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THE GUYANA-VENEZUELA BORDER DISPUTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS
BEHIND VENEZUELA'S CONTINUING DEMANDS FOR ABROGATION
OF THE 1899 ANGLO-VENEZUELAN ARBITRAL TREATY

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BY

ORLANDO JESUS FERNANDEZ Y GOMEZ

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A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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Statement A per telecon Jim Creighton
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Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School
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BEHIND VENEZUELA'S CONTINUING DEMANDS FOR ABROGATION
OF THE 1899 ANGLO-VENEZUELAN ARBITRAL TREATY

By

Orlando Jesus Fernandez y Gomez

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Chairman: Dr. Terry L. McCoy
Major Department: Latin American Studies

This thesis examines the unstated reasons behind Venezuela's attempts to abrogate the Anglo-Venezuelan Arbitral Treaty signed on October 3, 1899 which supposedly settled the boundary dispute between the Co-operative Republic of Guyana (then British Guiana) and the Republic of Venezuela. The research focused on the periods immediately preceding the February 1944 release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum and the formal rejection by Venezuela of the 1899 Arbitral Award at the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on August 18, 1962 to the collapse of the Port-of-Spain Protocol on June 17, 1982. Research was further conducted to examine some of the relevant factors in Venezuela's foreign relations with its neighbors and domestic issues which may have affected its decision to nullify the Arbitral Award and demand re-examination of the boundaries with the Republic of Guyana.

Venezuela's rationalizations for abrogating the 1899 Arbitral Award are discussed and analyzed. The arguments regarding Venezuela's dismissal of the 1899 Arbitral Award can be divided into two camps: the Mallet-Prevost February 1944 posthumous declaration that there was collusion between Great Britain and Czarist Russia in deciding the border issue, and that Venezuela used the Mallet-Prevost memorandum merely as a vehicle to distract popular attention from foreign policy and domestic failures that arose after the British-Venezuelan Mixed Boundary Commission settled the limits between the two nations.

Using the premise of the latter argument, I have argued that Venezuela's reasons for declaring the Arbitral Award "null and void" were a "reflex-reaction" against internal and external pressures that affected a succession of Venezuelan governments. This thesis took the focus that Venezuela's discovery of rich mineral deposits in the contested Essequibo region while arbitration was being conducted to settle the border dispute exacerbated by the subsequent "loss" of other portions of national territory to Colombia in 1941, pushed the Venezuelan government to refute the 1899 Arbitral Award.

Guyana's and Venezuela's current attempts to resolve the international crisis were also examined. The thesis concludes with a look at existing prospects and options for resolving the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

After almost fifteen years of diplomatic protests between Great Britain and Venezuela concerning the exact limits of British Guiana's western boundary with Venezuela, the two nations reached an impasse on the settlement of their border dispute in 1895. President Grover Cleveland of the United States and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney, who had been repeatedly asked to intervene in the matter on the side of Venezuela finally did so with the effect that on July 20, 1895, the United States accused Great Britain of violating the Monroe Doctrine and almost went to the brink of war on account of perceived British attempts to colonize new territories in South America (Kryzanek, 1990: 33-34).


Britain, which was involved with other "more pressing demands," and was facing serious challenges to its empire in South Africa and possible threats in Canada, acquiesced to U.S. pressure and agreed to go along with international arbitration to settle the boundary issue (Kryzanek, 1990: 33-34). On October 3, 1899, an Arbitral Treaty was signed by Great Britain and Venezuela under the auspices of the United States.

The outcome of the Arbitral Award, according to the judges who made up the Arbitral Tribunal, was largely in Venezuela's favor, and as a result of the "generous" terms of the 1899 Treaty, it was generally believed that the Anglo-Venezuelan border dispute had finally been resolved. But, late in the

1940's. Venezuela resurrected its claim to over 58,000 square miles of territory belonging to British Guiana (Figure 1-3). Venezuela claimed that a posthumous memorandum, written in 1944 by Severo Mallet-Prevost, a junior counsel present at the 1897 Arbitral Tribunal, and published after his death in 1948, proved that Venezuela had been "cheated" of territory that was rightfully hers. Mallet-Prevost alleged that the award of the Tribunal, was the product of collusion, and that the United States had been pressured by Great Britain and Russia into accepting the provisions of the award as dictated by these two nations. Due to this supposedly corrupt handling of the award, Venezuela considered that the Arbitral Tribunal's decisions were totally invalid and refused to abide by its terms any longer.

In a message dated August 18, 1962, Venezuela went to the United Nations Organization with an appeal for "justice" in the settlement of her territorial claims with British Guiana. Venezuela asked the United Nations to include the question of boundaries and the territory of British Guiana on the agenda of the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Manley, 1979: 41-42).

The purpose of this thesis has been to chronicle the facts and circumstances relating to the Guyana-Venezuela border controversy, with the specific intent of examining why, Venezuela waited until 1962 to revive her supposedly settled borders with British Guiana, and what those reasons could have been. It was not the purpose of this thesis to make a judgment regarding which nation has legal claim to the Essequibo region.



FEATURES: 1) Guyana 2) Venezuela

Figure 1-1
Map of South America





Figure 1-2
Map of Venezuela



/// Disputed Area

Figure 1-3
Map of Guyana

Background to the Guyana-Venezuela Border
Dispute: the Colonial Period

The origins of the border controversy between Guyana and Venezuela can be found in the struggles between the major European colonial powers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries for new markets and possessions. While Britain, Holland, Portugal and Spain competed against one another for power and wealth, their colonies in the New World began their struggles for independence. In the early years of the nineteenth century, the Latin American colonies emerged as independent nations without the benefit of clearly defined boundaries and with still unsettled claims going back to their colonial periods (Figure 1-1). In 1811 Venezuela proclaimed its independence from Spain, but still had to defeat the Spanish Empire on its soil before it could attend to settling the matter of national boundaries (Lombardi, 1975: 126-151).

Guyana consisted originally of the three separate Dutch colonies of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. Between 1609 and 1621 the Dutch settlements in the New World flourished and in 1621 the charter of the Dutch West India Company was granted. In 1640 war broke out between Holland and Spain, and at the conclusion, the Treaty of Muenster was signed in 1648. Through this Treaty, Spain legally accepted the fact that the Dutch had extended their influence in the region between the Amazon and the Orinoco Rivers. On this Treaty rests the basis for later British claims to the Essequibo region. In 1803 the English conquered the three Dutch colonies of Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo and these were ceded to Britain by the Treaty of

London signed August 13, 1814. Thus by means of the Treaty of Muenster, Britain became the successor to the Dutch in the area (Daly, 1974: 44-45).

Venezuela's claim to the area that would become British Guiana, and much later the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, rests with the gift of the area by Pope Alexander VI via his 1493 Bull "Inter Caetera," to Spain and in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, an amendment of the Bull of 1493. This, and the "rights" of religious occupation, vis-a-vis mission activity, and conquest are the sole basis for Venezuela's claim to the area east of the Orinoco and west of the Essequibo Rivers (Martens, 1986: 43-48).

Venezuela claimed the territory by right of the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, which removed the point of the division of the New World between Spain and Portugal 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands (Tolman, 1988: 636-637). Yet in 1750, all rights given Spain by the 1493 Bull and the Treaty of Tordesillas were officially nullified by Article One of the Treaty of Madrid. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries England, Holland and France ignored both the Papal Bull and Treaty of Tordesillas. The British exercised their own rights to settlement in the New World by the settling of English colonies in North America. The Spaniards made their complaints to King James regarding the "unwarranted" incursions into Spanish territory, but the English ignored the Bull and the Spanish. Claims and charters for territory in North America were issued repeatedly by the kings of England.

As noted above, the Treaty of Muenster was signed in 1648 by Spain and the Netherlands. It recognized the right of the Dutch to retain possession of territories in South America as well as the right of the Dutch to expand and extend their influence in any area which was not already effectively colonized by Spain. And Venezuela now claims that the Treaty of Muenster was used by the Dutch to legitimize claims to territory that was not rightfully theirs. Venezuela claims now, as Spain claimed then, that she was the sole owner of the Guyana territory by virtue of the 1493 Papal Bull and the Treaty of Tordesillas; however, there is some question as to how effectively Venezuela has maintained the rights of occupation in those territories.

In the sixteenth century Spain included under the name of "Guayana", all the territory known commonly to geographers and travelers as Guiana. The first Spanish settlement founded in 1596 was called Santo Thome de Guayana de Orinoco (Figure 1-2). For a long time, the Spaniards continued to call this colony Guayana de Orinoco. According to the Venezuelan case at the Tribunal, the first mention of a Dutch voyage to Guayana was in 1598, when a Dutch trading vessel traveled up the Orinoco to Santo Thome. No Dutch settlement was mentioned on the coast prior to 1613 (Ramos-Perez, 1976: 696-687).

There is contradictory evidence that in 1595, an English explorer, Captain Charles Leigh, had discovered and established a Dutch settlement near the mouth of the Orinoco (Daly, 1985, pp. 43; 49). Reports to the Spanish Crown during the late

sixteenth century described Dutch settlements between the Amazon and Orinoco Rivers and there may be some validity to the Guyanese claims that the Spanish appeared to have accepted de facto, the Dutch settlements in that territory. Individual Spaniards did make several incursions into the territory occupied by the Dutch, but the Spanish government according to some Guyanese historians, during these early years, did not put forward any further claims to the territory; this may be due to the contention on the part of the Spanish that they did not need to make any claims to what was already theirs.

Between 1609 and 1621 there was a truce between Spain and the Netherlands. The Dutch settlements prospered, and in 1621, the charter of the Dutch West India Company was granted. In 1640 war broke out again between Spain and the Netherlands, and, at the conclusion, the Treaty of Muenster was signed. Through this Treaty, Spain gave the de jure acceptance to a de facto situation, namely that the Dutch had extended their influence in the region between the Amazon and the Orinoco.

On this Treaty rests rests the British claim to the Essequibo region, which includes the mouths of the Barima and the Amacura Rivers. From the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch consolidated their gains in the territory. The Dutch traded with the Caribs, as well as used them to work on their plantations in "Essequibo, Berbis, Surinam and Corentin." According to Daly, Dutch activity in the area and in the various river basins contrasted sharply to the "ineffective occupation" of Santo Thome de Guayana by the Spaniards (Daly, 1985: 44-48).

The Spanish continued to monitor Dutch activities and interests in the area. In 1659, it was noted by a commission appointed by Middleburg, Flushing and Vere in Zeeland, that a large number of colonists and their families, with materials necessary for colonization and cultivation, had settled on the mainland coast in the area that was called "Nova Zeelandia", and has also taken possession of the rivers Essequibo, Demerara, Pomeroon and Corentyne and as far inland as the province of Moruka. Soldiers were sent to erect a fort, and a Commander and Director were appointed (Daly, 1975 : 48-54).

In 1661 Daly notes that Pomeroon planters were writing to the Dutch West India Company requesting sugar boilers and negro slaves to work the fields (Daly, 1985: 48-55). Ten years later, Santo Thome remained sparsely populated and impoverished. According to Spanish records, the province of Guayana was under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Trinidad who did not proceed with any other development plans in the area aside from those already in place for the city of Santo Thome de Guayana until 1694, when it became a major concern for the Spanish to strengthen their control over the mouth of the Orinoco River (Ramos-Perez, 1976: 692-693).

With the appointment of Lauren Storm van's Gravesande to the posts of Commander, then Director-General of Essequibo (1738-1772), the Dutch were able to push forward their claims to the territory the Venezuelans call Guayana Essequiba (Daly, 1975: 85-86). During this period Director-General Gravesande made several official complaints to the Spanish government

regarding Spanish raids and incursions directed against Dutch settlements on the Cuyuni; the Spanish however, regarded Dutch activity on the Cuyuni as an incursion on their territory.

Kissler reports that the Spanish protested and ousted the Dutch encroachers and established settlements to deter further advancements. Spain issued a number of decrees during the colonial period in which she proclaimed ownership of the entire Guyana area extending to the Essequibo River and south to the Amazon. Kissler maintains that the Spanish and Dutch were vying for control of the coastal area and were moving into the interior between the Orinoco and the Essequibo Rivers (Kissler, 1972: 12).

Spain, through her missionaries, maintained her claim to the territory in the Cuyuni, as well as other areas, by right of religious occupation. The question concerning whether religious occupation constituted effective occupation was of course debatable; however, as far as Spain was concerned, religious and political occupation were synonymous. In the Spanish political system, the Church and State were one. However, throughout most of the eighteenth century Spain rarely applied other methods to justify her claim. Regardless, the Spanish still considered this area, as well as the mouth of the Orinoco, to be a strategic position critical for stopping the Dutch from ascending into the Orinoco River.

During the battles for independence, Simon Bolivar in his 1819 Angostura Address, offered land as an enticement to secure Creole and mestizo support during the long struggle for

liberation from 1811-1825 (Lombardi, 1982: 151; 257). Officers and soldiers were granted titles to land in reward for their service during the wars of independence. Some of these lands were in the region of Venezuelan Guayana in the east of the new nation. This was to put Venezuela and England on a collision course as both nations claimed territory that the other held. The territory claimed by Venezuela was almost all of the original Dutch colony of Essequibo, over 58,000 square miles and almost five eighths of present day Guyana (Davis, 1975: 195). Great Britain's territorial claims under the Treaty of London of 1814 reached far into what are now the eastern and north eastern parts of Venezuela.

During the 1820's the Foreign Minister of Gran Colombia to England had instructions to negotiate a boundary between the British colony and Gran Colombia. The Gran Colombian Minister complained to the British Crown that the colonists of Demerara and Berbice had usurped land west of the Essequibo River, and that these colonists should either submit to Colombian law or leave the area. Kissler states that "Throughout the 1820's, delegates from the government of Gran Colombia to the United Kingdom requested the delimitation of the border, claimed the Essequibo River as their eastern boundary, and protested English settlements to the west of that line. All diplomatic efforts by the Gran Colombians were fruitless. Because of internal dissensions, the eastern part of Gran Colombia withdrew in 1829 and in 1830 established itself as the United States of Venezuela. The new government continued the claim, protests,

and requests for the demarcation of the boundary (Kissler, 1972: 13)."

To clearly define her territory and to "protect the natives" who were subject to frequent raids by the Venezuelans, the British Colonial Government commissioned Robert Schomburgk in 1840 to survey the boundaries of British Guiana and to provisionally mark them until neighboring powers (i.e., Brazil and Venezuela) could be notified (Singh, 1982: 139-166). When the Venezuelan government learned of the commission, it proposed the negotiation of a boundary treaty, to be followed by a joint commission to demarcate the boundary. Great Britain did not respond to the proposal and Schomburgk carried out the commission (Singh, 1982: 2-8). Venezuela's Minister Plenipotentiary in London, Alejo Fortique, learned of the British markers and protested to the British Foreign Office that his country's eastern border was the Essequibo River and that Schomburgk had placed markers on Venezuelan territory. After several letters of protest from Venezuela, Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary, ordered the removal of the markers. Fortique pressed for negotiations to conclude a boundary treaty, but nothing came of this (Kissler, 1972: 14).

U.S. Intervention

During 1844, Venezuela made her first formal claim for the Guyana territory in an official communique to Great Britain which was answered by the Earl of Aberdeen, the British First Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs. The communique argued that since Spain had been the first discoverer and

occupant of the New World, and since the Dutch had no possessions north and west of the Essequibo River at the time of the Treaty of Muenster of 1648, that therefore the Essequibo region rightfully belonged to Venezuela as the inheritor of all Spanish titles and lands. In 1850, England signed a mutual agreement with Venezuela which restricted both parties from occupying or encroaching on the territory in dispute. In 1882 Venezuela brought up the case once again, but Britain did not concede any of "her" territory.

In the years 1881-1884 the Venezuelan government granted concessions of territory in the Essequibo area to a number of persons, which fanned the flames of the dispute even more. In 1886 the British declared a "modified Schomburgk line" as the boundary of British Guiana. Venezuela responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with Great Britain on February 21, 1887.

During the years 1876-1896, Venezuela repeatedly approached the United States for assistance in the matter of its border dispute with England. Venezuela made her appeals to the U.S. on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, seeking help against the encroachment of foreign powers in the hemisphere, namely Great Britain. The United States supported arbitration between Venezuela and Great Britain but did not advocate itself taking up the role of arbiter. In 1887, the United States urged Venezuela and Great Britain to resume diplomatic relations (Daly, 1974: 181-184).

Venezuela and Great Britain had reached an impasse in 1894. Venezuela once again urged the United States to intervene on her

behalf. In 1895 the United States finally succumbed to Venezuelan pressure and Secretary of State Richard Olney accused Britain of attempting to colonize new territories in the western hemisphere in contravention of the Monroe Doctrine. Olney indicated that the United States was prepared to safeguard her South American neighbors against "the forcible intrusion of European neighbors." He threatened war if Britain did not agree to settle its border dispute with Venezuela. Responding to the U.S. pressure, Britain agreed to submit the dispute to international arbitration and as a result of this Britain and Venezuela signed a treaty on February 2, 1897 wherein they agreed to establish an international arbitral tribunal for the purpose of determining the exact boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. The Arbitral Tribunal was to determine the extent of the territories belonging to or claimed by the Netherlands or by the Kingdom of Spain at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the colony of British Guiana.

The Arbitral Tribunal was made up of five members. Two of these were appointed on behalf of Britain; Baron Russell of Killowen, the Lord Chief Justice of England, and Sir Richard Henn Collins, an English Justice of Appeal. Venezuela nominated the Honorable Melville Weston Fuller, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Honorable David Josiah Brewer, also a Justice from the Supreme Court. The fifth member and President of the Tribunal, chosen in accordance with the articles of the Treaty of Washington, was Fyodor Fyodorovich de Martens, a distinguished Russian diplomat and

authority on international law; de Martens was unanimously chosen by the four other members as the "neutral" arbitrator (Robinson, 1981: 8-17).

Britain was represented by a team of four counsels: Sir Richard Webster; Attorney-General Sir Robert Reid; former Attorney-General G.R. Askwith; and a noted lawyer named Rowlatt. The representatives chosen by Venezuela were: former President of the United States Benjamin Harrison; Severo Mallet-Prevost, the former Secretary of the Boundary Commission appointed by President Cleveland in 1896; General Benjamin Tracy and James R. Soley.

The Arbitral Tribunal met in Paris in 1899 and heard some fifty-four oral arguments regarding the demarcation of the border between British Guiana and Venezuela. The team of lawyers representing Venezuela based their arguments on rights based on the Spanish discovery of the New World and subsequent occupation of the region. The British position was based on evidence of extensive occupation, possession, and development carried on by themselves and by the Dutch before them.

On October 3, 1899, the Arbitral Tribunal gave its unanimous decision establishing the present boundary line between Guyana and Venezuela. The Award of the Tribunal agreed substantially with the British case, but compromised in that certain areas claimed by the British, including the strategic mouths and lower reaches of the Amakura and Barima Rivers and the upper reaches of the Cuyuni River, were awarded to Venezuela.

Pena Gomez claims that Venezuela was far from satisfied with the results of the Arbitral Award, intimating that Venezuela wanted to come away with even greater territorial gains (Pena Gomez, 1988: 585-594; 601-611). Sheldon B. Liss, in an essay on Venezuela's boundary problems, maintains that Venezuela was not content with the results of the Arbitral Award and resolved to drag the issue into the twentieth century. In fact, as early as October 7, 1899 the Venezuelan government protested the terms of the Arbitral Award as a "political deal" not in consonance with international law (Davis, 1974: 425-427).

During the years 1901-1905 the boundary as defined in the Arbitral Award was demarcated by a British-Venezuelan Mixed Boundary Commission. On January 10, 1905, the Boundary Commissioners signed a Joint Report signifying the final delineation of the boundary as demarcated by them and as set out in a map of the entire border. The report with the boundary map was accepted by both governments. For the next sixty-two years the final boundary as laid down by the Arbitral Tribunal and as demarcated by the British-Venezuelan Mixed Boundary Commission was outwardly accepted by the parties involved and by the international community as a whole (Singh, 1982: 20-25).

The Mallet-Prevost Memorandum

In February 1944, this was all to change. Severo Mallet-Prevost was a junior member on the team that in 1899 represented Venezuela's case before the Arbitral Tribunal. In January 1944, he was decorated by the Venezuelan government with the "Order of the Liberator." This is the single highest award that can be

conferred on a civilian by the Venezuelan government. One month later, on February 8, 1944, after all participants of the Arbitral Tribunal had passed away, Mallet-Prevost dictated a memorandum which he directed was not to be published until after his death. This document was posthumously published in 1949, and in it Mallet-Prevost asserted that the 1899 Arbitral Award was null and void, on the alleged ground that it was the result of a political deal between Great Britain and Czarist Russia (Singh, 1982: 26-34).

Research by experts in the field has not unearthed any definitive evidence to substantiate the Mallet-Prevost claims. Clifton Child, a knowledgeable American lawyer, examined the Mallet-Prevost charge that the Award was the result of a political deal between Britain and Russia and he concludes that the claim is wholly without substance (Daly, 1975: 275-280). Venezuela, however, contests the validity of the award on the basis of Mallet-Prevost's posthumous declaration. Venezuela claims the fact that the Award Tribunal did not substantiate the reasons for its decisions as grounds for nullifying the 1899 Arbitral Award. The counter argument to Venezuela's position is that she had in her possession the materials she required to contest the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal for over sixty-two years and only sought to do so in August 1962.

Singh (1982: 26-28) cites the text of the posthumous memorandum, which appeared in the American Journal of International Law, Volume 43 (1949), July. It was published by Otto Shoenrich, who was a member of the firm of Curtis, Mallet-

Prevost, Colt and Mosle of New York. The memorandum was left in the possession of Judge Shoenrich, with the instructions that it could be published only at his judgment after the death of Mallet-Prevost:

Judge Brewer and I embarked for Europe in January 1899 to attend the first sitting of the Arbitration Tribunal which was due to meet in Paris with the object of determining the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana.

The terms of the Protocol signed between Great Britain and Venezuela, designated a meeting of the Tribunal on this occasion. Nevertheless, if this date was inconvenient for all those who had to participate in the Arbitration, it was designed to carry out a simple preliminary session in order to observe the terms of the Protocol and adjourn the sessions to meet at an appropriate later date.

Before going to Paris, Judge Brewer and I stopped over in London, and while there Mr. Henry White, Charge d' Affaires of the United States Embassy, gave a small dinner at which Lord Justice Russell was invited. I sat next to Lord Russell and in the course of the conversation I expressed the view that the international arbitrations should be based exclusively on legal considerations. Lord Russell immediately replied: 'I totally disagree with you. I feel that the international arbitrations should be concluded through very wide channels and take into consideration issues of international politics.' From that moment, I came to the conclusion that we could not count on Lord Russell to decide the boundary question on a strict legal basis. When we met in Paris on the first June following, I met Lord Collins. During the addresses of the Attorney General Sir Richard Webster and mine (which lasted for 26 days), I appreciated clearly that Lord Collins was sincerely interested in taking into account all the facts of the case and then applying the law to them.

Lord Collins, of course, did not indicate how he was going to vote on the issue. But his whole attitude and the numerous questions he asked, were critical of the British claims and gave the impression that he was inclined on the side of Venezuela.

After Sir Richard Webster and I concluded our addresses, the Tribunal suspended its sessions for a short vacation of two weeks. The two British Arbitrators returned to England, accompanied by Mr. Martens.

When we resumed our positions after the recess, there was a visible change in Lord Collins. He asked very few questions and his attitude was completely different from what it was previously. It appeared to us (I wish to say in the defence of Venezuela) as if something had happened in London to make this change.

When all the addresses had been concluded, in the month of August, and in the beginning of September, the Tribunal suspended its sittings in order to permit the Arbitrators to confer amongst themselves and dictate their decision. Several days passed while we waited anxiously, when one evening I received a message from Judge Brewer in which he told me that he and Judge Fuller wished to speak with me and requested an immediate meeting in his hotel room. I immediately went there. When I entered the room where the two American Arbitrators were waiting on me, Judge Brewer rose and very excitedly said:

'Mallet-Prevost, it's useless to continue any further this pretended farce of our being Judges and you being a lawyer. Judge Fuller and I have decided to reveal confidentially just what happened. Martens came to see us and informed us that Russell and Collins were disposed to decide in favour of Schomburgk's line which begins from Point Barima on the Coast and gives to Great Britain the control of the principal entrance to the Orinoco, and that if we insist in beginning the line from the coast in the Moruka River he will place himself on the side of the British and approve of the Schomburgk line as a true boundary line. Nevertheless, Martens added that he was anxious to have a unanimous decision and if we accepted the line which he proposed, he would be able to obtain the agreement of Lord Russell and Lord Collins in order to arrive at a unanimous decision. What Martens proposed was that the line on the Coast should begin at a certain distance south-east of Point Barima, in order to give Venezuela dominion on the mouth of the Orinoco, and that this line should be connected with the Schomburgk Line at a certain distance in the interior, leaving Venezuela the control of the mouth of the Orinoco and about 5,000 square miles of territory around its mouth.

'Judge Fuller and I were of the opinion that the boundary on the Coast should begin in the Moruka River. What we had to decide was whether to accept the Martens proposition or give a dissenting opinion. In these circumstances, Judge Fuller and I decided to consult with you and we now wish to let you know that we are disposed to follow one way or another, in accordance with what you wish to do.'

By what Judge Brewer just expressed and by the change which we observed in Lord Collins, I was convinced then, and still believe, that during the visit by Martens to England there took place an arrangement between Russia and Great Britain to decide the issue on terms suggested by Martens, and that pressure had been brought to bear in one form or another, on Collins in order that he should follow that route. Naturally, I became aware that I alone could not assume the enormous responsibility that was required of me. I made this known to the two Arbitrators and asked their permission to consult General Harrison (General, and former President of the United States, Benjamin Harrison, was one of the American lawyers representing Venezuela before the Arbitration Commission). On getting this permission, I went to his apartment to deal with the matter.

When I revealed to General Harrison what just had taken place, he rose angrily and walked to and fro. He qualified Great Britain's and Russia's conduct in terms which are useless for me to report here. His first reaction was to ask Fuller and Brewer to give a dissenting opinion, but after he calmed himself and studied the matter from a practical point of view, he said to me: 'Mallet-Prevost, if one day it should be known that it was in our hands to save the entrance of the Orinoco for Venezuela, and we did not do it, we shall not be forgiven. What Martens has proposed is harmful, but I do not see how Fuller and Brewer can do anything other than accept it.'

I was in agreement with General Harrison and I informed Judges Fuller and Brewer about it. The decision of the Tribunal was, in consequence, unanimous. But though it was true that he gave Venezuela the most important part in litigation, from the strategic point of view, it was unjust to Venezuela and took away very extensive and important territory from her, over which Great Britain did not have, in my opinion, a shadow of right.

The above has been dictated by me on 8th February, 1944.

(Sgd) Severo Mallet-Prevost

Ulterior Motives and Considerations

At the same time that Venezuela was attempting to settle her disputed eastern boundary with Great Britain, Venezuela also had to contend with demarcating her western boundary with Colombia. The dissolution in 1830 of Bolivar's Gran Colombia forced Venezuela to begin negotiations with Colombia to clearly establish her western frontier. During the period between 1836-1840, Venezuela attempted to settle the question of her western border with Colombia, but was unable to reach a satisfactory resolution.

In 1891 the Colombian border controversy was submitted to Spain for settlement by the Spanish Crown, and in 1898 the results of the Arbitration Award were handed down mostly in Colombia's favor, according to the Venezuelans. Venezuela claimed that the Colombians had unduly influenced Queen Maria Cristina of Spain, and that they had evidence of collusion. In 1907 and in 1909, a Colombian-Venezuelan Mixed Commission settled on fixing the border between the two nations (Herrera, 1990: 24-30).

On June 17, 1941, Venezuela and Colombia concluded another border treaty, this time with the intent of demarcating the rivers and waterways between the two nations. After the treaty had been ratified in the Venezuelan Congress, it was alleged that Colombia was using the treaty to encroach on the Gulf of Venezuela and thus threatening Venezuela's sovereignty. After considerable accusations between the two nations, Colombia did in fact gain access to the Gulf. Allegations of a sell-out were

immediately raised and a storm of adverse public opinion swept throughout Venezuela (Herrera, 1990: 30-44).

Before the final decision of the Arbitral Treaty of 1899, was handed down determining the borders between Venezuela and British Guiana, there were numerous reports of newly discovered mineral wealth in the Essequibo region (primarily gold and emeralds). Venezuelans from Guayana were already exploiting this area and continued to do so even after the British-Venezuelan Mixed Commission finished its work of delineating the final boundaries between the two nations in 1905. (Rodney, 1981: 98; 149)(Daly, 1975: 275-277).

The discovery in 1910 of gold in the Barima basin and on the Venamo River in Venezuelan territory near the British Guiana border added a new dimension to the conflict. British citizens were now exploring and exploiting the area. The Venezuelan government protested encroachments there, however, and both governments were able to resolve their territorial difficulties (Kissler, 1972: 19). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, to this day, the gold and diamond industries in the Essequibo region continue to be prey to extensive smuggling (EIU, Country Profile Guyana, 1991-92: 16-17).

In the case of Colombia, Venezuelan nationalists were convinced that the territories "lost" to Colombia in 1898 and 1941 were quite literally a loss of national treasure. With the onset of petroleum exploration around the Lago de Maracaibo, it was felt that the territories lost to Colombia and in the Gulf

of Venezuela itself, contained valuable oil deposits which were now lost to the Venezuelan "people" (Herrera, 1990: 35-43).

In 1962, in consultation with the leaders of British Guiana, the British government began taking steps toward granting British Guiana her independence. However, Venezuela raised the boundary question in the United Nations, repudiating the 1899 Arbitral Award and objecting to independence being granted to British Guiana until the boundary dispute had been settled. At the same time, Venezuela launched an international campaign against British Guiana designed to delay the granting of independence and prolonging British Guiana's colonial status.

This campaign was not successful, and even though Venezuela's efforts to sidetrack Britain's timetable for granting British Guiana independence failed, Great Britain and British Guiana agreed to meet with representatives of the Venezuelan government to examine under what grounds they deemed the 1899 Arbitral Award null and void. An examination of all pertinent documents was again conducted between 1963-1965 and in the opinion of the governments of Great Britain and British Guiana their experts disclosed that there was no evidence to support Venezuela's position (Burnham, 1968: 4-7).

Despite this re-examination of the evidence by the three nations involved, Venezuela continued to pressure both England and British Guiana during the period immediately preceding Guyana's independence. Four months prior to Guyana's official independence date, the governments of Great Britain and Guyana

agreed with the government of Venezuela to establish a Mixed Commission of Guyanese and Venezuelan representatives.

The purpose of the Mixed Commission was to settle the ongoing controversy that had arisen as a result of the Venezuelan claim that the 1899 Arbitral Award delineating the border between Venezuela and present day Guyana was null and void. The arrangements to this effect were laid out in the Geneva Agreement and were signed by Great Britain, British Guiana, and Venezuela in Geneva on February 17, 1966. The Mixed Commission was to function for a period of four years, during which time all signatories were specifically prohibited from pursuing the issue in any form or manner except within the Mixed Commission.

The Mixed Commission had several meetings during the four years of its existence. At the first meeting, Venezuela was asked to produce evidence and arguments in support of her basic contention that the 1899 Arbitral Award was null and void. Venezuela did not argue the issue of nullity directly. Instead, a series of proposals were brought forward which called for "joint development" of the area claimed by Venezuela; under these arrangements Venezuela would have achieved substantial control over the area in question if not de facto sovereignty. Guyana found the proposals for "joint development" unacceptable.

Venezuelan Attempts to Avert Peaceful Settlement of the Border Dispute

The work of the Mixed Commission was repeatedly hampered by pressure and hostility exerted by Venezuela throughout the life of the Mixed Commission, in direct violation of the Geneva Agreement. Cheddi Jagan, the leader of the Guyanese People's

Progressive Party, in a speech before the Legislative Assembly blamed much of the on-going problems between Guyana and Venezuela on collusion between the United States and Venezuela. Jagan attempted to link the Central Intelligence Agency to destabilizing efforts inside Guyana.

For the most part these charges were an outgrowth of internal political differences between Jagan's People's Progressive Party and L.F.S. Burnham's People's National Congress. These allegations were aimed at tying then Guyanese Prime Minister, L.F.S. Burnham with U.S. interests but nothing was proven. Regardless, the allegations provide some interesting insights into what a vocal percentage of the Guyanese people believed at the time (Jagan, 1968: 4-19).

During this period the Venezuelan government launched a series of economic campaigns aimed at foreign investors who were contributing to Guyana's economic development. Venezuela was responsible for blocking Guyana's membership in the Organization of American States and in the Inter-American Development Bank. Venezuela was unsuccessful in blocking Guyana from signing the Treaty of Tlateloco, banning nuclear weapons in Latin America, and was unable to damage Guyana's international image.

Among Venezuela's other breaches of the Geneva Agreement were: Venezuela's violation of Guyana's territorial integrity by militarily invading and seizing the eastern half of the Island of Ankoko on October 12, 1966, only five months after Guyana's independence. Under the terms of the 1899 Arbitral Tribunal, Ankoko Island was partitioned in half; the eastern

portion going to British Guiana and the western portion to Venezuela.

Venezuela also attempted to annex part of Guyana's offshore waters. Later, on January 1, 1969 Venezuelan diplomatic personnel were involved in a covert plot to interfere in Guyana's internal affairs by fomenting an uprising among the Amerindian Rupununi tribe against the government of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana. The Venezuelan authorities were encouraging a secessionist movement among the Rupununis in the area that Venezuela coveted. The intent was to later annex the region as part of Venezuelan Guayana (Davis, 1975: 195-196).

At the end of its four year term of office, the Guyana-Venezuela Mixed Commission was unable to reach an agreement on resolving the controversy. In accordance with Article IV of the Geneva Agreement, both governments were then committed to seek another means for peacefully resolving their differences. As specified in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, both governments were therefore obligated to choose a means of peaceful settlement, specifically: negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other means of peaceful settlement (Singh, 1982: 37-42)(Serbin, 1983: 198-202).

The requirement to resort to these settlement procedures was suspended in 1970 by a new Agreement which in effect froze the problem for a twelve year period. The Agreement, which was signed at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, operated as a Protocol to the Geneva Agreement of 1966. While the Protocol was in force, it

forced Guyana and Venezuela to continue to explore all possibilities for better understanding between both nations and their peoples and for the constructive improvement of their relations. The Port-of-Spain Protocol continued the provision imposed by the original Geneva Agreement prohibiting both nations from pursuing the issue except through official inter-government channels (Singh, 1982: 114-118).

Several months before the proscribed end of the Port-of-Spain Protocol there were some signs of possible belligerence from Venezuela. There were nationalistic accounts in the domestic media and the military appeared ready to take some kind of action. A military option for Venezuela at the time was entirely possible. Venezuela possessed a much greater military force than Guyana.

The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) numbered only 7000 total personnel in 1981, of whom 6,500 were in the Army. A paramilitary People's Militia with about 2,000 members, and the Guyana National Service (a military, educational and developmental body for young people and students) with about 1,500 members existed, but these were no match for Venezuela's modern Armed Forces which were the sixth largest in all Latin American (English, 1984: 268-271). The danger in pursuing a military resolution to the border conflict lay in sanctions from the international community and the risk of militarily involving Great Britain in the conflict.

The twelve year period during which the Port-of-Spain Protocol was to operate expired on June 17, 1982 without any definitive conclusions. The problem was thrown back in the lap of the United Nations where it sits now. The United Nations then appointed an arbiter with the power to make a conclusive decision regarding the borders between Guyana and Venezuela. At present, the U.N. Secretary General's special envoy, U.N. Commissioner Alister McIntyre, is examining all materials pertinent to the issue and will make his recommendations to the Secretary General who will render a final decision.

Thesis

It is my contention that the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute was revived because of ulterior political considerations on the part of Venezuela, and not based solely on the disclosure of the Mallet-Prevost memorandum of 1949. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that Venezuela had fully accepted the Arbitral Award of 1899 and had resigned herself to accepting the demarcation of the border between the two nations as laid out by the British-Venezuelan Mixed Commission in 1905. It was only the timing of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum which presented Venezuela with the opportunity necessary to further its own ends by trying to regain "lost" territory, restore national honor and to divert Venezuelan public opinion from growing domestic unrest.

A systematic review of the available literature convinced me that there was in fact reasonable evidence to support the theory that Venezuela was motivated by factors in addition to

the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum. Numerous explanations concerning the timing of the re-opening of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute were examined, but these have stopped short of giving a concrete explanation for Venezuela's actions to reverse the outcome of the 1899 Arbitral Award.

It is my contention that certain pivotal economic and political events that occurred in Venezuela between 1899 and 1962 were the key to understanding Venezuela's actions vis-a-vis the renewal of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute and why it took Venezuela so long to reassert her claim to the Essequibo. Specifically, I maintain that the possibilities of newly discovered mineral wealth in the Essequibo region as well as the results of the politically humiliating losses of large chunks of Venezuelan territory to Colombia in 1898 and 1941 were the chief reasons for Venezuela's about face concerning the Arbitral Award. The Mallet-Prevost Memorandum became the catalyst which is being used by Venezuela to regain the Essequibo and which has become a national objective and a means for uniting public opinion behind successive governments.

These issues are dealt with in four separate chapters: chapter one examined the problem concerning the re-emergence of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute; chapter two deals with the controversy from the Guyanese perspective and looks at how Venezuela's lack of success in settling her other border dispute with Colombia could explain Venezuela's motives for raising the issue concerning the boundary with Guyana again; chapter three presents the results of a content analysis of Venezuelan daily

newspapers covering the years 1943, 1961, and 1962 in an attempt to gauge public opinion and support for Venezuela's decision to abrogate the Arbitral Treaty of 1899; and chapter four is a final conclusion encompassing the results of all the research.

CHAPTER 2
VENEZUELA'S CONTINUING DEMANDS FOR ABROGATION OF THE
1899 ARBITRAL AWARD

Introduction

This chapter will concentrate on examining some of Venezuela's possible reasons regarding Guyana in her decision to abrogate the 1899 Arbitral Award at the Seventeenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly as well as some of the overlooked attempts by Venezuela to renegotiate her eastern boundary prior to 1962. This chapter will also take a closer look at Guyana's charges concerning Venezuelan attempts to pressure her into backing down and renegotiating the demarcation of her western boundary.

As described in Chapter One, relations between British Guiana and Venezuela deteriorated significantly after 1962 when Venezuela reopened the matter of renegotiating its eastern boundary with British Guiana. The border dispute between the two countries was thought to have been settled in 1899 by the Paris Tribunal. However, Venezuela renewed her claims to the Essequibo territory as far east as the Essequibo River which covers five-eighths or 58,000 square miles of Guyanese territory. Venezuela alleged that the 1899 Arbitral Award was null and void because of collusion between the British members of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Russian jurist Fyodor de Martens who was supposedly acting as the neutral member of the

five-man panel. Documents to this effect were discovered in 1949, in the form of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum, but Venezuela apparently did not pursue the case until Guyanese independence appeared imminent (Manley, 1979: 43).

In February 1966, the governments of Great Britain, Guyana and Venezuela agreed at Geneva, without prejudice to their legal claims, to establish a Mixed Commission to resolve the dispute by 1970. As noted above, in the event the dispute was not settled by that date, it was to be turned over to the United Nations for settlement under Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. Steady progress was made at the meetings of the Mixed Commission between 1966 and 1967, and a sub-committee was established in January, 1968 to study possible areas of cooperation between the two nations. However, all prospects for cooperation would soon fade (Manley, 1979: 43).

By the fall of 1968 relations between the two nations were severely strained. During the fall of 1966 Venezuela occupied the Guyanese portion of Ankoko Island in the Cuyuni River. In the summer of 1968 she fortified the entire island, and in July 1968 Venezuela extended her twelve-mile territorial seas as far east as the mouth of the Essequibo. Venezuela also escalated tensions between the two countries by stationing 2,500 troops on Guyana's southwest border. Venezuelan claims became increasingly more forceful; by the fall of 1968, while the Guyanese press was responding to the Venezuelan claims with its own sharp propaganda attacks, the Venezuelan Armed Forces provided covert support and military training to the Amerindian

Rupununi in southwest Guyana. In January 1969 a plot allegedly engineered by Venezuela to help the Rupununi secede from Guyana was uncovered and stopped before it could gain momentum.

After four unsuccessful years of negotiations by the Mixed Commission, the Protocol of Port-of-Spain was signed on June 18, 1970. This addendum to the 1966 Geneva Agreement in essence froze the problem for the next twelve years during which time the parties involved continued to work toward a negotiated settlement. At the end of the twelve year period Guyana and Venezuela still had not reached a solution to their boundary dispute. On April 4, 1981 Venezuela terminated the Port-of-Spain Protocol and the issue was returned to the United Nations for resolution under Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. Both nations are waiting for a decision from the U.N. Secretary General.

The Guyanese government's position is that the 1899 Paris Award is entirely valid; the Guyanese believe that they have the stronger case in international law, as well as prescriptive right, from lawful possession derived through long and unchallenged occupation. Guyana has exercised administrative control over the disputed Essequibo territory without challenge during the twentieth century except for Venezuela's continuing claim to said territory.

The Mallet-Prevost Posthumous Memorandum

British and Guyanese researchers have cast some doubt on the accuracy and validity of Mallet-Prevost's posthumous memorandum. Writers known to be sympathetic to Guyana argue

that Mallet-Prevost's allegations that the award was the result of a political deal between Britain and Russia lacks substance (Manley, 1979: 42-43). Yet it is chiefly upon the strength of this memorandum with which Venezuela seeks to discredit the integrity of the 1897 Arbitral Tribunal and the validity of the 1899 Arbitral Award.

Venezuela's case is not formulated solely on the Mallet-Prevost allegations of a political deal; Venezuela has sought to show other grounds for abrogating the Arbitral Award, including, for example, matters relating to the negotiation of the Treaty of Washington of 1897 which set up the Arbitral Tribunal, and the fact that no reasons were given by the Arbitral Tribunal for their final decision in October 1899. However, the material upon which the challenge is brought on, has always been within the full knowledge of Venezuela which nevertheless has affirmed the validity of the existing boundary for over sixty-two years; it would seem that any such challenge based exclusively on such evidence would be without merit.

Discontent with the 1899 Arbitral Award

As early as October 7, 1899, just four days after the Arbitral Award was made, Venezuela was already voicing her discontent over the terms of the Award. Kissler quotes Jose Andrade from his report to the Venezuelan foreign office: "The Award does not seem based on reason and justice, as affirmed by Senor de Martens, in his farewell discourse and the Venezuelan arbitrators did not give their adhesion." Kissler points out that Venezuela pushed for arbitration with Great Britain

believing that any award would be based on a judicial or legal decision and that, since the Arbitral Award of 1899 did not recognize her historic claims in the region, the decision could only be the result of an intentional political compromise; purely "the consequences of the struggle of a great Power against a small country such as Venezuela (Kissler, 1972: 164)." Kissler argues that it was only because of the formidable military and political strength of Great Britain and the apparent lack of further support for her case from the United States that forced Venezuela into a position where she had to accept the Arbitral Award (Kissler, 1972: 168-169).

Almost immediately after the results of the Award were made public, the jurists presenting Venezuela's case before the Arbitral Tribunal spoke out concerning the injustice in the Arbitral Award. On October 4, 1899 Benjamin Harrison was quoted by the New York Times:

The President of the Tribunal...had in his closing address today commented on the unanimity of the present judgment and referred to it as a proof of the success of arbitration. It did not, however, require much intelligence to penetrate behind this superficial statement and see that the line drawn was a line of compromise and not a line of right. If the British contention had been right, the line should have been drawn much farther west. If it had been wrong, then it should have been drawn much farther east. There was nothing in the history of the controversy nor, in fact, in the legal principles involved, which could adequately explain why the line should be drawn as it was found. So long as arbitration was to be conducted on such principles it could not be regarded as a success, at least by those who believed that arbitration would result in an admission of legal rights, and not in compromises really diplomatic in their character. Venezuela had gained much, but she was entitled to much more, and if the arbitrators were

unanimous it must be because their failure to agree would have confirmed Great Britain in the possession of even more territory (Kissler, 1972: 166).

Mallet-Prevost echoed the same position in a letter which he wrote on October 26, 1899, fifty years before the release of his posthumous memorandum:

The decision was imposed on our arbitrators and in absolute confidence I have no doubt in saying to you that the British arbitrators did not conduct themselves by legal or judicial considerations, and that the Russian arbitrator probably was urged to take the position that he took for consideration totally foreign to the matter....The result was in my opinion a slap in the face against arbitration (Kissler, 1972: 164).

The issue of the boundary dispute did not just quietly die away as many pro-Guyanese writers maintain. The Venezuelan press, as well as numerous scholars and teachers, took it upon themselves to keep alive the notion that the frontier line did not correspond to the legitimate rights of Venezuela. Kissler points out that between 1915-1917 the Venezuelan government attempted in vain to relocate some sectors of the frontier line and that during the next twenty years there were three separate incidents involving the legality of the frontier line (Kissler, 1972: 19-20).

In December 1935 when Eleazar Lopez Contreras became President of Venezuela he encouraged the re-examination of the Arbitral Award. In the 1930's both the Venezuelan and British governments released a number of previously classified documents and other materials and made available many private papers written by persons involved in the original controversy. As a result of the Venezuelan government's encouragement,

professors, students, writers, newspapermen, and non-academic scholars began to investigate the award and all its ramifications (Kissler, 1972: 21). It should be noted that all these events occurred well before the release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in 1949.

Kissler indicates that in the 1940's the Venezuelan Congress made revision of the Arbitral Award of 1899 a national issue. The Venezuelan Congress' permanent commission on foreign relations, which represented the various political parties, issued a declaration calling for revision of the boundary line. Kissler states that during the next twenty-five years there was substantial popular support for renegotiating the boundary; numerous articles appeared in leading Venezuelan newspapers demanding a revision of the Arbitral Award (Kissler, 1972: 21).

This produced a public outcry which led to numerous official initiatives to have the border between British Guiana and Venezuela renegotiated. Grass roots support continued for such a move; in the 1950's the leading newspapers in Caracas averaged several articles each month demanding re-examination of the Arbitral Award (Kissler, 1972: 176).

Despite the fact that Great Britain and Guyana did not recognize any claims by Venezuela to recover the Essequibo territory prior to August 18, 1962, there were in fact a number of recorded instances in which Venezuela officially made her position clear to Great Britain that she rejected the terms of the Arbitral Award of 1899.

At the signing of the United Nations Charter in 1947, Venezuela denounced the Anglo-Venezuelan Arbitral Treaty and demanded reparation from Great Britain. In 1948 at the Ninth Inter-American Conference in Bogota, Romulo Betancourt made formal claim to the Guayana-Essequibo area. At the Organization of American States Fourth Foreign Ministers Meeting in Caracas in 1954, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister demanded that the Arbitral Award of 1899 be renegotiated. Venezuela's position regarding the return of the Essequibo was once again reiterated at the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas. In March 1960, after the election of Romulo Betancourt as President of Venezuela, the Venezuelan Council of Ministers directed Foreign Minister Ignacio Luis Arcaya, to investigate the Essequibo claim and to formulate a policy for the Venezuelan government.

It became the policy of the Venezuelan government throughout the 1960's to take official action to rectify a situation which a vocal percentage of the Venezuelan population considered unwarranted and illegal. Kissler points out that the possibility of independence for British Guiana before the border issue could be resolved with Great Britain, followed by British plans to organize a Federation of Autonomous States of the Caribbean and the possibility that a pro-Communist government in British Guiana similar to the Castro regime could come to power were all factors which could have compelled Venezuela to take a more forceful stand by taking her demands to the United Nations General Assembly on August 18, 1962. It should also not be overlooked that Great Britain had continuously turned a deaf

ear to Venezuela's demands for re-examination of the Arbitral Award, and that this was a deliberate means by which Venezuela could take Great Britain to task within a forum that Great Britain could not ignore (Kissler, 1972: 23).

Venezuelan Objections to Guyana's Independence

Guyanese demands for independence were gaining strength during the 1960's and could not be put off much longer. In 1962, during what Singh and Manly have described as a vulnerable phase in Guyana's movement for independence, Venezuela raised the question of the boundary in the United Nations on August 18, 1962. Venezuela formally renounced the 1899 Arbitral Award and objected to independence being granted to Guyana until and unless the question of the boundary between the two countries could be settled. Venezuela followed this up with an international economic and propaganda campaign against Guyana to the effect that had it been successful, it would have prolonged British Guiana's colonial status and caused a delay in the granting of independence to Guyana.

Venezuela's attempts to delay Guyana's independence failed. When the time for granting independence to Guyana approached, the British government, in consultation with the government of the then colony of British Guiana, agreed as "a gesture of goodwill" to allow the Venezuelan government to present its case regarding the nullity of the award. On November 12, 1962, Colin Crowe, representing the United Kingdom at the United Nations, made an offer to Venezuela in the U. N. Special Committee to have all pertinent documentary material on the 1899

Award examined by experts from the United Kingdom, British Guiana and Venezuela. Crowe emphasized that this was in no way an offer to engage in a revision of the border since Great Britain considered that there was no justification for it.

Venezuela accepted this offer and the documents were thoroughly examined by experts from each of the three countries between 1963 and 1965. In the opinion of the governments of the United Kingdom and British Guiana the work of their experts disclosed that there was no concrete evidence to support Venezuela's contention of nullity. Venezuela, however, stood by her original claim that a political deal between Britain and Russia had been engineered and emphasized the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum was proof of collusion by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal (Singh, 1988: 125).

The Geneva Agreement

Venezuela's demands for renegotiation of its eastern border with British Guiana increased during the period immediately preceding Guyana's independence. Four months before the actual independence date the government of the United Kingdom, in consultation with the government of Guyana, agreed with the Government of Venezuela to establish a Mixed Commission of Guyanese and Venezuelan representatives with the task of finding satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy. This arrangement produced the Geneva Agreement which was signed by the United Kingdom, Guyana and Venezuela in Geneva on February 17, 1966. The Geneva Agreement explicitly prohibited all parties from pursuing the issue in any form or

manner except within the confines of the Mixed Commission (Manley, 1979: 42; 47).

The Mixed Commission had several meetings during the four years of its existence. During the initial meeting, British Guiana asked Venezuela to produce evidence and arguments in support of her basic contention that the 1899 Arbitral Award was null and void. Venezuela however maintained that she would only discuss before the Commission the issue of renegotiating the border between British Guiana and Venezuela. Guyana declined to discuss the issue and the talks broke down almost before they got started. Venezuela then sought to circumvent the argument about her contention of nullity by putting forward proposals for the "joint development" of the area claimed by her under arrangements which would effectively have transferred to her substantial elements of sovereignty over the area. These "joint development" proposals were consequently unacceptable to Guyana.

Venezuela's Manipulation of the Geneva Agreement

On several occasions the work of the Mixed Commission was hampered by Venezuelan intransigence. Venezuela carried out several acts that represented clear breaches of the Geneva Agreement and which were also regarded as unacceptable norms of international diplomacy. Guyana's protests, both within the Mixed Commission and directly to the government of Venezuela, were ignored.

Specifically, Venezuela was responsible for launching a military invasion of Ankoko Island and seizing the eastern

portion of the island in contravention of the 1899 Arbitral Award. In accordance with the general map of the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela, as demarcated and authenticated in 1905 by the Venezuelan-British Mixed Boundary Commission, the island of Ankoko in the Cuyuni River was split in half; the eastern portion was designated as part of British Guiana and the western portion was designated as belonging to Venezuela. In October 1966 the armed forces of Venezuela invaded the Guyanese portion of the island, which ever since has been occupied by Venezuela, despite repeated protests by Guyana (Singh, 1982: 56-58). This was not the first time in which Venezuela resorted to military force to enforce a territorial claim. As will be seen, Venezuela also used military force to take over the Los Monjes archipelago from Colombia (Samper, 1981: 70-75).

In an effort to coerce Guyana economically, The Times of London published an advertisement titled "Communique from the Venezuela Ministry of Foreign Affairs" which appeared on June 15, 1968, in which the government of Venezuela publicly stated that it would not recognize any type of concessions, either granted or to be granted, by the government of Guyana over the territory stretching to the west of the Essequibo River from its source to its mouth. The Venezuelan government was utilizing its own form of economic aggression to counter any economic assistance that the United Nations and the United States was providing to the government of Guyana. This was done in order to forestall Guyana from developing the mineral sector of her

economy in the Essequibo region (Ince, 1970: 21). Roy A. Glasgow has written that this economic pressure focused on Guyana's potential investors was aimed to stunt Guyana's economic development (Davis, 1975: 195-196).

Another example of Venezuelan belligerence is the case where President Raul Leoni of Venezuela issued a decree on July 9, 1968 purporting to annex as part of the territorial waters and contiguous zone of Venezuela a belt of sea lying along the coast of Guyana between the mouth of the Essequibo River and Waini Point, and further required the armed forces of Venezuela to impose the dominion of Venezuela over the said belt of sea (Singh, 1982: 68). This Presidential decree also contravened international maritime law since it violated the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, both of which clearly recognized that such off-shore waters pertained only to the relevant coastal state (Samper, 1981: 73-75). The end result of this, according to Singh and Manley, is that the decree had the effect of scaring off prospective investors who might have been interested in developing the mineral wealth to be found in the region; these actions also paralyzed the possible exploration of oil deposits in that area (Singh, 1988: 127)(Manley, 1979: 49).

Such acts of "economic aggression" have severely disrupted Guyana's economy. Manley quotes S.S. Ramphal, then Guyanese Attorney General and Minister of State at the U.N. General Assembly in October 1968 as he described the effects of

diverting resources from development as a result of mobilization to counter the Venezuelan threat:

Every million dollars that a developing nation spends on defence, whether it be on aircraft or on ships or on a standing army, or on any of their several adjuncts, represents a million dollars diverted from development. Indeed, in some cases, it may represent a much greater diversion - dependent on the terms of bilateral or multilateral assistance available to the State for projects of development. And this is to say nothing of the diversions of human resources, of expertise, of manpower, of energies from the urgent tasks of social and economic change to which they ought to be applied (Manley, 1979: 49-50).

The Burnham government alleged that between 1966 and 1968 agents of the government of Venezuela had organized clandestine meetings with the citizens of Guyana, with the purpose of promoting her claim through subversion. These efforts were unsuccessful. In January 1967, shortly after her independence, the government of Guyana expelled the Second Secretary of the Venezuelan embassy, Leopoldo Taylhardat, for the part he played in inciting the Amerindians to revolt and for other acts of interference in the internal affairs of Guyana (Singh, 1988: 126).

Between December 24, 1968, and January 2, 1969, the Venezuelan government stirred up and conspired with a number of Amerindian ranchers in the remote hinterland areas of the Rupununi District of Guyana, to seize certain administrative posts in the area. This area is near the Brazilian border, and is part of the area claimed by Venezuela. The aim was to establish a separate state in secession from the rest of Guyana which would later be annexed by Venezuela. Venezuela had an

active role in training, arming and supplying these ranchers. The rebellion was put down by the Guyana Defence Force and many of the rebels fled across the borders into Venezuela and Brazil. The attempted act of secession failed and with it Venezuela's efforts at promoting her claim by such means (Davis, 1975: 195-196)(Manley, 1979: 45-47; 50-55).

Chaitram Singh explains that "...The Burnham government took the matter to the U.N. Security Council where it accused the Venezuelan government of engaging in subversive activities among Guyana's Amerindians. The Venezuelan government denied the allegation. However, on January 10, 1969, the Venezuelan minister of interior, Dr. Renaldo Leandro Mora, admitted that some Guyanese had received training in Venezuela, and that Venezuela would grant asylum to the rebels (Singh, 1988: 127)."

After the Rupununi rebellion, Venezuelan pressures against Guyana decreased. This was mostly the result of a successful diplomatic campaign conducted by the Guyanese Foreign Affairs Ministry. Guyana's Foreign Minister argued successfully at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties during April and May 1969 that most of the world's frontiers would be thrown into chaos if all that a party to a boundary settlement had to do was to claim that the settlement was not valid without being required to establish the truth of its claims. He cautioned that countries that have had frontier problems could not support Venezuela's claim without risking a reopening of their own boundary settlements. Venezuela lost much support for her cause in this forum, including the support of several Latin American

countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama and Peru. It was after this diplomatic setback that Venezuela seemed willing to reach some sort of understanding with Guyana (Singh, 1988: 127).

According to Manley, the Venezuelan claims to the Essequibo ironically had a positive affect on Guyanese nationalism. He states that from the viewpoint of the Burnham government, these claims provided an excellent opportunity to employ the "classic device" of appealing for national unity in the face of external threats. Manley maintains that the fact that the elites in Venezuela could be portrayed as "European" or "white," in contrast to the majority "colored" population of Guyana, could only enhance Guyanese nationalism and national unity (Manley, 1979: 45).

Prime Minister Burnham later used the racial issue against Venezuela when he spoke at the annual conference of the People's National Congress in April 1970. He questioned Venezuela's motives for pursuing her territorial claim and stated:

When one considers the size of Venezuela, its wealth and its thousands of square miles of undeveloped land (more than the whole of Guyana) one finds it impossible to square its avarices with its oft repeated intentions and love for freedom. Can it be that the mineral wealth of Essequibo excites this avarice? Can it be that the fact that ours is the only non-white republic on the American continent explains it? Why do the Venezuelan leaders seek to subvert the Amerindian section of our population? Why do they, with their problems of guerrillas, university violence, assassination of the brother of a Foreign Minister, seek to suggest that we are seeking to create diversions to turn attention from our internal problems - problems which are miniscule as compared to theirs? We have no territorial ambitions, we want to

rule no one but ourselves. All we ask is to be allowed to develop in peace and without interference from outside, our Guyana for ourselves (Manley, 1979: 46).

The Protocol of Port-of-Spain

The Guyana-Venezuela Mixed Commission ended its four year term of office without reaching agreement for the settlement of the controversy. In keeping with Article IV of the Geneva Agreement the governments of Guyana and Venezuela were then required to choose one of the means of peaceful settlement specified in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, namely, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other means of peaceful settlement chosen by the parties (Manley, 1979: 42).

The requirement to resort to these settlement procedures was suspended when a new agreement was signed on June 18, 1970; this agreement in effect froze the problem for twelve years. The agreement was automatically renewable unless either party gave six months advance notice of termination. The Agreement, signed at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, operated as a Protocol to the 1966 Geneva Agreement. So long as the Protocol was in force it imposed upon Guyana and Venezuela the duty to explore all possibilities of better understanding between them and their peoples and for the constructive improvement of their relations. It also continued the prohibition imposed by the Geneva Agreement against any activation of the controversy raised by the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award was null and void (Manley, 1979: 49).

The Protocol of Port-of-Spain produced a period of calm following the earlier acts of intimidation carried out against Guyana in contravention to the Geneva Agreement by Venezuela. For the most part, relations between the two countries appeared to be improving. In 1971 Dr. Haydee Castillo de Lopez Acosta, Minister of Development, became the first Venezuelan Minister ever to make an official visit to Guyana. Later that year P.A. Reid, the Deputy Prime Minister of Guyana returned the visit. In 1974, Guyana's foreign minister visited Venezuela and the following year, Guyana's Prime Minister made his first visit to Venezuela.

As a result of these cooperative interactions, Venezuela began to import alumina from Guyana. In the years that followed, friendly discussions took place at various ministerial levels with the purpose of improving cooperation between the two countries. The spirit generated by the Protocol of Port-of-Spain provided the climate for exploratory conversations of substance which took place in 1978 between Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez and Guyana's Prime Minister Forbes Burnham. These conversations examined in considerable depth the state of relations between Guyana and Venezuela and were regarded as helpful in advancing the objectives of the Protocol and in opening the way for a more ordered search for a settlement of the controversy. In the process, the Venezuelan government advanced the notion that it would be willing to scale down its territorial claims to a quarter of the area originally claimed provided that Venezuela would get an outlet to the Atlantic

Ocean. The government of Prime Minister L. F. S. Burnham later rejected this idea (Singh, 1988: 128).

Breakdown of the Port-of-Spain Protocol

Between 1974-1980 the Burnham government used the Protocol of Port of Spain to advance several plans to populate the disputed area and thereby bolster the Guyanese position in future negotiations. The Burnham government unsuccessfully tried to encourage West Indian immigration to the area as well as attempted to create a settlement for displaced Hmong tribesmen from Southeast Asia. This latter scheme met with a great deal of resistance domestically, as well as from Venezuela, and was soon abandoned. During the later years of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain there was another resurgence of Venezuelan hostility towards Guyana. With the election in 1979 of the new Venezuelan administration of Luis Herrera Campins, the government of Guyana renewed its efforts towards meaningful discussions and co-operation with Venezuela.

From April 2-3, 1981 the President of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana paid a visit to Venezuela in response to an invitation by his counterpart, Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins. Herrera Campins had asked Burnham to come to Caracas to notify him that Venezuela would not extend the Protocol of Port-of-Spain when it expired in June 1982. Officially, the visit was described as cordial, but Guyana claimed that it all had been a ruse designed to mask what it described as an orchestrated Venezuelan campaign of hostility, which produced

strident calls for military occupation of the Essequibo region as well as the adoption of a naval blockade of Guyana. The government of Herrera-Campins denied any such military actions.

In addition to not extending the Protocol of Port-of-Spain, Herrera Campins objected to the hydroelectric project that the Guyanese government had on the Upper Mazaruni River in the Essequibo area. The Burnham government was quite distressed at this objection from Venezuela since this particular hydroelectric project had been in development since 1972 and the Burnham government had kept Venezuela informed about the project and had received no complaints on the matter. The Burnham government was concerned that Venezuela might be contemplating the use of military force to take back the Essequibo territory.

Charges and Counter-charges: Presidents Herrera Campins of Venezuela and Forbes Burnham of Guyana and the Failure of the Port-of-Spain Protocol

On April 4, 1981, the day after the President of Guyana returned to Georgetown, President Herrera Campins issued the following statement from Miraflores Palace:

As a result of the recent visit to Venezuela of the President of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Mr. Linden Forbes Burnham, and the meetings he held with President Luis Herrera Campins, the Venezuelan government announced that:

1. Both Chiefs of State held cordial and frank talks on relevant issues and matters of current international interest.
2. President Herrera Campins firmly ratifies Venezuela's claims to the Essequibo territory. An illegal arbitration award of 1899, which was never valid, despoiled Venezuela of that territory.
3. President Herrera Campins thus reiterates Venezuela's rejection of any compromise incompatible

with Venezuela's claim and stresses the nation's desire that the grave injustice committed against it by the voracity of the colonial empires should be righted.

For the same reason President Herrera Campins reiterates Venezuela's rejection of the Hydroelectric Project of the Upper Mazaruni.

4. President Herrera Campins also reiterates that Venezuela and Guyana are committed to seek practical and satisfactory solutions to the pending controversy, and ratifies Venezuela's determination to continue exploring every means to achieve that end. Therefore, for the record, he states that at this moment, Venezuela is not willing to extend the Port-of-Spain Protocol (Office of the President, 1981: 17-18).

President Forbes Burnham of Guyana issued his own statement on April 8, 1981 in which he responded to statements made by the President of Venezuela on April 4, 1981. Burnham clarified the Guyanese position as follows:

1. The 1899 Arbitral Award was entirely valid.
2. Even if the Award was invalid, the boundary laid down pursuant to the Award has acquired full validity as a result of Venezuelan recognition, acquiescence and other conduct relating thereto.
3. Even if both the Award and the boundary laid down pursuant thereto are invalid, the land claimed by Venezuela does not automatically go to her.
4. In such a situation, whatever settlement procedure is adopted, account will have to be taken of all the claims of both sides, including in particular:
 - (a) claims by Guyana to the Amakura, Barima and Cuyuni areas, which we lost to Venezuela as a result of the Award; and
 - (b) claims by Guyana based upon possession and occupation right up to comparatively recent times when Venezuela first formally rejected the validity of the 1899 Award.
5. Meanwhile, the Essequibo Region is an integral part of Guyana and has been so for the entire history of the country.

6. There is nothing whatsoever in the Geneva Agreement of the Protocol of the Port-of-Spain which precludes Guyana from developing any part of her territory, including the area claimed by Venezuela. Nor will Guyana ever consent to any arrangement having any such effect. On the contrary, Guyana has a moral duty to make optimum use of her resources for the benefit of her population and for the promotion of the integrated development of the region and the hemisphere of which she is part.

7. This applies very specifically to the Upper Mazaruni Hydro-Electric Project. Besides being crucial to the development of the nation, the project offers opportunities for regional cooperation of a kind visualized under OLADE, which Venezuela vigorously espouses, and the Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation to which both Guyana and Venezuela stand committed. Guyana therefore intends to intensify her efforts to bring this project to fruition.

It is entirely a matter for Venezuela to decide whether she will terminate the Protocol of Port-of-Spain. But this government does have some say over the course to be pursued when the Protocol comes to an end. We would hope that the exploration of the problem will continue to develop, as it has been developing under the Protocol, in a climate of friendship, understanding and cooperation. To those honorable ends I pledge this government. I would sincerely like to think that the same applied to the government of Venezuela (Office of the President, 1981: 23-24).

The Border Controversy Today

In September 1981, the Burnham government complained to the United Nations General Assembly about Venezuela's efforts to cripple the economic development of the disputed territory by continuously opposing efforts by Guyana to obtain financial support for the implementation of projects vital to her economic development. The following year, Guyana again complained to the U.N. Security Council about territorial violations by armed Venezuelan government officials who allegedly crossed into

Guyanese territory with a substantial body of Venezuelans for the purpose of establishing acts of occupation by Venezuela in the Essequibo territory.

The Protocol of Port-of-Spain expired on June 18, 1982. Despite the clause in the Port-of-Spain Protocol which would have allowed both nations to continue to work out their differences in a peaceful manner, President Herrera Campins of Venezuela chose to go on record and not extend the life of the Protocol. In effect, this action did upset the economic development plans of Guyana.

Venezuela's actions were somewhat at variance with the image of concern that Venezuela projected for helping the economically disadvantaged third world nations and for championing the cause of economic co-operation among developing countries. Guyana viewed the termination of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain as a return to the earlier period during which Venezuela threatened Guyana's peace and internal security.

In March 1983 the Venezuelan government proposed to Guyana that U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar act as a mediator in the border dispute. The government of Guyana expressed no objections to this proposal and the matter was turned over to the U.N. for disposition where it still remains.

Singh states that in 1985, the government of Venezuela once again made a proposition to Guyana in which it would drop its original claim to the Essequibo territory in exchange for a port on the Atlantic and a strip of coastal territory to link the port to Venezuela. Singh reported that the Guyana government

was receptive to this proposal and that it appeared that a final settlement to the boundary dispute could be worked out, but seven years later the issue still remains unresolved and there have been no further diplomatic moves regarding the Essequibo from either side (Singh, 1988: 129).

Conclusions

As described in Chapter One, Venezuela's demands for reclamation of the Essequibo region have been largely presented in terms of her rejection of the 1899 Arbitral Award which Venezuela claims was the result of a political deal between Great Britain and Russia. The so-called evidence revolves around the release of the posthumous Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in 1949 which substantiated Venezuela's charges of collusion among the judges who made up the Arbitral Tribunal.

Great Britain and Guyana maintain that Venezuela kept silent about her dissatisfaction with the Arbitral Award of 1899 until 1962 in an effort to derail British Guiana's forthcoming independence from Great Britain. In actuality, both Britain and Guyana have overlooked, or have chosen to disregard, a substantial body of official diplomatic protests from Venezuela starting just four days after the announcement of the Arbitral Award on October 7, 1899 and continuing unabated until Venezuela confronted Great Britain at the Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly on August 18, 1962.

The existence of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum cannot be considered a catalytic event in Venezuela's efforts to abrogate the 1899 Arbitral Award but rather as another piece of evidence

with which to strengthen her case. The Mallet-Prevost Memorandum became a powerful tool which Venezuela has used to show how an imperialist power used her military and diplomatic muscle without regard for the rules of international law and took advantage of a smaller and weaker nation for purposes of her own colonial expansion.

Venezuela's claim to five-eighths of Guyana's territory, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the population in the area claimed now regards itself as wholly Guyanese, has not received wide support from the international community. It would be difficult to accept that even if the territory in question were to be returned to Venezuela, how circumstances could justify Venezuela recolonizing a territory (and population) which since 1899 has been under British dominion and since 1966 has exercised its right of self-determination by freely joining in the formation of the independent sovereign State of Guyana.

CHAPTER 3
MOTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ON-GOING
BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY AND ITS EFFECTS ON VENEZUELAN
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH COLOMBIA

Considerations

This chapter will look at Venezuela's "stormy" relationship with Colombia, and how worsening bilateral relations between these two countries could have motivated Venezuela to nullify the 1899 Arbitral Award with Guyana after sixty-two years. To do so, this chapter will focus on some of the relevant factors involved with Venezuela's and Colombia's foreign relations and how they might have affected Venezuela's acceptance of the Arbitral Treaty. This chapter will examine some of the domestic issues which are affecting the way these two Andean neighbors are carrying out their foreign policies and how these could carry over into the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute. Issues concerning Venezuela's and Colombia's rationalizations for justifying their external policies will be discussed. A background analysis is presented regarding Venezuela's perceived "loss" of national territory resulting from the 1898 Colombo-Venezuelan Arbitral Award and the popular discontent that arose after further "losses" of Venezuelan territory during the subsequent 1941 border treaty.

This chapter will show how Venezuela's foreign policy frustrations with Colombia could be linked to Venezuela's decision to nullify the 1899 Arbitral Award with British Guiana.

Venezuela's perceived foreign policy failures and the "loss" of parts of the Guajira Peninsula to Colombia may have pushed the Venezuelan government to focus its political strength where it believed it would have the greatest chance for regaining some of its "lost" territory. This could explain why Venezuela voided the 1899 Arbitral Award and sought to reclaim the Essequibo region as her own.

The Colombo-Venezuelan Border Dispute

The origins of the border controversy between Colombia and Venezuela, like the border problems with Guyana, are an outgrowth of the struggles between the major European colonial powers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries for new markets and lands. While Spain, Portugal, Britain, and Holland competed with one another for power and wealth, their colonies in the New World began their struggles for independence. In the early years of the nineteenth century, the Latin American colonies emerged as independent nations without the benefit of clearly defined national boundaries. These disputes were left to be settled by the new nations themselves through negotiation and arbitration. Venezuela, which proclaimed her independence from Spain in 1811, still had to defeat the Spanish Empire on her soil before she could attend to settling the matter of national boundaries (Lombardi, 1975: 126-151).

In Venezuela, patriot soldiers were granted titles to land in reward for their loyal service during the wars of independence. Some of these lands were in the region of the Venezuelan llanos

in the west of the new nation. These land grants were to put Venezuela and Nueva Granada (later Colombia) on a collision course as both nations claimed territory that the other held. The territory claimed by Venezuela was almost a full third of the amount that would become the future Colombia (Davis, 1975: 195)(Lombardi, 1982: 151; 257).

Simon Bolivar, the father of South American democracy, dreamed of a federation, a sort of United States of Spanish America, and through his influence united Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador in the Republic of Gran Colombia. But, by the time of his death in 1830, Bolivar's federation of Gran Colombia had fallen apart, and Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador became separate states. Independent Venezuela was at once faced with boundary problems. Because of the vagueness of the Spanish delineation of the boundaries of the former Captaincy General, as well as the inaccessibility and the lack of accurate maps of the frontiers, negotiations and surveys with her neighbors extended over the next one hundred years (Davis, 1975: 425-427).

Negotiations with Brazil were amicable. Territorial limits were defined in agreements signed in 1859 and by 1905 most of the boundary with Brazil had been surveyed and marked. To ensure continued smooth relations, a boundary commission composed of Venezuelans and Brazilians was created in the 1970's to handle any difficulties that might arise.

Venezuela, during the period between 1836-1840, attempted to settle the question of her western border with Colombia after the dissolution of Bolivar's Gran Colombia in 1830, however,

Venezuela was unable to reach a satisfactory resolution. Negotiations with Colombia were long and involved. Failing to arrive at a final agreement, Spain and later Switzerland were called on to arbitrate the Colombo-Venezuelan boundary dispute. The main sticking point during the arbitration revolved around the source of a small stream, the Gold River, which empties into Lake Maracaibo. When the Gold River was found to have two branches, both Colombia and Venezuela claimed the territory in between. This point, as well as disagreement over the area south of the Meta River and west of the Orinoco and its tributaries, led to an agreement in 1881 to resort to arbitration by the Spanish Crown.

In 1891, the Colombian border controversy was submitted to Spain for settlement, and in 1898 the results of the Arbitration Award were handed down mostly in Colombia's favor. Venezuela claimed that the Colombians had unduly influenced the Spanish Queen, Maria Cristina, and that they had evidence of collusion (Herrera, 1990: 24-30). In 1899 Venezuela would again make charges of collusion after the results of the Arbitral Award over the Essequibo region did not go Venezuela's way. Sheldon B. Liss, in an essay on Venezuela's boundary problems, maintains that Venezuela was not content with the results of either Arbitral Award and resolved to drag the issue out until Venezuela could get more favorable terms (Davis, 1974: 425-427).

In 1907, and again in 1909, a Colombian-Venezuelan Mixed Commission settled on fixing the border between the two nations. Despite the efforts of the Mixed Commission, further

interpretation became necessary, leading Colombia and Venezuela to seek still additional arbitration; this time with the help of the Swiss government in 1917. Ultimately, an award was handed down in 1922, but it was not until 1932 that the boundary was finally marked (Herrera, 1990: 24-30).

On June 17, 1941, Venezuela and Colombia concluded another border treaty, this time with the intent of demarcating the rivers and waterways between the two nations. After the treaty had been ratified in the Venezuelan Congress, it was alleged that Colombia was using the treaty to encroach on the Gulf of Venezuela and thus threatening Venezuela's sovereignty. After considerable accusations between the two nations, Colombia did in fact gain access to the Gulf. Allegations of a sell-out were immediately raised and a storm of adverse public opinion swept through Venezuela (Herrera, 1990: 30-44).

Venezuelan nationalists were convinced that Venezuela had "lost" valuable territories to Colombia in 1898 and again in 1941 which were a source of national treasure. With the onset of petroleum exploration in the area around the Lago de Maracaibo, it was felt that the territories lost to Colombia and in the Gulf of Venezuela itself, contained valuable oil deposits which were now completely lost to the Venezuelan people (Herrera, 1990: 35-43).

Questions of national sovereignty consumed policymakers in both nations. In addition to claims over the Gulf of Venezuela, relations with Colombia became complicated by the question of ownership of a small group of unoccupied islands, the Los Monjes

Archipelago, just off the Guajira Peninsula. In November of 1952, Venezuela threatened military action against Colombia, and after considerable pressure, Colombia finally withdrew her claim to the islands, thus ending the matter.

During the 1960's, another set of border problem arose with Colombia over the oil rich territorial waters of the Gulf of Venezuela. Colombia claimed half of the Gulf of Venezuela on the grounds that the border extended from her portion of the Guajira Peninsula on the western shore of the gulf. Venezuela claimed that the gulf was historically a part of her territorial waters, and asserted that Colombia was aggressively seeking a valuable source of petroleum. Negotiations have been conducted at various times since 1965 but with little progress. Both governments state publicly that negotiations continue to be carried out in a cordial manner; nevertheless, the issues surrounding the Gulf of Venezuela evoke considerable nationalism in both countries, and as such have remained a sensitive political issue throughout the 1970's and 1980's. Most recently, in the two weeks before the aborted coup d'etat of February 4, 1992, Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez made a series of public statements appealing to Venezuelan nationalism concerning the issue of sovereignty over the gulf. Venezuela's Attorney General Ramon Escovar Salom affirmed in Caracas that Venezuela's sovereignty over the Gulf of Venezuela was not open for discussion because Venezuelan territory is a historic and geographic fact and not open to interpretation (Diario las Americas, January 15, 1992: 2).

The press of both countries has frequently reported isolated border skirmishes along other parts of the Colombo-Venezuelan border, but these have been of only minor consequence to the generally improved economic relations between the two countries. Despite this, the issue of access to the Gulf of Venezuela is getting more attention and could threaten to become the new catalyst which would derail these mutually beneficial economic relations.

Colombian Migration to Venezuela

Generally, as the level of rhetoric over Venezuela's perceived "losses" of national territory increased, attention often focused on the Colombian minority in Venezuela and the issue of immigration to Venezuela. Colombian emigration is officially estimated at between 15,000 to 20,000 departures a year; a rate which some demographers estimate as being probably too low. Gomez-Jimenez and Diaz-Mesa estimate that between 1974-1979 over five million people emigrated to Venezuela and of this number an estimated 3.25 million were illegal aliens, of which it is believed that 1.5 million were Colombians. Gomez-Jimenez and Diaz-Mesa further estimate that as much as twenty-five percent of the Venezuelan population could presently be made up of legal and illegal Colombian immigrants. This prospect has created strong dissatisfaction among some sectors of the Venezuelan military (Gomez-Jimenez. 1983: 80-85).

These figures do not take into account the undocumented workers who illegally cross the border into Venezuela in search of employment in the more prosperous cities or in the fields of

the western part of the country where there has been a chronic labor shortage. Berglund indicates that a total of 1,039,953 legally documented Colombians migrated to Venezuela between 1964-1972. This number climbed to 1,059,152 between 1973-1980 alone; unfortunately, this number does not include illegal aliens which would generally tend to be "blue-collar" or unskilled laborers, and would reflect much greater numbers than those with the means to emigrate legally. This outflow continued throughout the 1970's and 1980's and is predicted to continue throughout the 1990's (Berglund, 1985: 126).

Some of these illegal migrants are seasonal workers. It is estimated that about 10,000-20,000 reportedly enter to work during the harvest. Others take jobs on farms or in factories for a limited time with the intention of returning to their homes after saving a little money. Most, however, are believed to be in the country with the intention of remaining indefinitely.

This migration contributes to the large volume of illegal and contraband trade that exists along the borders of Colombia and Venezuela to such an extent that it is considered a traditional industry in many of the border regions. Contraband from Venezuela consists mainly of consumer products, such as television sets, radios, refrigerators, and washing machines - goods not readily available or else very costly in Colombia. In addition to cheap labor, such illegal goods as rustled cattle, coffee, potatoes, textiles, and other primary commodities flow in the other direction (Parra Pena, 1982: 121-156). Neither

country has been able to do much about the smuggling or the illegal migration.

As noted above, in the early 1970's as many as 500,000 Colombians were believed to have crossed illegally into Venezuela. By the 1980's this figure was estimated at nearly four million (Gomez-Jimenez, 1983: 80-85). There has been no corresponding movement of Venezuelan migrants into Colombia, but smugglers reportedly saturate the markets in Colombian border towns with a variety of Venezuelan goods, particularly electrical appliances. In early 1976 a Bogota newspaper reported that the border town of Maicao on the Guajira Peninsula had a resident population of 35,000 and a transient population of about 10,000 smugglers at any given time. The illegal movement of goods into Colombia was offset by a substantial movement of Colombian cattle smuggled into Venezuela. Banking institutions on both sides of the frontier do a thriving business on the basis of this clandestine trade, which is believed to have a value many times that of all official legal commerce between both countries (Parra-Pena, 1982: 211-231).

The illegal crossings from Colombia to Venezuela can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, when there was a mass movement through the Colombian border town of Cucuta into the adjoining region of Venezuela. Cucuta, which is on the Pan-American Highway has since played the role of what David S. McMorris described as "...a Polish corridor in the history of relations between the two countries." Colombian migrants come principally in response to wages far higher than those available

in Colombia. A large number of these find their way into Caracas or other major cities, where their wages, when converted from Venezuelan to Colombian currency, place them on a competitive level with that of some Bogota professionals. The largest urban concentration, however, is undoubtedly in Maracaibo, where the newcomers find work in construction, in the petroleum industry and in factories. The governor of the Venezuelan state of Zulia estimated that over one third of the population of the city of Maracaibo was made up of Colombians (Gomez-Jimenez and Diaz-Mesa, 1983: 126-145).

The Venezuelan military has naturally become concerned over this "uncontrollable" migration as a matter of national security (Zambrano-Velasco, 1989). Skeldon maintains that *this migration* is almost impossible to control, particularly when held up against the pull factors of major urban centers offering economic and social services unavailable in rural areas of Colombia (Skeldon, 1990: 151-157). The border between the two nations is long, and the two peoples are virtually identical in ethnic composition and culture - the two countries are very tightly interconnected. Property lines on some estates extend across the border, and persons living on one side of the border often work on the other. Seriously ill Colombians near the border are sometimes taken by Venezuelan ambulance to hospitals in Maracaibo, and some Colombian villages near the border receive electricity from Maracaibo and send their children to Venezuelan schools. The state of Zulia even purchases water from Colombia to be used in Venezuelan petrochemical plants.

Both countries have expressed concern over this illegal migration, which has received considerable coverage in the press of both countries and has been the subject of discussion at high levels between government officials. According to Barrera, the Venezuelan government has voiced some concern that among the illegal migrants there are members of Colombia's leftist guerrilla groups who may be using the Venezuelan side of the border as a safe haven to launch cross-border operations. There is a further fear that some of these guerrilla groups could be spreading subversive propaganda to disgruntled Venezuelan political groups (Barrera, 1989: 145-160).

There have been some complaints that Colombian border crossers have established themselves illegally on farmlands belonging to Venezuelan campesinos and have resisted efforts to be removed. There are also reports that undocumented Colombian workers routinely deprive Venezuelans of jobs by accepting below standard wages (Barrera, 1989: 142-144).

Substantial numbers of illegal Colombian migrants are routinely expelled from Venezuela. In the early 1970's, one Venezuelan newspaper estimated the number of migrants sent back to Colombia to be at a rate of about 500-1000 a month. In the mid-1970's, however, the traditionally close relations between Colombia and Venezuela had yet to be seriously threatened by the movement, which continues to be economically advantageous to both countries.

Labor remains in short supply in the western part of Venezuela, and it has been seriously suggested that the

Colombian migrants be encouraged to settle on lands in undeveloped localities. To Colombia the movement represented a better life for some of its people, and is an important safety valve against serious domestic unemployment, and a source of Venezuelan exchange through remittances from migrants in Venezuela to families at home (Skeldon, 1990: 170-172). A 1976 report noted that special employment offices had been established in Cucuta in Colombia and in San Antonio de Tachira in Venezuela to regularize the flow of migrants (Parra Pena, 1982: 211-216).

Boundary Considerations Between Colombia and Venezuela

According to Luis Eduardo Zambrano Velasco (brother of former Exterior Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco) in a lecture given to the Escuela Superior del Ejercito in December 1989 on Venezuelan geopolitics, Venezuela currently has territorial disputes with all its neighbors. Venezuela has open disputes with Guyana over the Essequibo territory, which resurfaced at the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations on August 18, 1962, when Venezuela repudiated the 1899 Arbitral Award, and the matter with Colombia over the Gulf of Venezuela (Manley, 1979: 41-42).

On the other hand, Colombia has no outstanding international boundary problems; frontiers with Panama, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador have been demarcated by completed surveys and placement markers. The boundary with Venezuela has been entirely delineated by international agreement but is not fully demarcated.

The Venezuelan Association of Retired Military Officers complained in 1974 that since the beginning of the century some 280,000 square kilometers of claimed territory had been lost, beginning with the "secession" of Panama in 1903 and continuing as late as 1952, when Colombia relinquished a claim to the Los Monjes Archipelago near the tip of the Guajira Peninsula.

The complaint of the military officers included a plea that the earlier losses should not be followed by relinquishing claims to the seabed in the Gulf of Venezuela, an area of potential petroleum wealth. Between 50-100 miles wide at its entrance (depending on the points between which the entrance line is drawn), the Gulf of Venezuela widens to a maximum of 120 miles. The shores of the gulf are entirely in Venezuelan territory except in the northwest, where they extend for a short distance along the coast of the Guajira Peninsula. Venezuela has traditionally held the position that the gulf is an inland body of water under its jurisdiction and has defined its entrance as a line extending eastward from the border point between the two countries on the Guajira Peninsula to the northern extremity of Venezuela's Paraguana Peninsula. Colombia, however, claims the waters offshore from its portion of coastline to the midpoint of the gulf, an arrangement that would give it a triangular sector claimed also by Venezuela (Barrera, 1989: 140-142).

Discussions concerning the conflicting claims as well as concerns about mistreatment of Colombian nationals and increased guerrilla activity were initiated in the mid-1960's. In 1970

the two governments agreed to specific negotiating procedures, and in mid-1975 the presidents of both nations engaged in discussions that led to a draft agreement for settlement of the long conflict over territorial claims and development of the border between the two countries. The agreement was presented by the presidents to their respective governments early in 1976. There was a great deal of nationalistic debate in both countries' legislatures concerning the agreement and it was referred to several commissions for further study and consideration. It appeared as if the matter would eventually be settled to both countries' satisfaction when, in 1976, an incident occurred over the ownership of the Island of Cucurital and the issue was tabled. The matter did not go away and in August 1987 a Colombian corvette (pocket battleship) entered Venezuelan waters in the Gulf and nearly provoked a war between both nations.

Colombo-Venezuelan Foreign Relations

Bilateral relations between Colombia and Venezuela are more extensive than with any other nations in the region because both countries share a 1379 mile border and a heritage of once having been the same nation. Border disputes and territorial differences have been part of the relations between these two nations since the 1830's, and in the 1970's and 1980's they continued to have an impact.

The problem began during the Lleras Restrepo presidency, when Colombia attempted to negotiate contracts with foreign oil companies to do offshore exploratory drilling on the continental

shelf of the Gulf of Venezuela. This prompted Venezuela to protest that the gulf was an inland waterway whose waters had always been "traditionally and historically Venezuelan." Venezuela, however, did not deny Colombia's claims to the continental shelf. The issue of the gulf prompted a number of meetings between ministers of the two nations, presidential visits, an escalating arms race, and the establishment of discreet formal negotiations in Caracas, Bogota, and Rome. In 1971, both nations had tacitly agreed to suspend exploratory operations in the area until an agreement could be reached.

Barrera points out that some of the differences over the right to explore the continental shelf around the gulf and possession of the gulf itself had some basis in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Both countries signed and ratified this convention. Venezuela, however, at the time of ratification inserted a reservation that stipulated that special circumstances existed in the case of internal seas, such as the Gulf of Venezuela (Barrera, 1989).

Samper has noted that Colombia argued its claim under articles one and six of the convention, which defined the continental shelf as the areas adjacent to a coast but outside the territorial waters of a country to a depth of 200 meters. The convention allowed for the drawing of a dividing line equidistant from countries that border an area of the continental shelf. Venezuela indicated a willingness to consider such a dividing line, but differences continued over where it should be drawn (Samper, 1981).

In 1976, after six years of serious negotiations, the issue heated up again when Venezuelan troops raised their flag on the disputed island of Cucurital, which is inhabited by nationals of both countries. A bi-national commission was quickly established to try to resolve the situation, and both presidents hastened to reiterate that relations remained cordial. As described above, circumstances turned conflictive when in August 1987 a Colombian pocket battleship sailed into the Gulf of Venezuela, into waters considered to be wholly Venezuelan, pushing the naval forces of both countries into a state of alert that almost erupted into war (EIU Country Profile: Venezuela, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, 1990-1991).

One of the most disturbing aspects of the gulf dispute has been the development of what could be perceived as a limited arms race between Venezuela and Colombia from 1968 to 1973, in spite of United States pressures against it, and the drain this placed on both countries' finances. Both Colombia and Venezuela increased the proportions of their national budgets allocated for defense expenditures and purchased additional modern arms. According to the CIA World Fact Book 1990 Colombia's military expenditures went from US\$98 million in 1968 to US\$138 million in 1970. Venezuela, the richer nation, greatly increased its expenditures from US\$194 million in 1968 to US\$310 million in 1970. Colombia is currently (1990) spending US\$700 million on military expenditures while Venezuela is spending an estimated (1990) US\$570 million (CIA World Fact Book, 1990). The limited arms race was fueled by a variety of incidents. In one

instance, for example, a Venezuelan bomber fired on two Colombian helicopters in the airspace over or near the disputed continental shelf area; in another, Venezuelan gunboats seized Colombian fishing boats in the same area.

Improved relations based on resolution of their disagreements is something both governments continue to emphasize. In May 1990 both countries announced the formation of four bilateral commissions that would negotiate outstanding differences between the two countries. The commissions would tackle the issues of boundaries of marine and water areas, hydrographic basins, international rivers, migration and the delineation of boundary markers. These commissions would follow up with discussions on border drug trafficking problems and the combined use of natural resources to preserve the ecosystems of the border areas (Rodriguez, 21 March 1990: 9A).

Conclusions

Despite attempts by both nations to ease tensions along their borders and to increase economic integration, there would seem to be some circumstantial evidence which points to continued resentment and mistrust between Venezuela and Colombia which justified or not will continue to affect their bilateral relations. Issues dealing with illegal migration, indigenous peoples, smuggling and nationalistic politics are receiving more attention than they normally would merit and in the process are coloring what would otherwise be considered very minor matters.

Relations between Colombia and Venezuela, which appeared to have taken a turn for the better since Carlos Andres Perez began his second term of office in February 1989, have reverted to their old pattern of nationalistic claims and counter-claims. Although both nations are still negotiating a final resolution to their on-going border dispute, tensions have increased considerably between these two former Gran Colombian nations, particularly after declarations regarding the Gulf of Venezuela by Carlos Andres Perez earlier this year (Diario las Americas, January 14, 1992: 2).

Largely due to Perez' efforts, there had been an increase in bilateral cultural and economic cooperation agreements signed between the two countries, but it will have to be seen how Perez handles the border issue in the face of new rightist sentiments in the country, particularly from ultra-nationalist elements within the military. Colombian President Virgilio Barco was extremely receptive to Perez' past overtures and his successor, Cesar Gaviria, also accepted Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez' more rationalistic policies towards eliminating the border dispute; however, both countries have once again raised the level of rhetoric between them. Perez has personally reassured Colombia that Venezuela is prepared to listen to Colombia's arguments for full demarcation of all border territories and for the present Colombia is responding in kind. However, there is a sense of unease from Colombia due to Venezuela's most recent outbursts and an inability to determine

if there will be a far-right backlash erupting from the aborted coup in Venezuela.

Because of the close economic and historic ties between Venezuela and Colombia it is very likely that these two Andean neighbors will eventually work out a solution to their boundary and migratory problems. It is even conceivable that as a result of the "mestizaje" caused by Colombian migration into Venezuela, which has resulted in an ethnic blurring of the separateness of national identities between these two countries, that a major outbreak of hostilities could be averted. However, as in the past, it is more likely that a strong nationalistic response on the part of Venezuela aimed at Guyana or Colombia could be made to appease the military and to divert public opinion from more pressing economic and social problems at home.

CHAPTER 4 CONTENT ANALYSIS

THE PROBLEM

This chapter examines the pivotal question of why, since both countries had accepted the 1899 Award, did Venezuela seek to revive the issue of the supposedly settled borders with British Guiana when it did in 1962? What could those reasons have been and what bearing could they have to the border dispute?

CONSIDERATIONS

It has been shown in chapters two and three that some of Venezuela's actions toward Guyana may be considered a "reflex-reaction" to relations with Colombia and against internal and external pressures which have affected a succession of Venezuelan governments. Venezuela's discovery of rich gold and diamond fields in the Essequibo region and of vast petroleum deposits in the contested Gulf of Venezuela have only heightened the problem. Added to this are the perceived "losses" of parts of the Guajira Peninsula, along with other portions of national territory to Colombia. All these have been exacerbated by internal political and economic turmoil which moved the Venezuelan government to refuse to examine any legitimate claims by Colombia concerning the Guajira Peninsula or the Gulf of Venezuela. Whether or not this is in fact the case has been the reason for conducting the content analysis detailed in this chapter.

The focus of this chapter will be on examining those factors involving Venezuelan, Colombian and Guyanese foreign relations (as well as selected domestic issues) during the period before the release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in 1949 and prior to Venezuela's 1962 announcement at the United Nations abrogating the terms of 1899 Arbitral Treaty. It is believed that events occurring during these two periods could provide substantive evidence for Venezuela's rejection of said treaty. The content analysis will be used to show how these elements may have been used by Venezuela to justify carrying out her foreign policy vis-a-vis Colombia and Guyana.

The most salient issues concerning Venezuela's rationalizations for justifying her external policies were analyzed; specifically recurring issues dealing with cross-border migration, economic development and mineral exploitation of Guayana; Venezuela's borders with Colombia and British Guiana and the existence of possible diplomatic problems with Great Britain were also examined. These issues were analyzed using the two leading independent Venezuelan newspapers with the largest circulation as the primary data sources. To conduct this historical analysis, newspaper headlines were used to assess Venezuelans' perceived preoccupation with their "losses" of national territory stemming from the 1941 Colombo-Venezuelan Border Treaty as well as lingering problems with the 1899 Anglo-Venezuelan Arbitral Award. Unchecked immigration from Colombia to Venezuela, as well as economic exploitation of the Essequibo region were examined as possible ulterior motives. Presumably,

the print media would record to what extent there was popular discontent and concern over these issues. Frequency of news stories dealing with these issues would indicate a strong preoccupation with these matters and could be a possible motive for Venezuela's later rejection of the 1899 Arbitral Award. Through the use of frequency measurements and content analysis of headlines and editorial pages inferences were drawn from the text in order to establish just how prevalent these considerations were to the majority of Venezuelans. The focus was then placed on establishing if Venezuela's problems concerning the Colombo-Venezuelan border dispute, problems with uncontrolled immigration to Venezuela, and the discovery of new rich mineral deposits in the Essequibo and in the Gulf of Venezuela were in fact the primary (though unstated) reasons for renewing Venezuela's claims to the contested Essequibo region.

Significance

Venezuela's border disputes with Guyana and Colombia have been a prominent element of Venezuelan foreign policy since the end of the nineteenth century. Even though the Guyana-Venezuela and the Colombo-Venezuelan border disputes remain technically unsolved and a source for protracted conflict, Venezuela's relationships with these two countries should not be viewed as one of continuous confrontation. For the most part, Venezuelans do not regard Guyana with great animosity and in terms of Colombia, many Venezuelans have strong bonds of friendship or kinship ties with the Colombia people as well as share the

common history of once being part of the nation of Gran Colombia. In terms of resolving the two border disputes, the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute is currently awaiting resolution by the United Nations High Commissioner, and the Colombo-Venezuelan border dispute is being dealt with by a Colombo-Venezuelan bilateral commission. All three governments are acting in concert to solve their border disputes, and problems are minimal. It is when other factors divert attention from the negotiations that the discussions break down.

Although the literature on the border dispute between Guyana and Venezuela is quite extensive, there is a need for a detailed study to pinpoint what in fact motivated Venezuela to reject the Arbitral Treaty of 1899 at the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations. In order to accurately evaluate this decision it is vital to understand which issues were consuming the Venezuelan people during that time. It would be too simple an explanation to accept that the breakdown in the Arbitral Treaty was due exclusively to the release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in 1949; for this reason it is necessary to establish if there were other unstated motives for Venezuela's foreign policy reversal regarding the Essequibo region. An understanding of Venezuelan popular opinion during the period of 1943-1944 prior to the release of the Mallet-Prevost memorandum and also from 1961-1962 before Venezuela nullified the Arbitral Treaty is essential to this end.

Much of the literature on the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute has been devoted to "solving" the border dispute itself.

Authors have expressed support for either returning the Essequibo to Venezuela, or scratching the entire Arbitral Award and renegotiating the treaty from the beginning (Kissler, 1972: 218-225). Others have suggested appeasing Venezuela's demands by giving her access to the Atlantic Ocean (a sort of "Polish Corridor" to the ocean) and letting Guyana keep the Essequibo intact (Braveboy-Wagner, 1984: 270-276). Although the issue of solving the border dispute remains highly controversial, these sources provide an excellent point of departure for an analysis of Venezuela's decision to reject the Arbitral Award. It is the intention of this chapter, however, to demonstrate why this decision was taken.

Relevance of Data Sources

Many sources could have been used to establish Venezuela's ulterior motives regarding her rejection of the 1899 Arbitral Award. Military war plans which are influenced by the national command authority were not examined. Some possible data sources such as official diplomatic correspondence, foreign ministry communiques, or annual presidential addresses were available. These were not used due to the purely political nature of their content which would not allow for dissenting opinions or representation of events as they were actually happening. Further, official government releases are sometimes predetermined and often contain only what the government and politicians want the people to know which is often very subjective in nature. This is sometimes the case for newspapers as well, as they often represent the publisher's own policies.

however, they are reasonably free of government manipulation. Instead, the comprehensive analysis of daily newspaper articles and editorials which appeared in El Nacional and El Universal was conducted to determine to what extent, if any, external events or government actions were affecting public opinion (or vice-versa) regarding the resolution of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute.

Celente and Milton indicate that the use of newspapers as part of a long term study can be useful tools in identifying and predicting a particular direction or sequence of events. Such an analysis can be performed by measuring the frequency of specific events and then tracking these events to establish a series of predictable sequences (Celente and Milton, 1990: 3-10). A comprehensive analysis using newspaper headlines to measure specific event frequencies followed by a thorough examination of the associated content of each headline thus can provide a reliable means from which to ascertain specific motives or directions. Celente and Milton maintain that "Tracking trends shows us how we got here, where we are, and where we're going (Celente and Milton, 1990: 4; 27-30)." It is this type of trend analysis that will be used principally to establish Venezuela's motives for abrogating the 1899 Arbitral Award.

Using the headlines in the newspapers to categorize daily events and occurrences as reported by the different wire services to which each newspaper subscribed provides a relatively objective data source that is generally free of

political manipulation (editorial influences and control were taken into consideration when analyzing the headlines). The editorial pages reflect popular support for or opposition to government policies or existing conditions which can be used to get a sense of how the general public felt about specific issues. In both instances the subject matter appearing in the newspapers was not predetermined.

In order to ensure the objectivity and reliability of such a study, Emmert and Barker emphasize the need for a research methodology that can produce replicable and valid inferences from data to their context (Emmert and Barker, 1989: 197-213). By means of measuring the frequency of the newspaper headlines using a set of pre-established standardized procedures, the requirement for objectivity, consistency and replicability as outlined by Emmert and Barker could be satisfied.

According to Weber, content analysis provides a general framework or methodology which allows the researcher to develop a design that best suits a particular study. For this reason, content analysis is appropriate for this study. The procedures and methodologies employed in this study have been adapted primarily from the writings of Gerald Celente and Tom Milton and Robert P. Weber (Weber, 1985).

In sum, the use of newspaper headlines and editorials should reveal shifting concerns by the Venezuelan government regarding its foreign policy stance and possible reasons for any changes. The use of this type of research methodology should be helpful in establishing if Venezuelan diplomatic failures

stemming from the renewal of the Colombo-Venezuelan border dispute or the existence of new mineral wealth in the Essequibo region were in fact the dominant motives for scrapping the 1899 Arbitral Treaty and not just the release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum.

Research Methodology for Content Analysis

This chapter involves a content analysis of daily newspaper headlines found on the front and back pages of El Nacional and El Universal as well as their respective editorial pages during the periods of January 1 to December 31, 1943 and August 1, 1961 to August 31, 1962. These daily newspaper headlines and editorials provide an opportunity with which to assess the state of the country and to follow the development of specific trends to what should be their logical conclusions.

The whole of the year 1943 was purposely chosen due to the fact that this was the year before Severo Mallet-Prevost was presented with Order of Liberator by the Venezuelan government in January 1944. The year 1943 also covers the events prior to his dictating the February 8, 1944 memorandum in which he declared that the United States had been pressured by Great Britain and Russia to act on the side of Britain in settling the Anglo-Venezuelan border dispute. The year 1943 was also researched to determine if there were any outstanding events that would motivate Mallet-Prevost to change his mind about what happened at the conclusion of the 1899 Arbitral Treaty.

The period of August 1, 1961 to August 31, 1962 corresponds with the year prior to the rejection of the 1899 Arbitral Treaty

by Venezuela at the United Nations on August 18, 1962. This time frame was chosen to examine if there were any motivating factors which could influence Venezuela to reject the 1899 Arbitral Treaty at that precise moment after being in possession of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum for thirteen years.

The use of newspaper headlines establishes a historical record of the day-to-day events in the lives of the Venezuelan people. Identifying, tabulating, and studying these topics will provide a better understanding of the dynamics of Venezuelan foreign policy as well as multilateral relations with Colombia and Guyana.

Even though this study deals largely with matters relating to the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute, there are other relevant issues that affect Venezuelan foreign policy. This analysis has three objectives: first to identify the relevant issues; second to establish the frequency of these issue as expressed in the number of times they appear in headline or editorial form; and third to analyze specific articles for their content related to the border dispute.

Data, Methods and Procedures

The most comprehensive way to study Venezuelan foreign policy during the period from 1943 to 1962 would require the examination of a vast number of foreign ministry and congressional records which would be a voluminous and unwieldy task; further complicated by the unavailability of many records due to the Venezuelan government's official secrets act which forestalls much scholarly research and investigation. By using

category distribution and headline frequency to determine trends, this analytical method can provide the researcher with an efficient data-reducing mechanism with which to interpret large amounts of published data to analyze variations in concerns over a period of time (Weber, 1988: 44-57).

Therefore, using newspaper headlines and editorials from the period standardizes data sources as well as avoids: political rhetoric and domination from only one party, specialized target audiences, problems with limited access and distribution, stratification of delivery and timing. Because El Universal and El Nacional as the two leading daily newspapers in Caracas, Venezuela were highly accessible to the general masses, they represent a reliable means for analyzing then current information as it was disseminated as well as for gauging public opinion through the editorial pages.

The sampling unit for this study was restricted to categorizing and analyzing newspaper headlines found on the front and rear pages of the two newspapers mentioned above, which aside from the sports page are generally the most widely read parts of newspapers (Celente and Milton, 1990: 27-30). The front and rear pages, according to newspaper editors, contain the most "newsworthy" articles and are therefore of more importance to readers. The editorial pages of these same newspapers were used to analyze, categorize and measure the frequency of public opinion dealing with certain pre-selected content areas. The normal units used in content analysis are generally sentences or paragraphs; newspaper headlines can also

be used in this vain (Smith, 1988: 263-268). In addition, examining daily newspaper headlines over an extended period reduces the possibility of overlooking events of major importance. Furthermore each edition was examined in its totality for any articles of relevance dealing with British Guiana or the Essequibo region not on the front or rear pages.

The first step in the study consisted of determining what the different categories or fields for examination would be. This was done by selecting at random one month's worth of newspapers and writing down all the headlines in each edition for the full thirty days; from these daily headlines repetitive categories were grouped together to establish the different fields. The month of August 1961 was chosen at random from the microfilm reels which were to be analyzed. Headlines for the period beginning August 1, 1961 and ending August 31, 1961 were recorded and then divided into a series of nineteen similar reoccurring content areas or categories; these were further refined into nine recurring categories. To this number were purposely added the categories of: border disputes, British Guiana, Colombia, Great Britain, and immigration as specific discriminators which were necessary for purposes of this thesis. In order to assess to what degree the Venezuelan population was reacting to news stories dealing with these categories and what their reactions to these specific events could be, the same procedure was conducted for the editorial section; however, the search was restricted solely to the five predetermined categories listed above. All headlines were read twice in order

to ensure accuracy and in order to look for trends that could be developed over time. A model was then constructed to record the number of occurrences by category to which each headline corresponded.

Thus, a listing of relevant issues was used for the construction of a model to categorize and establish the frequency of certain events. The decision to create a special model was based on the need to analyze specific content fields and certain pre-determined categories which would not have neatly fit into standard content analysis dictionaries. According to Weber, appropriate modification to suit basic research needs is acceptable (Weber, 1985: 22-26).

The final list of 15 categories or content fields is generally mutually exclusive, with the exception of the category listed as "opinion column." Although it could be argued that there are some issues which fall within a given content field which could be interpreted to belong to another content field, all headlines which appeared to belong in more than one category were coded into the category which they fit best, and only in that one. The next step involved counting the frequency of headline occurrence for each content field. The different headlines that appeared were divided into categories and added to determine the total frequency of news articles dealing with a particular subject for a given day. This process yielded the data shown in the tables below. Over the course of the study this allowed for the examination of those events which were thought to be the hidden reasons for Venezuela's rejection of

the 1899 Arbitral Treaty. However, the data gathered did not reveal any significant patterns which could be used to conclusively establish strong correlations among the different categories. The following tables provide the basis (or lack thereof) for identifying variables which were used to test the thesis of whether there were in fact unstated motives for Venezuela to reject the 1899 Arbitral Treaty.

Trends in Issues Over Time

This part of the chapter discusses the data generated by the procedures outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The first part of the content analysis (Tables 1-10) is organized on a month by month basis and concentrates on the period beginning with August 3, 1943 and ending with December 31, 1943. The newspaper used as the primary data source during this period was El Nacional. El Nacional is a center-right daily newspaper. El Nacional used Reuters and the Associated Press as its primary wire services. The second part of the analysis (Tables 11- 36) examines the period from August 1, 1961 to August 31, 1962. The newspaper used as the primary data source during this period was El Universal. El Universal is a center-left daily newspaper. El Universal used the Associated Press as its primary wire service.

The content analysis begins with an examination of the year 1943. As previously mentioned, the year 1943 is being examined due to the fact that it is the year prior before Mallet-Prevost wrote his famous memorandum; this is also the year prior to his

being awarded the Venezuelan "Order of the Liberator," which is the highest award that the Venezuelan government can bestow on a civilian. Any outward evidence of problems with the 1899 Arbitral Award or of border disputes with British Guiana which could have influenced Mallet-Prevost to write his memorandum were of particular interest during this period.

The period covering 1943 comes only eighteen months after the signing of the June 17, 1941 Colombo-Venezuelan Border Treaty. Any indications of lingering ill-feelings toward Colombia were expected to carry over into the popular press.

Tables 4.1 through 4.5 during this period demonstrate a significant preoccupation in the popular press with events taking place in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific and very little interest was demonstrated with events taking place in South America. During the months under scrutiny for the year 1943 the largest number of news stories dealt with World War II, this was followed by a variety of articles dealing with domestic issues and then by stories dealing with Colombia and with the petroleum industry. There were only two articles dealing with border disputes: one dealt with free access to navigation on a Venezuelan river and the other dealt with Brazil reorganizing its territories along the Venezuelan border. Significantly there were no stories dealing with British Guiana or the Essequibo region.

The major news stories which occurred during the period of August 3-31, 1943 involved the Allied offensives in Italy, Greece and the Aleutian Islands, followed closely by stories

dealing with the Russian summer offensive, Allied bombardment of Berlin, the Battle of Kursk and the Orinoco River overflowing its banks and causing severe flooding in Ciudad Bolivar.

There were five stories found dealing with some aspect of relations with Colombia in Table 4.1; these were reported through the wire services and dealt with Colombia's use of the Arauca River, Colombia's decision to join World War II on the side of the Allies and one article dealing with smuggling in Colombia. There was also one story dealing with the Colombian petroleum industry and another story discussing the possibility of dual-citizenship being conferred on Venezuelan citizens residing in Colombia. Clearly nothing that would indicate any open hostility with Colombia. There was no mention of stories dealing with border disputes, immigration or British Guiana.

Table 4.1

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
August 1943

Border Issues	1
British Guiana	0
Colombia	6
Domestic Issues	360
Economy	0
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	253
Great Britain	75
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	0
Petroleum/Oil Policy	6
Opinion Column	0
Social Unrest	0
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 701

The major stories which occurred during the period of September 1-30, 1943 dealt principally with the impending fall of the City of Rome; the continuing Allied invasion of the Italian peninsula; the impending surrender of Italy and the likelihood of the Italians changing sides and fighting with the Allies against the Axis powers; Mussolini's escape from Rome and the invasion of Tarawa as part of the island-hopping campaign by the United States against Japan. In Table 4.2 there was only one article dealing with Colombia and this involved oil production. There was only one story dealing with any aspect of boundaries and that story concerned an internal reorganization by Brazil of its border territories. There were no stories dealing with British Guiana or immigration problems.

Table 4.2

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
September 1943

Border Issues	1
British Guiana	0
Colombia	1
Domestic Issues	314
Economy	2
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	290
Great Britain	58
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	1
Petroleum/Oil Policy	2
Opinion Column	0
Social Unrest	0
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>669</u>

The major stories for the period of October 1-30, 1943 involved the liberation of Rome by General Mark Clark; Italy changing sides in the war and fighting on the side of the Allies against the German Reich; daylight and nighttime aerial bombing of Berlin; and the uncontrolled flooding of the Orinoco River in Guayana. The only stories associated with Colombia reported several cabinet level resignations, a fire in the capital followed by a series of strikes and the declaration of marshal law in the capital. The stories dealing with Colombia during this period concluded with the nomination of new cabinet ministers and the exchange of diplomatic personnel between the Soviet Union and Colombia. Table 4.3 shows no incidence of border disputes or problems with immigration into Venezuela. There was absolutely no news concerning British Guiana.

Table 4.3

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
October 1943

Border Issues	0
British Guiana	0
Colombia	13
Domestic Issues	330
Economy	5
Elections	7
Foreign Affairs	220
Great Britain	78
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	0
Petroleum/Oil Policy	15
Opinion Column	0
Social Unrest	0
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 668

The major headlines found during the period of November 1-30, 1943 involved continued Allied advances about the Italian peninsula and the round-the-clock bombing of targets throughout Germany by Allied bombers. Domestic news was dominated with stories concerning the damage caused by the Orinoco River floods and local efforts to stop the river from rising further. Table 4.4 shows thirteen stories dealing with topics in Colombia. Chief among these were headlines describing Colombian President Lopez' trip to the United States for medical treatment; Colombian diplomacy on behalf of Venezuela with the Dominican Republic; Nazi attacks on Colombian ships; and Colombia's reaction to the U.S. "good neighbor policy." In Table 4.4 there were no headlines or editorials dealing with border disputes, immigration issues or British Guiana.

Table 4.4

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
November 1943

Border Issues	0
British Guiana	0
Colombia	13
Domestic Issues	302
Economy	0
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	248
Great Britain	85
Guayana	2
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	0
Petroleum/Oil Policy	7
Opinion Column	0
Social Unrest	0
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 657

The period covering December 1-31, 1943 had the largest number of headlines dealing with Colombia for all of 1943. A total of twenty-three different articles are noted in Table 4.5 which deal with Colombia. However there were no headlines found dealing with British Guiana, border disputes or immigration issues. The other major news stories during this period dealt with Allied operations in the Balkans and the start of the Nazi V-1 rocket attacks of London. There were also a series of stories covering relief efforts and economic aid for the victims of the flooding in the state of Bolivar.

The majority of stories dealing with Colombia continued to focus on the Nazi attacks on Colombian ships in the Atlantic and Caribbean; there were headlines indicating Venezuelan solidarity with Colombia regarding the Nazi attacks; reports of several foreign ministers from Mexico and the Soviet Union arriving in Bogota and the most recurring headlines dealt with Colombia's declaration of war against the Axis on the side of the Allies. There were also a series of articles dealing with flooding in Cali, and the results of improved trade between Colombia and Venezuela. The only negative story concerned a report from Venezuelan students studying in Colombia stating that they were the victims of Colombian prejudice. This story was balanced by another headline reporting the election of a Venezuelan woman as a beauty pageant queen in Colombia. There was no mention of any boundary problems with Colombia.

Table 4.5

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
December 1943

Border Issues	0
British Guiana	0
Colombia	23
Domestic Issues	287
Economy	5
Elections	1
Foreign Affairs	246
Great Britain	86
Guayana	3
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	3
Petroleum/Oil Policy	9
Opinion Column	0
Social Unrest	0
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 663

Overall, Tables 4.1-4.5 indicate a lack of news stories showing any diplomatic or border disputes with either Colombia or British Guiana. The stories that did appear concerning Colombia were generally taken from the wire services and those written by local personnel were generally positive in tone. Significantly there were no stories whatsoever about British Guiana or stories dealing with immigration problems. The only stories dealing with Guayana concerned the uncontrolled flooding from the Orinoco River. There were no editorials written concerning British Guiana, Colombia, mineral exploitation in Guayana, immigration problems, or border disputes. This is specifically noteworthy since much of the literature dealing with Venezuela's border disputes with Colombia and Guyana constantly brings up the 1941 Colombo-Venezuelan Border Treaty as a diplomatic failure which resulted in the loss of

substantial national territory. The 1899 Arbitral Award is repeatedly described in the literature as an unjustified "erosion" of Venezuelan territory. In both instances there is significant lack of preoccupation with these events in the Venezuelan press during the period.

The period covering the events that took place between 1961-1962 describes those incidents of note that occurred exactly one year before Venezuela formally rejected the terms of the 1899 Arbitral Award at the Seventh Session of the United Nations on August 18, 1962. It was expected that there would be a substantial number of new stories and editorials dealing with the topic of the border dispute as well as a wide range of stories covering developments in British Guiana. As it turned out, Tables 4.6-4.18 during this period showed that the major issues of concern in the Venezuelan press involved domestic affairs, national security, social unrest and the state of the economy. There were a total of twenty-nine headlines dealing with the topic of border disputes, twenty headlines dealing with British Guiana and eighty-five headlines covering events involving Colombia. These numbers were still quite small when compared to other categories such as oil or the petroleum industry.

The major headlines found during the period of August 1-31, 1961 dealt with the deteriorating situation in the Belgian Congo, Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution and the Berlin crisis. There were a total of four articles dealing with Colombia and another four articles dealing with British Guiana.

There was only one headline recorded showing mention of a border dispute and this article dealt directly with the question of whether Venezuela would recover its territories lost to Great Britain. The articles dealing with Colombia reported routine domestic affairs and no mention of border problems with Colombian migrants. The headlines dealing with British Guiana concerned themselves primarily with reporting the current Guyanese elections and British Guiana's projected independence. There were reports of the possibility of British Guiana becoming a communist state if Cheddi Jagan were to win the elections; and reports from Washington and London warning against the results of a leftist victory. In the interior pages of the editions examined there were four additional stories dealing with British Guiana, these dealt with political violence against Cheddi Jagan, the upcoming Guyanese elections and reports of diamond production increases in the Essequibo region.

There were no headlines recorded for this period that dealt with immigration problems or any opinion columns dealing with border disputes. British Guiana, Colombia, Great Britain or immigration problems. However, there were twenty separate headlines found dealing with social unrest in Venezuela. A number of these headlines were linked to subversive, pro-Castro groups.

Table 4.6

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
August 1961

Border	1
British Guiana	4
Colombia	4
Domestic Issues	367
Economy	37
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	272
Great Britain	0
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	2
Petroleum Oil Policy	23
Opinion Column	0
Social Unrest	20
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 730

The events described in Table 4.7 dealt chiefly with the resumption of Soviet above ground nuclear testing and the associated fears by western nations of unchecked contamination; continuing concerns about Cuba; and the construction of the Berlin Wall. There were no headlines dealing with Colombia during this period nor any mention of border disputes. There was only one article listed under the category of British Guiana and this dealt with Cheddi Jagan winning the Guyanese elections and assuming the position of Prime Minister of British Guiana. There were two other headlines found in the interior pages of two editions during this period; one dealt with Cheddi Jagan's electoral win and the other discussed the outbreak of malaria in western British Guiana.

One headline of particular interest which could have some later significance to the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute was the announcement by Venezuela that it was seeking a seat on the United Nations Security Council effective January 1962 and that the prospects looked promising. If this were to happen it would put Venezuela in an advantageous position in any dealings it would have with Great Britain.

In terms of domestic news there was one headline announcing the formation of the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) which would promote economic development of the Orinoco basin. In other associated headlines there were disclosures of foreign investors already interested in prospective projects with the CVG. There were no headlines on the front or rear pages dealing with immigration. In terms of public opinion there was one editorial dealing with exploiting the hydroelectric potential of the Orinoco (this comes under the heading of economic development of Guayana) and two editorials discussing the need to revise Venezuela's immigration policies.

There were two articles dealing with national security during this period, but these dealt more with domestic issues than any exterior threat to the sovereignty of Venezuela. There were also a total of seventeen different headlines dealing with social unrest and related problems. This figure should not be taken out of context, as it was spread out over a thirty day period, and represents only a little over half the number of headlines discussing petroleum production over the same period.

Table 4.7

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
September 1961

Border	0
British Guiana	1
Colombia	0
Domestic Issues	293
Economy	42
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	263
Great Britain	0
Guayana	2
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	2
Petroleum Oil Policy	24
Opinion Column	3
Social Unrest	17
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 645

The period from October 1-31, 1961 revealed only six headlines dealing with Colombia and one headline involving British Guiana. There were also no headlines concerning any border difficulties with Colombia or British Guiana. The overall number of headlines dealing with social unrest declined but the number of headlines describing problems with national security tripled from the previous thirty days. There was also one headline involving Venezuelan nationalism, one editorial discussing immigration problems and another editorial urging young men to go to Guayana where the future of Venezuela is waiting. There was one headline dealing with immigration.

The single headline involving British Guiana concerned economic aid for Cheddi Jagan's new government. Two headlines not appearing on the front or rear pages described U.S. and Canadian economic aid to British Guiana and Cheddi Jagan's

declaration that British Guiana would become non-aligned. The six headlines dealing with Colombia documented a state of siege in Bogota; desertions by Colombian soldiers; Colombian guerrillas operating on the Venezuelan border; and Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia against the guerrilla problem.

Among the headlines grouped under the heading of foreign affairs appeared a headline confirming that Venezuela had received a seat on the U.N. Security Council for the period of January 1, 1962 to December 31, 1962. Venezuela would abrogate the 1899 Arbitral Award at the Seventeenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly while it held the U.N. Security Council seat.

Table 4.8

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
October 1961

Border	0
British Guiana	1
Colombia	6
Domestic Issues	317
Economy	57
Elections	3
Foreign Affairs	214
Great Britain	3
Guayana	2
Immigration	1
Nationalism	1
National Security	6
Petroleum Oil Policy	30
Opinion Column	2
Social Unrest	10
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>653</u>

Table 4.9 does not show any headlines under the categories of British Guiana or border disputes for the period of November 1-30, 1961. There was one article found in the interior pages of one edition describing a visit by Cheddi Jagan to Puerto Rico to confer with Munoz Marin. There are eight separate headlines under the category of Colombia and twenty-eight incidents of social unrest but no headlines dealing with national security. There were two editorials discussing the economic development of Guayana and one editorial describing British Guiana as a "bloody wound" on the side of Venezuela.

The eight headlines dealing with Colombia discussed Colombia's foreign policy position in the OAS with Cuba; seizures of contraband along the border with Venezuela; actions by the Colombian Congress against communists in the country; declarations of support from Colombia to Venezuela for breaking diplomatic ties with Cuba; and Colombia condemns Cuba for its ties with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The headlines dealing with Colombia during this period were taken exclusively from the wire service and do indicate any hostility between Colombia and Venezuela. In those instances where there is a headline describing both countries, relations are seen as cordial and cooperative. There were no headlines dealing with any immigration problems between the two countries or with boundary problems in the Guajira Peninsula or the Los Monjes Archipelago. There was nothing noted under the category of immigration.

Table 4.9

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
November 1961

Border	0
British Guiana	0
Colombia	8
Domestic Issues	253
Economy	36
Elections	1
Foreign Affairs	234
Great Britain	0
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	0
Petroleum/Oil Policy	22
Opinion Column	3
Social Unrest	28
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 585

The major trends recorded in Table 4.10 concerned the Berlin crisis; condemnation of the Soviet Union's continuing atmospheric nuclear testing; worries about Fidel Castro exporting communist revolution to the rest of Latin America; a coup d'etat in Brazil; social unrest and rioting in Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Katanga, and Peru; and the start of the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress.

During this period there was one headline dealing with British Guiana, ten headlines dealing with Colombia and no headlines dealing with any border disputes. The headline dealing with British Guiana concerned the proposal by Cheddi Jagan to form a "Federation of the Antilles." There were also two inside headlines recorded during this period: one dealt with Jagan attacking the British Colonial Office and the other described how Jagan wanted to change the name of British Guiana

to "El Dorado" after independence. There were no headlines found dealing with Venezuela's renewed claims for the Essequibo.

The headlines involving Colombia described the breaking of diplomatic ties with Cuba; the return of order to the Colombian capital after rioting; upcoming elections; increased guerrilla activity within the country; and the inauguration of the friendship bridge between Colombia and Venezuela. The only headline in the category marked opinion column during this period described how immigration to Venezuela was slowing down. There were also six headlines describing national security problems and nineteen headlines describing social unrest. There was no connection in any of these to Colombia or British Guiana.

Table 4.10

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
December 1961

Border	0
British Guiana	1
Colombia	10
Domestic Issues	294
Economy	40
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	220
Great Britain	0
Guayana	1
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	6
Petroleum/Oil Policy	19
Opinion Column	1
Social Unrest	19
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 611

The headlines recorded in Table 4.11 concerned themselves principally with domestic affairs. Fifty-five headlines were recorded describing social unrest (the highest incidence for the entire content analysis) and thirty-one headlines were recorded under the category of national security. The period of January 2-31, 1962 was a period of social and political upheaval in Venezuela; the majority of headlines recorded described massive street riots and strikes in most urban centers. Added to this were reoccurring headlines demanding the immediate ouster of Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt. In contrast to these headlines, there were only three headlines recorded under the category of opinion column; two of these editorials dealt with issues of national security and social unrest and one dealt with the problems that would arise if British Guiana became another communist satellite. In other international news there were several headlines dealing with the invasion of Portuguese Goa by India as well as the fateful decision to have Cuba removed from the Organization of American States; on the social-cultural front, the new dance called "the twist" made its official debut.

During this period there were seven headlines dealing with Colombia and three headlines dealing with British Guiana. The Colombian headlines described a meeting between the presidents of Colombia and Venezuela; an assassination plot against Lleras-Restrepo in Colombia; increased trade between Colombia and Venezuela; Colombian condemnations of Cuban human rights abuses; and Colombian demands for Cuba's expulsion from the OAS.

Of the three headlines which dealt with the category of British Guiana during this period; two of these headlines concerned themselves with the expected date of independence for British Guiana, the other was a report of a mystery virus spreading throughout British Guiana. There were no "antagonistic" type headlines dealing with Guyana.

There were five headlines dealing with border disputes during the period. Four of these dealt directly with the issue of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute and the other dealt with the existing border dispute between British Honduras and Guatemala. Two headlines dealing with British Guiana described Venezuela's plans to bring the matter up for discussion at the United Nations; and two other headlines noted that Britain had no knowledge of any outstanding boundary dispute with Venezuela. It is interesting to note that January 1962 was the first month in which Venezuela took its seat on the U.N. Security Council and immediately confronted Great Britain with the issue of the border dispute.

There were nine other headlines dealing with border disputes in the inside pages of six different editions during this period but only one actually dealt with the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute; the others concerned Guatemala, Mexico and Belize. The stories which dealt with border disputes expressed Venezuelan displeasure against the former colonial powers. There were no headlines recorded under the categories of nationalism, Guayana or immigration during this period.

Table 4.11

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
January 1962

Border	5
British Guiana	2
Colombia	5
Domestic Issues	332
Economy	32
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	178
Great Britain	1
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	31
Petroleum/Oil Policy	20
Opinion Column	3
Social Unrest	55
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 664

The period of February 1-28, 1962 featured a number of articles concerning civil war in the French colony of Algeria, the establishment of a U.S. embargo against Cuba, and an aborted coup d'etat against the government of Charles De Gaulle; during this period also occurred the highest incidence of headlines falling under the categories of border disputes and British Guiana. There were a total of nine headlines dealing with British Guiana and eight headlines dealing with border disputes.

Six of the eight headlines listed under border disputes concerned themselves with the question of Venezuela's reclamation of the Essequibo region at the United Nations and the official responses from Great Britain and British Guiana; the remaining three headlines dealt with the border dispute between Guatemala and British Honduras. There were two follow-up articles found in the inside pages of two different editions;

one dealt with the border dispute with Venezuela and the other with the border dispute with Guatemala.

The headlines dealing with British Guiana during this period described uncontrolled political violence in the major urban centers; mobs attack Cheddi Jagan; communist activity in the capital; labor strikes; the visit of Prince Phillip to British Guiana; Georgetown is burned down causing over ten million pounds (sterling) in damages; British troops are sent to stop the violence and restore the government; press censorship invoked; several headlines reported delaying independence for British Guiana; and one headline discussed reforestation programs for British Guiana. There were an additional ten articles dealing with British Guiana found on the inside pages of several editions, but these were follow-ups or continuations of articles already appearing on the front pages.

As previously noted, the period of February 1-28, 1962 had the highest incidence of headlines dealing with the issues of border disputes and British Guiana. Despite this fact, the headlines for these two categories only make-up 2.6 percent of all headlines recorded during the month or 1.9 percent of all headlines recorded during the whole year. Taken collectively, the total number of headlines dealing with British Guiana and border disputes equaled only .43 of one percent of all headlines in this study.

There were twelve headlines recorded dealing with Colombia; these discussed crime in Colombia; suspension of the right to congregate; a meeting between the presidents of Colombia and

Venezuela on the border; the inauguration of a bridge between Colombia and Venezuela; and the foreign ministers of Colombia and Venezuela meeting to discuss democracy in both countries.

There were twenty-four articles dealing with national security and thirty-two dealing with social unrest during this time. There were also three editorials during this period calling for Venezuela to take back the Essequibo region, one editorial discussing Venezuelan and Colombian friendship and ten other editorials concerning social unrest and national security issues. There was only one headline dealing with immigration.

Table 4.12

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
February 1962

Border	10
British Guiana	8
Colombia	12
Domestic Issues	261
Economy	58
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	183
Great Britain	11
Guayana	2
Immigration	1
Nationalism	0
National Security	24
Petroleum/Oil Policy	16
Opinion Column	14
Social Unrest	32
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 632

There are only four headlines under the category of border disputes during the period of March 1-31, 1962 and these continue Venezuela's claim to the Essequibo region; there is an announcement that Venezuela and Great Britain will discuss the

matter; in a related article Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan states that Venezuela is free to appeal the 1899 Arbitral Award and in another article Jagan says he does not want the matter brought up in the United Nations. There is also one article concerning Argentina, Chile and Great Britain and boundaries in Antarctica. There were three headlines recorded on the inside pages during this period, one concerns Venezuelan ministers trying to gather support for Venezuela's case at the U.N.; the other two are about Guatemala and Belize's border dispute.

There were two headlines recorded for British Guiana during this period; one article described how businessmen blamed the recent fire in Georgetown on Jagan and his politics and wanted him to pay damages; the other article described how Cheddi Jagan was trying to make the peace with the opposition party.

Table 4.13 indicates that there were four headlines dealing with Colombia during this time frame. The headlines discussed seditious activities being denounced by the military; liberal party strength; foreign aid to help the private sector; and a conservative party win upsets the national elections.

Additionally, there were twenty-seven headlines recorded dealing with internal national security threats and thirty-seven counts of articles dealing with social unrest. Coupled with this, there were eighteen separate editorials listed under opinion column reporting national security and social unrest issues; there were two editorials calling for the return of the Essequibo to Venezuela and one article denouncing British neo-colonialism. There were no headlines dealing with immigration.

Since August 1961 the number and degree of severity of headlines dealing with national security has been steadily growing each month. Social unrest in the form of street riots, work stoppages, labor strikes and violent crimes has also been peaking. When editorials are added to these two columns almost ten percent of all headlines account for social unrest and national security issues. Interestingly, headlines dealing with British Guiana and the border dispute also increased in frequency.

Table 4.13

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
March 1962

Border	4
British Guiana	1
Colombia	4
Domestic Issues	351
Economy	43
Elections	0
Foreign Affairs	226
Great Britain	0
Guayana	1
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	27
Petroleum/Oil Policy	30
Opinion Column	20
Social Unrest	37
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>744</u>

The period of April 1-30, 1962 contained only one headline dealing with British Guiana during this period; the article discussed Cheddi Jagan's declaration that a new chapter was beginning in the history of the Caribbean. This is related to Jagan's plans for a federation of the Antilles.

Table 4.14

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
April 1962

Border	4
British Guiana	0
Colombia	7
Domestic Issues	238
Economy	86
Elections	1
Foreign Affairs	141
Great Britain	0
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	48
Petroleum/Oil Policy	21
Opinion Column	24
Social Unrest	52
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 622

There were four headlines recorded dealing with border disputes; one headline dealt with a Venezuelan ambassador going to England to discuss the border dispute; the other three headlines described border disputes between Holland and Indonesia and territorial disputes between Bolivia and Chile. There were seven headlines involving Colombia, these dealt with crime in Colombia; Colombia accusing Castro of fomenting guerrilla activity on its soil; an aerial disaster; and Colombia's diplomatic reactions to the coup d'etat in Argentina.

Headlines describing national security concerns and social unrest continued to increase during the period with forty-eight separate headlines dealing with national security and fifty-two articles dealing with social unrest. There were twenty-four headlines listed under the category of opinion column; of this number twenty-three of twenty-four headlines dealt with the

worsening domestic situation in terms of national security and social unrest. The twenty-fourth editorial dealt with the British Guiana's pending independence from Great Britain. There were no headlines or editorials concerning immigration issues during this period.

The period of May 2-30, 1962 concerned itself with a number of diverse incidents. There were a number of articles dealing with communist aggression in Thailand; skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops in what would become the Indo-Chinese War; President Kennedy began sending U.S. troops to Laos and Vietnam to help these countries fight communist expansion; and France's colonial hold on Algeria was losing its grip. On the domestic scene the majority of headlines dealt with the aborted "golpe" by elements of the military at Carupano; there were a number of stories describing campesinos armed with machetes marching to Carapuno to fight the insurrectionists and to prevent another military dictatorship from seizing power in Venezuela.

During this period there were no headlines dealing with British Guiana and there was only one headline discussing border disputes. This headline dealt with Venezuelan denials of any plans to invade British Guiana and to seize the Essequibo by force. There were a total of eight headlines under the category of Colombia, these dealt with the Colombian elections; Colombian and Venezuelan cooperation; Colombian and Venezuelan air travel accords; and the denial of visas to Cubans by Colombia.

There were a total of sixty-four headlines dealing with problems of national security (the highest incidence for the

entire study); thirty-seven headlines dealing with social unrest; and eighteen editorials dealing with social unrest and national security and one editorial discussing democracy and the recent Colombian elections.

Table 4.15

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency

May 1962

Border	1
British Guiana	0
Colombia	8
Domestic Issues	253
Economy	81
Elections	4
Foreign Affairs	169
Great Britain	1
Guayana	1
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	64
Petroleum/Oil Policy	26
Opinion Column	19
Social Unrest	37
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 663

The period from June 1-30, 1962 registered further attacks to Venezuelan democracy from the military. Military uprisings were staged in Puerto Cabello and were reported to be more violent and bloodier than those that were put down at Carupano in May 1962. The events described for May and June 1962 put Venezuela almost at the point of civil war.

During this period there were a total of twelve headlines dealing with national security concerns; there were forty-three headlines dealing with social unrest; and there were twenty-eight editorials recorded during the period dealing with national security and social unrest and one editorial about

Venezuelan Guayana. It should be noted that there was press censoring in effect during this period so actual numbers could be potentially much higher for stories dealing with Venezuelan internal affairs during this period.

Tables 4.16 indicates that there were no headlines dealing with any border disputes during the period; there was one headline concerning Soviet technicians exploring for natural gas in British Guiana; and there were two headlines involving Colombia. The headlines concerning Colombia involved an airline disaster and the stalled aviation accord between Colombia and Venezuela. There were no headlines discussing immigration to Venezuela or immigration policy. In other international news there were reports of Formosa threatening to invade mainland China and several articles on the "beatnik" culture in the United States and how it is making its way to Venezuela.

Table 4.16

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
June 1962

Border	0
British Guiana	1
Colombia	2
Domestic Issues	346
Economy	87
Elections	1
Foreign Affairs	142
Great Britain	0
Guayana	1
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	12
Petroleum/Oil Policy	18
Opinion Column	28
Social Unrest	43
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 681

Tables 4.17 shows no articles dealing with border dispute issues or with British Guiana for the period of July 1-31, 1962. There were a total of six headlines describing events in Colombia. These headlines dealt with Colombia indicating its desires to join the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Colombia's president ending his term in office; an article about Colombia's Independence Day celebrations; the improved economic relations between Colombia and Venezuela; and a report of Colombia's foreign minister traveling to the United States for consultations.

Domestically events were quieting down in the Venezuelan capital and throughout most urban centers but there was still a great deal of political tension recorded in headlines during this period. There were five headlines dealing with national security and there were forty-one articles describing social unrest problems. There were fourteen editorials concerning national security and social unrest issues and one editorial about British Guiana and another about Cheddi Jagan at the United Nations. There were three stories dealing with economic development and the steel industry in Guayana. There were no listings under the category of immigration.

Dealing with other international affairs, there were numerous headlines discussing the U.S. satellite "Telstar" and how it would revolutionize the communications and entertainment industries. There were also a number of headlines concerning the recent military coup d'etat in Peru and its repercussions.

Table 4.17

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
July 1962

Border	0
British Guiana	0
Colombia	6
Domestic Issues	297
Economy	67
Elections	7
Foreign Affairs	293
Great Britain	1
Guayana	0
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	5
Petroleum/Oil Policy	23
Opinion Column	17
Social Unrest	41
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 757

The period of August 1-31, 1962 was the crucial period when Venezuela formally took its case concerning the abrogation of the 1899 Arbitral Award between Great Britain and Venezuela to the United Nations. On August 18, 1962 Venezuela voided the terms of the Arbitral Award and called for renegotiations concerning ownership of the Essequibo.

Interestingly there was only one headline recorded under the category of British Guiana and four headlines listed under border disputes. The single headline dealing with British Guiana involved a report stating that communist subversives in Venezuela were receiving guns from British Guiana. The four headlines dealing with border disputes all dealt with the Venezuelan border dispute and all headlines occurred after the

announcement of Venezuela's abrogation of the 1899 Arbitral Award. One headline accused Venezuela of bringing up the boundary controversy to stall British Guiana's pending independence talks; the other headlines concerned Great Britain's assessment that Venezuela's charges were unjustified and that it would not renegotiate the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela; the last article described the contents of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum as justification for Venezuela to renegotiate the borders between both countries.

There were eight headlines dealing with national security issues and another twenty-six headlines dealing with social unrest. There were only four editorials recorded for this period and all four editorials dealt with national security and social unrest. There were no headlines dealing with immigration.

During this period there were thirteen headlines dealing with Colombia; this was the highest number of headlines recorded for the period of August 1961 to August 1962. However this figure does not come close to the number of twenty-two headlines recorded during the period of December 1-31, 1943. The headlines concerning Colombia in Table 18 discussed the damage caused by an earthquake in Colombia; Colombia's new president is sworn-in; the new Colombian cabinet; and flooding in Colombia. In other international news there were numerous articles concerning the death of American film actress Marilyn Monroe and the coup d'etat in Argentina.

Table 4.18

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
August 1962

Border	4
British Guiana	1
Colombia	13
Domestic Issues	283
Economy	57
Elections	5
Foreign Affairs	169
Great Britain	1
Guayana	1
Immigration	0
Nationalism	0
National Security	8
Petroleum/Oil Policy	12
Opinion Column	4
Social Unrest	26
<hr/> TOTALS	<hr/> 584

Conclusions

This study of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute, along with the preceding content analysis of newspaper headlines set out to find and establish what were the unstated reasons Venezuela may have had for nullifying the 1899 Arbitral Award when it did. Possible motives were examined at length using the two leading newspapers in Caracas during the periods of August - December 1943 and August 1961 - August 1962.

It was expected that by examining newspapers in 1943 there would be a substantial number of articles dealing with issues concerning British Guiana, or with diplomatic troubles with Great Britain, or about mineral wealth in the Essequibo. It was believed that perhaps some of these issues could have swayed Mallet-Prevost to write a memorandum conducive to nullifying the

Arbitral Award. For that matter, articles dealing with public discontent and with the recently (1941) negotiated border treaty with Colombia were also sought. However, no significant correlation or trends were discovered.

The period covering August 1961 - August 1962 was examined because it was the year before Venezuela took the issue of the border with British Guiana to the United Nations for resolution. It was expected that the newspaper headlines during this period would reveal a flurry of activity in terms of articles dealing with British Guiana or the border controversy or with Great Britain. It was further expected that there would be numerous articles dealing with diplomatic problems with Colombia and with immigration problems in Venezuela. This line of reasoning was also proven wrong from the examination of the newspapers during this period.

The content analysis for all newspaper headlines for the periods indicated in Tables 4.20 and 4.21 yielded a total of 11,929 separate headlines including editorials. It was expected that major trends would be visible over time as to why Venezuela renounced the Arbitral Award thirteen years after having the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in her possession but this was not the case. As a matter of fact, Table 4.19 reveals that the categories mentioned above produced a significantly small percentage of headlines over the entire period.

Border issues figured only two tenths of a percent of all headlines; articles dealing with British Guiana only appeared two tenths of a percent; articles dealing with Colombia appeared

one percent of the period; and articles dealing with Great Britain appeared three percent of the time in question. It should be noted that there were a number of headlines identified in Tables 4.1-4.5 under the heading of Great Britain, but, these stories merely reflected events involving World War II and at no time were there any headlines noted which connected Great Britain with Venezuela or British Guiana during the entire period in question. So, this would make the percentage for Great Britain even smaller.

When analyzing the events recorded during the period of 1961-62 it should be remembered that Venezuela already had the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in its possession since 1949 and that news articles appearing after that date could be prejudiced against British Guiana and Great Britain. Interestingly, except for the period of February 1962 and August 1962 when the matter of the border dispute was brought up in open fora, relations with Great Britain and British Guiana were exceptionally good.

There was only one period from January to February 1962 when headlines dealing with British Guiana and the border dispute rose in frequency, keeping pace with headlines dealing with national security and social unrest issues; contrary to any pattern, the border dispute issues began to taper off after March 1962 while national security and social unrest issues continued to climb to their highest numbers in April and May 1962. Headlines dealing with British Guiana and the border dispute during this period dropped to almost zero.

Issues dealing with Colombia on the other hand remained fairly constant throughout all of 1943 and 1961-62 even at the height of Venezuelan domestic problems. After searching the content of all articles dealing with Colombia it was found that there was no mention of any border dispute whatsoever between Colombia and Venezuela. No new or old squabbles were noted. In fact headlines dealing with Colombia generally dealt with cooperation and fraternity between Venezuela and Colombia.

Aside from one headline in October 1961 and another in February 1962, there were no other articles making any mention of immigration. The hypothesis that immigration problems caused by large numbers of undocumented Colombians in Venezuela as a possible motive proved to be a dead end.

In searching for answers to the unstated motives for Venezuela's abrogation of the Arbitral Award more questions were found at the end of the search than when it started. The content analysis performed for the purposes of this study did not reveal any concrete motives for Venezuela's actions concerning the Arbitral Treaty, however, the research was able to isolate and eliminate certain variables from the hypothesis.

It may in fact be the case as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, that the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum was not a catalyst for Venezuela to abrogate the 1899 Arbitral Award, rather it may have only provided further evidence for Venezuela's contentions that there had in fact been a political deal between the British judges and the Russian judge at the Arbitral Tribunal. As Kissler and Braveboy-Wagner have

indicated in their research, Venezuela showed almost immediate disapproval with the 1899 Arbitral Award. As early as October 7, 1899 Venezuela voiced her condemnation of the Award, and demanded the renegotiation of her eastern border with British Guiana. After numerous diplomatic attempts failed to convince Great Britain of her seriousness to nullify the Arbitral Award, Venezuela took her case to the United Nations in 1962.

A plausible explanation for the timing of Venezuela's abrogation of the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty of 1899 on August 18, 1962 may be linked to the political leverage or advantage that Venezuela may have felt it had as a result of holding a seat on the U.N. Security Council from January - December 1962; perhaps the Venezuelan government felt that it was in a stronger position to raise the issue of the border dispute during this time. It can only be surmised, but it is also possible that Venezuela could have felt that it had sufficient prestige with the non-aligned nations and enough economic clout due to its position in OPEC that the circumstances were propitious for it to broach the issue of the Essequibo with Britain at that time.

Further research into this subject is certainly warranted. Additional research comprising the period prior to the release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in 1949 could in fact yield more conclusive results. A more comprehensive study utilizing a broader resource base or one that is not restricted solely to analyzing just the content of headlines from the front and rear pages of newspapers from the years 1943 and 1961-1962 might be more appropriate.

As official government records become available, a thorough examination of pertinent Venezuelan and British foreign ministry documents may also shed more light on the political give and take that went on between the nations that participated in the 1897 Arbitral Tribunal. An examination of Venezuelan presidential speeches and congressional records could also prove suitable. The research for this study concentrated primarily on Venezuelan sources for information; a more thorough examination of documentation from the Guyanese and British perspectives may be advantageous.

Table 4.19

Total Frequency of Occurrence for Selected Categories

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Border Issues	29	.243
British Guiana	24	.201
Colombia	143	1.199
Domestic Issues	5478	45.922
Economy	735	6.161
Elections	30	.251
Foreign Affairs	3961	33.205
Great Britain	399	3.345
Guayana	19	.159
Immigration	2	.017
Nationalism	1	.008
National Security	239	2.004
Petroleum/Oil Policy	323	2.708
Opinion Column	138	1.157
Social Unrest	408	3.420
TOTAL NEWSPAPER HEADLINES:	11929	

Table 4.20

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
August-December 1943

	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Border Issues	1	1	0	0	0
British Guiana	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	6	1	13	13	23
Domestic Issues	360	314	330	302	287
Economy	0	2	5	0	5
Elections	0	0	7	0	1
Foreign Affairs	253	290	220	248	246
Great Britain	75	58	78	85	86
Guayana	0	0	0	2	3
Immigration	0	0	0	0	0
Nationalism	0	0	0	0	0
National Security	0	1	0	0	3
Petroleum/Oil Policy	6	2	15	7	9
Opinion Column	0	0	0	0	0
Social Unrest	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	701	669	668	657	663

Table 4.21

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
August 1961-August 1962

	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG
Border	1	0	0	0	0	5	10	4	4	1	0	0	4
British Guiana	4	1	1	0	1	2	8	1	0	0	1	0	1
Colombia	4	0	6	8	10	5	12	4	7	8	2	6	13
Domestic Issues	367	293	317	253	294	332	261	351	238	253	346	297	283
Economy	37	42	57	36	40	32	58	43	86	81	87	67	57
Elections	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	7	5
Foreign Affairs	272	263	214	234	220	178	183	226	141	169	142	293	169
Great Britain	0	0	3	0	0	1	11	0	0	1	0	1	1
Guayana	0	2	2	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	1	0	1
Immigration	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nationalism	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
National Security	2	2	6	0	6	31	24	27	48	64	12	5	8
Petroleum/Oil Policy	23	24	30	22	19	20	16	30	21	26	18	23	12
Opinion Column	0	3	2	3	1	3	14	20	24	19	28	17	4
Social Unrest	20	17	10	28	19	55	32	37	52	37	43	41	26
TOTALS	730	645	653	585	611	664	632	744	622	663	681	757	584

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS

Venezuela's Unstated Motives for Abrogating the Arbitral Award

Venezuela's objections to the terms of the Arbitral Treaty of 1899 did not suddenly materialize with the release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum in 1949. Almost from the moment that the results of the Arbitral Award were made public on October 3, 1899, Venezuela protested the outcome of the Award (Braveboy-Wagner, 1984: 106-109). Venezuela's Foreign Minister Jose Andrade made clear on October 7, 1899 that the Arbitral Award of 1899 was the product of political collusion and that it should not be adhered to by Venezuela. Benjamin Harrison who was one of the jurists presenting Venezuela's case before the Arbitral Tribunal declared on October 4, 1899 that the results of the Arbitral Award were not the product of a legal arbitration but rather one of political compromise and coercion. On October 26, 1899 in a letter to a colleague, fifty years before the release of his posthumous memorandum, Mallet-Prevost stated that the Arbitral Award was the result of pressures brought on the judges by the President of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Russian jurist Pyodor de Martens (Kissler, 1972: 166; 172).

These objections were to take on more concrete form in years to come. During 1915-1917 Venezuela took up the issue of relocating its frontier line with British Guiana but could not come to terms with Great Britain. During the next twenty years there were three separate incidents involving the legality of

the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela, but none of these were resolved in Venezuela's favor (Kissler, 1972: 19-20). In 1935 Venezuelan President Lopez-Contreras made the re-examination of the 1899 Arbitral Award one of his country's central foreign policy initiatives, and, in the 1940's the Venezuelan Congress made revision of the 1899 Arbitral Award a national priority (Kissler, 1972: 21).

Having failed through bilateral diplomacy to convince Great Britain to reopen the Arbitral Award for re-examination and negotiation, Venezuela took its case to the international diplomatic community for support. At the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945, Venezuela denounced the Anglo-Venezuelan Arbitral Award before the Assembly. In 1948 at the Ninth Inter-American Conference held in Bogota, Colombia, Romulo Betancourt representing Venezuela made formal claim to the Guayana-Essequibo (Braveboy-Wagner, 1984: 115). At the Organization of American States Foreign Ministers Conference in 1954, Venezuela again demanded that the 1899 Arbitral Award be renegotiated. Venezuela reiterated this demand at the Tenth Inter-American Conference as well. In March of 1960, the Venezuelan Council of Ministers directed that a plan be prepared which would ensure the renegotiation of the Arbitral Award (Kissler, 1972: 21).

In the context of this environment it can be seen how Venezuela's long-standing determination to abrogate the Arbitral Award of 1899 was repeatedly raised long before she addressed the U.N. General Assembly at the Seventeenth Session of the

United Nations on August 18, 1962. Clearly Venezuela had been methodically and deliberately denouncing the terms of the Arbitral Award long before there was any indication that Great Britain intended to grant British Guiana its independence. From this it should be clear that Venezuela did not raise objections to the terms of the Arbitral Award "at the eleventh hour" in order to prevent Guyana from gaining her independence, as some pro-Guyanese writers would present it, but rather that Venezuela had made her protests regarding the terms of the Arbitral Award from the moment that the terms of the Award were made public sixty-three years earlier.

It is then more a case of why Venezuela directed its strongest attack of the 1899 Arbitral Award during the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly on August 18, 1962, than if Venezuela had any hidden agendas or unstated motives for declaring the 1899 Arbitral Award null and void. As the research indicates, Venezuela had made her position known to Great Britain (and the international community) regarding the Arbitral Award long before even the release of the Mallet-Prevost Memorandum occurred in 1949.

There are several possible explanations of why Venezuela chose to resurrect its claim to the Essequibo in 1962. Kissler postulates that one of the possible reasons for Venezuela raising the issue of the border dispute was that Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt saw the settlement of the border dispute with Great Britain as an issue directly affecting Venezuelan pride and honor and one that could help to divert

attention overseas while he proceeded with the task of establishing and consolidating representative government at home (Kissler, 1972: 222); a move not unlike what Manley claims Forbes Burnham capitalized on after the Venezuelan attempt at subversion during the Rupununi incident (Manley, 1979: 45).

This may in fact have been a valid reason. According to Table 39 of the content analysis, the number of newspaper headlines dealing with social unrest and national security issues were on a steady rise in Venezuela up to August 1962 when Venezuela rejected the Anglo-Venezuelan Arbitral Treaty at the United Nations on August 18, 1962. Closer examination of events in Venezuela prior to the opening of the Seventeenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly revealed that the months of May and June 1962 had the highest incidence of headlines dealing with issues of social unrest and national security. The fact is that Venezuela's declaration of her intent to nullify the Arbitral Treaty was made only two months after the outbreak of the military revolts at Puerto Cabello and Carupano. This could have been a deliberate move by the Betancourt government to create some kind of "diversionary tactic" with which to distract public attention from the worsening problems at home, however, this does not eliminate Venezuela's earlier statements rejecting the Arbitral Award.

Singh described how the struggle for Guyana's independence began shortly after World War II but did not gain real momentum until the early 1960's. By 1962 British Guiana's independence from Great Britain was considered a foregone conclusion (Singh,

1988: 13; 30-31). The possibility exists that the Betancourt government in Venezuela may have judged that this was an opportune time to force Great Britain to the negotiating table. This could have been a calculated gambit on the part of the Venezuelan government, trusting that Great Britain would not put herself in a position to invite international censure by appearing to saddle a former colony with a still unsettled border dispute just before independence. Accordingly, the Venezuelan claim could then be given the type of consideration and attention that it had repeatedly failed to receive from Great Britain since her initial objections to the terms of the Arbitral Award in back in October of 1899.

An examination of the frequency and distribution of newspaper headlines dealing with independence talks for British Guiana, as well as issues about border disputes and Great Britain occurring during the period of February 1-15, 1962, substantiates that the greatest incidence of these categories took place simultaneously with an increase in the total number of headlines describing independence talks for British Guiana and Cheddi Jagan's leftist Peoples Progressive Party winning British Guiana's parliamentary elections. Because of the increased likelihood of pending independence for British Guiana it seems reasonable to assume that Venezuela may have wanted to put increased pressure on Great Britain to settle the border dispute while British Guiana was still a colony of Britain's and not an independent state and a third party that would have to be included in any future settlement of the border dispute.

The flip-side of this argument is that the possibility also existed that by delaying British Guiana's independence, Venezuela could delay what seemed likely to be the almost inevitable emergence of a Marxist style government on her eastern border under the leadership of Cheddi Jagan. Jagan was a self avowed Marxist and a friend of Fidel Castro. During this time Venezuela was fighting Castro supported-insurgents inside her own borders and probably feared that an independent British Guiana under Jagan might be used by Castro to spread communism throughout South America. For these reasons Venezuela was determined not to permit an independent Marxist state from getting a foothold on the South American mainland.

Both scenarios were a "win - win" situation for Venezuela. If Venezuela could force Great Britain to re-negotiate the Arbitral Award before British Guiana gained her independence then Venezuela won. If Venezuela could keep a Marxist style government from coming to power by delaying British Guiana's independence then Venezuela also won.

Further, if Venezuela had in fact waited to renew her claim to the Essequibo region until after British Guiana's independence from Great Britain, Venezuela would have been seen by the international community as an aggressor and bully, trying to intimidate and coerce a weaker, and less developed neighbor. Much like the situation that Venezuela was in during the nineteenth century when she first tried to settle her eastern boundary with Great Britain. This way Venezuela appeared as the honest broker, desirous of settling all claims with Great

Britain and allowing Guyana to enter the family of nations with a clean slate.

What is missing from the explanations as to why Venezuela may have decided to take the border dispute to the United Nations in 1962 are two components which were part of the original thesis at the onset of this study and have since been discarded, they were: (1) that Venezuela was pursuing her claim partly on the strength of the economic potential of Guyana-Essequibo; minerals such as lead, zinc, nickel, chromium, gold, bauxite, and manganese along with diamonds were known to exist in the area, and (2) that Venezuela's inability to solve its ongoing border disputes with Colombia had pushed the Betancourt government to try to restore national honor by reopening the border dispute over the Essequibo region with Great Britain.

The results of the content analysis failed to reveal any significant trends indicating any increase in newspaper headlines detailing Venezuelan concerns with mineral wealth in the Essequibo area or with economic development of the region. Headlines dealing with economic development in the Guayana region figured slightly more than one tenth of a percent during the period. Venezuela was definitely aware of the economic potential of the region, but during this period she still lacked the infrastructure to economically exploit much of Venezuelan Guayana, let alone expand her activities to include the Essequibo region.

Venezuela had in early 1962 formed the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana to begin work on major steel projects in

Venezuelan Guayana but this industry was only in its infancy. During this time Venezuela was concentrating primarily on trying to develop the petroleum industry in the Lago de Maracaibo area. It would not even be until August 1962 before the bridge across Lake Maracaibo would finally connect the state of Zulia with the rest of Venezuela, after which Venezuela would then start economic development projects in the eastern part of the country.

An examination of headline frequency dealing with Colombia proved to be equally disappointing. The content analysis revealed that issues dealing with Colombia appeared in the popular press only slightly more than one percent of the time during the entire period of August 1961 to August 1962. This was true even at the height of Venezuela's civil unrest and domestic problems. After searching the content of all articles dealing with Colombia it was found that there was simply no mention of any border disputes, old or new, between Colombia and Venezuela. There was also a significant absence of headlines dealing with any problems of emigration from Colombia to Venezuela or the existence of any problems concerning Colombian migrants already in Venezuela. For the most part, the headlines revealed no traces of the "traditional" animosity that is supposed to exist between Venezuela and Colombia; the majority of the articles dealing with Colombia concerned either events occurring and affecting only Colombia, or, articles describing increased cooperation between the two countries.

All in all, the content analysis tended to refute any theories that mineral wealth in the Essequibo region and on-going diplomatic problems with Colombia may have had any significant influence on re-surfacing the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute at the United Nations in 1962. If the mineral wealth of the Essequibo and problems with Colombia did in fact have some influence on the case, this information would have to have been contained in some other sources, such as ministerial or cabinet documents not widely available to the Venezuelan press at the time.

The major conclusion that can be drawn from the content analysis is that there were no discernible trends or hidden motives discovered behind Venezuela's rejection of the 1899 Arbitral Award at the Seventeenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly on August 18, 1962. A plausible explanation for the timing of Venezuela's abrogation of the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty of 1899 may be attributed to the political leverage or advantage that Venezuela may have felt it had as a result of holding a seat on the U.N. Security Council from January to December 1962. Consequently, the Venezuelan government may have felt that it was in a stronger position to raise the issue of the border dispute during this time.

It can only be surmised, but it is also possible that Venezuela may have felt that it had sufficient prestige with the non-aligned nations and enough economic clout due to its position in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries that the circumstances were right for it to raise the issue of

the Essequibo territory with Britain at that time. Venezuela's image among the non-aligned nations was rather strong during this time but would tarnish considerably after British Guiana's independence.

Based on the source materials examined it was abundantly clear that Venezuela had been quite open about her demands for nullifying the 1899 Arbitral Award and that these demands had been made repeatedly since October 1899 and not merely in August 1962 as pro-Guyanese writers like to claim. The final conclusion is that Venezuela's abrogation of the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty at the U.N. was not the result of hidden agendas or unstated motives, but really just the continuation of her struggle to have the Arbitral Award nullified, this time by making her demands known before a world audience where Great Britain could not refuse to acknowledge Venezuela's demands for renegotiation of her eastern boundary.

APPENDIX

CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION AND HEADLINE FREQUENCY
AUGUST - DECEMBER 1943 AND AUGUST 1961 - AUGUST 1962

Table A.1

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
3-15 August 1943

	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues				1									
British Guiana													
Colombia					1					2			
Domestic Issues	16	16	15	14	14	8	7	16	10	10	11	13	7
Economy													
Elections													
Foreign Affairs	8	6	8	7	7	14	7	7	9	9	7	7	7
Great Britain	1	2	1	2	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	2	1
Guayana													
Immigration													
Nationalism													
National Security													
Oil/Petroleum Policy				1								1	
Opinion Column													
Social Unrest													

Table A.2

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-31 August 1943

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Border Issues																
British Guiana																
Colombia					1	2										
Domestic Issues	10	15	13	17	15	13	16	15	10	15	16	6	11	9	10	12
Economy																
Elections																
Foreign Affairs	5	4	5	7	13	8	8	7	7	8	10	14	10	15	11	18
Great Britain	2	5	6	3	6	2	5	4	2	3	0	1	3	2	2	3
Guayana																
Immigration																
Nationalism																
National Security																
Oil/Petroleum								1	1				1	1		
Opinion Column																
Social Unrest																

[illegible]

Table A.11

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 August 1961

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues															
British Guiana															
Colombia										3					
Domestic Issues	16	12	13	11	20	10	8	14	10	7	12	7	17	13	17
Economy	2	2	4		4				3	1				1	3
Elections															
Foreign Affairs	5	12	7	7	4	7	11	6	9	8	8	10	9	8	7
Great Britain															
Guayana															
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security															
Oil/Petroleum					2	1	1		1	1	2	2			1
Opinion Column															
Social Unrest			1	5	1	1			1				2	1	1

Table A.12

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-31 August 1961

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Border Issues													1			
British Guiana					1		1	1					1			
Colombia																
Domestic Issues	7	15	14	7	15	14	11	11	10	9	8	22	10	13	4	10
Economy	1	2	3	2				1	1	1		1		2	3	
Elections																
Foreign Affairs	11	6	9	6	13	12	9	10	6	12	14	6	10	10	9	11
Great Britain																
Guayana																
Immigration																
Nationalism																
National Security				2												
Oil/Petroleum	1		1		2			1	1	3		2			1	
Opinion Column																
Social Unrest	1		1	1	1		1			1				1		1

Table A.13

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 September 1961

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues															
British Guiana						1									
Colombia															
Domestic Issues	15	18	20	16	8	8	10	14	11	8	9	10	9	8	4
Economy	1	2			1	2	2	2					2	1	2
Elections															
Foreign Affairs	11	10	8	5	9	7	14	6	12	11	11	10	10	12	11
Great Britain															
Guayana					1										
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security															
Oil/Petroleum		2	2	1	1				1	1	1				
Opinion Column															
Social Unrest															

Table A.14

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-30 September 1961

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Border Issues															
British Guiana															
Colombia															
Domestic Issues	7	12	7	11	11	8	5	6	12	14	5	7	3	4	13
Economy	2			2		2	2	3	2		4	2	3	4	1
Elections			1				1								
Foreign Affairs	9	10	7	9	10	9	7	9	6	6	8	7	9	6	11
Great Britain															
Guayana											1				
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security	1										1				
Oil/Petroleum	1	3	2				1		1			1	1	2	3
Opinion Column			1		1				1						
Social Unrest	1	1	2		1		2		1						1

Table A.19

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 December 1961

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues															
British Guiana															
Colombia										1	2	1			
Domestic Issues	13	10	8	13	13	5	7	13	8	10	7	4	7	8	2
Economy	1	2	1		2		2	2	2	1		3	3	3	2
Elections															
Foreign Affairs	3	6	7	13	8	8	6	11	6	9	11	9	10	9	8
Great Britain															
Guayana			1												
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security														1	
Oil/Petroleum	2	1	2			2	1	1				1			
Opinion Column															
Social Unrest	2	2						1		2		2	1	1	1

Table A.20

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-31 December 1961

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Border Issues																
British Guiana																
Colombia						1					2	2	1			
Domestic Issues	11	9	2	11	7	4	1	8	18		13	16	18	20	10	18
Economy		1		1	2	2	1	1	1				1	3	2	1
Elections																
Foreign Affairs	9	6	10	5	7	6	6	4	6		16	5	1	3	7	5
Great Britain																
Guayana																
Immigration																
Nationalism																
National Security	4	1														
Oil/Petroleum							1	1	1				2	3		1
Opinion Column															1	
Social Unrest	1	2		2				1	1							

Table A.21

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 January 1962

	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues						1					2			
British Guiana														1
Colombia				1				1		2				1
Domestic Issues	14	19	18	12	14	18	10	12	18	16	18	10	5	14
Economy			1	3	2	3		1		1	1		3	1
Elections														
Foreign Affairs	5	8	9	9	4	7	9	3	4	4	3	8	5	4
Great Britain														
Guayana														
Immigration														
Nationalism														
National Security					1							1		
Oil/Petroleum				1	2	2		1	1	1			2	
Opinion Column														
Social Unrest								1		1	1	2		

Table A.22

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-31 January 1962

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Border Issues	1				1											
British Guiana	1															
Colombia				1				1								
Domestic Issues	11	12	11	11	4	4	7	3	2	3	5	9	14	16	14	8
Economy	1		1	1	4	1		1	1	2	1		2		1	2
Elections																
Foreign Affairs	6	5	7	8	7	11	8	4	2	2	4	7	5	7	6	7
Great Britain																
Guayana																
Immigration																
Nationalism																
National Security			1			2	2		9	3	4	3	2	1	2	
Oil/Petroleum	1		1			2					1	1	1		2	2
Opinion Column				1							1			1		
Social Unrest	1		1	1	4	3	2	11	5	5	8	4	2	1	2	

Table A.23

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 February 1962

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues		1				3									
British Guiana						1		1		1				1	
Colombia						1				1	2				
Domestic Issues	11	11	6	6	9	11	7	5	8	2	8	11	5	9	10
Economy	2	2	4	1	1	3	2	2	3	4	1		1	1	3
Elections															
Foreign Affairs	6	6	7	11	10	8	5	6	6	4	8	11	6	7	8
Great Britain							1	1	2	1	1	1	3	1	
Guayana		1				3									
Immigration	1														
Nationalism															
National Security			3	3	1		3	2	1	1	1			1	
Oil/Petroleum	1	1		1		1	2		1		1				1
Opinion Column						2		2	1	1	1		1		
Social Unrest	1		2	3	1	1	4	2	5	1	2		1	2	2

Table A.24

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-28 February 1962

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
Border Issues			1	1				2					1
British Guiana				1	2	1						1	
Colombia				1	1	1			1	1	1	2	
Domestic Issues	11	15	10	19	12	11	9	9	11	10	10	8	7
Economy	2	1	2		6	1	3	1	2	2		4	4
Elections													
Foreign Affairs		5	7	8	6	9	5	4	1	9	5	5	7
Great Britain													
Guayana													
Immigration													
Nationalism													
National Security		1	1				1	1	1	3			
Oil/Petroleum				1				1		1	2		1
Opinion Column				2	2				2	1			
Social Unrest				1		1		1					2

Table A.25

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 March 1962

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues						1									
British Guiana					1										
Colombia				1											
Domestic Issues	15	11	7	15	8	19	16	16	11	22	13	17	9	8	10
Economy	1		3	2		1	1	2	1	1	1		1	1	1
Elections															
Foreign Affairs	4	3	3	6	10	15	6	11	5	7	8	7	5	9	6
Great Britain															
Guayana												1			
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security			2	1	4	1			1	1	1	1			
Oil/Petroleum		2		3			1		1		1	1		3	1
Opinion Column	1			1					1			2	2	1	1
Social Unrest	1		1		1				1		1		2	1	1

Table A.26

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-31 March 1962

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Border Issues						1					1			1		
British Guiana																
Colombia				2	1											
Domestic Issues	6	9	8	14	14	8	11	9	12	13	14	8	10	6	6	8
Economy	1	4	3			2			2			2	4	4	3	3
Elections																
Foreign Affairs	12	8	10	9	7	6	8	7	4	8	6	5	6	2	8	5
Great Britain																
Guayana																
Immigration																
Nationalism																
National Security						1				1	2	1	1	5	3	1
Oil/Petroleum	2		3		1			1	3	3	2	1			1	2
Opinion Column	1	1			1	1		1	1		1		2	1	1	
Social Unrest	4		1			1	6	3	2	2		2	2	1	1	3

Table A.27

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 April 1962

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues															
British Guiana															
Colombia		2					8			1					
Domestic Issues	7	11	11	4	4	10	4	4	8	10	6	8		6	8
Economy	2	1	2	4	6	6	6	3	1	5	5	1	4	3	2
Elections															
Foreign Affairs	7	7	8	3	6	4	6	5	14	4	5	1	1	2	5
Great Britain															
Guayana															
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security	2	2		7	2	1	2	4		1	3	4		1	
Oil/Petroleum	4						1	2	1		1			1	1
Opinion Column	3	2		1	1			1	1	1	1		2	2	2
Social Unrest	1		4		3	1	1	1		3	1	1	3	5	4

Table A.28

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-30 April 1962

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Border Issues			1				1	1		1					
British Guiana															
Colombia									1				1		
Domestic Issues	12	11	16			12	15	9	13	7	4	4	8	14	12
Economy		3	1				2		2	3	5	7	7	4	1
Elections							1								
Foreign Affairs	3	5	2			4	5	12	5	7	6	4	5	3	2
Great Britain															
Guayana															
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security	3					5	3	1	1	3	1	1		1	2
Oil/Petroleum		1	1				1		2			1	1	2	1
Opinion Column	1	2	1										1		2
Social Unrest	4	5	2			3	1	1		4	1	1	1		

Table A.31

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 June 1962

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues															
British Guiana															
Colombia															
Domestic Issues	13	18	9	4	10	9	10	12	13	12	12	12	14	9	12
Economy	2	5	1		4	4	5	3	5	4		5	3	2	3
Elections															
Foreign Affairs	2	4	3	2	3	4	6	6	5	7	9	4	1	5	2
Great Britain															
Guayana															
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security			11	19	7	3	3	3	4	3			7	3	2
Oil/Petroleum			1					1		1		1			1
Opinion Column	1			1		1	1	2	1		2		1	1	1
Social Unrest				1	2	4	2	3		1	3	3	2		4

Table A.32

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-30 June 1962

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Border Issues															
British Guiana			1												
Colombia	1							1							
Domestic Issues	13	16	12	8	13	12	9	8	11	12	13	17	11	9	12
Economy	3	2		4	2	2	5	5	2		3	2	6	4	1
Elections		1													
Foreign Affairs	6	5	10	5	10	5	3	5	8	7	3	3	1	4	4
Great Britain															
Guayana		1													
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security	5		1	1						1	2	2			
Oil/Petroleum		2	1		1	1		2	2		1		1		2
Opinion Column	2	1	2	2		4	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Social Unrest			1	2	2	2		1	2	3	2		2	1	

Table A.33

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 July 1962

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues															
British Guiana															
Colombia										1					
Domestic Issues	7	13	9	10	12	6	9	8	11	9	10	5	8	5	15
Economy	1	1	5	2	2	1	2	1	1	3	2	1	4	3	2
Elections			1					1	1						
Foreign Affairs	5	6	2	6	3	9	6	6	8	4	3	5	4	4	6
Great Britain											1				
Guayana		1	1					1							
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security				2					1				2		
Oil/Petroleum	1		1				1	2	1		1	1	1	1	2
Opinion Column	1		1				2		1	1	1		1		
Social Unrest		1	2	2	2	1		2		5		2	3	2	3

Table A.34

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-31 July 1962

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Border Issues																
British Guiana																
Colombia			1		1	1		1								1
Domestic Issues	11	12	10	4	13	9	16	12	10	12	11	12	14	6	4	4
Economy	1	4	5	5	4				1	1	1	1	3	4	1	5
Elections											1	1		1		1
Foreign Affairs	8	5	6	6	7	5	9	10	6	8	9	9	7	6	11	4
Great Britain																
Guayana																
Immigration																
Nationalism																
National Security																
Oil/Petroleum	1	1	1	1	1						1	1	3		1	
Opinion Column		2					1	1			1		1		1	
Social Unrest	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	3		1		1			1

Table A.35

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
1-15 August 1962

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15
Border Issues															
British Guiana					1										
Colombia	1				1	3		1	2	1					
Domestic Issues	6	2	8	12	10	10	6	8	10	5	8	11	3	10	8
Economy	3	4	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	4	2	3		1	3
Elections		1	1		1					1		1			
Foreign Affairs	6	5	6	4	4	8	8	5	7	5	7	8	8	7	8
Great Britain															
Guayana															
Immigration															
Nationalism															
National Security	1							2				1	1		
Oil/Petroleum			1		1					1		2			1
Opinion Column		2		1				1							
Social Unrest	1	1		1	1	1	1	3	2	1				1	2

Table A.36

Category Distribution and Headline Frequency
16-31 August 1962

	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Border Issues								2	1		1					
British Guiana																
Colombia				1							1	1		1		
Domestic Issues	11	13	10	11	13	8	11	4	15	10	13	12	11	6	10	9
Economy	2	1	2	3			4	1	2		1		2	1	4	2
Elections																
Foreign Affairs	4	5	3	3	6	10	3	7	4	5	5	12	7	4	3	6
Great Britain																
Guayana		1														
Immigration																
Nationalism																
National Security										1				2		
Oil/Petroleum	2		1				1				1		1			
Opinion Column																
Social Unrest					2	1				1	1	1	1	2	1	1

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
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH


Orlando Jesus Fernandez y Gomez was born in Matanzas, Cuba. Shortly before the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis he fled to the United States from the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship of Fidel Castro. In 1978 he was awarded a Bachelor of Arts degree in Foreign Languages from the University of Miami and was designated a Distinguished Military Graduate and commissioned as a Military Intelligence officer. In 1984 he received a Master of Education degree in Secondary Education and Administration from the University of Arizona.

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.


Terry L. McCoy, Chairman
Professor of Latin American
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August, 1992


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