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
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**STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT  
IN THE POST-COLD WAR PENTAGON**

Robert J. Art

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


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**Robert J. Art**

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## FOREWORD

Robert Art explores two fundamental and interrelated questions about the National Military Strategy. First, how well suited is the strategy to the needs of the post-cold war world, and second, does the top political and military leadership of the Pentagon have sufficient control over the defense bureaucracy to make its decisions stick?

The author's answer to the first question is that two of the strategy's four foundations—strategic defense and reconstitution—are beyond the scope of our resources as well as any conceivable threats on the horizon.

In answering the second question the author relates management to strategy, and concludes that as a result of the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff now possess the requisite management tools to get what they want from the bureaucracies they oversee. Goldwater-Nichols has not and will not end interservice rivalry, but these reforms have successfully created an institutional force within the military to wage constant war against it. The true test will be whether the emphasis on joint duty will begin to produce officers truly capable of putting the coherence of the national military strategy above service parochialism.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a contribution to the debate on the National Military Strategy.



KARL W. ROBINSON  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ROBERT ART is the Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University, and Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. He has published in the field of national security affairs and U.S. foreign and defense decisionmaking. His most recent publications are: "A Defensible Defense: U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*; and, with Seyom Brown, ed., *America's Foreign Policy after the Cold War*. He is currently working on a book for the Twentieth Century Fund entitled *The Purposes of Power*.

## **STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR PENTAGON**

In response to the breathtaking developments in international politics since late 1989, the Bush Administration has significantly revised the defense posture of the United States.<sup>1</sup> Four specific factors have driven the revisions: the end of the cold war, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the desire to retain both a superpower military force and an overseas U.S. military presence, and the American public's demands for cuts in defense spending. The basic elements of America's post-cold war defense strategy are now clear, even if the ultimate size, cost, and exact composition of the military forces to support it have not been settled.

There are two fundamental questions to ask about the changes in U.S. military strategy. First, do they make sense? Second, does the top political and military leadership of the Pentagon have sufficient control over the defense bureaucracy to make its decisions stick? An answer to the first question requires an analysis of how well suited the Bush strategy is to the needs of the post-cold war world. An answer to the second requires an assessment of how effective are the changes in defense management that have been made since the mid-1980s, especially those brought about by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. It will do the United States little good if it proclaims a military strategy that is ill adapted to U.S. interests in the post-cold war world, or if it adopts one well-suited, but is unable to translate its general strategy into the detailed decisions that actually constitute policy.

This study attempts to answer both these questions. First, there is much to commend in the Administration's "new military strategy," but crucial correctives need to be taken if the strategy is to be fully effective. Second, with the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, the two top managers of the Pentagon—the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs



of Staff—now possess the requisite management tools to get what they want from the bureaucracies they oversee. A few critical tests demonstrate that the 1986 reforms are working as intended. In assessing strategy and management, therefore, the latter appears to be in relatively better shape than the former.

The first section of this report lays out an alternative military strategy, compares it to the Bush Administration approach, and suggests two correctives: scrapping plans for a global-war reconstitution capability and altering the focus of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from a space- to a ground-based system. The second section sets forth three Pentagon budgetary and bureaucratic outcomes that traditionally occurred before the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, compares them with the outcomes that have occurred since the 1986 Act, and explains why matters are getting better. The third section presents the case for “creeping jointness”—the view that defense management, especially on the military side, has significantly improved because the Goldwater-Nichols integrated approach to military planning is becoming institutionalized within the Defense Department. In the management area, then, what is called for is not sweeping new legislation, but further refinement of the tools now available. Together with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, such refinement makes it possible to preserve an effective U.S. military instrument even though significantly fewer resources will be devoted to it.

## **THE NEW MILITARY STRATEGY**

The United States has four vital foreign policy goals to pursue in the post-cold war world: first, to protect of the U.S. homeland from attack and destruction; second, to preserve an open international economic order; third, to maintain assured access to Persian Gulf oil; and fourth, to prevent great power wars on the Eurasian continent.<sup>2</sup> It has three additional goals that are not vital but are highly desirable: fifth, to promote democratic institutions and human rights; sixth, to prevent, retard, or reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles, chemical, and nuclear weapons;

and seventh, to prevent the extensive slaughter of a nation's citizenry, either by a ruthless dictator or by the breakdown of governmental order that then results in ethnic slaughter, such as happened in what was formerly Yugoslavia.

All seven goals, but especially the second, third, and fourth, can be served, though in varying ways and in differing degrees, by the peacetime deployment of U.S. military forces overseas. The primary functions of the overseas deployment are: to provide insurance and reassurance to key regional allies during the post-cold war transition; to deter aggressive actions by states either towards other states or towards their own citizens; to make states feel secure enough against their neighbors such that they can keep their armaments limited and can avoid acquiring weapons of mass destruction; and to prevent power vacuums from materializing, should the United States precipitously withdraw; and, in general, to preserve regional stability. The fifth goal is best achieved through economic growth and the development of a middle class in a nation, though there may be rare instances in which a U.S. military intervention could tip the balance towards democracy. The sixth and seventh could well require the United States to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states in preemptive, preventive, peacemaking, and peacekeeping roles. Such interventions must be done sparingly and only in concert with selected regional allies. Only the first goal can be achieved through unilateral action by the United States, and for at least the next decade, and more likely well beyond that, it is easily accomplished. The other six goals require the cooperation of other states.

#### **Four Elements of a Post-Cold War Strategy.**

From these seven foreign policy objectives we can construct the four elements of the post-cold war U.S. military strategy. They are: (1) severely reduced offensive nuclear forces, with a significant slowdown in qualitative modernization; (2) research and development on a continental defense against a limited ballistic missile attack, and a vigorous research and development effort and deployment, when successfully achieved, of effective theater ballistic

missile defenses for U.S. overseas forces and key allies; (3) a continuing, though much reduced overseas military presence in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East; and (4) a ready, mobile reserve of conventional forces in the United States that can rapidly reinforce the forward deployed forces.

*Nuclear Deterrence.* First, in the post-cold war era, there is no reason for the United States to abandon nuclear deterrence because it provides such a high degree of security at such a low cost. But with the cold war's demise, the offensive nuclear force can be severely reduced in size and modernized much less rapidly than before. Most of the impetus for America's huge nuclear force and its frequent modernization came from the political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was not the arms race that produced the political competition, but the political competition that produced the arms race.<sup>3</sup> With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a significantly weakened and seemingly benign Russia, the United States can now size its strategic nuclear force closer to the dictates of homeland deterrence than to those of extended deterrence and damage limitation.<sup>4</sup> For homeland deterrence, what counts is the number of warheads that the nation can threaten to launch against an adversary's main cities in order to deter attack, not the number of warheads required to destroy the adversary's nuclear forces. Because the number of such cities is small, so, too, can be the forces required to target them. A homeland deterrent force could easily be under 1,000 warheads, and perhaps as few as 100 to 200, as long as there are a sufficient number of survivable platforms to launch them.<sup>5</sup>

Should the United States, then, reduce its strategic nuclear force to somewhere between 100 and 1,000 warheads?<sup>6</sup> Cutting the force all the way down to a bare minimum deterrent makes sense only if the United States completely ignores the needs of extended deterrence. A strong argument can be made that the United States should maintain a nuclear force large enough to give other non-nuclear states over whom it continues to extend its nuclear umbrella confidence about its robustness. During the cold war, this type of thinking had a powerful effect: considerations of extended deterrence

substantially drove up the size of America's nuclear force.<sup>7</sup> America's key allies did not view a U.S. minimum deterrent force as providing them with a credible nuclear umbrella against large Soviet nuclear forces; rather such a force smacked of isolationist overtones. A large strategic nuclear force, together with the overseas deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, were equated with a robust and hence a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella. Even though there is at present no clear nuclear adversary threatening key U.S. allies that do not have their own nuclear weapons, such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, there is still a rationale for extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella over them. It discourages them from acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And as long as they retain a residue of the belief that a larger nuclear force is a more credible umbrella than a smaller one, the United States will need nuclear forces larger than those it would require were it to take account only of its own defense, if it wishes, that is, to keep those states that could easily go nuclear, non-nuclear.

Were matters to rest here, the case for a larger nuclear force, precisely to prevent nuclear spread, has strong merit. There is, however, a second political force at work—nuclear delegitimization—whose purpose, just like extended deterrence, is to discourage nuclear proliferation. This force, however, pushes the United States in the direction of a minimum, not a maximum, force. If the United States, in concert with Russia and the other nuclear great powers, wishes to delegitimize, or at least significantly diminish, the perceived political utility of nuclear arsenals in international politics, then it, together with the other nuclear powers, should scrap its nuclear force entirely, or at least reduce it to a minimum deterrent while relying more on maintaining a conventional deterrent force.<sup>8</sup> The United States cannot call upon other states to forego acquiring nuclear weapons when it shows by its own example, with large forces, how much political leverage they give.

Thus, there are two political forces that work at cross purposes, even though the goal of each is, paradoxically, to retard the further spread of nuclear weapons. The requirements of extended deterrence tug the United States

away from a minimum force; those of nuclear delegitimization, towards it. The issue cannot be resolved by theoretical analysis because theory yields an indeterminate result. Instead, the exact size of the U.S. nuclear force will be determined ultimately by a political judgement as to how these two opposing political forces—extended deterrence versus nuclear delegitimization—balance out. And that judgment, in turn, will depend mostly upon the attitudes about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella by states that do not have nuclear weapons but easily could. What should be clear from this discussion, however, is that the United States can do with an offensive nuclear force much smaller than it has had for nearly 40 years, even if it does not go for the minimum one.<sup>9</sup>

*Ballistic Missile Defense.* Second, the United States should continue with a vigorous research and development program on homeland ballistic missile defense, but should avoid deployment at this time. The research program should be focused on ground-based defenses and space-based sensors. This is the program mandated by the Congress through its passage of the November 1991 Missile Defense Act. It requires the Secretary of Defense to “develop for deployment” the requisite technology, with the goal of a target deployment of a “cost-effective, operationally effective, and ABM Treaty compliant” Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) system of 100 interceptors at one site by fiscal year 1996.<sup>10</sup> In this act the Congress explicitly stated that it had not given final approval for deployment of a homeland defense system, but it did want to be in a position to make a judgment in several years, based in part on an assessment of what the technology will then look like.<sup>11</sup> Congress had an additional goal: to reorient the Bush Administration away from space-based defenses by causing it to accelerate development of ground-based defenses. The 1991 Act therefore instructs the Defense Department to reorient its research away from space-based to ground-based interceptors, although the latter would make use of space-based sensors, which do not violate the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In addition, the 1991 Act stressed the importance of developing an effective theater missile defense (TMD) to protect U.S. allies and U.S. forces stationed abroad.

The 1991 Missile Act is sensible. If the United States keeps forces stationed overseas, then it must take the steps necessary to defend them. Because the spread of ballistic missile technology has put at risk U.S. forces stationed abroad, the United States cannot leave its overseas troops vulnerable to them.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, U.S. allies that come under range of hostile ballistic missiles deserve protection; and theater defenses may aid U.S. efforts, even if only marginally, to retard the spread of massively destructive weapons.<sup>13</sup> For these three reasons, there is a strong case for developing and deploying theater missile defenses.<sup>14</sup> Deployment of a limited homeland defense, however, is not now warranted. The only Third World nation that can attack the United States at present and for the next 10 years is China. The United States has lived under China's ballistic missile threat for quite some time, just as China has lived under America's. All other Third World ballistic missile forces are only regional in their range, not intercontinental.<sup>15</sup> Development of a hedge for the future emergence of crazy or ruthless Third World leaders and terrorists is a reasonable step at this time, but the hedge requires only an active research and development program that is compatible with the ABM treaty, not deployment.<sup>16</sup>

*An Overseas Military Presence.* Third, the United States should retain overseas somewhere between 175,000 to 250,000 troops, roughly one-third to one-half the 510,000 troops that it had stationed abroad at the tail end of the cold war. These forces should remain deployed primarily in Western Europe and East Asia, with a small residual presence, primarily offshore, in the Persian Gulf area. There are several reasons why the United States should continue to keep some combat forces overseas.

One reason why U.S. troops should remain abroad is that there is as yet no reliable collective substitute for the potential peacemaking role that U.S. forces can play in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Peacemaking means either deterring aggression (the deterrence aspect of peacemaking) or punishing it should it occur (the punishment aspect). In contrast, peacekeeping generally means the insertion of forces between combatants, after they have ceased fighting

and with their agreement, to help preserve the peace that they have agreed to. In both its deterrent and punishment aspects, peacemaking is a more demanding task than peacekeeping. U.S. overseas forces can strengthen the deterrent aspect of peacemaking in these three regions simply by their presence. Ultimately, however, if deterrence is to remain credible, these forces may have to be used, in concert with the forces of other regional powers and under the aegis of either the United Nations or other regional organizations, to punish aggression should it take place. There will be those infrequent instances when vital American and allied interests are so directly and forcibly challenged that not to react in kind would be to weaken deterrence fatally. Only in these rare instances should U.S. force actually be used, and they must remain infrequent because the United States cannot allow itself to become the world's policeman. Neither the American public nor other nations will tolerate that. Under what circumstances U.S. forces should be used to defend vital interests by punishing aggression is *the* central question about U.S. military power for the future.

The point remains that there is as yet no viable substitute for U.S. forces. The European Community, for one, has proven militarily impotent in dealing with the breakup of Yugoslavia.<sup>17</sup> The United Nations, for another, has not yet demonstrated that it can become an effective global collective security force, though its record in peacekeeping actions and in voting sanctions since 1989 has been impressive.<sup>18</sup> The U.N. was effective in its forceful peacemaking role against Saddam Hussein in 1990-91 primarily because the United States wanted it to be and because the United States did the hard work necessary to get the U.N. to act. U.S. forces, moreover, provided the bulk of the air and armored forces used in this peacemaking action. Since then, the U.N. has imposed economic sanctions twice, once against Libya on April 15, 1992, and then against Serbia on May 30, 1992.

No one can know for certain whether the United Nations will evolve into a truly effective world collective security organization. The rich industrialized nations have signaled their political intention to work to make it so.<sup>19</sup> But until that day



arrives, if ever, U.S. troops in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East continue to provide a useful peacemaking (deterrent) role. And even if that day arrives, U.S. forces will need to be involved in U.N. peacemaking operations of any size. Whether a U.N. military force is organized along an ad hoc or a permanent standing basis, large-scale punishment actions will be facilitated by the overseas presence of U.S. forces.<sup>20</sup>

A second reason for U.S. troops to remain in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East is that many of the governments in those regions, whether allies of the United States or not, want American troops to stay. They see American military power as a stabilizing force.<sup>21</sup> For example, the Japanese government views the presence of U.S. troops as reassuring its East Asia neighbors that there will not be a revival of Japanese militarism. The Chinese government, although it holds to the principle that no nation should station troops outside of its territory, admits that there are "certain historical conditions" that justify the presence of U.S. troops in East Asia for the time being. South Korea's views about the deterrent effect of U.S. troops against North Korea are well-known. In Western Europe, no government, not even the French, wants American troops to leave Europe. They are seen as insurance against a sudden adverse turn of events in Russia or against the "renationalization" of defense in Western Europe; as reassurance against the reemergence of a militarily powerful, united Germany; and as a stabilizing influence that helps keep the path smooth for European political union.<sup>22</sup> The nations of Eastern Europe, especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, want to join NATO because they view it as the only reliable security organization functioning in Europe today.<sup>23</sup> Their initial enthusiasm for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has waned, especially because the CSCE proved impotent in dealing with the ethnic slaughter that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia. Similarly, the desire of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms to retain some American military presence, although as invisible as possible, is clear. In these three regions, the U.S. military presence can help the United States



to serve as a stabilizer, a mediator, and an "honest broker" among regional rivals.

The third reason for U.S. troops to remain abroad is that it serves American interests, not simply those of others. A U.S. presence in Europe and East Asia helps to discourage Germany and Japan from acquiring their own nuclear forces and thereby strengthens the global regime against nuclear weapons spread. The U.S. presence helps to preserve stability and thereby provides the political framework conducive to international trade and the economic growth that creates the middle classes central to the emergence of democratic institutions. The U.S. presence keeps the likelihood of a great power war on the Eurasian continent, which is quite low as it is, lower still. The U.S. presence increases the security that states experience and thereby lessens the pressures for them to acquire large military forces, including weapons of mass destruction. Finally, a U.S. residual presence in the Persian Gulf serves as a warning to any future would-be regional hegemon that the United States will do what is necessary to preserve access to Middle Eastern oil.

*Reinforcement Capability.* The fourth and final element of America's new military strategy is a credible reinforcement capability: highly ready forces in reserve in the continental United States that can be sent abroad quickly should that prove necessary. A residual U.S. overseas presence means little in and of itself. What the overseas forces represent is the tangible commitment of American might. Unless backed up by sufficient power within the United States, the forces abroad will come to be seen simply as tokens. An overseas residual presence can carry with it a credible American guarantee only if others are convinced that the presence can be quickly expanded to a credible warfighting force. Again, this is not a license for the United States to intervene in each and every dispute abroad. Rather, the capability for rapid reinforcement is a strategy primarily for dampening the likelihood that the conflicts which would seriously threaten U.S. interests would happen in the first place and, secondarily, for dealing with them should they occur. If U.S. forces overseas are to serve a stabilizing function, then they require the same two elements that all

deterrent forces have always required: the will and the capability to use them.

### **Two Criticisms of the Pentagon's Strategy.**

How does the Pentagon's strategy fit with this recommended post-cold war strategy? The four elements of the Cheney-Powell strategy are strategic deterrence and defense, a forward presence, crisis response, and a reconstitution capability.<sup>24</sup> The second and third elements are sensible because they are equivalent to the overseas presence and the reinforcement capability described above. The two major flaws in the Pentagon's proposed strategy are its first and fourth elements: its ambitious plans for strategic defense and its desire to develop and retain a reconstitution capability for global war.

*Space-Based Defense.* In contrast to congressional mandates, the administration wants to deploy a space-based defense system for global protection against limited attacks (GPALS) of up to 200 nuclear warheads on the homeland of the United States and that of its allies. Space-based interceptors are expensive to deploy, and the technology is by no means proven.<sup>25</sup> Space-based systems will not be effective against missile attacks by regional rivals that threaten U.S. allies because these missiles will have depressed trajectories well below the range of U.S. space-based interceptors. The United States can better protect its allies from such regional threats by deploying theater-based defensive systems. For the next decade, moreover, there is no Third World ballistic missile threat against the U.S. homeland and hence no need for a homeland defense, space- or land-based.

Finally, a space-based defense is a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. It makes little sense at this stage in the political evolution of Russia for the United States to take a hard line on security matters by violating the 1972 ABM Treaty. At a time when the United States is trying to deal with the consequences for nuclear spread of the breakup of the Soviet Union, it is counterproductive to pursue policies that will only embolden conservative opponents of the democratic

reformers and anger the democratic reformers themselves. The United States needs the passive acquiescence of the former and the active cooperation of the latter. Deploying a system that the United States does not currently require for its security is foolhardy when such an action could threaten the nuclear reductions already agreed to, as well as those proposed by, the United States and Russia.<sup>26</sup> Thus, GPALS is expensive, not yet technologically feasible, not necessary at present, not effective for all the missions assigned to it, and politically counterproductive. GPALS time has not yet come.<sup>27</sup>

*Reconstitution Capability.* Similarly, the Pentagon's strategy for a global reconstitution capability is not well-founded. The Pentagon intends reconstitution "to deter any potential adversary from attempting to build forces capable of posing a global challenge to the United States and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global warfighting capability."<sup>28</sup> As defined by the Pentagon, reconstitution is the ability quickly to rebuild U.S. forces to wage global war by preserving those elements of military power that take the longest to acquire, such as highly trained and specialized personnel, weapons with long lead times to produce, and an industrial base that can rapidly gear up for mass production. Providing for some reconstitution capability is sensible, if by that one means the ability quickly to accelerate the output of existing production lines and to mobilize the reserves of trained manpower in a crisis. But this is a surge capability for a limited regional crisis, not a reconstitution capability for all-out global war.<sup>29</sup> This is precisely the capability that the United States will require because the wars that will confront it in the future will be regional, not global, in nature. They are likely to be no larger than the size of the DESERT STORM operation, which the base force can handle, and probably much smaller.<sup>30</sup> And the United States will deal with them as it has done in the past, one at a time. What is required for crisis response, therefore, is a limited surge, not an all-out reconstitution, capability.

Moreover, were such a would-be hegemon to appear on the horizon, the United States would have ample warning time to rebuild its forces without reinvesting in a reconstitution

capability now. There is no country today that can hide from U.S. intelligence assets the military buildup that would be required to wage global war against the United States. If such a threat materialized, the United States would know about it well in advance of when military action would have to be taken so that it could build up the necessary forces. As the Pentagon envisions it, the ability to reconstitute forces is, fundamentally, the ability to transform one's industrial capability from peacetime to an all-out wartime effort. The United States would have the time to do this. Whether it did would depend, not on advanced warning, but on the will to do it.

The United States does not now need to get a leg up on such a potential adversary. Moreover, taking visible actions to do so will only make such an event more rather than less likely. In the post-cold war era, the United States must use its power carefully and avoid actions that smack of arrogant unilateralism. During the cold war the United States needed its key allies, but they needed the United States more than it needed them. Their need for U.S. protection against the Soviet Union dampened their understandable reactions to frequent U.S. unilateralist actions. In the post-cold war era, the cement of the anti-Soviet alliance is no longer there to counter the political strains produced by American unilateralism. Without this dampening effect, the arrogant exercise of U.S. power will produce counterreactions, as balance of power theory predicts.<sup>31</sup> Thus, plans taken now to gear up U.S. forces against potential global hegemony partake of the arrogant, overweening actions that the United States should avoid.<sup>32</sup> It must walk the fine line: use its considerable power to assume the leadership role where its vital interests and those of its key allies are at stake, but in doing so, avoid running roughshod over them, thereby provoking them to build up their own power or to construct a coalition against the United States. Walking the fine line between leadership and dominance is what Secretary of State Baker meant by "collective engagement": the United States must be the leader of coalitions that take into account the interests of all the members, not act unilaterally as the lone superpower.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, however, the whole scenario of a large-scale, sustained, conventional global war in the nuclear age is a flight of fancy. It is absurd to think of spending many resources to develop the capability to wage such a war against an unidentifiable adversary. It made no sense for the United States to spend dollars for such a war against the Soviet Union, which the Reagan Administration made some attempts to do. It makes no more sense now. There is little that the United States could do, short of using its military power preemptively against it, to prevent the emergence of a global military competitor, because such a global competitor would generate its resources through its own internal efforts. This is exactly how the Soviet Union challenged the United States. A preemptive use of U.S. military power in such a case is something it never did against the Soviet Union, something the American people would probably never tolerate, and something that would be equivalent to national suicide, because such a would-be global challenger would have first acquired a nuclear force precisely to deter such a preemptive U.S. attack. Moreover, a global conventional war did not occur during the cold war era because of nuclear deterrence. As long as there is nuclear deterrence, why would it occur in the future? Were such a global adversary to emerge, it would be nuclear-armed. Were it and the United States somehow to blunder into a conventional war, that war would not last long. Either it would quickly become nuclear because one side would escalate to nuclear weapons use to end it, or, more likely, either or both nations would employ nuclear escalatory threats to bring it to a prompt end. On practically every count, therefore, reconstitution for global war smacks of a poorly-designed rationale for an inflated defense budget.

Instead of planning to gear up for global conventional wars, the United States should concern itself with the readiness and sustainability of the active and reserve forces that it will have on hand at the time. Wars of the future are likely to be intense, short, and limited. U. S. forces will have to go on short notice, rely on existing stocks of materials, mobilize the reserve forces and the critical personnel they contain, and surge existing production lines for ammunition and weapons. What the United States needs to plan for is a well-equipped, ready, sustainable,

and mobile force. It will not have the leisure to take several years to double the size of its military forces and produce exotic new weapons. Defense policy should not focus on global war reconstitution issues, but the maintenance of critical skills, the requisite lines of production tailored to smaller forces, and the preservation of American high technology.<sup>34</sup> In part, this is what the Defense Department means, or should mean, by reconstitution. The emphasis should be on keeping the forces that will be available, both active and reserve, well-equipped and well-led, not on increasing their size by some significant factor for a fantasy scenario.

## **THE NEW MANAGEMENT TOOLS**

If the above four elements constitute a sound post-cold war military strategy, does the Defense Department have the management tools to implement it? The question is important to address because a sound strategy means little if it cannot be the governing element in constructing the programs and budgets that yield the nation's military forces. A sound defense strategy can quickly unravel unless the Pentagon's top leadership is able to make certain that the thousands of detailed programmatic and budgetary decisions that the defense bureaucracy subsequently makes are consistent with it. A coherent strategy, together with the requisite program elements and budgets that give it meaning, have the best chance of surviving the political gauntlet of congressional review. The Pentagon has done well with the Congress when its decisions have been integrated; it has fared poorly when its decisions have been disjointed.

In the past, Pentagon leaders have experienced considerable difficulty in getting from the military services what they have wanted. Are they doing better now? The simplest way to assess the current relationship between strategy and management is to compare the Pentagon's programmatic and budgetary outcomes before passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation with those that have come after it. Such a comparison demonstrates that the legislation is having many of the effects its authors intended, though matters are by no means perfect.

## **Cold War Outcomes.**

The traditional decisionmaking outcomes that prevailed from 1947, when the Defense Department was first created, until 1986, when it was last reorganized, were a product in part of the Defense Department's organizational structure. The cold war Pentagon had four characteristics. First, it began as a system of halfway measures, representing a compromise between a highly centralized, tightly integrated Army plan, on the one hand, and a loosely-coordinated, committee-like Navy plan, on the other. The separate services were housed in one governmental department, but they remained distinct and autonomous organizations.<sup>35</sup> As it evolved over the years, the Pentagon moved gradually from the Navy's and towards the Army's conception. Second, the statutory changes in organizational structure that were made until 1986 were far-reaching on the civilian side, but modest on the military side. Several acts of the Congress significantly increased the power of the Secretary of Defense, but until the 1986 Act, when the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was increased, the Chairman's ability to get things done depended mostly on his persuasiveness with his fellow chiefs and his relationship with the Secretary of Defense. His person was so important precisely because his statutory powers were so weak. For 40 years after its creation, a fundamental statutory imbalance therefore persisted between a powerful Secretary of Defense and a weak Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Third, throughout all the reorganizations until the one in 1986, the military services retained considerable autonomy to develop war plans, to train and equip the forces, and to allocate resources in ways each judged best for their own interests.<sup>36</sup> As a consequence, until 1986, the only agent in the Pentagon that could effectively countervail against service insularity was the Secretary of Defense.

This organizational structure produced three perverse bureaucratic outcomes. First, spending by the services tended to be unbalanced. Because the services retained a large degree of control over how they spent the funds allocated to them, they typically gave too much to modernizing their preferred weapons, bought too few of them because they



goldplated them, and allocated too little to the more mundane tasks involved in enhancing the readiness of the forces for combat. The users of the forces that the services trained and equipped—the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the warfighting commands—had little say over how the resources were spent in peacetime, but they had all the responsibility for fighting with them in wartime. The CINCs want many things, but the readiness of their forces is always high on their list. There was thus a significant disconnection between the ultimate users of defense resources (the CINCs) and the providers of them (the services). No central military figure stood above the users and providers, effectively able to adjudicate between them.

Second, too much emphasis throughout the entire Pentagon was put on annual budgeteering at the expense of other important activities. Because there was no integrative force on the military side of the Pentagon, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) spent too much of its time fighting the annual budget wars with the services and the Congress and too little on planning and oversight.<sup>37</sup> As a consequence, OSD became overburdened, overextended into detailed daily management, and overly involved in matters that the military should have initially handled. Rather than oversee and react to military initiatives on those matters that the military properly should have dealt with first, OSD was forced to do the work that the military did not do.

Third, there was too much of what Huntington called “servicism”—too much of a focus on separate service interests.<sup>38</sup> The services experienced roles and missions conflicts with one another that absorbed too much of their energies. The Army and the Air Force fought over close air support; the Air Force and the Navy, over power projection; the Army and the Marines, over intervention forces. Servicism also led to a less than optimal integration of differing military functions across the services. This lack of integration was often manifested in the interoperability of equipment among the services, especially in communications. In the Grenada operation, for example, the Army on land could not easily communicate with the Navy at sea. Reportedly, because he could not directly speak to the Navy offshore, an Army officer



had to use his credit card at a pay phone to call the military command in the United States and be patched through to the naval officers on board ship off the Grenada coast.<sup>39</sup> Servicemism also led to service slighting, or downright neglect, of those functions that they did not favor but which were vital to the other services and to the nation's overall military effectiveness. The Air Force and the Navy, for example, traditionally spent fewer funds on air and sea lift than was required to take the Army to where it had to fight. The Air Force traditionally preferred to have dogfights with enemy aircraft in the sky rather than support the Army's troops on the battlefield by bombing enemy positions. Thus, focused mainly on their own interests, the services cooperated less fully with one another than they should have in allocating resources, developing contingency plans for war, and in waging war.

### **Post-Cold War Outcomes.**

How do the current outcomes compare with the traditional ones? Is Pentagon spending unbalanced? Is there too much budgeteering and too little planning? Is there still rampant servicemism? A preliminary assessment of Pentagon decisionmaking since 1987 demonstrates that in the first two areas—in the balance struck among modernization, the size of the forces, and their readiness, and in comprehensive, integrated planning—real progress has been made. In the third area—servicemism—more moderate, but still measurable progress is occurring.<sup>40</sup>

These are exactly the outcomes to be expected given the nature of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.<sup>41</sup> The 1986 legislation brought about four significant changes in the military side of the Pentagon. First, the legislation strengthened the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was made the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense and was charged with the responsibility of giving military advice that looked across the services rather than merely reflecting the corporate, compromised view of the Joint Chiefs. He was given control over the Joint Staff, which now works for him. And he was charged with the responsibility for developing strategic and contingency plans and for giving

the President and the Secretary advice on matters of resource allocation. Second, the legislation enhanced the voice of the CINCs in the resource allocation process by encouraging them to express their preferences on resource allocation throughout the Pentagon's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and by requiring the Chairman to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the CINCs. In essence, the Chair was made the spokesman for the CINCs. Third, the legislation took steps to make the CINCs command authority commensurate with their responsibilities. They could, for example, now fire their component commanders and could issue orders directly to the forces under their control rather than through the component commanders, as had been the case. Fourth, the legislation created a joint officer specialty and required that all officers who make it to flag rank must first have served in designated joint billets. The act altered officer career incentives by making joint duty mandatory for promotion. The effect of the 1986 reforms has been to produce more integrated military planning and to create a counterweight on the military side of the Pentagon against servicism. In the post-cold war Pentagon, there is no longer simply one institutional countervailer against service parochialism, but two: the Secretary and the Chairman.

By themselves, however, the 1986 reforms could not have produced such measurable progress without two additional ingredients: an aggressive Chairman determined to exploit his new found authority, and a Defense Secretary determined to control the Pentagon and to manage in as planned and balanced a fashion as possible the downsizing of the military establishment. The Cheney-Powell management team has made an effort to increase the effectiveness of Pentagon planning by spending more time on it, by continuing to use biennial budgeting for Pentagon purposes, and by aggressively using the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) mechanism to give better direction to Pentagon planning.

#### **Four Tests of Goldwater-Nichols.**

We can derive an approximate assessment of the effectiveness of both the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and the

Cheney-Powell management style by looking at four examples of Pentagon action since 1989: (1) the development of the base force and the new military strategy; (2) the balance that has been planned over the next 5 years among modernization, readiness, and force size; (3) the military conduct of the Persian Gulf War; and (4) the current status of the roles and missions disputes among the services. The first example bears upon the nature of current planning in the Pentagon; the second, on the degree of balance in resource allocation; and the third and fourth, on the state of servicemism. The first two examples show that real progress has been made in planning and resource balance, though much work still needs to be done; the third, that significant progress in the joint conduct of military operations has been brought about; the fourth, that the improvement in coping with roles and missions disputes is more mixed.

*The Base Force and the New Military Strategy.* The development of the base force and the new military strategy were top down exercises. Both were developed more or less in tandem and, in the case of the base force, in some secrecy by the Joint Staff. Both came at the instigation of Cheney and Powell. Both avoided the cumbersome, oftentimes convoluted, and nearly always stylized process of strategic planning that had characterized previous such exercises. Both were then presented to the service chiefs for their approval.<sup>42</sup> As Sharon Weiner notes:

It was only after the concept [the base force] was fully developed and reviewed that it was presented to the services [by Powell himself] by way of an audience with the service chiefs. By this time, the base force concept was a fait accompli; the service chiefs voiced little disagreement in public....The key is to remember that the base force was developed by the Chairman and sold to the defense establishment from the top down.<sup>43</sup>

In the case of the base force, it was the budget that drove force planning. The base force was designed around the resources that the Joint Staff estimated would be available by fiscal year 1996. Preliminary planning for the base force began in the Joint Staff at the end of Admiral Crowe's tenure as Chairman and was based on an informed estimate that a 25

percent reduction in the defense budget was in the offing.<sup>44</sup> This early preliminary estimate proved remarkably accurate because the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act mandated an 11.3 percent decline in real budget authority for defense in fiscal year 1991 and a 3 percent per annum decrease after that for the next 4 years, or about 25 percent for the 5-year period.<sup>45</sup> Powell wanted to avert budgetary warfare and open bloodletting among the services and have the military itself guide the cuts. He therefore had the Joint Staff further refine the work done under Crowe and then presented it to the service chiefs on May 22, 1989, nearly 5 months before the passage of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, and gained their acquiescence to it.<sup>46</sup> In developing and selling the base force, General Powell clearly exploited the authority given to him by the Goldwater-Nichols Act to present his views on resource allocation. It was a prime example of an aggressive Chairman taking full advantage of the powers that had been granted him.<sup>47</sup>

The development of the new military strategy followed a similar course. It came out of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, with heavy input from the Chairman and the Joint Staff. After assuming his position, Secretary Cheney revamped the strategic planning system of the Pentagon in order to strengthen the planning component of the PPBS system. The Defense Guidance was renamed the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and was now to be more of a top down, not a bottom up exercise. In addition, beginning with the drafting of Cheney's first DPG in the fall of 1989, detailed program guidance would no longer be given; instead, there would be a broader focus on policy and strategy. The intent was to make the DPG more of a planning than a programming document.<sup>48</sup> In conjunction with the drafting of the first DPG in the fall of 1989, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense conducted a study of the emerging security environment. What resulted from this study were the conceptual fundamentals of the base force—strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.<sup>49</sup>

Similarly, the Joint Staff revamped the military side of the strategic planning process, known as the Joint Strategic

Planning System (JSPS), both in order to incorporate the new statutory responsibilities that the Goldwater-Nichols Act had given to the Chairman and to simplify a process that had become cumbersome. Much of Powell's input into the new military strategy, which culminated in the January 1992 document *The National Military Strategy of the United States*, came, however, not in the guise of formal written guidance from the Chairman that had ground its way through the revised process, but in the form of oral communications to the Joint Staff and the services. Rothmann argues that oral rather than written instructions from Powell were issued because of the rapid changes in the international environment. There simply was not the time to send the Chairman's guidance through the JSPS, no matter how streamlined it may have become, because events were continually outpacing the planning system.

This explanation may be plausible, although the base force and the new strategy were at a general enough level, and forward looking enough, that they did not have to be overtaken by daily events. For whatever reason it was done, the fact that Powell make his required input into the JSPS and set the bounds of overall strategy through oral utterances shows how strong he had become. Again, Powell, in conjunction with the OSD, made aggressive use of his new statutory authority to give advice to the Secretary and the President on strategic planning.

*Degree of Balanced Spending.* The second example of Pentagon action since 1989—the planned allocation of resources among the modernization, force size, and readiness accounts—shows some progress, though there is still substantial room for improvement.<sup>50</sup> Any given defense budget can be broken up into three areas: investment (research-development and procurement), or how much is spent to modernize weapons; force size, or how many and what type of standing combat forces to have; and readiness, or how well-trained the standing forces are for war, how quickly they can be sent to where they are needed, and how sustainable they are once in combat.<sup>51</sup> Too often in the past, the readiness of the forces, the number of major weapons with

which they were equipped, the air and sea lift to transport them abroad, and their sustainability were all less than they should have been because they were partially sacrificed for modernization. Previously, new weapons were valued above all else.

In planning for the base force, Cheney and Powell attempted to strike a better balance among these three components. They made a deliberate decision to have a smaller, but well-trained, ready, transportable, and sustainable standing force.<sup>52</sup> The tradeoff made was to decrease procurement by significantly slowing down the pace of weapons modernization. In analyzing the Defense Department's fiscal year 1992-96 defense program, Kaufmann and Steinbruner noted that Cheney had cut procurement by 27 percent, personnel by 22 percent, research and development by 21.3 percent, and operation and maintenance by 20.4 percent. They stated that "the biggest loser is Pentagon procurement" and that "he [Cheney] has reduced operation and maintenance less than military personnel, which suggests that he is giving combat readiness more than lip service."<sup>53</sup> Even though Kaufmann and Steinbruner are tough critics of Cheney's 1992-96 budget, believing the request to be too large and arguing that the same missions could be done with a smaller and less costly force, they still found a more reasoned balance in the force that Cheney was requesting.<sup>54</sup>

Cheney and Powell, however, have not been completely successful in the effort to strike a better balance. Their own projections show an increase in the defense budget beginning in 1997.<sup>55</sup> In analyzing the 5-year program, Robert Hale, Assistant Director of the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office, argued that "the level of real defense budget authority the Administration has proposed for 1995 will not be enough to support the smaller forces in the long run."<sup>56</sup> The reason is that the next generation of weapons systems that the Pentagon hopes to procure in the later 1990s will be more expensive than the Pentagon has planned for. Hale estimated that the annual procurement costs to maintain the 1995 forces over the long term, figured in 1991 dollars, is \$67 billion with current equipment and \$109 billion with the

planned-for modernized equipment, or \$40 billion more than the amount budgeted for procurement in fiscal year 1995.<sup>57</sup> Thus, while a better balance has been struck for the next 5 years, the problem has not been solved beyond 1997.

Still, by the Pentagon's past performance, this is measurable, even if not overwhelming, progress. The fact that some real improvement in spending balance has been made is due to Cheney's and Powell's determination to have a ready and sustainable military instrument and to advice on the allocation resources that a strengthened and determined Chairman can now offer.<sup>58</sup>

*Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.* The actual military conduct of the Persian Gulf War is a third benchmark by which to measure the effectiveness of the 1986 changes in Pentagon management.<sup>59</sup> The DESERT STORM campaign was not without its blemishes, and it revealed some important shortcomings in the forces. But compared to past combat action, it was outstanding in one crucial respect: because of the greater authority the 1986 legislation gave to the theater commanders (the CINCs), General Schwarzkopf was able to command his forces without undue service and Washington interference. Goldwater-Nichols simplified the chain of command between Washington and the theater and gave the CINCs more authority over their component commands. The difference this made for the operation of the forces in the field is easily measured by comparing the Defense Department's post mortem on the 1983 Beirut operation with its interim report on DESERT STORM.

The American forces sent to Beirut by President Reagan in 1983 for a "presence" mission were attacked by a suicidal terrorist driving a truck loaded with explosives and suffered over 200 casualties. The Long Commission concluded.

that the 'presence' mission was not interpreted the same by all levels of the chain of command and that perceptual differences regarding that mission, including the responsibility of the USMNF [United States Multinational Forces] for the security of Beirut International Airport, should have been recognized and corrected by the chain of command.<sup>60</sup>



The Long Commission found that security at the American base was lax because the forces in the field were not alerted to intelligence reports circulating in Washington that an attack might occur. Washington was aware of these reports, as was the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), under whose responsibility the Beirut operation ultimately fell. The Long Commission found that there was "a lack of effective command supervision of the United States Multinational Force security posture." Because of the great distance of CINCEUR from Beirut and because of the undue length in the chain of command, this information from Washington never got to the field commander of the forces in Beirut. Washington had been alerted to a possible terrorist attack, but the forces at the airport were not. As a consequence, they had not taken simple precautions that could have foiled it. The subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon heavily damaged American credibility among its Middle Eastern allies.

In its interim report on DESERT STORM, the Defense Department concluded: "The success of these operations can be partially attributed to the impact GNA [the Goldwater-Nichols Act] has had on the Defense Department."<sup>61</sup> The House Armed Services analysis is more explicit in its assessment:

Goldwater-Nichols gave the CINCs authorities commensurate with their long-held responsibility for the conduct of war. Most of the added authorities, such as command, employment of forces, and hiring and firing of subordinates were exercised by General Schwarzkopf in the Persian Gulf war. It also gave the CINC significant authority over logistics and support.

The most identifiable feature was the streamlined chain of command from Washington to the field commander. General Schwarzkopf, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, controlled operations in the theater. The theater commander also was in complete control over combat forces.

Because of the single chain of command, there was little opportunity to revisit decisions endlessly, as is the usual Pentagon practice. *Goldwater-Nichols did not terminate interservice disagreements—it made their resolution possible.*<sup>62</sup>



DESERT STORM was a success for many reasons, but one of them was because the warfighter could fight without one hand tied behind his back.

*Roles and Missions Disputes.* The final example by which to assess the effectiveness of current Pentagon management is the status of the roles and missions disputes among the services. Here the record is less impressive, and the progress in resolving long-standing issues hardly noticeable. At first glance, this assessment may appear strange. How can an argument be made that more integrated military planning and better resource allocation is taking place when little or no progress is being made in resolving roles and missions disputes? Does not the persistence of the latter prevent the existence of the former? Are the two not mutually exclusive?

The apparent paradox is easily explained, and the key lies in the last quotation from the House Armed Services Committee's report on DESERT STORM. Goldwater-Nichols did not abolish service disputes over roles and missions because it did not abolish the services. What it did try to do was to make the services primarily trainers, equippers, and weapons developers for the warfighters and to make the Chairman of the JCS, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs, the transservice integrators and warfighters. As long as the services exist, however, as long as they have a role in training, equipping, and developing the forces, they will inject their preferences into the military establishment. That is not all bad. After all, the services do have tremendous expertise about different modes of warfare. They engender a sense of loyalty, tradition, and comradeship that is essential to successful combat. They do train and equip the forces. Much of what they offer is crucial to an effective U.S. military establishment. What Goldwater-Nichols did, then, was not to end interservice disputes, but rather to create an institutionalized force on the military side to wage constant war against it.

Currently there are one hot and three simmering service wars going on.<sup>63</sup> The hot one revolves around the never-ending battle between the Army and the Air Force over what previously was called close air support and now is called battlefield interdiction. The Air Force has traditionally not

wanted to provide battlefield support for the Army. The Army has preferred not to waste its dollars doing so, but has done it with helicopters in the face of Air Force default.<sup>64</sup> What once was a dispute over who should provide battlefield support one to five miles beyond the FEBA (forward edge of battle) has become one of who should do so up to 100-150 miles beyond the battlefield. The culprit is technology. With its own ground-to-ground missiles (ATACMS), long range attack helicopters (Apaches), and shorter range rockets (MLRS), the Army can now attack enemy forces far beyond the traditional range of artillery in support of its troops on the battlefield, at ranges that only the Air Force once could, at ranges where the Air Force itself will have its planes flying, and at ranges where it does not want Army missiles dangerously cluttering up its working airspace. With the new technology, it has become harder to draw the line between where close air support ends and battlefield interdiction begins.

This issue, as with most other roles and missions ones, is highly emotional and not resolved. For the air force pilot, the mission that can land him in the most trouble is the one where he has to fly low at 300 miles per hour, identify friend from foe, and destroy all of the latter and none of the former. For the Army ground commander, the thing that he fears most is having his troops subjected to withering artillery fire and the enemy's own close air support, without the air assets to counter them. Where lives are at stake, emotions understandably run hot.

The three simmering disputes are: the Army versus the Marines over Third World intervention, the Marine Corps versus the Army and Air Force over special operations, and the Air Force versus the Navy over power projection. In the Army-Marines dispute, the Marines maintain that they are the force of choice for expeditionary jaunts into the Third World and are trying to "heavy up" their forces a bit. The Army maintains that it has always had a contingency capability for that mission and is trying to "lighten up" some of its forces for it. At this stage, the two services have decided that there is probably enough of this mission to go around for both of them and have agreed not to disagree in public. In the special

operations dispute, the Marines have offered the MEUSOC (the Marines Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable) as a light intervention force for low intensity conflicts. The Army and the Air Force maintain that there is no reason for the Marines to be floating around at sea, waiting to pounce, when Army forces can just as easily be dropped into a country by the Air Force. This dispute is muted at present. Finally, after Secretary of the Air Force Don Rice a few years ago demonstrated that two B-2 bombers flying from the United States could drop as much tonnage on a nation as could one aircraft carrier, he revived the power projection debate that raged publicly for a time between the Navy and the Air Force in late 1940s. This dispute has waned a bit. The Navy is running less scared after Cheney cut the B-2 force to 20.

Disputes such as these will rise to the fore from time to time as long as the services exist. In one respect, they are healthy because competition produces better results than monopoly. In another respect, they are unhealthy because they often produce too much redundancy. The trick is to manage interservice disputes in such a way so as to maximize the benefits of competition and minimize the costs of duplication. Interservice rivalries should be viewed as one of the costs of doing business, but, as with all business costs, they should be kept low.<sup>65</sup>

## **CONCLUSION—THE CASE FOR “CREEPING JOINTNESS”**

The Goldwater-Nichols reforms were the fourth major legislative reorganization of the U.S. military establishment since the end of World War II. The 1947 National Security Act created a national military establishment and set the precedent for a single defense department. The 1949 Amendments to that act established the Department of Defense and significantly enhanced the authority of the Secretary of Defense. The 1958 Reorganization Act created a powerful Secretary of Defense. The 1986 Act created a powerful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Are more such reorganizations required?

The answer offered here is "no." Rather, a strong case can be made that, barring the abolishment of the military services, such reorganizations for the time being have run their course. Instead, what is required is time for the 1986 reforms fully to work their will. This is a matter more of what I call "creeping jointness" than it is of additional legislative reorganizations. The evidence presented here suggests that the 1986 reforms are working and that Pentagon management has improved significantly. Other studies have confirmed the conclusions reached here.<sup>66</sup> What appeared to many at the time as marginal changes have begun to produce big results. An early, but perceptive observer of the post-1986 Pentagon wrote:

Although on the surface changes in the roles and structure of joint organizations may appear relatively minor, a major cultural change is under way. The predominance of the services in planning, programming, and budgeting is gradually being modified to give a significant role to the joint military structure, particularly to the chairman, the CINC's, and the Joint Staff. The services, of necessity, must continue to play key roles as they fund, administer, support, train, and provide forces for the CINC's, but the joint voice is being heard and listened to far more than before. As one CINC told the author, 'When we knock they have to open the door.'<sup>67</sup>

The issue now is for future Defense Secretaries and Chairmen of the JCS to utilize fully the statutory authority they currently have. Secretary of Defense Weinberger initially opposed the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and did little during his tenure to make it work. Cheney has been committed to it. Chairman Crowe went slowly with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. He chose his issues carefully so as not to antagonize the services and went cautiously in implementing the legislation so as to preserve their spirit of hesitant cooperation. But he had an agenda and favored the 1986 Act. Powell accelerated the pace of implementing Goldwater-Nichols. In retrospect, he had little choice. With two military operations and severe budget cuts, all during his first 2 years, he had to exploit the powers the 1986 Act gave him if he wanted to run a successful military operation. The Gulf War was especially critical in pushing Powell to take full advantage of the powers Goldwater-Nichols had granted him.<sup>68</sup> As Powell was reputed to have said during the war-planning phase of DESERT

STORM: "We go, we win."<sup>69</sup> The reputation of the U.S. military establishment was on the line. No more Vietnams could be tolerated. The crucible of war forced the pace of reform.

The ultimate test of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms is what the military officers who have to live with them think. The evidence is clear about the impact of the reforms on career tracks.<sup>70</sup> In the past, the fast track to flag rank was a service command billet and then a posting on the service staff in the Pentagon. Today, the fast track is a command billet and then a posting on the Joint Staff. Before, the service staffs got the best of their officers and the Joint Staff, whatever was left. Now, the Joint Staff gets the best the services have, and the service staffs get whatever is left. What inside participants disagree about is whether the officers who seek out joint duty become less parochial in their outlook, less service focused, and evolve to a truly joint outlook; or whether they are merely punching their tickets, donning the cloak of jointness when required, and then casting it off when returning to their service. The system does work with only joint ticket punchers. It will work best with truly joint thinkers who place the coherence of the National Military Strategy above service parochialism.

## ENDNOTES

1. President Bush first spelled out the new strategy in his speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium, Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. Secretary of Defense Cheney elaborated on it in his testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in connection with the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1992-93 budget, on February 7 and 21, 1991, respectively. The most recent complete statements of the new military strategy are found in Colin L. Powell, *The National Military Strategy, 1992*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992; and Dick Cheney, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, pp. 1-19. I explain these four terms more fully below.

2. See Andrew Rosenthal, "U.S. to Give up Short-Range Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, September 28, 1991, p. A1.

3. In 1960, at the height of the cold war, Hedley Bull eloquently made the point that political competitions drove arms races in his *The Control of the Arms Race*, New York: Praeger, 1960. For an analysis of the critical

decisions shaping America's cold war nuclear force, see Robert J. Art, "The United States: Nuclear Weapons and Grand Strategy," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., *Security with Nuclear Weapons?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 57-99.

4. During the cold war, four criteria were used to size the U.S. nuclear force: (1) finite or minimum deterrence—the forces needed to destroy a significant percentage of the Soviet Union's most populated cities; (2) equality in the size of forces—the forces needed to match the size of the Soviet's forces, on the grounds that forces equal in size were equal in political effect; (3) extended deterrence—the forces needed to convince the Western Europeans and the Japanese over whom the U.S. nuclear umbrella was extended that they were well protected; and (4) damage limitation—the forces needed to minimize damage to the U.S. homeland should it have had to wage a nuclear war against the Soviets. Only the first criterion invariably calls for a small deterrent; the next three criteria were used by cold war U.S. administrations to justify forces much larger than the minimum deterrent. With the United States and Russia already on the path towards nuclear reduction, the second and fourth factors will no longer drive up the size of the U.S. nuclear force. This leaves the first and third factors as the ones that will primarily determine the size of the U.S. nuclear force in the post-cold war world.

5. Before the United States and the Soviet Union signed the START Treaty on July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union had, respectively, about 11,600 and 10,200 strategic nuclear warheads. By the terms of the START Treaty, each nation is required to reduce its warhead arsenals by about 30 percent, giving the United States 8,600-9,000 warheads and the Soviet Union 6,500-7,000. The START Treaty limits both powers to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. (The discrepancy between the higher figures and accountable warheads results from the fact that gravity bombs on planes are counted only as one warhead, even though bombers carry more than one bomb). On January 28, 1992, in his State of the Union address, President Bush proposed cutting the U.S. strategic arsenal even further to 4,500-5,000 warheads. The next day, President Yeltsin bettered that by proposing that both powers cut their nuclear arsenals to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads. See Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Considering Sharp Cuts in Multi-Warhead Missiles, Core of Nuclear Force," *The New York Times*, January 23, 1992, p. A8; Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush and Yeltsin Propose Deep Cuts in Atomic Weapons," *The New York Times*, January 30, 1992, p. A1; Barbara Crosette, "Four Ex-Soviet States and U.S. in Accord on 1991 Arms Pact," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1992, p. A12; and Dick Cheney, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1992*, p. 10.

6. For the case that it should, see Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjens, "Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4, pp. 95-111. For a thoughtful treatment of what effects

different international political outcomes can have on the size and character of U.S. nuclear forces, see Charles L. Glaser, "Nuclear Policy without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the Post-Soviet Era," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring 1992, pp. 5-34.

7. Concerns about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to the Western Europeans, for example, drove up the size of the ballistic missile force constructed by the Kennedy Administration, probably by a factor of three or more. See Robert J. Art, "The United States: Nuclear Weapons and Grand Strategy," pp. 77-86.

8. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is up for review in 1995, requires the nuclear powers to take steps to reduce their arsenals in return for the NPT signatories' agreement to remain non-nuclear.

9. Were the United States not to be concerned about nuclear spread, it could rapidly move to a minimum force. My view is that it should worry about the consequences for itself and international politics if the spread continues. For an assessment of the pros and cons of nuclear spread, see Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring 1981, pp. 23-30.

10. The Missile Defense Act as quoted in *Missing the Target: SDI in the 1990s*, A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1992, p. 10. See also Lewis A. Dunn, *Containing Nuclear Proliferation*, Adelphi Paper No. 263, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Winter 1991, pp. 63-65; and mimeo from the office of Congressman Les Aspin, "From Deterrence to Denuking: Dealing with Proliferation in the 1990s," February 18, 1992.

11. Expansion of such a land-based system to seven sites, each with 100 interceptors, would be a clear violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty because it would give the United States a continental defense, even if it were a thin one. Expansion to seven sites would require the United States to revise the treaty in negotiations with Russia. But even the deployment of 100 interceptors at the ICBM missile field in Grand Forks, North Dakota, could be a violation of the treaty if the range of the interceptors were great enough such that the Grand Forks site gave something well beyond a regional defense of the missile field. This is the conclusion reached in a draft 112-page report by the Pentagon's SDI office on the merits of the 1991 Missile Defense Act. See William J. Broad, "'Stars Wars' Found to Violate Treaty," *The New York Times*, June 4, 1992, p. A7.

12. If they can be made effective and not easily offset by countermeasures, TMD could offer some protection to overseas U.S. forces against ballistic missiles armed with high-explosive conventional or chemical warheads. Because TMD will never be leakproof, they could offer little hope against a ballistic missile nuclear attack. But U.S. nuclear forces



should be able to deter such an attack. For a skeptical view of the military value of theater defenses, see Theodore A. Postal, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter 1991-92, pp. 119-172. For Robert Stein's counter to Postal's article, and Postal's reply, see Stein's and Postal's correspondence in *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 199-240. Robert Stein works for the Raytheon Corporation, which makes the Patriot missile.

13. If they have any effect, theater defenses are more likely to dampen the incentives of threatened states to acquire ballistic and chemical weapons than they are to discourage them from acquiring nuclear forces. Theater defenses will never be perfect. The consequences of only one nuclear warhead on a city are immensely greater than hits by several ballistic missiles with chemical warheads, terrible though the latter may be. States that feel subject to a severe nuclear threat are more likely to rely on their own nuclear forces for deterrence than to base their security on defenses provided by others that will leak, even if only a little. For a good analysis of the ballistic and chemical threats, see Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, especially pp. 7-28.

14. Lewis A. Dunn, an analyst not known for an eagerness to deploy new military systems, has almost reached the same conclusion: "...some near-term deployments of next generation ground-based defenses (including sensors in space) in countries threatened by neighboring new nuclear powers...warrants careful scrutiny." See Dunn, p. 63.

15. Matthew Bunn, "Star Wars Redux: Limited Defenses, Unlimited Dilemmas," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 21, No. 4, May 1991, pp. 13 and 14; and Harold Brown, "Yes on Patriot, No on SDI," *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1991. For an argument in favor of limited homeland deployment, see Michael Krepon, "Limited ABM Defense: A Prudent Step," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 21, No. 8, October 1991, pp. 15, 19, and 20. For an analysis of the costs and dangers of too early a deployment of homeland defenses, see William J. Broad, "Pentagon Analyst Questions Plan for Early 'Star Wars' Deployment," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1992, p. A1; and William J. Broad, "'Stars Wars' Plan to Be Delayed Because of Risk," *The New York Times*, June 6, 1992, p. A1.

16. There are those, such as Senator Sam Nunn, who have given an additional reason for a limited defense of the United States: they worry about a rogue Soviet military commander firing an unauthorized strategic warhead against the United States. For Senator Sam Nunn's views, see his statement on the Senate floor, in *The Congressional Record*, July 31, 1991, S11466-468. This is physically possible, according to a recent Harvard study. See Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, and Charles A. Zraket, *Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal*



in a *Disintegrating Soviet Union*, Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, November 1991, especially pp. 35-47. It is hard, however, to see why it is more politically probable now than it was before the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rather, the real worry about Soviet nuclear weapons must be forcible seizure of the tactical nuclear warheads, which are more likely to be used by the former Soviet republics against one another, or sold to other nations or terrorists. By July 1992, all Soviet tactical nuclear warheads are to be in Russia.

17. The United Nations has proved reasonably effective in peacekeeping between Croatia and Serbia, but, as with most peacekeeping operations, only after a lot of slaughter had first taken place and only after exhaustion in both warring camps had set in. It has as yet not proved able to engage in successful peacekeeping between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. See Paul Lewis, "U.N. Rules Out a Force to Halt Bosnia Fighting," *The New York Times*, May 14, 1992, p. A1.

18. For a good short review of United Nations' peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, see Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in a New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 69-84.

19. The G-7 political leaders (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada) in their July 1991 summit meeting declared: "We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfill completely the promise and the vision of its founders....We commit ourselves to making the U.N. stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression." "Text of the G-7 Political Declaration," in *Asahi Evening News*, July 17, 1991, p. 3. See also Paul Lewis, "World Leaders at the U.N. Pledge to Broaden Its Role to Achieve a Lasting Peace," *The New York Times*, February 1, 1992, p. A1. For a thoughtful proposal on the design of an effective U.N. peacemaking force, see Richard N. Gardner, "Practical Internationalism," in Graham T. Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security*, New York: Norton, 1992, pp. 267-279.

20. A standing U.N. military force is likely to be more of a deterrent to aggression than one organized on an ad hoc basis after aggression has occurred, as was the case in the Persian Gulf War. The problem is that the first type of force is more difficult to bring into existence than the second. Thus, the type of force best suited for deterrent purposes is the one hardest to create.

21. The information about the attitudes of governmental leaders in East Asia and Western Europe towards a U.S. military presence is based on 17 interviews conducted with governmental officials and with scholars in research institutes close to official thinking in Tokyo in July 1991; 20

interviews with scholars in research institutes close to official thinking in Beijing in July 1991; and 40 interviews conducted with NATO officials in Brussels and with officials of defense and foreign affairs ministries in London, Brussels, Paris, and Bonn in January 1992.

22. One of the imponderables is whether the publics will see things the same way as their governments. For example, in a recent survey of public attitudes in Germany in December 1991, 64 percent of West Germans believed NATO was essential to Germany's security, but 49 percent of them wanted all American troops removed from their territory. Both figures were significantly lower for East German attitudes. See John Tabliabue, "In Germany, West Plus East Means Policy Shifts," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1992, p. E5. Other polls, however, have produced different results. One conducted in May 1991 in the four largest EC countries found opinion running two to one against the United States leaving NATO or U.S. forces withdrawing from Europe. See Erika v.C. Bruce, "NATO's Public Opinion Seminar Indicates Continuing, But Not Unshakable, Support," *NATO Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2, April 1992, p. 7.

23. This statement is based on interviews conducted in Washington, DC in May and December 1991 with U.S. Government officials who carefully monitor East European matters. NATO has not yet agreed to membership for these three nations, but it has devised an arrangement called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the NACC), which is an expansion of the North Atlantic Council, to provide a more formal NATO link to the former Warsaw Pact nations and the former republics of the Soviet Union. Through this mechanism, all these nations are members of a NATO organization, even though they are not members of NATO itself. For a concise description of the NACC, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central Europe," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 141-153. For a good overview of Eastern European thinking about security matters since 1989, see Richard Weitz, "Pursuing Military Security in Eastern Europe," in Robert O. Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann, and J.S. Nye, Jr, eds., *After the Cold War*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

24. As described in *The National Military Strategy, 1992*, pp. 6-8.

25. For three alternatives to GPALS, each of which would cost less than the Bush proposal, see Congressional Budget Office, *Costs of Alternative Approaches to SDI*, CBO Papers, May 1992.

26. The same logic of averting deployment at this time of a space-based defense also applies to a land-based defense. From one standpoint, the issue of deployment of a land-based defense is moot, because the Pentagon has slipped the date from 1997 to 1998. From another standpoint, the issue is crucial, because plans made now to deploy systems later might adversely affect the current internal political evolution of Russia. As

mentioned above, Congress has made clear that the 1991 Missile Act is not a decision to deploy, but one to develop a system for deployment. This distinction should be maintained. The political evolution of Russia should be a critical factor in any deployment decision, which means that it should not be made on technical grounds alone.

27. See *Missing the Target* for a more extended treatment of these argument.

28. *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1992*, p. 9.

29. I am indebted to Samuel P. Huntington for this insight from his speech delivered at the "Conference on Reconstitution, Force Structure, and Industrial Strategy," held by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, May 7-8, 1992.

30. For a useful typology of the size and nature of the threats the United States may face, see mimeo from office of Congressman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era," January 24, 1992.

31. Because I believe in the predictions of balance of power theory, I am skeptical that the United States can indefinitely retain its preeminent position. The use of power is never benign to all actors, and it begets counters and checks to it. What I prescribe is therefore more in the way of a delaying than a preventive tactic. For a short, perceptive statement about the potential effects of unbalanced power, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "America as a Model for the World?", *PS: Political Science and Politics*, December 1991, pp. 667-670.

32. The Pentagon's Draft Planning Guidance (DPG) for the Fiscal Year 1994-99 time frame smacked of such arrogant unilateralism. As described in an excerpt: "Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union." After much political opposition within the United States and from abroad, particularly on the grounds that such planning could provoke the very thing it was designed to avoid, the DPG was revised to put more emphasis on regional threats: "The third goal is to preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and our allies." The language appears somewhat softened, though the ultimate goal to me looks the same. It appears that the State Department's preferences for "collective engagement" prevailed over those of the Defense Department for U.S. unilateralism. For the first quote, see *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p. 8; for the second, *The New York Times*, May 24, 1992, p. 14.

33. For more details on Secretary of State Baker's views on collective engagement, see Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Spells Out U.S. Approach: Alliances and 'Democratic Peace'," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1992, p. A6.

34. For interesting proposals on how to preserve the defense industrial base in an era of shrinking procurement, see mimeo from office of Congressman Les Aspin, "Tomorrow's Defense From Today's Industrial Base: Finding the Right Resource Strategy for a New Era," speech before the American Defense Preparedness Association, February 12, 1992.

35. See Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, for a good analysis of the bureaucratic and political compromises made in unifying the military departments after World War II.

36. For a fuller analysis of these points, see Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace*, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985, especially the introduction and the chapters by Vincent Davis, William J. Lynn, Robert W. Komer, and Samuel P. Huntington.

37. For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Robert J. Art, "From Budget Wars to 'Real' Wars: The Pentagon and Biennial Budgeting," in James A. Blackwell, Jr. and Barry M. Blechman, eds., *Making Defense Reform Work*, Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990, pp. 25-71.

38. Art, Davis, and Huntington, eds., p. 233.

39. This rumor was checked out by the Senate Armed Services Committee and was found to be correct in its fundamentals. I am indebted to John Hamre, who works on the Senate committee, for verification of this newspaper report.

40. It is important to stress that this assessment of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms must be preliminary. As described below, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms made four important changes, three of which have produced clear results. The fourth will take more time because it tackles the hardest area of all—changing the mental attitudes of officers and their emotional attachments to their service roles and missions. Thinking jointly, not simply acting jointly, will take time to bring about through the educational and socialization reforms prescribed by Goldwater-Nichols.

41. For a concise description of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and an early assessment of them, see Blackwell and Blechman, eds., Chapter 11. The 1986 legislation is to be found in *Public Law 99-433 — October 1, 1986* (Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986).

42. I have relied for information about the development of the base force and the new military strategy on Harry E. Rothmann, "Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 26, 1992; and Sharon K. Weiner, "Adapting to Change: U.S. Defense Policy Confronts the New World Order," unpublished paper, MIT Department of Political Science, August 1991. Colonel Rothmann, as chief of the Strategy Applications Branch, Strategy Division, J-5, Joint Staff, was a participant in the development of both the base force and the new military strategy. Sharon K. Weiner conducted a series of interviews with participants in the base force deliberations.

43. Weiner, pp. 27-28.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

45. Patrick J. Garrity and Sharon K. Weiner, "U.S. Defense Strategy After the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 58.

46. Weiner, p. 28.

47. One can make this judgment about the role that the Chairman played, even if one does not agree with all of the decisions contained in the base force. It is the ability of the Chairman to offer transservice advice, not the quality of that advice, that is at issue here.

48. Telephone interview with a civilian in the Pentagon who works in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense and is involved in the resource allocation process, February 4, 1992.

49. Weiner, p. 29.

50. Important as the issue is, I do not systematically address the level of defense spending here, only how the dollars are allocated once the level is set. My own view on the matter is that the Bush Administration's planned 25-28 percent cut over 5 years is too little, but that proposals for 50 percent are too much. If the deployment of U.S. forces in Europe is cut from the planned 120,000 to 40-70,000 and the additional troops are demobilized, if modernization of the strategic forces is slowed even more, if a careful comparative look is taken at the nations' four tactical air forces, if resources budgeted for reconstitution are mostly scrapped, and if the number of carrier battle groups is reduced somewhat, another 10-12 percent cut in the defense budget seems easily attainable. Somewhere between a 33-38 percent cut in the defense budget over 5 years is my own preference. For a careful analysis of the force structure implications of alternative defense budgets, see William W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner, *Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order*, Washington, DC: The Brookings

Institution, 1991, Chapters 7 and 8. It also is important to keep a longer term perspective when determining the size of future defense budgets. Budget authority for defense has declined from \$387 billion in fiscal year 1985 to \$300 billion in fiscal year 1992. For the same period, budget outlays have gone from \$330 to \$285 billion. These represent real cuts, respectively, of 22 and 14 percent since 1985. (Figures are in constant fiscal year 1993 dollars and come from House Armed Services Committee, *Fiscal Year 93 Defense Authorization Bill—Summary of Major Actions in Committee Markup*, May 13, 1992. Thus, additional cuts of 25-37 percent in budget authority and outlays over the next few years are being made on a base that has already been cut from 14-22 percent. The Defense Department projects a cumulative real decline in budget authority from 1985-93 of 29 percent and from 1985-97 of 37 percent. See "DOD Budget Briefing with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney," January 29, 1992, appended tables.

51. These three accounts correspond, respectively, to the research and development and procurement titles, the personnel title, and the operation and maintenance title in the congressional authorizing and appropriations legislation.

52. Cheney first laid out his approach in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 7, 1991. See pp. 6-12 of that testimony (Department of Defense mimeo).

53. Kaufmann and Steinbruner, p. 38. I must add that although they note these trends in the fiscal year 1992-96 budget proposal, Kaufmann and Steinbruner are critical of the size of the budget request and believe that the same missions can be accomplished for less cost. See Chapters 7 and 8 of their *Decisions for Defense*.

54. It is important to keep in mind that Cheney's fiscal year 1992-96 request was made in January 1991, 8 months before the Soviet coup and nearly a year before the breakup of the Soviet Union. A year later in January 1992, Cheney responded to these developments with further cuts that amounted to about another \$60 billion for the same period above what had been recommended a year earlier. See "DOD Budget Briefing with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney," January 29, 1992.

55. "DOD Budget Briefing with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney," January 29, 1992, appended tables.

56. Robert F. Hale, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, March 19, 1991, Congressional Budget Office (mimeo), pp. 23.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

58. Part of this improvement must be attributed to the greater role that the CINCs play in the Pentagon PPBS system. This role began in the early



1980s, but was immeasurably strengthened by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. For an analysis of how the CINCs have operated in the PPBS system since 1986, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Roles of Joint Military Organizations in Resource Allocations*, NSIAD-90-76, June 1990.

59. The full Pentagon report on the Gulf War is not yet available to the public. In assessing the effects of the 1986 legislation on the relation between the theater commander and Washington and on the ability of General Norman Schwarzkopf to command his forces in the field, I have relied on three sources: Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991; Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, An Interim Report to Congress, July 1991*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991; and House Committee on Armed Services, *Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

60. *Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983*, (The Long Commission), December 20, 1983, p. 122.

61. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict*, p. 26-1.

62. *Defense for a New Era*, pp. 41-42. Emphasis added.

63. The information on current roles and missions disputes is based on two phone interviews with a well-placed colonel who works in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy on February 5 and May 22, 1992, and one phone interview with a long-serving staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 10, 1992.

64. This is what the Army did in Vietnam. See Frederic A. Bergerson, *The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.

65. I do not want to be misunderstood on this point. The Secretary and the Chairman can do more to mitigate interservice rivalry. The four tactical air forces that the Pentagon currently has—the Army's, the Air Force's, the Navy's, and the Marine's—are an excellent place to begin. My only point is that, short of abolishing the services, there will always be a degree of rivalry among them for missions because it is impossible to draw hard and fast lines around modern warfare.

66. See Blechman and Blackwell, eds., Chapters 6 and 7; U.S. General Accounting Office, *Compliance with Legislative Mandate for Contingency Planning*, NSIAD-91-312, September 1991; U.S. General Accounting Office, *Roles of Joint Military Organizations in Resource Allocations*, NSIAD-90-76, June 1990; U.S. General Accounting Office, *Implementation Status of Joint Officer Personnel Policies*, NSIAD-89-113, April 1989; U.S.

General Accounting Office, *Progress and Concerns at JCS and Combatant Commands*, NSIAD-89-83, March 1989; *1992 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, pp. 141-153; House Committee on Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee, *Hearings on Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986*, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 1988; House Committee on Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee, *Hearing on DOD Reorganization Implementation*, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.

67. Admiral Robert P. Hilton, "The Role of Joint Military Institutions in Defense Resource Planning," in Blechman and Blackwell, eds., p. 163.

68. Telephone interview on February 5, 1992.

69. Quoted in Woodward, p. 314.

70. For example, see GAO Report NSIAD-99-113 and *1992 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense*, pp. 141-153.



**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**Major General William A. Stofft  
Commandant**

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