

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NATO's New Troops: Overcoming Obstacles to Multinational Ground Forces

Richard Seitz

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This study examines the implications of NATO's strategic transformation for the U.S. Army and NATO allies and investigates their ability to achieve its envisaged future multinational force structure. The July 1990 NATO Summit Declaration in London recognized that a promising new era in Europe has begun and stated the Alliance's integrated force structure and strategy would fundamentally change. The November 1991 NATO Rome Summit subsequently endorsed sweeping changes in the ground force structure. The author provides a review of the political and military context behind these dramatic and ambitious changes, shifting from eight national level corps organizations in the Central Region to six multinational corps. He then turns to the challenges that current national level NATO ground forces will face in the next few years as they begin to reshape themselves and transform into multinational forces. He concludes with identifying some proposed principles to guide the creation of multinational formations, and thoughts on future policy considerations.

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NATO's NEW TROOPS:
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO MULTINATIONAL GROUND FORCES

Colonel Richard Seitz
U.S. Army Fellow
Center For International Affairs
Harvard University

June 1, 1992

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forward to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050.

FOREWORD

This study, initiated during the author's 1991-92 Army Fellowship at Harvard University's Center For International Affairs, examines the implications of NATO's strategic transformation for the U.S. Army and NATO allies and investigates their ability to achieve its envisaged future multinational force structure. The July 1990 NATO Summit Declaration in London recognized that a promising new era in Europe has begun and stated the Alliance's integrated force structure and strategy would fundamentally change. The November 1991 NATO Rome Summit subsequently endorsed sweeping changes in the ground force structure.

The author provides a review of the political and military context behind these dramatic and ambitious changes, shifting from eight national level corps organizations in the Central Region to six multinational corps. He then turns to the challenges that current national level NATO ground forces will face in the next few years as they begin to reshape themselves and transform into multinational forces. He concludes with identifying some proposed principles to guide the creation of multinational formations, and thoughts on future policy considerations.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this essay as a contribution to the field of European security affairs.

KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF AUTHOR

RICHARD SEITZ is an Army Planner in the Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate of U.S. Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Prior to assuming his present position, he was the Army Chief of Staff Fellow at Harvard University's Center For International Affairs. Colonel Seitz is a career infantry officer with multiple tours in Germany, Korea and Vietnam. He has served on the Joint Staff, is a graduate of the National War College and holds a Master's degree in International Relations from Boston University.

NATO's NEW TROOPS:
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO MULTINATIONAL GROUND UNITS

The world has experienced epic changes in its political and military landscape over the past 2 years, beginning with the Eastern European revolutions, collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the continuing withdrawal of formerly Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. The unification of Germany, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and achievement of arms reduction agreements and new initiatives affecting conventional and strategic systems are also landmark events, along with the failed Soviet coup and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The world community, international institutions and regional organizations must adapt their security policies to this new, and evolving, environment. For all, this is both a national and a collective process.

At the forefront of the collective process is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the cold war trans-Atlantic defensive alliance, confronted by these events with a genuine need to review its structure and future direction. The July 1990 NATO London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance clearly recognized that a promising new era in Europe has begun and stated that the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will fundamentally change. At the November 1991 NATO Summit in Rome, all Heads of State and Government opened a new chapter in the history of the Alliance

by publishing the new NATO Strategic Concept and endorsing sweeping changes in its ground force structure.

This study examines the implications of NATO's transition for the U.S. Army and NATO allies, investigating their ability to achieve the future multinational force structure for NATO ground forces, primarily in the Central Region. I begin with a review of the political context leading to these dramatic changes in ground force structure, including the political and military rationale that became a part of the July 1990 London Declaration and subsequent work by the NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers-Europe (SHAPE), and national level staffs. I then turn to the challenges that current national level NATO ground forces will face in the next few years as they begin to reshape themselves and transform into multinational forces.

EARLY NATO MULTINATIONALISM.

The idea of multinationalism is not new. General Eisenhower led the way when he established SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters as true multinational organizations. During the 1950s, there were a few advocates of multinational units along the lines of the current NATO discussions. General Eisenhower was originally skeptical of extending multinationality to lower levels, but supported the concept of a European Army in which Belgian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Luxembourg troops would serve together in

multinational corps under overall command of the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR). Eisenhower stated:

> I have come to believe that at least most of the governments involved are sincere in their efforts to develop a so-called European Army. The German strength is vital to us. I am certain that there is going to be no real progress toward a greater unification of Europe except through the medium of specific programs of this kind. I am coming to believe Europe's security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a U.S. of Europe.[1]

In the ensuing 40 years this vision of multinationality contributed to greater European integration as evidenced by the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, the land forces JUTLAND Corps, the integrated air defense system, the allied tactical air forces, and the standing and on-call maritime forces. However, national defensive sectors along the former inner German border did not foster further ground unit multinationality.

The London Declaration launched renewed interest in multinationality as the Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new security landscape in Europe.

NATO LONDON DECLARATION, JULY 1990.

The NATO London Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Governments participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on July 5 and 6, 1990 focused on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance. The most far-reaching declaration issued since NATO was founded, it stated that Europe has

entered a new era with the promise of enduring peace, and that the Alliance must and will adapt, beginning with a fundamental strategic review. "NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have the maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units."[2]

The rationale behind such forces is clear. Multinational forces, which complement other national commitments to NATO, demonstrate the nations' resolve to maintain a credible collective defense at the operational level and enhance Alliance cohesion. These forces (a) underline the principle of shared roles, risks, and responsibilities, thus also reinforcing the trans-Atlantic partnership; (b) strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by planning for some specifically European force structures, and reinforce the principle that an attack on one would be an attack on all; (c) provide, especially for smaller NATO members, a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available from purely national forces and so help to make more efficient use of scarce defense resources; (d) offer a basis for stationing forces more appropriate to the new security environment, away from the former forward positions along the old inner German border; and (e) ensure political acceptability and

burdensharing by preserving a role for each nation. Lastly, multinational force structures inhibit re-nationalization and independent security policies, while stimulating standardization and maintaining deterrence by keeping national flags forward as a visible symbol of solidarity.[3]

BRUSSELS MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, MAY 1991.

At the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) Ministerial Meetings held in Brussels on May 28-29, 1991, the NATO defense ministers reviewed the work of military planners adapting NATO to the post-cold war era, and the new Alliance strategic concept, noting with satisfaction the progress that had been made on the document, especially as a basis for future defense force planning. The NATO Military Committee proposed the force structure to implement the strategy. This plan called for multinational Reaction Forces at high states of readiness for crisis management; Main Defense Forces with an emphasis on multinational corps, particularly in the Central Region; and national Augmentation Forces from both North America and Europe to round out the structure as reinforcing forces.[4] These multinational units are the centerpiece of NATO's reorganization, especially the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the multinational corps in the Central Region Main Defense Forces. U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and U.K. Defense Minister Tom King had majority support for the concept of an all-NATO rapid deployment force primarily consisting of

European units under British leadership, strengthening the European pillar of NATO. Both multinational corps are discussed below in more detail, but there will be little further mention of national level Augmentation Forces which will not be multinational.

Four months later, in October 1991, German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand proposed a European corps formation built around the current Franco-German brigade.[5] This was viewed with some consternation by the United Kingdom, United States and others as an attempt to undermine NATO. Such a proposal suggests that NATO multinationality is not likely to draw France closer to NATO's military structure, even though the Germans may think so.[6] France wants a leading military and political role in a future European security identity and feels the new ARRC could preempt full development of a European force structure under European control. However, the French military values professional contact with allied armies. This is principally achieved through the continued stationing of French forces in Germany, and such bilateral French contact with Germany may lessen Bonn's reliance on NATO. The proposed route for this will be the Western European Union (WEU), which the European Community declared at the December 1991 Maastricht session as their future security arm. Although European multinational units could very well swing from NATO to WEU control in the future, dual command of forces presents severe

difficulties for subordinate units, and will factorially complicate normal interoperability problems.

All nations agreed on multinationality in the Reaction Forces and the Main Defense Forces. The Defense Ministers also approved political guidance to individual nations recommending that their forces be restructured in conformity with the emerging NATO strategy and force structure. NATO is still working on what it wants each nation to contribute. The 1992 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire on force goals, when accepted next year, will formalize national contributions. In sum, it took about a year for NATO to agree on broad force structure changes in the new security environment, preparing the way for the November 1991 NATO Summit in Rome.

ROME SUMMIT, NOVEMBER 1991.

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept and the Rome Declaration, agreed on by the Heads of State and Government in Rome on November 7 and 8, 1991, reflect the transformation process launched in London in July 1990. The New Strategic Concept adapts NATO to the dramatically improved security environment in the Central Region, giving military force structure planners the necessary political guidance upon which to reshape NATO's force posture. Though the military confrontation of the cold war has been overcome, a great deal of uncertainty about the future of, and risks to, the security of the Alliance remains. The changes in the political

landscape are not synonymous with stability. The security challenges now faced are different in nature from those of the past--harder to predict and assess, notwithstanding the military imbalances that persist with the remaining conventional and nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union, even after negotiated reductions.

These diverse challenges require a broad approach to security, preparation for linear or nonlinear battlefields, and concentration or counterconcentration missions, thus keeping the military dimension essential. No one NATO nation can carry the burden for such broad challenges, but with multinational formations the Alliance's resolve in a crisis is readily apparent to a potential aggressor.[7] Politically driven, multinational formations will play a major role within the integrated military structure. The primary military goal of ensuring Alliance security and territorial integrity remains unchanged. But with lower total force levels, enhanced flexibility for crisis management and conflict prevention is required.

Multinational forces, whether as Reaction or Main Defense Forces, will have the capability to respond to a wide range of missions and eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. However, such capable forces do not happen by accident. They result from thorough planning and commitment of all participating nations. Of course, one key issue, whether

Alliance members will agree to participate in a deployment of a multinational formation, will always remain an unknown. It is, therefore, imperative that force planners make provision for selected participation by states, in order to mitigate these disruptions as much as possible, a priori of the multinational formation's deployment.

THE PLAN AND THE OBSTACLES.

The plan is for NATO to shift from eight national level corps organizations in the Central Region to six multinational corps. NATO has had two successful models of ground force multinationality, the JUTLAND Corps (composed primarily of Danish and German units) in the Allied Forces North Region, and the German 12th Panzer Division with the former U.S. VII Corps in the Central Region. However, the multinational design of NATO future ground forces is significantly more ambitious, involving not only a rapid reaction corps, but also five other multinational corps. Accomplishing such a transition demands carefully coordinated planning at all levels to overcome inherent obstacles and barriers which NATO will encounter as it proceeds toward full operational capabilities with multinational forces. Some of these challenges are in the areas of logistics, command, control, and communications systems, geography, culture, doctrine, force multipliers, national resistance to interoperable systems, fiscal resources, exercises, and training. Taken together, the political

imperative for multinational forces must be balanced against military operational considerations. Other functional operational areas are examined through the lens of U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine. With these measures, this report will not only identify the challenges, but also offer ways and means to overcome them and reach full operational capabilities.

NEW FORCE DESIGNS.

The scope and depth of multinationality in the proposed force structure will vary in many of the units and their staffs. To begin with, the plan is that the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps will be built around two British divisions (an armored division in Germany and a mechanized infantry division in the United Kingdom), a Central Region multinational airmobile division (composed of Belgian, German, Dutch, and British brigades), and a Southern Region multinational division (composed of Italian, Turkish, and Greek brigades). Additional national commitments for the Reaction Force will probably include divisions from Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the United States. Two brigades from Spain might also be made available for the Reaction Force's operations.[8] With such a menu of forces, a very capable corps of three to five divisions can be selected and tailored for any mission based on unit capabilities. However, the corps base of combat support and combat service support units has not received similar national contributions, and these gaps will be addressed in the

discussion of operational capabilities. In any event, the corps headquarters, the corps level combat support troops, and the two multinational divisions clearly give a multinational character to a predominantly European manned ARRC organization. This corps will be capable of ACE-wide operations, as opposed to earlier, smaller NATO reaction forces, where employment planning was limited to only a few specific locations.

There will be six multinational corps in the Central Region. Participating countries are the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, and the United States. The exact composition of national divisions has yet to be firmly established. All corps are planned for possible ACE-wide employment, but primarily for use in the Central Region. Here the resulting multinationality occurs primarily at the corps level, in contrast to the ARRC where the multinationality begins within two subordinate divisions (one made up of Central Region contributions and one from Southern Region Alliance states).[9] The Belgian corps will be an exception to the pattern, as it will comprise only a U.S., a German, and as yet to be determined number of Belgian national brigades, with no divisional level structures at all.

It is important also to look at the way the multinational headquarters will be put together, especially since corps level structures vary considerably between nations. These staffs may be proportionally represented by all nations contributing to

the unit, or one nation may take the lead in setting the framework for the bulk of the multinational headquarters. For proportional representation, which now exists only in the JUTLAND Corps, all nations would share equally the responsibility to provide personnel and equipment for the headquarters. Sharing this responsibility should enhance standardization and interoperability, but it might also highlight doctrine, structure, and equipment differences. Such multinational headquarters as the JUTLAND Corps and the ARRC Central Region multinational division would also have rotational general officer command by the representing nations in an established scheme. For framework, in multinational headquarters the bulk of the corps staff would be provided by the lead nation, e.g., the United Kingdom in the case of the ARRC. Its staffing principles will dominate, and a British three-star general will command the corps. Other ARRC participating nations will have officers on the corps staff, though not proportional to the British lead. British expeditionary experience in the Falklands and the Gulf War, along with a political desire not to lose the British corps to national defense reductions, probably formed the basis for its ARRC leadership role.[10] It appears that all other new multinational corps staffs will follow the framework or lead nation design with nonrotational command. This allows a nation

to unhook from multinationality and use its corps headquarters for any possible non-Alliance or unilateral action.

It is noteworthy that the multinational units described above have gone through several iterations of organizational design as nations refine their proposed contributions, considering both national defense expenditures and desire to support NATO's changing force structure. It is the SHAPE staff, in very close coordination with the NATO Military Staff and the national Ministries of Defense that have built these organizational structures based on what nations said they could provide. Future force structure will be implemented through the normal NATO defense and force goals planning process, during which formal commitments will be sought, and goals for national participation agreed.[11]

IMPLICATIONS AND PROPOSALS.

An issue for both NATO's political and military leadership is balancing the political imperative for increased multinationality against military concerns about the possible degradation in operational effectiveness from the current level that exists in the standing national corps formations. Any multinational force created must have credible warfighting skills, a responsibility more strongly felt by military than political leaders. How exactly does this new multinational policy affect the forces of the various members of the NATO Alliance?

Many of the specific linkages and relationships between the nations involved in the multinational formations will be determined by the nations themselves through bilateral agreements. Over the past 40 years, NATO forces have acquired interoperability experiences in peace and crisis preparing the way for multinationality. During the last half of 1991, many functionally-based working groups at various levels have been established between nations who will participate in future multinational units to address anticipated, specific interoperability issues. Some aspects are easily achieved in agreement, as defined by national command and NATO operational control. National command allows nations to retain peacetime command of those forces which have crisis or operational relationships subordinate to multinational headquarters. Operational command relates solely to the actual employment of forces for designated objectives exercised by national or allied commanders.

In many ways the successful experiences of the LANDJUT Corps and former VII Corps/12th Panzer Division will be followed. More than officer liaison teams, these peacetime relationships will involve formal associations primarily through interoperability and contingency planning, command and staff coordination, and combined exercises and training. The obvious goal is to cement ties and build confidence between units. The control of garrisons, unit administration,

discipline and small unit training management remain the responsibilities of the national parent unit. However, there are a number of very significant areas where interoperability challenges remain. These include communications, training and exercises, logistics, command and control, and several other functional areas.

The remainder of this paper is largely devoted to a closer look at these specific areas and the implications of change and proposals to met the new challenges. Understanding these interoperability issues is key to their successful resolution, not only by the units involved, but also by their national military staffs and the internal service components that provide, support, and train forces for NATO commands.

COMMUNICATIONS.

A prerequisite for successful multinational integration at corps and division level, between corps, and to higher headquarters is an adequate interoperable communications system, using if possible the same equipment, procedures and language. Effective operational and tactical command and control, not to mention the need for mutual recognition to avoid fratricide, is based on efficient communications. Additionally, Gulf War experience shows an increasing need for effective communications. The ideal solution, which has been a reality in national corps, is common equipment within all corps signal unit and subordinate commands. However, this will

probably not be the case for most of NATO's new multinational formations. A quick fix is to have the lead nation be responsible for all communications allocate detachments from corps signal battalions to those subordinates and external reinforcements that have different equipment. But this method does not use equipment efficiently and will reduce the available corps signal spare capacity, restricting wartime flexibility in operating alternate headquarters. It also presumes that the lead nation has such signal battalion assets at the corps level, when in fact several nations do not.

Another means to reach communications interoperability involves nations reverting to older and more common communications technology, but this would prevent the use of new, national-level secure communications and battlefield management systems seen recently in the Gulf War. It also affects the issue of classification and the willingness of nations to share secure communications, which are key for multinational emergency actions procedures. Whether interoperability requirements can be met through technical means of analog/digital specifications interface must be determined. For example, U.S. Mobile Subscriber Equipment communications can talk to German equipment in nonsecure voice, but not in secure voice. Data language barriers also exist and must be standardized for all routine transmittals of information. In any event, greatly increased communications

training between nations is required involving standard training objectives, frequent field training exercises, command post exercises and, especially, pure communications exercises. On future battlefields, where corps may maneuver over great distances with frequent attachments and detachments, interoperability across the Central Region is essential. A comprehensive review of NATO communications Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) would be a timely investment of effort.

Additionally, at the multinational headquarters level, the lead nation will have to determine whether communications interoperability requirements can be overcome by increasing personnel and equipment in liaison detachments, or whether it is necessary for NATO to extend infrastructure funds for the development and procurement of common systems or links between existing systems. This may require deferring national industrial interests in favor of a NATO designed and procured system, a difficult request at a time when some national defense industries are barely surviving. The new communications system for LANDJUT Corps is a successful example of such subordination of national interests to support a common goal.[12] Also, a joint industrial venture may appeal to some nations.

In summary, communications flaws could be war-stoppers, for if you cannot talk, you cannot fight. Unless a new united effort or commitment emerges, it is unlikely that the

communications system in a multinational corps will be as efficient as that of a national corps. Standardization, or at least compatibility, among national communications systems must be reached. For the United States and Germany this is an absolutely key issue, considering the number of multinational units in which they will participate.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES.

Training in a multinational unit has one major objective, to achieve interoperability for total operating effectiveness, a different focus from that in a national corps. Forces from the various nations differ in organization, language, and standards of training, but also in their ability to fulfill given missions. Only an extensive training program with agreed standards can overcome these differences and allow multinational units at corps and division levels to accomplish all assigned missions. Standard operating procedures and NATO training procedures are aids, but they cannot replace practical training, whether it takes the form of field training exercises, command post exercises, or computer assisted exercises. Such a training program must involve all aspects of the multinational formation, not only the combat forces but also the combat support and combat service support elements, and must carefully delineate multinational and national responsibilities.

Additionally, they must include all forces and their staffs, whether on active duty or in the reserves. Initial impressions from the Fall 1991 field exercise of the Central Region airmobile division indicate the flow of operations among the various national brigades improved throughout the exercise as procedural gaps were bridged.[13] Without such training, unit confidence in its interoperability at the beginning of a contingency operation or crisis response would be low, a dangerous situation for any military unit as this could easily become a battlefield disadvantage. A problem immediately emerges within the U.S. multinational corps, where the U.S. division is at 100 percent active duty troops and the German division is split between active and reserve forces.

At the national level, near-term steps can be taken to improve the knowledge of potential command and staff officers in multinational units. Intermediate and senior level officer and noncommissioned officer schooling should be adjusted to include instruction on multinational units and their operations. This training should complement similar courses being offered at NATO military schools. Another training obstacle for multinational units is their geographic stationing. Geography may well restrict the frequency of training, especially for the two multinational divisions in the ARRC. With several of their brigades stationed in home nations, the difficulty and cost of movement will limit the

frequency of training events. One proposal to ease this transportation burden for U.S. forces in multinational units is to seek U.S. Joint Staff exercise transportation funds. To use these, the multinational training must be a joint or combined exercise in support of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Some additional funds to sustain training may be available from other nations. However, as stated earlier, unit and individual training is a national responsibility.

There are two other possibilities for training of multinational forces and their headquarters, both in Germany. The first is the Warrior Preparation Center (WPC) at the Ramstein U.S. airbase, which offers computer assisted command post exercises for division and corps level headquarters. This is a proven computer simulation center, which has run many successful exercises, thus far primarily for U.S. forces. For multinational headquarters, these simulation exercises would provide practical experiences in coordinating differing doctrines and operating procedures. The LANDJUT Corps will conduct an exercise at the center in mid-1992. In late 1992, the U.S. multinational corps and the German multinational corps will also conduct a battle simulation exercise at the center.[14] Other multinational headquarters should observe these exercises and plan for their own exercises. The second opportunity, maybe less feasible, would be for maneuver training, primarily for multinational divisions or select units, at one or more of

the very large military training areas in former East Germany. Although the Unification Treaty prohibits NATO from stationing in the east, training deployments are short in duration. Such training for NATO multinational units offers multi-echelon experience for ground troop units, similar to what their headquarters receive at the Warrior Preparation Center.

The multinational commander and his staff, with guidance from the Defense Planning Committee and Military Committee, have the responsibility for increasing cross-national training and establishing the training standards that all subordinate national units must achieve. Many small difficulties need to be overcome: the hours of training allowed per week (the German Army, for example, generally uses only 42 hours of training a week, seldom at night and rarely on weekends); other differences in unit regimens for training conscript and volunteer forces; and national ammunition allocations for training. Needless to say, the development of a long-range training calendar, its careful integration and coordination with national level training plans, and finding funds to pay for all this training are absolutely essential. The allocation of time and training resources will be a key mission for the multinational staffs, along with training guidance of the commander. Multinational commands in which command rotates between nations will have more of a task adjusting to the guidance of differing commanders. Multinational training will

be an uphill challenge for commanders and staffs at all levels, but in the long term will be accomplished as a direct result of the traditional military professionalism within national armies and a strong commitment to the task of ensuring high operational capabilities in multinational units.

LOGISTICS.

One of the single most significant challenges and prerequisites for effective multinational forces is logistics. This functional area will require a maximum effort by all concerned. Nowhere in NATO is the division of responsibilities so difficult as in logistics. NATO commanders currently have an assessing, requesting and recommending role, as logistic units are under national command in peace as well as war. The obvious result of this split authority is the restriction of NATO commanders' flexibility in operational planning and warfighting on the battlefield. Changes in this structure are needed in order to support the new multinational corps, especially the ARRC. Though some aspects such as personnel services must remain national, it doesn't matter who handles the ammunition or drives the transport.

Another aspect of logistics is the reliance of some nations on fixed facilities or territorial support commands, a strategy that made sense when the forward line of defense was the inner German border. Lessons from the recent Gulf War have underscored the importance of deployable and mobile combat

service support units and also the ability of these units to sustain the combat force for a long period of time. One can, without too much imagination, construct a scenario for a possible deployment of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps to the Turkish frontiers, or other areas on NATO's flanks where undeveloped ports and airfields are the norm, expanding the problem from sustaining the forces to actually getting them there. Needless to say, the United States would play a major role in any airlift. However, the United States cannot provide all the necessary sustainment, or lift. Another possible future mission is humanitarian or disaster relief operations, similar to Operation Provide Comfort for the Kurds on the Turkish border following the Gulf War. Here again, logistics forces will play a major role.

There are several ways to meet these challenges and they include role specialization, increased prestockages, and expanded host nation support. The last two will be difficult in times of reduced defense spending. Role specialization within NATO would allow nations to take on an entire logistic functional area in depth, thus freeing others to do the same in a mutually supportive and cohesive manner, as opposed to each nation covering all logistic functions for its own forces. For example, accepting that national assets follow national priorities, the United States could provide theater airlift, while another country provides heavy equipment transporters for

tanks and armored vehicles. Economically advantageous, the success of this plan requires that all nations support it and accept procurement by one nation and operational sustainment by all users.

Prestockage is the establishment of additional corps stocks above the basic load. Though some nations still do not agree on the definition of a basic load or days of supply requirements, these additional stocks of common items would give the multinational corps commander greater flexibility in his operational decisions. Prestockage implies increased spending, a hard sell these days.

The last of this short list is the expansion of host nation support roles and responsibilities across NATO. The host nation support infrastructure in Germany has been successful and could well serve as a model for other nations, but few nations have Germany's infrastructure or economy.

Within the multinational corps themselves, several steps can be taken to improve interoperability. Laws, regulations, and procedures can be simplified to increase sharing of petroleum products, munitions, engineering materials, and other common supplies and repair parts. Increased sharing dictates a greater NATO responsibility for integrated material management and logistics doctrine. One sure method to ensure logistics support to a national division in a multinational corps is for that nation's theater area command to tailor a support group

for its division, which might include supply/service and maintenance battalions. But this can be constraining if a country is part of several multinational units.

It is not difficult to see the need for a NATO logistics command to take the lead in addressing these and forthcoming logistics doctrinal issues. Illustrative examples are standardized medical support and treatment, evacuation of wounded, hospitalization, blood handling, physician liability, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment, to name a few.[15] An initiative of this type would require the strong support of all nations and their military staffs.

Decisive improvements in standardization remain the surest route to interoperability. It is politically difficult to put standardization above the national defense industry, as the United Kingdom's recent decision for national production of a new tank illustrates. NATO agencies and national committees responsible for industrial procurement and design policies for weapon systems and equipment need strength and should study what will motivate nations toward standardization. Past standardization problems will only be compounded in new multinational units.

COMMAND AND CONTROL.

Successful command and control of multinational forces depends on several key factors. These include headquarters integration, doctrine, operational planning, intelligence, and

communications. As mentioned earlier, most corps multinational staffs will follow a lead nation framework. Whether a nation is participating in that particular staff or has to coordinate with it as an adjacent corps, intense training is absolutely necessary to gain mutual understanding of the different structure and internal staffing systems. Although some national military staffs may look similar, they do their work differently as a result of varied national military cultures, training, and traditions. The decision levels in the staffs must be known and cultural differences that may affect smooth and clear staff operations must be take into account. These requirements led to more reliance on the lead nation principle in the new multinational units.

The use of top-notch liaison teams, both at higher and lateral headquarters, reliance on the written word to convey the commander's intent (though less frequent with secure communications and the speed of battle), and interoperability training on staff procedures can provide quality control for communications of missions and orders within and between multinational units. Doctrinal compatibility within multinational units is also essential to synchronize operations and achieve total integration and unity of effort. The U.S. Airland Battle Doctrine has notable differences from the doctrine of some of the NATO allies in its functional orientation and employment of assets. This leads to dramatic

differences between nations in force structures, equipment and training patterns. U.S. doctrine prepares for warfighting at the corps level, while other nations fight at the division or separate brigade levels. For example, German doctrine does not identify the need for a commander to conduct and synchronize deep, close and rear operations, while this is a major role for the commander in U.S. Airland Battle doctrine. Such variations also stand out particularly in the availability of vital combat support units for the combat troops. A U.S. division, expecting similar U.S. corps support, would not receive it if operating under German or Belgian corps. For the near term it may be wise to continue the use of national doctrines while evaluating and building on lessons learned from doctrinal interoperability experiences of existing NATO multinational units. Nations will want to maintain their own doctrines and capabilities for unilateral actions. The aim is to gain experience in bridging operational differences in exercises and training, and harmonize doctrine throughout NATO for maximum interoperability. Much can be gained from practical training experiences together and realistic assessments of doctrinal gaps.

With such experience, allies will be able to work closely together and operational planning in multinational units will result from common practice and teamwork. Operational planning can then be worked out in detail, together with the formations

involved and the supporting national headquarters. Study periods and conferences will add the necessary refinement to the plan, and mutual knowledge of staffs will deepen.

Another challenge to be overcome is geography. The location of the multinational headquarters and the distances from their subordinate national units will affect the frequency of command and staff visits and coordination, and the resultant operational planning accomplished. Every effort must be made to carry out routine planning, coordination, and review sessions; otherwise multinational warplanning will simply not be credible. Distributed computer-assisted command post exercises, as offered by the Warrior Preparation Center, provide excellent battle simulation training for separated headquarters and staffs.

The last aspect to be considered, a vital part of planning, is intelligence. Current national intelligence systems are different and require integration at the corps level. Some nations lack long-range collectors and sensors. The U.S. European Command Joint Analysis Center, with its organic Central Region Joint Intelligence Cell, will become the focal point for U.S. intelligence support for the multinational corps.[16] Increased standardization of procedures and dissemination policies, and future acquisition of common or compatible equipment for connectivity will serve to optimize tactical intelligence support in multinational units.

It is clear that successful command and control of multinational units will not be an easy task. NATO military professionalism and a common goal alone cannot solve these interoperability problems. Only through recurring training and exercises at all levels will the practical experiences be gained which are needed to bridge the gaps that exist. This will require time, and other challenges still remain to reaching full operational capabilities.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.

The multinational corps faces the important challenge of achieving the same or better operational capabilities than national level corps. These capabilities are absolutely necessary for responding to a wide range of contingencies requiring flexible and mobile forces, such as the ARRC, which can have its subordinate units tailored for deterrence, crisis management, or employment. There is no perfect standard by which this can be measured. Nevertheless, U.S. Airland Battle Doctrine identifies seven functional systems that are applicable: intelligence, command and control, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility/countermobility, and combat support.[17] The first two and the last have been discussed in preceding paragraphs.

Maneuver may take many forms, in either an offensive or defensive framework. To compensate for various national level tactical procedures for all types of maneuver, multinational

tactical doctrine and techniques may be necessary for common understanding on the same battlefield. In the short term, commanders and staff must always be prepared to learn in depth the tactical doctrines and traditions of other nations. Instruction on multinational tactical operations in national service schools is essential to achieve the professionalism required for multinational forces. Another measure of maneuver depth is presence of combat multipliers, as found in the U.S. Corps and not present in other national corps. For example, only the U.S. Corps has attack helicopter formations for deep strike operations, modernized heavy fire support systems, an armored cavalry regiment, air defense, engineer, and electronic warfare and intelligence units. Such units, at the immediate call of the corps commander, can decisively influence the battlefield, as was clearly seen in the Gulf War. New multinational corps should strive for similar combat capabilities in the corps base. As mentioned earlier, however, it appears that nations are more focused on their combat units than on depth in the corps base. It will be a tough trade-off as nations will take from their own multinational corps base to fill the ARRC corps base, particularly the United States, which has the desired force multipliers in the U.S.-led multinational corps. Strength in combat support and service support units for the ARRC is absolutely essential for its future missions.

Fire support also demands close coordination and standardization of call for fire procedures, target location and selection, and fire support planning, not to mention the differing links between fire support systems and the supported maneuver units. This includes not only artillery but also close air support from combat aircraft. A comprehensive review of applicable STANAGs and their updating is appropriate. Again, the U.S. corps may serve as a model for multinational artillery organization, because of its versatility, modernization, and recent successful missions in the Gulf War.

Multinational forces cannot count on unchallenged air superiority, and their counter air systems must be integrated to preclude firing on friendly aircraft while allowing maximum attack on enemy aircraft. Such systems must be deployable throughout the ACE region. This includes not only modern manportable surface-to-air systems but also medium range systems. Close coordination on a distributed system for multinational corps and air defense operational planning is a clear priority, along with adoption of a standard Identify Friend/Foe (IFF) system for the aircraft of national air forces operating over, and in support of, multinational units.

Finally, with regard to mobility/countermobility, terrain provides opportunities and limitations on any battlefield, and engineer operations are key to the operational use of terrain. During the Gulf War, counter obstacle operations and combined

arms combat engineering tactics played a very significant role in the ground campaign. Multinational units will need standardized engineer doctrine, tactics and procedures for breaching operations, obstacle planning, control of barrier material, and minefield marking and recording. Several NATO nations, for example Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, have modernized mine laying and clearing systems and engineer vehicles that would be desirable for all multinational units.

The operational capability achieved by multinational units will be directly proportional to the degree of interoperability and success they reach in each of these functional areas. Presently, such interoperability exists in gross terms, and new defense investments are necessary to bring it to the desired standards and maximize the strength of some national achievements.

FUTURE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

It is appropriate to consider future adjustments to current policy and planning for multinational forces. A continued review of force structure will in large measure be a task for the political and military leadership of NATO, with consideration given to national views of the security environment. If no potential military challenge, hostile ideology, or crisis emerges in the next few years, changes will surely be proposed to the current multinational force structure

design. Additionally, further arms reductions agreements between the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union will have a definite impact on NATO's forces. One likely possibility would be markedly lower states of readiness and availability for the Main Defense Forces, leaving corps and subordinate division headquarters on active duty while placing the troop units in cadre or reserve status. This assumes longer warning time for mission employment allowing for mobilization and stand-up, while headquarters elements would continue to plan and train. Interoperability would obviously suffer. It is also entirely possible that one or more of the Main Defense Force corps led by the smaller nations may totally go into reserve component status or face complete inactivation. With less availability of Main Defense Forces, more reliance will be placed on Reaction Forces.

It is unlikely there would be a similar reduction in the Reaction Forces. On the contrary, nations would probably increase their commitments to Reaction Forces. It is clearly possible that the number of national level combat divisions and brigades made available to the ARRC would increase by several divisions or brigades as nations strive to keep some units at higher levels of readiness than the Main Defense Forces. Politically, it would be easier to sustain and slightly increase Reaction Forces for future crisis response missions, while taking down Main Defense Forces for national defense

savings. In such a scenario, interoperability between Reaction Force units will become more important than standardization as the total number of forces declined.[18]

Deliberate steps must be taken to stimulate standardization and resolve interoperability problems existing within several functional operational areas. Progress has begun, and much can be drawn from NATO's successful multinational formations, but sustained effort by all nations is essential to reach the level of operational capabilities expected of all new multinational corps formations. National armies must disseminate multinational lessons learned throughout their services and, more importantly, refocus internal military professional education and training to include multinational operations. Most of these obstacles and barriers are practical difficulties. They will be met by the solid NATO military professionalism and cooperation that has led to multinational successes in the past. Some areas, especially communications and logistics, will require longer-term resolution through cooperative procurement of armament and equipment. If not solved, these military problems may inevitably lead to serious political ones should a multinational unit fail in a mission.

Several guiding principles for multinational units are in order. First, multinationalism should occur at the corps level. Integration at lower levels, such as a division becomes

increasingly difficult. Second, no more than two nations should be in any multinational corps. Coordination of operational procedures is more difficult as more nations participate. Third, maximum efforts must be made to fully integrate staffs to assure effective problem solving in a crisis. Fourth, mutual agreements are necessary on who provides what support and at what levels. Responsibility should be clearly fixed to avoid unfulfilled expectations in a crisis. Fifth, communications should be the responsibility of the lead nation in the multinational corps. Sixth, command of multinational units should not be rotational to minimize the loss of continuity. Absent these principles, multinational units may bite off more than they can chew, leading to failure of the concept.

In summary, the military and political challenges presented by NATO's transition to multinational formations in the new security environment will be formidable over the next few years. Without a direct military threat to NATO or even a hostile ideology, sustained defense investments to reach new levels of interoperability will require considerable effort by the political leadership articulating the requirement for multinational forces and their possible missions. Some of these problems were not even solved when NATO faced a massive military threat. The difficulties are certainly not insurmountable, but without resolution, multinational units

will have few military capabilities and lose political credibility and public acceptability. In the long term, multinational formations, complementing national commitments to NATO, can give the Alliance the flexibility and broad capabilities to meet future uncertainties.

ENDNOTES

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5. Alan Riding, "Paris and Germans Propose Creation of European Army," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1991, p. A1.

6. SHAPE Policy Division Staff, group interview by author, Mons, Belgium, January 7, 1992.

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8. See, Thomas-Durell Young and William T. Johnsen, *Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems*, SSI Special Report, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 30, 1992, pp. 27-35.

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