Peacemaking:
Implications For The US Army

A   Monograph
by

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Armor

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Second   Term   AY   91–92

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

PEACEMAKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US ARMY

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

MAJOR EMMETT E. PERRY, JR., USA

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
ATTN: ATZL-SWV
FT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS   66027-6900
COM: (913) 684-3437   AV 552-3237

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

SEE ATTACHED SHEET.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

PEACEMAKING   CAMPAIGN PLANNING   ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
THEATER DESIGN

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

49

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Peacemaking: Implications for the US Army

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Accepted this 3rd day of June 1991

ABSTRACT

PEACEMAKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US ARMY by MAJ Emmett E. Perry, Jr., USA, 48 pages.

As the 1990s begin, the Cold War has ended and the US Army is reevaluating its role in a rapidly changing world. While the threat of global conflict has been reduced, in some ways the world is less stable. Threats to US interests are likely to occur in a variety of regional crisis settings. One response to such crises includes peacemaking.

This monograph first examines the post-cold war environment in which a peacemaking response may be appropriate. The evolution of concepts inherent in peacemaking is then evaluated. This review includes the strategic policy of intervention, UN peacekeeping, and early US Army doctrine. Current doctrine at Army and joint levels is then evaluated. In the analysis, historical factors are compared with those found in current doctrine to find areas where improvement can be made.

The monograph concludes that peacemaking is a long-term process requiring broad multiagency cooperation and a careful balance of the elements of national power. The military element contributes primarily in the initial stages of peacemaking by focusing on gaining and sustaining stability. The monograph also concludes that improvements can be made to existing doctrine for peacemaking.

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Let us not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all that is going on. If they weren't involved in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hotspots in the world. [1]

President Reagan, 1983.

Never before has the United Nations been so ready and so compelled to step up to the task of peacemaking, both to resolve hot wars and to conduct that forward-looking mission known as preventive diplomacy. [2]

President Mitterand, 1992.

I. INTRODUCTION

Until recently, statements like the first, made less than 10 years ago, represented the dominant American view of the world since the end of World War II. However, since 1989, the world has undergone dramatic change. Simply put, an era of bipolar confrontation has passed. Two points are clear. First, at least for the foreseeable future, conflict will occur without the overshadowing concern of global war between military superpowers. The second point extends the first point. Future conflict will be local or regional rather than global. Nations will struggle to achieve local or regional ambitions. This is made possible, in large part, because of the declining military presence of global superpowers.

Change in the context of conflict demands reexamination of the doctrine the Army uses to meet national security challenges. Open-minded reexamination and, if necessary, flexible adaptation to change is necessary. The second quotation suggests one vision of how future conflict may be resolved. While the United States may or may not take the lead in such international efforts, US participation is certainly possible. This participation may be under United Nations leadership as suggested by the French President. It is equally plausible that coalitions will be formed to respond to regional crises.

The concept of peacemaking offers a reasonable response to the problems the Army is likely to face in the 1990s. While the understanding of the peacemaking concept has evolved, the following excerpts from current doctrine serve as a preliminary definition and point of departure for the study.

Peacemaking. "While the ultimate objective may be to maintain a peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to achieve it. . . . Peacemaking is often unilateral, possibly with some consent from the beneficiary. . . . The long-range goals of a peacemaking operation are often unclear; therefore, these operations are best terminated by prompt withdrawal after a settlement is reached, or by rapid transition to a peacekeeping operation. . . . Political considerations influence the size and composition of the force more than operational requirements."[3]

The purpose of this paper is to examine and suggest changes in the doctrine for peacemaking. This is essential as military forces may participate in future peacemaking efforts. While the term *peacemaking* is relatively new, the concept has a clear evolution.

This monograph is structured into six sections to facilitate its examination of peacemaking. Following the *Introduction*, Section II, *The Changing World*, reviews changes in the global environment, and likely causes for future conflict. Section III, *Evolution of Peacemaking*, describes the early concepts relating to peacemaking from World War II, but short of current doctrine. Three terms are used in Section III to describe the evolution of peacemaking: *intervention, peacekeeping, and situations short of war*. This section reviews the development of peacemaking within the US strategic policy of intervention, United Nations guidelines for peacekeeping, and Field Service Regulation (FSR)* 100-5 (1962), Operations, which describes the Army's keystone doctrine for missions in the environment referred to as

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* The title, *Field Service Regulation* (FSR) was used in 1962. Subsequent versions of Operations were titled *Field Manuals* (FM).

situations short of war. Section IV, *Current Doctrine*, examines
peacemaking concepts as found in current Joint and Army doctrine.
JPUB (TEST) 3-07, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity
Conflict</u>, FM 100-5, <u>Operations</u>, and FM 100-20/AFP 3-20[*],
<u>Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict</u>, are the primary
doctrinal manuals examined. In section V, *Analysis*, historic and
current doctrine are compared to assess the sufficiency of the
doctrine to anticipate the issues associated with peacemaking.
Section VI, *Conclusion*, summarizes the paper and provides
suggestions for future doctrine.

II. THE CHANGING WORLD

As suggested in the introduction, the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the communist Warsaw Pact will continue to have
a significant impact on our world in the 1990s and beyond. This
event has set into motion a process of foreign policy
reevaluation in many countries around the world. Implications of
this reevaluation upon doctrine in the US military, and in
militaries around the world, are significant. While changes are
evident in many areas, those most likely to affect peacemaking
operations are discussed in this section.

First, the loss of a powerful and unified Soviet block has
increased the likelihood of regional conflict not only among its
republics, but throughout the former Warsaw Pact and in regions
formerly under Soviet influence. The second factor is that
purchases of modern military equipment by third world nations and
regional powers continues unabated. While the superpowers and
their allies reduce their militaries, others continue to grow.
This too, is a source of increased instability.[4] Third,

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* Hereafter referred to as FM 100-20.

virtually every action the West has taken since World War II has occurred because of, or at least with consideration of, the potential response by the Soviet Union. For the first time since World War II, this is no longer the case.

Regional Instability

The first area of significant global change is the increased probability of regional conflict. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has freed its republics, and remaining Warsaw Pact nations, to pursue independent domestic and foreign policy agendas. These agendas are extremely diverse and their implementation is likely to have unpredictable repercussions. Conflicts are likely to develop in attempts to resolve age-old territorial and regional disputes that, until recently, Soviet rule has suppressed.

Other states around the world are similarly affected. These states, once under the Soviet sphere of influence, feared the loss of aid from the Soviets or perhaps Soviet intervention (e.g., Czechoslovakia or Hungary). Now free of Soviet influence, these nations will pursue their own foreign policies. To the extent these nations are unable to afford military equipment without Soviet military aid, stability may be supported. However, wealthy nations once constrained as suggested above, are now free to arm and use military force without concern about Soviet response. The world will undergo trying times as nations test the limits of this new-found freedom.

Another contributor to potential conflict is related to the reduction in size of western, and former Warsaw Pact forces. The result is that nations will be less likely to be intimidated regarding the use of military force in advancing foreign policy goals.[5] To the extent that restraining influence is reduced, or is perceived to have been reduced, instability may result.

Arms Proliferation

The second major factor contributing to change in the 1990s is the distribution of modern weapons. While NATO and former Warsaw Pact nations sign disarmament treaties and demobilize forces, third world nations readily purchase these modern weapons. Nations now sell arms for economic reasons where, in some cases, their previous motives were based on ideology. Examples include the sale of T-72 tanks by Czechoslovakia to the militaries of Iraq and Syria.[6] This proliferation of modern weapons has increased the lethality of many potential battlefields around the world. The costs of future conflict, in virtually every sense of the word, will remain high.

Of concern to the military planner is the fact that relatively small or poor nations continue to expend large portions of their gross national product (GNP) to purchase highly effective offensive and defensive weapons. In 1990, the aggregate spending increase by third world nations on arms was "mainly due to defense spending growth in a few countries and regions, in particular in China, India, Pakistan, and in most countries of the Middle East."[7] One implication of this redistribution of arms is that any response is likely to require a sophisticated and large force. As a result, this may require a collective response by several nations.

End of the Cold War

As suggested in the paper's first quotation, concern for Soviet responses to US military operations has been a dominant consideration since World War II. This is no longer true. While concerns about the former Soviet Union remain, the global expansionist threat, at least for now, is gone. This allows the US to interact with other nations in entirely new ways.

The impact on the operational planner is likely to be greater consistency between short and long-term objectives. It may be less likely that long-term political policies or goals must necessarily be compromised to support a short-term, anticommunist requirement. This will contribute to clearer vision for the implementation of policy and the use of military force.

Reasons for Conflict

While the causes of the turbulent environment described above are unique, the reasons a nation will seek to use military force to achieve its aims in the future are not. Until emergence of another force with global ambitions, the following represent classical reasons for conflict.[8]

> - *Territorial disputes.*
> - *Nationalism.*
> - *Ethnic strife.*
> - *Regional hegemony.*
> - *Economic crisis.*

While the reasons for conflict suggested above are not all-encompassing, they give some insight into dominant themes.

Territorial disputes have historically been a common cause of conflict. In the former Soviet Union, territorial disputes are frequently tied to ethnic problems or nationalism. While somewhat of an over simplification, Moldovia serves as an example. Ethnic Russians, the minority in Moldovia, seek an independent territory apart from the majority, ethnic Moldovians. Romania supports the Moldovians, while the Russian Republic supports those seeking independence. Similar scenarios are found in many developing nations in eastern Europe, Africa and Asia.

The fight for regional dominance, or hegemony, is becoming an issue of growing importance because of the vacuum created by the reduction of forces by the global powers.

Like the decline of Soviet influence, the extent to which
the US demonstrates its military presence around the world can
play a role in containing nations with expansionist ideas. This
is not to imply that the US is impotent to counter such threats.
Rather, a question a nation might ask seems appropriate, "Is the
US, and international resolve, sufficiently strong to discourage
or defeat nations seeking regional domination?"

Economic conditions, particularly in Eastern Europe, have
continued to decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In
an address before the United Nations, Francois Mitterand,
President of the French Republic, observed that there are two
main categories of countries.

> *Some have succeeded in making progress but many
> others, especially in Africa but also elsewhere in
> the Indochinese Peninsula, are bogged down in a
> situation from which they cannot emerge without
> our help.* [9]

Discontent arises when a populace recognizes that the standard of
living is in decline. When basic human needs are not met,
desperation may lead to violence. This is especially true if
government institutions appear insensitive to the plight of the
people. Dissatisfaction is heightened still further when the
people perceive that other nations, that may be otherwise
similar, have growing prosperity. The lack of economic growth,
fueled in part by greater awareness of the disparity with others,
can be a contributor to instability. Unfortunately, such
scenarios are developing in eastern Europe and elsewhere. As
conditions proceed from dissatisfaction to frustration and
desperation, the potential for violence and anarchy increases.[10]

Summary

The preceding discussion gives some perspective of the
future in which the Army will operate. Several generalizations

can be made. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
demobilization of military forces does not presage an era of
global peace and stability. Fundamental changes in traditional
political relationships, combined with military build-ups in some
nations offer sufficient preconditions for conflict. Further,
the reasons for conflict have not changed. Their scope could be
more limited. Consequently, the US Army may very well find
itself involved in peacemaking, especially in a multinational
effort. The following section examines the evolution of doctrine
to conduct this operation.

III. EVOLUTION OF PEACEMAKING

The concept of peacemaking evolved primarily since World War
II within the framework established by a strategic policy of
intervention. This section will review the evolution of
peacemaking by examining the strategy of intervention, the UN's
peacekeeping guidelines and the Army's doctrine as described in
Field Service Regulation 100-5 (1962), Operations.

Intervention

The concept of intervention encompassed the wide range of US
policy for the use of all elements of national power to support
foreign policy objectives. It included concepts closely entwined
with peacemaking. While military doctrine for operations did not
directly use the term *intervention*, it was commonly utilized in
discussion of foreign policy. One particularly clear definition
of intervention is:

> ". . . *the purposeful and calculated use of*
> *political, economic, and military instruments [of*
> *national power] by one country to influence the*
> *domestic politics or the foreign policy of another*
> *country.*"[11]

It is significant that since World War II intervention has been the primary term used to express a wide range of military operations short of conventional war. The term has included a spectrum of activity including:

> 1. Economic sanctions.
> 2. Covert actions.
> 3. Counter-intervention in response to real or a perceived threat of Soviet intervention.
> 4. Benevolent intervention for humanitarian reasons.
> 5. Intervention to overthrow an "undesirable" government.
> 6. Intervention to advance or protect national interests. [12]

The fourth and sixth tasks remain associated with peacemaking today.

The term *intervention* is not used in current doctrine for two reasons. First, intervention described a spectrum of activity from humanitarian acts to aggressive use of force to obtain national objectives. Hence, it can be ambiguous and misunderstood. Another, and perhaps the most important reason the term may be inappropriate, was its implications in a Cold War context.[13] The tasks of intervention to "overthrow" an unfriendly government or to counter a real or perceived Soviet threat dominate contemporary notions of the term and restrict its utility in describing current national security strategy.

Thus far the discussion briefly describes the strategic context and conditions in which initial peacemaking concepts were developed. During the same period, the United Nations was defining its global role in support of peace. In doing so, it was clear that situations might arise requiring the United Nations to intervene in a conflict to make and attempt to keep the peace, pending more permanent solutions. The result included guidelines for the use of force in the role of *peacekeeping*.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a concept which was developed beginning in the late 1950s by the United Nations.[14] At the time peacekeeping was broadly defined and included aspects associated with the contemporary concept of peacemaking. In fact, only recently the United Nations has begun to clarify this discussion by using both terms and viewing each as distinct.

Historically, the United Nations' definition of peacekeeping included the well-known role of maintaining a peace by placing a force between two or more belligerents. Peacekeeping also included the security force mission of setting up control of a country or territory until it could be handed over to a sovereign authority.[15] Undergirding both of these missions was the requirements for "willing" hosts and the maintenance of neutrality by the peacekeeping force.[16] But, peacekeeping was defined as encompassing much more than separating belligerents and acting as a security force.[17]

The UN concept of peacekeeping has also included the use of force where "peacekeepers . . . **use force** to **impose peace** in an area where conflict has erupted (emphasis added)."[18] While this is the concept, there are few examples of this actually being accomplished by the UN in a short, decisive operation. Except for the unique case of the Korean conflict, a protracted affair, and perhaps Operation Desert Storm, the UN has shown little enthusiasm for involvement in this mission.[19]

A contemporary example of an initially successful peacekeeping mission was the US participation with the multinational force (MNF) "peacekeeping" mission to Lebanon July-September, 1982. While not UN sponsored, the United States acted with France and Italy to restore peace, support the pro-Western regime of Amin Gemayel and supervise the departure of the

Palestinian Liberation Organization from Beirut. Something had to be done about the house-to-house fighting in Beirut as Israelis sought to destroy the PLO army.[20] This mission was accomplished in an environment that Caspar Weinberger described as "run by a disparate collection of foreign armies and indigenous militias."[21] Still, the mission, which began in July and ended on September 14, 1982, was a success.[*] The PLO was evacuated, the Israelis withdrew from the city, and the MNF departed. The operation, more closely akin to **peacemaking**, was referred to as **peacekeeping**. Again, this was consistent with the UN usage of the term *peacekeeeping*.

In summary, the use of force to restore order has historically been associated with the term *peacekeeping*. The UN has been reluctant, however, to conduct such operations. Nevertheless, the US has been involved in these ambiguous operations as its participation in the multinational force in Lebanon illustrates.

The US Army anticipated the need to conduct military operations to support the strategy of intervention and developed doctrine to guide such operations. The Army doctrine for operations like those described in this section first appeared in doctrine in 1962.

Army Doctrine, 1962

Until the 1962 version of FSR 100-5, <u>Operations</u>, tasks related to peacemaking were not discussed.[22] In 1962, using the term *situations short of war*, US Army doctrine described an environment and tasks that clearly foreshadowed modern peacemaking. Situations short of war were defined as:

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[*] The second MNF mission to Beirut (September 1982-February 1983) was the mission which ended in withdrawal of the MNF following the bombing of the US Marine barracks.

> *". . . those specific circumstances and incidents*
> *of cold war in which military force is moved to an*
> *area directly and is employed to attain national*
> *objectives in operations not involving formal open*
> *hostilities between nations."* [23]

The following tasks were those expected to be accomplished in situations short of war:

> *". . . encourage a weak or faltering government,*
> *stabilize a restless area, deter or thwart*
> *aggression, reinforce a threatened area, check or*
> *counter aggressive moves by opposing powers, or to*
> *maintain or restore order."* [24]

Two of the tasks expected of military operations in situations short of war included the mission to stabilize a restless area and maintain or restore order.[25] Both tasks are associated with peacemaking.

The primacy of politics in situations short of war was clear in doctrine. "In most instances, in conditions short of war, political considerations are overriding."[26] Hence, subordination of the military to other departments of government was specifically addressed. While subordination of military operations to the political arm was recognized, this theme, and attendant problems, were not developed.

Doctrine expressed little of requirements for, or concern about, legitimacy. The need for legitimacy in the perception of the host country, and internationally, was only briefly suggested. The main point made was that the commander had to create the perception of sensitivity and "keep an official record of all important transactions and decisions."[27]

The doctrine also foresaw the requirement for joint and combined cooperation. The suggestion was made that Army forces "may be subordinated to another service" in the situation where another service was dominant.[28] The doctrine further envisioned the situation where the US force would need to

cooperate and even act as "subordinate of an allied commander."[29] Just as in World War II, situations short of war were expected to require combined operations. Unfortunately, doctrine did not fully develop the discussion associated with this alternative.

According to the doctrine, the scope of such conflicts was likely to be limited as the force envisioned to accomplish these missions was a relatively small one. A division-sized organization, specially tailored for the task, was believed sufficient.[30] This may have been appropriate in the 1960s before the proliferation of modern weapons. This issue was not developed, but the perceived requirement to use a small force could be related to a concern to maintain regional legitimacy. No discussion was made about the principles governing the proper amount of force to use.

The unique requirements for intelligence were not assessed in detail in the 1962 doctrine for peacemaking operations. However, the need for strategic, allied and comprehensive tactical intelligence was suggested. Intelligence needs, unique to an operation involving military and non-military threats, were not outlined.

The full intent of the 1962 doctrine for situations short of war is difficult to assess. This is so because the diversity of tasks receive only an introduction. It is appropriate though to draw several conclusions. The doctrine reveals a clear anticipation of the problems associated with operations in this environment. It touches upon many key issues. For example, there was an expectation that a small military force, much guided by political considerations, could quickly conduct an operation and redeploy. The assumption in early doctrine seems to be that most situations short of war would be of short duration.

In the context of a short operation, the doctrine outlined the contribution which military force could provide. Conversely, issues associated with longer term operations were not addressed. It appears that the writers appreciated the difficulty of extended conflict and focused on the contribution the military could make more directly--that of supporting long-term political objectives by conducting short, and decisive military operations.

Doctrine: 1963 to the Present

The 1976 and 1982 revisions of FM 100-5, _Operations_, do not expand the discussion of situations short of war found in the 1962 version. In fact, the section is deleted.

There is, however, in the 1986 version of FM 100-5, _Operations_, an introduction to the section on contingency operations which addresses peacemaking types of operations.

IV. CURRENT DOCTRINE

Today, as in the past, the Army's keystone doctrine is found in FM 100-5, _Operations_. Current doctrine is unique in that it was developed within a broader framework established by joint doctrinal publications. The specific joint publication upon which the Army's doctrine for peacemaking operations is based, is JPUB (TEST) 3-07, _Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict_. In turn, FM 100-5 establishes a context for development of FM 100-20, _Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict_ which expresses the Army's explicit doctrine for operations related to peacemaking.

Joint Doctrine

In JPUB 3-07 the term _operations to restore order_ is used to describe operations intended to:

> ". . . halt violence and reinstitute more normal civil activities. Where applicable, they seek to

> *encourage the resumption of political and*
> *diplomatic dialogue. They are typically*
> *undertaken at the request of appropriate national*
> *authorities in a foreign state or to protect US*
> *citizens; however it is unlikely that the consent*
> *of all belligerent will be obtained."* [31]

Like the 1960s doctrine for situations short of war, the
doctrine does not speculate as to how long these operations may
last. Still, joint operations have a clear focus and are
unambiguous in many areas. The doctrine is clear in its primary
focus upon a short-term objective--that of reducing or stopping
violence. In so doing, operations to restore order make the
significant contribution of setting conditions for the
accomplishment of long-term goals through diplomacy and
negotiation.

Joint doctrine expands the consideration of several key
issues. The first is the fact that a military force must be able
to adapt to an increase or decrease in the level of violence.
Plans anticipating an increase in violence demand preparations
for "force protection, evacuation or combat operations as
appropriate."[32] Second, if an operation to restore order
(peacemaking) is successful, the transition may be to
peacekeeping. Doctrine does not, however, clarify whether the
same force conducting operations to restore order should remain
and transition to the new role of peacekeeping.

The need for clear objectives for the peacemaking force is
implied throughout the doctrinal discussion. However, the
planning considerations necessary for military forces operating
in a highly politicized environment in which objectives may
undergo change is implied but not discussed.

While the focus of the joint doctrine is upon accomplishment
of short-term objectives, the doctrine does suggest that
operations may be protracted.[33] Joint doctrine does not

develop the issues associated with that prospect. It does, however, discuss the idea that military operations in a low intensity conflict setting occur in "an environment in which political, military, economic and informational elements must be used in an orchestrated effort."[34]

In summary, joint doctrine is focused primarily on the short-term aspects of peacemaking. In support of peacemaking operations, the military provides the service suggested by the term used in the joint doctrine. It can conduct *operations to restore order*.

Army Doctrine

In the 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations, a short discussion is provided on contingency operations.* Those operations included the restoration of order discussed earlier. However, the types of operations to be conducted as contingency operations are not developed further. The doctrine simply states that the US Army will "participate in peacekeeping operations which support diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore or maintain peace."[35] While limited operations are regaining prominence, the priority in the 1986 version of FM 100-5 remains on the threat of conventional war in Europe.

While FM 100-5 does not provide details of operations related to peacemaking, it does provide a supporting framework for operations conducted in low intensity conflict as described in 1990 as FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. This manual gives significant detail concerning peacemaking operations.

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* Contingency operations are understood later to include operations like those found in the 1962 doctrine for situations short of war.

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US Army doctrine in FM 100-20 is significantly different from that described in joint doctrine on two points. First, the Army uses the term *peacemaking* instead of *operations to restore order*. Field Manual 100-20 describes peacemaking in the following manner:

> *While the ultimate objective may be to maintain a peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to achieve it. The significance of the difference [between peacemaking and peacekeeping] is that peacemaking is often unilateral, possibly with some consent from the beneficiary, and the peacemaking force imposes it. The United States conducts peacemaking operations with its military forces when in the national interest to stop a violent conflict and to force a return to political and diplomatic methods. The United States typically undertakes peacemaking operations at the request of appropriate national authorities in a foreign state or to protect US citizens as part of an international, multinational, or unilateral operation.* [36]

The quotation suggests the second distinction between joint and Army doctrine. Maintaining peace is a long process whose initial phase is to stop the violence and force the resumption of diplomatic and political methods. However, Army doctrine does not adopt the joint term, *operations to restore order*, for these initial operations. Otherwise, the discussion of stopping violence in FM 100-20 is similar to that found in joint doctrine. Besides suggesting that a long process follows this first step, there is little discussion of the issues associated with the remainder of a peacemaking operation.

Though the quotation from FM 100-20 implies that peacemaking operations are likely to be of extended duration, in another place it states that the operations, which include peacemaking, are "usually of short duration."[37] Further, these operations are "characterized by short-term rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war."[38] Therefore, the issue to be resolved is whether peacemaking is of short or long duration.

The doctrine anticipates the difficulty in imposing lasting solutions, especially when prolonged involvement is unacceptable. The following statement is an insightful observation about the nature of long-term goals:

> *The long-range goals of peacemaking operations are often unclear; therefore, these operations are best terminated by prompt withdrawal after a settlement is reached, or by rapid transition to a peacekeeping operation. Unless the peacemaking force has the necessary military and political power to compel a lasting settlement, the force may find itself attempting to govern in the face of opposition from both parties.* [39]

This quotation gives two additional insights related to peacemaking operations. First, military operations should be decisive and second, they should rapidly transition from the initial operation to restore order to whatever supporting operations are required. The doctrine states that because of the ambiguous nature of peacemaking objectives, the military portion of the operation should be conducted rapidly. Decisive action serves to allow the military to make its contribution under the most favorable conditions followed by swift transition to peacekeeping or withdrawal of the peacemaking force. The doctrine does not clarify further the considerations associated with the transition between missions beyond that given in the quotation. It implies, though, that the peacemaking force can effectively accomplish the follow-on mission of peacekeeping.

In sum, current joint and Army doctrine clearly anticipates the process of peacemaking. Joint doctrine emphasizes the initial task and calls it *operations to restore order*. Army doctrine envisions peacemaking as a long-term process, but does not clearly describe the Army's role.

IV. ANALYSIS

This section will analyze the fundamental issues associated with the peacemaking process and assess the implications upon the planner of peacemaking operations. This is done by comparing the ideas found historically in the development of peacemaking with aspects found in current doctrine. Seven factors are used as a framework to conduct this analysis.

PEACEMAKING ISSUES

- **Short-Term Operation and Long Term Process**
- **Clear Objectives**
- **Neutrality**
- **Legitimacy**
- **Unilateral or Multinational**
- **Size of Force**
- **Intelligence**

Short-Term Operation and Long-Term Process

Peacemaking is both a short-term operation and a long-term process. Until the current doctrine in FM 100-20 was published, the focus of peacemaking was consistently upon short-term, military operations to restore order. This was true of the 1962 version of FSR 100-5 and current joint doctrine in JPUB 3-07. FM 100-20 can be confusing in this regard because, while it takes an appropriately broad view of the peacemaking process, it does not clearly describe the generally understood requirement to restore order. For example, FM 100-20 states that peacemaking should be

of short duration but also states that, "long-term goals of a peacemaking operation may be unclear."[40]

As the dominant ingredient in the short-term operation to restore order, military forces can make specific contributions. During the period of violence, activities associated with the other elements of power may be suspended. The military serves to create a more peaceful environment in which other elements of power can be effectively utilized to resolve the conflict. Once stability is restored, other agencies, transnational organizations or nations can resume routine activities or continue to operate, but more effectively. In this sense, the military can reestablish and maintain some of the preconditions necessary for the resumption of non-violent competition.

Doctrine should clearly develop and discuss the connection between the short term objective of restoring order and the long-term political process of peacemaking. Doctrine should also clarify the relationship between the military operations and the wider context in which they function.

Military operations are conducted in combination with other elements of power to support the long-term goals of peacemaking. The military accomplishes what the other elements of power (diplomatic, economic and informational) may not be able to accomplish alone. Together, each element of power makes distinct, but interrelated, contributions to the process. It is becoming increasingly important that cooperation exist in the plans to use each element. This is vital because each is most effective when fully integrated with the other elements of power. For example, diplomatic negotiation is likely to set important

preconditions for the use of the military force. Preconditions
may include international embargoes of economic or military
goods. Additionally, political negotiations may be used to form
a coalition to conduct the peacemaking mission. In turn, the
military conducts operations which may support a particular
economic initiative. For example, in speaking specifically of
the relationship between military actions and political issues,
the observation has been made that, "political needs and military
exigencies impact on one another throughout the course of a war,
causing each to mold and alternately be molded by the other."[41]
The same observation can be make of a peacemaking operation.

Peacemaking plans should be made with sensitivity to plans
and objectives of other agencies. To the extent other agency's
objectives are supported, the employment of the elements of power
is enhanced. While this coordination does not ensure success, it
enhances the prospect of finding long-term solutions. The idea
of synchronization, a tenet of AirLand Battle doctrine, conveys
this idea.

The process of synchronization is not a luxury. It must
occur, because in complex and limited operations, success is
unlikely to occur without mutual support. This is due in part to
the important observation that:

> *Abiding solutions to most of a country's political*
> *problems have to be found by its citizens;*
> *foreigners can seldom be of much help.* [42]

There is another reason that military force alone is unlikely to
bring peace.

> *The attempt to solve political problems by*
> *military means may harden the lines of internal*
> *conflict. The use of force embitters those on*
> *whom it is used, and it then becomes more*
> *difficult to achieve the political compromises*
> *necessary to remove the sources of political*
> *instability.* [43]

The quotation suggests that the entry of an outside military force changes the situation. The new force does not simply add to the military balance of forces. Rather, in large part because it is an "outsider," its influence on the situation is not entirely calculable. In fact, the nature of the problem may fundamentally change when foreign force is introduced.

When a foreign force becomes involved in a conflict, the relationships between warring factions are likely to change. This occurs in part because the balance of force shifts, which may cause a reevaluation of alliances by the warring factions. In sum, while the full impact of these foreign forces is complex and cannot be fully anticipated, it is a key consideration which cannot be ignored.

The Dominican Republic is an example where US forces participated in operations to restore order and remained to support the subsequent diplomatic process.[44] US involvement was not simply a short exercise beginning in April, 1965. Rather, during April and May operations to restore order were conducted, followed by 15 months of civil affairs and civil action operations.

Diplomatic efforts had preceded the intervention and resumed following successful military operations. Once order was restored, US forces transitioned to a mission whose "purpose was to create and maintain the stability needed by political negotiators."[45] The tasks associated with this mission included disarmament and a variety of security, civic action and civil affairs tasks. These tasks proved difficult for the force in large part because American forces were not neutral and became sniper targets. Still, sufficient stability was provided to facilitate a political settlement by September 1965. The US and

its Latin American allies continued security operations for another year. The last force departed by September 1966.

The Dominican Republic example suggests two final issues concerning the short and long-term aspects of peacemaking. The two issues are the expected duration of the operation to restore order and the impact of restrictions placed on the military force. The issue of how long an operation to restore order will require is difficult if not impossible to predict. However, an interesting observation of military history was captured by one military theorist, Geoffrey Blainey. He noted, "It is doubtful that any war since 1700 was begun with the belief, by both sides, that it would be a long war."[46] This was the case in the Dominican Republic. No clear idea of the duration of the intervention was predicted beforehand, but US forces served for 17 months. In this relatively short period, the military participated in the wide range of peacemaking tasks. To have anticipated the duration of the Dominican Republic commitment would have been impossible. The conclusion is simply that many variables make it especially difficult to judge the duration of the operation.

Restrictions placed on the force may have an important but equally incalculable impact on the operation. There are two extremes: first, that no restrictions are placed on the force and second, that many restrictions are placed on them. In the first case, where the military is virtually free to accomplish their assigned mission without restriction, the operation to restore order has the best opportunity to be decisive. This is certainly desirable. However, there may be negative consequences for decisive actions. If great damage to infrastructure, loss of civilian property, or if loss of life occurs, the transition to peacekeeping or the longer process of peacemaking may be

undermined. Once weakened, the already long-term process of peacemaking may be prolonged still further.

The opposite case, when military operations are highly restricted, may also have undesirable consequences. Highly restrictive rules of engagement may dictate how force will be used by prescribing which weapons or tactics will be allowed. As restrictions increase, so too do the risks. Risks may include an increase in the force's casualties or outright failure. There are, however, potentially positive results from the restricted use of force.

Restrictive use of force may support the long-term peacemaking process because of the restraint it demonstrates. For example, an operation to restore order may become more protracted but with fewer civilian casualties. The operation to restore order may be slower, but the operation's legitimacy may be enhanced such that subsequent steps in the peacemaking process are much more successful. This may result in an overall shorter commitment and fewer casualties. There is, however, an additional pitfall which may surface when the operations to restore order are not decisive.

Whenever a peacemaking operation, especially an operation to restore order, becomes protracted, the situation grows in complexity. Over time, the political climate, at home and internationally, will invariably shift. This complicates the peacemaking efforts. If the process is stalled, this can have an especially frustrating impact in a multinational community. Each nation's resolve and objectives may begin to change. This can jeopardize the prospects for finding long-term solutions. Each nation, independently experiencing tension between commitments to a coalition and pressures at home, can quickly question its role. This may also undermine the peacemaking effort.

In summary, the key points are as follows:

- Doctrine should clearly distinguish the short-term operation to restore order from the long-term process of peacemaking.

- The military operation to restore order, as part of the long-term peacemaking process, is a key role which the military can contribute.

- Military operations should be planned to support the use of other elements of national power during, and especially after, restoration of order.

Clear Objectives

As in combat operations, clear objectives are a requirement for peacemaking operations. This is clear in doctrine and to many, this is self-evident. While clear objectives are important, this does not imply that objectives cannot change. Nor does it suggest that clear objectives are easily developed. In fact, even if clearly articulated initially, the modification of objectives should be anticipated. The example of US involvement in Lebanon during the 1980s illustrates several of these points.

A new operation, calling for a return to Lebanon, was being considered even as the MNF was departing Beirut on September 14, 1982. Recall that the first operation had concluded the same day. Earlier that day, the Lebanese President, Amin Gemayel was assassinated. Immediately, the suggestion was made that a deployment of a "major force, of several American and some French divisions, should deploy to 'force withdrawal' of both the Syrians and Israelis."[47] The US President rejected this suggestion, but debate continued. Finally, on 29 September, with

what Secretary Weinberger called an "unobtainable objective," US

forces returned to Lebanon with a mission to "establish a

presence."[48] Later this mission was redefined as:

> . . . imposition of the multinational force
> between the withdrawing armies of Israel and
> Syria, until the Lebanese armed forces were
> sufficiently trained and equipped to take over
> that role. [49]

However, there was to be no withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian

forces. Once this became clear, and US forces received no

subsequent mission, the MNF became more open in its support of

the Christian government. Other Lebanese factions began to

attack the lightly armed MNF as it was viewed as just another

warring faction supporting an unpopular Lebanese Government.[50]

The situation continued to deteriorate until the tragedy of the

Marine barracks bombing in October 1983. This event led to the

subsequent withdrawal of the MNF. When the MNF finally departed,

the situation reverted to its former state within a few months.

> "Anarchical groups roamed in terrorist fashion all
> over the country, Israelis controlled southern
> Lebanon, Syrians occupied eastern and northern
> Lebanon, Beirut itself was under Shiite control,
> and Christians occupied a small enclave north of
> Beirut."[51]

The decision to use force was due in part to the failure of

other elements of power to show progress. The military, then

employed to break the deadlock, was equally unable to succeed.

The military mission, at least in short-term, failed.

These results are in contrast to the 1958 intervention into

Lebanon. Threatened by Egypt's President Nasser to overthrow the

Lebanese government, President Eisenhower sent in US forces. The

operation lasted four months and was successful. In sum,

> The Government [Lebanese] was not overthrown, and
> stability, undergirded by the general knowledge
> that America's strength had supported the Lebanese
> Government, was restored for several years. [52]

The final phrase, "restored for several years," is important. It illustrates that military intervention may only support the long-term objective. More important is what military force actually accomplished. The successful use of force to restore order provided a relatively stable environment wherein diplomatic dialogue could have continued, if required. Though this situation was relatively decisive and brief, in longer operations, objectives are likely to change. Clausewitz anticipated this.

Clausewitz's comment about clear objectives implies an understanding that the complexity of operations must be anticipated beforehand:

> No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his
> senses should do so- without first being clear in
> his mind what he intends to achieve by that war
> and how he intends to conduct it. [53]

The complexity of any large peacemaking mission makes it essential to understand the objectives in light of the costs, risks and uncertainties before force is committed.

The quest for clear objectives is likely to be an ongoing struggle. This occurs because it is difficult for the political branches of government to articulate national objectives within a complex political setting. Still, operations conducted without clear objectives are likely to be regrettable, if not catastrophic. The return to Lebanon in 1982 serves to illustrate the consequences of a decision to leave a force in a dangerous environment without clear purpose. The fundamental point is that objectives are likely to be unclear and change throughout the operation. Regardless of success or failure of the operations to restore order, the planner must look past them in light of the changes in political climate, to the impact on subsequent operations.

In summary, the key points are as follows:

- Clear objectives remain a crucial element of all military operations.

- In peacemaking, continuous effort to maintain full awareness, and support the political objectives is required.

- Clear objectives will be illusive and likely to change.

Neutrality

Armed forces doctrine clearly states that a US peacemaking force is not a disinterested, or neutral[*] force. This is clearly appropriate. Nevertheless, the peacemakers should attempt to be equitable in the treatment of the warring factions.

The distinction between neutrality and impartiality is a narrow one. However, the contrast is helpful. Peacemakers are not neutral because they are likely to be aligned with a particular side. Though they take a definite side in the affair, this does not preclude the peacemakers from behaving fairly toward all sides. They is done by treating all sides equitably. To the extent that this occurs, the credibility and legitimacy of the peacemakers is improved.

The history of US security assistance makes neutrality difficult for US forces. In many places around the world, the US has a history of support for one side or another. This support, whether military or economic, is likely to imply support of one side well before the peacemaking force arrives.

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[*] *Neutral* is defined in Merriam-Webster 3ed., as "not favoring either side in a quarrel, contest or war."

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There are two facets to consider when the US has an established history of supporting one side in the fight. First, the established relationship with one participant in the violence should help military forces during initial efforts to establish a force on the ground. The second factor is a negative one. If the peacemakers make the claim of neutrality, while accepting support from one side, other factions have a basis to reject the claim. Once the opportunity for neutrality is lost, the association with one side is likely to be used by others as a pretext to fight. These difficulties suggest the question of whether it is possible for a force to be neutral.

The best example of difficulty in this area for US forces was the second "peacekeeping" mission in Lebanon, September 1982-February 1983.[54] In Lebanon, US forces attempted to remain neutral but were perceived as being partial toward the Lebanese government. While attempting to portray US forces as part of a peacekeeping force, the assigned mission of assisting the Lebanese government conflicted with another mission, that of assisting to bring an "end to violence," and to prevent "the spread of Soviet military and political influence."[55] In sum, military leadership found itself in a position with a clear requirement to use force but with a mandate to appear, for political reasons, to be neutral peacekeepers.

The fundamental point is that the character of the peacemaking mission should be unmistakable and not neutral. The peacemakers should assert that while a side is taken, all parties will be treated fairly. In essence, it is better to take a side

and demonstrate equitable treatment than to claim to take no side and attempt to be equitable.

Though rarely possible to achieve, there may be circumstances where the peacemaker must attempt to remain neutral. While there are variations to the concept, neutrality may be possible when the peacemakers can remain isolated from the warring factions. The central points are that the peacemakers must be able to control the interaction with the fighting factions, and that they not rely on either side for support. There is a final example where the peacemaking force may be able to remain neutral.

Neutrality may be possible in a case where the peacemaking force is able to overwhelm the collective strength of all participants. In this case, the warring factions are compelled to accept the peacemaker. In fact, neutrality is not really at issue because the risk of failure is small due to the peacemaker's domination of the situation.

Once order is reestablished, the problem is to transition to the supporting role described earlier. Not only is it likely to be difficult to be a neutral peacemaker, it is equally difficult for the peacemaker to transition to the peacekeeping role. Although a peacemaking force can succeed by being aligned yet fair, neutrality is an imperative in peacekeeping.

It is difficult for a peacemaking force, which by design is not neutral, to transition to peacekeeping. Unlike the peacemakers, the peacekeeping force has a well-established recognition of the need to remain neutral. In a paper

considering this specific subject, the assessment is that, "[peacekeeping] forces designed to accomplish one [mission] cannot accomplish the other [peacemaking]."[56] The basis of the argument is that the inherent nature of the two missions are distinct and cannot be mixed. This is particularly true if the initial operations to restore order angered much of the population. The population would be inclined to reject the peacemakers as peacekeepers. This argument has merit and should be carefully considered in peacemaking plans.

In summary, the key points are as follows:

- The peacemaking force is not a neutral force.

- Neutrality, if required by the situation, is difficult to achieve except in specific circumstances.

- Peacemakers are far less likely to be able to transition to peacekeeping where neutrality is imperative.

Legitimacy

The issue of legitimacy is unique as it is not discussed in the evolution of doctrine for peacemaking. It is however, identified in FM 100-20 as an imperative in the low intensity conflict environment.[57] Its importance will increase as global cooperation rather than unilateral interventions become the preferred responses to crisis.

Legitimacy can be considered as consisting of four parts: legitimacy within the host nation, regionally, internationally, and at home. Each has a significant impact on operations.

From the perspective of the host nation, outside intervention by any force, even an invited one, is seldom fully

supported by the people. Hence, it may be difficult for the peacemaking force to establish and maintain legitimacy. If the peacemaking force is invited by the standing government, opposition parties will attempt to exploit this among the people. Efforts will be made to undermine the standing government by suggesting that its reliance upon an outside force compromises its legitimacy. The peacemaking force must recognize these dynamics. Peacemakers must seek to support the legitimate government without alienating the other factions. This occurs while simultaneously attempting to maintain and strengthen their own legitimacy as fair but firm arbiters.

Regional legitimacy, that is legitimacy in the eyes of the region powers, is another ingredient to successful peacemaking. With support or active participation in the operation by one or more major regional powers, it may be possible to gain and expand the active support of other regional powers in the search for long-term resolution of the conflict. This is certainly the goal. Without this support, the opportunity to widen the crisis and undermine the search for long-term solutions is ever-present. The operational commander must remain concerned about regional legitimacy. Initial plans must be sensitive to the opportunities and dangers attendant to its maintenance.

International legitimacy is prerequisite to global support of the peacemaking process. To the extent international legitimacy is established and enhanced, pressures will be placed on the warring parties to resume non-violent negotiation.

Conversely, without international support, the peacemaking force may be pressured to withdraw.

Domestic legitimacy manifests itself as political and popular support at home. Especially in democratic nations this remains important to peacemaking operations. In this sense, popular support is legitimacy. Not only is legitimacy a requirement, it has been of increasing importance since World War II.[8] The question is whether the support will be sufficient to last through to mission completion.

The initial political decision to conduct a peacemaking operation may be able to assume sufficient domestic support at least for a short operation. Hence, this issue may not be as crucial in a short operation. This may be less true as the conflict becomes protracted. In protracted operations, concern at home will grow as costs in lives and resources grows. While responsibility for building support at home rests primarily with politicians, there will be some impact on operations.

Each type of legitimacy becomes increasingly important over time. It is equally true that the extent to which the operations planner can or should be actively involved in plans to maintain legitimacy is likely to decrease the further from the operation one looks. In other words, at the tactical or operational levels, the focus is more upon local and regional legitimacy. Nevertheless, the sensitivity to the requirements for legitimacy in each of the areas outlined is clearly important. To the extent the planners understand the requirements for legitimacy at

home, they are better able to anticipate the impacts upon operations and contribute to the operations' success.

In summary, the key points are as follows:

- **There are four types of legitimacy: local, which is in the host nation, regional, international, and domestic.**

- **Legitimacy is difficult to gain and difficult to maintain.**

- **The maintenance of legitimacy must be considered in campaign plans.**

- **Legitimacy becomes more critical in long-term operations.**

Unilateral or Multinational

While retaining the right to respond unilaterally, US doctrine clearly indicates that US involvement in peacemaking operations will normally be as a part of a multinational structure. In large part due to the earlier discussion of legitimacy this seems appropriate.

Multinational response to crisis is preferred when order is to be restored in an environment where the peacemaking force has not been invited. Unfortunately, conducting virtually any operation as a combined force is very difficult. There is, however, at least one potentially acceptable approach.

One solution is to use different forces for distinct operations in the peacemaking process. For example, one nations' force may be used in the initial phase to impose order, while others conduct supporting operations or prepare for subsequent phases. The key is to select forces well-suited to the task. The advantages of this approach are simply that the benefits of being a multinational force are enjoyed without the

liabilities of coalition warfare. In such an operation, what role would the US play?

US forces may be suited to the first task, that of restoring order, when the warring factions are fighting with conventional forces. In other words, in situations where overwhelming force of the US military can be brought to bear, the US may be able to make the contribution of restoring order. In other cases, the US may be best suited to other roles. In either case, without the complications of combined operations, the initial operations will be simpler.

The forces not involved initially retain eligibility to serve in other tasks. They may assist in the more long-term tasks of peacekeeping, civil affairs, or civil reconstruction.

In summary, the key points are as follows:

- **Multinational peacemaking operations are required to establish and maintain legitimacy.**

- **It may be most appropriate for one force to restore order while another, from another nation, provides subsequent support.**

Size of the Force

Determination of the size of the appropriate force is clearly an issue of concern in doctrine. Early doctrine espouses the use of minimal force. Later doctrine suggests that the size of the force is difficult to anticipate and little development of principles to guide the decision are given. There are, however, several principles to guide this important decision.

First, if vital national interests are at stake, in all likelihood the US is less concerned about international

approval. Hence, the size of the force should be sufficient to meet any potential threat. Our interest in decisive action is made primarily because of the expectation of sustaining minimal casualties. The best way to achieve this is to use overwhelming, or in current parlance, "decisive" force.

Second, many cultures understand force and are likely to view a small force as a lack of will. Any reluctance to provide sufficient combat power to protect the force and to overwhelm the belligerent parties may be the first step toward failure.

Third, it makes little sense militarily to escalate the use of force over time. If constrained by political considerations to apply gradual force, the initial analysis should clearly reflect the consequences this approach may bring. Gradualism undermines decisiveness and allows those who would resist the necessary time to adapt, which otherwise would not occur. The National Military Strategy captures the idea: "our strategy is to resolve any conflict in which we become involved swiftly and decisively, in concert with our allies and friends."[59]

Finally, while the force must be decisive, it must be a proportionate response to the threat at hand. In other words, while remaining overwhelming, the size of the force should not create the perception of being heavy-handed. If it is, the force's legitimacy may be undermined and hence the long-term political objectives may be compromised.

The decision of how much force to use is very difficult. However the principles of using decisive and proportionate force while protecting the force are fundamental principles. These

principles prevent gradualism and misunderstanding as to the resolve of the force.

In summary, the key points are as follows:

- **Application of overwhelming force conveys clear intentions and resolve.**

- **The use of force should be proportionate to the threat it faces.**

- **Decisive force reduces the opportunity of the warring factions to adapt and prolong the conflict.**

Intelligence

Current Army doctrine does not highlight the importance of intelligence in peacemaking operations. In JPUB 3-07, the need for intelligence support of peacemaking is mentioned but not described in detail. US experience supports the view that "intelligence is the premier instrument in low intensity conflict."[60] This is also so because of the unique requirements for intelligence to support the use of the other elements of power.

Intelligence requirements for peacemaking are considerably broader than those to support conventional combat operations. In addition to conventional intelligence requirements, the peacemaking force is particularly dependent on political intelligence. Military support of the broader political aims requires this political intelligence. The situation in Lebanon in 1982 is a good example of the complexity of political intelligence.

> *There were 5 categories of non-aligned groups in the area: Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Christian and a miscellaneous category of non-aligned factions. In 1985, there were 15 Shiite sub-groups Sunni had*

13 sub-groups, of which one was further divided
into 3 sub-groups; Druze had 5 subgroups; and the
Christians 9. In the miscellaneous category there
were 14 groups. [61]

The MNF not did not understand the spectrum of threats suggested above. More importantly, they did not have intelligence as to each group's objectives, capabilities and intentions. But the intelligence requirements are still broader than military and political.

Peacemaking operations integrate economic and informational elements of power in addition to the political and military elements. Hence, the intelligence requirements to support the use of these elements increases the burden on the intelligence process. This must occur despite the fact that the complexity of intelligence gathering and integration increases with the number of participating nations.

Implied in a requirement for detailed intelligence is the need for time. The additional time seems rarely given. This was the case in Lebanon. In the Lebanon case, the decision to commit force did not allow time to assess the situation fully. To the extent intelligence voids exist, uncertainty and risk increase. This must be considered in planning peacemaking operations.

The fact that many scenarios may not allow sufficient time to gather, process and disseminate comprehensive intelligence assessments should be expected. This is simply a fact repeated in the Army's experience. The solution, or at least a key ingredient, is to keep the requirements for intelligence at the forefront of peacemaking doctrine. The unique requirements for intelligence are certainly among the most difficult challenges to planning and executing peacemaking operations.

In summary, the key points are as follows:

- Intelligence requirements are more diverse than in conventional operations.

- Comprehensive intelligence before a peacemaking operation is likely to require much time. To the extent intelligence is lacking, risk is increased.

- Intelligence is the "premier" element of successful peacemaking and demands greater attention in doctrine.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The US Army is at the threshold of a new era where military operations are more likely to be characterized by operations with limited aims. Should the Army be thrust into situations suggested in this paper, the doctrine should be written to fully anticipate the distinct nature of such operations.

Peacemaking is not fully developed in current doctrine. An initial step is to clarify the terms. The meaning of the terms should be easily understood, or better put, terms should be difficult to misunderstand. The following clarification of the terms *peacemaking* and *operations to restore order* should be adopted to remove any ambiguity as to the intent of each operation.

Peacemaking. Peacemaking is a long-term process. Cooperating nations use one or more elements of power in peacemaking to reinstate a political process wherein lasting solutions to problems can be found. A primary role performed by the military during peacemaking is to stop violence. Subsequently, it provides support as necessary to maintain the environment necessary for continuation of diplomatic process.

Operations to Restore Order (OTRO). OTRO occur primarily at the outset of peacemaking. Other elements of power, while operating in parallel, are secondary during this operation. Normally of short duration, OTRO stop violence. By stopping violence the military force sets the conditions where peacetime engagement can resume.

Military operations can best support peacemaking objectives with decisive operations to accomplish a clearly defined objective. However, other considerations must be weighed before force is committed. The military objectives must support the political objectives. In fact, they must support the use of each of the elements of power. Doctrine should clearly establish the principles to guide the planning for this mutually supporting relationship.

Operations to restore order should not require the force to maintain neutrality. Neutrality is difficult to establish but more important, it is difficult to maintain while using force to reestablish order. While not neutral, military forces must continually strive to establish, maintain or enhance the legitimacy of the operation. Not only is this important to facilitate military operations, it is important for the resumption of political dialogue and support of the long-term objectives. Doctrine should maintain discussion of neutrality in discussion of peacemaking and expand discussion of the elements of legitimacy.

Peacemaking operations are likely to be multinational. The multinational character will enhance legitimacy as well as provide practical support to the operation. The use of different forces for distinct roles in the peacemaking process may be a good technique in planning a peacemaking operation.

Intelligence requirements in support of peacemaking operations are more complex than in conventional operations. Doctrine should state this is and especially at joint level,

provide a framework for intelligence collection, integration and dissemination.

The opportunities to use a peacemaking process exists today. The complex nature of the peacemaking process requires full understanding if the US Army is to be prepared for the mission. Doctrine should continue to develop and articulate the Army's unique roles in the peacemaking process.

ENDNOTES

1. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character," <u>Foreign Affairs</u> 62, 1 (Fall 1983): 5.

2. Francois Mitterand, President of the French Republic, "Solidarity," <u>Vital Speeches</u> (1 March 1992): 292.

3. Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, <u>Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict</u>, (Washington: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1990) 4-10, 5-7.

4. Huba Wass de Czege, <u>Understanding and Developing Combat Power</u> (An unpublished manuscript for the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984) 15-19. In his paper, Colonel Wass de Czege, describes a "Relative Combat Power Model" where military force is dependent on more factors than simply equipment. Leadership is the key parameter of many to which equipment capabilities may be subordinated. Therefore, large forces alone do not necessarily constitute a corresponding large threat.

5. Peter J. Schraeder, ed., <u>Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World</u> (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989) 4.

6. Special, dateline Prague, "Czechoslovakia Clings to Arms Sales," <u>New York Times</u>, 2 May 1992, sec 4, p 4.

7. <u>World Armaments and Disarmament</u> SIPRI Yearbook 1991, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 162.

8. Walt Whitman Rostow, <u>The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto</u>, 3d ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) xix. Rostow describes the issue of regional hegemony in particular.

9. Mitterand, 293.

10. Dr. Jacob Kipp, Research Coordinator, European Military Studies, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.. In remarks on 24 March 1992, to the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.. Dr. Kipp suggests that the expectation for Eastern Europe is very bleak. The problems are too complex and the prerequisite elements for positive change are simply not present or not expected to develop.

11. Schraeder, 2. In the context of discussions of intervention the term "Third World Interventions" are defined by Schraeder as

interventions in nations not aligned directly with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

12. Schraeder. In the collection of articles in his <u>Intervention in the 1980s</u>, Schraeder identifies many types of interventions. These six are the most important.

13. Schraeder, 7.

14. Alan James, <u>Peacekeeping in International Politics</u> (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) 10.

15. A.W. Baker, <u>Peacekeeping: A New Role for US Forces</u>, (Carlisle Barracks PA: US Army War College, 1983) 4.

16. James, 366-367.

17. James. In his book, James identifies approximately 75 peacekeeping efforts and classifies them in five unique categories: those occurring "within the sphere of a major power" as backyard problems; those dealt with "by a group of states to deal with an intra-group problem," clubhouse troubles; those with the chance of growing into wider problems, neighborhood quarrels; those where "states leave their own localities and associations of the international high street," high-street embarrassments; and finally, those where states "behave rather in the manner of reckless drovers at a crossroads," are called dangerous crossroads.

18. Baker, 5.

19. James, 10-11.

20. Caspar Weinberger, <u>Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon</u>, (New York: Warner Books, 1990) 143.

21. Weinberger, 135.

22. The 1949 and 1954 versions of FM 100-5 describe doctrine for conventional war fought by heavy mechanized forces like those used in Europe during World War II.

23. Field Service Regulation 100-5, <u>Operations</u>, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1962), 155.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 158.

28. Ibid., 157.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 156.

31. Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington: Joint Staff, 1990) V-15.

32. Joint PUB 3-07, V-16.

33. Joint Pub 3-07, V-3.

34. Joint PUB 3-07, VI-3.

35. FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington: Department of the Army, May 1986) 5.

36. FM 100-20, 4-10, 5-7.

37. FM 100-20, 5-1.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 5-7.

40. Ibid.

41. James R. McDonough, USA, War in the Falklands: The Use and Disuse of Military Theory, an AMSP Monograph, (Ft Leavenworth KS: The School for Advanced Military Studies, May 1987) 13.

42. K. Waltz, A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force, 55, as cited by Neil Macfarlane in Adelphi Papers No. 196, Intervention and Regional Security, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Dorchester: The Dorset Press, 1985) 44.

43. Macfarlane, 45.

44. The desire for cessation of violence was only the pretext for the Dominican Republic intervention. In large part, the motive was a perceived Soviet threat-fear of "another Cuba."

45. Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pact: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1964-1966, Leavenworth Papers Number 15. (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1988) 119.

46. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3d ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1988) 294.

47. Weinberger, 151.

48. Ibid., 152.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 154.

51. Ibid., 172.

52. Ibid., 136-137.

53. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) 579.

54. Argersinger (p. 21) cites the Department of Defense (Long) Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23 1983, as concluding: "The mission of the USMNF was implicitly characterized as a peacekeeping operation, although 'peace-keeping' was not explicit in the mission statement. In September 1982, the President's public statement, his letter to the United Nations''s' Secretary General and his report to Congress, all conveyed a strong impression of the peacekeeping nature of the operation. The subject lines of the JCS Alert and Execute Orders read, 'U.S. Force participation in Lebanon Multinational Force (MNF) Peacekeeping Operation."

55. Argersinger, 13-14.

56. Ibid., ii.

57. FM 100-20, 1-6. FM 100-20 provides a narrow definition of legitimacy. It is defined as the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions.

58. Morris Janowitz and Ellen P. Stern, The Limits of Military Intervention: A Propositional Inventory, Military Review (March 1978) 20.

59. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (January, 1992) 16.

60. Randy Beer, Director of International Programs, National Security Council, US Strategy in Low Intensity Conflict: a lecture, April 16, 1992, at the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

61. John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface, (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989) 88. cited by Lieutenant Colonel Steven J. Argersinger in Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, and the United States, Senior Service College Fellow, Harvard University, (Carlisle Barracks PA: U.S. Army War College, 1 May 1991) 16.

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