


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THESIS/~~EXERCISE~~

Press Pools and Newspaper Coverage of the Gulf War:
Attitudes of Newspaper Editors



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Abstract

Press Pools and Newspaper Coverage of the Gulf War: Attitudes of Newspaper Editors

Jay C. Steuck
Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Telecommunication
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Press pools have been the principal means of front-line media coverage of U.S. military contingency operations since 1983, and have been criticized on a number of grounds since their inception. A review of Gulf War literature revealed problems in three categories. Attitudinal problems were rooted in a lack of trust between the military and media. Logistical problems were categorized as copy transmission and access difficulties; access was the major hurdle. Operational problems were largely characterized as problems with press escorts and copy review delays. This study used a self-administered mail survey of managing editors (MEs) at the 200 largest daily circulation U.S. newspapers to address the issue of Gulf War coverage. Response (n=58) was low. A majority of MEs found Gulf War coverage to be credible, but more than one-fourth disagreed with that assessment; respondents indicated strong dissatisfaction with the pool system. MEs were willing to accept brief delays (3 days) in coverage, regardless of fighting/non-fighting activity or pool/non-pool membership. MEs with prior military service were more concerned with troop safety, accepting longer delays of troop movement stories than their non-service colleagues; these MEs were split over censoring major troop movement stories, compared to overwhelming

disapproval of censorship among non-service MEs. A quartile design was used to stratify respondents (on the basis of circulation) into blocks of 50 (e.g., the 1st largest circulation to the 50th, the 51st to 100th, etc.) Respondents in the last quartile (e.g., the 151st to 200th-ranked newspapers) were contrasted with their larger counterparts; MEs at the smallest newspapers were more inclined to delay publication of troop movement stories to resolve details of those stories. These MEs were also more tolerant of press escorts and Joint Information Bureau (JIB) personnel than were MEs at larger newspapers. MEs gave individuals at all levels of the press pool hierarchy low marks, but ratings were significantly different. Press escorts and policymakers were seen as being more capable than JIB personnel, and escorts were seen as more cooperative than either policymakers or JIB personnel. A large bibliography (138 references) is included.

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Press Pools and Newspaper Coverage of the Gulf War:

Attitudes of Managing Editors


by

Jay C. Steuck

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
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


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Press Pools and Newspaper Coverage of The Gulf War:
Attitudes of Managing Editors

Jay C. Steuck

An Applied Project Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Master of Mass Communication Degree

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Arizona State University
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Press Pools and Newspaper Coverage of The Gulf War:
Attitudes of Managing Editors

Chapter One: Introduction, Problem & Research Questions

Introduction

"Covering a war by pools must be something like phone sex, judging from the middle-of-the-night television ads. It sounds safe and easy, and with enough imagination you could get the job done, but you instinctively know there must be a better way." -- Cragg Hines, *Houston Chronicle*. (Prepared Statement of Cragg Hines, 1991, p. 39).

It would be fair to characterize the use of press pools in the 1990-1991 Gulf War as an acrimonious affair, marked by distaste or outright disgust by the media. The values at stake were high: the public's "right to know" versus national security concerns. The Pentagon's top spokesman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Louis A. "Pete" Williams, touted pooling as "a good-faith effort on the part of the military to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war" (Williams, 1991, p. 9). One reporter, however, saw matters from a different perspective: "journalists...are, in effect, prisoners of war, trapped behind the barbed wire of reporting curbs" (Boot, 1991a, p. 24). These perspectives were neither new nor extreme; however, to understand the press pool system, it may be helpful to place it in a historical context.

The exclusion of the U.S. media from the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada was the genesis of the current press pool system. (White,

1984). While media coverage was allowed after the second day of the invasion, (Warden, 1988) this initial exclusion led to media cries for an acceptable policy on media access, ("A Statement of Principles," 1984). The then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., commissioned a joint media-military panel to create plans for future coverage of U.S. military action (Warden). The working press refused to serve on the panel, but its chair, retired Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, persuaded retired news executives and war correspondents to participate (Warden, 1988). From February 6-9, 1984, the panel heard testimony from five military and 25 senior media representatives at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.; closed sessions continued until February 11 (White, 1984). The panel's findings, which came to be known as the Sidle Report, were officially released August 23, 1984 (Stebenne, 1991).

The report's chief recommendation was to establish the press pool system, in which a small group of reporters and photographers, representing the print and broadcast media, would be chosen from a prepared roster to accompany the military (Warden, 1988). Their reports would later be shared, or "pooled," by media organizations (Warden).

Pooling was not a new concept: for example, a rather draconian version of pooling was introduced in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, when the Japanese kept Western reporters "detained under tight escort at a risible distance from the fighting" (Lubow, 1991, p. 24). Criticized since its introduction in 1984, pooling was called the "worst possible solution to coverage, but better than nothing" (White, 1984, p. 19).

Since that time, press pools have been used a number of times, most recently in the coverage of the Gulf War. Although pools have functioned acceptably in some instances (Lederer, 1991; Pyle, 1988; Rodrigue, 1991), they have generally functioned with some difficulty (Cloud, 1990; Garneau, 1987 a & b; Lee & DeVitt, 1991; Thompson, 1987).

Press pool problems prior to the Gulf War can be grouped into three broad categories: logistical, operational and attitudinal. Logistical problems, which were defined as difficulties in transporting, supplying and handling pool members and their output, ranged from transmission of print copy and videotapes (Garneau, 1987a & b; Pyle, 1988) to more troublesome problems, such as getting to the action (Cloud, 1990; Elson, 1990) and dealing with military systems (Komarow, 1990; Sheahan, 1988).

Operational problems were defined as difficulties in operating the pools, including military field review of copy; these problems were sometimes perceived as censorship. For example, problems in obtaining troop transport helicopters to move the press pool from ship to ship (Manker, Boyd & Van Dyke, 1988) were seen as censorship through keeping the press from the action (Sheahan, 1988). There were instances of censorship beyond pre-established "ground rules": on one naval cruise, the ship's senior staff was allowed to review press copy, which violated the ground rules (Thompson, 1987). After the 1990 invasion of Panama, the Department of Defense acknowledged "incompetence" (Komarow, 1990, p. 50) in delaying field access.

A third problem category, attitudinal problems, were defined as difficulties created by each group's attitudes and consequent

perceptions of the other. While largely attributed as a "legacy of Vietnam" (Sarkesian, 1987) other factors exist (Halloran, 1991; Trainor, 1991). Overall, while some found that pools have worked, others subscribed to the idea that "the Pentagon has one agenda and the news media have another agenda and quite often, they are in conflict" (Garneau, 1987b, p. 24c).

The Problem

Statement of the Problem

The problem of press pools lies in the conflict between the societal interest of "the public's right to know," as derived from the First Amendment, and the government's national security interests (Minor, 1970; *The Nation Magazine* v. *United States Department of Defense*, 1991; Silverberg, 1991; Stebenne, 1991). Exposure of information unfavorable to government is also a factor in that conflict (Gibson, 1985; Trainor, 1991). A concept closely linked to this conflict is the media's "watchdog" role, in which the media acts as the public's eyes and ears in coverage of institutional activity, such as government (Charnley & Charnley, 1979). In wartime, this concept is often exemplified by coverage of atrocities such as the infamous Vietnam "Zippo raid" at Cam Ne (Emery, 1971). Although such events undoubtedly occurred in earlier U.S. wars, press coverage was muted through tacit press cooperation (Steele, 1985) or left unreported by individuals (Braestrup, 1985).

In summary, press pools exist at best as "a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media's desire for unilateral coverage with...[the military] responsibility to maintain operational

security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations." (CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] Pool Membership and Operating Procedures, 1991 [Appendix A]). At worst, pools lead to a situation where

"When the crunch comes, military people become soldiers first and public affairs specialists somewhere after that. Everything is subverted to the military objectives. All the good-faith planning in the world will not change that." (Aukofer, 1991, p. 26).

Both statements are somewhat polarized; as we shall see, the reality of press pool coverage lies somewhere between.

Significance of the Problem

Credibility of press coverage in press pools may be suspect; limited access by a numerically tiny press corps precludes full coverage of wartime activity, which casts doubt to the overall credibility of coverage. The efficacy of unrestricted coverage is open to philosophical question: does more coverage provide better coverage? Massing (1991) and Maitre (1991) cast doubt on this concept in coverage of the Gulf War; however, the majority of media opinions (e.g., Gersh, 1991j) support unrestricted coverage. Additionally, the paucity of scientific research on this topic may indicate a need for study of this relatively new press-government interface.

Research Questions

The research question on which this study is based is: Does press pool coverage of military wartime activity provide credible coverage for newspapers? Newspapers were chosen for this study due to the large number of newspapers published and the in-depth nature of newspaper

coverage; the author contends that due to these characteristics, newspapers are comparatively affected to a greater degree by press pool restrictions than their broadcast brethren.

One journalism text put it this way: "Broadcasting, with only a fraction of its day's schedule assigned to news, offers fewer stories, in fewer words, than do newspapers." (Charnley & Charnley, 1979, p. 80). One measure of this assertion is the makeup of press pools; for example, the 17 members of the first pool sent to the Gulf represented seven print and two broadcast organizations (Williams, 1991). This pool, the Department of Defense National Media Pool, is selected from a roster jointly prepared by the military and the media (Warden, 1988); its makeup indicates the relative emphasis placed on print media. Subsequent pools, in which participation was controlled by the media, maintained a strong (and hotly contested) print majority (Gersh, 1991c).

Managing editors were chosen as the survey subjects. Trayes (1978) identifies a number of activities that these individuals fulfill; these activities include selection and display of information, budgetary control, control of assignments, establishing priorities and overall newsroom supervision. In dealing with press pools, the managing editor plays a role in determining participation in pools (the prioritization and assignment roles), how long participation continues (budgetary and assignment decisions), and how coverage is used (selection and display). As the "captain of the ship" (Charnley & Charnley, 1979) managing editors clearly fill a leadership role; their attitudes reflect authoritative opinions based on years of experience.

Questions will survey the managing editors' attitudes in three areas -- access, censorship and credibility -- which will be used to approximate their overall attitude on credibility. A subquestion in the access category will focus on the variable of fighting versus non-fighting as a factor affecting coverage. Charnley and Charnley (1979) cite conflict as a prime factor in the newsworthiness of a story; it is thus hypothesized that in the absence of fighting, media will more readily accept delays and for longer periods of time than if fighting were underway, because the impetus of conflict does not exist.

Another subquestion concerns chain-affiliated newspapers. Chain members tend to share editorial philosophies, and smaller members often share national stories from the chain (Bagdikian, 1983), in effect creating news services supplementing traditional sources such as the *Associated Press*. Managing editors will be asked to identify if "their" newspaper is a chain member. If so, they will be asked if a chain reporter's copy would be acceptable in lieu of their own reporter's stories. If so, a larger but still limited pool (with chain representatives) may partially mitigate representation problems.

The third subquestion addresses military service as a possible source of personal bias. Several demographic questions will ask for information on managing editors' military service, if any; respondents with military service will be analyzed versus those without service experience. Prior service may bias respondents, positively or negatively, compared to their non-service colleagues.

The fourth subquestion analyzes assertions made regarding support at various levels of the military's pool apparatus. It is asserted that the military, particularly senior officers and policymakers, distrusts the media (Lamb, 1991; Monroe, 1991); the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was also criticized, while field personnel were seen in a more favorable light (Gersh, 1991i.) To test these assertions, managing editors will be asked to evaluate each level of the military interface -- press escorts, JIB personnel and policymakers -- with respect to their capability and cooperation.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The literature review will be presented in four sections. The first three expand upon the major problem categories alluded to above: attitudinal, logistical and operational. Definitions of each category are those of the author, and are designed to separate problems into working areas. However, it should be acknowledged that in the situations discussed below, factors from more than one area may be at work in any situation. The fourth section focuses on the legal challenges to press pooling filed against the Department of Defense (DoD) by various parties in the wake of the Gulf War.

Attitudinal Problems

During a Gulf War press briefing, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, was questioned about a chart which lacked details to corroborate Powell's comments. Powell replied that the gist was accurate: "Trust me," he said. "Trust me." (Zoglin, 1991a, p. 44). This exchange underscores the underlying problem in pooling: simply put, the media distrust the military (Boot, 1991a & b; Lee & DeVitt, 1991; McMasters, 1991, Rodrigue, 1991) and the military, particularly among senior officers, distrust the media (Lamb, 1991; Monroe, 1991; Schanberg, 1991). In the time-honored role of the press' adversarial relationship with government, this distrust is considered by some (Pavlik & Rachlin, 1991) to be inevitable and even healthy (Soucy, 1991; Trainor, 1991). However, while skepticism may be healthy for the

media and military, "the problem of minimizing the natural friction is a daunting one." (Trainor, 1991, p. 123).

The origin of this distrust is attributed to the Vietnam War.

Newsday's Rita Ciolli neatly summarizes the general perspective:

"The discussion [of pool ground rules] are taking place against a recent backdrop of disastrous relations. The Pentagon is still influenced by the perception that the media prevented the United States from winning the Vietnam War; and journalists are very wary about being deliberately shutout of the action during the incursions in Grenada and Panama." (Ciolli, 1990, p. 2).

Others put it bluntly: access restrictions were "mostly a reaction to the legacy of Vietnam" (Alter, et al., 1991, p. 19). Coverage of the Vietnam War is thus blamed for two divisive attitudes; first, an anti-media attitude in the military; second, an anti-military attitude on the media's part.

There is some basis for the first criticism. For example, retired Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor writes:

"It [the anti-press attitude] is a legacy of the war, and it takes root [in officers] shortly after they enter service. The credo of the military seems to have become 'duty, honor, country, and hate the media.'" (Trainor, 1991, p. 122).

This attitude can be found in at least one Vietnam veteran: after the Vietnam War, Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces there from 1964-1968, remarked, "Press and television created an aura not of victory but of defeat, which, coupled with vocal antiwar elements, profoundly influenced timid officials in Washington." (Kinnard, 1976, p. 164). Maj. Gen. Patrick H. Brady, chief of Army public affairs from 1987-1990, is quoted as saying:

"Some look on news as just another four-letter word, but I believe it is more useful to look at it as a C-letter word: chaos, confusion, contradiction, crime, corruption, catastrophe. It does not hurt if you add some S's -- sex, sensationalism, state secrets. The words of a reporter for a national news syndicate best sum it up. He came to us for some information we provided with the comment that we were always happy to get it right. He replied rather hurriedly: 'I don't care if I get it right; I only care if I get it first.'" (Browne, 1991, p. 1,184).

Other factors contribute as well. Retired Maj. Philip Soucy (a former public affairs officer (PAO) for the Secretary of the Army) quotes a Washington media bureau chief as saying, "It's not my job to keep your secrets; if I get one, and it's a good story, I'm going to print it." (Soucy, 1991, p. 109). Along with this element of concern for preserving operational security, Halloran (1990) lists three other factors in the military's distrust: the military's traditional distrust of critical civilians, an ignorance of the media's role and the First Amendment, and a reaction to media excesses.

One example of this attitude during the Gulf War: John Balzar of the *Los Angeles Times* writes of an Army colonel who, when asked about an after-battle assessment, asked the reporter, "Do you have a security clearance?" (Lamb, 1991, p. 36). Faced with a lack of cooperation from the Army, Balzar's pool, which included two Vietnam veterans, later voted to disband (Lamb.)

Following the Gulf War, 17 major media organizations issued an ad hoc report on media coverage of the war, calling it "the most under-covered major conflict in modern history" (Gersh, 1991i, p. 7). This report sharply criticized the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) and military high command for delaying review and ordering lower-ranking

personnel to "not..be cooperative, indeed to detain and expel independent reporters" (Gersh, 1991i, p. 8).

This attitude was not universal. The *Dallas Morning News'* George Rodrigue (1991) writes that "almost every unit we visited welcomed us heartily" (p. 22); *Associated Press* correspondent Edith Lederer tells of how an Air Force colonel escorted her and *Chicago Tribune* reporter David Evans to a secret telephone to post the story of the initial U.S. air attack against Iraq (Lederer, 1991). The ad hoc media report credited "soldiers and many company and field-grade officers [who] welcomed press coverage, were not afraid of it, and tried to help reporters" (Gersh, 1991i, p. 8).

In the sole research study found, Pavlik and Rachlin's (1991) purposive survey of Desert Storm journalists found that 86 percent said informal military contacts were helpful, and 37 percent said those contacts were very helpful. Unfortunately, this survey reached a very small number (n=37) of Gulf War reporters. The number of reporters in the Gulf War theatre are variously reported between 1,300 to 1,800 (Grossman, 1991); Pavlik and Rachlin (1991) cite a figure of 1,400 reporters. The generalizability of this study is thus suspect.

Another attitude media members found objectionable was the military's concern for their safety (Apple, 1991; Galloway, 1991). As in the Panama invasion, in which the military kept reporters from the action for their safety (Cloud, 1990; Komarow, 1990), Gulf War pools were sometimes held back (Leeson, 1991.) The Iraqi capture and incarceration [January 24 to March 2, 1991] of the CBS news team headed

by Bob Simon demonstrated the danger of capture in the Gulf War (Williams, 1991). Trainor states:

"The military is protective and feels responsible for the safety of any civilians they are sponsoring. Keeping the press pool isolated at an air base in Panama was a genuine reflection of military concern for the reporters's safety." (Trainor, 1991, p. 128).

On the other hand, the journalist's precept is that their safety is their own concern. As Marvin Kalb said on this subject in *USA Today*: "If journalists, in doing their work, feel they must be in harm's way to do the job properly, that should be their call and not the Pentagon's call." (Kalb, 1991, p. 1,165). Their employers, however, may not always agree. Komarow writes: "With American news executives complaining that the military didn't do enough to protect the reporters trapped at the Marriott downtown [in Panama City], it was harder to convince the military that danger was our business." (Komarow, 1990, p. 49).

In the Gulf War, the same dichotomy was observed. Bureau news chiefs told the Pentagon's Pete Williams that a reporter's security was not the military's concern; but when approximately 40 journalists were captured in Iraq after the March 4 cease-fire, "four news industry executives wrote to the President, saying that no U.S. forces should withdraw from Iraq until the issue of the journalists was resolved." (Williams, 1991, pp. 8-9). [These detainees were released to the International Red Cross in Baghdad March 9.] Although journalists (Apple, 1991; Leeson, 1991) claimed safety concerns were an excuse to force journalists into press pools and restrict access, their executives clearly saw matters differently.

Another example of a military attitude arose in regard to unilateral reporters (those U.S. reporters who covered U.S. military activity independent of pools and without military escort.) Unilateral coverage was to be allowed once safety and operational conditions warranted (CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating Procedures, 1991), but was not officially allowed. However, several instances occurred during the brief ground war, particularly during the liberation of Kuwait City (Gugliotta, 1991). Although by definition the unilaterals were not part of pools and thus lie outside the scope of this study, the military's treatment of unilaterals sometimes exceeded the rather vague policy of "exclud[ing] from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals." (Department of Defense Guidelines for News Media, 1991, p. 469).

A unilateral's lot wasn't easy; as Bob Simon's experience proved, the Iraqis were quite capable of handling unarmed journalists. If found by U.S. forces, the military detained unilaterals until they were returned to press centers; unilaterals also could have their press credentials revoked (Hedges, 1991; Offenburger, 1991). Pavlik & Rachlin (1991) cite 30 percent of their respondents as having engaged in such reporting; treatment of unilaterals was uneven. While some were threatened with revocation of their credentials, others had their credentials temporarily revoked (Hedges); others were rebuked. After losing his credentials to two Army public affairs officers, one reporter wrote: "Two other Army public affairs officers with them -- I didn't get their names -- had plenty to say to me too. In short, I hadn't been talked to like that since I went through Army basic training in 1969. I

feel like I have only about half my rear end left." (Offenburger, 1991, p. 1,173.)

On the media's part, one attitude -- a perceived military grudge against the media -- was quite evident. "Doing away with independent reporting has been the Pentagon's goal ever since Vietnam" (Morrow, 1991, p. 18). "It's obvious the government has been planning for a rematch since Vietnam. They were brilliantly successful." (Zoglin, 1991d, p. 57). "They [the press] were still fighting the last war in Vietnam, always suspecting that the United States would eventually screw up, that its generals would lie and its soldiers would die in droves." (Gergen, 1991, p. 57).

And what of objectivity? One reporter wrote: "I look at the news media predicament like this: journalists accredited to the allied command in Saudi Arabia are, in effect, prisoners of war, trapped behind the barbed wire of reporting curbs." (Boot, 1991a, p. 24.) A nice wartime analogy, but it might have been more meaningful had Boot actually been in a pool when those words were written. Indeed, William Boot* provides an interesting pair of articles -- the "before-and-after" pool stories. The "before" story is quoted above; his "after" article opens tongue-in-cheek:

"I was a combat pool correspondent, one of the happy few who helped provide America with what Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams called 'the best war coverage we've ever had.' True, most of us never saw a battle and few of us

*It's interesting to note that "William Boot" is actually a pseudonym for Seattle *Post-Intelligencer* Washington correspondent Christopher Hansen. The use of a pen name is unexplained.

even saw a dead Iraqi soldier, but at least we got to be part of the great adventure. True, many of our news dispatches never made it back to our news organizations, but at least we got to write them. True, military officers controlled our every movement, but that, after all, may be why Williams bestowed his glowing praise, and pool veterans should not take compliments lightly." (Boot, 1991b, p. 24.)

Another journalist saw matters from a different perspective:

"When the flow of information to the public is totally controlled by the government, when the tradition of civilian control of the military is flouted, when the Pentagon tries to shoulder a political as well as a military role, then a democratic society is in peril." (McMasters, 1991, p. 9.)

Of course, not all reporters shared these opinions (Lamb, 1991; Lederer, 1991; Maitre, 1991.) An interesting comment on pooling comes from Pulitzer Prize-winner George Rodrigue: "The pool work reminded me of the importance of making your own observations and drawing your own conclusions. In other words, the pool system often did not work well for non-pool reporters." (Rodrigue, 1991, p. 21). Rodrigue's solution to pooling was either to abandon the idea or to expand pooling to such a degree that pools functioned solely as support mechanisms.

In summary, while it would be fair to say that both sides -- military and media alike -- often suffered from prejudicial attitudes, such attitudes were by no means universal. These attitudes, however, often set the tone for media-military encounters, some of which will be explored in the next section.

Logistical Problems

Logistical problems are defined as difficulties in transporting, supplying and handling pool members and their output. These problems

manifested themselves as copy transmission and access problems; of the two, access problems were widely judged to be the worst (see Apple, 1991b; Aukofer, 1991; Gersh, 1991i; Rodrigue, 1991), while transmission problems were largely a result of being too far ahead of support facilities (Boot, 1991b).

Access was clearly the most annoying problem: while estimates ranged from 1,300 - 1,800 reporters in the war theatre, (Grossman, 1991) pools only accommodated approximately 130 (Lamb, 1991). Although the military was criticized (Apple, 1991b; Gersh 1991i; Leeson, 1991) for not providing more slots, Massing (1991) criticized the emphasis on front-line reporters, saying that more openness wouldn't have necessarily produced better reporting, and that unlike Vietnam, where front-line reporters could bring back the story, the air war in the Gulf didn't lend itself to on-the-spot reporting. Vietnam's relatively relaxed coverage rules seem to have become the yardstick for coverage: for example, Zoglin writes that in Vietnam, "reporters were free to travel almost anywhere they wanted in areas under nominal U.S. control. With the restrictive gulf pool system, military escorts stand by while a limited number of journalists conduct their interviews." (Zoglin, 1991a, pp. 44-45).

Access on the Vietnam model, however, was perhaps asking too much. Veteran correspondent Otto Kriesher of the *Copley News Service* said:

"...I don't think in a case like this you can simply open up the theatre, as happened in Vietnam, and say, 'Okay, everybody drive out to the war.' The hazards are too great. To a large extent, the group on the front lines has had reasonably good access. They've even

brought back information that the official briefers in Riyadh don't want to handle. So I'd give the military a B-plus for effort and a C for execution." (Lamb, 1991, p. 35).

Another perspective echoed the point:

"Too often, American reporters seemed to be fighting the last war. Where there was sand, they saw rice paddies, and, like latter-day David Halberstams, they instinctively headed for the front. This was no guerrilla war, however, but a high-intensity, fully conventional conflict, and it required something other than the traditional on-the-ground reporting." (Massing, 1991, p. 23).

Reasons cited for controlled access (CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating Procedures, 1991) were several: they included maintaining operational security, protecting troop safety and preventing interference with military operations. With 1,300 - 1,800 reporters in-theatre, some restraints can perhaps be understood.

One anecdote illustrates the point: an Apache helicopter unit of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division was so overwhelmed by reporters that its pilots were unable to fly for one week. "After the unit's commander gave 20 interviews that week, answering the same questions over and over, media visits to the unit were suspended." (Lamb, 1991, p. 35). While this would probably not occur to the same degree if unrestricted access were allowed, the nature of "pack journalism" raises the specter of hordes of reporters flocking from one unit to the next as stories break, impeding supply routes and operations.

But access was ultimately found to be lacking. By February, pools covering ground combat units were doubled due to what the commander of the Dhahran JIB, Navy Captain R. E. Wildermuth, called "the complaints of the press corps, who have brought to our attention the inadequacies

of the current system." (Apple, 1991b, p. 1,160). As noted above, when the ground war broke out, a "jailbreak" of sorts occurred when a number of pool journalists turned unilateral and headed for Kuwait City (Gugliotta, 1991). Although the Iraqi capture and later release of 40-odd journalists [March 4-9, 1991] after the cease-fire demonstrated the danger of even a defeated enemy (Williams, 1991), the exigencies of the situation clearly reached the breaking point for some journalists.

Another problem involved coverage of fatalities suffered by U.S. forces. The ad hoc media report outlines three separate incidents, but perhaps the most clear-cut example involved the Feb. 25 SCUD missile attack on a troop barracks in Dhahran. Despite being a few miles from the JIB headquarters, and although a quick reaction pool was available there, the pool was never deployed; access was restricted, no Dhahran officials were "authorized to comment...[and] official information came from Riyadh, 150 miles away." ("Military Obstacles Detailed, 1991, p. 9). The official rationale was that by executive directive, next-of-kin had to be personally notified by the appropriate service. Media coverage held the potential to cause "anguish [by] sudden recognition at home [that] far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape" (Guidelines for News Media, 1991 [Appendix A]).

Similar sensitivities were cited (see Stebenne, 1991) as a reason to bar media coverage of the arrival of flights bearing U.S. casualties at Dover AFB, Del.; although Department of Defense policy (Public Affairs Guidance, 1991) was to hold ceremonies at the service member's

duty station to spare family members the cost and inconvenience of traveling to the port of entry, this rationale was later legally challenged in *J. B. Pictures, et. al. v. Department of Defense* (1991).

Access wasn't the only logistical problem. One reporter said the pool system "was fatally flawed by the fact the military did not put assets or resources in the hands of the public affairs people in the field." (Pavlik and Rachlin, 1991, p. 28). This problem, particularly in the transmission of pool copy, (see Boot, 1991b) led to this castigation in the ad hoc media report:

"many [media] reports from front-line units were delayed and/or recommended for censorship by on-scene PAOs [Public Affairs Officers]. That JIB officers refused in most cases to go along with these recommendations was small consolation, given the transmission delays involved." (Gersh, 1991, p. 8).

This problem did not sit well with the Pentagon's Pete Williams:

"I would say the biggest lesson learned is that we need to do much better getting stories back from the field; it was the part of this that I don't think anybody was particularly satisfied with....Whether that means that there's dedicated stuff for reporters -- dedicated transportation...helicopters, armored personnel carriers, things like that -- I think that military units are going to have to just do a better job of putting people in the unit who don't do anything but take care of reporters...." (Gersh, 1991, p. 17).

In summary, the access problem was clearly the most odious for poolers. One dispirited correspondent was asked whether having 800 instead of 100 journalists in front-line positions would improve accounts of the gulf war; the reporter said, "I can't say, because I really don't know what the truth is here." (Lamb, 1991, pp. 35-36).

While it seems clear that complaints about the access and copy transmittal problems have been at least heard, if not heeded, the problems of access and copy transmission were considerable. Promises of change aside, *Newsweek's* Tony Clifton sounded a facetious note:

"Now I know why I haven't had children. It's because later in my life, I don't want some innocent child saying, 'Daddy, what did you do in the gulf war?' Because I would have to reply, 'Child, I watched it on CNN, from an armchair in a big hotel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.'" (Clifton, 1991, p. 36).

Operational Problems

Operational problems are defined as problems in operating pools, including field review, or censorship, of copy. While reporters naturally found any modifications of their copy offensive (Boot, 1991b; Browne, 1991a), others (Lamb, 1991; Rodrigue, 1991) found censorship to be "mostly rather light-handed" (Grossman, 1991, p. 28.) Other operational problems were more troublesome and outside the pre-established "ground rules" (Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules, 1991 [See Appendix A]).

Field review, or censorship, of copy was instituted to prevent the release of "sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations or vulnerabilities" (CENTCOM Guidelines for News Media, 1991 [Appendix A]). Changes suggested by press escorts would be discussed by the reporter; if agreement could not be reached, disputes were forwarded to the Dhahran JIB for military-media discussion. If agreement could not be reached there, copy was forwarded to the Pentagon for discussion with Washington bureau chiefs; the final decision lay

with the reporter's organization. (CENTCOM Guidelines, 1991). This system was touted as allowing "expeditious" review and clearance of copy; however, such was not always the case.

Most copy modifications were relatively minor; for example, *The New York Times'* Malcolm Browne (1991a) was persuaded to change his description of F-117A fighter pilots returning from a successful mission from "giddy" to "proud;" while Browne and others (see Pavlik & Rachlin, 1991) decried this, one observer called it "not exactly the Pentagon Papers." (Massing, 1991, p. 23). Browne's story also fell prey to misrouting errors during review. After agreeing to the modification of his story, Browne was promised quick telefaxing of his story to pool headquarters in Dhahran. The story, however, wound up at Air Force facilities at the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, (the F-117A's home base) for review. After a 24-hour delay, it was released, but by that point was termed "hopelessly stale." (Browne, 1991. p. 1,186).

Perhaps the most notorious instance of routing delays was found in the Army's VII Corps, where a so-called "layering effect" caused copy to be

"reviewed by the PAO of the 2nd Armored Division, then by the 1st Infantry Division, then by VII Corps' 'notorious' Major Cook and finally by the Dhahran JIB. The process added days to an already unacceptably slow process." (Military Obstacles Detailed, 1991, p. 9.)

This layering problem was not unknown to the media or the military.

Wall Street Journal reporter John Fialka assessed the situation this way: "Seventh Corps was simply a black hole." (Boot, 1991b, p. 25).

Fialka had first-hand knowledge of VII Corps' care: one of his stories

was so heavily marked up when it reached the JIB that the PAO there believed VII Corps wanted it deleted. Upon further review, inserting the term "perhaps" in an appropriate spot solved the problem -- after a three-day review (Military Obstacles Detailed, 1991). In their study, Pavlik and Rachlin (1991) found that 23% of respondents reported delays in copy transmission; however, the small return rate (n=37) of their study may cast doubt to the veracity of this statistic.

These delays were also known to the military, and were sharply reprimanded by the Public Affairs staff at U.S. Central Command (Media Pool Feedback, 1991). Such delays were termed "unacceptable" and the primary field review procedure was emphasized. Transport of copy was also directed for the fastest means available, including aircraft when possible and frequent courier runs. Delays in transmission were nonetheless numerous (see Military Obstacles Detailed, pp. 9-10).

Other censorship problems seemed timed to allow the military, not the media, to break stories. For example, ABC News wanted to announce that the pilot of a downed F-14 had been rescued but was denied permission, on the rationale that the F-14 carries two crewmembers and Iraqi forces would seek the other member. "That seemed perfectly reasonable to us," said ABC's Richard Kaplan, but "20 minutes later they have a briefing, and the briefer says, 'An F-14 was shot down, and we picked up one of the pilots.'" (Zoglin, 1991a, p. 45).

Another example (Military Obstacles Detailed, 1991) makes less sense. During an interview, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer's* military/defense issues writer, Ed Offley, was told that the Air Force's EF-111,

an electronic warfare aircraft, carries 10 "exciters," which the operator uses to electronically jam enemy radars and radios. A PAO told Offley that the information was classified, so he deleted it from his story. The next day, Offley read an Air Force press release, which mentioned that the EF-111 carries exciters. One possible explanation is that the number of exciters was classified; more likely, the PAO simply wasn't familiar with the press release.

One reason for inconsistent public affairs response may have been the training level of the PAOs and press escorts. Press escorts were not always active-duty public affairs personnel; while escorts traveled with six to nine reporters, they were often reservists just called up (Williams, 1991b). While this may explain some errors, others were more egregious. Some (Boot, 1991b; Schanberg, 1991) criticized escorts for causing interviewees to "self-censor" their remarks. One escort (Military Obstacles Detailed, 1991) sat in at every interview, sitting behind the interviewer "and shaking his head yes or no as to whether a question should be answered." (p. 9). Written advisories read to troops before interviews became known in the press corps as the "Miranda warning." (Military Obstacles Detailed.) These activities were sharply condemned by the CENTCOM Public Affairs staff (Media Pool Feedback, 1991.)

However, if some press escorts were a little "green," their media counterparts were often wet behind the ears. Maitre (1991) catalogs some of the more egregious factual media errors: *The New York Times* report of smoking F-15 fighter engines that give away their presence;

the claim by *Newsweek's* Charles Lane that F-15s and Apache helicopters would not be effective against Iraqi tank forces; the assertion by *Boston Globe* correspondent Fred Kaplan that the M-1 Abrams tank was not suited for desert warfare. Veteran correspondent Peter Braestrup (1991) summed it up by labeling these reporters "yuppies in the desert."

On the other hand, some (Aukofer, 1991; Rodrigue, 1991) found their escorts to be fairly benign. In their study of Gulf War journalists, Pavlik and Rachlin (1991) found that only 17% of respondents said they were ever unable to file stories; in Rodrigue's experience, his escort (a navy lieutenant) "actually told his captain that we, and not the captain" (p. 21) were allowed to change stories.

Another, more interesting operational problem lies in the assignment of pool openings. Following the August 1990 arrival of the DoD National Media Pool, other reporters began flowing into Saudi Arabia; the decision on how to allocate pool openings in the nine pool categories (television, radio, wire service, newsmagazine, newspaper, photo, Saudi, international, and "pencil"[writers]) was left to the pool coordinator. Since the pool coordinator was a media member, the media determined which individuals went in the pools; internecine squabbling for press pool slots ultimately resolved itself in favor of the four TV networks and 10 major newspapers (Aukofer, 1991; Lamb, 1991; Rodrigue, 1991.)

These major organizations became known as "the Sacred 14" (Gersh, 1991c, p. 9), dividing the media against themselves. Aukofer said the Sacred 14 "run [pools] like some kind of despotic monarchy... Some newspapers are getting screwed and so are the photographers." (Gersh, p. 9).

The Sacred 14 took advantage of the rule (CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating Procedures, 1991) that mandated rotation in and out of the pool every three weeks. By having staff members arrive in the Gulf three weeks before their pool member was due to rotate out; these new arrivals were able to get on the waiting list for assignments into pools; once on the waiting list, these members then replaced the staffer rotating out. The pool coordinator was the final authority on pool matters; thus, although CENTCOM rules forbade "favoritism or disparate treatment of the media by pool coordinators in pool operations," (p. VI), the Sacred 14 were able to maintain control. Aukofer (1991) claims the Sacred 14 were determined to exploit the system to gain "virtual exclusives," since other organizations would normally use the pool's information, but not the actual stories.

It was also alleged (Gersh, 1991i; Grossman, 1991; Pavlik and Rachlin, 1991) that the military used the press in a disinformation campaign, particularly in regard to the rumored amphibious landing in Kuwait City. The ad hoc media report cites Desert Storm commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf as waiting until the war was over to "explain that the press had been deliberately used to mislead the Iraqis...." (Gersh, 1991i, p. 8).

DoD's own interim report on the conduct of the Gulf War (Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, 1991) lists three shortcomings of their media support plans. These shortcomings were: command support (at the component command levels) was uneven; PAOs were often not properly trained to conduct security reviews of pool products, and although most

performed well, some public affairs escorts overstepped their bounds. This report mirrors many media complaints, but did not outline any specific solutions, rendering it more of an acknowledgement of problems than anything else.

In summary, field treatment of copy, particularly in transmission delays, often lessened a story's news value through delay. Overzealous or uninformed press escorts often exacerbated problems; many of their opposite numbers displayed their lack of knowledge as well. This lack of information, coupled with the lack of trust between the two sides, made for short tempers and long-term grievances.

A Few Words From the Lawyers

In the wake of media distaste and self-recrimination over press coverage, three suits (*The Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense, Agence France-Presse, et. al. v. United States Department of Defense* and *J. B. Pictures, et. al., v. the Department of Defense and Donald O. Rice, Secretary of the Air Force*) were filed in 1991.

J. B. Pictures (1991) concerns press access to Dover AFB, Del., traditionally the port of entry for deceased servicemembers. While this case does not concern press pooling, and is thus outside the scope of this study, it is mentioned here as an adjunct to the legal issues involved: prior restraint and the emerging right of access (Silverberg, 1991).

The *Nation* case was filed Jan. 28, 1991 in New York's Southern District U.S. District Court before Judge Leonard B. Sand. The media

plaintiffs contended that pooling restrictions violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights; specifically, that the pool system violated their news-gathering privileges under the First Amendment and that the media have an unlimited right of access to foreign areas in which American forces are engaged. The *Nation* plaintiffs sought immediate injunctive relief from pool restrictions. Department of Defense attorneys argued that the First Amendment does not bar the government from restricting access to combat activities, and that pool regulations were narrowly tailored in response to national security concerns. DoD also contended that three threshold arguments made the case non-justiciable (eligible for judgment by the court). These threshold arguments -- (1) access was allowed under the pool system and thus access was not denied; (2) the political doctrine question removed the case from the court's consideration and (3) after March 4, when the pool system was disbanded, the suit became moot -- were later considered by Judge Sand in his findings.

The *Agence France-Presse* case was filed in the same court, again before Judge Sand; this case, however, is not as straightforward as the *Nation* case. Agence France-Presse (AFP) is one of three international photo services, similar to the AP/Reuters photo services, and is headquartered in Paris. AFP had requested access to the photo pool in late September 1990 and at least five times between Sept. 27, 1990, and Feb. 1, 1991; however, despite numerous letters of support from U.S. newspapers, AFP access to the photo pool was denied.

An explanation for AFP's exclusion surfaced in a Feb. 14th hearing. The Department of Defense asserted that due to AFP's status as a French corporation, it was eligible for and was admitted to the international pool. Agence France-Presse again sought access to the photo pool, contending that the international pool produced no photos, and that they would be ineligible for photo pool products under the CENTCOM guidelines. Agence France-Presse further contended that its exclusion was discriminatory and unlawful; Reuters, a British corporation, was allowed to participate in the photo pool, but unlike Reuters, AFP was classified into the international pool.

Upon discussion with attorneys for all parties, these cases were merged on Feb. 25, 1991 (*Nation*, p. 1,260.), with the proviso that issues unique to either plaintiff were to be resolved separately. Judge Sand then heard oral arguments on March 7, 1991, three days after the cease-fire.

In his decision, Judge Sand rejected the first two threshold claims. The first -- failure to deny access -- was rejected because AFP was, in the merged case, denied access.

The second, the political question doctrine, refers to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which places the military under the command of the President; under the separation of powers principle, the President can order executive actions beyond judicial review. In this instance, the Department of Defense's contention was that the separation of powers principle moved the case beyond the court's power to review. Judge Sand rejected this claim as overbroad and inconsistent with constitutional

precedent, because the judiciary has and can rule over the military in certain situations. In this case, that the pool system was imposed by an Executive agency (DoD) did not qualify under Article II of the Constitution as a non-justicative executive action.

The third question, mootness, was not decided. Citing the requirement in *Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles* (1947) that "underlying constitutional issues [be presented] in a clean-cut and concrete form" as precedent, Judge Sand ruled that the access issues were "not sufficiently in focus at this time to meet the *Rescue Army* requirement" (*Nation*, 1991, p. 1,271) and dismissed the complaint.

Two articles on the topic of media access to battlefield operations (Silverberg, 1991 and Frenznick, 1992) reach opposite conclusions. Regarding prior restraint, neither concedes an absolute governmental right to bar the press under the national security exemption established in *Near v. Minnesota* (1931) and modified in *New York Times Co. v. U.S.* (1971) [The Pentagon Papers case]. Both concede, however, that the use of emerging technologies (e.g., real-time satellite uplink) may well provide enough evidence to support Justice Brennan's requirement of demonstrating inevitable, direct and immediate peril of troop safety in wartime.

Both differ over the emerging right of access, which offers some hope for the press. Silverberg (1991) and Frenznick (1992) suggest virtually identical tripartite tests, based on precedents in *Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia* (1980) and *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court* (1982). The tests require the press to prove (1) that

the place "historically [has] been open to the press and general public" (*Globe* and *Richmond*); (2) that the right of access must "play a particularly significant role" in the operation at issue and of the government in its entirety (*Globe*); (3) but the press still may fail if the government can show that "denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest" (*Globe*). Silverberg and Frenznick diverge in their conclusions.

Silverberg (1991) argues that there is no First Amendment right to battlefield access. He argues that the public has never had a right to battlefield access, and that military activity is not a public forum due to the "historically unquestioned power of [an installation's] commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from his area of command (*Greer v. Spock*, 1976). Frenznick does not include the *Greer* decision in his reasoning and concludes that since the press often represents the public (*Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 1975), there is a First Amendment right of access to battlefields.

They continue to diverge at the test's second step. Silverberg (1991) argues that the military's role is to ensure the success of their mission, and that unless the media takes up weapons in battle, they cannot contribute to mission success, but can quite possibly contribute to mission failure. Frenznick (1992) argues that the military depends on public support and tax dollars. He also claims the military uses the media to influence public opinion and acceptance of its policies; thus, in his view, the media plays a significant role in military functions.

Both differ at the third step as well. Silverberg (1991) argues that the military has a compelling interest in the success of its mission, and that since the courts have "traditionally...been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs" (p. 174), the military commander's decision may well be final. Frenznick (1992) modifies the test in *U.S. v. Chagra* (1983) to test the constitutionality of battlefield access. To deny access, his three-part test requires the military to prove (1) national security will suffer if access is allowed; (2) alternatives to denying access cannot adequately protect national security, and (3) denial of access will effectively protect national security.

The U.S. government has clearly learned from its attempt to deny access in Grenada that outright exclusion is neither desirable nor wise; however, even Frenznick (1992) concedes that pooling does not always violate his First Amendment right of access argument. Silverberg (1991) stipulates that pools are quite legal, but based on the experience following the Grenada invasion, both the military and the public are better served in the long run by allowing access as much as is feasible.

Chapter Three: Methodology

Research Question and Subquestions

The research question is: Does press pool coverage of U.S. military operations provide credible coverage for newspapers? In a mail survey survey of the managing editors of the top 200 U.S. daily newspapers, (as defined by circulation) answers were sought through an analysis of their attitudes on questions regarding press pool access, censorship and credibility. Due to strong negative media reactions toward press pools, it was hypothesized that managing editors will have strong negative attitudes towards scenarios involving access restrictions and censorship; the null hypothesis is that managing editors would display neutral attitudes towards these scenarios. It was hypothesized that managing editors are likely to have attitudes favoring the level of credibility of coverage; hence, the null hypothesis was that managing editors would express neutral attitudes towards the level of credibility of Gulf War coverage.

Four subquestions were explored; the first uses the variable of fighting versus non-fighting as an impetus to coverage in a paired analysis. These scenarios replicated conditions in the two phases of the Gulf War: Operations Desert Shield (when fighting was not happening) and Desert Storm (when fighting was underway.) It was hypothesized that since conflict is a prime factor in the newsworthiness of a story, managing editors would more readily accept delays and would be less

likely to keep their reporters waiting to cover stories than if fighting were underway. Expressing the null hypotheses, managing editors would (1) express neutral attitudes toward the acceptance of delays, and (2) express neutral attitudes toward keeping their reporters waiting to cover battles.

A secondary factor in the "reporter waiting" decision-process is the cost-productivity tradeoff involved; it was thus hypothesized that newspapers with smaller circulations, which comparatively lack the fiscal and manpower resources of their larger brethren, would recall their reporters sooner than larger newspapers. Comparing the response between quartiles on this question was used to yield answers.

The second subquestion concerned chain-affiliated newspapers. Since chain members often share national stories, these chains often mimic traditional newsgathering organizations such as the Associated Press or United Press International by providing national stories to chain members. Managing editors will be asked to identify if "their" newspaper is a chain member; if so, they will be asked if a chain reporter's pool coverage would be acceptable in lieu of coverage from a staff reporter from their newspaper. It was hypothesized that the initial reaction would be negative; however, particularly if the newspaper is a small one, the cost-productivity factor might later alter their acceptance. Again using paired fighting/non-fighting scenarios, managing editors were be asked if and how long they would delay recall of their reporter.

The third subquestion addressed a possible source of personal bias.

Several demographic questions asked for information on respondents' military service, if any; respondents with military service were identified and analyzed versus those without service experience. It was hypothesized that positive and negative motivational factors might be operating in those with military service; positive factors include a tendency to more readily accept restrictions due to their understanding of military systems, and these respondents might also be more likely to favorably identify with the military due to their experiences. The reverse of the last factor is also true: former servicemembers might be less likely to identify with the military due to negative experiences. The null hypothesis for this question is that managing editors with prior military service would show no significant differences than their colleagues without military service.

The fourth subquestion analyzed assertions made regarding support at various levels of the military's pool apparatus. It was asserted that the military, particularly among senior officers and policymakers, distrusted the media; the Joint Information Bureau was also criticized, while field personnel were seen in a more favorable light. Managing editors were asked to assess military/governmental people in three categories: press escorts, JIB personnel and policymakers, with respect to their capability and cooperation. It was hypothesized that managing editors would display highly negative attitudes toward JIB personnel and policymakers, while registering more favorable but still negative attitudes toward press escorts. The null hypothesis is that managing editors would display neutral attitudes toward all categories.

Data Collection and Recording

Methods

Data was collected through a self-administered mail survey of the managing editors of the 200 largest circulation U.S. daily newspapers. Follow-up mailings were sent one week after the initial mailing, with a second follow-up one week after the first follow-up mailing. Follow-ups are suggested to improve response; for example, Parton (1950) and Wimmer and Dominick (1987) cite a 10-20% increase in response by using follow-ups. Due to the increased time lapse between the first and second follow-up mailings, a smaller yield was expected from the second follow-up.

A pilot study (Appendix B) surveyed the managing editors of the 201-250th largest newspapers, along with a comments sheet for their input. While not of the main survey group, these editor's responses should be valid, as one of the assumptions of this study is that attitudes of a representative subset are representative of the population. This also avoids the problem of pretest sensitization in the main survey sample (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987).

Population

The study's sample was the managing editors of the top 200 U.S. daily newspapers, as determined by circulation in the American Newspaper Markets, Inc., *Circulation '91* (1990) listing (Appendix C). These newspapers form a large subset -- 200 of the 264 (*Editor and Publisher Yearbook*, 1990) daily newspapers with a circulation in excess of 50,000 -- of all U.S. newspapers. Managing editors were selected as

the individuals most likely to make decisions regarding the utilization of their staff and to have an overall grasp of their organization's philosophy and operations. Names and addresses (Appendix D) were found by cross-referencing the *Editor and Publisher Yearbook*, providing a relatively current and complete list. In cross-referencing the *Circulation '91* list, three newspapers were not found. They are: *Portland This Week*, *Miami El Nuevo Herald*, and the *Los Angeles Daily Breeze*. However, three major newspapers were excluded from the *Circulation '91* list: the *Wall Street Journal*, *USA Today*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*. The three missing newspapers were inserted into the list at their proper points.

Instrument

The instrument used was a self-administered mail survey. The questionnaire (Appendix E) was printed in four blocks of 50, using a different color paper stock per block to stratify the respondents into four segments (e.g., the first through 49th, 50th through 99th, 100th through 149th and 150th through 200th.) While maintaining respondent anonymity, this system was used to examine the question of whether chain-supplied stories would be acceptable to the smallest-circulation newspapers (e.g., those in the fourth strata). This question was tested by cross-tabulating the fourth strata against the others for those questions on chain acceptance. Because these newspapers are the smallest of the set, it was assumed that their responses were more influenced by financial considerations than the others. If so, this

influence might, in turn, affect their decision to accept a chain report in lieu of their own coverage.

Instrument Design.

Questionnaire design was modeled on Dillman's (1978) Total Design Method (TDM), which he cites as producing response rates as high as 75%. Perhaps as important as the possible return rate, however, is his thorough, step-by-step methodology, including a theoretical background, question wording, questionnaire design, scheduling, and numerous in-text examples of various types.

Based on the theory of social exchange, Dillman identifies three desirable factors in obtaining response: minimal cost to the respondent, maximal reward and trust that the reward will be established. (Crosby, et al. (1989) provide an excellent precis of Dillman's method.)

Costs are defined as the respondent's time and effort in completing a survey; Dillman recommends minimizing costs by making the task appear brief, and eliminating embarrassment or direct monetary costs. This is accomplished through clear and simple questionnaire design, anonymous or confidential returns, and by providing prepaid return envelopes. In this research, the pretest survey was redesigned to create a more visually appealing item (cf Appendices B and E); anonymity was guaranteed, and prepaid return envelopes were provided.

Rewards include showing positive regard for and verbal appreciation to the respondent, using a consulting approach, and making the questionnaire interesting. These goals are met by specific wording of the cover letter and careful selection of respondents to ensure they

would be interested in the questionnaire's topic. Judging from the amount and intensity of anti-pool commentary, it is assumed that managing editors would be interested in the topic; the cover letter (Appendix E) and other letters were modeled on the examples Dillman provides. in the fifth chapter of his book. Dillman suggests making a further reward offer: furnishing a copy of the completed study to interested respondents. Dillman claims this demonstrates social utility for the respondent; this offer was made to survey respondents.

Dillman (1978) recommends building trust by providing a token of appreciation and identifying with an organization of known legitimacy. Dillman suggests enclosing a pen as a token; however, due to mail handling and possible ink smearing from broken pens, this approach was omitted. Identification with a organization of known legitimacy was accomplished by using Arizona State University letterhead and envelopes.

Dillman (1978) suggests a fourth technique: the veiled threat. This rather grandiose-sounding item is in fact nothing more than a paragraph in the cover letter encouraging respondents to complete and mail the questionnaire quickly to avoid follow-up mailings. To encourage frank responses, anonymity was promised; a postcard bearing an identification number (Appendix F) and offer to send a copy of the completed study was included with the first two mailings to allow removal of respondents from the mailing list.

Response Rate

Response rate is of interest to researchers because low response rates bring the problem of response bias and the consequent inability

to generalize to the population (Babbie, 1990). Exactly what constitutes an "adequate" response rate, however, varies. Early studies (cf Andreason, 1970) show large response rates, normally above 50%; others using Dillman's TDM ranged between 75%-50%. Later studies, however, find response rates dipping well below 50%. For example, in their study of 93 journal articles, Yu and Cooper (1983) cite 47% as the average response rate; Heberlein and Baumgartner's 1981 study encompassing 13 studies found an average of 42%, and McCrohan and Lowe's 1981 study averaged 32% over four studies.

From the above review, it can be seen that response rates are generally dropping, although those involving professional populations or using Dillman's TDM demonstrated higher-than-average return rates. As outlined below, a number of response-enhancing factors were incorporated into survey design and administration; however, a key initial decision -- to canvass all 200 managing editors -- was made to provide a high initial "n." This entailed higher copy and postage costs than a random stratified survey, but offered a higher potential rate of return; a target response rate around 50% was anticipated.

Other researchers have identified factors increasing response rates; in his analysis of 12 studies, Linsky (1975) cites one or more follow-ups, pre-contact, the use of stamped versus metered or business-reply envelopes, a small cash reward and university auspices to increase response. In their analysis of 93 journal articles, Yu and Cooper (1983) suggest personalizing communications; Fox, et al. (1988) recommend using light green paper stock to improve response.

Follow-up timing and the number of follow-ups has attracted some attention. Heberlein and Baumgartner (1978) found that the first follow-up was most effective, while the second was less effective; successive follow-ups were only marginally effective. This study used two follow-ups, the first containing a duplicate questionnaire; most studies (cf Crosby, et al. (1989)) show the majority of response to the first mailing, with the second mailing generating the lion's share of further responses. On a cost-benefit basis, this study's third mailing was of the postcard-reminder type (Appendix G). Postage combinations have received a great deal of attention (cf Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978; Yu and Cooper, 1983); at worst, most combinations seem to cause minor, if any difference in return rate; this study used a stamped, university outgoing/business-reply return combination to minimize costs while establishing university auspices upon respondent's receipt.

Personalization of envelopes and letters has also received great scrutiny (cf Carpenter, 1974; Kerin, 1974; Neider and Sugrue, 1983; Wunder and Wynn, 1988). Again, most combinations seem to make little if any difference; for simplicity's sake, this study used letter-quality computer-generated labels for envelopes and individually-addressed letters.

The use of colored paper stock was critical to this study, as the promise of anonymity forced an alternate means of identification for the planned quartile analysis. Overall, Fox, et al.'s (1988) meta-analysis of 82 studies found that color at best only marginally increases response; however, it may be reasonably inferred that barring

aesthetically unpleasant colors, color does not retard response. Yellow, white, beige and light gray paper stock was thus used for the questionnaires.

Paper size seems to be of little concern; this study used 11 1/2- by 17-inch pages printed double-sided and folded to an 8 1/2- by 11-inch booklet. This departs from Dillman's (1978) recommendation of a slightly smaller (8 1/2- by 12 1/4-inch) booklet; however, this stems from the desire to keep mailing weight under the minimum (1 oz.) first-class postage limit and still fit standard envelopes. Neither factor was a problem in this study. Dillman recommends questionnaires to be less than 11 pages long; this study's questionnaire was eight pages. Like many questionnaires, this questionnaire was precoded; Stevens (1974) found no significant difference between precoded and uncoded questionnaires.

Schedule

Dillman (1978) recommends specific mailings at prescribed intervals. The first mailing should go out early in the week; this study's first mailing was mailed Sunday, March 8th. Dillman's second mailing, a postcard reminder, is to go out two weeks later; this study substituted a duplicate questionnaire/cover letter, based on Heberlein and Baumgartner's (1981) study results. This mailing was sent March 15th. This study's questionnaires were thus timed to arrive during the first two weeks of the survey period, with return during the first three weeks. Dillman's second follow-up, a duplicate questionnaire/cover letter, is timed to go out three weeks after the initial mailing; for

cost/benefit reasons, this study substituted a postcard follow-up, which was sent March 26th.

Dillman recommends a third follow-up, consisting of a duplicate questionnaire/cover letter, to be sent via certified mail seven weeks after the first. Due to time and fiscal constraints, this follow-up was omitted.

Definitions

To clarify terms used in the text, as well as to specify those terms defined by the author, the following definitions are included.

1. **Access problems:** Problems in transporting, supplying and handling pool members and their output. Problems ranged from transmission of print copy (Garneau, 1987a) to videotape transport (Pyle, 1988) to more troublesome problems, such as getting to the action (Cloud, 1990; Elson, 1990; Garneau, 1987c; Sheahan, 1988).

2. **Area of operations:** The area in which U.S. military activity takes place.

3. **Attitudes:** The term used to refer to responses to scales used in the survey; attitudes represent a preconceived response to certain stimuli in a given situation.

4. **Attitudinal problems:** Difficulties created by the military's and media's attitudes and consequent perceptions of the other; while largely attributed as a "legacy of Vietnam," (Sarkesian, 1987) other factors exist (Halloran, 1991; Trainor, 1991).

5. **Censorship:** A formal (e.g., through legal action) or informal (e.g., through voluntary withholding or persuasion to withhold) means of information control (Gibson, 1985).

6. **Chain ownership:** Ownership of multiple newspapers by one corporation or news entity (Charnley & Charnley, 1979).

7. **Chain reporter:** A reporter working for a news chain.

8. **Credibility:** The qualities of coverage that provide the public with a basis for accepting that coverage as an accurate reflection of reality. These qualities include integrity and capability, (Lipset & Schneider, 1983) trustworthiness and accuracy, (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986) and span and believability of coverage (Robinson & Kohut, 1988).

9. **Contingency operation:** A U.S. military conflict of limited duration and size, such as Operation Just Cause (the Panama invasion of 1989-90). In conflicts of larger scope, such as Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, press contingents are allowed to grow larger and while press pools remain in use, they are not the sole source of information availability.

10. **Gulf War:** The time period August 6, 1990 to March 4, 1991, encompassing operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During this time, U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and other allied forces prepared for war with Iraqi forces, (Operation Desert Shield, Aug. 6, 1990 - Jan. 15, 1991) and later delivered air and ground attacks against Iraqi forces in occupied Kuwait and Iraq (Operation Desert Storm, Jan. 16 - March 4, 1991).

11. **Logistical problems:** Difficulties in transporting, supplying and handling pool members and their output.

12. **Media:** Used as an all-purpose term to encompass all news-gathering organizations.

13. **National Security Considerations:** The term used to justify the withholding of various items of military information; such information might prove damaging if released indiscriminately.

14. **Operational problems:** Difficulties in operating the pools, including military field review of copy.

15. **Press pool:** A term used to describe a small group (6-17) of press members, representing the print and broadcast media, which accompany the U.S. military during contingency operations to cover their activity.

16. **Prior restraint:** As defined by Gillmor, et al, (1990) a type of press censorship which requires a reporter to submit copy to a government official for review before publication is allowed.

17. **"Right to Know":** An extension of First Amendment rights which allows the press to act as the public's representatives in obtaining information, chiefly from government (Silverberg, 1991).

18. **Staff reporter:** A reporter from a specific newspaper.

Limitations, Delimitations and Assumptions

Limitations include several different factors. Since this study utilizes a mail survey, the limitations of that method -- slow delivery and return speed, lost or misplaced mail, the generally low return rate and consequent question of validity, self-induced bias of respondents

and the uncertainty of exactly who completes the survey -- are inherent (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987). The author planned multiple follow-up mailings, which was the only factor which the researcher could adjust.

Other limitations are inherent in the population. It is not random, which introduces bias; however, the sample is assumed to be representative and well-defined. Since the newspapers surveyed are the largest of their universe -- all daily newspapers in excess of 50,000 circulation -- it is additionally assumed that they set the professional standards of the population. It is assumed that these newspapers are most affected by the limitations of press pools, since they possess the resources to send reporters to obtain coverage.

Limitations inherent in attitudinal surveys include the problem that behavior may not be inferred from attitudes measured, nor that causation may be implied from measurement correlation (Oppenheimer, 1966.) Face validity (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987) thus remains a necessary assumption. Additionally, while survey bias may be mitigated through pilot studies, a margin of error may remain. It is further assumed that attitudes regarding press pools are measurable and that the survey instrument, in its final form, is valid. This study conforms to the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA), third edition, style requirements.

Chapter Four: Findings

Pretest

The pretest was conducted February 14 - March 6, 1992. The survey frame was based on circulation figures (see Appendix C), and were the 201st through the 250th members of the list. As outlined earlier, the main survey design stratified the main survey frame, (e.g., newspapers with a daily circulation in excess of 50,000) with 50 members in each quartile. The pretest used the "next" 50 newspapers to avoid pretest sensitization in the main survey set and to pretest the questions. Response rate (n=7) was low, accounting for 14% of the sample; however, total returns after the March 6 cutoff point reached 28%, which closely mirrored the main survey's response rate.

An analysis of the pretest is probably not significant and is omitted here. In terms of testing the questions, it is worth noting that none of the seven respondents reported problems understanding or completing the pretest questions. Means of answers to the Likert scale questions fluctuated between one and five, with standard deviations ranging from approximately 0.5 to 2.0, indicating variability of answers and limited validation of the question set.

Main Survey

Administration and Return Tracking

The main survey was conducted March 8 - April 6, 1992. The first mailing was sent March 9th. The first follow-up mailing was sent March 16th, and the second follow-up was sent March 27th. Questionnaire

return rate is summarized at Table 1. The overall return rate was

Table 1: Questionnaire Response Rate

	Percent Received
Week 1 (March 9-16)	7%
Week 2	28%
Week 3	38%
Week 4	<u>28%</u>
Total	101%
	(n=58)

low (n=64); after excluding ineligible returns and those who declined to participate, usable n=58. Return of the postcard enclosed with surveys (see p. 40) tallied closely with the survey's return rate. Sixty-one postcards were received.

Return rate

Return rate, 29% (n=58) was lower than the hoped-for 50%. This return rate is, however, consistent with the trend of generally decreasing response rates (see p. 41). To address the consequent question of generalizability, attempts were made to locate demographic data on managing editors for comparison with the demographic data gathered. A literature search was fruitless, as was a review of the *Associated Press Managing Editors (APME) Redbook* (1989).

A call to APME headquarters (1992) in New York was not helpful; their response was that the idea of gathering demographics on members had "not come up." A call to the offices of the American Society of

Newspaper Editors produced a reference to their (1989) *The Changing Faces of the Newsroom*. The demographic data in this book, however, is based on a composite survey of all newsroom personnel: news executives, editors, reporters, photographers, etc. These demographics were not broken down into the subcategories listed above, rendering that data useless for comparison here. In summary, generalizability of this study to all managing editors may be limited, due to the small response size and consequent question of validity.

Dataset Verification

To check for errors in data transcription from the surveys to the computer dataset, 25% of the surveys (n=15) were randomly selected. The edge-coded surveys were manually checked against the computer dataset on-line; no errors were found.

Findings

Research Question One.

The overall research question was: Did press pool coverage of the Gulf War provide credible coverage for newspapers? A variety of questions were used to address this topic.

First, editors were asked to rate the credibility of coverage. It was hypothesized that editors would give coverage credibility high marks; results are shown at Table 2.

These results show that managing editors had a favorable opinion of coverage, with 59% issuing either a favorable or strongly favorable rating. Interestingly, over one-quarter (28%) of respondents expressed

Table 2: Credibility of Coverage

Assessment	Percentage
Strongly Agree	7%
Agree	52%
Neutral	14%
Disagree	28%
Strongly Disagree	<u>0%</u>
Total	101%
	(n=58)

Question read as follows: "Finally, how would you rate the overall accuracy and credibility of Gulf War coverage? Please check the block which most closely indicates the level of your agreement/approval:"

a negative response. This negative response could be explained by a lingering resentment of pool restrictions.

Next, an open-ended question was used to survey editors' opinions of press pool coverage. The hypothesis was that editors would express strongly negative opinions toward pooling. Results are tabulated at Table 3 (p. 52).

Overall, opinions were strongly negative, with 62% of those responding expressing a negative opinion. Mixed opinions were expressed by 28% of those responding, while 5% reported no problems.

Table 3: Opinions of Press Pools

Assessment	Percentage
Unacceptably Restricted Coverage	21%
Over-controlled the Press	21%
Other Negative	21%
Necessary but Too Many Problems	10%
Necessary but Overcontrolled Press	9%
Useful but Too Limiting	3%
Other Mixed	5%
No Problems	5%
No Opinion	<u>5%</u>
Total	100%
	(n=58)

Questions evaluated here will be discussed in the conclusions section of this study. Due to the low response rate of this study's survey, the conclusions reached will have a limited generalizability. The conclusions will, however, provide a basis for discussion.

Research Question Two.

The second research question was: Does fighting create more of an impetus to coverage than non-fighting? It was hypothesized that since conflict is a prime factor in a story's newsworthiness, respondents would be less inclined to accept delays and would be less likely to keep their pool reporters waiting if fighting were underway than if not.

A paired design was used to test the hypothesis. Scenarios were cast in pool and non-pool situations, creating a four-celled design.

Pool Scenario

In these scenarios (Questions 2 and 3, Appendix E), the editor's reporter is in a pool awaiting access to front-line units. The dependent variable is the factor of fighting versus non-fighting. Editors were asked to indicate their level of agreement toward accepting a given period as a reasonable period of delay. Since fighting was hypothesized to decrease acceptance of delays, the delay period in the nonfighting scenario where disapproval reached 50% or higher was selected as the "cut" level, since disapproval in the fighting scenario should have been even higher at that level. Responses at the paired level (a 4-7 day delay) are summarized at Table 4.

Table 4: Fighting v. Non-fighting: Pool scenarios*

Assessment	Fighting (4-7 day wait)	Non-fighting (4-7 day wait)
	Percent	Percent
Strongly agree	7%	9%
Agree	14%	10%
Neutral	14%	2%
Disagree	29%	21%
Strongly Disagree	<u>36%</u>	<u>58%</u>
Total	100%	100%
	(n=57)	(n=57)

* $p < .05$ significance determined by t-test.

Table 4: Text of Questions

Questions read as follows: (Fighting scenario) "Although fighting has begun, the military has again warned that access to front-line units may be delayed for an indefinite period. Your reporter is part of a pool; you have the option to have your reporter wait or to recall your reporter home. For each of the periods listed below, please check the category which most closely indicates your level or agreement/approval regarding that period as a reasonable period of delay."

(Non-fighting scenario) "In this scenario, fighting has not begun. The military has warned that access to front-line units may be delayed for an indefinite period. Your reporter is part of a pool; you have the option to have your reporter wait or to recall your reporter home. for each of the periods listed below, please check the category which most closely indicates your level or agreement/approval regarding that period as a reasonable period of delay."

Disapproval in the fighting scenario was 79%; disapproval in the non-fighting scenario was 65%. A t-test was used to determine significance; the difference between the scenarios was significant at the .05 level.

Non-pool Scenario

In these scenarios, the editor's reporter is not in a pool, but is waiting for access at an area behind the lines. Since these reporters are not as likely to gain access to front-line activity as their pool counterparts, it was hypothesized that while editors would display a

greater level of dislike in the fighting versus the non-fighting scenario, the difference would not be as pronounced. In terms of selecting the "cut" level, the reasoning is the same as above. The "cut" level in this scenario was also found at the 4-7 day delay level. Responses are summarized at Table 5.

Table 5: Fighting v. Non-fighting -- Non-pool scenarios

Assessment	Fighting (4-7 day wait)	Non-fighting (4-7 day wait)
	Percent	Percent
Strongly agree	7%	2%
Agree	12%	21%
Neutral	7%	9%
Disagree	22%	28%
Strongly Disagree	<u>51%</u>	<u>40%</u>
Total	99%	100%
	(n=57)	(n=57)

Table 5: Text of Questions

Questions read as follows: (Fighting scenario) "In this scenario, your reporter is not part of a pool, but is waiting with other reporters at a central location for access to front-line units. Fighting is underway. Your option is to have your reporter remain in place or to recall him/her. For the period given below, please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval regarding that period as a reasonable period of delay:"

(table continues)

(Non-fighting scenario) "In this scenario, assume your reporter is not part of a pool, but is instead waiting with other reporters at a central location for access to front-line units. Fighting has not begun. Your option is to have your reporter remain in place or to recall him/her. For the period given below, please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval regarding that period as a reasonable period of delay:"

Disapproval in the fighting scenario was 73%; disapproval in the non-fighting scenario was 68%. The t-test difference between these scenarios was not significant at the .05 level. This does bear out the direction of the hypothesis that in a non-pool situation, editors would not be as sensitive to the dependent variable. Because reporters in these scenarios would not have the likelihood of access that pool reporters would, the comparative variance in these scenarios could reasonably be expected to be less than the variance in pool scenarios.

Research Question Three.

The third question tested was: **Would editors of smaller newspapers (i.e., those in the fourth quartile) be more likely to recall their reporters than their counterparts at larger newspapers?** It was hypothesized that cost-productivity concerns would affect the smaller newspapers more than the larger newspapers. Editors of smaller newspapers would thus be more likely to call their people sooner.

The main survey design used a quartile design (i.e., four groups of fifty respondents in decreasing order of circulation). Questionnaires

were printed in sets of 50 on four different-colored paper stocks, with a specific color for each quartile. This approach provided a means to identify respondents' appropriate quartile while maintaining anonymity. This color, or group, variable was recoded to differentiate between the two circulation groups (i.e., groups 1-3 and group 4). The first through third sets were recoded into one set. This composite group was then tested against the fourth group using t-tests to determine if any significant differences existed in recall scenarios; none were found.

Research Question Four.

This question addressed chain-affiliated newspapers. Would editors of smaller newspapers, owing to the cost-productivity factor, recall their reporter in lieu of stories generated by reporters from a larger newspaper affiliated with the same chain? In essence, this would establish the chain as a smaller version of news services a'la the *Associated Press* or *United Press International*. It was hypothesized that although initial reaction to this idea would be negative, it would become more attractive as time progressed, particularly if fighting did not occur.

This hypothesis was tested by posing paired fighting and non-fighting scenarios. Respondents were asked to identify their chain affiliation, if any. If affirmative, they were asked if they would recall their reporter, providing that they could use stories from their chain. Chi-square statistics were used to test this hypothesis.

Responses are summarized at Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6: Chain Affiliation Questions -- Non-fighting Scenario

	Groups 1-3	Group 4
Yes	12	9
X ² : .03	D.F.: 1	p: .86
		Min E.F.: 8.22

Acceptable length(days)	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
1	0%	22%
2	0%	11%
3	22%	33%
4	11%	0%
5	33%	0%
7	33%	11%
8	0%	11%
10	<u>0%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	99%	99%
	(n=9)	(n=9)
X ² : 10.2	D.F.: 7	p: .18
		Min E.F.: .50

Table 6: Text of Questions

Questions read as follows: "In this scenario, fighting has not started. If your newspaper is a chain member, would you recall your reporter if another reporter from your chain was in the pool and your newspaper could use that reporter's stories? (Circle One) YES / NO

(Number of days) "If so, how many days would you wait until recalling your reporter? ____"

Table 7: Chain Affiliation Questions -- Fighting Scenario

	Groups 1-3	Group 4
Yes	7	9
X ² : .81	D.F.: 1	p: .37
		Min E.F.: 7.04
Acceptable length(days)	Groups 1-3 (Percent)	Group 4 (Percent)
1	29%	22%
3	14%	33%
5	0%	11%
7	14%	11%
8	14%	11%
10	<u>29%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Total	100%	100%
	(n=7)	(n=9)
X ² : 2.11	D.F.: 5	p: .83
		Min E.F.: 0.44

Table 7: Text of Questions:

Questions read as follows: "In this scenario, fighting has begun. If your newspaper is a chain member, would you recall your reporter if another reporter from your chain was in the pool and your newspaper could use that reporter's stories? (Circle One) YES / NO

(Number of days) "If so, how many days would you wait until recalling your reporter? _____"

Unfortunately, there simply were not enough affirmative responses in either scenario to evaluate the hypothesis, nor was n large enough to even determine direction. In terms of the decision to accept the chain-supplied report, the chi-square was less than 1 in either case.

Research Question Five.

This question addresses a possible source of bias: **Would the answers from respondents with prior military service differ from the answers of their colleagues without?** Several of the demographic questions used focused on the respondent's military service, if any; respondents with prior military service were compared versus those without. Positive and negative motivational factors may be present in prior service respondents.

These respondents may more readily accept restrictions due to their understanding of the military, or may identify with the military due to favorable experiences. Alternatively, respondents with military service may react negatively to the military due to unfavorable experiences.

This question was tested by crosstabbing all variables against the service/non-service variable. Significant differences were found over six variables, four of which are demographic: Age, gender, time in the profession and time as the managing editor of their newspaper. The remaining two variables deal with censoring stories regarding troop movements.

The first of the troop movement situations deals with a matter of degree. Respondents were asked for their level of agreement/approval

to delaying publication of a story concerning a major change in U.S. troop strength. Results are summarized at Table 8.

Table 8: Prior Service/Non-service Differences*

Major Troop Strength Change

	Prior Service(Percent)	Non-service(Percent)
Strongly Agree	24%	8%
Agree	21%	11%
Neutral	11%	8%
Disagree	17%	31%
Strongly Disagree	<u>27%</u>	<u>41%</u>
Totals	100%	99%
	(n=29)	(n=27)

* $p < .05$ significance determined by t-test.

Table 8: Text of Question.

Question read as follows: "Pre-established "ground rules" allow press escorts to review a reporter's story before release to resolve disputes over details of a sensitive nature. Again, please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/ approval to censoring a story on:"

The frequencies show that the prior service group is evenly split (45%/44%) between the agreement/disagreement sides of the Likert scale. Comparatively, non-service respondents clearly disagree (72%) with censoring the story. There are many possible explanations.

Age could provide one explanation: as we shall see, prior-service respondents were significantly older than their non-service colleagues. If one accepts the idea that individuals generally grow more conservative as they age, the split in the prior-service group may reflect an internal conflict between journalistic values and an increasingly conservative mindset.

Another explanation could be that ex-servicemen identify with military personnel to a greater degree than do non-servicemen. This identification factor may in turn lead to a greater consideration for troop safety among prior-service respondents.

The other troop movement scenario involves a time factor. This question was posed as agreement to withholding (censoring) a story on troop movements for six hours. Results are summarized at Table 9.

Table 9: Prior Service/Non-service Differences*

Delay Troop Movement Story for 6 Hours

	Prior Service(Percent)	Non-service(Percent)
Strongly Agree	21%	15%
Agree	55%	30%
Neutral	21%	22%
Disagree	0%	22%
Strongly Disagree	<u>3%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=29)	(n=27)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test.

(table continues)

Table 9: Text of Question.

Question read as follows: "The ground rules include the option to delay publication of a story for an indefinite period to resolve disputed passages. Fighting is underway; please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval regarding delaying publication of a story for the indicated period:"

Over three-fourths (76%) of the prior service group agreed to hold this story for six hours, compared to 45% of the non-service respondents. Again, concern for troop safety and identification with those troops due to service experiences is one explanation. Another explanation could be linked to age. Charnley and Charnley (1979) link the growth of the "adversarial journalism" norm with the media's experience in Vietnam. This adversarial attitude may be present in younger respondents to a greater degree than in older respondents.

Age is significantly different between the groups; results are shown at Table 10 (see p. 64). This difference can be explained several different ways.

One explanation deals with the use of compulsory service ("the draft") in the WW II / Korean War era through the Vietnam era (circa 1973). During this period, the height of the Cold War, military manpower requirements were significant. For example, those in the age 57-69 notch would have been subject to the WW II or Korean War draft. Only one (4%) of the non-service respondents fell into this notch, versus eight (28%) of the prior-service respondents.

Table 10: Prior Service/Non-service Differences*

Age	Prior Service(Percent)	Non-service(Percent)
29-38	0%	21%
39-56	72%	75%
57-65	<u>28%</u>	<u>4%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=29)	(n=28)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test.

Note. Age categories were unevenly collapsed to show distribution peaks.

Conversely, individuals younger than 39 -- six (21%) of the non-service respondents to none of the prior service respondents -- were never eligible for the Vietnam draft, and as such would have served only as volunteers. Two other factors are at work in the younger group: the "baby boomer" generation and the Vietnam-era "lottery" draft.

The post-WW II "baby boomer" generation was much larger than the "pre-boomer" generation, making a numerically larger group of "boomers" eligible for the draft than "pre-boomers." At the same time, the Vietnam-era "lottery" draft system selected a smaller percentage of eligible draftees than the WW II and Korean War drafts, as manpower requirements were not as pressing in Vietnam as they were in the WW II and Korean War eras. In combination, these two factors made it highly likely that boomers had far better odds of not being drafted than did

the pre-boomers. Educational deferments were also issued during the the Vietnam-era draft; although educational status was not surveyed in this group, it is possible that some younger respondents were in college during their draft-eligible years.

Gender is summarized at Table 11. All prior-service respondents were male; five (19%) of the non-service respondents were female.

Table 11: Prior Service/Non-service Differences*

Gender

	Prior Service(Percent)	Non-service(Percent)
Male	100%	82%
Female	<u>0%</u>	<u>19%</u>
Totals	100%	101%
	(n=29)	(n=28)

* $p < .05$ significance determined by t-test.

Possible explanations include the male-dominated nature of most professions, particularly before the 1970s; another explanation is that the vast majority of military specialties were restricted to males until the 1970s. Of those non-restricted specialties, a majority were in medical or administrative-related fields, neither of which, it can be hazarded, tend to produce journalists in any great numbers.

Years in the profession is summarized at Table 12. While approximately one-third (31%) of prior-service respondents had less than 23 years in newspapering, 79% of non-service respondents were found

Table 12: Prior Service/Non-service Differences*

Years in the Profession

	Prior Service(Percent)	Non-service(Percent)
7-22	31%	79%
23-43	<u>69%</u>	<u>21%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=29)	(n=28)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test.

Note. Categories were arbitrarily collapsed to show significant differences.

in this niche. This is likely a function of age; as the managing editor position is reached through experience (among other factors), it is likely that the individuals with more than 20-odd years would either retire or continue in managerial positions.

Years as managing editor is shown at Table 13. While prior-

Table 13: Prior Service/Non-service Differences*

Years as Managing Editor

	Prior Service(Percent)	Non-service(Percent)
1-5	45%	89%
6-26	<u>55%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=29)	(n=27)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test.

Note. Categories were arbitrarily collapsed to show significant differences.

service respondents were split roughly equally (45%/55%) between between the categories, the vast majority (89%) of non-service respondents are in the first category. Like years in the profession, this again is likely a function of age.

Research Question Six.

This question expanded research question three -- were there significant differences in answers from the smaller (quartile four) newspapers' editors versus their counterparts at larger newspapers? This question was addressed by crosstabulating the two subgroups -- groups one through three versus group four -- against the variables. Significant differences were found in variables 48 through 50.

These variables deal with a censorship scenario in which respondents are asked to indicate their level of agreement to delay publication of a troop movement story to resolve a specified number of sensitive details. Responses are summarized in Tables 14-16 (see pp. 68-69).

Editors of smaller newspapers agreed to delays more readily than did their counterparts at larger newspapers, but the difference decreased inversely to the number of details. In the first scenario (1-3 details), the agreement ratings were 50%/27% between the smaller/larger groups; in the second scenario (4-7 details), the rating difference dropped to 50%/30%, and in scenario three (8+) details, fell to 55%/43%. The difference at the larger newspapers may be attributable to the "adversarial relationship" response (see research question five above); but as the level of sensitive content and consequent peril to security consideration rises, common sense (and clearer heads) prevail.

Table 14: Groups 1-3 v. Group 4: Details*

A Few (1-3) Sensitive Details

	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
Strongly Agree	0%	20%
Agree	27%	30%
Neutral	11%	15%
Disagree	30%	25%
Strongly Disagree	27%	10%
No Opinion	<u>5%</u>	<u>0%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=20)

* $p < .05$ significance determined by t-test. Text of Question at Table 16.

Table 15: Groups 1-3 v. Group 4: Details*

Several (4-7) Sensitive Details

	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
Strongly Agree	0%	15%
Agree	30%	35%
Neutral	11%	20%
Disagree	24%	20%
Strongly Disagree	30%	10%
No Opinion	<u>5%</u>	<u>0%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=20)

* $p < .05$ significance determined by t-test. Text of Question at Table 16.

Table 16: Groups 1-3 v. Group 4: Details**

Many (8+) Sensitive Details

	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
Strongly Agree	5%	20%
Agree	38%	35%
Neutral	5%	15%
Disagree	24%	25%
Strongly Disagree	24%	5%
No Opinion	<u>3%</u>	<u>0%</u>
Totals	99%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=20)

**p<.051 significance determined by t-test.

Tables 14-16: Text of Question.

Question read as follows: "In the above scenario [fighting underway] the story is being held to resolve disclosure of a number of sensitive details. Please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval to delaying publication of a story for the indicated number of details:"

In the analysis of smaller v. larger newspapers, another set of differences were noted (see Tables 17-20). Ratings of escort capability and cooperation were significantly different.

Editors of smaller newspapers rated escort capability higher (21% v. 11%) than their counterparts (see Table 17); similarly, editors at

Table 17: Groups 1-3 v. Group 4: Escorts*

Escort Capability

	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
Strongly Agree	0%	5%
Agree	11%	16%
Neutral	14%	36%
Disagree	22%	21%
Strongly Disagree	16%	11%
No Opinion	<u>37%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=19)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test. Text of Question at Table 18.

Table 18: Groups 1-3 v. Group 4: Escorts*

Escort Cooperation

	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
Strongly Agree	0%	5%
Agree	8%	16%
Neutral	14%	26%
Disagree	24%	26%
Strongly Disagree	16%	16%
No Opinion	<u>38%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=19)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test.

(table continues)

Tables 17-18: Text of Question.

Question read as follows: "In Gulf War press pools, news passed through a series of gatekeepers: press escorts, and, when involved, their Joint Information Bureau (JIB) superiors and government policymakers. Press escorts and JIB superiors varied in capability (the ability to do their jobs) and cooperation (willingness to do those jobs within the ground rules.) Policymakers' roles are also important; because they set the ground rules, their capability and cooperation with the media "set the stage" for news coverage. Please check the block which most closely indicates your assessment of the overall performance of the indicated group with respect to the attribute listed:"

smaller newspapers rated escort cooperation higher (21% v. 8%) than their colleagues (see Table 18). T-tests were significant at the .05 level. This does match the hypothesis that field personnel would receive unfavorable but less negative ratings than the JIB or policymakers. Again, this may reflect an "adversarial relationship" mindset present in larger newspapers.

Similarly, the smaller newspapers demonstrated a more favorable response to the JIB than did their larger counterparts (see Tables 19-20). Smaller newspapers gave the JIB a higher rating (16% v. 5%) on capability and on cooperation (16% v. 0%). T-tests were significant at the .05% level. Again, results may reflect a normative response in larger newspapers due to the adversarial relationship mindset.

Table 19: Groups 1-3 v. Group 4: JIB*

JIB Capability

	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
Strongly Agree	0%	5%
Agree	5%	11%
Neutral	19%	31%
Disagree	22%	21%
Strongly Disagree	14%	21%
No Opinion	<u>40%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=19)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test.

Table 20: Groups 1-3 v. Group 4: JIB*

JIB Cooperation

	Groups 1-3(Percent)	Group 4(Percent)
Strongly Agree	0%	5%
Agree	0%	11%
Neutral	16%	31%
Disagree	27%	21%
Strongly Disagree	16%	21%
No Opinion	<u>41%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Totals	100%	100%
	(n=37)	(n=19)

*p<.05 significance determined by t-test.

(table continued)

Tables 19-20: Text of Question.

Question read as follows: "In Gulf War press pools, news passed through a series of gatekeepers: press escorts, and, when involved, their Joint Information Bureau (JIB) superiors and government policymakers. Press escorts and JIB superiors varied in capability (the ability to do their jobs) and cooperation (willingness to do those jobs within the ground rules.) Policymakers' roles are also important; because they set the ground rules, their capability and cooperation with the media "set the stage" for news coverage. Please check the block which most closely indicates your assessment of the overall performance of the indicated group with respect to the attribute listed:"

Research Question Seven.

The final subquestion analyzed assertions made regarding support from various levels of the military/governmental pool hierarchy. It was asserted that the military, particularly among policymakers and senior officials, distrusts the media; the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was also criticized, but while field personnel were criticized, they were seen in a more favorable light. Managing editors were asked to assess the individuals at each of the three groups regarding their capability (the ability to do their jobs) and cooperation (their willingness to do their jobs within the ground rules). It was hypothesized that although reactions would be predominantly negative to each group, reactions would be more favorable toward field personnel. This last question was: **Would respondents rate different the three groups differently?**

The hypothesis was tested by cross-tabbing each group against the others. Chi-squares were used to determine significance. Frequencies are reported at Table 21; crosstabs and chi-squares are shown at Tables 22-23. Since the number of cells in crosstab tables increase the chi-square statistic (and may cause Type 1 errors), the five agreement-disagreement categories (which would create a 25-cell crosstab) were collapsed to agreement-neutral-disagreement categories (creating a nine-cell crosstab) to minimize this possibility. Missing responses were also omitted in the crosstabs to minimize cell numbers.

Table 21: Pool Hierarchy -- Frequencies

Capability	Escorts Percent	JIB Percent	Policymakers Percent
Strongly Agree	2%	2%	2%
Agree	13%	7%	13%
Neutral	21%	23%	24%
Disagree	21%	21%	20%
Strongly Disagree	14%	16%	18%
No Opinion	<u>29%</u>	<u>31%</u>	<u>24%</u>
Totals	100%	100%	100%
	(n=56)	(n=56)	(n=55)

(table continued)

Table 21: Pool Hierarchy -- Frequencies

Cooperation

	Escorts Percent	JIB Percent	Policymakers Percent
Strongly Agree	2%	2%	2%
Agree	11%	2%	2%
Neutral	18%	18%	13%
Disagree	25%	31%	31%
Strongly Disagree	17%	16%	28%
No Opinion	<u>29%</u>	<u>31%</u>	<u>24%</u>
Totals	100%	100%	100%
	(n=56)	(n=56)	(n=55)

Text of Question shown in Table 23.

In terms of capability, the policymakers and press escorts finished in a dead heat (15%/15% approval rating), but the JIB didn't fare as well, with an approval rating of 9%. In the literature review, the JIB was frequently cited as a problem area for reporters, which may account for the comparatively lower rating. Both crosstabs of the JIB versus the other groups (Table 22) were significant at the .05 level.

Regarding cooperation (Table 21), the findings fit the hypothesis, as the JIB and policymakers tied with a 4% approval rating, compared to the escorts' 13% rating. Both crosstabs of escort cooperation versus the other groups (Table 23) are significant at the .05 level.

Although this may not be the sole explanation for the significance, the hypothesis does stand up to examination in this instance.

Table 22: Capability -- JIB Versus Other Groups*

JIB Capability v. Escort Capability

Count	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	No Opin	Escort
Exp Val					
Residual					
JIB	4	0	1	0	
Agree	.7	1.1	1.8	1.4	
	3.3	-1.1	-.8	-1.4	
Neutral	3	7	3	0	
	1.9	2.8	4.6	3.7	
	1.1	4.2	-1.6	-3.7	
Disagree	1	5	15	0	
	3.0	4.5	7.5	6.0	
	-2.0	.5	7.5	-6.0	
No Opin	0	0	1	16	
	2.4	3.6	6.1	4.9	
	-2.4	-3.6	-5.1	11.1	

X²: 80.09

D.F.: 9

*p: .00

Min E.F.: .71

Cells with E.F. < 5: 13 of 16 (81.3%).

JIB Capability v. Policymaker Capability

Count	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	No Opin	Policymaker
Exp Val					
Residual					
JIB	3	2	0	0	
Agree	.7	1.2	1.9	1.2	
	2.3	.8	-1.9	-1.2	
Neutral	2	6	5	0	
	1.9	3.1	5.0	3.1	
	.1	2.9	.0	-3.1	
Disagree	3	4	13	0	
	2.9	4.7	7.6	4.7	
	.1	-.7	5.4	-4.7	
No Opin	0	4	3	13	
	2.5	4.0	6.5	4.0	
	-2.5	-3.0	-3.5	9.0	

X²: 51.93

D.F.: 9

*p: .00

Min E.F.: .73

Cells with E.F. < 5: 14 of 16 (87.5%).

(table continues).

Table 23: Cooperation -- Escorts Versus Other Groups*

Escort Cooperation v. JIB Cooperation

Count	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	No Opin	JIB
Escorts	2	1	4	0	
Agree	.3	1.3	3.4	2.1	
Residual	1.8	-.1	.6	-2.1	
Neutral	0	6	4	0	
Disagree	.4	1.8	4.8	3.0	
No Opin	-.4	4.2	-.8	-3.0	
Agree	0	3	19	1	
Neutral	.8	4.1	11.1	7.0	
Disagree	-.8	-1.1	7.9	-6.0	
No Opin	0	0	0	16	
Agree	.6	2.9	7.7	4.9	
Residual	-.6	-2.9	-7.7	11.1	

X²: 76.61 D.F.: 9 *p: .00 Min E.F.: .25

Cells with E.F. < 5: 13 of 16 (81.3%).

Escort Cooperation v. Policymaker Cooperation

Count	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	No Opin	Policymaker
Escort	1	0	5	0	
Agree	.2	.8	3.6	1.4	
Residual	.8	-.8	1.4	-1.4	
Neutral	0	4	6	0	
Disagree	.4	1.3	6.0	2.4	
No Opin	-.4	2.7	.0	-2.4	
Agree	1	3	19	0	
Neutral	.8	2.9	13.8	5.4	
Disagree	.2	.1	5.2	-5.4	
No Opin	0	0	3	13	
Agree	.6	2.0	9.6	3.8	
Residual	-.6	-2.0	-6.6	9.2	

X²: 51.15 D.F.: 9 *p: .00 Min E.F.: .22

Cells with E.F. < 5: 12 of 16 (75.0%).

(table continues)

Tables 21-23: Text of Question.

Question read as follows: "In Gulf War press pools, news passed through a series of gatekeepers: press escorts, and, when involved, their Joint Information Bureau (JIB) superiors and government policymakers. Press escorts and JIB superiors varied in capability (the ability to do their jobs) and cooperation (willingness to do those jobs within the ground rules.) Policymakers' roles are also important; because they set the ground rules, their capability and cooperation with the media "set the stage" for news coverage. Please check the block which most closely indicates your assessment of the overall performance of the indicated group with respect to the attribute listed:"

There is, however, a problem in the chi-square tests: minimum expected frequencies dip below the minimum level (five) cited by Norusis (1988). Norusis recommends cross-checking the cells with expected frequencies < 5 statistic; if this figure does not surpass the 80% level, the chi-square test is invalid. This problem affects the escort cooperation v. policymaker cooperation test; while the direction clearly matches the other three tests, the cells with E.F. < 5 statistic falls beneath the 80% level and this test is thus invalidated. Once again, the relative lack of response limited analysis in this instance.

Conclusions

The analysis of this study was to result in an approximation of the attitudes of managing editors (MEs) toward the use of press pools in coverage of military contingency operations. Seven research questions

were developed; six were developed in the course of the literature review and questionnaire design, while research question six is an extension of research question three.

The first research question is the overarching question of this study: Did press pool coverage of the Gulf War provide credible coverage for newspapers? MEs were asked this question directly, and, as might be expected, responded favorably. While their overall rating -- 59% of those responding either agreed or strongly agreed that coverage was credible -- was favorable, more than one-quarter (28%) disagreed with the credibility of coverage.

MEs were offered an open-ended question to express their opinion of press pools, and their attitudes were strongly negative. One-fifth (21%) found coverage restrictions unacceptable; another fifth claimed the military over-controlled the press, while still another fifth expressed negative attitudes. Some MEs waxed eloquent over pooling's faults: for example, one respondent's full-page reply likened the experience to a military "Disneyland in the desert." Others characterized pooling as co-opting the media as "part of the war effort;" one said "much of the reporting smacked of cheering for our side rather than hard-nosed reportage." Two respondents chose brevity: "They sucked." Not all responses were negative; 17% ceded the need for some sort of restrictions but felt the pool system went too far. Five percent had no problems. Although the answer to research question one is that press coverage was credible, a majority of those responding gave little credit to press pools as an effective newsgathering method.

Research question two was: **Does fighting provided more of an impetus to news coverage than non-fighting?** Pool and non-pool scenarios were used to replicate conditions in the Gulf War, using the fighting/non-fighting condition as the dependent variable. "Cut" levels were set at the time element where more than 50% of respondents would disagree to continue waiting for access in the non-fighting scenario.

Fighting was found to be a statistically significant predictor of impetus at this level, as well as the levels above it; however, the results do indicate a "window" of roughly three days as an acceptable period of delay for more than 50% percent of respondents. While this would probably not prove true in practice (witness the two-day exclusion in Grenada), there is nevertheless evidence to suggest that a brief period of delay in access would be acceptable.

Research question three was based on cost/benefit considerations: **Would MEs at smaller newspapers (those in the fourth quartile) recall their reporters sooner than MEs at larger newspapers?** No significant differences were found; although the initial direction favored this hypothesis, attitudes past the 4-7 day threshold were inconclusive.

Research question four, again based on cost/benefit considerations, addressed chain-affiliated newspapers: **Would MEs at smaller newspapers accept reports from a larger chain-affiliated newspaper in lieu of stories from their own reporter?** Although the initial reaction was expected to be negative, the difference was expected to flatten as time passed. Unfortunately, there weren't enough responses to evaluate this question or even its direction.

Research question five yielded significant results. **Would MEs with prior military service provide different answers than their non-service counterparts?** This variable was significant in acceptance of security review of a story concerning major troop strength change, and in acceptance of a six-hour delay of a troop movement story. Although a number of explanations were possible, these two questions, in tandem, demonstrate a protectiveness on the part of prior-service MEs.

The prior-service MEs were also significantly different in a number of demographic categories: age, gender, years in the newspaper profession and years as the managing editor of his/her newspaper. While service eligibility, gender, years in the profession and as the ME could all be explained as a function of age, the differences between these two groups, whether due to age or service status, illustrate a definite division of groups. The virtually even division between categories -- 29 prior-service MEs v. 28 non-service MEs -- gives credence to these differences, as the relatively small "n" in this study could cause Type I errors.

Research question six, as noted above, is an extension of research question three: **Would MEs at smaller newspapers provide different answers than MEs at larger newspapers?** Significant differences were found in attitudes toward publication delays to resolve a specified number of sensitive details. Although differences in the agreement level declined inversely to the number of details, all three were significant. This may indicate a greater willingness among MEs at smaller newspapers to accept delays; MEs at larger newspapers may

may initially be predisposed toward an adversarial relationship with governmental bureaucracies, or a combination of the two may be in effect. The direction of responses from both categories change inversely to the number of details involved, which tends to support the latter "combination" hypothesis.

The MEs of smaller newspapers also differed from their counterparts in their attitudes toward the three levels -- press escorts, Joint Information Bureau personnel and policymakers -- of government representatives in the press pool process. The MEs at smaller papers gave press escorts higher marks for capability and cooperation vis-a-vis the other government personnel than did their colleagues at larger papers, reflecting the general trend of opinion in the literature review. Surprisingly, the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) personnel also fared better with the "smaller" MEs; whether this reflects a lower level of disenchantment with bureaucracies at this level or a greater level of trust in government is unclear.

Research question seven returns to the press pool hierarchy: **Would respondents rate the three groups differently in terms of capability and cooperation?** Again, the literature review indicated a negative but relatively favorable attitude toward press escorts.

Not surprisingly, the JIB was rated lowest in terms of capability, which reflected a trend in the literature review. The cooperation ratings supported the hypothesis that press escorts were seen in a more favorable light, which may again reflect the "adversarial relationship" response.

Summary

Press pools have been plagued by problems since their introduction. A review of Gulf War literature revealed problems in three categories: attitudinal, logistical and operational. Attitudinal problems were rooted in a lack of trust between the media and military, setting the stage for conflict. Logistical problems were manifested as copy transport and access problems; access was clearly the more troublesome of the two. Operational problems were largely seen as problems with press escorts, particularly with copy review delays. Two lawsuits filed against the government over pooling were inconclusive.

This study used a self-administered mail survey of managing editors at the 200 largest daily circulation newspapers to address the credibility of Gulf War coverage. Response was low (29%); attempts to find demographic information for comparison purposes was futile.

While MEs found that coverage of the Gulf War was credible, theirs was not a ringing endorsement. While a majority agreed that coverage was credible, nearly one-third disagreed; respondents clearly indicated dissatisfaction with the press pool system.

There were some clear-cut findings. Respondents were willing to accept some delays in coverage, but after four to seven days, a majority of respondents were unwilling to wait any longer. Whether in a pool or waiting behind the lines, whether fighting was underway or not, the three-day period was the maximum acceptable delay.

A respondent's prior military service clearly affected some answers. While a number of the affected categories -- age, gender, years in the

profession and years as the managing editor -- have age-related explanations, prior-service editors were more concerned about troop safety than their counterparts. These editors favored delaying publication of troop movement stories longer than the non-service editors; unlike their colleagues, these editors were split over censoring major troop movement stories.

Other significant differences were found among managing editors of the smallest-circulation newspapers versus their colleagues at larger newspapers. The editors of smaller newspapers were more inclined to delay publication of troop movement stories than their counterparts; although the difference between these groups declined inversely to the number of details involved, the difference was significant at all three levels surveyed. These smaller editors were also more tolerant of press escorts and Joint Information Bureau superiors than were MEs at larger newspapers.

As expected, MEs gave individuals at all levels of the press pool hierarchy low marks, but the difference in ratings was significant. Press escorts and policymakers were seen as being more capable than JIB personnel, but escorts were seen as more cooperative. Tests of the latter comparison, however, were marred by low response rates. Although the direction of the relationship was clear, the low response rate invalidated the escort v. policymaker comparison.

Chapter Five: Postscript

"The more things change, the more they are the same."
Alphonse Karr (Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 1980, p. 288).

Following the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf (March 4, 1991), the media's attention shifted to other matters. The controversy over pooling did not, however, disappear: as mentioned above, the media issued their ad hoc report in July, and also sent a 10-point statement of principles to Defense Secretary Richard "Dick" Cheney.

This statement demanded changes in the way U.S. military operations were to be covered in future conflicts; specifically, the statement demanded open, independent reporting, not press pools, as the standard means of coverage. Additionally, the statement listed requirements abolishing security review, mandating access to all major military units, requiring timely and secure transmission of independently-gathered copy, and limiting the authority of public affairs offices. Limited use of pools would be allowed in the opening hours -- 24 to 36 -- of a conflict or in areas where open coverage would be "physically impossible" (Gersh, 1992b, p. 24 [Copy at Appendix H]).

Following a September 12 meeting with senior representatives of the *Associated Press* (AP), the *Washington Post*, *ABC News*, the *Los Angeles Times*, *Knight-Ridder* and former *American Society of Newspaper Editors* president Burl Osborne, Secretary Cheney directed Pete Williams, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to meet with media representatives to iron out an agreement (Gersh, 1991j).

Discussions with Washington bureau chiefs of the *AP*, *Knight-Ridder*, *ABC News*, *Time* magazine and the *Washington Post* were to begin in September and conclude in February, 1992 (Gersh).

The revised guidelines were informally released in March, 1992; although the document was not formally endorsed by either the heads of media organizations nor by Secretary Cheney, that step is largely a formality.

Nine of the 10 original demands were accepted with minor editorial changes; but the two sides could not agree upon the prior review issue. For their part, the media asserted that they would "abide by clear operational security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary." (Gersh, 1992b, p. 18). Citing their record in the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and other wars, the media concluded that journalists should be trusted and that "We will challenge prior security review" if attempted in future conflicts (Gersh).

The military sounded a conservative note, saying that they must "retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop safety or the success of a mission." (Gersh, 1992, p. 18). The review system, however, was significantly altered from the Gulf War model.

Implemented only to prevent disclosure of information which might jeopardize safety or success, the system would still use initial field review. Unlike the Gulf War system, this initial review, conducted by the [local] military commander's representative, leaves the copy in the reporter's control. If left unchanged, the disputed copy would be

dispatched to the reporter's editor, who would then contact the Pentagon to discuss security concerns, effectively leaving copy review and editing in the media's hands.

But what has really changed? Under the new rules, pools will still be used, primarily in the first hours (where they've generally worked well) or in situations where access is limited. Access to special operations will be limited "in some cases;" copy transmission and transportation responsibilities lie with the military "consistent with its capabilities" (Gersh, 1992, p. 24).

Additionally, the review issue begs clarification; outside the ground rules, there would be little to limit publication. The words of the Washington bureau chief linger: "It's not my job to keep your secrets; if I get one, and it's a good story, I'm going to print it." (Soucy, 1991, p. 109). Clearly, the gray areas allow room for leeway, but also for trouble.

At the beginning of the literature review, an anecdote centered on trust, and it is to trust we return. The Roman philosopher Publius Syrus wrote "Trust, like the soul, never returns once gone." (Evans, 1968). Whether trust is completely gone remains to be seen, but it certainly has not flourished between the military and the media of late; its future remains a question.

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Appendix A

Operation Desert Storm Ground Rules (14 Jan 91)

Guidelines for News Media (14 Jan 91)

U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM] Pool Membership
and Operating Procedures (30 Jan 91)

Note: Pages are reduced to 80% of original size to allow
placement of "Press Pool" headers.

PREFACE

POLICY OVERSIGHT MATERIALS

Operation Desert Shield

GROUND RULES—JANUARY 14, 1991

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Nations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.

(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA—JANUARY 14, 1991

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations—Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news

value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies. Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopard-

ize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed mate-

rials to JIB Dhahran for review by the Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD-PA for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES—JANUARY 30, 1991

General

The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool concept for providing news to the widest possible American audience during the initial stages of U.S. military activities in the Arabian Gulf area. The CENTCOM pools will be drawn from news media within Saudi Arabia. Their composition and operation should not be confused with that of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The pools are a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media's desire for unilateral coverage with the logistics realities of the military operation, which make it impossible for every media representative to cover every activity of his or her choice, and with CENTCOM's responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations. There is no intention to discriminate among media representatives on the basis of reporting content or viewpoint. Favoritism or disparate treatment of the media in pool operations by pool coordinators will not be tolerated. The purpose and intention of the pool concept is to get media representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau-Dhahran for filing—rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media coverage of combat and combat-related activity as soon as possible. There will be two types of pools: eighteen-member pools for ground combat operations and smaller, seven-member pools for ground combat and other coverage. Pools will be formed and governed by the media organizations that are qualified to participate and will be administered through pool appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB-Dhahran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by CENTCOM on January 15, 1991.

Pool participation

Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and that have had a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except for pool positions specifically designated as "Saudi" or "international." Pool positions will be divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, news magazine, newspaper, pencil, photo, Saudi, and international. Media that do not principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM media pool in the international category.

Pool procedures

Because of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations are represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more organizations and individuals will arrive in the future, membership in all categories except pencil will be by organization rather than specific individual. An organization will be eligible to participate in pool activities only after being a member of the appropriate media pool category for three continuous weeks. Members of a single-medium pool may use their discretion to allow participation by organizations which have had a significant stay in country, but which have had breaks in their stay that would otherwise cause them to be ineligible to participate under the three-continuous-weeks rule.

The single-medium pools will be formed and governed by the members. The members of each category will appoint a pool coordinator who will serve as the spokesperson and single point of contact for that medium. The print media will select a coordinator who will serve as the point of contact for the pencil cat-

egory. Any disputes about membership in or operation of the pool shall be resolved by the pool coordinator.

Each single-medium pool coordinator will maintain a current list of members and a waiting list prioritized in the order in which they should be placed on the pools. The same order will be used to replace pool members during normal rotations and those individual members who return from the field prematurely and who do not have another individual in Dhahran from their organization to replace them.

Membership of standing pools will rotate approximately every two to three weeks as the situation permits.

Pool categories and composition:

Television: The television category will be open to the major television networks.

Radio: The radio category will be open to those radio networks that serve a general (nonprivate) listening audience.

Wire Service: The wire service category will be open to the major wire services.

News Magazine: The news magazine category will be open to those major national news magazines that serve a general news function.

Newspaper: The newspaper category will be divided into two subcategories for participation in the eighteen-member pools. One will be open to those major papers and newspaper groups that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and which have had a continuous or near-continuous presence in Saudi Arabia since the early stages of the operation, such as the *New York Times*, *Cox*, *Knight-Ridder*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, and *Boston Globe*. The second category will include all other newspapers.

Pencil: The general category of "pencil" (print reporter) may be used by the print media pool coordinator in assigning print reporters to the smaller pools. All eligible print reporters may participate.

Photo: The photography category will be divided into the four subcategories of wire, newspaper, magazine, and photo agency. Participants may take part in only one subcategory.

Saudi: The Saudi category will be open to Saudi reporters as determined by the Saudi Ministry of Information liaison in the JIB-Dhahran. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

International: The international category will be open to reporters from organizations which do not principally serve the American public from any news medium. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

SHARING OF MEDIA PRODUCTS WITHIN THE CENTCOM POOLS

Pool participants and media organizations eligible to participate in the pools will share all media products within their medium; e.g., television products will be shared by all other television pool members and photo products will be shared with other photo pool members. The procedures for sharing those products and the operating expenses of the pool will be determined by the participants of each medium.

ALERT PROCEDURES FOR COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL ACTIVATION

When the pools are to be activated, the JIB-Dhahran director or his designated representative will call each of the pool coordinators and announce the activation of the pools. The pool co-

ordinators will be told when and where the pool members are to report (the reporting time will be within—but not later than—two hours of alert notification).

Operational security (OPSEC) considerations are of the utmost concern JIB personnel, pool coordinators, and pool members need to be especially cognizant of OPSEC. All involved with the activation of the pools need to remain calm and unexcited. Voice inflection, nervous behavior, etc., are all indi-

cators that something extraordinary is underway and could signal that operations are imminent.

Neither pool coordinators nor pool members will be told if the activation is an "exercise" or actual "alert."

Pool members should report to the predesignated assembly area dressed for deployment, with the appropriate equipment and supplies.

Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Appendix B

Pilot Study Questionnaire

Note: Pages are reduced to 80% of original size to allow placement of "Press Pool" headers.

Press Pools Questionnaire

Almost a year has passed since the Gulf War ended, but questions about the war still remain; for the media, one of the most controversial questions is the use of press pools. Although the joint media-Pentagon group report (due this month) on planning for future media coverage has not yet been released, press pools will likely remain part of coverage.

This questionnaire is designed to gain your responses to a series of questions regarding press pool coverage of U.S. military wartime operations. The survey covers three general topics: access, censorship and credibility. Where indicated, please assume one of your reporters has been selected to participate in a pool at a site outside the continental United States.

Please do not sign, indicate your newspaper's name, or otherwise indicate your identity on the questionnaire. To allow you the freedom to fully and honestly express your views, you may be assured of complete anonymity. To verify completion of the questionnaire, (and avoid follow-up mailings) please print your name on the enclosed postcard so that we may remove it from our mailing list; to request a copy of the completed study, please check the box on the postcard. *Only* the questionnaire should be returned in the postage-paid envelope.

Thank you for taking the time to complete and return this questionnaire. Comments and criticisms are welcomed; if there are any, please indicate them on the back of this sheet.

ABOUT YOUR NEWSPAPER

1

Daily circulation _____ (3) Chain affiliation (e.g., Knight-Ridder, Gannett, etc.) _____ (4)

1. In general, how do you feel about press pools as they were used in the Gulf War? (If more space is needed, please use the back cover of the questionnaire.) (5)

The following questions, unless otherwise indicated, seek your responses on an agreement/disagreement scale. Abbreviations for the five-category scale (strongly agree/approve, agree/approve, neutral, disagree/disapprove, strongly disagree/disapprove) are shown below:

SA	A	N	D	SD
strongly	agree /		disagree /	strongly
(agree / approve)	(approve)	(neutral)	(disapprove)	(disagree / disapprove)

The abbreviations shown will be used for brevity; the scale and abbreviations can be found at the top of each page for easy reference.

ACCESS

2. In this scenario, fighting has started. The military has warned that access to front-line units may be delayed for an indefinite period. Your reporter is part of a pool; you have the option to have your reporter wait on-scene or recall your reporter home. For each of the time periods indicated below, please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval re the given period as a reasonable period of delay:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
1 DAY.....						(6)
2-3 DAYS.....						(7)
4-7 DAYS.....						(8)
8-10 DAYS.....						(9)
11-14 DAYS.....						(10)

SURVEY CONTINUES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE

SA A N D SD
 strongly agree / disagree / strongly
 (agree / approve) (approve) (neutral) (disapprove) (disagree / disapprove)

3. In this scenario, assume your reporter is NOT part of a press pool, but is instead waiting with other reporters at a central location for access to front-line units while fighting is underway. Your option is to have your reporter remain or to recall him/her. For the time periods given below, please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement /approval re the given period as a reasonable period of delay:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
1 DAYS.....						(11)
2-3 DAYS.....						(12)
4-7 DAYS.....						(13)
8-10 DAYS.....						(14)
11-14 DAYS.....						(15)

4. If your newspaper is a member of a chain, would you recall your reporter IF another reporter from your chain was in the pool and your newspaper could use that reporter's story? (Circle One) YES / NO (16)

5. If so, how many days would you wait until recalling your reporter?
 _____ (17)

6. If fighting was not underway, would your answers to questions 2-4 change? (Circle one) YES / NO (18)
 (If your answer is "NO," please skip to question 8.)

7. If so, how? (If more space is needed, please use the back cover of the questionnaire.) (19)

SA A N D SD 3
 strongly agree / (neutral) disagree / strongly
 (agree / approve) (approve) (disapprove) (disagree / disapprove)

CENSORSHIP

8. Pre-established "ground rules" allow press escorts to review a reporter's story before release to resolve disputes over details of a sensitive nature. Please check the block below which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval to censoring a story containing information on:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
MINOR U.S. TROOP MOVEMENTS.....						(20)
MAJOR U.S. TROOP MOVEMENTS.....						(21)
PROBLEMS WITH UNIMPORTANT EQUIPMENT.....						(22)
PROBLEMS WITH IMPORTANT EQUIPMENT.....						(23)
MINOR ERRORS BY U.S. FORCES.....						(24)
MAJOR ERRORS BY U.S. FORCES.....						(25)
MINOR CHANGE IN U.S. TROOP STRENGTH.....						(28)
MAJOR CHANGE IN U.S. TROOP STRENGTH.....						(29)

9. The "ground rules" include the option to delay publication of a story for an indefinite period of time to resolve disputed passages. Fighting is underway in this scenario. Please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/ approval re delaying publication of a story for the indicated period of time:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
A TROOP MOVEMENT STORY FOR 6 HOURS.....						(30)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 12 HOURS.....						(31)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 18 HOURS.....						(32)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 24 HOURS.....						(33)
A STORY WITH A FEW (1-3) SENSITIVE DETAILS...						(34)
A STORY WITH SEVERAL (4-7) SENSITIVE DETAILS.						(35)
A STORY WITH MANY (8+) SENSITIVE DETAILS.....						(36)

10. In one press pool expedition, difficulty in providing transport to front-line units was perceived as censorship, as reporters were "kept" from the action. In this scenario, fighting is underway. The military has told your reporter there may be a delay in transport to front-line units. Your option is to leave your reporter in place or to recall him/her home. Please check the block which most closely indicates your level of acceptance to the given period of delay:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
29 MINUTES.....						(37)
30 MINUTES TO 1 HOUR.....						(38)
2-4 HOURS.....						(39)
5-7 HOURS.....						(40)
8-10 HOURS.....						(41)
11-14 HOURS.....						(42)
15-19 HOURS.....						(43)
20-24 HOURS.....						(44)
MORE THAN 24 HOURS.....						(45)

SURVEY CONTINUES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE

SA A N D SD 4
 strongly agree / disagree / strongly
 (agree / approve) (approve) (neutral) (disapprove) (disagree / disapprove)

CREDIBILITY

11. As perceived by the public, the level of news credibility often seems to vary. Researchers have identified a series of attributes related to news credibility; these attributes include integrity, capability and accuracy. Please check the block which most closely indicates the level of agreement/approval regarding the overall performance of reporters with respect to the attribute listed:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
INTEGRITY OF REPORTERS.....						(46)
CAPABILITY OF REPORTERS.....						(47)
ACCURACY OF REPORTERS.....						(48)

12. In Gulf War press pools, news passed through a series of gatekeepers: press escorts, their Joint Information Bureau (JIB) superiors (if involved) and governmental policymakers. Press escorts and their JIB superiors varied in capability (ability to do their jobs) and cooperation (willingness to do their jobs within the ground rules). Policymakers play an important role; because their policies define the ground rules and their implementation, their capability and cooperation with the media in setting the ground rules "set the stage" for news coverage. Please check the block which most closely indicates the level of your agreement/approval regarding the overall performance of the indicated group with respect to their capability and cooperation:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
CAPABILITY OF PRESS ESCORTS.....						(49)
COOPERATION OF PRESS ESCORTS.....						(50)
CAPABILITY OF JIB SUPERIORS.....						(51)
COOPERATION OF JIB SUPERIORS.....						(52)
CAPABILITY OF POLICYMAKERS.....						(53)
COOPERATION OF POLICYMAKERS.....						(54)

13. Finally, how would you rate the overall accuracy and credibility of Gulf War coverage? Please check the block which most closely indicates the level of your agreement/approval:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	
ACCURACY OF THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE.....						(55)
OVERALL CREDIBILITY OF COVERAGE.....						(56)

SURVEY CONCLUDES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE

Information About You

12. To provide demographic information on the managing editors surveyed, please complete the following questions:

Year born: _____ (57)

Gender (Circle one) MALE / FEMALE (58)

Years in the newspaper profession: _____ (59)

Years as Managing Editor of your newspaper: _____ (60)

Have you served in the U.S. armed forces? (Circle one) YES / NO (61)

If so, how long? _____ (62)

Which branch? (Circle one)

Air Force Army Coast Guard Marine Corps Navy (65)

Highest rank held? _____ (63)

This completes this survey of managing editors on press pools. Thank you for your participation; it is greatly appreciated. Should you desire a copy of the resultant study, please check the box on the enclosed postcard and a copy will be sent to you when the study is complete.

Appendix C

Circulation List
1st-250th Largest Daily Circulation U.S. Newspapers

Note: Page are reduced to 80% of original size to allow
placement of "Press Pools" headers

U.S. NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION SUMMARY (ranked by total daily)

Table with 6 columns: Rank, Newspaper Name, Morning or All Day, Evening, Total, Sunday. Lists 250 newspapers and their circulation figures.

Circulation from Audit Bureau of Circulations

Data Bank copyrighted 1980 unless newspaper name is preceded by a square symbol

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CIRCULATION 91

Appendix D

Mailing List
1st-200th Largest Daily Circulation U.S. Newspapers

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Times Mirror Sq.
Los Angeles, CA 90053

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Managing Editor
Philadelphia Inquirer
400 N. Broad St.
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Christina Bradford
Managing Editor
The Detroit News
615 Lafayette Blvd.
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Chicago Sun-Times
401 N. Wabash Ave.
Chicago, IL 60611

Peter Thompson
Managing Editor
The Oregonian
1320 S.W. Broadway
Portland, OR 97201

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Kansas City, MO 64108

Alex MacLeod
Managing Editor
Seattle Times
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Miami Herald
One Herald Plaza
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Norman Pearlstine
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The Wall Street Journal
200 Liberty St.
New York, NY 10281

Matthew Storin
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New York Daily News
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New York, NY 10017

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Newsday
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Lou Colasuonno
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New York Post
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New York, NY 10002

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Managing Editor
Atlanta Journal-Constitution
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Atlanta, GA 30302

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Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel
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Milwaukee, WI 53201

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Phoenix Republic
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Baltimore Sun
Calvert & Centre Streets
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Houston, TX 77210-4747

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Lori Demo
Managing Editor
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Managing Editor
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Appendix E

Cover Letter

Follow-Up Cover Letter

Main Survey Questionnaire

Note: Pages are reduced to 80% of original size to allow placement of "Press Pool" headers.

Arizona State University

*Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Telecommunication
Tempe, Arizona 85287-1305
(602) 965-5011*

Gerry Molina
Managing Editor
Lawrence Eagle-Tribune
P.O. Box 100
Lawrence, MA 01842

March 9, 1992

Just over a year has passed since the Gulf War ended, but questions about the war remain. For the media, one of the most controversial questions of coverage was the use of press pools. A joint media-Pentagon panel was formed last September to decide the nature of future media coverage, but its recommendations have not yet been announced. However, it is likely that press pools will remain a part of U.S. war coverage.

Despite numerous editorials, commentaries and stories on the use of press pools, there are few reported research findings on media attitudes regarding the use of press pools. Toward that end, you have been selected for a nationwide sample of managing editors of daily newspapers. To ensure that research findings accurately represent editors' attitudes, it is important that each questionnaire is completed and returned.

Anonymity is offered to encourage frank responses. A postcard bearing an identification number is enclosed; this method was chosen to allow identification of respondents while maintaining their anonymity. To verify completion of the survey (and avoid follow-up mailings) please fill out and mail the postcard when you return the completed survey.

This research is conducted to fulfill requirements toward my master's degree at Arizona State University; however, a condensed version of this study will be submitted for publication. If you would like to have a copy of this study, please check the box on the postcard and a copy will be sent to you.

I would be happy to answer any questions you have regarding this study. If you have any questions, please contact me at (602) 966-7681. Thank you for your assistance.

Jay C. Steuck

Arizona State University

Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Telecommunication
Tempe, Arizona 85287-1395
(602) 965-5011

Gerry Molina
Managing Editor
Lawrence Eagle-Tribune
P.O. Box 100
Lawrence, MA 01842

March 16, 1992

Last week a questionnaire seeking your opinions about the use of press pools in wartime coverage of the U.S. military was mailed to you. You were selected as part of a nationwide sample of managing editors.

If you have already completed and returned the questionnaire, please accept my sincere thanks. If not, please do so today. Because this study surveys a sample of managing editors at major metropolitan dailies, it is important that yours be included if the results are to accurately represent the opinions of managing editors.

If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got misplaced, a duplicate is enclosed. Anonymity is offered to encourage frank responses. A postcard bearing an identification number is enclosed; this method was chosen to allow identification of respondents while maintaining their anonymity. To verify completion of the survey (and avoid follow-up mailings) please fill out and mail the postcard when you return the completed survey.

This research is conducted to fulfill requirements toward my master's degree at Arizona State University; however, a condensed version of this study will be submitted for publication. If you would like to have a copy of this study, please check the box on the postcard and a copy will be sent to you.

I would be happy to answer any questions you have regarding this study. If you have any questions, please contact me at (602) 966-7681. Thank you for your assistance.

Jay C. Steuck

PRESS POOLS QUESTIONNAIRE

Almost a year has passed since the Gulf War ended, but questions about the war still remain. For the media, one of the most controversial elements of war coverage was the use of press pools. Although the joint media-Pentagon group report on planning for future media coverage has not been released, press pools will likely remain part of coverage.

This questionnaire is designed to gain your responses to a series of questions regarding the use of press pools. Where indicated, please assume one of your reporters has been selected to participate in a pool outside the continental United States.

Please do not sign, list your newspaper's name, or otherwise indicate your identity on the questionnaire. To allow you the freedom to fully and honestly express your views, the questionnaire has been designed to assure complete anonymity. To verify completion of the questionnaire (and avoid follow-up mailings) please print your name on the enclosed postcard so that we may remove your name from our mailing list. To request a copy of the completed study, check the box on the postcard. Only the questionnaire should be returned in the postage-paid envelope.

Thank you for taking the time to complete and return this questionnaire. Your cooperation is appreciated.

 /
N (1) G (2)

SA	A	N	D	SD	NO 2
strongly	agree/		disagree/	strongly	no
agree/approve	approve	neutral	disapprove	disagree/disapprove	opinion

3. Although fighting has begun, the military has again warned that access to front-line units may be delayed for an indefinite period. Your reporter is part of a pool; you have the option to have your reporter to wait or to recall your reporter home. For each of the periods indicated below, please check the category which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval regarding that period as a reasonable period of delay.

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
1 DAY	---	---	---	---	---	---	(12)
2-3 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(13)
4-7 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(14)
8-11 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(15)
12-15 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(16)
16-24 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(17)

4. In this scenario, assume your reporter is not part of a pool, but is instead waiting with other reporters at a central location for access to front-line units. Fighting has not begun. Your option is to have your reporter remain in place or to recall him/her. For the periods given below, please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval regarding that period as a reasonable period of delay:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
1 DAY	---	---	---	---	---	---	(18)
2-3 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(19)
4-7 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(20)
8-11 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(21)
12-15 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(22)
16-24 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(23)

SURVEY CONTINUES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE

SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	4
strongly	agree/		disagree/	strongly	no	
agree/approve	approve	neutral	disapprove	disagree/disapprove	opinion	

(Question 10 continued) Pre-established "ground rules" allow press escorts to review a reporter's story before release to resolve disputes over details of a sensitive nature. Again, please check the block below which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval to censoring a story on:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
MINOR ERRORS BY U.S. FORCES	---	---	---	---	---	---	(38)
MAJOR ERRORS BY U.S. FORCES	---	---	---	---	---	---	(39)
MINOR CHANGE IN U.S. TROOP STRENGTH	---	---	---	---	---	---	(40)
MAJOR CHANGE IN U.S. TROOP STRENGTH	---	---	---	---	---	---	(41)

11. The ground rules include the option to delay publication of a story for an indefinite period to resolve disputed passages. Fighting is underway; please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval regarding delaying publication of a story for the indicated period:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
A TROOP MOVEMENT STORY FOR 6 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(42)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 7-12 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(43)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 13-18 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(44)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 19-24 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(45)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 25-36 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(46)
THE ABOVE STORY FOR 37-48 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(47)

12. In the above scenario, the story is being held to resolve disclosure of a number of details. Please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval to delaying publication of a story for the indicated number of reasons:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
A FEW (1-3) SENSITIVE DETAILS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(48)
SEVERAL (4-7) SENSITIVE DETAILS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(49)
MANY (8+) DETAILS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(50)

SURVEY CONTINUES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE

SA	A	N	D	SD	NO 5
strongly	agree/	neutral	disagree/	strongly	no
agree/approve	approve		disapprove	disagree/disapprove	opinion

13. In one press pool expedition, difficulty in providing transport to front-line units was later characterized as censorship, as reporters were "kept" from the action. Fighting is underway in this scenario; the military has told your reporter there may be a delay in transport. Your option is to leave your reporter in place or to recall him/her home. Please check the block which most closely indicates your level of agreement/approval to the given period of delay:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
A HALF-HOUR	---	---	---	---	---	---	(51)
AN HOUR	---	---	---	---	---	---	(52)
2-5 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(53)
6-12 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(54)
13-24 HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(55)
1-2 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(56)
3-6 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(57)
7-11 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(58)
12-14 DAYS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(59)

CREDIBILITY

14. As perceived by the public, the level of news credibility seems to vary. Researchers have identified a number of attributes related to news credibility; these attributes include integrity, capability and accuracy. Please check the block which most closely indicates your assessment of the overall performance of reporters with respect to the attribute listed:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
INTEGRITY OF REPORTERS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(60)
CAPABILITY OF REPORTERS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(61)
ACCURACY OF REPORTERS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(62)

SURVEY CONCLUDES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE

SA	A	N	D	SD	NO 6
strongly	agree/		disagree/	strongly	no
agree/approve	approve	neutral	disapprove	disagree/disapprove	opinion

15. In Gulf War press pools, news passed through a series of gatekeepers: press escorts, and when involved, their Joint Information Bureau (JIB) superiors and government policymakers. Press escorts and JIB superiors varied in capability (the ability to do their jobs) and cooperation (willingness to do those jobs within the ground rules.) Policymakers' roles are also important; because they set the ground rules, their capability and cooperation with the media "set the stage" for news coverage. Please check the block which most closely indicates your assessment of the overall performance of the indicated group with respect to the attribute listed:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
CAPABILITY OF PRESS ESCORTS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(63)
COOPERATION OF PRESS ESCORTS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(64)
CAPABILITY OF JIB SUPERIORS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(65)
COOPERATION OF JIB SUPERIORS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(66)
CAPABILITY OF POLICYMAKERS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(67)
COOPERATION OF POLICYMAKERS	---	---	---	---	---	---	(68)

16. Finally, how would you rate the overall accuracy and credibility of Gulf War coverage? Please check the block which most closely indicates the level of your agreement/approval:

	SA	A	N	D	SD	NO	
ACCURACY OF THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE	---	---	---	---	---	---	(69)
OVERALL CREDIBILITY OF COVERAGE	---	---	---	---	---	---	(70)

INFORMATION ABOUT YOU

To provide demographic information on the managing editors surveyed, please complete the following questions:

- 17. YEAR BORN: _____ (71)
- 18. GENDER: (Circle One) MALE / FEMALE (72)
- 19. YEARS IN THE NEWSPAPER PROFESSION: _____ (73)
- 20. YEARS AS THE MANAGING EDITOR OF YOUR NEWSPAPER: _____ (74)
- 21. HAVE YOU SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: (Circle One) YES / NO (75)
(If your answer is "NO," please skip the remaining questions.)
- 22. IF SO, HOW LONG? _____ (76)
- 23. WHICH BRANCH? (Circle One) (77)
AIR FORCE ARMY COAST GUARD MARINE CORPS NAVY
- 24. HIGHEST RANK HELD? _____ (78)

This completes this survey of managing editors. Thank you for your participation. it is greatly appreciated

Appendix F

Postcard Reply
Enclosed with Main Survey Questionnaire

Jay C. Steuck
200 E. Southern Ave. #132
Tempe, AZ 85282-5144

I have returned my questionnaire separately.

your name
(please print)

Thanks again for your help with this important study. If you would like a copy of the completed study, please check this box and a copy will be sent to you when it is completed.

<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>

Appendix G

Postcard Follow-Up



USPS 131

March 27, 1992

Two weeks ago, a questionnaire seeking your opinion on the use of press pools was mailed to you. Your name was drawn from a nationwide list of newspaper editors.

If you have already completed and returned it, please accept our sincere thanks. If not, please do so today. Because it has been sent to a small sample of newspaper editors, it is extremely important that yours be returned to accurately represent the opinions of newspaper editors.

Sincerely,

Jay C. Steuck

Appendix H

War Coverage Guidelines

by Debra Gersh

Editor & Publisher, pp.18, 24

War coverage guidelines

After six months of talks, media and military agree on proposed principles for news coverage of battlefield operations

By Debra Gersh

The media and the military have agreed on nine of 10 principles proposed for news coverage of battlefield operations and have essentially agreed to disagree on the issue of prior review.

The principles agreed to are the result of about six months of talks between Washington, D.C.-based representatives of major news organizations and Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs Pete Williams.

The media representatives were Clark Hoyt, Knight-Ridder Newspapers bureau chief; Jonathan Wolman, bureau chief for the Associated Press; *Time* magazine bureau chief Stanley W. Cloud; Michael Getler, assistant managing editor/foreign, the *Washington Post*; and George Watson, ABC News bureau chief.

Following dissatisfaction with the military's relationship with reporters covering the Persian Gulf war, 17 news executives sent a report and a 10-point statement of principles to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in June 1991 (*E&P*, July 6, P. 7).

Other than some minor editing changes, the principles agreed to are basically the same as those originally proposed, with the exception of prior review.

As *E&P* went to press, the statement had been presented to and approved by other Washington bureau chiefs and was to be sent to the heads of their news organizations for approval. In addition, Cheney was to be sent a copy for his endorsement.

According to the new statement of principles, a copy of which was obtained by *E&P*, the media originally proposed that "News material — words and pictures — will not be subject to security review."

The Pentagon countered with "Military operational security may require review of news material for conformance to reporting ground rules."

After agreeing that they simply could not agree on the issue of prior review, both the news media and the Department of Defense includ-

ed statements explaining their positions.

The news media statement read, "The news organizations are convinced that journalists covering U.S. forces in combat must be mindful at all times of operational security and the safety of American lives. News organizations strongly believe that journalists will abide by clear operational security ground rules. Prior security review is unwarranted and unnecessary.

"We believe that the record in Operation Desert Storm, Vietnam, and other wars supports the conclusion that journalists in the battlefield can be trusted to act responsibly.

"We will challenge prior security review in the event that the Pentagon attempts to impose it in some future military operation," they stated.

The Pentagon, however, argued that the military "must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that could endanger troop safety or the success of a mission.

"Any review system would be imposed only when operational security is a consideration — for example, the very early stages of a contingency operation or sensitive periods in combat. If security review were imposed, it would be used for one very limited purpose: to prevent disclosure of information which, if published, would jeopardize troop safety or the success of a military operation. Such a review system would not be used to seek alterations in any other aspect of content or to delay timely transmission of news material.

"Security review," the Department of Defense continued, "would be performed by the military in the field, giving the commander's representative the opportunity to address potential ground rule violations. The reporter would either change the story to meet ground rule concerns and file it, or file it and flag for the editor whatever passages were in dispute. The editor would then call the Pentagon to give the

military one last chance to talk about potential ground rule violations.

"The Defense Department believes that the advantage of this system is that the news organization would retain control of the material throughout the review and filing process," it explained.

"The Pentagon would have two chances to address potential operational security violations, but the news organization would make the final decision about whether to publish the disputed information. Under principle four, violations of the ground rules could result in expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone."

The two sides found more common ground in the other nine principles. The Original and Revised points are as follows:

- **Original:** Independent reporting will be the principle means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

- **Revised:** Open and independent reporting will be the principle means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

- **Original:** The use of pools should be limited to the kind envisioned by the Sidle Commission. Pools are meant to bring a representative group of journalists along with the first elements of any major U.S. military operation. These pools should last no longer than the very first stages of deployment — the initial 24 hours to 36 hours — and should be disbanded rapidly in favor of independent coverage. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. forces.

- **Revised:** Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations, but pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity — within 24 to 36 hours when possible.

The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

- **Original:** Some pools may be appropriate for events or in places (See *GUIDELINES* on page 24)

IAPA

(Continued from page 23)

that "IAPA's response demonstrates to the U.S. newspaper industry that IAPA does care about free speech in the North, and that U.S. newspapers have a good reason for belonging to IAPA."

* * *

Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer addressed the opening IAPA session expressing his firm support for "freedom of expression in all its manifestations."

This was the fourth time that he has addressed an IAPA session since 1964. The president, who is blind, has been in office for four terms, not successive. His half-hour address was a tribute to freedom, concluding with a statement that "IAPA is a symbol of freedom—we don't all speak the same language but we understand the same language of freedom."

The president entertained the 160 delegates and guests of IAPA, plus the diplomatic corps, at a dinner at the Presidential Palace that evening.

* * *

Three newsmen provided an update on conditions in Haiti. Garry Pierre Pierre, a reporter for the *Sun-*

Sentinel, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., was born in Haiti and said he left there 12 years ago. The situation is very volatile, scary, and sad, he said. No one apparently is in charge, the military profits by the instability, and 80% of the people would leave if they could.

Kevin Noblet, AP Caribbean correspondent, who has spent eight weeks in four visits in Haiti since the coup, said the suppression of human rights is obvious. The people are thoroughly frightened and the police act with impunity, sometimes executing with summary justice on the streets.

Nathanial Sheppard Jr., *Chicago Tribune*, told of a hair-raising experience trying to cover events in a remote village when he and other journalists were apprehended and threatened with death by a roving band. They were rescued by soldiers.

Noblet thought the chances for President Aristede's return to office are practically nil short of a popular uprising. Pierre said there is not much to be gained by his return because the damage to the country has already been done. Sheppard felt the OAS must bring about his return or appear to be just a paper tiger.

Noblet said that everyone has been trying unsuccessfully to find examples of repression and persecution

of the returned refugees.

* * *

Robert S. Pastorino, U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, gave tribute to a free press, saying that "societies with a watchdog press have far more accountable governments. . . . The choice between a decent standard of living and the state of being fully informed is spurious. The most prosperous societies in the twentieth century are also those with the richest sources of information and the fewer restrictions on what may be printed or broadcast."

He complimented the press of the Dominican Republic "on the role it has played in the steady progress toward institutionalizing democratic processes over the past three decades."

* * *

The Future Sites Committee confirmed that the 1992 IAPA General Assembly will be held in Madrid, Spain, Sept. 28 to Oct. 1 at the Palace Hotel in celebration of the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' voyage of discovery.

The next midyear meeting of the board of directors will be held in Miami, Fla., in the spring of 1993 and the General Assembly will be held in the fall at Bariloche, Argentina, at dates to be announced.

Guidelines

(Continued from page 18)

where open coverage is physically impossible, but the existence of such special-purpose pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage. If news organizations are able to cover pooled events independently, they may do so.

Revised: Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

• **Original:** Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security guidelines that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the guidelines can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone.

Revised: Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of

the ground rules can result in suspension of the credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations. . . .

• **Original:** Journalists will be provided access to all major military units.

Revised: Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

• **Original:** Military public affairs offices should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

Revised: Same.

• **Original:** The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools. Field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and transport whenever feasible.

Revised: Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever possible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

• **Original:** The military will sup-

ply public affairs officers with timely, secure, compatible transmission facilities for pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available and will not be prevented from doing so.

Revised: Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

• **Original:** These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing Department of Defense National Media Pool system.

Revised: Same.