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Peacemaking And Operational Art:
The Israeli Experience In Operation
"Peace For Galilee"

A Monograph
by
Major Walter E. Kretchik
Infantry



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School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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ABSTRACT

Peacemaking and Operational Art: The Israeli Experience
In Operation "Peace For Galilee" by MAJ Walter E.
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This monograph analyzes the 1982 Israeli peacemaking operation against the Palestinian Liberation Organization in regards to current military theory. It uses operation "Peace For Galilee" as a case study to examine the possibility of using current operational art concepts to explain and design a peacemaking operation.

The monograph first defines the terms peacemaking, operational art, and campaigns. Next it reviews the historical and strategic setting that prompted the Israeli operation. It then examines how political and military interaction drove the peacemaking campaign design, and how operational art concepts of strategic aim, endstates, centers of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, and battle were used by Israeli military planners. It also includes an analysis of the political, strategic, operational and tactical interaction as the campaign unfolded.

The monograph concludes that operational art can be used to design and explain a peacemaking operation. The Israeli Defense Forces used operational art concepts in the design and execution of the peacemaking operation. Operational art also explains peacemaking operations. Operational art alone cannot guarantee a successful peacemaking operation. Peacemaking requires international and national will as prerequisites for operational success. The military needs clearly defined political objectives to ensure that the operation accomplishes the desired political endstate. Peacemaking can be affected by personal political agendas that might not be in the best interest of the nation. Additionally, peacemaking is an extremely dangerous and complex operation--one that requires a skilled military planner who is educated in political affairs as well as military operations and tactics. The indications are that any nation undergoing a peacemaking operation must ensure that all elements of a nation--government, people, and military--agree to a common objective before the operation commences or risk political and military failure.

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I. Introduction

Throughout our history, when our vital interests or those of our friends and allies have been threatened, often with very little warning, the U.S. military has been called upon to both demonstrate U.S. commitment and, when necessary, to fight.

Joint Chiefs of Staff
National Military Strategy¹

The United States is entering an era of changing ideas regarding world politics. Long suppressed nationalistic movements and ethnic struggles challenge the old world order's inherent stability. In some areas "regional disputes could unleash local, destructive forces . . ." that directly or indirectly threaten the national interests of the U.S. and its allies.²

The August 1991 edition of the National Security Strategy of the United States notes that,

The United States seeks . . . to deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and . . . [to] end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies.³

To protect U.S. interests and those of its allies, the U.S. might require its armed forces to enter a volatile region to end a conflict, make peace and reestablish stability. Accordingly, military planners will design and execute a campaign to accomplish that purpose. This paper, then, seeks to answer the question: Can current operational art be applied to the understanding

and design of peacemaking operations? To answer that question, this paper first defines the terms peacemaking, operational art, and campaigns. Clarifying those terms should help the operational planner to comprehend what comprises an operation to make peace.

Next, this paper uses a historical case study to decide if operational art can be applied to the understanding and design of peacemaking operations. The Israeli operation "Peace For Galilee" in June 1982 is an example of one nation projecting military power into an unstable region to accomplish an operational purpose--to restore order.⁴ An examination of operation "Peace For Galilee" in terms of U.S. operational art provides insights into how an operational planner might design a future peacemaking campaign. Finally, this paper concludes by answering the research question and addressing implications for peacemaking operations now and into the future.

The term "peacemaking" is not clearly defined in our current doctrine.⁵ Several terms, used interchangeably, add to the reader's confusion. Depending upon the source--peacemaking, operations to restore order, and contingency operations--all describe an unstable situation where forces enter a region to make peace. The crux of those terms is that the

operation achieves the political end of halting violence and promoting or forcing the resumption of political and diplomatic talks.⁶ Moreover, peacemaking operations are unilateral or multinational, and occur with or without the consent of the warring factions. Since the belligerents might not approve of outside peacemaking assistance, it is possible that the peacemaking force could immediately find itself in combat. Thus, "a [peacemaking] force . . . must be prepared to fight, if necessary."⁷

The political nature of peacemaking operations requires that the available military force not only be robust enough to restore order, but use its power with discretion.⁸ Rules of engagement (ROE) are likely to be limiting due to the mission of restoring law and order and realizing complex political goals. The military commander must use his forces prudently or risk failing to attain the political goal of making peace.

Moreover, peacemaking operations are subject to friendly national will. The use of military force, at least in the U.S., compels the approval of the people and its governing body. An example of building "national will" to use military force was the recent Gulf War. President Bush spent considerable effort creating consensus not only in Congress, but among the

American public as well.⁹

President Bush realized that high U.S. casualties and an extended military campaign could weaken U.S. resolve and hazard the military operation.¹⁰

Therefore, President Bush continually stressed the need to keep U.S. casualties to a minimum and end the operation as rapidly as possible. Thus, the military commander must be aware of the political need for a quick and low cost operation. Moreover, he must reconcile political want with sound military practice. He does so through the application of operational art.

Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 defines operational art as,

the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.¹¹

That statement encompasses several ideas. Operational art requires a broad vision, the ability to foresee, an understanding of the linkage of means to ends, and strong joint and combined cooperation.¹² An operational commander creates operational art when he imagines the clear and complete picture of the endstate toward which he directs all military action (ends); the calculation of what resources he must have to achieve his ends (means); what is a feasible, acceptable, and suitable use of the available means (ways); and what

risks he will accept when means and ways do not certify the attainment of ends.

The operational commander, by balancing means, ways, and risk to achieve a strategic end, expresses operational art by designing and conducting campaigns.

A campaign is

a series of sequential or simultaneous tactical engagements, battles, or major operations--air, ground and sea--arranged in time, space, and dimension that link the tactical and strategic levels of war.¹³

A campaign plan organizes tactical engagements, battles, and major operations to achieve strategic ends.

Current military theory stresses several ideas that are basic to campaign design and execution. These ideas include the following: identifying the strategic aim, finding the strategic and operational centers of gravity, selecting a military endstate, determining lines of operation, and seeking decisive result in all engagements, battles, or major operations. Each of those ideas will be examined as they apply to operation "Peace For Galilee."

II. Historical and Strategic Environment

Modern Lebanon came into being on September 1, 1920, when General Henri Joseph Gouraud, French High Commissioner in Lebanon and Syria, proclaimed Lebanon an independent republic under a French mandate.¹⁴

The new nation, carved from Syria, included a variety of religious groups organized by geographic region. Sunni Muslims and Christians equally divided Beirut, while Shiite Muslims dominated the Bekaa Valley and the Jabal Amel region. Moreover, the coastal plains were primarily Sunni's, the Shouf mountains mostly Druze, and the Mount Lebanon region Maronite Catholic. (Appendix A provides a map showing the ethnic and religious variety in Lebanon.)

Some French officials saw this religious diversity as a threat to regional stability. However, French efforts to revise the Gouraud boundaries met with strong Maronite opposition. The Maronites feared dividing Lebanon into Christian and Muslim regions. The Maronites thought that the Muslims might ally with Syria, resulting in a powerful Muslim bloc that would dominate Christian Lebanon. Accordingly, the Maronites sought and received international recognition of the Lebanese borders in 1923. In 1926 Lebanon ratified its constitution and recognized the states' religious diversity.¹⁵

The Muslims viewed political pluralism as a colonialist agreement imposed upon them by the French-Christian mandate. The Maronites, however, saw the political arrangement with France as a link to Christian Europe and a haven safe from domination by

its Muslim neighbors. Thus, from its origins, the new republic suffered internal splits along political and sectarian lines.¹⁶

In 1943, the French mandate ended and Lebanon gained full autonomy. The Lebanese government sought to ease internal political tensions by basing power upon the 1932 population census. The census showed that the Christians embodied a majority within the state by a fifty one percent margin. Due to this slim majority, the Maronites held the office of the presidency, plus controlled the military and the security forces. The prime minister was a Sunni, the largest Muslim group, while the speaker of the parliament was a Shiite. The power-sharing model did not include the Druze.¹⁷

Although the Lebanese government tried to ease internal tension, Christian-Muslim distrust increased over religious difference. Additionally, a newly sovereign Syria refused to acknowledge independent Lebanon, which the Syrians believed was part of Syria. Syria wanted to merge the two states to compete with Egypt and Iraq for regional dominance. Furthermore, Syria refused to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon for fear that this action would officially recognize Lebanon's independence.

The announcement that the British mandate in

Palestine would expire at midnight on May 14, 1948 further complicated Lebanese politics. The six months before the mandate expiration saw increased Arab attacks against Jewish villages with Jewish fighters responding in kind. On May 14 Zionist movement representatives assembled in Tel Aviv and declared the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, to be known as Israel.¹⁸

During the night of May 14/15, an Arab coalition, commanded by Prince Abdullah of Transjordan, attacked the new Jewish state. Lebanon provided 3,500 Muslim volunteers and attacked into Israel, securing the village of Kadesh. The Lebanese, satisfied with the results of that effort, halted their operations and remained in place for a week. Israel counter-attacked on the night of May 28/29, and for several weeks the area changed hands. On October 29, the Israelis pushed the Lebanese back into Lebanon and occupied ten Lebanese villages. The Israeli forces left when Lebanon and Israel signed an armistice on March 22, 1949.

The declaration of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 further divided Lebanese politics. The joint venture between Egypt and Syria inspired Muslims within Lebanon to seek membership in that Arab federation. Camille Chamoun, the Lebanese President and a staunch

Maronite, believed that joining the UAR meant the end of Christian rule in Lebanon. The Lebanese government split over the UAR issue, with the Muslim factions calling for a general strike throughout the country. The strike led to unrest and violence, with Muslim partisans attacking the presidential palace near Dair al-Qamar. Lebanon plunged into civil war.¹⁹

A coup in Iraq that resulted in the death of Chamoun's close ally, King Faisal, further compounded the Lebanese crisis. Chamoun asked for U.S. assistance out of fear of a similar overthrow, and on 15 July, 1958 two thousand U.S. Marines landed in Lebanon. The Marine presence eventually grew to 15,000.²⁰

American Under-Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, negotiated a settlement in Lebanon by convincing Chamoun not to run for reelection. General Fuad Shihab, commander of the Lebanese Army, became the popular candidate for president and took office on September 28. Shihab formed a new government, giving power for the first time to lesser Muslim factions. The new government caused political reform, and the civil war ended in October, 1958.²¹

While Lebanon struggled with its own internal problems, Palestinian nationalism would soon complicate matters.²² In the late 1940s, many Palestinians fled Israel into Jordan where they hoped Prince Abdullah

would further their cause for reclaiming Palestine. However, Abdullah died in 1951, and the Hashemite kingdom went briefly to a mentally disturbed King Talal until the Jordanian Parliament deposed him.

In August 1952, a 17-year-old King Hussein assumed power of the weakened Hashemite dynasty. The Palestinians, observing a fragile Jordanian state and a young king, believed that their interests could no longer be served in Jordan. In 1964, several Palestinian groups within Jordan formed an anti-Israel group called the Palestinian Liberation Organization or PLO.²³

The PLO became an expression of Palestinian nationalism. For several years the relationship between King Hussein and the PLO became polarized, with Hussein having little say in PLO policies. In 1967, as an aftermath of the Six Day War, more Palestinian refugees poured into Jordan from the now Israeli-occupied West Bank. The PLO, now led by Yasser Arafat, established a de facto state within Jordan. Arafat directed armed raids against Israeli forces in the West Bank, with the Israeli's retaliating against Palestinians and Jordanians alike.²⁴

In September 1970, Hussein, now believing his monarchy threatened, directed a brief but bloody fight against the PLO to remove them from his country. The

incident, known as "Black September," destroyed the PLO in Jordan. Arafat fled into Lebanon, adding 200,000 of his followers to the 300,000 Palestinians already in refuge there.²⁵

The PLO established its new headquarters in Beirut. They quickly moved to take advantage of the internal political struggles within the Lebanese government. The PLO allied itself with leftist and Muslim movements within Lebanon, seeking to destroy the Lebanese state and create a PLO base for continued forays against Israel.²⁶

Aware of the growing PLO strength, the Lebanese government tried to impose stricter control on the Palestinians in Lebanon. The PLO, however, ignored all attempts to restrict its activities, and continued to raid Israel. Negotiations between the Lebanese government and the PLO reached an impasse in April 1969, with clashes occurring between Lebanese police and PLO forces until November of the same year.

Lebanese officials received increased pressure, particularly from Egypt, to legitimize the PLO. In November 1969, the Cairo Accord established the PLO presence in Lebanon and condoned PLO armed operations against Israel. The Lebanese government and the PLO agreed to non-interference with each other.²⁷

The Lebanese Christians found the Cairo Accord

intolerable. The Lebanese government could not uphold its obligations to defend the state, assure law and order, or curb PLO actions. The Phalangists, or Christian militia, resorted to force to restore their nation's sovereignty and their dominant position in society.

Fighting erupted in April 1975 over a Phalangist attack in retaliation for the assassination of one of their leaders against a bus carrying PLO guerrillas. The ensuing violence caused a civil war between Christian militia and a Muslim coalition comprising Lebanese, Palestinians, and non-Lebanese Arab volunteers. Muslim coalition pressure destroyed the Lebanese state, fragmented the military, and caused many Muslim soldiers to defect.²⁸

The Christian situation became desperate by early 1976. The Palestinian-Muslim coalition was on the verge of victory. The Christian leadership, believing that Syria would not want a Palestinian-controlled Lebanon, asked the Syrian government to intervene.

The Syrians rapidly entered the fray and drastically changed the situation. The Syrian army overwhelmed the Palestinian-Muslim coalition, enabling the Christians to survive. However, in a rapid political move, Syria changed sides. Syria seized control of the Palestinian-Muslim coalition and turned

against the Christians. The Syrians assumed a foreign military occupation status, possessing more than half the country.²⁹

Following the Syrian political coup, the Arab League convened an emergency session in Cairo. On June 9, 1976, the Arab League condoned Syria's move and authorized its activity as a "token Arab Security Force."³⁰ However, as fighting continued it became clear that Syria alone could not end the conflict. On October 17, the PLO and four nations--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria--agreed to establish the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF). The ADF was to be answerable to the president of Lebanon, assist in a cease-fire, separate belligerents, and to help the Lebanese government.³¹

Although the ADF appeared to have good intentions, it could not achieve its stated goals. Syria, which dominated the ADF, did not share the same interests as the rest of the coalition. Instead, Syria used the ADF to apply pressure on the remnants of Lebanese ruling power to establish a Syrian puppet government. Faced with an adamant Syria, the ADF fell apart and ceased to exist by April 1978.

The Syrian presence in Lebanon assumed a permanent status that Christian Lebanese increasingly feared. Syria's relations gradually improved with the Muslim

left and the PLO, to include Syria's permitting unlimited PLO activity in most of Lebanon and into Israel. Many Christian sects began to clash with Syrian soldiers with little effect to force a Syrian troop withdrawal.

Concurrently with the increased Christian military activity against Syria, the PLO expanded its attacks against Israel. One PLO raid, known as the Coastal Road Massacre, killed thirty five Israeli civilians and wounded over seventy four others. The action prompted the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to enter Lebanon on March 14/15 1978 to attack PLO bases.³²

The Israeli action, known as the Litani River Operation, killed 100 PLO members at the expense of sixty eight Israeli military casualties. On March 17, at the request of both Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations (UN) approved a 4000-man multinational peacekeeping force. Ghanaese General Emmanuel Erskine commanded the force. Israel declared a cease-fire on March 21, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) began arriving on March 22.³³ Israeli forces withdrew by June 1981.

The UNIFIL created a physical barrier to prevent further PLO activity into Israel. The PLO, however, resorted to artillery and mortar attacks against Israeli civilian targets. Those actions prompted

retaliatory Israeli air and ground attacks. The Israeli attacks caused an estimated 1,200 PLO casualties and destroyed important military equipment.³⁴

Beginning in July 1981, the PLO amassed in southern Lebanon an arsenal of twenty T-54/55 tanks and forty Katyusha rocket launchers. Moreover, the Soviet Union gave the PLO several surface-to-air SA-7 missiles as protection against Israeli air attack. Although those weapons did not pose a tremendous threat to Israeli security, they raised political pressure within the Israeli government to take action against the PLO.

In August 1981 Ariel Sharon became the Israeli defense minister. By 1982 he built a powerful faction within the Israeli Defense Ministry to further his own political objectives.³⁵ Sharon urged Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister, to take military action to destroy the PLO in Lebanon. Sharon and his ministers believed that the destruction of the PLO guerrilla capability was the best way to bring peace to the Galilee region. Moreover, Sharon saw the PLO as an indirect threat to the Israeli government. To Sharon, the less action Prime Minister Begin took to eliminate the PLO, the weaker the government became.³⁶

Prime Minister Begin was not a military man although he had military experience.³⁷ He was,

according to one author, "awed by Israel's senior military commanders and . . . felt inferior in their presence."³⁸ Sharon, meanwhile, enjoyed a strong military reputation having served in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during all Arab-Israeli wars. Begin respected Sharon's opinion regarding Israeli security matters.³⁹

However, both Begin and Sharon thought that a major clash with the PLO was inevitable. First, both Begin and Sharon saw the PLO as the root cause of Israel's security problems in the region. The PLO under Arafat continued to gain international political legitimacy. Israel's greatest political blow resulted from French President Francois Mitterrand's demand that Israel grant the Palestinians their rights and "allow the establishment of a Palestinian state in an effort to broaden regional peace."⁴⁰ Second, former U.S. Presidents Carter and Ford announced that the U.S. would eventually have to deal with the PLO. When former American National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski made a similar statement, Begin and Sharon saw American politicians as having new ideas regarding the PLO that could lessen Israeli political power.⁴¹

Tensions between the PLO and Israel continued to build between April and June of 1982. A series of PLO bombings and Israeli air attacks violated the United

Nations cease-fire. Israel attacked PLO positions in Lebanon in response to the shooting of their ambassador in London on June 3, 1982. The PLO responded with a twenty four hour artillery barrage into northern Israel. The PLO attack caused little damage. However, the Israeli government felt intensive internal pressure to retaliate against the PLO. The stage was now set for Operation "Peace For Galilee."

III. Israeli Campaign Planning

The planned invasion of Lebanon, first under code name "Big Pines," and then "Peace For Galilee," began roughly eighteen months before the start of the operation. However, there is little evidence to show that the politicians agreed to the strategic aim--what the operation was to accomplish. Prime Minister Begin favored a limited operation where the IDF destroyed the PLO in southern Lebanon. The war was to be fought only against the PLO and end quickly; combat against the Syrians was to be avoided at all costs.⁴² The IDF would advance no farther than the Aouali River, or forty kilometers from the Israeli border. Begin believed that a forty kilometer advance would protect Israel from PLO artillery and terrorist attacks on Israeli settlements. Begin added an additional requirement to move on Beirut--the PLO headquarters--to link-up with the Christian militia and

help them to destroy PLO forces there.⁴³

Sharon, however, favored a war with both Syria and the PLO to destroy their capability to fight. Sharon would then impose an Israeli peace settlement on the region. As Sharon put it,

I wanted them out of Beirut, out of Lebanon. In Lebanon they [the PLO] had had their political and military headquarters. They could reach out and act in every part of the world. The PLO terrorists were ten thousand only, including the Syrians, and against those . . . we exacted a terrible pressure.⁴⁴

Sharon believed that the PLO and the Syrians together embodied the greatest threat to Israeli security. The Syrian military provided security for PLO military units. Moreover, Syrian protection gave the PLO the freedom to attack Israel. Sharon saw no peaceful solution in the region unless both the PLO and their Syrian supporters left Lebanon.

Begin and Sharon believed that any operation into Lebanon must end quickly because of possible adverse U.S. political response. American President Ronald Reagan's political interest in the Middle East meant that the Israeli leadership could expect immediate political pressure to stop the fighting as quickly as possible.⁴⁵ Any Israeli military operation into Lebanon must show success quickly to help diffuse American political pressure. Additionally, Israeli national will might not accept another assault into

Lebanon, especially if IDF casualties were high. Begin and Sharon wanted an operation that kept IDF casualties low to retain Israeli public support.⁴⁶

The IDF chief of staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, worked to devise a strategic military plan that would attain both Begin and Sharon's political wants.⁴⁷ Eitan and his staff began by identifying the enemy strategic center of gravity.

Carl Von Clausewitz, in his work On War, describes a center of gravity as the "hub of all power and movement on which everything depends."⁴⁸ Eitan saw the PLO as a political group but that its hub of power was the military arm. Eitan thought that by destroying the PLO's military capability to conduct offensive action he would defeat the PLO and achieve the political end. Having decided his endstate--the destruction of the PLO military--Eitan used the IDF Northern Command under Major General Amir Drori as the means to reach his end.⁴⁹

Drori, as the operational commander, had a total of seven mechanized and tank divisions, plus many independent brigades and special purpose units. Altogether his force totaled some 76,000 men, 1,250 tanks, and 1,500 armored personnel carriers (APCs).⁵⁰ Israeli air and naval forces, although not under his direct command, would support the operation.

Eitan now gave Drori his mission. Drori was to prevent artillery fire and terrorists from creating any incursion across the Israeli border and to destroy the PLO military in southern Lebanon. Should the Syrians attack the IDF, Drori would destroy the Syrian Army in southern Lebanon. The IDF would also advance on Beirut to link-up with Christian forces in the area. This mission was of primary political importance because it showed Israeli resolve to support their unofficial ally against Muslim aggression. Drori was also told to perform the operation rapidly and with few casualties.⁵¹

Drori's own mission analysis revealed that the PLO's operational center of gravity was its ability to fight cohesively. Drori observed that PLO military forces contained many political factions, each separated in time and space throughout southern Lebanon and Beirut. Keeping the factions separated would be critical to his plan. Drori's failure to prevent PLO concentration might increase Israeli casualties and threaten Israeli national will. Moreover, Syrian forces protected the PLO. Drori had to consider how to avoid fighting the Syrians, or if necessary defeat them.

Drori's operational analysis led him to consider several decisive points. Decisive points are,

according to the military theorist Antoine Henri Jomini, "any vulnerable point whose seizure or retention will provide a force with a marked advantage over an opponent."⁵² Decisive points are potential objectives. They are

usually geographical in nature, such as a hill, a town, or a base of operations. They could also include other physical elements such as enemy formations, command posts, a critical boundary or a communications node. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are the keys to getting at the centers of gravity.⁵³

Drori's identified three such decisive points to get at the PLO military center of gravity: 1) PLO bases in Lebanon, 2) PLO command posts, and 3) the PLO units in southern Lebanon. Drori envisioned that to achieve his endstate--the destruction of the PLO military in southern Lebanon--he would have to seize or destroy the PLO decisive points.⁵⁴

Further IDF analysis revealed three major factors that influenced the campaign. First, the rugged Lebanese terrain would influence IDF lines of operation. A line of operation

defines the directional orientation of a force. [It] connects the force with its base . . . and its operational objective.⁵⁵

To get to Beirut, Drori would need to use the rocky coastal road on the extreme west side of Lebanon.⁵⁶ To accomplish his remaining tasks, Drori also considered the dominating Lebanon Mountains running

north-south in central Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon. Each of these geographical features affected how he planned his lines of operation for communications and logistics back to Israel.

His second concern was how to get at the PLO bases and the military forces. The UNIFIL had a security area just north of the Israeli border. Many PLO members lived within this cordon for their own security. Moreover, the Syrians now occupied over seventy five percent of Lebanon. Any ejection of the Syrians by force might entail sweeping the entire country from south to north. Most troublesome would be the Syrian air defense umbrella that covered most of the PLO forces. That umbrella might require destruction to assure the Israeli Air Force (IAF) of air superiority during the operation.

Drori's last concern was his race against time. His operation must be planned to allow for rapid success in his assigned mission. A lengthy operation would be politically inadequate and weaken Israeli resolve. Drori would have to accept risk and bypass Syrian forces and Lebanese civilians where practical to destroy PLO forces and rapidly get to Beirut.

To create the ways to accomplish his mission, Drori decided to advance along three axes: a western axis along the coast, a central axis on both sides of

the north-south Lebanon Mountains, and an eastern axis through the Bekaa Valley.⁵⁷ He ordered IDF units to bypass UNIFIL units unless it was unavoidable. He accepted additional risk by allowing his units to move rapidly without securing his lines of operation from interdiction by the PLO and the Syrians.

Drori divided his campaign into three phases. Initially, parts of the IDF would require mobilization. The IDF contained up to sixty percent reservists in June 1982. Mobilization required forty eight hours to bring IDF units up to 100 percent strength.⁵⁸ The mobilization operation ended when the IDF reported it was ready to conduct offensive actions.

Phase II was an attack into south and southwest Lebanon to destroy PLO bases and equipment, break PLO resistance, and restore order in Lebanon. To prevent the PLO in northern Lebanon from reinforcing units in the south, it would be necessary to initially cut the north-south coastal road.

Drori designed an operational maneuver to accomplish this task. Operational maneuver is

the disposition of forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing the operational advantages of position before battle is joined or exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results.⁵⁹

Drori directed that a western amphibious landing (Task

Force B) occur north of Sidon to block the coastal road PLO line of operation between Beirut and the PLO positions in southwestern Lebanon. Moreover, Task Force B would engage PLO forces in the area and eventually link-up with other IDF forces. The predominance of PLO forces in southwestern Lebanon would then be encircled and easily destroyed.

The two western-most IDF Task Forces (A and C), would attack northward from Israel to the link-up point with Task Force B, destroying PLO forces and bases along the way. Additionally, Task Force C, plus parts of Task Force D, would seize the Jezzine-Ain Dara axis in central Lebanon to further split PLO forces. They would then prepare for future operations to the north, if necessary.

Task Force H would advance along the eastern axis down the Bekaa valley toward the town of Hasbaiya. Task Force H would destroy PLO concentrations in the area and repel Syrians attacks, if they occurred. The IDF would next conduct a simultaneous attack north along the coastal highway to Beirut, and a central attack north from Jezzine to Barouk then Chtaura to further split and destroy PLO forces. Additionally, an attack in the east down the Bekaa valley to the town of Baka would destroy PLO forces and push the Syrians out of southern Lebanon by force if needed. (A map showing

the movement of Israeli forces during the campaign is in Appendix B.)

The IAF and Navy would support the ground operation. The IAF planned to establish air superiority over the theater of operations as the ground operation commenced. The IAF would then attack PLO formations near Beirut to delay and disrupt their reinforcing PLO units further south. Additionally, the IAF planned to neutralize the Syrian air defense umbrella within the Bekaa Valley, if necessary. The Israeli Navy would support the amphibious operation and blockade the Lebanese coast. Phase II would end with a link-up with the Phalangist forces, Beirut encircled, the PLO military destroyed, and the Syrians ejected from southern Lebanon, if necessary.⁶⁰

Phase III consisted of the mopping up of any remaining PLO resistance in southern Lebanon, to include the use of IDF-supported Phalangist forces to reduce any PLO forces encircled in Beirut. Drori believed that his military endstate would then be met, and the settlement of hostilities would be turned over to the politicians.⁶¹

On June 5, 1982, the Israeli Cabinet approved Begin's limited plan for Operation "Peace For Galilee."⁶² H-Hour was set for 11:00 A.M. on June 6, with the amphibious landing to occur at 10:00 P.M. the

same night. Sharon and Eitan assured the Israeli Cabinet that every effort would be made to avoid war with Syria. They further guaranteed the Cabinet that the military objective was to impose peace upon southern Lebanon by an Israeli occupation of up to forty kilometers north of the Israeli border. Some Israeli Cabinet members remained skeptical of Sharon's intentions. They wondered what would happen if the IDF reached their objectives and the fighting continued. Prime Minister Begin replied that "The cabinet will meet daily and make decisions according to the evolving situation."⁶³ The entire operation, according to IDF time lines, would be over by the ninth of June.⁶⁴

IV. Peacemaking In Lebanon

Promptly on schedule, the IDF crossed their line of departure and entered southern Lebanon. The IDF quickly advanced through the UNIFIL security zone, meeting no resistance from the United Nations forces.

Task Force A, advancing in the west, rapidly overwhelmed PLO resistance and moved quickly to envelop the port city of Tyre. The PLO, realizing that they risked encirclement, moved toward their refugee camps to the east of Tyre. Task Force A succeeded in positioning itself between Tyre and the refugee camps, cutting off the PLO's movement and inflicting heavy casualties upon three PLO brigades. Task Force A

encircled Tyre, and by nightfall was speeding northward up the coastal highway to link-up with Task Force B.

Task Force B landed its naval commandos at 10:00 P.M. on June 6 as planned. They met no resistance. One group of commandos moved off the beach and blocked the coastal highway; a second group secured the beach for follow-on forces. Shortly after midnight, groups of paratroopers and several battalions of the IDF's 96th Division landed and moved inland toward their objectives. The PLO, although surprised, began to fire rockets and artillery onto the beach. Israeli naval gunfire quickly silenced the PLO artillery, and by sunrise the PLO Castle Brigade found itself cut off from their bases and headquarters in Beirut. The Castle Brigade sought to leave the Sidon area toward the northeast only to find that the IDF already threatened their withdrawal route.

Task Force C in the center, with Task Force D close behind, crossed into Lebanon and immediately moved on two axes to cross the Litani River. The Litani River, fordable only in two areas, represented a major obstacle along the Israeli central line of operation. The PLO strong-pointed both fording sites, requiring the IDF to cross the Litani River under fire.

The Israeli forces used extensive reconnaissance and engineer effort, in coordination with air and

artillery support, to clear two narrow routes around the PLO strongpoints. An Israeli Infantry Brigade, following the engineers, overcame PLO resistance and penetrated the PLO defensive line. By nightfall, the IDF separated many PLO units from their headquarters, and began a rapid northwest advance to link-up with Task Forces A and B.⁶⁵

Task Force H, on the eastern zone, crossed into Lebanon without any serious resistance. The task force pushed into Fatahland, but the attack slowed when the only mountain road in the area collapsed when crossed by only five APC's. The brigade commander ordered the five APC's to continue to the brigade objective, Hasbaiya, while the remainder of the force repaired the road. The five APC's reached their objective, immediately drawing fire from Syrian artillery and PLO anti-tank units. Additional units from Task Force H arrived during the day, and by nightfall the PLO vacated the town. By the end of the first day, the IDF cut PLO command and control between Beirut and the forward units. Moreover, the IDF was surrounding and destroying the PLO Castle Brigade and its bases, occupying an operational line between Sidon-Nabatiye-Hasbaiya.⁶⁶

To support the Israeli ground effort, the IAF struck deep into southern Lebanon--attacking known PLO

command posts, bases, and troop formations in the vicinity of Beirut. The IAF also provided close air support to IDF ground elements throughout the day. The Israeli Navy continued to support Task Force B's beachhead.

The second day of operations saw the initial stages of PLO collapse in Lebanon. Task Force A was across the Litani River by sunrise. Part of Task Force A conducted mopping up operations vicinity of Tyre, while a second force annihilated a PLO battalion and supply bases within the UNIFIL security zone. Still another portion of Task Force A continued north along the coastal road to encircle the port city of Sidon, bypassing many PLO strongpoints.

Task Force B received ground reinforcements delivered by the Israeli Navy, increasing its size to about four battalions. General Yaron, Task Force B commander, organized his force into three battle groups. One battle group immediately headed north and reached Ras Saadiyat, about twenty kilometers south of Beirut. A second battle group expanded the beachhead to the east, forcing the PLO into the mountains. The third battle group went south and helped Task Force A clear the city of Tyre, linking-up with that force at dusk.

Task Force C drove northwest to Sidon as well,

linking-up with elements of Task Forces A and B, and completing the encirclement of Tyre. Closing the encircling ring meant the destruction of the PLO Castle Brigade as a fighting force, although many pockets remained that would be reduced later.⁶⁷

Task Force D now passed through Task Force C and pushed northward to capture the Besri Bridge in the Bekaa Valley. IDF control of the Besri Bridge would prevent PLO forces in the coastal plain region from withdrawing north. During the day Task Force D advanced thirty kilometers, fighting briefly with Syrian commandos. By nightfall the task force was within a few kilometers of their objective.

Task Force H, in the east, consolidated its positions vicinity Hasbaiya-Kaoukaba and exchanged fire with PLO and Syrian units. Its forward elements pushed three kilometers northward to seize the town of Ain Keniya.

The IAF continued to support Drori by conducting deep operations against PLO forces in the vicinity of Beirut to delay their movement south. The IAF also destroyed a Syrian MiG-23, the first sign of Syrian air involvement since the operation began.⁶⁸

Possible Syrian commitment eventually threatened the success of the operation. Although Begin intended to avoid a direct conflict with Syria, it soon became

unavoidable. The Syrian air defense umbrella in the Bekaa valley threatened Israeli air operations, while Syrian ground defenses blocked the eastern-most Israeli line of operation. Moreover, if the IDF attacked Syrian ground positions, the Syrian Air Force might come to their aid. The combination of Syrian air power and a strong air defense network made Israeli local air superiority in support of eastern ground operations tenuous at best.⁶⁹

The IDF previously identified Syrian military power as a decisive point that supported the PLO strategic center of gravity. The IDF was ready to deal with the Syrian military as an operational branch to the main plan. "Branches" are

options for changing dispositions, orientation, or direction of movement and accepting or declining battle [and] preserve the commander's freedom of action. Such provisions . . . anticipate the enemy's likely actions Expressed as contingency plans, such branches . . . can be of decisive importance⁷⁰

General Eitan and the Israeli Cabinet weighed the risks connected with attacking Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) positions. Directly attacking Syrian SAM sites would invite war with Syria. Conversely, ignoring the SAM threat would make "a total victory difficult, if not impossible."⁷¹ The IAF was ready, having practiced for months to do such an operation.

The Israeli Cabinet, however, was not yet

convinced that attacking the SAM sites was worth war with Syria. From the beginning there was no national consensus on Operation "Peace For Galilee." Begin repeatedly stressed that Israel was not planning to attack Syria, unless Syria intervened in the fighting. Israeli public criticism increased as civilians and soldiers alike perceived that the IDF, by moving toward the Bekaa valley, was provoking a war with Syria. For the first time, the Israeli public doubted official government accounts that IDF objectives were only to eliminate the PLO military.⁷² Israeli citizens started to protest the operation, with some demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities.

Teetering Israeli public support dramatically affected the Israeli government. The Israeli Cabinet split with some members believing an attack upon the Syrian SAM sites would escalate the operation and crush Israeli will. Other Cabinet members saw destroying the SAM sites as essential to protect IDF units from Syrian air attack.

Meanwhile, the ground operation continued as the Israeli Cabinet debated the SAM dilemma. On the evening of June 7 General Drori notified General Ben Gal, commander of the Bekaa Forces Group (BFG), to attack Syrian positions and the remnants of PLO forces in the vicinity of Lake Karaoun. The BFG consisted of

three task forces, totalling an estimated 35,000 troops and 800 tanks.⁷³ Ben Gal's plan called for an attack by one task force to fix the Syrian 1st Tank Division (approximately 300 tanks, mostly T-72s) vicinity Jezzine with one task force. While this fixing attack began, two additional task forces would conduct an enveloping maneuver to trap PLO and Syrian units vicinity of the lake.⁷⁴ Ben Gal submitted his plan to Drori who approved it.

On June 8th, the BFG attacked the Jezzine area, immediately fighting Syrian commando forces and a PLO brigade. The BFG quickly overwhelmed the defenses, and by evening seized the entire Jezzine defense sector. However, threats to Israeli operations increased by the arrival of three more Syrian SAM batteries, bringing the total in the Bekaa valley to nineteen. Syria hoped the increased SAM presence would deter Israel's direct contact with Syrian forces. Sharon saw the additional SAMs as a major threat to the entire operation.⁷⁵ The Israeli Cabinet, after much debate, approved attacking the SAM sites on June 9.

The IAF used remotely piloted vehicles, electronic counter-measures, and precision guided anti-radar missiles to destroy seventeen SAM sites without the loss of a single aircraft. The magnitude of the operation was tremendous. As Dupuy and Martell put it,

June 9 was the critical day of the Bekaa Valley battle, and of the war. Not only did the IAF gain complete control of the air, and eliminate the potential air defense threat, but Israeli ground forces established a preeminence on the ground. The forward Syrian defense line . . . was shredded.⁷⁶

The combination of Israeli ground and air operations dealt Syria a severe blow. Syria signed a cease-fire agreement with Israel on June 11. Except for minor actions with Syrian forces, the IDF now focused on Beirut. Moreover, the lack of Syrian SAM sites left the PLO vulnerable to Israeli air power. Consequently, PLO field operations halted by June 12. On June 13 the IDF encircled Beirut by linking-up with Phalangist forces near Basaba.

The IDF now surrounded over 14,000 Arab combatants in Beirut. Israeli political leaders pondered what to do next. The operation went rapidly, but Israeli national will swayed over conflicting political objectives and casualties. Moreover, Cabinet members who approved a quick operation into Lebanon now grew concerned that the IDF might enter Beirut. Entering the city promised heavy IDF casualties. Additionally, the Israeli Cabinet felt extensive international pressure to end hostilities.

Israel reached a cease-fire with the PLO on June 25. The IDF and Phalangists controlled all land routes into or out of Beirut, while the Israeli Navy blocked

the coast. In addition, the IAF enjoyed air superiority over the theater of operations. However, to Sharon and Eitan the operation would not be successful if the PLO leadership escaped to fight again. Meanwhile, the IDF paused while the politicians decided what to do.⁷⁷

On June 27 the Israeli government proposed allowing the Phalangists to disarm the PLO in Beirut and escort them, under Red Cross supervision, to Syria. Yasser Arafat, however, would not concede to Israeli terms. He suggested that the PLO would fight Israel forever to retain a presence in Lebanon. As the Israeli and PLO leaders engaged in rhetoric, the PLO turned Beirut into a defensive fortress.

In the weeks that followed there were many cease-fire breaches as negotiators tried to figure out how to get the PLO out of Beirut. The PLO, using delaying political tactics, sought to grind away at Israeli will by letting international condemnation of Operation "Peace For Galilee" run its course. Israel threatened to use military force to eject the PLO from the city. For the remainder of June and into late July the IDF and IAF bombarded PLO headquarters, ammunition dumps, and troops.⁷⁸

In early August, with PLO bargaining ongoing, the IDF attacked into Beirut for two days. The IDF

conducted many tactical actions within the city, each reducing the size of PLO-controlled Lebanon. The Israeli Cabinet expressed great concern over those attacks, accusing Begin of following events instead of guiding them. Another cease-fire occurred on August 12, with U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib arbitrating the removal of PLO forces from Beirut.⁷⁹

The PLO began leaving Beirut on August 21 with the arrival of a three-nation Multinational Force from France, Italy, and the United States. Yasser Arafat left on August 30 for Cyprus, and the remaining PLO forces departed September 3. On September 10 the Multinational Force departed without firing a shot.⁸⁰

On September 14 a bomb exploded in Beirut that killed Lebanese President-elect Bashir Jemayel. Prime Minister Begin immediately called IDF Chief of Staff Eitan to an emergency meeting. Begin decided that, due to the volatile state of Beirut, the IDF should enter the city for peacekeeping operations. On September 15, shortly after 6:00 A.M., IDF units under General Drori occupied Beirut. While Israeli peacemaking now ended, Israeli peacekeeping was just beginning.⁸¹

V. Conclusion and Implications

This paper began by asking if current operational art can be applied to the understanding and design of peacemaking operations. The IDF used operational art

in the design of its Lebanese peacemaking operation. Israeli military planners tried to balance two strategic aims--Begin's limited forty kilometer operation and Sharon's ejection of the PLO and Syria from Lebanon. Eitan and Drori identified strategic and operational centers of gravity to focus their efforts--the military arm of the PLO and its ability to fight cohesively. Drori identified and seized decisive points--PLO bases, command posts, and PLO forces--to get at the operational center of gravity. Moreover, Eitan and Drori envisioned a military endstate for the operation--the destruction of the PLO military in southern Lebanon.

The Israelis expressed operational art through a campaign. Drori arranged his campaign by phase, each linking a series of tactical actions to achieve the merged strategic ends. Drori used his means--the Israeli Defense Forces--to destroy PLO bases, command posts, and units to unhinge the operational center of gravity. He employed three lines of operation to direct his forces toward Beirut, accepting risk by bypassing enemy units enroute to the city. Drori accepted more risk by allowing temporary interdiction of his lines of operation. Lastly, Drori succeeded in encircling Beirut and linking-up with the Phalangist forces.

Operational art alone is not enough to ensure a successful peacemaking operation. Using military force to make peace compels the agreement of all parties--the government, the people, and the military--as to what is an acceptable goal. Begin's goal was to advance "forty kilometers" into Lebanon to protect the Israeli people from PLO artillery and terrorist attack. He never intended to start a war with Syria. Sharon, believing that war with Syria was inevitable and desirable, sought to oust Syria and the PLO from Lebanon--a personal agenda that might not have been in the national interest. Thus, military planners must recognize that personal political agendas can conflict with national interest and affect peacemaking operations.

The lack of a unified strategic aim prompted the design of a military operation that sought to satisfy both Begin and Sharon. The ensuing operation allowed IDF forces to move toward Syrian units in the Bekaa Valley. That maneuver led to war with Syria--exactly what Begin did not want. The military planner and political leaders need to agree upon a common strategic aim before initiating peacemaking operations.

Peacemaking requires public support to be successful. Although Syria sued for peace, the political reaction of fighting Syrian forces divided

the Israeli nation because the military operations were not aligned with Begin's publicly-stated political objectives. The Israeli public dissented when they perceived that what Begin was saying was not what Sharon and the IDF were doing. The military planner, then, must be aware of public opinion and design a peacemaking campaign that is acceptable to the people and the government.

In addition to public backing, peacemaking compels the marshaling of international support. Begin did not muster international endorsement, and it is unlikely that he could have done so.⁸² Accordingly, Begin's failure to gather political support placed tremendous internal and external pressure upon the Israeli government to cease hostilities before achieving political ends. Consequently, military planners must understand the impact of international support upon friendly national will. More importantly, the military planner must consider the effects of will upon military operations and plan for what happens if the will gives out.

The military operation failed to defeat the PLO in what is called the "greatest blunder in Israeli military history."⁸³ However, it is doubtful that military force alone could do so. While the IDF destroyed PLO bases, command posts, and units, the PLO

political leadership did not acquiesce. The IDF misread the true PLO strategic center of gravity--the will to fight to regain their land. Even if the IDF annihilated Yasser Arafat and his followers, it is doubtful that the Palestinian people would capitulate. Israel's use of military force to resolve this issue may have been inappropriate. Military planners, then, must be careful to identify the correct center of gravity in a peacemaking operation. More importantly, military planners must also properly assess the political situation to determine what is a suitable use of military force--if any. The IDF neglected to correctly perform that analysis, resulting in a failure to make peace and accomplish their ends.

Peacemaking requires a detailed understanding of operational consequences or sequels. Sequels are,

based upon possible outcomes--victory, defeat, or stalemate. They establish general dispositions, objectives, and missions for subordinate units after battle.⁸⁴

The Israeli government, although concerned with casualties and a short operation, did not foresee possible outcomes to its military action. Thus, Israel suffered significant political damage both at home and in the international community.⁸⁵ Military planners, then, must envision the political consequences of their military actions.

Peacemaking is clearly a dangerous and complex


operation. The IDF had to accomplish many intricate tasks--avoid a UN peacekeeping force while destroying PLO bases in a UN security zone, avert a war with Syria, rapidly encircle Beirut, and keep casualties to a minimum. Israeli forces succeeded in bypassing UN troops and attacking the PLO units protected by those units. The IDF quickly encircled Beirut. Israeli forces failed to avoid a war with Syria. The loss of 214 Israelis killed and 1,176 wounded was costly and resented by most Israelis.⁸⁶ Thus, a military planner requires the skill to design a peacemaking operation that reduces operational complexity and avoids squandering precious human life.

Operation "Peace For Galilee" has implications for future U.S. peacemaking operations. Political leaders can achieve more through peace than war. If the military is to be used to make peace, then the U.S. political leadership must view national and international support as preconditions for using military force. The political leader's failure to do so increases operational risk. Consequently, military schools must train officers to work with political leaders in identifying clear political objectives. Political leaders must accept that precise political goals assist, not hinder, operational success. Although that is easier said than done, a political-


military dialogue is important to better align political and military objectives. Additionally, the military school system must emphasize to its students the role of national will and interest in campaign design. Military planners must consider those needs, especially when contriving operation duration and projecting casualties. Also, military planners should be aware of and consider operational sequels. A planner must weigh the effect of military success or failure and its political implications. Instructors throughout the military school system should, in addition to teaching military operations and tactics, educate military planners in political theory. Military planners should then be better prepared to link the strategic and tactical levels of war to achieve a political end through operational art.

Carl Von Clausewitz said that "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."⁸⁷ Peacemaking seeks to achieve a similar purpose. It is hoped that this paper helps the operational planner to understand peacemaking operations, and to design a peacemaking campaign that is not just another name for war.

Appendix A: Lebanese Ethnic and Religious Diversity.
Reference: Dupuy and Martell, 23.



**Appendix B: Israeli Operations In Lebanon.
Reference: Herzog, 342.**



Operation "Peace for Galilee"

ENDNOTES

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), 4.
2. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, August 1991, 3.
3. National Security Strategy, 3.
4. Yair Evron, War and Intervention In Lebanon, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 121. Restoring order in Lebanon required the formation of a new Phalangist regime with Israeli backing. This idea will be examined later on in the paper.
5. Joint Pub 3-07 (Test), Doctrine For Joint Operations In Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1990), p. V-8 calls peacemaking "operations to restore order." This operation is conducted to "halt violence and reinstitute more normal civil activities." Army Field Manual 100-20 and Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Departments of the Army and Air Force, 5 December 1990), p. 5-7 notes that peacemaking operations occur "when it is in the national interest to stop a violent conflict and to force a return to political and diplomatic methods." Army Field Manual 100-7 (Draft), The Army in Theater Operations, (Fort Monroe: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 31 July 1990), p. 5-13 notes that peacemaking operations are a sub-mission of contingency operations and as such are intended to "stop violent conflict and force the parties to turn to non-military means of resolving differences."
6. Joint Pub 3-07, V-8. Army Field Manual 100-20 and Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, 5-7. Army Field Manual 100-7 (Draft), 5-13.
7. Joint Pub 3-07 (Test), V-8.
8. Ellen P. Stern, ed., The Limits of Military Intervention (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), pps. 189-194.
9. "I Can Call Spirits From The Vastly Deep," The Economist, September 8, 1990, p. 15.

10. "The Warrant For War," The Economist, December 1, 1990, p. 16. Also "War plan anticipated 10% losses," The Kansas City Star, 11 April 1992, p. A1. The Star, quoting a Pentagon report released 10 April 1992, reported that General Norman Schwarzkoph was given, among his "operational imperatives" in fighting the war, an order to "accept losses no greater than the equivalent of three companies per . . . brigade." The Star further reported that Schwarzkoph repeatedly mentioned his determination to keep casualties at a minimum, the implication being that a commander who failed to obey [that guidance] would be relieved.
11. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, May 1986), 10.
12. Army Field Manual 100-5, 10.
13. James M. Dubik, A Guide To The Study of Operational Art and Campaign Design (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1991), 5.
14. Tabitha Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), pps. 28-32.
15. Trevor N. Dupuy and Charles Martell, Flawed Victory (Fairfax: Hero Books, 1986), p. 10.
16. Petran, 31.
17. Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications For Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 18-26.
18. Petran, 32.
19. Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 89.
20. Cobban, 89. For the U.S. involvement in Lebanon see Roger J. Spiller, "Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon." (Fort Leavenworth: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 1981). King Faisal was a key member of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. Chamoun asked for assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine, a plan to prevent the spread of communism. The Marines guarded the U.S. embassy and provided a show of force. Although the Soviets protested the use of American Marines in Lebanon, they took no direct action. The Marines left on October 27, 1958, losing one Marine to sniper fire.

21. Cobban, 92.

22. Israel's creation in 1948 caused various Palestinians to flee their homeland into adjacent Arab states such as Jordan and Syria. Some Palestinians vowed to regain their usurped territory in Israel. The Palestinians are primarily Sunni Muslims and the land has significant religious focus for them since the days of Mohammed. The Palestinian fervor to recapture their land eventually led to the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jordan. The PLO's growth as a political organization, coupled with its move from Jordan to Lebanon, eventually caused tremendous internal divisions in Lebanese politics as will be discussed further in this monograph. See Petran, 37-57 and Khalidi, 5-42.

23. Dupuy and Martell, 24-25.

24. Cobban, 100-103. Petran, 93-97. Dupuy and Martell, 25.

25. Dupuy and Martell, 25.

26. Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege, PLO Decisionmaking During the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 28-33.

27. Khalidi, 28-29.

28. Petran, 95-97.

29. Khalidi, 34.

30. Cobban, 140.

31. Cobban, 144, 153, 159.

32. Cobban, 161, 175.

33. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 24-31.

34. Dupuy and Martell, 57.

35. Ariel Sharon (born Arik Scheinerman, 1928) is the son of Jewish-Russian immigrants. He was born on a cooperative farm near Tel Aviv. Severely wounded in the 1948 struggle for independence, he became a career officer commanding forces in the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars, as well as a counter-terrorist unit in the 1950s. While winning praise for his daring and strategic

brilliance, he was accused by his foes of recklessness, brutality, and insubordination. He resigned from the military when he disagreed with government policies over peace talks with Egypt. He entered politics in 1977 as the Israeli Minister of Agriculture in Begin's Cabinet. After Prime Minister Begin won reelection in the Israeli General Election of June 1981, Sharon became the Minister of Defense. He is known as a hard-nosed, hard-line nationalist. In only six-months of office prior to the operation, Sharon built a strong political faction that dominated Israeli defense policy. He reorganized the ministry of defense and the defense industries, instituted a new West Bank policy, and made public in December 1981 that Lebanon was a major problem for Israeli security. For further reading see Uzi Benziman, Sharon: An Israeli Caesar (New York: Adama Books, 1985).

36. Benziman, 81.

37. Menachem Begin (1913-1992) was born in Brest, Poland and educated in law at the University of Warsaw. He headed the Betar, a youth movement seeking the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish state, while in Czechoslovakia (1936) and Poland (1939). In World War II he fought against Germany with the Polish army in Russia. In 1942 he commanded the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), an underground resistance force that fought British rule. In 1948 Begin helped found the Herut (Freedom Movement) Party. Begin was elected to the Israeli Cabinet in June 1967. He left the Cabinet in 1970 over disagreement with the Labor Party. He became the leader of the Likud Party, or the opposition. Begin became the Israeli Prime Minister in 1977, winning the election by a slim margin. For further reading see Eitan Haber, Menachem Begin, The Man and The Legend (New York: Delacourt Press, 1978).

38. M. Thomas Davis, 40 KM Into Lebanon (Washington: National Defense University, 1987), 65.

39. Benziman, 274.

40. Davis, 69.

41. Davis, 71.

42. Evron, 115-116. Itamar Rabinovich, The War For Lebanon 1970-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 121.

43. Rabinovich, 104-108, 121-124. Bashir Jemayel, 28, became the leader of the Phalangist party in 1976. He immediately advocated a growing closeness with Israel. Israel, under Prime Minister Rabin, was unwilling to interfere directly into Lebanon's civil war, but feared a Syrian take-over. In 1977, however, Begin radically changed Israel's view of Lebanon. Begin favored assisting the Lebanese Christians. In 1980, Begin began informal talks with Jemayel over political support for the Christians. Begin saw "President" Jemayel as the solution to the Lebanese problem. Jemayel gained full control of all Christian forces in July 1981, and accepted Israeli military training and equipping of his units. In January 1982, Jemayel and Sharon, who was visiting Beirut, agreed to a plan that linked Jemayel's drive for the Lebanese Presidency with an Israeli military operation to "take Beirut's airport." Sharon agreed to back Jemayel in return for Phalangist military assistance in Beirut.

44. "Sharon: I Wanted Them Out of Beirut; I Got What I Wanted," Washington Post, 29 August, 1982.

45. Dupuy and Martell, 58-61. President Reagan was working to establish favorable relations with Egypt at the time of the Israeli operation. Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig had informed the Israeli government in January 1982 that the United States would not condone any military action against the PLO. Reagan viewed military action as useless against the PLO, plus an Israeli military action would throw the region into turmoil once again and impede U.S. relations with Egypt.

46. Evron, 124-128. Although the Israeli government considered casualties, one theory questions the degree of concern. Jacobo Timerman, in his book The Longest War, believes that the Israeli Cabinet underestimated the effect that casualties would have on this operation. Timerman believes that Israeli national will never questioned past Israeli military operations because Israel was fighting for its very survival, and the wars were short in duration. He also believes that Israeli journalists supported the wars for the same reasons. Timerman argues that this was an operation of firsts: the first time Israel attacked somebody without fighting for survival, the first time the Israeli press questioned the political inconsistencies, and the first time the Israeli people questioned their government. Timerman's bottom line--the Cabinet failed to anticipate negative public opinion. Timerman, 20-25.

47. Evron, 120-123. Rafal Eitan, Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff, commanded a division in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He and Sharon were old acquaintances, having worked together through the ranks in the IDF. Sharon and Eitan were frequently seen in public together during the operation. See Herzog, 353-354.

48. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595.

49. In early 1982, General Eitan engaged in a public debate over the Lebanon problem. General Eitan argued that "there was a military solution to the problem of the PLO in southern Lebanon." Yitzhak Rabin and Mordechai Gur (both former Israeli Chiefs of Staff) argued that another operation, similar to the Litani River operation, would not achieve any purpose as long as the PLO remained in Beirut. Sharon agreed with both arguments--the result is Operation "Peace For Galilee" or "Arik's War" as some Israelis call it. See Rabinovich, 122-128.

Major General Amir Drori graduated from Israel's Military Academy and advanced through the ranks in combat units. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War he commanded the Golani Brigade. He was severely wounded when his brigade recaptured Mount Hermon. He rose to command a division and finally to be the Commander, Northern Command. Described as "quiet and intellectual," he is considered a typical product of the Israeli professional school system. See Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 345.

50. Dupuy and Martell, 91.

51. Jacobo Timerman, The Longest War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 22. This crisis was a different breed for Israeli planners. Israel normally saw national will in a lesser light, mostly because their wars were short. Timerman argues that this conflict was different because it was long (compared to other Israeli actions), confused politically, and "the moral and institutional foundations of the state have been affected." Israeli politicians were concerned that the public would receive confusing signals, but probably did not anticipate the full magnitude of national will until the Bekaa Valley situation.

52. Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War, in Roots of Strategy (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1987), 467.

53. Army Field Manual 100-5 (Draft), Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1992), Chapter Six, 7.

54. Dupuy and Martell, 90-92.

55. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1986), 180.

56. In January 1982 Begin, Sharon, and Eitan discussed a more direct amphibious operation north of Beirut to seize the port of Junieh. Sharon and Eitan believed that the operation would rapidly encircle Beirut. This idea was considered and rejected when Begin failed to marshal political consensus in the Israeli Cabinet for the operation. See Evron, 119-121.

57. David Eshel, The Lebanon War 1982 (Jerusalem: Steimatzky's Agency Ltd., 1983), 34.

58. Eshel, 92.

59. Department of the Army Pam 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield (FT. Monroe: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 27 April 1990), 12.

60. Dupuy and Martell, 36-40.

61. "Two's A Crowd," The Economist (September 4, 1982): 36.

62. Rabinovich, 133-134.

63. Rabinovich, 134.

64. Dupuy and Martell, 95-97.

65. I cannot find daily compilations of casualties. Total IDF casualties, depending upon the source, are 214 killed, 1,176 wounded, twenty three missing, and 1 pilot taken prisoner by the PLO. PLO losses are estimated at 1,000 killed, 2,200 wounded, and 5,000 prisoners. See Dupuy and Martell, 217-226. Also Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace For Galilee (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), 182, 215. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner in The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 1: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 144, note that by 17 June, IDF losses stood at 214 killed, 1,176 wounded, 23 missing, and one POW. They cite Dupuy and Martell. Cordesman and Wagner's final figures for casualties are for Israel: 368 killed, 2,383 wounded, 23 missing and 7

POWs. The PLO casualties (estimated): 2,000 killed, 3,000 wounded, 250 POWs. Syrian casualties are 1,000 killed, 3,000 wounded. These figures are for the period from H-Hour until July 1982.

66. Evron, 134.

67. Evron, 108.

68. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 1: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 139. Dupuy and Martell, 109.

69. Cordesman and Wagner, 139-142. Benziman, 243-245. Sharon made a personal appeal to the Israeli cabinet telling them that "Failure to destroy the SAM batteries would leave IDF troops open to attack by Syrian planes and helicopters. Do not overlook any danger to our troops that could be averted." Benziman offers that Sharon's true aim was to get Syrian forces out of the Bekaa valley to weaken Syrian influence on Lebanese politics. Sharon believed that with Syria out of Lebanon Israel would be free to stabilize relations with the Lebanese and impose regional peace.

70. Army Field Manual 100-5, 30.

71. Eshel, 44-45.

72. Hirsh Goodman, "Doubts at the Front," Jerusalem Post, June 28, 1982, p. 2. This was the first time in Israeli military history where soldiers questioned why they were fighting. The impact on the government was "shocking." See Timerman, 121.

73. Dupuy and Martell, 221.

74. Herzog, 348.

75. Evron, 133-135. The battle in the Bekaa Valley cost the IDF 195 killed, 872 wounded, and 15 missing or POWs. Syria lost an estimated 800 Killed, 3,200 wounded, and 150 missing or POWs. The IDF lost 30 tanks destroyed, and an additional 100 damaged, but without the loss of a single aircraft. The IDF destroyed 400 Syrian tanks and 90 aircraft. See Dupuy and Martell, 225.

76. Dupuy and Martell, 122.

77. Evron, 137-139. The Israelis continued to shell PLO positions with artillery and aircraft. The politicians were in a fix. They had not planned to use Israeli heavy divisions to reduce Beirut. The Phalangists chose not to attack the PLO, and the PLO refused to leave. The Israelis had two choices--a siege or reduce Beirut themselves. They opted for a siege.

78. Cordesman and Wagner, 146-148. Petran, 277-290. Cobban, 182-190.

79. Evron, 140-148.

80. Herzog, 352-355.

81. "Begin's Mideast Peacemaking Costly, but Successful," Toronto Star, 27 May 1983, p. 4.

82. Begin believed that the United States, out of hatred for the PLO, would at least grant a few days of military operations prior to taking political action to cease hostilities. He also believed that the Soviet Union and Egypt would do nothing as long as the operation was directed against the PLO and not at Syria. Begin attempted to use several instances of PLO action (the killing of the Israeli ambassador and artillery shelling in the north of Israel) to convince the Israeli people that the operation was a necessity. His failure to clearly state his political objectives and reconcile them with Sharon sent mixed signals to the international community and the people of Israel as to his true intentions. This caused intensive international pressure and internal political discord. See Evron, 123-129; Timerman, 122; Rabinovich, 145-147.

83. Dupuy and Martell, 153.

84. Army Field Manual 100-5, 31.

85. Numerous military officers and political officials resigned in disgust over "Operation Peace For Galilee." Furthermore, the Likud Party fell from power, resulting in a new prime minister (Shimon Peres) in 1984. Israel's failure to achieve her desired ends eventually led to more international involvement in her affairs. The "Reagan Plan," named after U.S. President Ronald Reagan, involved a proposed dialogue between Israel and Jordan to solve the PLO problem. Israel rejected this concept in March 1983. More recently Israel is being pressured by President Bush to solve the PLO question. See "Israel, Reverses On Every Front," The Economist,

March 21-27 1992, 48-50. Also see John Laffin, "The War of Desperation" (London: Osprey Books, 1985), 167-190.

86. Numerous articles are available that highlight tremendous negative Israeli sentiment over "Peace For Galilee." The Israeli people truly questioned the moral fabric of the nation. Jacobo Timernan calls Israel a nation of mixed remembrances. The destroyed Lebanese cities caused many European Israelis to remember World War Two. The memory of past experiences plays heavily upon the public and its will. See Timernan, 12-17.

87. Clausewitz, 75.

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