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Does FMFM 1-1 Provide Adequate Guidance
To Understand Campaign Planning?

A Monograph
by

Lieutenant Colonel Pat Donahue
U.S. Marine Corps



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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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
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ABSTRACT

DOES FMFM 1-1 PROVIDE ADEQUATE GUIDANCE TO UNDERSTAND CAMPAIGN PLANNING? by LtCol Patrick E. Donahue, USMC, 51 pages.

This monograph examines the Marine Corps' current doctrine for campaign planning. The collapse of the Soviet government and the ongoing dispute over the control of the former Soviet military alters how the United States military will conduct campaign planning for the next conflict. The plan to reduce the United States military by 25% regenerates the call for joint warfighting doctrine. The first step toward a common warfighting doctrine must be how to plan the employment of all the capabilities of this nation's military power, not just a single service. This research attempts to define which tenets of campaign planning are required for unity of effort in future conflicts.

The monograph compares the current ten tenets of campaign planning as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) TEST PUB 3-0 to the tenets described in Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-1, (FMFM 1-1). To validate the ten tenets of JCS TEST PUB 3-0, two major Pacific campaign plans of World War II are researched. The research reveals that campaign plans written in 1944 include the majority of the ten tenets in JCS TEST PUB 3-0. The tenets not included were added after World War II as a result of advancements in American technology.

The heart of this monograph is the analysis of campaign designing in a joint environment utilizing FMFM 1-1 as the doctrinal basis. The paper concludes that FMFM 1-1 does not provide the needed guidance for joint campaign planning, and the research can not identify a circumstance where FMFM 1-1--Marine Corps doctrine--would take precedent over joint doctrine.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the bipolar balance of power and the resultant shift to a multipower world have resulted in a less stable and more complex world. Regional political, economic, and military power are attempting to assume more dominant roles in international and regional affairs.(1)

General A.M. Gray
Sea Power April 1991.

As the war to liberate Kuwait clearly showed, the essential demands on our military forces--to deter conflict whenever possible but to prevail in those that do arise--are certain to endure. Nonetheless, the specific challenges facing our military in the 1990s and beyond will be different from those that have dominated our thinking for the past 40 years.(2)

President George Bush
National Security Strategy Statement
August 1991.

The United States faces a new course in national security strategy. The dramatic changes within the former Soviet Union, coupled with the increasing strength of regional powers, reshape America's global defense posture. As a result of these changes, the new national military strategy emerges.(3) This strategy changes the very size, mission, and structure of the Armed Forces of the United States.

For forty-five years, the focus of American foreign policy has been the containment of communism.(4) Twice in this period, American sailors, soldiers, airman and marines invested their lives attempting to stem the spread of

communism in Korea, and later, in Vietnam. In addition to losing thousands of lives, the United States spent trillions of dollars on the policy to contain communism. The arms race, power projection capabilities, forward presence, and the maintenance of a large standing military contributed heavily to a 3.2 trillion dollar national debt.(5) At the same time, the Soviet Union spent countless dollars and lives sponsoring communism. The political and economic costs associated with the Soviet Union's foreign policy were more than the country could sustain. In two short years, changes of historic proportions transpired.

Since 1989, the world witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break up of the Warsaw Pact alliance, and the reunification of Germany. After years of internal struggle, the communist party lost its control of the Soviet Union. Finally, in August 1991, coup leaders in Russia failed to save the communist way of life. The Cold War was declared over.(6) Now, with the threat of communism diminished, American taxpayers no longer see a need for an enormous military budget. A "peace dividend" is in order, beginning with a reduction in the defense force. The "dividend" comes in actual monetary savings associated with a smaller military. Force reductions throughout the Department of Defense are assured in the 1990s. While a reduced defense budget is clear, future threats are uncertain.(7) The collapse of the Communist Party in the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics has reduced, but not eliminated the military capability of the former Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved and the Soviet Union is now the Commonwealth of Independent States, but most of the military power today remains under Russian control. Russian or Commonwealth ground forces are more than adequate to conduct acts of aggression anywhere on the continent of Europe. Additionally, the regional spread of communism is carried on by the communist parties of China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cambodia, Laos, and Cuba.(8) These countries require a watchful eye over possible regional disputes. Also, terrorists and third world countries armed with sophisticated weapons generate ongoing threats to regional peace.(9) Because of Desert Storm, much attention focuses on the problems in the Middle Eastern countries. Today's military planners consider all of these issues in order to establish the United States' current international responsibilities.

President Bush envisions a new world order following the end of the Cold War. He perceives regional instability as the threat to world peace. This vision of the future, plus the potential consequences of a constantly changing and still troublesome world, formulate the theme for a new defense strategy. The National Security Strategy of August 1991 states our responsibility not only to Europe but to all nations threatened with regional conflicts, and it emphasizes

our need to respond if called.(10) The four fundamentals of the new strategy are:

1. To ensure strategic deterrence.
2. To exercise forward presence in key areas.
3. To respond effectively to crises.
4. To retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should the need arise.(11)

The certainty of a leaner military, and the restructuring of America's defense strategy compel experts to examine the effectiveness of single service doctrine, such as the Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-1, Campaigning.

The United States demonstrates a history of willingness to protect its citizens and its democratic values. Throughout its history, the U.S. has also assumed a supportive role in other countries by promoting peaceful, evolutionary, and democratic change. As the nation's military force of rapid response and readiness, the Marine Corps must be prepared for the challenges that the new world order offers. These challenges can only be met by understanding how collective national power must be utilized to achieve our objectives well into the next century.(12)

The key to future planning is the ability to synergize national capabilities into one workable plan.(13) For the new defense plan to succeed, terminology used by the commander must be quickly understood by everyone involved. Clausewitz's On War highlights the essential aspect of unity during war: "When the time for action comes, the first requirement should be that all parts must act."(14) When the

next time comes, each service must be prepared to synergize its service roles in support of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the unified commands' assigned missions.(15) To be successful, the CINC's mission will require elements of all services to participate without the problems of parochial service-based interests. There must be a jointness of effort and a campaign plan with one end. To ensure this congruity, each separate service's campaigning doctrine should be joint oriented and compatible with established joint doctrine.(16)

This monograph explores the relationships among established Marine Corps doctrine, FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, the doctrine set forth in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) TEST PUB 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, and the proposed doctrine of JCS OUTLINE PUB 5-00.1, Campaign Planning. The analysis is focused on the content of FMFM 1-1, Chapter 2, (Designing the Campaign). The elements encompassed in Chapter 2 that explain how to design a campaign are compared to the ten tenets of campaign planning listed in JCS TEST PUB 3-0 and JCS OUTLINE PUB 5-00.1. The ten tenets established by joint campaign planning publications are:

1. Provide broad concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving strategic objectives.
2. Provide an orderly schedule of unified decisions.
3. Achieve unity of effort with land, maritime, air, space, and special forces.
4. Incorporate the commander's concept and intent.
5. Orient on the center of gravity of the threat.
6. Phase a series of related unified operations.

7. Compose subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
8. Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly defines what constitutes success.
9. Provide operational direction and tasks to subordinates.
10. Provide direction for the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons in theater.(17)

These ten tenets establish the criteria with which to determine if FMFM 1-1 provides adequate guidance for Marines to understand campaign planning in the joint arena.

To answer the research question, this monograph examines doctrine and its historical value to joint warfighting. First, relationships are established between FMFM 1-1 and joint doctrine in the areas of compatible terminology and the effects of doctrine on force structure. Research in the second section focuses on the joint Pacific campaign plans of World War II. Elements of these successful historical campaigns are compared to the ten tenets of campaign planning listed in JCS TEST PUB 3-0. Analysis of these successful Pacific campaign plans in the context of the ten tenets yields a clear picture of the tenets required of a campaign plan today. The third section defines campaign planning and examines a series of national security situations that place a Marine Corps planner at the operational level of war. The final section provides conclusions and implications about the future of FMFM 1-1 and campaign planning in the Marine Corps.

Marine Corps campaign planning, in a joint theater of operations utilizing the doctrine established by FMFM 1-1,

is the analytical thrust of this monograph. The first step requires a common language when discussing campaign planning doctrine.

II. DOCTRINE

What is doctrine? Doctrine is usually the topic of great discussion following major field exercises; both successes and failures are attributed to doctrine. In many cases, however, doctrine is confused with tactics, and it is substituted for tactical mistakes. Yet this confusion is in no way due to the lack of definitions for doctrine.

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines doctrine as:

- 1: TEACHING. INSTRUCTION.
- 2: a principle of law established through past decisions.(1)

JCS PUB 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines doctrine as:

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.(2)

The 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations, provided the U.S. Army's definition of doctrine:

Doctrine is the condensed expression of its approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, support structure, equipment and training must all derive from it. It must be rooted in time-tested theories and principles, yet forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions. It must be definitive enough to guide operations, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of worldwide situations. Finally, to be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood.(3)

When the U.S. Marine Corps published FMFM 1, Warfighting, in March 1989, it defined doctrine as follows:

Doctrine is a teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. In short, it establishes the way we practice our profession. In this manner, doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding.(4)

The complexity of these definitions obscure the importance of good doctrine. In Making Strategy, Colonel Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow explore the problem of so many complicated definitions for doctrine. They recognize the need for a definition that is "...accurate, concise, and yet retains the vitality befitting doctrine's importance."(5) To accomplish this goal, Drew and Snow defined doctrine as follows: "Military doctrine is what we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs. Even more briefly, doctrine is what we believe about the best way to do things."(6)

The most important word in this definition is "believe." Doctrine is based on military experience, to be used only as a guide for those without experience on how to implement military operations. It is important for the readers of doctrine to understand that the writers of doctrine "believe" the guidance will work, based on successful experiences worldwide, not necessarily their own.(7) For example, in the 1930s, the U.S. Marine Corps developed a new amphibious

doctrine based on the British experience of amphibious operations at Gallipoli during World War I.(8) The new doctrine, based on Britain's experience, was utilized by the U.S. Navy several years before the outbreak of World War II to plan for a possible (and eventual) war with Japan in the Pacific.(9) This strategic vision of a possible threat to national security allowed the U.S. Naval service to produce what they "believed" to be the best way to conduct military affairs against the threat. Thus, although Gallipoli occurred two decades before World War II, the doctrine was still effective when a similar situation arose.

Drew and Snow's work described three types of doctrine: fundamental, environmental, and organizational. Fundamental doctrine is the foundation for all of our doctrine. There are two characteristics of fundamental doctrine. First, it is timeless; fundamental doctrine describes the basic concepts of war rather than techniques. The second characteristic is that fundamental doctrine is unaffected by political philosophy or technological revolution.(10) Much of Clausewitz's writing is classified as fundamental doctrine. Environmental doctrine is ever-changing, and it is based on technological innovations such as the airplane, the machine gun and the submarine.(11) Giulio Douhet's book, The Command of The Air, is a good example of environmental doctrine.(12) Organizational doctrine is the basic belief

about the operation of any individual military force. Every military organization has doctrine describing roles and missions, force employment, current objectives and administration.(13) The Marine Corps' Amphibious doctrine, the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, the Air Force's missile employment, and the Navy's abandon ship procedures are all examples of organizational doctrine.

The interrelationship between these three types of doctrine is best described by Drew and Snow as parts of a tree. The analogy depicts fundamental doctrine as the trunk of the tree, with roots deeply buried in history. The branches exemplify the fact that all environmental doctrine comes from fundamental doctrine, the same way branches stem from the trunk of the tree--individual, yet connected. Organizational doctrine is represented by the leaves; although dependent on the trunk and branches, leaves have the innate ability to change with the seasons, just as organizational doctrine changes within each military force.(14)

The analogy of the tree also defines the role of joint doctrine. The bark surrounds and protects all parts of the tree. Without bark, a tree can not survive disease or the elements. Similarly, joint doctrine is required to maintain the strength of each individual military force. With joint doctrine, all other doctrine are cohesive and most effective.

The future of American warfighting capabilities will be more "joint" in nature. The emerging national strategy focuses on a light, self-sustaining, rapid response force and, a much heavier reconstituted force, when required. The National Military Strategy for the 1990s calls for the development of new joint doctrine and joint training.(15) The U.S. Army leadership commented upon the need to develop joint doctrine in Army Focus 1991.

In concert with the Joint Staff, CINCs, and the other services, the Army will continue its efforts to develop effective joint doctrine to guide future military planning and operations. This joint doctrine development process is intended to produce a body of common language, principles, techniques, and procedures that will facilitate the integration of the U.S. armed forces in the planning and conduct of operations in peace and war.(16)

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his October "Command Report," joined the joint movement by stating: "...our organization and our doctrine will be more 'joint' in nature."(17)

The call for joint doctrine is not new. In 1936, the U.S. Naval War College stated that doctrine had two essential parts: instruction and knowledge. The goal of the Navy was to provide the existence of a common and universal knowledge to further unity of effort. The strength of such doctrine could only become effective through the instruction of mutual understanding. Mutual understanding was the "keystone" because it allowed the commander to transmit his orders in a

common language.(18)

In upcoming years, unity of effort and mutual understanding of orders will be essential elements of successful campaigns. By mid-decade our fighting force will be smaller, and the importance of compatible terms in the development of joint doctrine and various service doctrine will be critical. The doctrine developed in peacetime will provide a common language which will allow discussion and smooth execution of operational level war plans without undue loss of life.

The application of doctrine is never more scrutinized than in its role with the campaign plan. Recently, campaign planning has experienced a resurgence in attention, due to the current interest in operational art. Campaign planning has become the topic of much debate; and by association, doctrine, too, has risen high on the list of important topics. In 1988, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College directed Colonel William W. Mendel and Lieutenant Colonel Floyd T. Banks, Jr. to conduct a study "...to determine the processes, procedures, and doctrine being used by high level commanders in the field to prepare campaign plans."(19) Mendel and Banks' look at campaign planning at the highest level revealed a lack of comprehensive doctrine at all levels. The U.S. Army's FM 100-5, dated 1986, provided the only reference to campaign planning at the time of their study. Their conclusions

encouraged an immediate development of joint doctrine for campaign planning.(20)

Modern theorist James J. Schneider, in his article "The Theory of Operational Art," reinforced the need for doctrine at the operational level of war with his statement:

Because of the complexity of operational art, it becomes more and more important to rely on operational doctrine. Doctrine provides the structure of military operations which at a distance resembles strategy and tactics. It provides an officially sanctioned framework for common understanding, dialogue, learning, and most importantly, action.(21)

In Military Doctrine and the American Character, Herbert I. London stated: "Doctrine is a map, a guide on how to proceed."(22) Doctrine, like the hit and run signal from the third base coach, provides a common substance for a common concept, a single set of signals. Each player must understand and expedite his part, for the success of the whole. The success of the whole can only be achieved through training and education of all members of the team, not just the members involved in the play.

When FMFM 1-1 was signed on 25 January 1991, it became a map and guide for Marines involved in campaign planning and campaigning. General A.M. Gray, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated:

This book, Campaigning, thus establishes the authoritative doctrinal basis for military campaigning in the Marine Corps, particularly as it pertains to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducting a campaign or contributing to a campaign by a higher authority. Campaigning is designed to be in consonance

with FMFM 1, Warfighting, and presumes understanding of the philosophy described therein. In fact, Campaigning applies this warfighting philosophy specifically to the operational level of war.(23)

FMFM 1, Warfighting, was published in 1989. It was the first book in a series that established General Gray's philosophy on warfighting. It has become the doctrine by which Marines prepare and plan for war. FMFM 1 not only provides guidance on how Marines conduct combat, but also how Marines think, in general, about combat.(24)

When FMFM 1-1 was published one year later, it expressed the idea that military action must ultimately serve the demands of policy, and any tactical action conducted by Marines must serve to accomplish the strategic aim.(25)

FMFM 1-1 identified the intermediate level of war that links strategy and tactics as the operational level of war. The first chapter is devoted to how the campaign is "... the basic tool of commanders at the operational level of war."(26) There is little doubt that FMFM 1-1 is written as an operations guide for the operational artist serving with MAGTF's, and serving as a member of a CINC's planning staff.

Gray's vision of the future for the Marine Corps and the importance of solid campaigning doctrine is expressed as follows:

In a campaign Marine leaders must therefore be able to integrate military operations with the other elements of national power in all types of conflict... Many future crises will be "short-fuzed" and of limited duration and scale. But make no mistake; no matter what the size and nature of the next mission--whether it be general war,

crisis response, peacekeeping, nation building, counter-insurgency, counterterrorism, or counternarcotics operations--the concepts and the thought process described in this book [FMFM 1-1] will apply.(27)

The Commandant's forward to FMFM 1-1 makes very clear his intent to establish Marine Corps doctrine for campaigning at the operational level of war. His challenge to commanders and officers at all levels was "... to read and reread this book, understand its message, and apply it. Duty demands nothing less."(28) The Commandant was looking for that mutual understanding of campaign planning and campaigning which allows Marines to communicate campaign plans to subordinates in a common language. In today's military, the subordinates with whom one will communicate will be from every branch of the armed forces; this can be counted on. Thus, the true importance of compatible terminology in a common language, or the utilization of joint doctrine, on the battlefields of the future will not only save the lives of Marines, but also of all Americans fighting on that same battlefield.

The developers of doctrine must communicate in a clear and succinct language. The writers of doctrine must understand the potential confusion they may cause if they fail to clarify a nonstandard term. Quick judgment will be required of the executors of doctrine regarding the application of any nonstandard term, as there will be little time to debate definitions on a fast moving battlefield. All

doctrinal terms and definitions must be consistent with JCS PUB 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.(29)

FMFM 1, Warfighting, calls for the Marine Corps to adopt Colonel Boyd's idea of implicit communication when issuing orders.(30) The philosophy of implicit communication is addressed as follows: "...to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases ...is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instruction."(31) FMFM 1 goes on to discuss how to exploit surfaces and gaps, the need for combat leadership well forward, and combined arms doctrine.(32) There is little question that these are essential elements of tactical warfighting, but they fall well short of the broad view required of an operational artist. Clearly, FMFM 1 is written for tactical thought.

The doctrine established in FMFM 1-1 does not conform to doctrinal terms and definitions in JCS PUB 1-02. FMFM 1-1 fails to recognize that at the operational level of war, Marine Corps units will fight as part of a joint team. FMFM 1-1 lacks the common language of campaign planning in the joint environment. For example, the term "center of gravity," used frequently in joint doctrine, is altogether absent from FMFM 1-1.

With FMFM 1 as a doctrinal guide, the author of FMFM 1-1 fails to transition from a tactical level of thought to the operational level. Although Clausewitz is repeatedly quoted throughout both manuals, the writers chose to use the term "focus of effort" rather than Clausewitz's term, "center of gravity."(33) In FMFM 1 the doctrine writer explains his choice of "focus of effort" over "center of gravity" with a footnote. The footnote indicates commitment to maneuver warfare but promotes a misunderstanding of center of gravity when planning at the operational level of war. FMFM 1 footnote 28 identifies "focus of effort" as:

Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However, there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into the theory of war, Clausewitz wrote (p.485): "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." Clearly, Clausewitz was advocating a climactic test of strength against strength "by daring all to win all" (p.596). This approach is consistent with Clausewitz' historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying the term to the modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy's center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability.(34)

Further reading of Clausewitz's, On War, would have given the writers of FMFM 1 and FMFM 1-1 a clear picture of center of gravity when planning total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz explains center of gravity as being the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends. The center of gravity is the point against which all energies should be directed. It is essential in war to understand your enemy's

center of gravity, and to focus your efforts against it. In Book Eight, Chapter Nine, Clausewitz wrote:

...two basic principles that underlie all strategic planning and serve to guide all other considerations... the first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one.(35)

Clausewitz's center of gravity for planning is clear.

It may be an enemy strength or it could be a critical vulnerability left unguarded. Whatever this critical hub of power, it must be identified early, ideally before the war begins. Once identified, the task of the strategist is to strike repeated blows against this hypercritical spot. Once this center of gravity has been identified and attacked, and the enemy thrown a disadvantage, he must be struck frequently and not given time to recover. Indeed, this is not necessarily strength against strength, it could be as simple as a Naval blockade to prevent the enemy from gaining additional combat power, as in Cuba. Or, it could be air strikes against Iraq's extended lines of communication from Baghdad to the Iraqi troops in Kuwait.(36)

In summary, center of gravity has become a joint term which provides a mutual understanding for referring to a critical enemy factor of vulnerability when planning at the operational level of war.(37) The term is accepted and used, and it should not be absent from Marine Corps doctrine. FMFM 1-1 established the authoritative doctrine for campaign

planning for Marines in 1990. General Gray took the tactical warfighting philosophy of FMFM 1 and mistakenly applied it to campaigning at the operational level of war.(38) Joint and combined operations are a reality of today's smaller force and interdependent world. This interdependence highlights the need for standardization of doctrine and terminology. Marines may prefer the term "focus of effort," but when the rest of team is using "center of gravity," Marines must know and understand its meaning, and the meaning of all joint terminology.

III. HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

The 1982 version of the Army's FM 100-5, Operations, renewed the interest in operational art for the first time since World War II. Questions were raised about campaign plans, and operational art became the topic of a number of papers, monographs, and theses statements. The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine published in 1986 increased the interest even further with the following definition of operational art: "...the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations."(1) This revived interest in operational art allowed Mendel and Banks to utilize their previous research to establish a framework for campaign planning.(2)

The framework Mendel and Banks developed served as a

template for reviewing campaign plans and campaign planning processes in the years ahead. Their "...framework evolved as a set of commonly held beliefs, or tenets, about what constitutes a campaign plan. The tenets are the result of a literature search and interviews with instructors at the U.S. Army War College, National Defense University, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and planners on the Army Staff and Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."(3)

The labor of these two officers resulted in the following seven tenets of a campaign plan:

1. Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve strategic military objectives in a theater of war and theater of operation; the basis for all other planning.
2. Provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions--displays the commander's vision and intent.
3. Orients on the enemy's center of gravity.
4. Phases a series of related major operations.
5. Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.
6. Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates.
7. Synchronizes air, land, and sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole; joint in nature.(4)

These seven tenets, as of the writing of this monograph, have not been incorporated into U.S. Army doctrine, and do not appear in FMFM 1-1. On 10 January, 1990, JCS TEST PUB 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, expanded Mendel and Banks' seven tenets to ten. (see page 5) The additional three tenets added a unified national strategic direction for planners to follow.

The ten tenets are intended to be used as guides for the essential components of a campaign plan. J.F.C. Fuller, a distinguished British military theorist, once remarked: "Looking back is the surest way of looking forward."⁽⁵⁾ If, as Mendel and Banks and the authors of JCS TEST PUB 3-0 suggest, these tenets are keys to the success of future campaigns, then traces of these tenets should be found in former successful campaign plans. An analysis of World War II theater campaign plans will determine if the ten tenets were utilized. If the analysis proves that the tenets were an intrinsic part of those successful campaigns, then military planners today will see the viability of the tenets.

Having briefly examined these campaign planning tenets, I will turn to the historical analysis of the two major Pacific campaigns of World War II, GRANITE and RENO. To fully understand the planning elements contained in these two plans it is important to know the background of the overall strategy to defeat Japan in the Pacific theater of war.

At the end of World War I, the Japanese Empire began to show signs of expansionist tendencies in the western Pacific as well as throughout the Far East. American strategists immediately began to explore possible ways and means to arrive at a desired end state in the event of war. Joint Army-Navy strategic "think tanks" produced a series of plans between 1924 and 1938. These plans were known as the Orange plans and were approved by the Joint Army and Navy Board.⁽⁶⁾

As the writers of the Orange plans searched for ways and means of dealing with the potential Japanese threat, they made the following assumptions:

1. The United States would assume the major responsibility for the war in the Pacific.
2. War in the Pacific would be primarily naval in character.
3. It would be essential to seize and defend forward naval bases in the Japanese Mandates to conduct operations against the Japanese mainland.
4. Defense of the Philippine Islands would be the focus of effort in the Pacific campaign.(7)

All the prewar Orange plans were fixed on a Central Pacific defense, followed by a Central Pacific offense. War in Europe generated new discussion of national strategy-- if the United States were to become involved. In April 1941, a new strategy called Rainbow 5 was published. Rainbow 5 did not change the Central Pacific direction of the Orange plans, but indicated that the allied strategy in the Pacific would be primarily defensive until Germany was defeated.(8) Only the events of December 7, 1941 modified the focus of the Orange plans. The Japanese surprise strike against American Naval forces at Pearl Harbor and the surrender of the Philippine Islands prompted a reevaluation of a single Central Pacific offensive plan.

In March 1942, the first strategic step was to organize the Pacific theater of war into two commands: the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific Ocean Area (POA), commanded by Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz.(9) The division of the theater increased the competition for resources of war that were already short.

Bitter fights raged between MacArthur and Nimitz over resources and over the axis of advance, until the Joint Chiefs published their "Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan".(10) The new strategic plan supported a dual advance to the strategic triangle--FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA. The Joint Chiefs selected Nimitz's Central Pacific plan (GRANITE) as the main effort, and MacArthur's Southwest Pacific plan (RENO) as the supporting effort. The Joint Chiefs' ultimate aim was "...to obtain objectives from which we can conduct intensive air bombardment and establish a sea and air blockade against Japan, and from which to invade Japan proper if this should prove necessary."(11) The plan also laid out broad general guidance on how to accomplish these objectives:

1. North Pacific forces to eject the Japanese from the Aleutians.
2. Center Pacific forces to advance westward from Pearl Harbor.
3. South Pacific and Southwest Pacific forces to cooperate in a drive on Rabaul. Southwest Pacific forces then to press on westward along the north coast of New Guinea.(12)

These strategic concepts were developed by the nation's leadership; now it was up to the theater of operations CINCs to develop the military campaign plans to accomplish the aims of this national strategy. As the main effort, Nimitz issued a revised GRANITE plan. MacArthur, as the supporting theater CINC, published RENO V, a revised Southwest Pacific plan.

The success of both of these plans is now history. Because of those successes, an analysis of the elements of these plans can validate the significance of the ten tenets of campaign planning proposed in JCS TEST PUB 3-0.

Following is a breakdown of each, if and when it appears in the plans submitted by Nimitz and MacArthur. The first tenet calls for each campaign plan to "Provide broad concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving strategic objectives."(13) Nimitz's GRANITE plan contains the first tenet of campaign planning. It lists the strategic objective as follows:

The immediate objective of the forces of the Pacific Ocean Area is to obtain positions from which the ultimate surrender of Japan can be forced by intensive air bombardment, by sea and air blockade, and by invasion if necessary. The ultimate strategic objective is to establish our sea and air power, and if necessary our amphibious forces, in those positions and force the unconditional surrender of Japan.(14)

GRANITE contains twelve tasks, divided into three categories--general, specific and eventual tasks. Examples of assigned tasks are:

1. To secure control of the MARSHALLS (islands) preparatory to a western advance through the Central Pacific.
2. To initiate bombing of Japan from bases in the MARIANAS.
3. To support strategically the operations of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA by covering and by destroying or containing enemy fleet forces.(15)

MacArthur's RENO V plan also contains the first tenet. It states the strategic concept as follows:

1. Secure land, naval and air bases in the southern PHILIPPINES from which to launch an attack upon LUZON with a view to an attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.
2. Isolate JAPAN from the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area.(16)

RENO V contains two types of tasks--present and eventual.

Present: Advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as the VOGELKOP by airborne-waterborne operations. Seize MINDANAO by airborne-waterborne operations and establish land, naval and air bases.
Eventual: By air and naval action, isolate JAPAN from the BORNEO-N.E.I.-MALAYA area. Seize LUZON, initiate V.L.R. bombing of JAPAN, and establish bases necessary to launch an attack against the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.(17)

Both of these plans provide statements broad in scope but clear in intentions. The first tenet of JCS TEST PUB 3-0 is a part of both plans.

The second tenet of JCS TEST PUB 3-0 is to "Provide an orderly schedule of unified decisions."(18) Only the RENO plan carries a clear list or schedule of unified decisions. RENO's concept of operations in the Pacific in 1944 describes, step by step, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decisions for the defeat of Japan. "They have decided to establish forces in the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area by advance from present positions through the MARIANAS-CAROLINES, PALAU, and MINDANAO as follows...."(19) GRANITE does not contain the second tenet.

The third tenet directs that the plan "Achieve unity of effort with land, maritime, air, space, and special operations forces."(20) Both plans accomplish tenet three

with guidance to land, naval, and air forces, by phases, in the scheme of maneuver. Throughout GRANITE, Nimitz provides a well-orchestrated fire support plan. His GYMKAHA-ROADMAKER phase provides the following:

...air forces based ashore in the BISMARCKS will conduct sustained air attacks...Landing (amphibious) operations against TRUK will be supported by sustained carrier (air) operations. Striking (naval) forces and submarines will engage and destroy Japanese forces that may attempt to intervene in the operation.(21)

Each phase of GRANITE contains identical guidance for land, air and naval forces assigned to the Pacific Ocean Area.

MacArthur's RENO plan provides more general guidance to his component commanders. He informs air, naval, and land forces what he expects:

Destructive air attacks are employed to soften up and gain air superiority over hostile air... Hostile naval forces and shipping are destroyed along the line of advance, preventing reinforcement or supply of enemy air and naval forces within range of objectives under our attack. Ground forces...to seize and establish bases in each successive area objective.(22)

At the time GRANITE and RENO were designed the employment of space warfare was not applicable. However, neither plan addressed the use of special operations forces.

Tenet four directs campaign plans to "Incorporate the commander's concept and intent."(23) Both campaign plans accomplish tenet four. Nimitz's intent is stated clearly in GRANITE. "The immediate objective of the forces of the Pacific Ocean Area is to obtain position from which the ultimate surrender of Japan can be forced..."(24) His

concept to accomplish this objective is communicated in tasks, time phased from Hawaii to mainland Japan.(25)

RENO states that FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA is designated as the strategic objective of operations in the Pacific. General MacArthur's intent of this strategic objective is "...to support the Chinese war effort and establish bases for the final assault upon Japan."(26) RENO provides four steps to accomplish the intent of Pacific operations:

1. Establish bases in Southern Philippine Islands.
2. Reoccupy Luzon and re-establish U.S.-Philippine sovereignty.
3. Support operations into the Formosa-China coast area.
4. Reduce the hostile war-making powers of Japan by air operations.(27)

The fifth tenet indicates that campaign planning should "Orient on the center of gravity of the threat."(28) Both plans accomplish tenet five. The continuous theme throughout GRANITE is the positioning of bases to allow allied air and naval forces to strike Japan and force a surrender. All actions in GRANITE are focused on Japan's lines of communications.(29) RENO focuses on seizure of the Philippine Islands to support the establishment of air bases on Formosa, China, or Luzon to attack mainland Japan.(30) The two theaters of operations in the Pacific theater of war are oriented toward the ultimate surrender of Japan. To force the surrender, both plans concentrated on Japan's external lines of communications--the Japanese center of gravity.

Tenet six is "Phase a series of related unified operations."(31) The operations of both plans are conducted in phases, therefore accomplishing the sixth tenet. GRANITE achieves tenet six by phasing five major related operations. Each phase of GRANITE is a series of linked or simultaneous actions leading to the attainment of an operational commander's strategic objective.(32) RENO incorporates tenet six in four phases.(33) Each phase of RENO is designed to move MacArthur closer to the Philippine Islands and force the enemy back to mainland Japan.

The seventh tenet of campaign planning is "Compose subordinate forces and designate command relationships."(34) GRANITE did not establish command relationships or designate specific subordinate units. A list of subordinate forces required to execute the plan is included as an annex to GRANITE. The list is a proposed task organization, without unit designations, to be used by subordinate units in their planning. This list was designed to aid the Joint Chiefs of Staff in transferring required forces and logistic support to the Pacific Ocean Area.(35) General MacArthur's RENO plan also overlooks command relationships. The principal combat elements required to successfully accomplish the RENO plan are listed as an annex. These forces have specified unit designations, but do not establish a clear command relationship.(36)

The failure of both plans to address command relationships led to many communication problems in the Pacific theater of war. For example, the Navy saw only large armadas of ships sailing on one large ocean, all belonging to Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. At the same time, MacArthur's naval force was commanded by a U.S. admiral who also commanded the U.S. Seventh Fleet. MacArthur's admiral technically worked for MacArthur but continually received orders directly from Admiral King. Conflicting orders slowed down maneuvers and created unnecessary confusion. King also maintained control of the Australian ships assigned as part of the Pacific Multinational Navy.(37) The problems associated with the failure of both plans to address command relationships reinforces the need for this tenet in planning today.

Tenet eight directs campaign plans to "Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success."(38) Both plans contain tenet eight. GRANITE states on the cover letter: "The plan is issued for the information of Major Commanders ...it will be utilized as a guide to long range planning."(39) RENO does not address specific subordinate units for planning, however, it does provide clear planning guidance to any subordinate receiving the plan with its clear phase taskings.(40) The surrender of

Japan constitutes success in both of the plans.

The ninth tenet is "Provide operational direction and tasks to subordinates."(41) Both plans abound with operational direction and tasks to subordinates. For example, phase FLINTLOCK of GRANITE tasks the subordinate commanders of the Pacific Ocean Area to:

1. Organize and train forces.
2. Secure control of the MARSHALL ISLANDS, by capturing, occupying, defending and developing bases therein.(42)

Phase II of RENO tasks the subordinate commanders of the Southwest Pacific Area to:

Seize selected objectives in the MINDANAO area, establish bases for the reoccupation of LUZON and for air operations in the Northern BORNEO area.(43)

The tenth tenet of campaign planning instructs each plan to "Provide direction for the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons in theater."(44) When GRANITE and RENO were designed, only the employment of chemical weapons were applicable. Neither plan addresses the use of chemical agents against enemy forces.

The ultimate objectives of GRANITE and RENO were to maintain unremitting pressure against Japanese land and naval forces while establishing air bases within bombing range of mainland Japan.(45) In late 1944, both plans reached the final phase of the Pacific campaign plan--the seizure of an air base from which the industrial heart of Japan could be destroyed by air bombardment. Operation CAUSEWAY was the

final phase of campaign plan GRANITE which focused on Formosa as that air base.(46)

According to operation CAUSEWAY, the allies needed a great deal of manpower to seize Formosa. But due to the manpower shortage, an alternative to operation CAUSEWAY became imperative. Lt.Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area stated: "...if the objective of CAUSEWAY was the acquisition of air bases it could be achieved with the least cost in men and materiel by the capture of positions in the Ryukyus."(47)

The flexibility of GRANITE's island hopping strategy allowed Admiral Nimitz to quickly change his focus and his forces from Formosa to Okinawa. Based on the directions provided from plan GRANITE, operation ICEBERG replaced CAUSEWAY and established the final air base from which to attack mainland Japan. ICEBERG, the invasion of Okinawa, was to be the final battle in Nimitz's Central Pacific axis of advance to mainland Japan.

An analysis of ICEBERG provides additional support for the ten tenets of campaign planning listed in JCS TEST PUB 3-0. ICEBERG incorporates the tenets from GRANITE into an operational plan.(48) The tenets addressed in GRANITE provided a sufficient base so the planners of ICEBERG could design and execute the theater commander's intent. ICEBERG allowed the warfighter to use the means available to accomplish the ends desired in GRANITE.

The historical analysis of campaign plans GRANITE and RENO provides indisputable evidence that the ten tenets in JCS TEST PUB 3-0 are required in campaign planning today. With these ten essential tenets as the guide for joint campaign planning, an examination of FMFM 1-1 will determine if it contains the same essential tenets.

FMFM 1-1 contains no list of tenets similar to those found in JCS TEST PUB 3-0 to guide the campaign planner. What FMFM 1-1 does contain is very generic guidance, loosely based on the tenets developed in JCS TEST PUB 3-0. The problem lies in the fact that one must have a working knowledge of campaign planning to extract from FMFM 1-1 the guidance required to develop a functional campaign plan.

Some examples of this generic guidance follow. JCS TEST PUB 3-0 states campaign plans "Provide broad concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving strategic objectives."(49) FMFM 1-1 provides similar direction with the following statement: "The campaign plan must highlight the strategic aim."(50) JCS TEST PUB 3-0 states each campaign plan must: "Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success."(51) In addition, each plan must "Provide operational direction and tasks to subordinates."(52) FMFM 1-1 lumps the above guidance into one confusing sentence. "It should describe, to subordinates and seniors alike, the end state which will

guarantee that aim, the overall concept and intent of the campaign, a tentative sequence of phases and operational objectives which will lead to success, and general concept for key supporting functions, especially a logistical concept which will sustain the force throughout the campaign."(53)

FMFM 1-1 contains a broad reference to five of the ten tenets listed in JCS TEST PUB 3-0. The five that are described are not directive in nature, but suggestive. Therefore, FMFM 1-1 is woefully short in providing operational guidance for the design of a proper campaign plan at any level. Marines assigned to joint staffs are unable to assist fellow officers from the other services in the development of theater campaign plans; therefore, the use of FMFM 1-1 as a reference to design campaign plans would be restrictive and inappropriate.

IV. CAMPAIGN PLANNING

By the end of World War II, the United States military had established a world renowned reputation for its ability to successfully conduct large scale operations and campaigns. Success was won through detailed strategic planning and the merging of air, ground, and naval forces at decisive points to obtain established strategic objectives. Campaign plans presented broad national strategy in the form of military strategic objectives. But during the years that followed World War II, military campaign planning skills eroded enormously, culminating in the mid 1970s. Throughout the

1980s, the military focused daily on assimilated ground, air, and naval forces to defeat the peacetime enemy on tactical objectives; but it failed to link tactical successes to long-sighted strategic objectives.

FMFM 1-1, published in 1990, was designed to change the focus of Marine Corps campaign planning. It successfully brought to light the need for change, and soon campaign planning became the popular buzz word. With its new found popularity, however, campaign planning mistakenly became associated with any plan. FMFM 1-1 muddied the water further by mixing maneuver warfare with campaign planning. Consequently, Marines became confused and wrote operations orders, calling them campaign plans. Now, most Marines understand how to execute a campaign plan but few understand how to design a campaign plan. Marines are not alone in their misunderstanding of campaign planning. A variety of definitions exist. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines a campaign plan as "A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space."(1) JCS TEST PUB 3-0 is the only other publication that utilizes the DOD definition.(2)

Although the Army's 1986 FM 100-5 definition of campaign planning carries some similar terms as that of the DOD definition, it is yet another definition, which adds to the

ambiguity:

Campaign plans set long term goals--strategic aims such as control of geographical area, reestablishment of political boundaries, or the defeat of an enemy force in the theater of operations. These must be accomplished in phases in most cases. Accordingly, the campaign plan normally provides both a general concept of operations for the entire campaign and specific plan for the campaign's first phase.(3)

The Marine Corps' FMFM 1-1 defines a campaign plan as follows:

The campaign plan is a statement of the commander's design for prosecuting his portion of the war effort, from preparation through a sequence of related operations to a well-defined end state which guarantees the attainment of the strategic aim. The campaign plan is a mechanism for providing focus and direction to subordinates executing tactical missions.(4)

This definition has some flaws. For instance, a platoon commander designs a plan for prosecuting his portion of the war which leads to a desired end state. He develops a five paragraph order providing focus and direction to his subordinates executing tactical missions. According to the FMFM 1-1 definition, his five paragraph order can be considered a campaign plan. However, a five paragraph order is far from a campaign plan, and it should not be misconstrued as one. The FMFM 1-1 definition is narrow in its scope, focusing only on the Marine Corps role. It lacks terminology such as "long term goals," "common objective," and "general concept."

The very idea of campaign planning calls for visionary thinking. Planners are required to view the battlefield

beyond today's battles and focus on strategic aims. Simply stated, the campaign plan is the commander's primary tool for strategic unity of effort. A campaign plan provides all operational, administrative, and logistic agencies with detailed guidance as to the probable intentions of the commander, and it acts as a guide for the deployment of combat forces capable of executing the plan.(5)

To meet specific military objectives, different commanders are called upon to create campaign plans. Because the campaign plan is the commander's primary tool for strategic unity of effort, the commander who creates the plan applies doctrine with which he is most familiar. To determine whether the FMFM 1-1 doctrine is suitable for any campaign plans, examine the roles of three different commanders: the CINC, the subordinate unified commander, and the JTF commander.

The CINCs have a responsibility to their subordinate commanders to transform broad national strategic guidance into a theater strategy. The theater strategy provides operational direction for military planners within each separate theater. This direction is accomplished through the theater of war campaign plan. In addition to establishing a theater of war strategy, the campaign plan must answer who, why, when, where, and how subordinate commanders will reach this strategy objective.(6) As a unified commander, the CINC's campaign planning for the theater of war will utilize

joint campaign planning doctrine.(7) Single service doctrine, such as FMFM 1-1, is not appropriate at this level of planning.

A CINC may divide his theater of war into theaters of operations. If the CINC designates theaters of operations, then subordinate unified commanders are selected for each theater. In this stage, the theater of war campaign plan allocates joint warfighting resources to each theater of operations commander. With these resources, the theater of operations commander develops his campaign plan.(8) Subordinate unified commanders utilize joint doctrine in their planning.(9) Single service doctrine, such as FMFM 1-1, is also not applicable at this level of planning.

FMFM 1-1 indicates that a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander may be selected as a Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander to conduct a campaign plan which meets a designated strategic objective. "In some cases, the MAGTF may itself be the JTF headquarters."(10) Joint Task Forces are designated for specific missions with limited objectives. A MAGTF is designed for such a mission and JTF commanders have a responsibility to produce a campaign plan. However, the very title indicates that JTF is a joint command and therefore would apply joint doctrine, not FMFM 1-1.(11)

All three joint levels of command examined here require joint doctrine, not single-service doctrine, such as

FMFM 1-1. Although the Marine Corps is not forbidden to develop campaign plans, doctrinally warfighting component commanders develop operation plans to direct their forces in the achievement of a theater campaign plan.(12) As in Desert Storm, Marine Corps forces are normally assigned as a warfighting component. In order to work effectively with all military forces, Marines must be able to plan and understand campaigns based on joint doctrine.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The issue in this study is not whether the current doctrine is correct, but rather, considering the increased emphasis on joint planning doctrine, is FMFM 1-1 adequate? Does it adequately explain to Marines how to plan campaigns in the joint environment? The clear answer is no. The most serious shortcoming of FMFM 1-1 is its failure to support the joint campaign planning tenets established in JCS TEST PUB 3-0 or JCS OUTLINE PUB 5-00.1. My research establishes strong support for the incorporation of these ten tenets in all future campaign plans.

Although FMFM 1-1 was the first document to publish campaign planning guidance, the rush to jointness by all services and JCS TEST PUB 3-0 makes FMFM 1-1 inadequate for planning a joint operation today. Although both JCS PUBs are only in the development stages, they still provide strong guidance for future planning so that joint staffs are able to apply them as doctrine. As these JCS PUBs become accepted,

Marines applying incompatible FMFM 1-1 doctrine to joint planning will only add confusion to unity of effort.

Incompatible planning doctrine is not a problem associated only with the 1990s. Captain George Marshall addressed similar planning problems in a letter to Major General James W. McAndrew, Commandant, General Staff College in 1920. His letter addressed the problem as follows:

My observation of the General Staff work in France, particularly at G.H.Q. and in the First Army, and my recent experience at the War Department in connection with Army reorganization, has caused me to feel that one of the most serious troubles in our General Staff has been the failure to follow the proper procedure in determining a policy or a plan, and in stating that policy or plan in such fashion that the various services, boards, or combat staffs could effectively carry out their portion of the plan or policy, or formulate their recommendations.(1)

Fifty years have passed and still each separate service continues to develop its own isolated doctrine. Today's reduced defense budget has forced drastic reductions in the Department of Defense's force structure. As a result the nation cannot afford to pay for excessive duplication of capabilities among the four services. Each service must develop and expand its capabilities to foster the idea that they complement the capabilities of each other, and are, therefore, not in competition with one another. These complementary capabilities will increase the joint nature of the campaigns which ensure our national security. Although there will always be a need for separate service

organizational doctrine, joint doctrine is required for future success at the operational level of war. Today's joint oriented campaign plans have mandated that all four services support and apply joint doctrine for the welfare of our nation's security. The jointness of Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the effectiveness of joint operational art.

Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the unified commands will affix services' capabilities to each phase of their campaign plans. Marines planning campaigns for the CINC need to be educated using established joint doctrine, not Marine Corps doctrine.

In conclusion, there is not a foreseeable future crisis in which a single service headquarters would assume sole responsibility for joint operational planning or execution. The facts presented in this monograph, combined with the reduction in the military forces, offer proof that the future of the U.S. military depends on total cohesiveness. With this in mind, the Marine Corps has no need for separate campaign planning doctrine and should cancel or rewrite FMFM 1-1 to conform with JCS guidance.

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