

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

AD-A255 136



2

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including reviewing the data collection, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments on this burden estimate and any suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Room 1204, 1215 Jefferson Avenue, Washington, DC 20540-6001, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Project (0471-0188), Washington, DC 20503-0001.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 28 May 1992	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJOR DAVID T. STAHL			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies ATTN: ATZL-SWV Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 (913) 684-3437			9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved For Public Release Distribution			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (ATZL) (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED				
14. SUBJECT TERMS NEO EVACUATION CONTINGENCY OPNS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASS			16. PRICE CODE	
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASS		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASS		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED

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Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in
Support of the National Military Strategy

A Monograph
by

Major David T. Stahl
Infantry



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 91-92

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
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in Support of the National Military Strategy

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Accepted this 3rd day of June 1992

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ABSTRACT

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in Support of the National Military Strategy by David T. Stahl, USA, 69 pages.

The National Military Strategy identifies the evacuation of noncombatants as a principal mission for the Department of defense (DOD). DOD has been charged with implementing evacuation decisions and supporting Department of State (DOS) objectives to protect US citizens abroad. The evacuation of US and other foreign nationals to a safe location is known as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). The purpose of this monograph is to develop a basis for Army and Joint NEO doctrine for contingency operations in response to crises anywhere in the world.

NEO is an essential mission that extends from the National Security strategy to the National Military Strategy to CINC OPLANS to the mission essential task lists developed by all Army units. Yet, there is no single document that provides clear doctrine for Army units to use in the training and conduct of these missions. Even though most NEO missions will be joint operations, there is also little joint doctrine covering the subject. Also, there are no bilateral or combined military agreements on NEO.

The subject will be examined by providing definitions and characteristics of NEO, explaining the role of the State Department, looking at joint and interagency positions and determining the Army's function in NEO. Several historical examples will also be studied for lessons learned. These lessons learned will be examined using the enabling concepts outlined in TRADOC Pam 525-5. Finally, the requirements for future NEO doctrine are examined. Outlines for joint and Army NEO doctrine will be presented. In an ever changing, unstable and developing world, military operations will continue to be conducted to insure the safety of US citizens. Joint and individual service doctrine will enhance the conduct of NEO missions, and in the long run, provide for better security of all US citizens abroad.

I. Introduction

US forces have traditionally been called upon when US lives and property are threatened abroad. Our uniformed military have frequently conducted short-notice evacuation missions, of Americans and non-Americans alike. Not only must our forces provide responsive and capable evacuation lift, they must be prepared to conduct those operations in the midst of armed conflict.

The National Military Strategy 1992¹

The National Military Strategy clearly identifies the evacuation of noncombatants as a principal mission for the Department of Defense (DOD). This mission must be accomplished in support of requests made by the Department of State when the Chief of Mission feels the safety of American citizens or other third country nationals is at risk and all other means have been exhausted. US military noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) plans provide for US military support to assist the Department of State (DOS) in the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants and designated aliens when requested by DOS and directed by the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).² In the past thirty years, the Department of Defense has conducted noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) around the globe in environments that range from peaceful to quite hostile. Only a few of these operations have been single service missions, such as Air Force operations in Zaire in 1978. Many have been dual service missions conducted by the Marine Corps and the Navy in places like Cyprus, Lebanon and most recently, Somalia and Liberia. Finally, several NEO missions

have been joint operations, with all four services participating in missions such as the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989.

Regardless of the nature of post-Cold War US foreign policy, the commitment to protect the lives of American citizens abroad will not diminish. Additionally, the US has a truly international economy, relying upon other nations for goods and providing products to other nations. This will mean that American citizens will be present in countries around the globe. Our collective security and political commitments to the United Nations and our regional and bilateral agreements with other nations will also mean US presence throughout the world.

Nevertheless, political changes in today's world are characterized in the National Security Strategy by President Bush in the following manner:

In the emerging post-Cold War world, international relations promise to be more complicated, more volatile and less predictable. Indeed, of all the mistakes that could be made about the security challenges of a new era, the most dangerous would be to believe that suddenly the future can be predicted with certainty.³

In this post-Cold War environment, President Bush advises that the US role will involve more than merely protecting American citizens.

We must not only protect our citizens and our interests, but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. We must work with others, but we must also be a leader.⁴

Clearly, the world is becoming more complicated and the Department of Defense will continue to be called upon to protect American citizens abroad. To support this requirement the

Department of Defense has published DOD Directive 3025.14: "Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations)."⁵ This directive spells out the responsibilities of the Chairman JCS, the Service Secretaries, and Unified and Specified commanders to conduct NEO missions. To support these missions, Army commanders from corps to battalion level have developed Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) that include NEO.⁶

NEO is an essential mission that extends from the National Security Strategy to the National Military Strategy to CINC OPLANS to the mission essential tasks developed by Army units. Yet, there is no single document that provides clear doctrine for Army units to use in the training and conduct of these missions. Even though most NEO missions will be joint operations, there is also little joint doctrine covering the subject. There are no bilateral or combined military agreements on NEO.

As a result of this doctrinal void, the purpose of this paper is to develop a basis for Army and Joint NEO doctrine for contingency operations in response to crises anywhere in the world. Since NEO is one mission that can be conducted in any of the three general states that make up the continuum of military operations--peacetime engagement, hostilities short of war and war--the doctrine will need to provide extensive guidance to organizations. This will be accomplished by providing definitions and characteristics, explaining the role of the State Department, examining joint and interagency positions and looking at the Army's function. Several historical examples will be

studied for lessons learned and then the requirements for future NEO doctrine will be examined.

The analytic criteria used in this study will parallel the "enabling concepts" found in TRADOC Pam 525-5.⁷ These "concepts" are described as being critical as the Army prepares to plan its future role in support of the National Military Strategy. The ability to provide a force projection capability and adequate command and control for operations will be critical in the execution of any NEO mission. Joint and combined operations will be a requirement in any future operation, including NEO. Logistics will also be a key factor. Sustainment of the NEO evacuation force as well as the well-being and safety of the evacuees will be a primary concern during evacuation operations.⁸ Of all possible missions assigned to the DOD, NEO will require the highest consideration of interagency operations. In addition, echelonment of forces will be required to properly conduct any NEO mission. Intelligence operations were not included as enabling concepts in 525-5, but they are so critical to the success of any operation, they too will be used as analytic criteria. Simply stated, NEO doctrine must closely examine all of these realities.

Training for and conducting a NEO mission is a complicated and difficult task that requires detailed planning and precise execution. The task is made more difficult by the dichotomy that exists between Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) aims and concerns when arriving at a decision to execute a military NEO. The DOD usually wants to conduct

evacuation early to avoid any competition for resources needed for potential military operations. The DOS, concerned with current and future political ramifications of a NEO, tends to wait as long as possible before requesting military assistance. They view evacuation as something that proper diplomatic process should be able to avert. This built-in tension makes NEO a rapidly assigned mission that must be conducted flawlessly.

II. Definitions and Characteristics of NEO

DOD Directive 3025.14 defines noncombatant evacuation operations as:

Operations directed by the DOS, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from areas of danger overseas to safehavens or to the United States.*

Under Executive Order 11490, the DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens and foreign nationals and for safeguarding their property. Under the same order, the DOD advises and assists DOS in preparing and implementing plans for evacuation of American citizens, host country nationals and selected third country nationals. The chief of mission (ambassador) can order the evacuation of all US Government employees and their dependents except for DOD personnel assigned to military commands and designated as "wartime essential."

There are two general categories of persons eligible for evacuation assistance. The first group consists of those personnel who the chief of mission can order to leave the country. This list generally includes all US Government

employees, US Government contractors, and all of their dependents. The second group is composed of all others. Private American citizens in a foreign country are eligible for assistance but cannot be ordered to leave the country by the DOS.¹⁰ The DOS must inform American citizens of impending danger and may offer assistance as necessary.

Once an evacuation decision is made by the DOS the priorities for evacuation assistance are as follows:

- Priority I: American Citizens;
- Priority II: Alien immediate family members of American Citizens;
- Priority III: Foreign service nationals and temporary contract national employees of the US Government;
- Priority IV: Eligible Non-Americans who are seriously ill or injured or whose lives are in imminent peril
- Priority V: Other eligibles

The Department of State establishes the priority category for potential evacuees.¹¹

Evacuation of noncombatants will generally correspond to evacuation plans established by DOS as follows:¹²

1. Standfast
2. Recommend non essential personnel and dependents leave (reduced American presence)
3. Recommend US citizens and other eligibles leave (evacuation)
4. Embassy or Consulate closing

When evacuation is ordered by the Embassy, movement options in order of priority are ordinary transportation, commercial charter, and then military charter. Ordinary citizens, who the government cannot order out of the country, must arrange for their own transportation or sign a promissory note to cover the cost of the transportation provided by DOS.

When any of these situations exist, the best way to notify noncombatants is in writing. The DOS Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) has excellent examples of the written notifications to noncombatants.¹³

The use of military options will usually occur when the embassy orders evacuation. This is not to say that an evacuation must be conducted during this stage. A militarily assisted NEO will only occur when the DOS requests it through the NCA.

At the time of commitment of military forces, the operational environment could be permissive, semi-permissive or non-permissive. These terms are defined in detail in Appendix A of this study. The same definitions are used in Joint Pub 1-02. These differ from the Marine Corps NEO Manual which only includes permissive and non-permissive environments.¹⁴ They also differ from the DOS EPH and the preliminary drafts of FM 90-C which include permissive, uncertain and hostile as definitions of the environments.¹⁵ Many of the Army division level NEO standard operating procedures (SOPs) include different definitions. This contradiction in terms is just one of many that occur in the limited NEO publications that exist today. This problem will be further discussed in Chapter VII.

Two planning groups have a significant impact on NEO missions. They are the Washington Liaison Group (WLG) and the Regional Liaison Group (RLG). The WLG is a joint monitoring body established and chaired by the DOS, with representation from JCS and the Service Departments. The WLG ensures coordination by appropriate US Government agencies at the national level for all

noncombatant emergency evacuation planning and implementation.¹⁶ Regional Liaison Groups (RLG) are joint bodies established by DOS with representation from the appropriate unified commander and others component commanders as desired. The RLG may invite other departments and agencies of the US government to participate as would be appropriate or useful. Nevertheless, they only participate as observers.¹⁷ RLGs maintain the link between diplomatic posts and the WLG. They also review, approve and forward approved evacuation plans to the DCG for review and distribution. With definitions of basic terms understood, the characteristics of evacuation operations must be examined.

Since evacuation operations require a rapid insertion, quick action on the objective and a planned withdrawal, a NEO is very similar to a raid mission in planning, preparation and execution. Although similar, there are also several characteristics that make NEO a distinctly different mission.¹⁸ These characteristics are: uncertainty inherent in the mission; limited military objective; care of civilians; political considerations and constraints; DOS participation; presence in the area; and extensive lift capability.

Noncombatant evacuation operations are difficult to plan due to the uncertainty inherent in the mission. This causes difficulty when trying to construct a detailed plan for the mission. Uncertainty as to the time of execution, the locations of the operation, the size of the force involved and the means of insertion and evacuation, can all be questions that remain open

until the execute order is given. The numbers, categories and locations of the evacuees will also have a prominent role to play in the planning of the operation. In addition, the intentions of hostile forces as well as the reactions of other noncombatants must be considered when planning these missions. Therefore, intelligence information on hostile forces, host country conditions and evacuee information are critical to the evacuation mission. Finally, the duration of the operation must be considered. The duration of the operation is affected by possible branches and sequels that could cause NEO forces to conduct other peacekeeping or warfighting missions.

The military objective of an evacuation operation is to seize evacuation sites long enough to permit the safe evacuation of all required personnel. These limited objectives cause evacuation missions to include the minimum force required and tend to produce rules of engagement that restrict the use of military force other than in self defense, or to protect the lives of the evacuees. The operation tends to be defensive in nature once the evacuation force is in place.

The care of civilians and the maintenance of order throughout the mission are special characteristics of evacuation operations. Special planning must be done to provide for the care of civilians from the evacuation site all the way to the safehaven. Maintenance of order must not only be accomplished at the objective areas, but must be maintained throughout the mission. Evacuating civilians from numerous nations, under difficult circumstances, can cause tensions to exist even

between the evacuees, requiring the maintenance of order among the evacuees.

Evacuation operations are unique because of the political considerations and constraints that will be more prominent than in any other type of military operation. Military operations may be hampered by a political desire to minimize military involvement. Also political constraints may not allow military personnel into the country prior to the actual evacuation or they may not allow weapons to be brought into the country.

The DOS will provide the political interface during this operation. In some cases it's almost as if the State Department is a "supported CINC". Although the military will normally be in charge of the evacuation once it begins, the State Department will continue to have extensive influence on the procedures as they unfold. Evacuation operations could also include the participation of several other government and international agencies, which will be discussed in chapter IV.

Since the mission is to protect civilians, this means there is a friendly presence in the evacuation area prior to commitment of forces. This can enhance military operations by providing an opportunity to provide liaison and establish communications prior to initiation of the operation.

The final characteristic involved in evacuation operations is the possible requirement for extensive lift capacity to transport the evacuees. The planning for evacuation capacity may be as simple as providing one aircraft for several people to providing airlift and sealift tens of thousands of evacuees.

These characteristics make evacuation operations unique missions that require special considerations in planning, preparation and execution of a mission. The compressed planning sequence that must be used due to rapid notification and deployment make the use of standard doctrine, techniques, tactics and procedures imperative when conducting evacuation operations. Current doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures are inadequate to meet this requirement. NEO doctrine must include a basic understanding of the role of the State Department. This understanding is not just for high level planners, but leaders and soldiers at all levels need to understand the primacy of the State Department and political considerations over warfighting capability.

III. The Critical Role of the State Department

In order to understand the role of the State Department it is important to comprehend the structure of a diplomatic mission and the key role that the ambassador plays. The ambassador is the ranking US government official in the country. According to Public Law 93-475, section 12:

under the direction of the president: the US Ambassador. . . shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government officers and employees in that country, except for personnel under the command of a US area military commander. . . any department or agency having officers in a country shall keep the Ambassador fully and currently informed . . . and comply fully with all applicable directives of the Ambassador.¹⁹

The preeminence of the ambassador has been confirmed and strengthened by successive administrations from President

Eisenhower through President Bush. President Bush's letter of instruction to his ambassadors refers to each of them as his "partners", thus enforcing their status as a direct representative of the president. He also charges them with the responsibility to protect all US government personnel in his country. In fact, President Bush goes on to say: "You must always keep security in the forefront of your concerns. The security of your mission is your direct, personal responsibility."²⁰

The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) is second in command, and in the ambassador's absence he directs the mission. He usually functions as a chief of staff. The political counselor directs the political section and is usually third in command. The economic counselor directs the economic section. The administrative counselor manages the mission personnel, finances, transport, housing, supply communications and security.

The Chief of Consular Section is usually known as the Consul General. He directs consular affairs, including services to resident American citizens. Consular officers are responsible for the welfare of all US citizens visiting and residing in the country. They attempt to maintain a count of all US nationals within their country as well as knowing their whereabouts. On January 1 and July 1 of each year, the embassy is required to submit revisions of the F-77 Report identifying numbers of potential evacuees by category.²¹ Also, in high threat areas this office provides all US Government American citizen employees with Emergency Evacuation Kits on arrival at post.²²

The post security officer has general security duties at the embassy. He exercises operational control over the marine security guards assigned to the mission. Within a specific region of the world, the regional security officer is responsible for the security of missions and is directly responsible to the DCS. He does not work for the chief of mission.

In countries where there are military forces present, the relationship between the ambassador and the area military commander are particularly important. The ambassador has a concern that military presence promote US objectives in the country. Even though the area military commander does not work for the ambassador, he usually works closely with the country team. The service attaches and the chief MAAG, however, are integral parts of the mission and are subordinates of the ambassador. Unless he is outranked by the area military commander, the Defense Attache is the ranking armed services attache of the mission and is the senior advisor to the ambassador on military affairs.

Any understanding of the embassy operation must include some knowledge of the "Country Team". The country team is a uniquely American concept that brings together all the representatives of government agencies and departments that function in a country and place them under the direct control of the ambassador. The membership and functions of the country team are not specified in any legal document. The team is whatever the ambassador makes it.²³ The members have no voting rights, although they are free to express their views. The viewpoints of many members of

the country team can differ, as they can see issues from many different perspectives. The team meets at the ambassador's will and its power is determined by the ambassador. Regardless of the relationships within the country team, the ambassador alone has the decision making authority for his mission.²⁴

The ambassador is responsible for the preparation of plans for the evacuation of American citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. Once the State Department approves the evacuation plan, the ambassador has the authority to implement it in crisis, but he cannot order the military to assist. The unified commanders are tasked by JCS to plan and conduct military evacuation operations in support of DOS. When ordered by the President, the unified commander can assign forces to conduct an evacuation operation. The military commander does not have the ambassador in his chain of command but every effort must be made to implement the evacuation plan.²⁵

The DOS also publishes an Emergency Planning Handbook that provides guidance to the chief of mission for preparing plans. It includes a chapter entitled "US Military Evacuation Assistance". Of interest to the military planner is the "Checklist for US Military Assisted Evacuation".²⁶ It also includes a chapter on developing emergency plans which includes important information for the military planner, to include; assembly area surveys, helicopter landing zone surveys, embarkation point surveys (both airfields and seaports), as well as, information on routes to these areas. In an article published in Marine Corps Gazette, LTC Richard Jaehne suggests

there are six key interface points for DOS and DOD planners.

These interface points are:

- Notification and movement of evacuees to assembly areas.
- Documentation of evacuees.
- Assembly areas procedures.
- Evacuation site and safehaven operations.
- Embassy security and operations.
- Interface with senior US military official on the country team.²⁷

Each of the interface points suggested by LTC Jaehne deserve attention.

The notification of evacuees is an extremely important phase of the operation. Each embassy may have as many as three notification systems. The first is a recall system for embassy personnel. Often it is a CB radio system tied to a telephone recall. Other nations' embassies may also be notified. The second system is a warden system. It relies upon volunteers to organize and operate it. It is activated by a prearranged code word received by radio, television or telephone. Once activated the warden is responsible to get all eligible personnel to the assembly areas. This system needs to be tested prior to an actual emergency. The third system is used to notify remote population centers. A system of shortwave radios and commercial telephones are used to notify evacuees. This notification can require a great deal of time. Once an evacuation is initiated, soldiers can also be used to notify potential evacuees.

Documentation is a critical phase of the operation. The ambassador is responsible for identifying who will and will not receive US evacuation assistance. Assistance is not just limited to US citizens, but the evacuation decision must be made by the

embassy representative. During Operation Just Cause this became a problem when adequate embassy personnel were not at the airport to make evacuation decisions.²⁸

Assembly area operations are a State Department responsibility. Regardless of who is in charge of the military operations at an assembly area, the overall evacuation operation at the assembly area is the responsibility of the person designated by the ambassador. The primary responsibility for the security of the assembly area may be the host nation, so further coordination by the military commander with the host nation is required. The embassy and military commanders must have a common plan for the documentation, search and isolation of all evacuees. They will move them either to an evacuation site or directly to a safehaven.

The same problems exist at the evacuation site. In addition, key transportation decisions are made at the evacuation site. The evacuation may be aboard military planes or ships or it may be done using commercial or private aircraft, ships, or wheeled vehicles. The operation of the safehaven also causes concern. If the safehaven is a US Navy ship, evacuees should be moved to a land-based safehaven as soon as possible. The embassy must coordinate for a safehaven and decide who is in charge and who will operate it. The embassy must also coordinate any overflight routes or transportation routes through third countries.

As this mission is being carried out, the embassy must remain secure. The RSO still directs the Marine Security Guards throughout the operation. Any forces that are designed to

supplement the security of the embassy will need to be integrated into their plan, but they do not usually work for the RSO. During an evacuation, people will usually flee to the embassy, whether or not it is an assembly area.²⁹ Plans must be made to continue to secure the embassy and deal with evacuees at the embassy.

The defense attache will play a key role in the evacuation. As the ambassador's military advisor, he may give the only military advice that reaches the ambassador.

The role of the State Department is critical. As the President's personal representative, the ambassador plays a key role in any evacuation operation. Military planners must be intimately aware of the position of the Consul General to provide important information on evacuees. The members of the country team can also provide information from their area of expertise. There are several other agencies and other joint forces that can play a key role in evacuation operations. Also, in the international community, combined forces may conduct simultaneous evacuation operations or operations in conjunction with each other.

IV. The Role of Joint Forces, Other US Commands,

Other Government Agencies and Combined Forces

Evacuation operations generally require the participation of forces from more than one service. This requires joint planning and joint operations to successfully conduct evacuation. The primary roles of the Air Force include airlift and defensive air

operations. If a forced entry must be made, offensive air operations may also be conducted. The Air Force can also provide medical, communications and logistic support. If either the evacuation sites or the safehaven require accommodations, the Air Force can provide Harvest Falcon type equipment for temporary evacuee shelter.

The Navy and the Marine Corps are the most experienced at conducting NEOs. The Marine Corps has even published a draft NEO manual.³⁰ The evacuation mission is usually assigned to a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable). The MEU (SOC) remains afloat as part of an Amphibious Ready Group that can be quickly dispatched to any location in the world. Since they are organized as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), they have adequate organic airlift and air support to independently conduct many evacuations. The MEU (SOC) also conducts extensive training prior to deployment. FMFLANT and FMFPAC have developed a Standardized MEU (SOC) Training Handbook which provides detailed instructions for the conduct of evacuation operations. The organization of a MEU (SOC) provides the flexibility to conduct operations in any environment and threat condition.

The Navy provides lift capability. It can also provide air support from its carriers, as well as critical engineer support through the SeaBees. During the 1975 evacuation of Vietnam, Military Sealift Command (MSC) shipping was used for evacuation operations.

The US Special Operations Command also has forces designed to

conduct an evacuation mission either as an independent force or as part of a larger operation under the control of a Joint Task Force (JTF). USSOCOM can provide a varied list of assets from the forced entry capability of an AC130 supported ranger battalion, to providing strategic intelligence from SEALs or Special Forces. Civil affairs units and psychological operations units are also critical elements in any task force conducting evacuation operations. USSOCOM provides a SOCCORD element to each US Army Corps to integrate special operations into their operations.

USTRANSCOM will be an integral player in all evacuation operations. The scheduling of both aircraft and sealift to support evacuation operations will be a critical task. US Space Command can also provide key components of a successful mission. Digital mapping, satellite communications, satellite intelligence collection and global positioning are all invaluable assets in any evacuation mission.

Other non-DOD agencies will play a key role in evacuation as well. Under emergency conditions, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the lead Federal Agency for the reception of all evacuees in the US and their forward movement. The Department of the Army is the DOD executive agent for repatriation.³¹ The United States Information Agency (USIA) provides great service in providing communications to the population during evacuation operations. During Operation Power Pack in the Dominican Republic, the USIA worked with Army psychological operations forces to provide PSYOPS support for

the operation.

Intelligence support is a critical component of all evacuation operations. The intelligence required of any operation is also required for evacuation missions, but in many cases in much greater depth and including several unique requirements. During Operation Urgent Fury, although the major purpose was to rescue the medical students, US forces had almost no idea where the students were. They knew that there were students on the True Blue Campus, but only after reaching them did they find out that a second, larger group was at the Grand Anse campus, four miles away from the airport. US forces did not know about students at the Lance aux Epines until the fourth day, when units conducting clearing operations stumbled upon them.³²

All US intelligence agencies can become involved in evacuation missions. During Operation Power Pack both the CIA and the FBI provided intelligence information.³³ The US Army Intelligence Agency publishes "Army Intelligence Surveys" which provide information on specific countries. The 480th Recon Tech Group publishes urban studies which have detailed imagery. They also publish the Contingency Reference Book that has very detailed information concerning air, port and petroleum facilities, cities and special installations. The US Army Intelligence and Security Command has published Emergency Evacuation Studies of selected countries that give detailed reports of evacuee locations, assembly areas, evacuation points, routes and zones of entry. A NEO Information Support Handbook (NISH) is also available for use during NEO missions. These and

similar intelligence products are listed in the DIA Register of Intelligence Products and the DIA Collateral Recurring Document Listing.³⁴

The role of combined forces cannot be ignored in today's political environment. Although the US maintains the ability to conduct worldwide evacuation operations unilaterally, other countries may also need to conduct evacuation operations. Many times the US will be the only nation capable of conducting evacuation operations, such as in Somalia. In this case American forces were charged with the evacuation of civilians from many different countries, including the Commonwealth of Independent States. In the future, US Forces can expect to be employed in areas where other allied forces are also employed. The close coordination of combined operations (either under one commander or not) will be essential to the success of all missions.

The role of joint forces, other agencies and combined forces will be closely tied to the role of Army forces in future operations. The Army has the ability to rapidly deploy light forces, quickly reinforce operations with heavier forces if required and conduct evacuation operations in any part of the world as part of a joint operation. The role of Army forces will be a key ingredient in the success of future evacuation operations.

V. The Army's Role in NEO

The Army has a wide variety of forces available to conduct evacuation operations. Actual NEO missions and training

operations have shown that mobility is a key to rapid evacuation operations. The use of air assault operations will greatly enhance any evacuation operation. Although other joint and combined forces will be involved in any NEO, this chapter concentrates on the use of Army forces as the primary evacuation force. The discussion of the Army's role will be divided into three phases: deployment, evacuation operations and redeployment.

Once the CINC has decided how to conduct the proposed NEO, he must develop a force which is suitable for the mission. Assuming that a Joint Task Force is designated, three forces can be established to include: the initial staging base (ISB) force, the evacuation force and the safehaven force. Of course, the JTF could also include air forces, special operations forces and naval or amphibious forces. (See Appendix B.)

The ISB is used as a staging base for rehearsals, a refueling point or a waiting location pending the approval to enter into a host nation. The use of an ISB outside of the host nation may be necessary in many operations. This would require additional support from DOS to secure the approval for an ISB in a third country. An ISB can be used to move forces closer to a tense political situation without violating the integrity of the troubled nation.

The evacuation force conducts the actual evacuation. It deploys to the host nation, sets up evacuation sites and assembly areas and assists in the evacuation of all noncombatants. It is further divided into five elements: a command and control

section, a marshalling force, a security force, an administrative element and a logistical element. (See Appendix C.) The evacuation force may need to have a forced entry capability if the operational environment is anything other than permissive.

The command and control section is made up of the command group, his staff elements and a liaison section for personnel required to make continuous contact with the embassy and other forces. This command and control element must have adequate communications to maintain control of his force and communicate to all parts of the JTF. Collocation with the embassy staff may also enhance command and control.

The marshalling force consists of a command group, marshalling teams and a transportation section.³⁵ The size of the marshalling force will depend upon the number of evacuees, location of assembly areas and the number of evacuation sites to be used. Its primary functions include: securing the assembly areas; initial screening and identification of evacuees (with DOS representative); gathering evacuees and moving them to the assembly area; and escorting the evacuees to the evacuation sites.³⁶ Marshalling teams are further broken down into a team headquarters, a search squad and a security squad.³⁷

The third major component of the evacuation ground force is the security force. It is composed of a command group, a perimeter force and a reaction force.³⁸ The perimeter force establishes defensive positions along the perimeter of the evacuation site and controls access to the site. The reaction force is the reserve of the evacuation ground force. It is

activated when someone violates the perimeter of the evacuation site or when a marshalling team encounters trouble it cannot handle.³⁹ The administrative force is responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the evacuation processing site. It is composed of a reception station, a registration station, a medical station, an embarkation station and a comfort station. The station will be required to operate 24 hours a day and provide comfort to all evacuees.

The final element of the evacuation force is the logistical element. It usually contains a supply and transport section, a medical unit and a maintenance unit.⁴⁰ The evacuation force may be required to provide supplies to support evacuees. DOS or host nation support may be available, but the evacuation force must plan on being self-sufficient.

The key to a successful evacuation operation is the action of the advance party. They must establish liaison with the embassy and prepare the evacuation site.

Redeployment is the final phase of the operation. Once the marshalling teams return and all evacuees are evacuated, the force should coordinate with the JTF commander and the embassy for any additional missions. Once no other missions are forthcoming, the force will move to the ISB, the safehaven or directly to the US. Evacuees can be sent directly to the US, taken to a safehaven in a third country and released or taken a safehaven until transportation is available to return to the US. This decision will be made in close coordination with, if not by, the ambassador.

The safehaven force secures the safehaven if it is outside the US. It consists of five elements: a command group, a reception team, a processing team, a comfort station and a departure group. (See Appendix C.) The reception station is a media information center. The processing center has six parts: registration, legal, transportation, intelligence, medical and customs inspection. The comfort station provides beds, food, emergency clothing issue, showers, lavatories and other necessities. The departure group gathers evacuees and escorts them to their transportation arrangements. Once all evacuees are processed, the safehaven force departs in coordination with the ambassador of the third country in which it was established.

After taking a look at the doctrinal requirements for evacuation operations, a look at actual NEO missions will assist in understanding the planning and execution of these missions. NEO missions in the Dominican Republic and Liberia will be the principle operations discussed.

VI. Power Pack to Sharp Edge: NEO Lessons Learned

Operation Power Pack in the Dominican Republic and Operation Sharp Edge in Liberia, are two of the many NEO missions conducted by military forces in the past thirty years. The review of these operations will focus on the evacuation portion of the mission.

On 24 April 1965 the Dominican Republic exploded into a bloody civil war. The streets were filled with roving bands of armed civilians, with several rebel and loyalist factions fighting for control of the government. On 28 April, the ruling

junta sent a message to the US Embassy that they could no longer guarantee the safety of American citizens. As a result, President Johnson ordered the Marines and the 82d Airborne Division into the Dominican Republic to protect American citizens and property. Although other objectives, such as the halting the spread of communism in the western hemisphere, were announced later, the primary reason for US military involvement was the protection of US citizens. In a speech to the nation on 2 May President Johnson included the following comments:

Ambassador Bennett, who is one of our most experienced Foreign Service officers, went on in that cable to say that only an immediate landing of American forces could safeguard and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of other citizens of some 30 other countries. . . . In addition our servicemen have already, since they landed on Wednesday night, evacuated 3,000 persons from 30 countries in the world from this little island. But more than 5,000 people, 1,500 of whom are Americans . . . are tonight awaiting evacuation as I speak."⁴¹

In accordance with the initial plan, the amphibious task force intended to send unarmed marines ashore to assist in the evacuation of noncombatants. As the situation rapidly deteriorated, evacuation began prior to the President's order. Evacuees assembled at the Hotel Embajador on the morning of May 27th. At mid morning rebels entered the hotel, fired shots over the heads of evacuees, and threatened to execute the men. At approximately 1300 hours, with the agreement of the warring factions, evacuation began by air and sea. By 1815 hours, 620 Americans had boarded two ships at the port of Haina and 556 had been airlifted by helicopter to the USS Boxer and USS Raleigh. Twenty-four hours later the Marines were ordered ashore to

evacuate and protect the remaining American citizens. At 0230 on the 30th, the 82d Airborne Division landed and secured the airfield at San Isidro. Meanwhile, evacuation operations continued. The Marines extended their perimeter to establish a 1 1/2 mile long by 1 mile wide International Safety Zone.⁴² The 82d pushed their perimeter to the Duarte Bridge. Within a month, American forces involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations totaled over 23,000. US forces remained in the Dominican Republic until 21 September 1968.⁴³ Exactly what lessons does Operation Power Pack teach about NEO?

The Dominican Republic intervention clearly displays that war is an extension of politics by other means. The political dominance in this crisis was evident throughout. As late as 48 hours prior to the landing of Marines, the embassy continued to downplay the military option.⁴⁴ As the Naval detachment entered the picture, Commodore Dare commented, ". . . it seemed as though the Ambassador had the conn."⁴⁵ Decisions were made that had direct military implications at very high political levels, such as: the decision to airlift the 82d; the constantly tightening rules of engagement; and the decision to appoint LTG Palmer as the ground commander.

Intelligence was difficult to obtain for the units on the ground. Relations with the FBI and CIA were not always congenial. On the other hand, some valuable information was obtained from Peace Corps volunteers.⁴⁶ HUMINT was the most important source of knowledge for the intelligence throughout the effort. As "detainees" were taken, they were interrogated and

then initially handed over to the ruling junta. The junta executed some of the first detainees turned over, so the American forces were forced to run their own detention center.⁴⁷ An additional problem for intelligence collection and unit operations was a lack of language capable soldiers.

Public affairs operations were made difficult, as the forces in country attempted to fill a "neutral" role. The news media, however, saw the intervention as anything but neutral. Consequently, a "credibility gap", was opened that continued throughout the Vietnam War. Regarding this public affairs failure, LTG Palmer conceded that "our handling of the press was not well done."⁴⁸

Psychological operations and civil affairs programs helped gain the cooperation of the people and reduce the confusion and bloodshed during the Dominican Republic intervention. The Army's psychological warfare effort in support of Power Pack was directed by the US Information Service (USIS).⁴⁹ The cooperation between civilian and military organizations insured the PSYOPS campaign was successful in supporting the NEO mission as well as all follow on missions. Civil affairs (CA) operations were also well done throughout the intervention. CA units provided the ability to interact with the DOS and they planned the civil-military operations to be conducted by the task force.

Actions in the Dominican Republic displayed the need for units to have a great deal of flexibility and adaptability. After being committed to conduct evacuation operations, some units remained in on the island for over 17 months conducting

combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts. One of the keys to this adaptability and flexibility was the discipline of soldiers and the restraint they showed in difficult situations. The Dominican intervention clearly shows that even in confusing situations, with a wide variety of guidance, conflicting guidance or even no guidance at all, the discipline and training of the individual soldier and his leaders can be the key to operational success.⁵⁰

The enabling concepts in TRADOC Pam 525-5 provide an excellent basis for the analysis of Operation Power Pack. Power Pack displayed the need to rapidly deploy forces and project joint power to a host nation in a limited time period. The most difficult part of power projection in this case proved to be the NCA problem of focusing on the end state. This caused a great deal of confusion in planning the operation. Command and control was difficult at best. Although certain contingency plans existed, they were not followed. The turnover of command and control proved to be a difficult task throughout the NEO mission. In addition, the White House was closely involved in day to day supervision of military activities, which should have been left to military leaders.

Power Pack was truly a joint operation. It required forces from all four Services. For the most part they did not work together as one force, but as four services operating in the same theatre. The missions assigned to the Services, however, did take advantage of the unique capabilities of each. It was also a combined operation with the introduction of the Inter-American

Peace Force (IAPF). American forces were eventually placed under the command of a Brazilian officer.⁵¹

Logistics proved to be a key element of the operation. The JTF was proved fully capable of providing for the evacuation and care of the civilian evacuees, as well as sustainment of the force for over 17 months. However, it must be remembered that the Dominican Republic was very close to the US, so lines of communication were not stressed. Interagency operations were both a plus and minus for this operation. For example, DOS attempts to organize an evacuation collapsed when civil war broke out. The DOS then had difficulty in providing information to the NCA. This interfered with the NCA's attempts to establish a required end state. While USIS and Army psychological operations efforts were well coordinated, CIA and FBI cooperation were extremely limited.

Once the NEO mission ended, forces spent over a year providing nation assistance. Finally, echelonnement proved to be an effective method of introducing forces. Marines arrived with a limited force and then built up their forces. The XVIIIth Airborne Corps phased forces into the area over an extended period to provide adequate forces in a changing situation. The phased deployment showed that the echelonnement of forces works and it must also occur on the redeployment as well. Intelligence operations were not handled well, in fact, Dr. Lawrence Yates, author of Leavenworth Papers #15, describes Power Pack as an overall "intelligence failure."⁵²

Conducted 25 years later in Liberia, Operation Sharp Edge

showed that the basic concepts behind evacuation operations have not changed significantly from the era of Power Pack. On 25 May 1990, the 22d MEU (SOC) was notified to proceed from Toulon, France to "Mamba Station", 50 nautical miles off the Liberian Coast. At that point the MEU was to prepare to conduct evacuation operations. The civil war in Liberia had become a threat to US and other third country citizens residing there. The American Embassy painted a bleak picture of the current situation. In his Marine Corps Gazette article, LTC Sachtlaben describes the situation as presented by the embassy as follows:

The question was originally not how many Americans we would need to evacuate, but how many would be left alive to evacuate.⁵³

The Marine Forward Command Element (FCE) (advance party) arrived in Liberia on 31 May. The Marine Amphibious Ready Group arrived off the coast of Liberia on 2 & 3 June. From 2 June to 5 August the Marines stood-by offshore awaiting the order to evacuate civilians. During this time, they planned and rehearsed evacuation operations, the reinforcement of embassy security, the security of communications sites, humanitarian assistance and the extraction of key personnel.⁵⁴ Evacuation operations began on 5 August and continued through the end of August. Marines remained ashore until 9 January 1991, when the mission was officially completed. While conducting operations, they evacuated over 2600 personnel to include over 330 Americans.⁵⁵ More important, from the DOS view, was that throughout the conflict the American Embassy remained open. It was the only foreign embassy that functioned the entire time.⁵⁶

On 4 August Prince Johnson and the INPFL began to threaten to arrest US citizens and foreign nationals.⁵⁷ On 5 August Marine landings began. Assigned by the CINCEUR, their four missions were:

1. Evacuate American citizens from the two communications sites.
2. Reinforce the American Embassy with a reinforced rifle company.
3. Evacuate American citizens and other designated foreign nationals from the American Embassy.
4. Provide logistical support as required, to the American Embassy.⁵⁸

On the first day, the initial rescue was conducted at a communications receiving site. Marines were inserted to secure the site and coordinate with the DOS representative. The Marines were back on their ship with 18 safe evacuees within 30 minutes. The mission at a second communications site went just as well and evacuated three personnel with no resistance. No time was wasted on the ground. Once identified by DOS personnel, the evacuees were searched by the use of a hand held metal detector and quickly evacuated to awaiting ships.

By the end of 5 August, 237 Marines and six Fast Attack Vehicles had been inserted into the embassy area and 74 evacuees were now safely out of the country. Marines set up security positions inside and outside the embassy. On several occasions rebels approached the embassy but were warned back by the use of bullhorns and the threat of use of riot control agents. On 6 August the task force was ordered to move all ships back over the horizon and to move all security positions that had been established outside the embassy back inside the compound.

On 12 August an evacuation at the Port of Buchanan was

ordered. Ninety-nine Spanish, Swiss, German and Vatican citizens were evacuated aboard 4 CH46s and 1 LCM-8. No weapons were carried by the Marines and security of the site was provided by the NPFL.⁵⁹ By 13 August the size of the force on shore was reduced to 65 men and the FCE. As the standby mission continued additional evacuations were accomplished. Most notable of these were the evacuation of 359 Indians and 754 Lebanese on 16 and 18 August respectively. Most of these third country nationals were removed to awaiting ships, then flown to Freetown, Sierra Leone.⁶⁰ By the time 22 MEU turned over the mission to 26 MEU on 22 August, they had evacuated over 1648 people.

The FCE was instrumental to the success of the mission. It was composed of the MEU executive officer (XO), the battalion XO, a SEAL representative, an ANGLICO member, and a communications expert. Their mission was to establish liaison with the embassy, provide detailed information to the MEU and provide a communications link with the DOS. The FCE conducted reconnaissance of helicopter landing zones, beach landing sites, assembly areas and evacuation sites. They worked closely with the RSO and coordinated the operation of the evacuation sites with the Consular staff. Briefings were conducted by the FCE to insure that embassy staff members fully understood the capabilities of the FCE and the MARG. Finally, they conducted planning for other possible branches to the operations.

Since most of the consular staff was evacuated prior to the military assistance, rifle companies had to screen, process and move evacuees with little DOS assistance. Unlike Power Pack,

communication was never a problem throughout the mission. Fire support was planned but not required during all operations. Organic mortars, AHIT helicopters, AV8B Harriers and the USS Peterson were all available to provide fire support if required. Nevertheless, intelligence dissemination remained a serious problem in planning the evacuation operation.⁶¹

Logistics support for the Embassy was also another key mission. Over 1600 sorties were flown to support logistics buildup and evacuation. Thirty days of food, fuel and water were provided to the embassy from offshore.⁶²

As stated earlier, the differences between the political thinking of the DOS and the military thinking of the DOD can cause problems in any military operation. Although there were no major differences during this particular operation, the relationships with some of the key Embassy players deserves examination.⁶³ The ambassador and the ground commander differed in their initial interpretation of the ROE published by CINCEUR. After meeting face to face the difficulties were worked out. During any evacuation mission, these two must meet face to face and discuss not only the ROE, but the overall mission and the end state each envisions.

Adequate raw intelligence was available during the mission, but interpretation and dissemination seemed to be a common problem from the beginning. Embassy interpretation of the problem was initially far off base, they initially saw the problem as much worse than it was in reality.

The DCM was the Acting Ambassador when the crisis began. He

is an extremely powerful individual who carries a great deal of weight with the ambassador and is the chief of staff for the rest of the embassy. He is also a career diplomat, who sees situations very differently from military commanders attempting to accomplish a military mission. Also, the new ambassador arrived during the crisis and was very knowledgeable about the situation, due to his briefings in Washington.

The Chief of Military Mission (CMM) maintains a liaison with the host nation military. He can be an obstacle to the evacuation mission, especially since he may outrank the FCE leader. Regardless, he can be extremely helpful in obtaining assets in the country and providing intelligence. The CMM and the DAO are competitors in many embassies. The FCE must attempt not to get involved in this competition and attempt to work with both offices. The CMM can control the destiny of the FCE.

The RSO was involved with the placement of reinforcements and the security of the embassy. A State Department Special Security Force (SSF) was brought to Liberia, so coordination had to be done with them. The SSF worked for the RSO and also provided additional bodyguards to the Ambassador, the DCM and others.

The Defense Attache Office (DAO) was also manned at a minimum staffing. The DAO insisted there was no need for military intervention in Liberia. He also recommended against embassy reinforcement and humanitarian operations. He has direct access to the ambassador and the DCM. His key role is in the fact that the SITREP information must be cleared through him before the ambassador will send it out. He also has HUMINT contacts and

usually good relations with the defense attaches of other third country nations in the host country.

The political officer has a great influence on the daily SITREP, in fact, he may draft it. He has many local contacts and is party to debriefings conducted of American citizens and others (such as the rebels). The economic officer supported the international Red Cross and the Catholic Relief effort. He contributed to the overall intelligence picture. The medical officer has a well stocked pharmacy and examination rooms. These assets can supplement any assets brought with the evacuation force.

Since he screens, processes and approves US passports and Visas, the Consular Officer is a key player in any evacuation operation. The ambassador tasks him with designing of the plans for evacuation. He provides the appropriate personnel to screen evacuees. If he doesn't have the ability to provide people, he can provide instructions to the military personnel operating the processing stations.⁶⁴

Sharp Edge must be viewed in relation to the analytic criteria presented in Chapter I. Rapid force projection was a key element of the success of this operation. The Marine Amphibious Group was able to steam off the coast of Liberia very quickly, and provide a level of comfort to US and allied personnel on shore. Contingency plans were rapidly developed and when actual execution came, the original evacuation plan was conducted. The Marines insured that adequate forces were present at all times. Command and control was easier since the Marines

and the Navy regularly conduct these types of operations. As a successful joint operation it took full advantage of the strengths of both services. Although combined operations were not actually conducted, citizens from allied countries were successfully evacuated from Liberia.

Logistics once again proved to be a great strength in this operation. An Amphibious Group was sustained off the shore for over seven months, and resupply of the embassy was done to insure it could continue to operate. As explained above, the coordination of interagency operations were a daily requirement throughout the operation. In this regard, the use of the FCE was critical to the rapid integration of the Marines with other agencies in the embassy. Although nation assistance did not occur to any great extent, the fact that the embassy was able to remain open provided an American presence in the area throughout the crisis. Echeloning of forces proved to be not only a proper method to deploy forces, but it was the method expected by the DOS. Only the minimum forces were introduced to conduct the required mission. In fact, during the Fort Buchanan evacuation, Marines were deployed with no weapons and redeployed with the evacuees in several minutes. Intelligence operations were burdened by too much information with not enough analysis. Much of the success achieved in this area can be accredited to the work of the FCE working in the Embassy. Again, the analytic criteria provided an excellent means of evaluating Operation Sharp Edge, as they did with Operation Power Pack.

VII. Current and Future Doctrine to Support NEO

The current frustration with NEO in Army units today can be summarized by the first line of the 101st Airborne Division's (AASLT) NEO Handbook: "Currently there is no standard doctrine available for guidance in the conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)."⁶⁵ To fill this gap, units have developed their own NEO handbooks or similar documents. Every unit in the Army that may be engaged in evacuation operations is currently forced to develop their own procedure for conducting operations. The Army has not included NEO in its program of instruction for officers. NEO is not discussed in advanced courses, CAS3, CGSC or even SAMS. To further confuse the situation, the USMC and the Army are concurrently writing separate NEO manuals (FM 90-C and FMFM 7-36)⁶⁶. With the current emphasis on joint operations, as well as a need to develop standard procedures and terms, the Joint Staff clearly needs to become directly involved in developing joint doctrine for evacuation operations.

By their nature, evacuation operations will require the ability to project power and sustain a force over vast distances. This projection of power is inherently a joint undertaking, because of the inter-Service linkages of modern command, control and communications, the multi-Service structure of the defense transportation system, and the broad range of forces typically involved.⁶⁷ The need for joint doctrine is further expressed in Joint Pub 1.⁶⁸ Joint doctrine for evacuation operations should provide detailed guidance for the

conduct of joint evacuation operations. Basic definitions, general planning considerations, typical NEO questions, DOS involvement and coordination, and a sample OPLAN are all subjects that could be included in joint NEO doctrine. A detailed structure for a proposed JCS NEO manual is presented in Appendix E. The US Marine Corps should be given the lead in developing a joint NEO manual. They have the only draft NEO manual published and have much more experience at conducting evacuation operations than any other service.

The services also need to develop service specific manuals that further develop and support the joint doctrine, tactics and techniques for evacuation operations. Today, there is no Army doctrine that supports evacuation operations per se. A few paragraphs are included in FM 100-20⁶⁹, there are a few words in the draft of FM 7-98⁷⁰, and a draft NEO Manual, 90-C⁷¹, is being prepared in the Low Intensity Conflict Proponencies Directorate. The only current publication dealing with evacuation operations is AR 525-12 "Military Operations Noncombatant Evacuation", dated 28 May 1973, which implements rescinded DOD Directive 5100.51.

Army doctrine needs to provide a bridge from joint doctrine to execution by units involved in evacuation operations. Army NEO doctrine should provide definitions, cover operations from predeployment through redeployment, include staff planning considerations, provide example forms and letters to be used, and review selected NEO missions. Appendix F provides a proposed structure for an Army NEO manual.

Even though there is little published doctrine, evacuation operations have become commonplace in many training events throughout all the services. JCS exercises, such as, Ocean Venture, Proud Scout and Wintex-Cimex have included evacuation operations in their scenario for many years. The USMC runs NEO exercises in the preparation phase of their MEU (SOC) deployment and they practice evacuations during deployments. Army forces in the XVIIIth Airborne Corps include NEO in their training programs and external evaluations at brigade, battalion and company level. All of these exercises are conducted without supporting training objectives, for there is no manual that expresses the task, conditions and standards for the conduct of evacuation operations. In the Army's Mission Training Plans⁷² there are no training objectives for NEO. The closest any Service comes is the Standardized MEU (SOC) Training Handbook produced by the Marine Corps.⁷³ Not only do the services need to develop doctrine for conducting actual NEO mission but training objectives should be developed to guide the conduct of training exercises. Appendix G provides a sample of NEO training objectives.

The unique requirements of evacuation operations make the publication of tactics and techniques manuals an additional requirement for NEO missions. In an article published in the Marine Corps Gazette, CPT Larry Zinser described the unique requirements of evacuation operations. His eleven requirements clearly demonstrate that detailed tactics and techniques are required for evacuation operations. (See Appendix H.) These

tactics and techniques manuals would provide detailed information to units concerning the evacuation processing, safehaven operations, marshalling force operations, and other detailed information on the conduct of evacuation operations.

Other Army doctrinal manuals need to be updated and still others need to be revisited when conducting training for NEO missions. For example, FM 90-10, MOUT Operations, needs to be updated to provide recent lessons learned in MOUT environments during Operation Just Cause and Operation Urgent Fury.⁷⁴

Doctrine that needs to be revisited in detail by forces conducting evacuation operations are civil disturbance training⁷⁵ and legal training. Legal training must cover detailed rules of engagement (ROE), as well as use of force instruction. Legal advisors will play a key role in any evacuation operation.

Civil Affairs personnel play an integral role in evacuation operations. They can provide established relationships with DOS representatives in most countries and act as the liaison with the DOS. A CA company provides area studies and country briefs to the task force. CA personnel advise the task force commander on population attitudes, key host nation government officials, availability of local resources, critical facilities, and organization of the assembly areas and the main evacuation site. Finally, they can augment the task force by setting up marshalling areas and the main evacuation site, screening and registering evacuees and conducting population control.⁷⁶

Doctrinally, psychological operations (PSYOPS) forces can

also be a key asset during evacuation operations. Working with USIA and public affairs personnel, psychological operations personnel can provide a key asset for the dissemination of information within the host nation.

Doctrinal developments, doctrinal changes and review of current doctrine are all methods that currently need to be conducted in order to insure forces are prepared to conduct evacuation operations. Much of the information required to draft detailed NEO manuals is available in one form or another today. It really requires a consolidation of all this information and an increased emphasis on NEO missions throughout the Services.

Conclusion

This monograph has established the requirement to develop Joint and Army doctrine for noncombatant evacuation operations. It has examined the basic definitions and characteristics of evacuation operations and looked at the critical role of the DOS. It has taken a quick look at the role of joint forces, other government agencies and Army forces in the conduct of evacuation operations. Historical examples have been analyzed and future doctrine has been recommended.

The analytic criteria developed in Chapter One can even be used to analyze the suggested doctrine presented in this monograph. The doctrine provides a source for projecting adequate power. Used in conjunction with Joint Pub 3-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations, a joint NEO manual could assist in rapidly assembling required forces and help improve

contingency planning and execution. All the manuals outlined above would assist in this process. Command and control, however, would need to be coordinated with current joint doctrine as well as individual Service requirements.

Joint operations would be greatly enhanced by producing joint NEO doctrine. Individual Service doctrine will also enhance the preparedness of the individual Services and provide information on the capabilities of the Service to other Services as well as other government agencies. Doctrine for combined operations is difficult at best to write. Regardless, joint NEO doctrine could be the starting point for any combined service operation. It should also include information on the evacuation of host and third country nationals.

Logistics doctrine for NEO will follow many of the existing joint and service manuals. Logistics operations for NEO must consider the safety and welfare of the evacuees as well as the sustainment of the force. In addition, it must consider the political and military limitations placed on the force when deciding how to meet its logistics requirements. All NEO missions will be interagency operations. Although the DOS and military tend to be the major players, all agencies involved in the country have information that they can provide and assistance they can render. NEO doctrine, therefore, must provide a good understanding of the operation of the DOS and of the country team as a whole.

Nation assistance will always be a possible branch or sequel to any evacuation operation. Military forces must understand

their capabilities and limitations in this area, as well as the capabilities and limitations of other US and foreign agencies involved in the host nation.

Echelonnement of forces will always be a reality when conducting evacuation operations. From the advance party to initial deploying forces to reinforcing forces, echelonnement of forces will be the required method of deployment. Echelonnement of forces must also be examined for the exit from the host nation.

As this monograph, and in particular the case studies in it have shown, intelligence is probably the most important part of any contingency operation, NEO included. Intelligence requirements for NEO not only include the terrain, weather, and enemy, but it must include detailed information on the location, numbers and special requirements of the evacuees. Simply stated, without accurate and detailed intelligence, successful NEO missions cannot be accomplished.

As stated at the outset, the safety of American and allied citizens will continue to be of great national interest to the US. During the past thirty years, American forces have expertly rescued embassy personnel, Vietnamese citizens (over 100,000 from March through May 1975), students, government employees, and citizens of many countries. In an ever changing, unstable and developing world, military operations will continue to be conducted to insure the safety of US citizens. Joint and individual Service doctrine will enhance the conduct of NEO missions, and in the long run, provide for better security of all US citizens abroad.

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Assembly Area: The place where the evacuee first meets the formal evacuation process. The assembly area and the evacuation site may or may not be the same area. Also known as a Marshalling Area. (Jaehne, Richard L., "Evacuation Operations The State Department-Military Interface", Marine Corps Gazette, March 1988, p50)

Emergency Action Committee: An organization established at the Foreign Service post by the Chief of Mission (i.e. Ambassador) or principal officer (i.e. Consul General) for the purpose of planning and coordinating the post's response to contingencies, to include the post's emergency action plan. (DOD Directive 3025.14 page 2-1)

Evacuation Kits: High threat posts should provide all US Government American citizen employees with these kits upon arrival. These kits should contain information helpful to personnel if an evacuation becomes necessary. The following forms should be included in the kit: DA Form 3955 - Change of Address, OF-144 - Emergency Evac (TDY) Travel Order, DS-1620 Claims for Loss or Damage to Personal Property, OF-28 - Evacuation Documentation, Power of Attorney, and DOS Publication No. 9139: "Evacuation Plan: Don't Leave Home Without IT!"

Evacuation Site: The place from which the evacuee departs the country for a safehaven or the US. The assembly area and the evacuation site may or may not be in the same place. (Jaehne, Richard L., "Evacuation Operations The State Department-Military Interface", Marine Corps Gazette, March 1988, p50)

F77 Report: On January 1 and July 1 of each year posts are required to submit revisions of the F77 report identifying numbers of potential evacuees. A copy of the most recent F-77 report must be filed in the post's Emergency Action plan. There are 24 categories of evacuees ranging from DOD personnel to US resident Aliens to Host Country Nationals to Third Country Nationals to US Tourists. It also includes a percentage of the total evacuees that would desire evacuation. (DOS EPH 1523)

Marshalling Area: See Assembly Area

Non-permissive Environment: Operational environment that is under control of hostile forces that have the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JCS Pub 1-02 p263)

Operational Environment: A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which effect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are: permissive environment, semi-permissive environment and non-permissive environment. (JCS Pub 1-02 p263)


Permissive Environment: Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JCS Pub 1-02 p263)

Repatriation: The procedure whereby American citizens and their families are officially processed back into the US subsequent to an evacuation. Evacuees are also provided various services to ensure their well-being and onward movement to their final destination. (DOD Directive 3025.14 p2-2)

Safehaven: Designated area(s) to which noncombatants under the US Government's responsibility may be evacuated during an emergency. A location within or outside the US to which noncombatants are authorized to travel for the purpose of temporarily remaining there until they are authorized to return to the location from which evacuated, or until they are authorized to travel to their final destination. Safehavens are normally designated by the DCS, in coordination with the DOD. (DOD Directive 3025.14 p2-2)

Semi-permissive Environment: Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. (JCS Pub 1-02 p263)


Annex 1 to Appendix A: NEO Mission Flow



- The ISB could be the MES and/or the Safehaven.
- The Safehaven could be in a third country, at the ISB, on board ship or in the US.
- Departing the MES, evacuees could go directly to the US.


Appendix B: Evacuation Task Force Structure

EVACUATION TASK FORCE STRUCTURE




Appendix C: Evacuation Force Structure

EVACUATION FORCE STRUCTURE



SAFEHAVEN FORCE STRUCTURE



Appendix E: Joint NEO Manual

A Joint NEO Manual will establish common operating procedures for the conduct of evacuation operations by joint forces. The basis for a joint manual can be found in the combination of two documents: DOD Directive 3025.14 and The DOS Emergency Planning Handbook. The Joint Manual should include the following subjects:

- Introduction to NEO and the Requirements to Conduct a NEO
- Definitions of Basic Terms
- NEO Policy
- Responsibilities
 - Services
 - CINCs
 - WLG and RLGs
- The Role of the State Department
 - Persons Eligible for Evacuation Assistance
 - Priorities of Evacuation
 - Report of Potential Evacuees (F77 Report)
 - Evacuation Kits
 - Notification of Evacuees
 - Examples of Notifications
 - Emergency Evacuation Plans
- Military Evacuations
 - Advance Party
 - Command Relationships
 - Evacuation Environments
 - Intelligence Support
 - NEOPACKS
 - Checklist for US Military Assisted Evacuation
 - Accounting for the Costs (Funding)
- Emergency Movement Plans
 - Assembly Areas
 - Helicopter Landing Zones
 - Embarkation Points (Main Evacuation Sites)
 - Airfield Surveys
 - Seaport Surveys
 - Routes
 - Overland Movement
 - Safhavens
 - Host Nation Support
 - Evacuation Documentation
 - Evacuee Processing
- Forms and documents Required
- Repatriation

Appendix F: Army NEO Manual: Table of Contents

The structure of this manual is based upon a Joint NEO Manual becoming a reality. This manual could be one doctrinal manual with tactics and techniques included, or it could be divided into two manuals: a doctrine manual and a tactics and techniques manual.

Chapter 1: Introduction

- Purpose
- Assumptions
- Restrictions
- Characteristics and Unique Requirements for NEO
- A Sample NEO Mission Narrative (Actual Mission)

Chapter 2: The Role of the Department of State

- DOS Structure
- Country Team Operations
- Embassy Role
- Priorities of Evacuation
- Political interface and Limitations

Chapter 3: The Role of Other US Agencies, Joint Forces and Combined Forces

Chapter 4: Predeployment/Crisis Action

- Planning Considerations
- Operational Environment
- Task Force Structure
 - Maneuver Forces
 - Fire Support
 - Engineers and Air Defense
 - Intelligence
 - SOF
 - Psychological Operations
 - Civil Affairs
 - Others
 - Logistics Support
- Advance Party
 - Mission and Composition
 - Embassy Preparation
- Intelligence Considerations
 - Terrain and Weather
 - Enemy and Friendly Forces (Organizations)
 - Evacuee Information
 - Movement Information
 - Ports, Airfields, HLZs, etc.
 - Intelligence Sources
- Command & Control
- Predeployment Training

Chapter 5: Deployment
Deployment Operations
ISB Planning Considerations
ISB Selection
ISB Forces
ISB Procedures
Establish Evacuation Force
Logistical Support

Chapter 6: Evacuation Operations
Organization of Evacuation Force
Concept of Operations
Main Evacuation Site Operations
Marshalling Area Operations
Evacuee Collection
Marshalling Force Operations
Evacuation Control Center
Evacuation from MES

Chapter 7: Redeployment
Safehaven operations
Safehaven Forces
Disposition of Evacuees
Redeployment of Forces
Repatriation of Evacuees

Chapter 8: Contingency Planning
Transition to hostilities
Humanitarian Relief
Peacekeeping Operations
Other Operations

Appendixes

- A. Staff Planning Considerations for NEO (by staff section)
- B. Civil-Military Planning Questions
- C. Logistics Planning Considerations
- D. Forms and Letters
For Example: Evacuee Roster Log; Certificate of Waiver;
Identification Tag; Sample Evacuation Notices; Evacuee
Information Card; Claims Waiver Form; Baggage Claim Tag;
etc.
- E. Safety Briefing (Soldiers and Evacuees)
- F. Legal Guidelines
- G. Sample NEO OPLAN
- H. Tasks, Conditions and Standards for NEO (This could be a
separate manual if required or they tasks could be
integrated into current Army Mission Training Plans.)
- I. References
- J. Glossary of Terms

Appendix G: Sample NEO Training Objectives⁷⁷

1. Primary Task 1 Conduct Coordination in Preparation for NEO
 - Subtask 1-1 Coordinate with DOS
 - Subtask 1-2 Coordinate with Other Agencies
 - Subtask 1-3 Coordinate for Linguist Support
 - Subtask 1-4 Deploy an Advance Party
 - Subtask 1-5 Coordinate with host Nation Authorities
 - Subtask 1-6 Prepare ISB for NEO
 - Subtask 1-7 Establish ROE
 - Subtask 1-8 Coordinate for Transportation Support
 - Subtask 1-9 Coordinate for Medical Support
 - Subtask 1-10 Coordinate with Civil Affairs assets
2. Primary Task 2 Conduct a Tactical or strategic Deployment
3. Primary Task 3 Conduct Lodgement Operations
 - Subtask 3-1 Protect the MES and Deploying Forces
 - Subtask 3-2 Prepare the MES
 - Subtask 3-3 Provide logistical Support for NEO
4. Primary Task 4 Conduct Marshalling Force Operations
 - Subtask 4-1 Deploy the Marshalling Force to MAS
 - Subtask 4-2 Secure MAS
 - Subtask 4-3 Locate and Escort Evacuees to MAS
 - Subtask 4-4 Process Evacuees at MAS/Transport to MES
5. Primary Task 5 Process Evacuees at the MES
 - Subtask 5-1 Conduct Physical Search and Inspection
 - Subtask 5-2 Conduct Initial Reception of evacuees
 - Subtask 5-3 Register the Evacuees
 - Subtask 5-4 Conduct Medical station Operations
 - Subtask 5-5 Conduct Counterintelligence Screening
 - Subtask 5-6 Operate a Comfort station
 - Subtask 5-7 Conduct Embarkation
6. Primary Task 6 Conduct Tactical/Strategic Redeployment

Annex 1 to Appendix G: Example Training Objectives

Task: Conduct Coordination in Preparation for NEO

Conditions: The directive to conduct the NEO has been received and tasked to the Division ready brigade. A Brigade (Bde) Task Force (TF) has been formed and the Division and Brigade staffs begin coordination in preparation to conduct the NEO.

Standards: See Subtasks 1-1 through 1-10

Subtask 1-1: Coordinate with the DOS

Conditions: The Bde TF has been ordered to conduct a NEO at a time yet to be determined. Information is incomplete or inaccurate. The Bde staff has been authorized to establish liaison and coordinate with the DOS.

Standards: 1. The DOS liaison is involved in the planning process.

2. The limits of authority and responsibility for each evacuation force element are clearly defined. A Memorandum of Understanding is prepared.

3. A by-name list of evacuees is requested. The list must include both US citizens and foreign nationals whom DOS has decided must be evacuated and known medical problems of the evacuees.

4. The DOS liaison briefs the staffs and subordinate commanders.

Appendix H: Unique Requirements of Evacuation Operations^{7*}

1. Liaison - The use of all communications means available, including physical liaison, to coordinate the landing force activities with the State Department and with the local officials of the stricken country.
2. Security - The protection of all nationals designated by the President of the United States against dissident activities within the stricken country. Training should emphasize civil disturbance and small unit security actions.
3. Basic Necessities of Life - The provision of food, water, clothing medicine, sex and age-peculiar items, and quarters to the evacuees.
4. Language - The ability to converse with the evacuees and local officials.
5. Intelligence - Timely information concerning the terrain and the dissident threat. This also includes intelligence concerning the evacuees; numbers, identification, locations, health problems, and other special requirements are all information that need to be known by the evacuation force. (Evacuee intelligence added by the author.)
6. Lines of Communication - The security, use, and flexibility of the necessary routes of evacuation and resupply.
7. Transportation - The use of the best means available along the LOC's and seaward. Experience has indicated that the tactical units will probably be required ashore "in dribblets."
8. Utilities - The provision of limited assistance to local public works.
9. Administration - The operation of an effective family reunification program and the provision for legal aid.
10. Indoctrination - The education of the members of the landing force in the rules of engagement.
11. Flexibility - The ability to respond to a changing situation with planned and effective action.

ENDNOTES

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy 1992 (Washington: JCS, 1992), 14.

²Department of State, FAH-1, Emergency Planning Handbook: 1500 Evacuation (Washington: Department of State, 1988), chapter 1533.1, 1

³The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, August 1991), 2.

⁴National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), v.

⁵Department of Defense, Directive Number 3025.14 (Washington: Department of Defense, November 1990), 1.

⁶U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force (Washington: Department of the Army, November 1988), 2-1. Chapter 2 of FM 25-100 discusses the development of mission essential task lists. NEO is a mission essential task listed by the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), 10th Mountain Division (Light), 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 25th Infantry Division (Light). Other Army units also have NEO as a mission essential task.

⁷U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, TRADOC Pam 525-5, Airland Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: HQs, Training and Doctrine Command, August 1991), 28.

⁸U.S. Army, TRADOC Pam 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield (Fort Monroe, VA: HQs, Training and Doctrine Command, April 1990), 51. At the operational level of war, NEO is defined as a subfunction of the operational support operational operating system.

⁹Directive Number 3025.14 (1990), 2-2.

¹⁰For a further explanation, see FAH-1 (1988), chapter 1520.

¹¹FAH-1 (1988), chapter 1522.3. Priorities have been established within each group is as follows:

Category A: Persons of national importance.

Category B: Pregnant women.

Category C: Women with children, children under the age of 18 with their designated sponsor, and unaccompanied children under the age of 18.

Category D: Aged and infirm.

Category E: Family Groups.

Category F: Unaccompanied adults.

These categories were obtained from U.S. Army, FO Pam 525-3, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Handbook (Fort Ord, CA: HQs, 7th Infantry Division, 1990), 1-4.

¹²FAH-1 (1988), chapter 1526; Richard L. Jaehne, "Evacuation Operations - The State Department-Military Interface," Marine Corps Gazette 72 (March 1988): 49.

1. Standfast: A country's political or security environment has deteriorated and it is perceived that American citizens are threatened; however, an evacuation is either not required or is temporarily impossible. All noncombatants are required to remain in place and take appropriate precautions to limit exposure since immediate movement would involve unacceptable risk. Prior to any evacuation notice DOS may issue a Travel Advisory when political or military actions within a country create a potentially dangerous situation for noncombatants.

2. Recommend non essential personnel and dependents leave (reduced American presence): The embassy encourages all American citizens to depart by regularly scheduled commercial travel. This also includes the return of selected government employees and dependents at government expense. The embassy security guards may be reinforced. The unified commander may alert and assemble military forces to be ready to assist in evacuation.

3. Recommend US citizens and other eligibles leave (evacuation): At this time, the chief of mission has determined that the evacuation of all US citizens and other eligible personnel is advisable. The embassy would arrange for charter transportation means are inadequate or because of the severity of the threat to the evacuees.

4. Embassy or Consulate closing: This is the final step in the procedure as the final official American presence departs the country. The evacuation will continue and the embassy will close.

¹³FAH-1 (1988), exhibit 1526A through 1526D. There is a different notice for each of the situations: Standfast, Leave Commercial, Evacuation and Post Closing.

¹⁴U.S. Marine Corps, Combat Development Command, "FMFM 7-36, MAGTF Noncombatant Evacuation Operations," Coordinating Draft (Quantico, VA: USMC Combat Development Command, 1991), 1-1.

¹⁵FAH-1, (1988), chapter 1533.4; U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center, "FM 90-C, Military Operations Noncombatant Evacuation," Draft (Fort Leavenworth, KS: HQs, USACAC, 1992), 5.

¹⁶Directive 3025.14, (1990), 2-3.

¹⁷There are currently four RLGs: European, East Asian, South American, and Washington. Department of State, "State-Defense Statement on Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad (Joint Statement)," (Washington: DOS, July 18, 1980), 11.

¹⁸These characteristics are summarized from "FMFM 7-36", (1991), 2-1.

- ¹⁹Charles E. Redman, The Ambassador and the Country Team, (Stockholm, Sweden: Defense Intelligence College of the United States Department of Defense, 1991), 6.
- ²⁰The Ambassador and the Country Team, (1991), 14.
- ²¹The F-77 Report can be found in FAH-1, (1988), chapter 1523.
- ²²The organization of an Evacuation Kit can be found in FAH-1, (1988), chapter 1524.
- ²³The Ambassador and the Country Team, (1991), 2.
- ²⁴Modern technology has eroded some of the ambassador's responsibility, by allowing instant communications to Washington and offering speed of international travel. Since international travel is so easy, Washington based experts, including the President and the Secretary of State sometimes replace the ambassador as a negotiator or representative with foreign governments. Nonetheless, the ambassador still has extraordinary authority and prestige within his operating area.
- ²⁵"State-Defense Statement on the Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad," (1980), 8. It specifically says: "The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of emergency and evacuation plans is the sole responsibility of the military commander who will, where time and communications permit, act in coordination with and under policies established by the principal US diplomatic or consular representative."
- ²⁶FAH-1, (1988), chapter 1533.
- ²⁷Jaehne, "Evacuation Operations - The State Department-Military Interface," 50.
- ²⁸U.S. Army, JULLS Report #1 (Author's Number), 1989.
- ²⁹Richard E. Carey and D. A. Quinlan, "Frequent Wind - Part Three Execution," Marine Corps Gazette 60 (April 1976): 42. During Operation Frequent Wind over 2000 personnel were evacuated from the US Embassy in Saigon by helicopter to awaiting ships.
- ³⁰"FMFM 7-36," (1991).
- ³¹Directive 3025.14, (1988), 2. U.S. Army, JULLS Report #2 (Author's Number), 1989. In this JCS exercise it was noted that DEHS does not participate in NEO except under Federal emergency conditions. In practice, FORSCOM has picked up the mission for repatriation of DOD personnel and all American citizens. It was recommended that FORSCOM continue to do all evacuee processing for contingency type NEO missions.

³²Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 174.

³³Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 Leavenworth Papers Number 15 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988).

³⁴"FM 90-C," (1992), draft.

³⁵See Appendix C.

³⁶FO Pam 525-3, (1990), 3-1.

³⁷See Appendix C.

³⁸See Appendix C.

³⁹FO Pam 525-3, (1990), 3-3.

⁴⁰See Appendix C.

⁴¹President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Crisis in the Dominican Republic," For Commanders 4 (15 May 1965): 1 and 3.

⁴²Yates, Power Pack, 95.

⁴³Yates, Power Pack, 186.

⁴⁴Yates, Power Pack, 37.

⁴⁵Yates, Power Pack, 44.

⁴⁶Yates, Power Pack, 103.

⁴⁷Yates, Power Pack, 104.

⁴⁸Yates, Power Pack, 173-174.

⁴⁹Wallace J. Moulis, "Key to a Crisis," Military Review 46 (February 1966): 10.

⁵⁰Yates, Power Pack, 178-179.

⁵¹Frederick C. Turner, "Experiment in Inter-American Peacekeeping," Army 17 (June 1967): 34.

⁵²Yates, Power Pack, 176.

⁵³Glen R. Sachtleben, "Operation Sharp Edge: The Corps' MEU (SOC) Program in Action," Marine Corps Gazette 75 (November 1991): 78.

⁵⁴Sachtleben, "Operation Sharp Edge", 79.

⁵⁵"Liberia Operation Ends for MARG," Marine Corps Gazette 75 (February 1991): 4.

⁵⁶Richard A. Biena, "Meanwhile, One Continent Way . . . in Africa . . . ," State 341 (February 1991): 7.

⁵⁷The IPNFL is the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

⁵⁸Sachtleben, "Operation Sharp Edge," 84.

⁵⁹The NPFL is the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

⁶⁰Biena, "Meanwhile, One Continent Away," 7; Michael R. Gordon "US Forces Evacuate 74 After Threats in Liberia," New York Times (International), 6 August 1990: A1.

⁶¹U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Lesson Learned #1 (Author's Number), 1990.

⁶²Sachtleben, "Operation Sharp Edge," 86. These supplies included 35,500 gallons of JP5, 28 pallets of food and 4800 gallons of water.

⁶³U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Lesson Learned #2 through #13 (Author's Number), 1990. The following comments are summarized from 12 separate after action reports in the MCLL system. The summary extends up to and including footnote number 63.

⁶⁴U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Lesson Learned #2 through #13 (Author's Number), 1990.

⁶⁵U.S. Army, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) NEO Handbook, (Fort Campbell, KY: HQs, 101st Abn Div (AASLT), 1990), 1.

⁶⁶"FM 90-C," draft, (1992); "FMFM 7-36," coordinating draft, (1991).

⁶⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces (Washington: JCS, 1991), 2.

⁶⁸Joint Pub 1 (1991), 6.

⁶⁹U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), 5-4.

⁷⁰U.S. Army, "FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict," Revised Final Draft, (Fort Benning, GA: United States Army Infantry School, 1991), 5-15.

⁷¹"FM 90-C," draft, (1992).

⁷²Mission Training Plans provide active duty and reserve component commanders and staffs a descriptive, mission-oriented training program to train their unit to perform its critical wartime mission/operations. These plans usually contain Training Matrixes, Operation Outlines, Training Exercises, Training and Evaluation Outlines and External Evaluations. The Training and Evaluation Outlines contain the tasks, conditions and standards for the major collective tasks that a unit must master to perform its primary wartime missions and to win in battle.

⁷³U.S. Marine Corps, Standardized MEU (SOC) Training Handbook III (Norfolk, VA: Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 1988). The NEO chapter in this manual has been modified slightly and is currently the coordinating draft of "FMFM 7-36" referred to earlier.

⁷⁴U.S. Army, JULLS Report #3 and #4 (Author's Number), 1990. The success of the 90 mm recoilless rifle was discussed in both AARs. Operation Just Cause also noted a need to develop Army Aviation doctrine for MOUT. AARs also praised the use of armored vehicles in a MOUT environment. Current MOUT doctrine is directed towards operations in war, particularly in Europe. MOUT operations conducted during NEO will often require techniques that meet the political and military limitations (restrictions and constraints) imposed on the evacuation force.

⁷⁵U.S. Army, FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances (Washington: Department of the Army, 1985). This manual outline the conduct of civil disturbance operations and training.

⁷⁶U.S. Army, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, "Briefing CA Company," (Fort Bragg, NC: 96th CA Battalion, 1992). Doctrinally, a 36-man active duty civil affairs company can provide an 8-man headquarters, six 4-man operational teams, one 2-man displaced civilian team and one 2-man civil supply team to support the task force commander. The company has language trained personnel as well as members familiar with any area in the world. They are also trained in processing and handling civilians.

⁷⁷101st Airborne Division (AASLT) NEO Handbook, G-1.

⁷⁸Larry R. Zinser, "The BLT in Evacuation Operations," Marine Corps Gazette 57 (December 1973): 28.

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