could never really be accomplished without the aid of a national transmission belt as *El Diario*."¹³⁴ The government subsequently shut down the newspaper.

El Diario still publishes clandestinely in Peru, and continues to serve as a communications media for passing coded instructions and updates on Party policy and priorities throughout the country. More importantly, it continues to provide "...an irreplaceable means of maintaining cohesion and group loyalty within an otherwise secret organization."¹³⁵

It does not appear that the Shining Path uses technical means to any large degree, other than *El Diario*, for operational communications. In fact, I have found only

¹³³"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 1-43. Guzman alleges that over 2,000 Party members met clandestinely somewhere in Peru for this Party Congress.

¹³⁴McCormick, Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 9.

¹³⁵Ibid.

one news report of radio communications being used by the Shining Path between commands. This reportedly links the Ene River basin region with the city of Huancayo in the central highlands.¹³⁶ The Peruvian military confirmed in 1990 that there was one radio link they were investigating that the Shining Path was allegedly using, but they would not give details.¹³⁷ It is unknown if these two reports are related. The insurgents have not yet used a clandestine radio station, such as the FMLN's use of *Radio Venceremos* in El Salvador throughout the 1980s, in the conduct of the insurgency.

The Shining Path did obtain a limited number of hand-held receiver-transmitters during raids on telephone exchanges. These are used only for tactical communications during important raids or urban assassination attempts.

Non-technical clandestine communications are the primary means of communications for the insurgents. This type of communications includes such techniques as dead letter drops, live drops, messengers, and clandestine personal meetings. The Peruvian security forces believe that the Shining Path also uses the country's postal system for coded communications. Non-technical clandestine

¹³⁶Sharon Stevenson, *Rebels Force Indians to Grow Coca in Andean Jungle*, "Miami Herald, 31 October 1990, 13A.

¹³⁷Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

communications are extremely slow, but afford the users greater security and facilitate communications while operating with a compartmentalized cellular organization. Another weakness of this type communications is that it is not efficient at supporting the Shining Path's centralized control of ideology, policy, and programs. The use of *El Diario*, however, greatly assists the Shining Path in extending this control.

Despite the communications handicap, the Shining Path's decision-making process is far from purely directive. The Shining Path's leadership is encouraged to continually evaluate, (or in communist terminology, to conduct "self-criticisms" of) all operations, especially those that fail to produce the intended result. The imbedding of the dialectic and the "two line struggle" in the decision-making process by Guzman has resulted in an organization that is able to assess its operations and is flexible enough to make the necessary decisions to ensure continued success.

Captured Shining Path documents demonstrate that the organization is capable of an almost brutal frankness in assessing failures. This frankness is important when considered with the fact that no Party purges have occurred since the initiation of violence in May 1980, by Guzman's own admission.¹³⁸ This creates a leadership climate that

¹³⁸"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 12.

promotes accuracy in reports and assessments, resulting in operational flexibility within an ideologically rigid organization.

The Shining Path has demonstrated this organizational flexibility in a number of key decisions. The leadership made a decision, most likely in the 1985 plenary session of the Central Committee, to become more selective with the use of terror after the excesses of 1983 and 1984 were perceived as detrimental to the movement. Another example, one that shows the ability to address failure, resulted from the Shining Path's failed 1985-1986 attempt to establish a permanent foothold in the southern Department of Puno.

Captured documents indicate that the movement's attempt to move on to a military footing had been premature. Armed action had outpaced efforts to prepare a secure base¹³⁹ of political support, with predictable results.

This failure was debated by the members of "the cupola" for some time before a decision was made to both return to a lower level of activity in Puno and to reaffirm the primacy of political action throughout Peru in the continuance of the People's War.

The Shining Path also encountered failure in 1987-1989 in its urban campaign. The insurgent organization was unable to penetrate and seize control of worker federations and unions, which were the Shining Path's primary targets

¹³⁹McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 10.

for mass mobilization. This failure was assessed and the focus subsequently reoriented to the urban shantytowns, which has proven to be a success for the insurgency and now appears to be the key to the Shining Path's urban campaign in Lima. This ability to critically review operations and policies is one of the Shining Path's important strengths, though it runs contrary to their image as a rigid, inflexible organization.

The Shining Path has also demonstrated depth in its ability to generate qualified leaders for the movement. Despite the loss of many of its key senior leaders, the Shining Path has continued the expansion of the insurgency and rarely have losses appeared to seriously degrade the momentum of the insurgency. Osman Morote, for example, was captured in Lima by police in June 1988. He was an original founder of the Shining Path movement and thought to be the second ranking member of the Shining Path at the time of his capture. Although he was also the Shining Path military commander, no decrease in Shining Path activities were noted in either Lima or in the countryside after his capture.

Many others can be cited. The movement lost Teresa Cardenas Lopez (*Techi*) and Laura Zambrano Padilla (*Meche*), both of them Metropolitan Regional Committee Secretaries, to police raids in 1983 and 1984, respectively. Two important Party ideologues, Maximiliano Durant Araujo and Hildebrando Perez Huaranga were lost, with the first fleeing to Europe

and the second believed killed in October 1986.¹⁴⁰ Claudio Bellido Huatallia, thought to have been the Central Regional Committee Secretary, is believed to have died in a battle with the Army in 1986.¹⁴¹ The Shining Path's propaganda head, Cesar Ramos Aguije (*Mario*), was arrested in March 1986. At least another half dozen other senior leaders have been lost to the movement with little long-term effect on the insurgency.

One notable exception that did impact upon the Shining Path's operations occurred on 18 June 1986. After incarcerated members of the Shining Path staged simultaneous uprisings at three Lima prisons, the Peruvian military assaulted the prisons and killed 244 people. Most of these killed were members of the Shining Path and were massacred after surrendering. The level of Shining Path activity dramatically dropped after these deaths. Captured documents subsequently revealed that most of the Metropolitan Regional Committee was operating from within one of the prisons. Even then, the Shining Path reconstituted a new Metropolitan Regional Committee and the insurgent organization was able to resume its previous level of activity in the Lima-Callao

¹⁴⁰ Anderson, Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model, 33.

¹⁴¹ McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 8.

area within six months.¹⁴²

The lack of long-term operational damage suffered by the Shining Path from personnel losses implies that the system of recruitment, indoctrination, and selection of organization members for upward advancement in the Party has not only been sufficient to support the expansion of the movement, but also has maintained enough of a cadre of trained leaders to swiftly repair a damaged part of the organization.

The factors that contribute to this ability to produce sufficient trained and committed leaders are several. There is the cause that motivated them to join the movement in the first place. Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano argues that the tiered membership structure greatly contributes to this process, providing "rigorous indoctrination" at each stage and valuable hands-on experience that reinforces an individual's self-worth.¹⁴³ Promotion in the organization is based upon ideological purity, which can also be defined in this instance as commitment to the goals of the organization, and individual performance. This opportunity for social mobility does not exist within Peruvian society. This opportunity, when

¹⁴²Since the massacres at the Lurigancho, El Fronton, and the women's Santa Barbara prisons, all suspected Shining Path prisoners are housed in the Canto Grande maximum security prison on the outskirts of Lima.

¹⁴³Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 74.

combined with the Shining Path's dominating drive for ideological purity, builds a loyalty to the organization that some analysts compare to religious fanaticism.

The result is a multi-level organization that selectively recruits, indoctrinates, and trains its leaders in a slow, deliberate, and methodical way. At each successive level performance and commitment to the common organizational goals are reinforced and used as a qualifier for promotion to the next level. Valuable experience is also gained prior to advancement, providing a depth of experience at the intermediate and senior leadership levels. The membership sees that advancement and personal accomplishment are possible through this organization that values them, unlike the society from where they come. The significance of this is that the strength of the Shining Path leadership is derived not from a few key individuals, but rather from "...the concerted effort of a well-oiled organizational structure in which trained, capable individuals are continuously accessible."¹⁴⁴

There have been numerous rumors of Abimael Guzman suffering from serious physical illnesses and he has been rumored to have died numerous times. There are claims from some leaders in the Peruvian Army and government that if Abimael Guzman were to die or be captured the revolution

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

would collapse.¹⁴⁵ This does not hold up under the evidence. The organization is not built on one, or even several key leaders. Therefore, the loss of individual senior leaders have limited long-term impact on the insurgency. The extensive, decentralized organization does not rely upon Guzman's leadership to survive. The Shining Path has shown an extraordinary ability to regenerate senior leadership.

Guzman is valuable for four key roles: he heads the Party apparatus through his leadership of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat; he is the leading party ideologue; he has become an almost god-like symbol to the insurgents; and he serves as the Shining Path's "maximum leader." As has been shown from the analysis of the Shining Path decision-making process, Guzman's value is not as an individual, but in the promotion of debate and discussion until the correct "line" is agreed upon. He is not the military commander of the organization, and others exist on the Central Committee that are reportedly as committed to the Shining Path's objectives as Guzman.

As to Guzman's value as an ideologue, moves have already been taken to institute his ideological discipline

¹⁴⁵The Peruvian business community's offer of a \$250,000 (US) reward leading to the capture of Abimael Guzman is evidence of this belief. See, "Guerrilla Bounty Rises," Detroit News, 7 February 1992, for more information.

through the publishing of "*El Pensamiento Gonzalo*" (Thoughts of Gonzalo).¹⁴⁶ One of the Shining Path's worst fears is to suffer the same fate as China's "Gang of Four." The Thoughts of Gonzalo were institutionalized by the Shining Path's 1988 First Party Congress as an attempt to not lose the ideological purity of the movement if Guzman is captured or dies. This was followed by *El Diario's* interview, which detailed the basics of the Thoughts of Gonzalo, and mimeographed copies are circulated in Peru.

Guzman's value as the movement's symbol does not require him to be alive. Many of his followers thought he was dead prior to the 1988 Party Congress and newspaper interview, yet the movement continued to grow. A dead Guzman merely becomes a martyr for the organization.

Guzman's critical importance to the movement is as the "maximum leader," or *El Presidente Gonzalo* as he is known. As long as the mystique of Guzman's infallibility exists at the head of the organization, there is little chance that others of the Central Committee or regional committees will risk challenging his authority for the sake of a dissenting opinion on ideology or strategy. Upon Guzman's removal or death, however, Guzman's all powerful

¹⁴⁶Luis Arce Borja, ed., *Guerra Popular en el Peru: El Pensamiento Gonzalo*, (Brussels, Belgium: Privately printed, 1989). This is the most comprehensive work of the Shining Path's ideology to date, as it was meant to institutionalize Guzman's ideological teachings.

"*El Presidente Gonzalo*" would no longer be a deterrent. This could lead to different factions forming within the top leadership and dissention occurring after the correct line of action is selected, reducing the effectiveness of the leadership. This, however, would take time to develop into a dangerously divisive situation. There are no indicators to support the claim that Guzman's downfall would immediately lead to the collapse of the insurgency.

Only limited cracks have revealed themselves in the party structure since the last PCP party purges of 1979 and 1980. Although there have been no major known challenges to Guzman's authority since the start of the military struggle in 1980, there have been reports of "individuals who have crossed Guzman" and were either "demoted" or expelled from the party.¹⁴⁷

Intense internal debate is known to have existed within the Central Committee between 1980 and 1982 over the definition of armed strategy. Guzman advocated a strategy of a prolonged struggle that originates in the countryside, encircles the cities, and then forces the eventual collapse of the cities. A competing position within the Central Party, which was finally defeated by Guzman's faction, was that of a strategy that would give equal weight to armed actions in both the rural and urban environments. What

¹⁴⁷McCormick, Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 10.

makes this significant is that the leader of the faction advocating the second strategy, a long time disciple of Guzman by the name of Luis Kawata, was subsequently removed from the Central Committee and he renounced the Shining Path for at least the next two years.

Another example of the what happens to subordinates that act outside of the Central Committee's guidelines and authorization occurred in December of 1985 in Lima. An individual was killed by a policeman while this individual and three others were attempting to rob funds being transferred from a business to a bank. It turned out that the person killed was Daniel Zanabria Levano, code named "Pedro", a member of the Metropolitan Regional Committee and one of the DIRCOTE's most wanted individuals. It was also discovered through captured documents of the April or May 1986 Fourth Plenary Session of the Shining Path's Central Committee that Zanabria had conducted the robbery without the authorization of either the Metropolitan Regional Committee or the Central Committee, and that he had unauthorized ties with the MRTA.

The same documents show how, as a result of this incident, the Shining Path discovered that another comrade of Zanabria's, one who was also connected to the Metropolitan Regional Committee, was also "ideologically in error" and he was subsequently assassinated. Guzman stated at the plenary session that "They have been the first but

there will be more; therefore we must have total political vigilance. Much vigilance."¹⁴⁸ The body of the second individual, "Javier", was found in the streets of Lima, assassinated the day following the botched robbery attempt.

There are several points of significance to be brought out of this example. One is that the Shining Path, while decentralizing execution, will not tolerate actions that stray from the narrowly defined guidelines of the party nor ideological transgressions. Another is the severity of the penalty for this error: death. Finally, the fact that the insurgent organization could discover Zanabria's transgression and death, connect "Javier" to the incident, decide to kill him, and to actually have "Javier" killed in one day's time is but another example of both the Shining Path's extensive intelligence network and the emergency communications network that must exist to ensure rapid communications between command and control cells when necessary.

Two unconfirmed reports of splits in the insurgent movement were reported in 1990. The first of these cracks in the Shining Path's armor allegedly took place in March 1990. The National Police in Tarapoto, located in the Upper Huallaga Valley in the Department of San Martin, reported

¹⁴⁸Raul Gonzalez, "La Cuarta Plenaria del Comité Central de S.L.," QueHacer, 44, December 1986/January 1987, 50. Translation done by myself.

the emergence of a group by the name of the *Haz Luminoso*.¹⁴⁹ The police source reported that the movement was organized by four unnamed Shining Path leaders that had "split from [the Shining Path] for ideological reasons, taking a group of activists with them."¹⁵⁰ The group, in addition to painting "HL" on buildings and handing out leaflets, was reported to have announced upcoming people's trials and the planned murders of government officials.

The second split was reported to have occurred in the Department of Ayacucho in May 1990. Seventeen leaflets, alleged to be from the Shining Path were found on the tenth anniversary of the Shining Path's initiation of the violent struggle, calling for a cease-fire with the government and questioning Abimael Guzman's leadership.¹⁵¹

Again, neither of these last two alleged splits from the party or the approved party line have been confirmed to have occurred nor directly linked to the Shining Path. The first allegedly occurred in a region of the Upper Huallaga in which the MRTA and the Shining Path are still competing for control. This incident could have been a government propaganda attempt to cause turbulence in the Shining Path

¹⁴⁹"Appearance of New Sendero Faction Reported," JPRS, 20 April 1990, 2, translated from Spanish, original source: El Nacional, 5 March 1990, 5.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Counter-Terrorism & Security Intelligence Bulletin, 4 June 1990, 5.

leadership in the area, or an MRTA operation to use the Shining Path's reputation to their advantage. The Ayacucho incident also could be a government disinformation campaign against the Shining Path leadership. No further information has been reported on either incident since.

There have been very few defections from the Shining Path over the last twelve years. As a trend of continuing and large numbers of defections is normally considered a sign of lack of guerrilla success and dissatisfaction with the organization, the Shining Path's current record must stand as testimony to the organization's successes, the cohesiveness of the organization, and the individual satisfaction it generates within its ranks.

Some of this record can also be attributed to the fact that the government security forces' normal course of action toward a defector was to kill the individual.¹⁵²

In 1990, however, the Peruvian military reported to US officers that the Army had begun to receive a small number of defectors from the Shining Path, but were frank about their lack of a program with which to handle these defectors.¹⁵³ These defectors were allegedly from the central Andean highlands, and had turned themselves in to

¹⁵² Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

¹⁵³ Ibid. This presentation was complete with a short videotape of interviews with these alleged defectors.

security forces far from their home village areas to avoid retribution from the communities in which they had committed the violent act that had originally "blooded" them into the insurgent organization. The number was never specified, nor could the subsequent fate of these individuals be determined. No other information is available to determine if a problem of individual dissatisfaction is developing within the ranks of the Shining Path organization or the reason for it.

The Shining Path has shown a remarkable ability to fully integrate women into the organization at all levels. The Shining Path has a strong ideological stand on the equality of women and the organization has a strong appeal to women. This is due to the women's rejection of the traditional role of women in Peruvian society and the breakdown of traditional society in the sierra. The appeal of the organization and the recruitment of women will be covered later in this study.

The ideological founding for the Shining Path's progressive stand on the woman's role in society is based in the writings of Lenin, Mao, and Mariategui. Lenin wrote of women's contributions to the Russian Revolution, while Mao wrote that the only way to free women of the historical roles and oppression under which women in semi-feudal societies suffer is through the transformation of society into socialism. Mariategui agreed, but emphasized that

"women, like men, belong to a social class" and that this oppression would be resolved through the class struggle.¹⁵⁴

These concepts form part of the ideological platform of the Shining Path and are integrated into the curricula of the Shining Path's clandestine "popular schools." But the Shining Path is not waiting for the arrival of the "People's Republic of the New Democracy" to implement this policy of sexual equality.

Women have played large roles in the organization since its inception. Guzman's wife, Augusta de la Torre, was reported to have been a key party ideologue prior to her death.¹⁵⁵ Brenda Perez Zamora is reported to have succeeded Osman Morote as the second-in-command of the Shining Path since his arrest in 1988.¹⁵⁶ Women are reported to have been the secretaries of the Metropolitan Regional Committee between 1983 and 1985.¹⁵⁷ According to Peruvian military documents, seven of the nineteen known

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Augusta de la Torre is now believed to be dead. A video tape captured in a Shining Path safehouse by Peruvian security forces shows what appears to be a wake or funeral for de la Torre, and captured documents also show that she was posthumously designated a "historic member" of the PCP at the final select session of the First Party Congress on 29 June 1989.

¹⁵⁶Carol Andreas, "Women at War," NACLA Report on the Americas, XXIV, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 21.

¹⁵⁷Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 59.

members of the PCP Central Committee are women, as are all three known Central Committee candidates. Teenager Edith Lagos was the Shining Path's first military leader in Ayacucho, and women have been documented in many other commands.

Women have also been routinely assigned difficult and violent assignments within the ranks of the organization. Normally young, educated, and unmarried with no children, these women are more emotionally cold and ruthless than their male counterparts. It was a woman that led an assault to free hundreds of prisoners from an Ayacucho jail and according to Gabriela Tarazona,

the analysis of almost any major assassination usually reveals that a woman¹³⁸ has been charged with delivering the lethal shot.

These assignments give the women confidence in their own abilities and demonstrate that the Shining Path puts action behind its policy of gender equality and not merely rhetoric. This appears to heighten the commitment of these women to the organization.

One of the insurgents' greatest strengths is their organization and unity. The Shining Path has created an organization of remarkable depth and that is both well-disciplined and adaptable. The organization has accomplished this despite a decentralized structure while also maintaining rigid adherence to its ideology and strict

¹³⁸Ibid, 77.

security measures. It provides a belief system and the upward mobility lacking in society, while demanding absolute loyalty. The organization encourages discussion, while crushing dissention, and once settling on a course of action requires total commitment of its members. It also provides an elaborate support organization that contributes to the individual commitment to the organization.

Most importantly, this organization supports the Shining Path's strategy and is based upon the reality of the Peruvian environment. The Shining Path exhibit both a determination and patience in the expansion of its organization, and has not allowed itself to take short-cuts in its organization in order to advance the pace of its operations. The Shining Path is very cohesive, and able to make operational changes when necessary.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Unless governments are utterly incompetent, devoid of political will, and lacking resources, insurgent organizations normally must obtain outside assistance if they are to succeed.¹⁵⁹

O'Neill argues that without popular support external support is crucial. Additionally, while external support is still important to an insurgency movement that possesses popular support, rarely can popular support "...provide all the resources necessary for the accomplishment of

¹⁵⁹O'Neill, 111.

insurgents' ultimate goals."¹⁶⁰ External support for the Shining Path can be examined by identifying and studying the insurgent movement for the four basic types of external support as defined by O'Neill: moral, political, material, and sanctuary.

On the surface, it appears that the Shining Path has not sought nor received any external support. No evidence exists that weapons or training is provided by another government. Neither of Peru's traditional enemies, Ecuador and Chile, provides support for the Shining Path. The movement's criticism and violent acts against the former Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea and China have demonstrated the Shining Path's rejection of these traditional supporters of international revolutionary movements. The Shining Path's rhetoric appears to reject most of the outside world which is consistent with Abimael Guzman's claim that the Shining Path is the only pure Maoist revolution. Closer examination, however, reveals that the movement has consciously planned and integrated external support into its strategy.

The leadership of the Shining Path has developed an international support network to provide moral support to its struggle and to reduce foreign political support to the

¹⁶⁰Ibid.

government of Peru since at least 1984.¹⁶¹ The first such organizations were created in Europe and the United States under various titles, such as the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru located in the United States, Gruppe Amsterdam in the Netherlands, and the Sol-Peru Committee in Belgium. These organizations fell under an umbrella Shining Path front organization, the Peruvian People's Movements (*Movimientos Populares Peru, MPP*).¹⁶² The majority of writers from the United States who reported on the Shining Path between the years 1980 and 1988 stressed the secretiveness of the organization due to the low level of activity of these support organizations, despite the growth of this network. The lack of a coordinated effort by these organizations and the fact that no statements emanated directly from the Shining Path acknowledging the support or solidarity of these organizations may have also contributed to them not being directly connected to the Shining Path nor seen as a voice of the PCP.

Another organization that needs to be examined is the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). The RIM

¹⁶¹Bard O'Neill defines moral support for the insurgents as "private and, more important, public statements that indicate sympathy for insurgents in very general terms," and political support as "explicit and active backing for the ultimate goals of the insurgents in the diplomatic arena." O'Neill, 114.

¹⁶²"Shining Path Figure in Europe Profiled," JPRS, 15 November 1991, 3, translated from Spanish, original source: Expreso, Lima, Peru, 29 October 1991, A9.

is headquartered in London and its members consist of over 17 communist parties and other revolutionary groups and terrorist organizations around the world. The RIM publishes a periodical, known in English as A World to Win, between one to four times annually and in 21 different languages by 1991. The RIM claims the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) among its signatories of the 1984 "Declaration of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement" and a participating organization in the RIM.¹⁶³

The Shining Path has received moral support from the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) since the latter's creations in 1984. The first issue of A World to Win that the RIM published in January 1985 began with an article supporting the Shining Path's struggle in the Andean highlands against the Peruvian government. Five more issues between April 1985 and late 1988 contained pro-Shining Path propaganda. It is believed by some that the Shining Path has provided funds to the RIM in return.¹⁶⁴

Abimael Guzman appeared to acknowledge and welcome the moral support of the RIM and its member organizations during a published interview given to the Lima newspaper *El*

¹⁶³"Our Red Flag is Flying in Peru," A World to Win 16 (April 1991): 2.

¹⁶⁴Steven M. Butler, COL, Military Intelligence, US Army, Chief of the Low Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate, Combined Arms Command, FT Leavenworth, KS. Interview conducted by MAJ William G. Graves on 17 January 1992 at FT Leavenworth, KS.

Diario in July 1988. Guzman stated that although the PCP remains independent and relies on no other organization in the world, it will not ignore proletarian internationalism. He went on to say that the "primary support" the international organizations give "is their own struggle."¹⁶⁵

Guzman also identified the two key contributions that the Shining Path gains from these organization's support. He claimed that,

the propaganda and celebrations they stage represent support that wins over public opinion; this is how proletarian internationalism expresses itself. The support also takes the form of the advice that they give us.¹⁶⁶

Thus Guzman sees the international support from organizations like the RIM and its member organizations as aiding in the international Shining Path propoganda campaign and in some form of advice they provide. No information has been found to document any form of advice or planning assistance received from these organizations by the Shining Path. Guzman did distance the Shining Path from this advice in the interview by stressing that the PCP must make the decision of whether to accept the advice that is offered.

1988 was a key year in the development of support organizations external to Peru because in the second half of

¹⁶⁵"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 13.

¹⁶⁶Ibid.

1988 Luis Arce Borja, a mass-media professional took charge of the Shining Path's overseas propaganda effort.

Luis Arce Borja was previously the editor of the Lima newspaper, *El Diario*. The newspaper had long been considered to be a mouthpiece of the Shining Path and the Peruvian security forces believed that the newspaper was one of the tools with which the insurgent organization communicated with its followers. They believed that coded instructions were passed to subordinate commands by the Central Committee of the PCP in editions of *El Diario*.

When *El Diario* printed 43 pages on 24 July 1988 of an alleged personal interview that Abimael Guzman granted to Arce and his news chief, Janet Talavera Sanchez, the Peruvian government shut down the newspaper. Arce was questioned by the government security forces and fled to Belgium after being released. Janet Talavera was arrested in 1988 after the closure of the newspaper and is today imprisoned in Canto Grande prison.

The subsequent results appear to support the security forces' claims of an *El Diario* connection to the Shining Path. Once in Brussels, Belgium, Arce began publishing a pro-Shining Path newspaper. Named *El Diario Internacional*, the newspaper is printed monthly in various languages and distributed in Europe, the United States and Latin America. *El Diario Internacional* is a version of *El Diario*, which continues to be published clandestinely in

Lima. It is interesting to note that Janet Talavera is carried as the Deputy Editor of *El Diario Internacional*, despite the fact that she is still incarcerated in a Peruvian maximum security prison. Arce also assumed control of the Shining Path front organization, the Peruvian People's Movements (*Movimientos Populares Peru, MPP*).

Before examining Arce's impact on the MPP, the legal status and activities of the Shining Path's support organizations need to be addressed. These organizations operate legally in the United States and Europe. In Europe these organizations are run by Peruvians with political asylum or refugee status. Spain, which has traditionally been liberal in the granting of political asylum and refugee status for Latin Americans, has one of the strongest support organizations in the Peruvian and Hispanic Friends Association in Madrid.

The organizations have concentrated on expansion of the organizations and the dissemination of Shining Path propaganda. Another of the principal activities they have conducted has been fund-raising for the maintenance and expansion of these overseas organizations, and to provide financial assistance for members of the PCP and their families that have sought refuge in Europe. This is a continuation of the Shining Path's United Front-type support activities that exist within Peru. Another destination of the funds is for the publication of *El Diario Internacional*.

Luis Arce Borja's arrival in Brussels brought improved coordination to the Shining Path's overseas propaganda effort. The support organizations in Europe began a coordinated effort to portray the Shining Path not as terrorists, but as legitimate "guerrillas of freedom" whose guerrilla actions are "a continuation of colonial rebellion" struggling against "...murderous military men, who try to preserve an unfair system that exploits millions of poor people."¹⁶⁷ Another of the propaganda program's key themes is the brutality of the Peruvian security forces and Peru's extremely poor human rights record. Consistently disseminated are statements such as the following,

But one cannot accuse the PCP of going to the villages to commit the horrible kind of killings of which the army and the police are culpable.¹⁶⁸

The objective is not to gain political support in the international arena for the Shining Path's cause, but rather, to undercut Peru's international political support it receives as a sovereign and democratic country. It is also to gain legitimacy as a political party and a revolutionary movement instead of being labeled as terrorists and criminals.

Arce also established a media headquarters in

¹⁶⁷"Government to Fight Guerrilla Propaganda in Europe," JPRS, 15 November 1991, 2-3, translated from Spanish, original source: Expresso, 29 October 1991, A9 and "Shining Path Figure in Europe Profiled," 3.

¹⁶⁸Anita Fokkema, "There Is No Other Way," NACLA Report on the Americas XXIV, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 23.

Brussels to better coordinate the propaganda effort. He installed fax machines, an offset printer, and a staff of language translators. This headquarters also serves as an international clearing house for MPP mail and propaganda. The increase in volume, quality and the coordinated effort in the Shining Path propaganda program can be directly attributed to Arce's installation as the main coordinator of this effort.

Interviews of representatives of Shining Path support organizations have also been occurring in Europe since Arce's arrival, which before had been a rarity. Arce himself has granted numerous interviews. In one interview Arce declared that he did not consider himself an official member of the Shining Path, but also emphasized that "I can express the PCP's ideas correctly."¹⁶⁹ Shining Path spokesmen in London and Madrid have also been interviewed in the press. These are just a part of the public image campaign that has been taking place in support of the Shining Path.

Since Arce's arrival in Brussels, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement has produced an increase in support of Peru in its A World to Win magazine. Since Arce's installation in Brussels, four of the five subsequent issues of A World to Win have contained major sections supporting the Shining Path's struggle. Additionally, the

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

1991 issue declared 1991 the "Year of Solidarity with the People's War in Peru," and devoted almost half the issue to pro-Shining Path propaganda.

Another indicator that Arce is a spokesman for the Shining Path occurred in February 1992. The New York City office of the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru and Revolution Books, also of New York City, organized a pro-Shining Path presentation with Luis Arce Borja as the scheduled speaker. When the United States allegedly refused Arce an entrance visa, two members of the Shining Path were scheduled to come from Peru to speak in his place. This connection between the Shining Path in Peru and Arce points to his role as a party spokesman.

Since 1988 the number of Shining Path support organizations has grown. As of 1991, the Peruvian military has identified support organizations in the following countries:¹⁷⁰

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS</u>
France	11
Spain	7
Germany	3
Sweden	2
Switzerland	1
Great Britain	6
Netherlands	1
United States	13

This list does not include other organizations that the

¹⁷⁰ Defensa Interna: Movimientos Subversivos en el Peru, [Internal Defense: Subversive Movements in Peru], Chorrillos, Peru: Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejercito Peruano, 1991, sub-section 22.

Peruvian military claims provide assistance to the Shining Path support organizations, such as organizations sponsored by the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement and other sympathetic Maoist parties in the world.¹⁷¹

The most significant and disputed external support is the Shining Path's connection to the coca production in Peru. The nexus between the insurgent movement and the coca production provides the Shining Path enormous material benefits, in addition to the popular support it provides. What is disputed is the nature of the Shining Path's actual relationship with the narco-traffickers themselves and its long-range impact on the organizational discipline of the Shining Path.

With the expansion of the Shining Path out of the Andean highlands in the Departments of Ayacucho, Apurimac and Huancavelica and into the Upper Huallaga in late 1983, the organization began realizing significant monetary benefits as early as mid-1987.¹⁷² Their military strength and their imposition between the traffickers and the coca

¹⁷¹Sub-section 22 of the Peruvian military's 1991 study, Defensa Interna: Movimientos Subversivos en el Peru, provides a detailed account of the Shining Path's overseas support organizations and the international movements that are alleged to also provide assistance. A copy of this document is on file at the Regional Military Studies Office, FT Leavenworth, Kansas.

¹⁷²Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 70 and 123.

growers permitted the Shining Path to both tax the grower and the trafficker.

The coca cultivation and trafficking provide a significant tax base for the insurgents. 211,000 hectares of coca was estimated to be under cultivation in 1988 in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the majority of this is cultivated in small, family-tended plots.¹⁷³ As the coca plants of the Upper Huallaga Valley can be picked 4-5 times a year, the taxation of the growers yields a large amount of Peruvian currency to the insurgency. Additionally, there is a network of local traffickers that buy the coca leaf from those growers (from that majority of growers that does not process the coca leaf into coca paste themselves) and process the leaf into coca paste. These local traffickers are also taxed by the Shining Path.

The international traffickers, who are primarily from Colombia, are forced to pay a tax to the insurgents for each plane-load of coca paste that leaves the valley. This tax is generally estimated at \$10,000-15,000 (US) per plane.¹⁷⁴ This tax is paid in US dollars and provides the

¹⁷³Ibid, 110. Also, a hectare is 10,000 square meters. A detailed account of the coca economy in Peru can be found in Edmundo Morales' Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru.

¹⁷⁴Although David Scott Palmer estimates that the Shining Path receives \$2,000-\$4,000 per flight in his article "Peru's Persistent Problems," conversations with COL Steven M. Butler, senior Peruvian military officers, and Peruvian military documents are convincing that the \$10,000-\$15,000 figure is more accurate.

Shining Path with significant funds that are protected from the inflation of the Peruvian economy.

The Shining Path also makes money on currency exchange in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Representatives of the Colombian drug cartels bring US dollars into the Upper Huallaga Valley for the purchase of coca, but must first exchange the dollars for Peruvian *intis*. Offices of Peruvian national banks located in the towns of Xion and Uchiza used to make all the currency exchanges, with the dollars returning to Lima for use by the national government as foreign currency reserves.

This continued until mid-1987, when the Shining Path intervened. Then, "...the movement designated certain individuals with whom currencies could be exchanged; no others were permitted."¹⁷⁵ Thus, the drug traffickers must conduct currency exchanges only with Shining Path-designated individuals, from whom the insurgent organization extracts a percentage as a revolutionary tax. Additionally, there is evidence that the Peruvian national banks continue to buy dollars in the valley to obtain sorely needed foreign currency, but the banks must now purchase the dollars at a higher price from the Shining Path-designated individuals

¹⁷⁵Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 121.

and from money-changers on the streets of Lima.¹⁷⁶

The amount of income that the Shining Path generates from currency exchange is unknown, but it is estimated that the Shining Path gains an estimated 20-30 million dollars (US) annually from just the coca cultivation and sale in the Upper Huallaga.

And for what are Shining Path using these funds? Little direct evidence exists to document the destination of these funds, yet some indicators exist.

It is obvious that the Shining Path has spent little of these funds on weaponry or communications equipment. The major source of weaponry continues to be the national security forces, and little in the way of electronic communications equipment has surfaced in the organization. One exception to this may be the rumored surface-to-air missiles in the Upper Huallaga Valley.

On the other hand, the benefits paid to organization members, the city-based United Front support organizations and their operations, the network of clandestine safehouses, and the overseas support network all require significant funding for which sourcing by means other than the drug trade has not surfaced. It is interesting to note that the expansion of the United Front support organizations, the urban front, and the overseas support organizations all

¹⁷⁶Roger Cohen, "Cocaine Rebellion: Peru's Guerrillas Draw Support of Peasants in Coca-Rich Regions," Wall Street Journal, 17 January 1990, A1.

significantly expanded in 1986-1987, the time when the Shining Path's control over significant areas of the Upper Huallaga Valley was being consolidated.

The point of contention with the Shining Path's connection with the coca cultivation and production is their relationship with the Colombian drug traffickers. Some journalists have claimed that the Shining Path and the drug traffickers have joined forces and can now be termed narco-terrorists. Although it is obvious that there does exist a relationship between the two groups, it has not been a marriage willingly entered into by both parties.

The international drug traffickers are "...entrepreneurs, they cannot afford to wage a political movement that does not report profits."¹⁷⁷ It was to their financial advantage to buy coca paste at as low a price as possible and export it from the Upper Huallaga Valley free of charge. The international traffickers used well-armed gangs and the use of violence to ensure that the growers met delivery quotas and to discourage the growers from organizing themselves. This exploitation of the growers maintained a pipeline of coca paste at minimum prices for the traffickers.

In the mid-1980s the Shining Path began to change this relationship between the growers and the international

¹⁷⁷Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989) 138.

traffickers. The insurgents would move into an area, seize control, and then kill or recruit the traffickers' gang members into the insurgent organization. Once in control of the area, the Shining Path then organizes the growers and negotiates higher prices for the growers coca crops.

Some evidence exists that the Shining Path may have established a written working relationship with the traffickers as early as late 1987. Peruvian journalists Raul Gonzalez and Abilio Arroyo have both written on this alleged pact between the drug-traffickers and the Shining Path. The Peruvian military has also produced a copy of what appears to be a written agreement between the two parties setting the procedures and prices for the traffickers to operate in the Upper Huallaga Valley.¹⁷⁸

Although the validity of the document is difficult to confirm, it became apparent by the beginning of 1988 that the Shining Path was no longer negotiating coca prices, but was setting the price. The insurgent organization also appears to have begun protecting both the drug traffickers

¹⁷⁸ Reunion de la Delegacion del Partido con los Senores Narcotraficantes Extranjeros y Peruanos el Dia 9-4-90. This is a document presented by a Peruvian intelligence officer to a US Army officer in September 1991 and is alleged to be a written agreement between the Shining Path's Huallaga support base and all narcotraffickers, both foreign and domestic, operating in the Upper Huallaga Valley. This appears to be the update of written agreements between the narcotraffickers and the Shining Path, with the latter setting prices and policies to the traffickers, for the continuance of trafficking in coca leaf, paste, and base.

flights and the rudimentary facilities for converting coca leaf to paste on a more regular basis. Indicators such as these support the claims to the validity of the document, but it must be mentioned that no other examples of the Shining Path using written agreements in the prosecution of the insurgency have been noted. Regardless of the validity of the document, the Shining Path is in control of the coca cultivation, prices, and cooperates with the traffickers.

But the Shining Path has not been the only insurgent group trying to take advantage of the coca industry in the Upper Huallaga Valley. The Shining Path has battled the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA)* for control of the valley since late 1983. By 1988 the Shining Path had effectively seized control of the majority of the coca-producing areas of the valley. There is evidence that the Colombian drug traffickers assisted the Shining Path in attacks against the MRTA. This pushed the MRTA out of the primary growing areas farther north toward Juanjui in the department of San Martin.

Although the Shining Path controls the majority of the coca production in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the MRTA was not totally ejected from the valley. The MRTA was reduced to the northern section of the valley and conflicts between the two groups continue. Accurate information is lacking, however, due to the peasants' distrust of outsiders, the danger inherent to any visit by journalists

to the region, and the inability of the government to maintain an effective presence in the valley outside of the counterdrug bases at Tingo Maria and Santa Lucia.

The Shining Path has also forced peasants of other regions to convert their agricultural lands to coca cultivation. Although this has been occurring in the areas of the Apurimac and Tambo River valleys, the Shining Path's most significant effort is being made in the Ene River Basin. Aerial and satellite imagery reveals that the Upper Huallaga Valley and Ene River Basin now have a combined cultivation of 352,800 hectares of coca.¹⁷⁹ The insurgents have not only forced the conversion to coca, but have also rapidly established a local network to process the coca leaves into coca paste.

The Shining Path does not appear to seek, nor need, sanctuary areas within the national territories of Peru's neighbors. Bard O'Neill argues that sanctuaries provide the benefits of providing secure logistics bases from which to support "widespread and large-unit guerrilla attacks" or permanent bases if the government security forces are effective in denying the insurgents permanent bases within the country.¹⁸⁰ The Shining Path has not conducted large-unit guerrilla operations and, with the possible exception

¹⁷⁹Hernando de Soto, Hernando, "Peru's Ex-Drug Czar on Cocaine: The Supply Side," Wall Street Journal, 14 February 1992, A11.

¹⁸⁰O'Neill, 117.

of the Upper Huallaga Valley, has not formed large units as of yet. Therefore, the insurgents do not have the need for external sanctuary areas for logistics.

The government, additionally, has been ineffective in denying the Shining Path permanent bases within Peru. Coupled with the remoteness of much of Peru's Andean and jungle regions, this ineffectiveness negates the need for an external sanctuary. Peruvian military sources state that in the Andean highlands most of the Shining Path's caches and training areas are at the 16,000 feet in altitude and the majority of insurgent support bases are established above an altitude of 14,000 feet to protect them from the government security forces.¹⁸¹ The inability of the government forces to easily gain access to these areas and the great expanses that would have to be searched or placed under observation results in a "security in altitude" within the highlands for the insurgents. The remoteness offered by many of the jungle regions and the growing insurgent control of many regions, such as the Ene River basin, offer additional internal safe base areas. The Upper Huallaga Valley is another example of a large support base area within Peru serving the movement.

Raul Gonzalez reported in the beginning of 1986 that the Shining Path was trying to establish a land corridor

¹⁸¹ Author's personal notes from the US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

with Bolivia via Huancane in the Department of Puno.¹⁸²

This conclusion was based upon the research of then ongoing insurgent operations in the region and Gonzalez speculated that the corridor could be used to supply the Shining Path with weapons, foodstuffs, and medicines. Gonzalez noted that through the control of Puno any land corridor with Bolivia would have natural routes to both the emergency zones in the Andean mountains and the jungle highlands to the north.

Since Gonzalez' claim, little evidence was found to support this rationale for the insurgent offensive in Puno. The Shining Path is reported to have had little success in the Department of Puno over the next two years and no other report on an insurgent connection with Bolivia has been found until 12 December 1988, when the Bolivian press reported on a Shining Path connection with a Bolivian insurgent movement.¹⁸³ The accuracy of this report is unknown, as is the Shining Path's motive, if true. What is known, however, is that Puno has remained a lesser priority than most of Peru for the Shining Path since the end of 1986. More indicators of insurgent activity and a higher insurgent priority would have been seen in the Department of

¹⁸²Raul Gonzalez, "Puno: el Corredor Senderista," QueHacer 39, February/March 1986, 55, 58.

¹⁸³Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 134-135.

Puno if sanctuary areas in Bolivia were important to the Shining Path.

In summary, the Shining Path has developed a sophisticated external support network that supports the needs of the insurgent organization. This network provides the organization moral support and aids in promoting the international isolation of the Peruvian government. Assistance is also provided to Shining Path members living in exile overseas. The drug connection provides significant external funding for the Shining Path, this connection is exploited in such a way as to maintain ideological purity and freedom from foreign control. This funding and the ability of the Shining Path to develop safe base areas within Peru free the organization from sanctuary areas in neighboring countries or assistance by a foreign power.

CHAPTER 7

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

"...the reactionaries are dreaming when they try to drown the revolution in blood; they should know that they are irrigating it."

-Abimael Guzman¹⁸⁴

The first time most of the Peruvian government had heard of the Shining Path was just prior the national elections in May 1980 that would restore civilian government to the nation after twelve years of military rule. A group calling themselves the Communist Party of Peru burned ballot boxes in a small town in the Andean highlands and hung dead dogs and banners denouncing the leadership of China from lampposts in the highland city of Ayacucho and in Lima. As there were several radical political parties claiming the title of the Communist Party of Peru and the acts appeared bizarre, little serious concern was aroused. Within two years, this new group would be commonly called the *Sendero Luminoso* within Peru and the government would decide to unleash the military to quickly destroy them, as it had defeated the communist insurgents in 1965.

¹⁸⁴"Reporters Interview Shining Path Leader Guzman," 20.

The government security forces had already heard of this group, however. The government intelligence organs had followed the formation of this political party since the Maoist Communist Party of Peru-Red Flag split from the pro-Soviet PCP in 1964. But with the long history of peaceful activities, albeit with inflammatory rhetoric, the Maoist factions did not appear to be a threat to the government. PCP-Red Flag did not even participate in the *foco*-style insurgency of 1965.

The security services continued to monitor all the parties of the left and were aware that Abimael Guzman and his faction based in Ayacucho split from the PCP-Red Flag in 1969. In fact, the security forces had arrested Guzman for his role in the 1969 wave of violence that occurred in reaction to the government changes in the free education laws. They were not, however, aware of the degree of political activity that this new faction was conducting in the central highlands. The military government, having made the decision by 1978 to hold elections in 1980 and turn over control of the country to civilian rule, was unaware that in 1978 the Shining Path had formally decided to initiate its armed struggle against the government.¹⁸⁵

As the Shining Path's influence in the Departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac grew in the first

¹⁸⁵Guzman was also arrested in 1979. He went underground after his release and has not been seen publicly since.

two years, it evoked a greater response from the government. New terrorism laws were passed by the Peruvian Congress. Two special police units, the Sinchis and the Lllapan Aticcs (both with Quechuan names) of the Civil Guard, were committed to the Ayacucho region to destroy the insurgents. The leaders of the Peruvian government believed that the insurgency was an Indian peasant movement that would be easily defeated. President Belaunde kept the military from participating, while the military saw it as a police problem.

The Sinchis and Lllapan Aticcs were totally unprepared to combat the Shining Path. According to Gabriela Tarazona,

...[the] police forces were seriously underequipped and undertrained. They lacked crucial tactical planning, logistical support, and communications systems. In fact, they did not even have radios.¹⁸⁶

These special police units rapidly gained reputations for brutality towards the local population. Little progress was made against the Shining Path which continued to expand its influence. By late 1982, the government realized that the police were ineffective against the Shining Path.

The government took stronger measures against the insurgency in December 1982. On December 21, 1982, the Belaunde administration issued Supreme Decree 068-82, which

¹⁸⁶Tarazona, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism, 89.

declared a large area of the Departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac an emergency zone and ordered the military to take control of this emergency zone and restore order. Two days later, the military deployed forces of the army, air force and naval infantry to Ayacucho to begin offensive operations against the Shining Path.

The Peruvian military was not prepared to deploy against an internal threat. It was deployed to fight its traditional neighbors, Ecuador and Chile, in a two front war. At least seventy percent of the military has been deployed near the borders with these potential enemies and the military has organized, equipped, and trained itself for this contingency.

Peru's military structure consisted of a large, conventional force that had modernized under the 1968-1980 years of military rule. Resourcing went to pay for a sophisticated air force, a relatively large naval force and a modern army. The air force, numbering 10,000 in 1980, possessed Soviet Su-22 and French Mirage fighters, in addition to Soviet helicopters. The navy grew under a modernization program that began in the 1970s until by the late 1980s it had become the third largest navy in Latin America. Its forces include fourteen surface warships, eleven submarines (the largest submarine fleet in Latin America), and a marine infantry force. The army possessed large quantities of Soviet tanks, armored personnel

carriers, attack helicopters, and artillery.

The Peruvian military's school system was one of the most professional in Latin America, but it too focused the studies of its students on those skills needed for a conventional two-front war. The lessons that had come out of the 1965 counterinsurgency campaign had not been institutionalized into this school system.

Counterinsurgency subjects were lacking from the curriculum and the role of internal security was seen as the function of the police forces.

With the declaration of an emergency zone around the Ayacucho region, the Peruvian military was committed with almost total freedom of action. The decree that authorized the emergency zone suspended individual rights in the zone, gave broad powers to the military, and essentially resulted in the military commander assuming the responsibilities of a military governor for the region.

The military forces that were initially committed went into the region confident of rapid success. The legacy of the rapid defeat of the 1965 insurgency led the military to enter the emergency zone with expectations of a short campaign. The belief that the Shining Path was an Indian-based movement also led the military leadership to believe that the military would rapidly defeat the insurgency because of the inferiority of the Indian.

The commitment of the military began the escalation

of violence in Peru that remains today. Several components of the counterinsurgency effort have remained relatively constant throughout these past ten years. The first of these is that the government has continued since 1982 to search for a primarily military solution to the problem. This has resulted in an upward spiral in the level of violence, human rights abuses by the military, and massive emigration from the countryside of the Sierra to the urban centers.

The military rapidly became frustrated in its inability to make contact with the insurgents, except for the contacts initiated by the Shining Path on its terms. The military was unable to distinguish members of the Shining Path from the local population and received no information on the insurgents from the indigenous population. This resulted in the military lashing out at the local population. Massacres of civilians, torture, and the "disappearance" of many suspected sympathizers became common. Between 1982 and 1988 over 6,000 people have vanished at the hands of the Peruvian security forces.¹⁸⁷ This alienated the local population and evoked an unexpected response from the Shining Path.

The Shining Path increased its level of violence to match that of the government. The level of violence continued to spiral upwards. The first Peruvian commander

¹⁸⁷Rosenberg, "Beyond Elections," 74.

of the Ayacucho emergency zone publicly stated:

There are no prisoners of war; and the population must understand that for better or for worse, that it is the military forces that make the rules of the game and that the power that the military has-- including that to generate terror in the population-- is definitely superior to that of the Sendero.¹⁸⁸

This became a conflict in which the civilians are caught between two brutal forces, both demanding that the civilians choose sides.

One major aspect of the attempt to find a military solution to the insurgency is the use of emergency zones. The Peruvian constitution permits the establishment of a state of emergency when the national security is threatened. Since 1982, the government has declared various areas, to include Lima, emergency zones. As much as sixty percent of the country's land mass and one half its population has been under emergency rule at one time or another. Once a region is declared an emergency zone, a senior military officer is appointed by the president to command the region. This officer serves as the administrative, political, and administrative chief of the region as long as its under a state of emergency. Although the governmental bureaucracy continues to operate under the authority of the military commander, by the time the region is declared to be under a state of emergency the governmental functions are usually

¹⁸⁸Raul Gonzalez, "Ayacucho: El Desfile de la Violencia," QueHacer, 33, February 1985, 45.

severely weakened and government officials have withdrawn from all but the larger villages and cities. The judicial system also continues to function, but the lines of jurisdiction between military and judicial authority have not been clearly defined by the law.

The chief result of creating emergency zones is an almost total abdication of civil governmental authority to the military. Little effort is placed upon the integration of non-military assets into the counterinsurgency campaign.

Contributing to the primacy of the military in the counterinsurgency has been the lack of an effective national counterinsurgency campaign that integrates all the resources of the government, such as economic development, social reforms, information management, and the mobilization of government services to a targeted region. The Belaunde government of 1980-1985 did plan a limited program of economic development for the Ayacucho area, but floods in the north and droughts in the Sierras strapped the administration for the necessary funding and the plan was shelved. Instead, the administration relied almost exclusively upon a police and military solution. Despite reported high losses by the Shining Path in the Ayacucho region, the insurgent organization not only responded with an increased level of violence, but also responded by opening up new insurgent theaters of operation throughout

the Sierras.

The Garcia administration of 1985-1990 made some initial attempts at harnessing other government resources into the battle against the insurgents. He offered to negotiate with the insurgents and according to Peruvian Gustavo Gorriti, President Garcia sent, "...scores of young professionals to the emergency areas to attack what he said were the 'root causes' of the insurgency."¹⁸⁹ Garcia initiated several economic development programs. The results, however, were that the Shining Path rejected negotiations, they killed dozens of the young professionals, and the economic development programs, which were flawed with corruption, did not assist the poor Indians in the mountains. By 1987 Garcia's own political party, APRA, was suspected of operating death squads against the insurgents, an economic crisis preoccupied the government, and Garcia had essentially returned the problem of the Shining Path to the military.

President Fujimori began his term of office in 1990 with announcements that his administration's counterinsurgency strategy would be different than those of the previous two administrations. He called for negotiations with the Shining Path and stated that military actions against the insurgents would be subordinated to

¹⁸⁹Gustavo Gorriti, "The Shining Path Fights on in Peru," Wall Street Journal, 20 July 1990, A11.

economic development initiatives. Fujimori's chief internal security advisor, Francisco Loayza, announced that, "The military should mainly provide security for development projects" and that the main thrust of Mr. Fujimori's pacification program would be to address the "structural violence [read: social injustice] that makes subversion possible."¹⁹⁰ Fujimori declared that his first priority was the economy, which was in a crisis of hyperinflation, and the Shining Path's insurgency was the second.

The first year and one half of Fujimori's administration has produced mixed results. The hyperinflation of the Garcia administration was reduced to a single and double digit monthly inflation rate through austere national economic measures the Peruvians have named "Fuji-shock." The government austerity program has, however, devastated the poorest sectors of society, exactly those who the Shining Path has been targeting. The Shining Path rejected the offer of negotiations. Fujimori has moved to strengthen the central government. He has reorganized the military and police such that the three military services fall under one command and he named an Army general to command the national police in an attempt to foster better cooperation between the military and police. Fujimori instituted a streamlined land title program.

¹⁹⁰Ibid. The comment on social injustice was added by Gorriti.

Headed by the author of The Other Path, Hernando de Soto, this computerized program was to rapidly provide land title to peasants in order to gain the support of the peasant and allow the peasant access to government agricultural programs that require the possession of land title for loans.

Directed primarily at the coca-growing regions, this program was all but terminated after less than a year. Although foreign investment was up dramatically by the end of 1991, little benefit was being seen by Peru's poor.

By the end of 1991, it appeared that Fujimori was turning to the military to lead the counterinsurgency again. Fujimori issued 116 military and economic emergency decrees in the beginning of November 1991 that result in vastly increased powers for the military while also predicting that the country would be pacified by the end of 1995. These decrees give the military the power to "...requisition private property and draft individuals for the war effort."¹⁹¹ They also grant the military the freedom to enter prisons and universities. They place great restrictions on the press and force journalists to reveal information and sources to the government, when requested. They also give the military total control over governmental functions in the emergency zones.

The military is also reducing its military forces on

¹⁹¹James Brooke, "Peru's Military Is Granted Broad Powers in Rebel War," New York Times, 3 December 1991, (page unknown).

the borders to commit them against the insurgents. Negotiations with Ecuador have occurred in an attempt to reduce the tensions over the disputed border to permit a reduction of forces on the Peru-Ecuador frontier. The military has also been retraining many of its battalions in "countersubversive operations" since as early as 1990.¹⁹² It remains to be seen how these additional forces will be employed.

One program that has played a role in the counterinsurgency efforts through all three presidential administrations is the that of the *rondas campesinas*. This is one of the few government programs that seeks to mobilize the population in contested areas. *Rondas* are civilian self-defense forces that have their origins in the 1970s. Peasant villages formed *rondas* for the defense of the village against robbers, theft of their livestock, and for the resolution of domestic disputes. Groups of men would patrol at night with flashlights, and the community leaders of the *ronda* served the functions of police, magistrate, and arbitrator. These groups were formed because of the breakdown of traditional society in the Sierra, the lack of police or the presence of abusive police, and the increase in crime. They were formed because of the government's

¹⁹² Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive-Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

inability to provide security or a reasonable judicial system for the peasants.

In 1984, the military operating in the Ayacucho emergency zone began cooperating with several of these self-defense groups. Soon villages were being forced to form self-defense groups and provide government patrols guides and translators. The military saw the formation of self-defense groups as a declaration of loyalty toward the government; those villages that did not form self-defense forces were immediately suspected as being sympathetic with Shining Path. The self-defense groups were only armed with weapons obtained within the villages: sticks, knives, machetes, hoes, and slings.

This had two adverse results. First, the villages used the *rondas* to resolve both individual grievances and long-standing disputes over water rights and land use with neighboring villages. Reports of peasant massacres committed by village self-defense groups in the military-controlled emergency zones began to reach both the press and international human rights organizations. The second was the result of placing the peasants out front in the government's counterinsurgency campaign. Poorly armed, the *rondas* were no match for the Shining Path's military columns. The government would not arm the peasants with firearms nor were the peasants able to call for a government reaction force, had one existed. No training was provided

to the peasants nor were any military personnel garrisoned in the village. This resulted in the peasants being caught between the government and the Shining Path; to refuse to organize a self-defense force brought a brutal response from the government forces and to organize one brought the same from the Shining Path.

The *rondas* have continued to be a part of the government's strategy. The administration of President Garcia legalized the status of these self-defense groups, and Garcia armed several of these groups with shotguns. This arming of the peasants was halted under pressure from the military after the Shining Path seized many of these weapons from the villagers. Later, the military began rearming some of the *rondas* with single-shot weapons. These crude weapons have only a 15-meter effective range and are no match for the Shining Path's weapons.

By 1991, the Peruvian Army had instituted a program to expand the peasant self-defense groups. This new focus on the peasant self-defense groups includes the identification of villages in disputed areas or of importance in terms of location, the mandatory formation of three to four platoons of peasant villagers, the provision of four to five 16 gauge shotguns per 30 person platoon, and some limited training. The program still does not include radios, reaction forces, or a military cadre stationed with the villagers to train or lead the *ronda*. By late 1991,

this program had created self-defense forces in 221 villages, with 23,300 participants, armed with 1,920 shotguns in the strategically important Mantaro Valley region.¹⁹³

One factor that has inhibited the Peruvian government's response to the Shining Path has been the Peruvian economic crisis that began in the second half of the 1980's. This severely restricted the Peruvian government's ability to finance economic development programs and undercut the military's counterinsurgency efforts. Inflation has wreaked havoc with military budgets and the purchasing power of military personnel. Peruvian colonels make the equivalent of \$250 (US) per month, a major \$180-190 (US), and a private \$10 (US). Most officers must hold second jobs and wives work to supplement incomes, as Lima is now the most expensive city in Latin America.¹⁹⁴ This fiscal crisis has severely reduced training and

¹⁹³Organizacion de las Rondas Campesinas: Casos y Experiencias, [Organization of the Civilian Self-Defense Groups: Cases and Experiences]. Peruvian Army document summarizing the legal authorities to establish Civilian Self-Defense Groups, the six phases needed to establish a Civilian Self-Defense Group and the locations, strengths and status of the Civilian Self-Defense Groups in the Departments of Junin and Pasco as of September 1991. (3 pages, including map)

¹⁹⁴Interview with COL Butler. Contrast this with the MRTA, which reportedly pays its officers \$2,000-3,000 (US) per month and other members \$250 (US) per month. There are reports that the Shining Path pays its combatants and one report that it has been recruiting in the shantytowns of Lima with US dollars.

maintenance, as little money exists for fuel and spare parts.

What results is a military with both a declining capability and a declining morale. Officers are leaving military service, some by just walking off the job and others by resigning their commissions. The number of officers requesting to leave the service was so great that by the end of 1991 the military was denying these requests. The Shining Path is also directly benefiting from this situation. They are now recruiting soldiers recently discharged from the military with special skills in weapons repair, communications, and demolitions.¹⁹⁵ These soldiers leave the military only to find no job prospects once they are discharged. This leaves them vulnerable to the Shining Path's recruitment efforts.

Military units have few resources with which to conduct operations. Peruvian officers related to me instances of military units having to be redeployed from the field because of no rations, soldiers going on patrol with an average of only a dozen rounds of ammunition, and that many of their soldiers receive boots only after 10-12 months of service because insufficient stocks exist.¹⁹⁶ The reduction of fuel and spare parts greatly restricts the

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

¹⁹⁶Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

military's access to remote areas of the country and the military's staying power when it does deploy. This results in larger areas being abandoned to Shining Path control.

Throughout the 1980s, the military has refused to deploy soldiers from the Sierra back into the Sierra to combat the insurgents out of fear of Shining Path infiltration into the military units and due to the low regard for the Indian. This has resulted in a military counterinsurgency force of Spanish-speaking mestizo soldiers from the coastal region who do not understand the Indian culture of the Sierra. These soldiers do not look like the indigenous people in the area of operations, they cannot speak to them because of the language difference, and the coastal mestizos see the Indians as inferior. The coastal soldiers, because they are from low altitudes, are physically unable to carry rucksacks because the operations are above 10,000 feet. What has resulted is the Peruvian military units are seen as a foreign invading army. The lack of a rucksack means that the soldiers sleep in village homes at night to avoid the cold nights and "procure" their food from the villagers. This leads to abuses and serves to further alienate the local population.

The security forces often blame the Shining Path for all brutal killings in an emergency zone, which enhanced the image of the Shining Path. This did not sufficiently cover the military's human rights abuses nor did it sufficiently

scare the peasants into supporting the government (if this was the purpose). It did, however, appear to reinforce the Shining Path's claim that "the Party has a thousand eyes and a thousand ears."

The Peruvian military attempted a relocation program in some areas of the Sierras in the mid-1980s, but it failed. Villagers were relocated to areas of less insurgent activity. Whole villages would be moved without warning. Villagers were forced to leave livestock, crops, and household possessions. They were often transported and left in a village that was not prepared to house or feed the displaced peasants. No provision was made to move livestock nor to provide construction or agricultural materials for the new community. The military merely created more refugees.

Additionally, the government has no plan nor policies designed to win the support of the people. The establishment of the *rondas campesinas* normally comes without any benefits provided from the government to the peasants. Peasant leaders who speak out for government services or against injustices are seen by the military as Shining Path sympathizers and many have been killed. The military possesses no trained interrogators resulting in a dependence on torture or other coercive techniques to elicit confessions rather than intelligence information. Therefore, most "investigative" contacts between the

military and civilians increase hostility towards the government.

The integrity of the government has also hampered the counterinsurgency effort. Drug trafficking has corrupted a portion of the National Police and the economic crisis has made them more susceptible to corruption. The military view of the National Police as corrupt inhibits joint operations.¹⁹⁷

The military also views the judicial system with contempt. Members of the Shining Path who go to trial do so in a judicial system with very demanding technical rules to include physical chain-of-custody of evidence. Many cases against suspected members of the Shining Path are dismissed due to procedural errors and an inability to get witnesses to testify.¹⁹⁸ Many Peruvian officers believe that the majority of the Shining Path members are released for three reasons: 1) intimidation of the judges and prosecutors with threats of violence; 2) bribing of judges and prosecutors; and 3) deliberate acts by leftist judges sympathetic to the

¹⁹⁷ Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

¹⁹⁸ One example of this difficulty is that of Osman Morote. Arrested in 1988, Morote is known to have been the second-in-command and the military commander of the Shining Path. He was also arrested with many incriminating documents on him. Yet, as he could not be convicted of personally committing an act of terrorism beyond a reasonable doubt, the charges were dismissed. He remains in prison on additional charges brought against him by the government.

Shining Path.¹⁹⁹ This results in military officers preferring to execute detainees instead of turning them over to the judicial system for prosecution.

There are several examples of the benefits of positive relations between the military and the peasants. The first, the government response to Shining Path attempts to seize control of the Department of Puno in 1985-86, has already been addressed in this study. In this instance, a less repressive military command was able to gain the cooperation of peasant and mining associations, resulting in sufficient intelligence to successfully strike against the Shining Path cells and military columns. A second example is that of Army General Adrian Huaman Centeno's policies. General Huaman was named in August 1984 to replace General Clemente Noel in the Ayacucho emergency zone after three mass graves of civilians who the military had massacred in the emergency zone were discovered and incited public outrage. General Huaman, a mestizo who speaks fluent Quechua, immediately began to treat the Indian population in a more benevolent manner. The improvement in the military's treatment of civilians began to earn results against the Shining Path. Huaman, however, pressed for regional investment and socioeconomic reforms and was removed from command in December 1984. These examples provide successful models that could be imitated by the military in its

¹⁹⁹Interview with COL Butler.

counterinsurgency operations.

External support for the Peruvian government's fight against the Shining Path is limited. One of the government's major military suppliers, the Soviet Union, is now gone. The economic conditions of the 1980s and President Garcia's policies isolated Peru from much of the first world countries. Before Fujimori instituted the economic austerity measures and resumed a schedule of debt payments acceptable to the International Monetary Fund, many countries, including the United States, had suspended economic assistance to Peru. The extremely poor human rights record continues to restrict aid from the United States to only the counterdrug effort.

The Peruvian government has never correctly assessed the nature of the insurgency nor taken adequate measures to defeat the Shining Path. It has demonstrated limited flexibility in its struggle to defeat the Shining Path. It continues to treat the peasants as part of the problem instead of victims of the violence. As one observer noted, the Peruvian government's solution has been to get a "bigger hammer" rather than a more appropriate instrument to solve the problem.

The Fujimori government has shown some signs of wanting to engage other than military tools in the counterinsurgency effort such as recognizing the supporting role of the military in such an effort, the recognition that

land title is an important issue, and the realization (through the civilian self-defense groups) that the mobilization of the population needs to be part of the solution. It has also begun to counter the Shining Path's overseas propaganda through the Peruvian Foreign Ministry and the overseas embassies.²⁰⁰

²⁰⁰"Government to Fight Guerrilla Propaganda in Europe," JPRS, 15 November 1991, 2-3, translated from Spanish, original source: Expreso, 29 October 1991, A9. It's interesting that this action occurred after a US Military Intelligence Subject Matter Expert Exchange to Peru made the point to numerous senior Peruvian Army officers that the Shining Path was attempting to politically isolate Peru internationally through its overseas support network.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The Shining Path is neither a peasant Indian movement nor a group of bloodthirsty fanatics seeking to return Peru to the glorious days of the Incan empire. The Shining Path is an insurgent movement that seeks to destroy the current government in Peru in order to replace it with an egalitarian society. This movement, led by the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), seeks to destroy the current institutions of Peruvian society and replace them with the institutions of the People's Republic of the New Democracy. This new society will most likely be an authoritarian, agrarian-based society with the PCP providing the ruling elites. Many of the details remain unclear about this future society. The insurgents use guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, and armed propaganda in the struggle to gain their objective.

The Shining Path's ideology is a blend of Maoism and the philosophy of the father of the Communist Party of Peru, Jose C. Mariategui. Mariategui's writings are used to

validate the following: that Peru is a semi-feudal state; that violent revolution is the only means of changing Peruvian society; and that the revolution must be conducted by Peru's Indians. His philosophy is also used to validate the use of a Maoist strategy for the conduct of a prolonged popular struggle. The Shining Path is not using Mariategui's writings to define the current Peruvian realities as some observers of the revolution claim, rather, the insurgents have adapted Mao's strategy of prolonged popular war to the realities of today's Peru.

The physical and human environment of Peru are very supportive of an insurgency. The physical geography of the country has retarded the integration of the various geographical areas--the Costa, the Sierra, and the Selva--into one nation. Geography physically and culturally divides the country, provides the insurgents many remote areas that are not easy for the government forces to gain access, increases the difficulty of the poor in the interior to survive, and retards national integration.

Peruvian society is polarized. Peruvians are divided by race, culture, class, and wealth. The Spanish feudal heritage has resulted in one of the most rigid class structures in Latin America, the exploitation of the lower classes, and racial discrimination against the large Indian population. This polarization has been exacerbated by the frustrated aspirations of the Indian and mestizo

populations, the desire for political and economic reform, and extreme economic crises. The majority of Peruvian society does not view the institutions of national government as existing for their benefit; these institutions serve only those with power and connections. Hence, the current government has a legitimacy problem in the perception of most Indians and mestizos.

The Shining Path, under the the leadership of Abimael Guzman Reynoso, has adapted Mao's prolonged popular warfare strategy to the realities of today's Peru. The organization's strategy is based in the countryside and seeks to encircle the cities, keeping with Mao's theory of revolutionary warfare. Differing from Mao's strategy, however, the leaders of the Shining Path do not intend to transition the Shining Path's People's Guerrilla Army to a conventional army with which to destroy the Peruvian military in battles of position and movement in the final stage of the revolution. There is a recognition that the geography of Peru and the modern Peruvian military could defeat the Shining Path's forces. The insurgents, therefore, are seeking to gain control of the shantytowns that ring Peru's capital while exacerbating the difficult living conditions for the majority of Peru's population that lives there in absolute poverty. This would result in the Shining Path laying siege to the seat of national power by encircling the city from within, culminating with a popular

urban insurrection that topples the government.

The Shining Path is also mobilizing the masses differently than did the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s and 1940s. Instead of gaining the support of the masses by sending cadres to live and work side by side with them, the Shining Path is relying on a relatively small party structure while mobilizing those Peruvians living on the margin. This is done by the destruction of the socio-economic system, worsening the living conditions of the masses to such a degree that they will rise up against the government under the ready leadership of the Shining Path.

Unlike Mao, the Shining Path has not appealed to a broad portion of society. The insurgents target limited sectors of the population, giving priority to the young educated mestizos who are frustrated by the rigid class system and the Indians that have been historically exploited and forgotten by the government. The insurgents use a variety of methods with which to make their appeals for popular support. These methods are well suited to the sectors of society to which the Shining Path appeals.

The Shining Path has methodically built an organization that is extremely well designed to execute the strategy of the insurgency. The organization, which places ideological purity and security above all other considerations, is appropriate to support the organization's mobilizational strategy throughout Peru. Designed for

centralized control and decentralized execution, the Shining Path consists of three major components: the clandestine political party structure that extends from the Central Committee to the village level; the People's Guerrilla Army, the military arm of the insurgency; and front organizations that exist in both the countryside and the cities to mobilize the masses. These organizations provide extensive services and support to the revolution. The command and control structure of the organization has proven to be very adaptable, and the organization as a whole is extremely cohesive. Very little dissention exists within the organization. The Shining Path's recruitment, training, and promotion system is resistant to penetration by the government and provides well-trained, experienced, and dedicated leaders to all levels of the organization. The Shining Path's organization is one of the insurgents' greatest strengths.

The insurgents have also developed an external support network that greatly assists in the struggle against the government. An international propaganda network aids in politically isolating the Peruvian government, raises funds with which to support the activities of the Shining Path, and provides support for revolutionaries who must flee Peru. The insurgent organization does not, however, depend on neighboring countries for support or sanctuary. The insurgents rely primarily on internal procurement of weapons

and explosives and have established safe base areas within Peru. The financing of the revolution appears to come from the funds provided by the Shining Path's control of the coca cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Valley and other areas along the eastern slopes of the Andes. The relationship that the insurgents have forced upon the narcotraffickers has resulted in not only large amounts of funds, but also safe base areas and large amounts of supporters.

The Peruvian government has failed to recognize the the political nature of the insurgency, choosing instead to apply a military solution. It does not possess a national counterinsurgency plan that integrates all the elements of national power at the government's disposal. The Peruvian government has concentrated on strengthening the central government's authority. The problem is that the central government's legitimacy is weak in the eyes of the majority of Indians and substantial numbers of mestizos. The abandonment of the village level authority to the Shining Path has given the initiative to the insurgents. The military is not prepared to conduct a counterinsurgency. INcompetence and frustration lead to repressive operations that have failed to make progress against the Shining Path. The peasant self-defense forces are one of the few efforts the government has made at mobilizing the population against the Shining Path, but it is a program designed to pit the peasants against the insurgents instead of an integrated

part of a program to gain the support of the peasantry.

Both the Shining Path and the government's strategies place the peasants on the front lines of the war. The use of the peasant *ronda campesinas*, or self-defense forces, by the government is its most prominent effort at mobilizing the masses in the insurgency. More study of the use of these forces by the government in its counterinsurgency campaign is needed to determine the effectiveness of these self-defense forces, especially because the government is expanding this program into the urban shantytowns of Lima. The strong reaction that the self-defense forces have evoked from the Shining Path is an indicator that the insurgents view the program as a serious threat to the revolution. Although civilian self-defense forces have been used before in Latin America, such as in the cases of El Salvador's and Guatemala's counterinsurgencies, Peru's *rondas* appear to be significantly different from previous programs in Latin America.

Another area for further study is the impact of the recent coup by President Fujimori and the military. The Shining Path has been trying to pressure the military into seizing control of the government in the hopes that the subsequent repression will further polarize Peruvian society and push more Peruvians into supporting the revolution. With President Fujimori's declaration of a national state of

emergency and a suspension of the judiciary, individual civil rights are suspended and military tribunals will most likely be the forum in which to try members of the Shining Path. All indications are that the military will gain a freer hand in the struggle, continuing the Peruvian government's military-dominated strategy. Peru's future will be determined by the outcome of the struggle between the competing strategies of the government and the Shining Path. That outcome has not yet been decided, but it is evident that the Shining Path is winning. It is also clear that their success owes as much to the Shining Path's leadership, strategy, and organizational unity and cohesiveness as it does to contradictions in Peruvian society and the ineffectiveness of the government's response.

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Briefing papers (photocopies) of the Peruvian Second Infantry Division briefing presented by COL Raul O'Conner la Rosa, *Jefe del Estado Mayor* [Chief of Staff], during the June 1990 combined U.S.-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange seminars conducted at the Second Military Region Headquarters in Lima, Peru. (12 pages)

Briefing papers of the Peruvian 31st Infantry Division briefing presented by the COL Espinoza, *Jefe del Estado Mayor*, [Chief of Staff], during the June 1990 combined U.S.-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange seminars conducted at the Second Military Region Headquarters in Lima, Peru. (20 pages)

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Esquema de los Grandes Planes Estrategicos-Tacticos Desarrollados por el PCP-SL. Consists of a copy of the Peruvian military's outline of the Shining Path's phased strategy from 17 May 1980 to 5 April 1991, with projected operations through September 1991. This record is claimed by the Peruvian Army to have been captured in June 1991 in a Shining Path safe-house in Lima, Peru. (3 pages)

Estructura Organica del Aparato Politico de la Organizacion Terrorista del PCP-Sendero Luminoso. Consists of an

organizational chart of the Shining Path that includes the following: the major commands, committees, bureaus and major support organizations. This document was prepared by the Peruvian Army in 1991.

Frente Unico o Nuevo Estado. Consists of an organizational chart of the Shining Path semi-legal and legal support organizations done by the Peruvian Military in October 1990 based upon documents captured from a Shining Path safe-house. (1 page)

Glossary of terms used by the subversive organizations in Peru as compiled by the Intelligence Section of the Peruvian 1st Division in July 1991. Provided to a U.S. officer participating in the U.S.-Peruvian Intelligence Subject Matter Expert Exchange seminars in Lima, Peru in 1991. (18 pages)

Organizacion de las Rondas Campesinas: Casos y Experiencias, [Organization of the Civilian Self-Defense Groups: Cases and Experiences]. Peruvian Army document summarizing the legal authorities to establish Civilian Self-Defense Groups, the six phases needed to establish a Civilian Self-Defense Group and the locations, strengths and status of the Civilian Self-Defense Groups in the Departments of Junin and Pasco as of September 1991. (3 pages, including map)

Reunion de la Delegacion del Partido con los Senores Narcotraficantes Extranjeros y Peruanos el Dia 9-4-90. This is a document presented by a Peruvian intelligence officer to a US Army officer in September 1991 and is alleged to be a written agreement between the Shining Path's Huallaga support base and all narcotraffickers, both foreign and domestic, operating in the Upper Huallaga Valley. This appears to be the update of written agreements between the narcotraffickers and the Shining Path, with the latter setting prices and policies to the traffickers, for the peaceful continuance of trafficking in coca leaf, paste, and base. (3 pages)

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Author's personal notes from US-Peruvian Counter-Subversive Operations Subject Matter Expert Exchange conducted in June 1990 in Lima, Peru.

Bradin, Stuart, CPT, Special Forces, US Army. CPT Bradin spent six months as the Chief of a Special Forces

Mobile Training Team in Peru in 1990 in support of counter-drug operations. CPT Bradin's detachment was located in an area that contained a spreading Shining Path influence. An interview by MAJ William G. Graves was conducted over several periods during November-December 1991.

Butler, Steven M., COL, Military Intelligence, US Army. Chief of the Low Intensity Conflict Proponency Directorate, Combined Arms Command, FT Leavenworth, KS. Served as the Team Chief of the 1990 and 1991 combined U.S.-Peruvian Military Intelligence Subject Matter Expert Exchanges held in Lima, Peru. Interviews conducted by MAJ William G. Graves on 17 January and 29 March 1992 at FT Leavenworth, Kansas.

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